The decision on the adoption of the Armata tank should be consistent with the positive results of state tests (GI). These tests are carried out in order to verify and confirm the compliance of the combat, technical and operational characteristics of the new tank with the requirements of the tactical and technical specifications (TTZ) for the conditions of contactless wars. Tests are organized by the customer responsible for their conduct.
The main feature of contactless wars is the defeat of our tanks on long-distance approaches. In this case, strikes will be applied by various ammunition to the least protected roof of the armored vehicle. Simultaneously, the enemy will use the microwave weapon, allowing to apply electronic strikes to disable the on-board information management system and other electronics of the tank "Armata", which will drastically reduce its combat capability. These features of contactless wars should be reflected in the TTZ for the development of a new tank, and in the GI program should contain the relevant test sections. The outdated Soviet-era GI methodology (see NVO, No.13, 2008; No.10, 2012) is unsuitable for testing the combat characteristics of the new Armata tank as applied to contactless wars.
ON MODEL MODERN BATTLE
Recently, the media paid considerable attention to the problem of the development of domestic armored vehicles. It is known that last year technical specifications were approved for the creation of a family of combat vehicles based on the Armata single platform. The General Staff also approved an appropriate program for the development of a new tank, infantry fighting vehicles and other vehicles for arming tank and motorized rifle brigades of the Ground Forces. The new tank "Armata" is planned to be commissioned in the 2015 year.
At the same time, statements, the articles of military leaders and specialists of the Uralvagonzavod research and production corporation, as well as the management of VNIItransmash, OJSC, do not link the characteristics of new armored vehicles to the conditions of contactless wars. The manipulation of technical characteristics (armored protection, firepower, mobility), which do not take into account the conditions of contactless wars, continues.
It can be foreseen that in non-contact wars the tank brigade will operate under the following conditions. Foreign space satellites of radar reconnaissance will detect “Armata” tanks even in the dark and in dense clouds. Their coordinates will be transmitted to ground and air weapons. The use of fire weapons will be preceded by an electronic strike based on the use of microwave radio emissions in order to disable key elements of on-board information control systems (CICS), active protection systems (KAZ) installed on Armata tanks, and electronics of military air defense systems, accompanying on the march and in combat conditions these machines.
An electronic strike will be followed by an attack by tactical missiles of the Ground Forces and ATACMS missiles (MLRS MLRS) with cluster warheads equipped with self-aiming (SPBE) and homing (SNBE) combat elements. Long-range anti-tank weapons will be simultaneously deployed aviation, artillery, which requires the availability of highly effective mobile air defense systems of short range and short range. Part of the tanks will be destroyed before approaching the line of contact. Bursts that break through will be fired by ATGM, BPS and RPGs. These conditions should be considered in the GI program. Since the existing methods of conducting the GI to the full do not allow testing of the Armata tank, the creation of new methods is required.
NEW METHODS FOR CARRYING OUT OF ATTECTS
The program and methods of GI are developed on the basis of TTZ and design documentation. If the program GI takes into account the conditions of contactless wars, then the following methods are required.
The first should be “The method of checking in typical combat situations the visibility (probability of detection) of Armata tanks by enemy radar reconnaissance satellites and other means of detection.” What we have today on this issue? The role of the “Cape” created by the Steel Research Institute using radio-absorbing and heat-insulating materials is still a mystery when our tanks are detected by foreign radar reconnaissance satellites and long-range radar detection aircraft (AWACS). No full test of the "Cape" was carried out, so it is necessary to establish the fact that Russian radar satellites of the reconnaissance brigade of our tanks equipped with the "Cape" detected.
It is known that the "Cape" was sold abroad, so we can assume that foreign organizations conducted large-scale tests of the "Cape" using reconnaissance satellites and DRLO aircraft.
In addition to passive means using radio-absorbing and heat-insulating materials, it is necessary to create active devices that block the functioning of foreign reconnaissance satellites. In this case, the methodology should be the appropriate section of the test.
The President, Director of Science at the Scientific Research Institute of Steel, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Valery Grigoryan noted: “At present, it is necessary to apply large-scale efforts for conspicuity, since its further disregard makes the maintenance of tank fleets senseless because of their inability to conduct any serious military operations. 10 years have passed since then, and things are still there.
INSPECTION OF BIUS RESISTANCE
The second is the “Method of testing the resistance of the BIUS, KAZ and other radio-electronic means of the Armata tank from the effects of the enemy's microwave weapons”. Microwave weapons can have a disastrous effect on the electronics of the Armata tank, damaging and destroying electronic circuits (see “NVO” No. XXUMX, 13). It can affect electronics even when it is turned off. The defeat of microwave weapons, for example, the main element of the KAZ - a radar station detecting and tracking flying ammunition to the Armata tank ensures its reliable destruction of the ATGM with self-guided and self-propelled combat elements of aviation and artillery ammunition and rounds of anti-tank grenade launchers.
At the same time, when checking the improvement of electronics installed on the Armata tank, in terms of protection against electronic shocks, a microwave weapon simulator with characteristics corresponding to promising foreign models is required. It is alarming to use in the electronic filling of the Armata tank and in the military air defense system (protecting Armata) imported elements, which will not make it possible to increase the durability of these systems from electronic impact.
“The method of assessing the security of the Armata tank when exposed to anti-tank weapons” is very important. It can be assumed that with the mass of the Armata 50 t (see fig. 1), the lower (1) and upper (2) frontal armor resistance and frontal armor of the tower will not exceed the armor-piercing projectile projectile (BPS) 600 mm , and for cumulative ammunition - 700 mm. The armor resistance of the 600 mm barrier for BPS means that this projectile with 600 mm armor penetration capability does not penetrate this barrier. At the same time, it is known that the armor penetration capability of foreign BPS DМ43 (Germany), М829А2 (USA) and others at a distance of 2 km exceeds the armor resistance of “Armata”. Therefore, it can be expected that the protection of the frontal zones of the hull and turret of the Armata tank will be enhanced by installing the Relict (5) complex, which, according to the developers, functions against modern tandem cumulative ammunition and BPS.
In the well-known metropolitan newspaper, it is reported that the basis of the Relikt complex is a new element of dynamic protection (EDS) 4-23 with a new composition of explosives. But the effectiveness of the DZ depends also on its design, and not only on the EHL. Overcoming the remote control "Relikt" can be accomplished with the aid of a shot-up precharge, having armor penetration 400 – 450 mm and providing detonation of two explosive layers (see “NVO” No. 45, 2011). Foreign experts own shooting precharges tandem warhead ATGM. Thus, the NOT2T rocket (FRG), which was put into service in 1992, provided for pre-charge shooting, which indicates the great potential of foreign experts in creating tandem warheads for reliably overcoming Relic.
With the weight of the tank "Armata" 50 t it is difficult to expect an increase in the reservation of the roof (4), sides and bottom. Obviously, the thickness of the roof armor will not exceed 50 mm, and the sides - 70 mm. On the whole, passive booking of the roof and sides in combination with the Relic Reactor will not provide reliable protection for the Armata tank. For this reason, a high level of reliability and effectiveness of the KAZ and military air defense in repelling attacks of long-range aviation and artillery anti-tank weapons is required.
Particular attention should be paid to foreign long-range anti-tank aircraft acting on the Armata tank from the upper hemisphere, which include the third generation of anti-tank anti-aircraft systems (“shot-forgotten”) AGM-114L “Hellfire” (USA), “Brimstone” ( UK) and PARS 3LR (FRG). The armor penetration rate of the main charge of the tandem warhead of these missiles is 1200 mm. The maximum firing range of the Hellfire and PARS 3LR is 8 km, and Brimstone is 10 km. The aircraft of the US Army in the 2016 year should come JAGM ATGM, in which the maximum firing range from a helicopter will be 16 km, and from an airplane - 28 km. The JAGM ATGM should replace the AGM-65 Maverick, AGM-114 Hellfire and BGM-71 Tou missiles in service.
Over the past two decades, various publications have been advertising complexes that increase the security of Russian tanks. These complexes should prevent the second-generation anti-tank missiles from getting into the armored vehicle (Blind optoelectronic suppression system, the life cycle of which ended long ago due to the adoption of foreign third-generation missiles with radar and thermal homing). Complexes must strike flying anti-tank ammunition, including from above (the Arena active defense complex does not intercept BPS and attack nuclei). Finally, drastically reduce the armor-piercing action of cumulative ammunition and BPS. Landmark mounted complexes - “Kontakt”, built-in - “Kontakt-V”, universal - “Relikt” had shortened life cycles. They ended in connection with the adoption of weapons of ammunition capable of overcoming these complexes.
It would seem that the eternal problem of “projectile-armor” has acquired new outlines. The active struggle with anti-tank ammunition begins when you approach the armored vehicle and continues until the beginning of direct interaction with the tank's armor. But, unfortunately, the emergence of new anti-tank weapons today overtakes ongoing measures to protect tanks.
Ten years ago, Valeriy Grigoryan, summing up the activities of steel research institutes in the article below, noted: “Today, the institute has developed a universal protection for frontal projections of the Relikt tank, which has anti-tandem properties and exceeds the standard“ Contact- V ”five to six times. Also, the sides and the tank were protected from above from monoblock and tandem anti-tank grenades and light ATGMs when fired at normal. The so-called electromagnetic protection against mines and warheads of anti-tank guided missiles with magnetometric fuses and collective, local and individual protection of the crew against secondary fragments have been developed. “But of the above devices, only dynamic protection Relikt was adopted in 2006.
Valery Grigoryan's message about the protection of the roof and sides of the tank from monoblock and tandem RPG shots and light ATGMs during normal shelling can be perceived as very outdated. In service of the aviation of the Land Forces of Germany ATGM PARS 3 LR is from 2008 year. This rocket can be programmed to strike at an Armat tank from above with a meeting angle close to 90 degrees. With the 8 km firing range and the armor penetration capacity of the 1200 tandem warhead, the roof of the Armata tank (4) will be broken even if the Relic is mounted on it. At the same time, the overhead effect of the cumulative jet can be assessed by breaking through the armor plates 200 – 300 mm thick. In this case, a protective capsule (8) will not save the crew and equipment from destruction.
The need to protect the roof of tanks in scientific research institutes has been felt for a long time, but still our tanks remain virtually unprotected by the engine-transmission compartment and the roof of the tower, on which are mounted hinged DZ blocks that do not provide reliable protection against modern foreign anti-tank weapons. This policy has been retained since 1983, when there was a danger of top-down aviation cluster-type cumulative elements with 200 mm armor penetration.
In 1983, the All-Russian Research Institute of Steel organized an inspection of the protection of the roof of a promising foreign tank with the help of a simulator, the design of which is shown in Fig. 2. During the experiments, aviation cumulative 2,5 KO cassette elements were used, which were installed at the following meeting angle values from the normal to the upper surface of the simulator: 0, 30, 45, 60 degrees. To determine zabronevogo action for the simulator installed a package of thin armor plates. Depths of penetration of cumulative jets into these armor plates determined the armor ‑ action. For the angles 0 and 30 degrees, the depth of penetration of the cumulative jets were 32 and 17, respectively, mm. At the corners of 45 and 60 degrees, the supergrade action was absent. Only such a super-dangerous action can save the crew of “Almaty”, which is in a special capsule.
To date, the results of research institutes of steel on armor and dynamic protection of our tanks were obtained using analogues of foreign ammunition, which was taken as the Soviet ATGM, RPG shots with 700 mm armor penetration, as well as BNP 3BM22 (armor penetration - 170 mm / 60 deg.). ) and 3BM42 (armor penetration - 220 mm / 60 degrees.). Today, these characteristics of foreign ammunition have increased significantly. Thus, the armor penetration of foreign tandem warheads of the AGM AGM-114L Hellfire, Brimstone and others is 1200 mm, and the armor penetration of the BPS DM43 (core material is from a tungsten alloy) is 350 mm / 60 deg. The tandem warheads of the Kornet and Chrysanthem ATGMs can be taken as analogues of modern foreign vehicles, which are advisable to use in static explosions in fragments of frontal protection of the Armat tank. But with analogs of foreign BPS things are very bad. For evaluation of armor resistance of the new tank BPS 3BM42 (armor penetration - 220 mm / 60 degrees) and 3БМ48 (300 mm / 60 degrees) are not suitable. In other words, there is no analogue of a foreign BPS to check the armor protection of the Armat tank.
MISSILE ARTILLERY ARMAMENT
One of the most important is the “Method of assessing the effectiveness of the Armata’s missile and artillery armament”. It can be expected that an 135-mm smoothbore gun - launcher (3) with a host of associated problems will be installed on the Armata tank. One of them is the production of barrels of tank guns with spatial curvature and low durability. These drawbacks double the drop in BPS speed at a distance of 2 km compared to foreign models. The curvature of the trunk also increases the dispersion of BPS and reduces the likelihood of hitting the target. Thus, the production of high-quality barrels of tank guns remains an unresolved problem for our defense industry.
The decision to install the 135-mm cannon on the Armata tank can only be considered an attempt to achieve the level of BPS armor penetration characteristic of foreign 120-mm artillery systems of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and France. Back in the late 80-x - the beginning of the 90-s, these countries carried out research and development to create 140-mm guns and BPS. The demonstration firing witnessed an increase in the armor penetration of 140-mm BPS by 40% compared with the armor-penetrating 120-mm BPS. But since foreign tank 120-mm guns still have sufficient potential to destroy Russian tanks, their life cycle continues.
The use of an ATGM fired from a barrel in an Armata tank seems to increase the target's range. However, according to employees of 38 Research Institute of Defense, Doctor of Technical Sciences Grigory Golovochev, Colonel Candidate of Technical Sciences Alexey Shevchenko, Colonel, Candidate of Technical Sciences Vladimir Shirobokov, a deterrent to the effectiveness of the use of ATGM is that in real combat the probability of direct visibility at distances greater than 2500 m, very insignificant ("Military Thought", № 1, 2012). In addition, our design bureau cannot create a third-generation ATGM.
With regard to anti-tank ammunition, this technique in the framework of the GI provides for obtaining experimentally the characteristics of armor-piercing and zabronevy actions. After that, the probability of destruction of a typical foreign tank is determined with the help of the System of Initial Data on the Vulnerability Characteristics of Typical Elementary Ground Armored Targets and the Defective Action of Anti-Tank Ammunition But the aforementioned Soviet LED does not contain the characteristics of the vulnerability of a typical foreign tank, defined and justified from a series of tanks M1А2 SEP, Leopard-2А6, Leclerc-2, М1А3 (see “NVO”, 28, 2011, М401.1.6А454 (see “NVO”, 85, XNUMX, МXNUMXАXNUMX) At the same time, experimentally obtained characteristics of armor piercing and zabronevy actions were previously carried out using simulators of the frontal (most protected) zones of foreign tanks, which were manufactured in accordance with the guidelines (RD XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX) "Composition of complex barriers for assessing the armor-piercing action of anti-tank ammunition" . This outdated taxiway does not reflect the latest protection achievements in foreign tank building. The absence of modern LEDs and taxiways, taking into account the development of foreign tank building, will not allow to give a reliable assessment of the missile and artillery armament of the tank "Armata".
INFORMATION TO THOUGHT
Tank "Armata" is created in the period of the advanced level of development of foreign technologies of reconnaissance, guidance and delivery of new small-sized with low radar visibility of guided anti-tank weapons operating on long-distance approaches from the least protected upper hemisphere of armored vehicles. In the conditions of the sixth generation of wars, the tank brigade can suffer heavy losses even at far approaches. In contactless wars, a new tactic of dealing with armored vehicles on long-range approaches can be seen by shelling the least protected roofs of armored vehicles. In the combat zone, the Armata tanks will no longer be attacked by old foreign tactical aircraft F-15, F-16 and A-10; Maverick missiles, which are planning to use Walley air bombs (see “NVO” No. 44, 2007). They will be replaced by small-sized high-speed anti-tank ammunition. In this situation, an Arena-type KAZ will no longer fully protect the Armata tank, for example, from SPBE with a warhead on the principle of a shock core. At the same time, in Germany, a KAZ is created for the Leopard-2А6 tank, which should provide protection against artillery and aviation munitions from SNBE, SPb by jamming their guidance systems and destroying them on the approach to armored vehicles at 20 – 150 m in the upper hemisphere. - 25 – 250 m.
The lag in the parameters of the domestic KAZ should be compensated by increasing the effectiveness of the action of the short-range and short-range air defense systems in the fight against promising anti-tank weapons. Unfortunately, this problem is not given due attention.
The article does not reflect the entire scope of work that must be carried out to ensure the GI of the Armata tank with appropriate methods, material and technical and metrological support of the tests. Much work should be done to substantiate and manufacture simulators for the protection of a typical foreign tank, as well as to select standard analogues of foreign ammunition intended to destroy the Armata tank. The main thing is not to repeat the main mistake of the past: to evaluate the protection of the Armata tank with old Soviet ammunition.