Attack on US military installations in Syria. Successful actions of Iranian UAVs with the information support of the Russian Aerospace Forces
A strike carried out a few days earlier by a squad of five kamikaze UAVs on the barracks and outbuildings of the US Army and the ILC, as well as the infrastructure of the Magavir al-Saura militia in a 55-kilometer "security zone" near Al-Tanf in the south of the Syrian province of Homs continues to remain in the focus of increased attention of both domestic and foreign military-analytical portals.
Such a high level of relevance in the above segment of the media space, this event is due to several interesting nuances of an operational-tactical and military-political nature.
The latter, in turn, testify to the maximum scrupulousness in the elaboration of each stage of this air operation with the use of modern specialized optical-electronic, radar and radio-technical reconnaissance means, which are not at the disposal of the regular Shiite paramilitary units in the territories of the SAR and Iraq.
Low-altitude modes of use of Iranian kamikaze UAVs in the course of striking the military infrastructure of the US Army and ILCM near Et-Tanf ensured overcoming the A2 / AD anti-aircraft zone formed by the Patriot PAC-3MSE complexes
In particular, 5 drones-kamikaze (including, apparently, drones of the Qasif-K2 and Samad-3 line) were able to absolutely unhindered overcome the anti-aircraft zone of restriction and prohibition of access and maneuver A2 / AD, erected over the 55-kilometer "security zone" and Al-Tanf by means of a battery Patriot PAC-3MSE multi-channel anti-missile system, which has a multi-functional target designation-guidance radar based on the AN / MPQ-53/65 passive phased array with the ability to detect targets with an ultra-low RCS of about 0,02–0,05 square meters. m at a distance of 45–80 km.
Moreover, the division could well have been assigned a multifunctional radar of the decimeter S-band AN / TPS-75 Tipsy, capable of performing all-round visibility in standby mode.
The use of this radar could be required in the case when the single battery AN / TPQ-53/65 radar of the Patriot complex is either deactivated and is inactive to prevent the aimless exhaustion of the operational resource (time between failures of the microwave klystron and arrays of transmitting and receiving PFAR modules) , or monitors the 90-degree azimuth sector in another missile-hazardous aerospace direction.
After all, it is well known that the MPQ-53/65 family of radar does not function in the all-aspect all-round mode.
But the TPS-75 (and possibly other auxiliary radar target designation systems or electronic reconnaissance systems capable of detecting and accompanying UAVs, or bearing them according to the radiation of the antenna of the asynchronous data exchange / telemetry module) could not cover American military objects from Iranian drones -kamikaze.
Analyzing the above circumstances, a number of very interesting conclusions can be drawn.
First of all, this is the construction of the most optimal ultra-low-altitude flight routes for attacking UAVs, taking into account the tactical and technical shortcomings of both the AN / MPQ-53/65 multifunctional guidance / targeting radars and AN / TPS-75 radar detectors known in the knowledgeable circles.
We are talking about limited minimum elevation angles (the lower limits of the elevation sector of view), which are 1 degree for the AN / MPQ-65 and 0,5 degrees for the Tipsy, which allows the former to detect, "tie tracks" and "capture" airborne objects on heights of 30 m or more, and the second - about 20 m.
As a result, the ultra-low-altitude flight of drones 15 m from the earth's surface completely ruled out their confident detection and tracking by means of the above-mentioned radars of the duty and combat modes of the Patriot PAC-3MSE complex.
It is worth noting that, for example, the passive HEADLIGHTS of the domestic all-altitude detector VVO 96L6 and the medium / low-altitude detector 48Ya6-K1 "Podlet-K1" heights of 3–2 m or above lowlands (well below the position of the radar data deployed on an elevated area of the terrain).
Moreover, the presence in the eastern part of this desert region of Homs governorate of a vast low-lying area of relief, well known to operators of kamikaze drones, could contribute to even more effective concealment of "creeping" drones, due to the use of the effect of the so-called "terrain screen", which limits the formation of meter, decimeter and centimeter radar diagrams.
In the same turn, it is well known that the MIM-104F missile-guided missile interceptors of the Patriot PAC-3MSE anti-missile systems have high-energy active millimeter-wave Ka-band radar seeker, which have receivers of an asynchronous two-way data exchange line with third-party ground, ship and air radar and optical - electronic intelligence of the Armed Forces and NATO Joint Armed Forces.
Using these receiving modules ARGSN missiles MIM-104F PAC-3MSE could receive target designation for approaching Iranian kamikaze drones from AWACS AWACS aircraft, strategic radio and electronic reconnaissance aircraft RC-135V / W Block 8 Rivet Joint and even radars AN / APG-81 fighters of the F-35A / B / C family (by means of retransmission by the command and control center EOC / IBCS), after which the UAV could be intercepted even with the inactivity of the AN / MPQ-53/65 divisional radar and beyond the radio horizon.
But this did not happen, since neither the E-3C / G Sentry nor the tactical aviation US Air Force capable of detecting these drones at a distance of about 75-100 km.
Obviously, information about the most acceptable time period for this strike to the command post of one of the UAV squadrons of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps could be transmitted either by the operators of the Shmel-M radar of the RLDN A-50U aircraft, or by the operators of the 96L6 surveillance radar assigned to the Syrian air defense missile launcher S-300PM2, deployed near Masyaf.
Completeness of the picture is given by the fact that the strike on the 55-kilometer "security zone" followed literally exactly after the use of the airspace over this area by the F-16I Sufa crews to launch Delilah-AL tactical missiles at the T4 airbase of the Syrian Air Force, where garrison of the paramilitary unit of the IRGC "Al-Quds".
In light of the strengthening and intensification of military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Tehran, achieved during negotiations between the Chief of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Mohammad Bagheri and the head of the Russian defense department Sergei Shoigu, this operation by the IRGC, carried out not without information support from the Russian Aerospace Forces, is a very symbolic demonstration to the Pentagon and Tel Aviv of the spectrum of consequences that will be fraught with any attempts to trample Iran's interests in the Near East region.
Information