Army of the future: SS troops and special forces

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Army of the future: SS troops and special forces
Servicemen of the "Dead's Head" division of the SS troops in the USSR in 1941

Innovators


The French made their main bet on the "Maginot Line" - a powerful line of fortifications on the border with Germany. The French generals assumed that the Germans would not be able to overcome it, at this time France would mobilize all forces, receive help from England, and a trench war would begin again, as during the First World War. The Nazis beat the enemy's headquarters with a blitzkrieg strategy, mobile formations simply bypassed the most powerful fortified areas of the enemy, broke through to the rear, and caused a wave of panic and horror. As a result, the French garrisons surrendered already in the deep rear of the German army, or the fighting was going far away from the French strongholds.

The Russians had little or no experience of fighting a modern, high-tech enemy before the start of the Wehrmacht invasion. In the Civil War, they fought with their own, aircraft and tanks there were few, the main role in the offensive, the breakthroughs of the front was played by the cavalry. The war with Poland was also fought and ended in defeat. In the 1929 operation on the Chinese Eastern Railway, we had to deal with weak Chinese troops. In Spain, the enemy was serious - the Italians and the Germans, but not the entire army was tested there, but only a group of military experts. The conflict on Lake Hassan with the Japanese was minor.



Only on Khalkhin Gol in the summer of 1939 did Soviet (Russian) troops collide with a modern army, which had a lot of aircraft, armored vehicles and artillery. The Japanese army was well trained, disciplined, and had extensive military experience. The Japanese in the Mongol steppes were utterly defeated, and as a result, the Japanese ruling elite decided that it was necessary to first solve the problem of defeating the enemy and seizing resources in the southern seas, and only then go to beat the northern barbarians.

Khalkhin-Gol made Soviet generals self-confident. Like, "the armor is strong, and our tanks are fast." Everyone believed that we would beat the enemy on his territory, and victory would come with little bloodshed.

Although, already in the battle with the Japanese army, the mistakes of the Red Army were noted: the Japanese at first dominated the sky and calmly bombed our troops; control of the battle on our side was unsatisfactory, interaction was not established; arriving troops and reserves were thrown into battle in units; mistakes of some led to unjustified losses of others (the heroism of some is a consequence of the negligence and stupidity of others). Obviously, the Wehrmacht would not forgive the Russians for such mistakes.

And so it happened in the harsh months of 1941-1942.

The war with Finland made its own adjustments. However, the enemy was defeated, the strategic task of strengthening the defense of the northwestern part of the country and Leningrad was solved. Therefore, the overestimation of their strengths remained.

Thus, the Westerners, that the Russians fought according to the old schemes, believed in the "lines of Maginot, Molotov and Stalin", in the number of tanks and aircraft. The Germans severely punished us for this. We were shown a new war, swift, with excellent interaction of armored forces, aviation, artillery, intelligence and special forces.


German paratroopers unload a BMW R-12 motorcycle from a Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft in Crete. May 52

Wehrmacht soldiers


Since the 1920s, the Germans abandoned the traditional methods of training soldiers, did not torture them with marches, drill and kitchen outfits. Therefore, Hitler's army was qualitatively different for the better, even from the Kaiser's army, which was very good and powerful. She was imbued with the philosophy of invincibility, self-confidence, which was proven in the Polish, Norwegian, French, Yugoslav and other campaigns. Swift and victorious. The army was confident in its strengths, commanders, commanders.

The soldiers had comfortable uniforms and equipment. Wehrmacht soldiers were taught to fight, they were not peacetime soldiers, but fighters. They were given as many cartridges as they wanted to shoot. They learned to drive motorcycles, cars, armored personnel carriers. Handle the radio. That is, what was taught in other armies only in special, special units.

The secret of the German Lightning War lies in the excellent interaction of different types of troops. German veterans in their memoirs praised the Luftwaffe more than once. They cleared the way for tanks and infantry at the beginning of the war, smashed defensive positions and columns of the enemy trying to counterattack or retreat to new positions. The German Air Force remained operational until the very end of the war, supporting and rescuing its infantry. All this is the result of exercises in peacetime!


German paratroopers and a group of captured British soldiers in Crete. May 1941

Elite - SS troops


The Wehrmacht was not enough for Hitler.

He created a "reserve army" - the SS troops. First, as "security detachments" (German SS, abbr. From German Schutzstaffeln "guard detachments"), then as a full-fledged, elite army.

One of the creators and leaders of the SS troops, General Paul Hausser (Gausser), prepared his troops for quick attacks. Such an approach, according to Hausser's aide, Colonel Felix Steiner, requires "a flexible, adaptable type of soldier, physically strong, with increased endurance."

Most of the candidates who entered the cadet schools had already been selected by the SA, SS or Gestapo, were recommended by their commanders. First, the cadets learned to master weapons, underwent physical training (obstacle course), etc. Then they studied at a higher level, including field communications, interaction between infantry and artillery, landing on the enemy's coast, received the ability to command small units. The goal was to train independent, proactive leaders, the future elite of the Third (world) Reich.

Thus, the SS troops were solving two main tasks.

Along with the previous army, a new one was created, even more modernized, with increased mobility and combat capability, personally loyal to the Fuhrer, ready to carry out any order and die for the leader.

At the same time, an alternative mechanism for the formation of the Reich elite was created. The bravest people, loyal to the idea and the Fuhrer, were promoted to the top, regardless of their origin. Thanks to the SS, the masters and officers of the new German Empire could become not only people from the aristocracy, the Prussian "military bone", the propertied classes, but also the children of workers, peasants and employees. The influx of "fresh blood" is a very good remedy for the decay of the elite.

From 1934, cadets-cadets began to be selected for the first SS officer school at Bad Tölz Castle in the Bavarian Alps. The future SS commanders, the elite of the Reich, were greeted not by dull barracks, but by the most beautiful places in Europe. Physical development went along with intellectual, aesthetic development. The cadets studied ideology, music, aristocratic etiquette. They were heavily involved in athletics and going out to the field. The castle had a football stadium, athletics grounds, halls for boxing, gymnastics, fencing, a swimming pool and a sauna. Physical culture developed courage, strength, dexterity, discipline, independence, aggressiveness (belligerence) and team spirit. Here cadres were forged, capable of leading others. Subsequently, such SS schools appeared in other places.


"Pope" of the SS troops, the commander of the SS division "Das Reich" SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser (1880-1972)

Speed, mobility and power


General Hausser and his assistant Steiner were not pure theorists. They had behind them the experience of the First World War, the creation of assault groups. Steiner commanded assault groups and already then developed a methodology for training personnel, which later became a model for all SS troops.

Based on his military experience, Steiner developed a concept for the development of the armed forces of the future. He believed that the war of the future would be completely different from the First World War. It will be a fast and transient war, where the speed of action, communications, technical equipment and the professionalism of the soldiers will decide everything. The main role will be played not by multi-million armies, but by small mobile, well-armed and specially trained strike units. They will break through the enemy's defenses with quick blows, block it and destroy it.

In 1936, Steiner took command of the SS Deutschland Regiment and began to put his theory into practice. He created combat mobile groups, armed them with submachine guns (automatic), supplied them with a large number of grenades. This increased the unit's firepower.

The SS fighters received colorful camouflage suits, which were not in the Wehrmacht, for which they received the nickname "tree frogs". In the SS troops, they did not increase the distinction between soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, but retained iron discipline. It was in the SS troops that the junior ranks addressed the elders only by rank, without adding, as in the army, the word "master". This gave an excellent result, a fighting brotherhood was created. The first SS divisions were distinguished by their high cohesion and combat effectiveness. Steiner later commanded the SS Viking Division, 3rd SS Panzer Corps.

During World War II, Hausser commanded the 2nd SS Panzer Division "Reich", then took command of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps as part of three SS Panzer divisions - "Leibstandart SS Adolf Hitler", "Reich" and "Death's Head". In 1944 he commanded the 7th Army, Army Groups Upper Rhine and G on the Western Front.

Thus, the SS troops could become the army of the future "eternal Reich". Their training system is similar to that of modern special operations forces. At the same time, the Germans created SS troops before they began to form special forces in other countries.


Officers of the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking" in a communications armored personnel carrier during the fighting near the village of Wilanow in eastern Poland. 1944 g.

Reich saboteurs and special forces


The Germans overtook the whole world in the creation of special forces, sabotage groups.

They were the first to discard the old "knightly" rules of war and merge intelligence with special forces. Today, special forces are an integral part of the armed forces. But at the beginning of World War II, everything was different, sabotage was considered an unworthy, uncivilized method of war.

In Britain, the Special Operations Directorate was created in 1940. Then special actions were called "irregular". Initiative and planning were the business of the chiefs of intelligence in the Navy, the Army, and the Special Intelligence Service. However, obtaining permission for such operations was difficult. The top leadership of Britain enjoyed the fruits of such operations with pleasure, but they were in no hurry to take responsibility for them. Even Churchill resorted to such special operations only as a last resort, often meeting opposition from the Foreign Ministry and the Treasury. It was also necessary to obtain permission from the naval command, and the admirals were always afraid of responsibility.

As a result, the British lagged well behind the Germans in this area.

The Nazis created the secret administration Abwehr-2 in 1938.

The Abwehr trained saboteurs to be deployed behind enemy lines, planned and carried out terrorist acts and sabotage, and trained insurgents to operate behind enemy lines. Units were also formed, which recruited Volksdeutsch - ethnic Germans who were born and raised abroad and representatives of national minorities. For example, Western Ukrainian nationalists.

The Abwehr trained future insurgents, the "fifth column" behind enemy lines. German saboteurs showed themselves well in the Polish campaign in 1939. In 1940, the Brandenburg special regiment was created. The special forces of the regiment, which was then deployed into a division, during 1940-1944 took part in sabotage and reconnaissance operations on almost all fronts. Overall, the operations were successful.

Thus, the Nazis were ahead of the whole world in creating a full-fledged special forces and thereby gained a great advantage over their opponents.


German tankers at the Pz. Kpfw. V Ausf. A "Panther" from the SS "Viking" division at a training ground in Poland. 1944 year

Soviet Russia


It is worth noting that the Soviet Union, which has vast experience in irregular, partisan warfare during the Troubles of 1917-1921, could well have outstripped Germany in this matter. Until the end of the 30s, we had sabotage and partisan detachments in the western border districts, aimed at partisan activities behind enemy lines that invaded our lands. It was precisely determined that the best targets for attacks by flying partisan detachments were the communication routes of the enemy army, fuel depots.

The special forces guerrillas were trained very well: topography, explosives, driving cars, parachuting, tactics of a small group, etc. Weapons, ammunition, explosives, and equipment were put into hiding places. Saboteurs-paratroopers were also trained to be thrown into the enemy's rear. It was planned to create special forces under Soviet intelligence.

That is, Russia was objectively ahead of the Germans in the creation of special forces, and the British, Americans and French were generally far behind in this important matter.

However, in 1937-1938, partisan-sabotage detachments and groups were disbanded, caches and caches were liquidated, many experienced personnel were repressed.

The fact is that there was a struggle for power. Stalin eliminated the "fifth column", the Trotskyists (How Stalin defeated the "fifth column" and saved the people from defeat in the Great Patriotic War). Obviously, the conspirators were also among the military elite. The fall of every Trotskyist, revolutionary internationalist was accompanied by the cleansing of his entourage and team.

The skating rink of repression also went through special units, since their command cadres were selected and placed by the former military elite. And the special units seemed to be a very dangerous tool, suitable for a military coup.

In addition, a new military doctrine was adopted - a war with little blood on foreign territory. The stake is on large mechanized, air and airborne formations. Partisan, sabotage actions on their territory were not envisaged. The idea of ​​the participation of special forces in the offensive did not come up.

True, the war with Finland has already shown the vital necessity of special forces. From the volunteers, they began to create ski units that raided the Finnish rear, fought against the "cuckoos". In 1940, an old military expert, a participant in the war in Spain, Khadzhi Mansurov, proposed creating special units in the army, in each district. His sensible proposal was not supported.

Only the head of the NKVD, Lavrenty Beria, moved the matter off the ground. In general, this person did a lot for the Motherland, but, unfortunately, he was completely blackened, demonized (The black myth of the "bloody executioner" Beria; Part 2). Already before the war itself, in June 1941, Beria ordered the creation of a reconnaissance and sabotage apparatus. Our intelligence star Pavel Sudoplatov was entrusted with this matter.

So, thanks to various "perestroika", by the beginning of the war we did not have a single special forces. And the Germans, having shown intelligence and resourcefulness, used our and their experience (partisans in Africa during the First World War), created the troops of the future, special forces, special operations forces.
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  1. +12
    21 October 2021 05: 49
    by the beginning of the war we did not have a single special forces. And the Germans, having shown intelligence and resourcefulness, used our and their experience (partisans in Africa during the First World War), created the troops of the future, special forces, special operations forces.
    Outright nonsense! The Germans just had everything taken apart and torn apart,
    "Brandenburg" army, paratroopers - Luftwaffe, Skorzeny - SS. By the way, the SS, with all the selection and all the supplies, at first fought much worse than the Wehrmacht!
    1. +8
      21 October 2021 06: 13
      I don't recognize Alexander Samsonov ... an article that is completely atypical for him. belay
      Unfortunately superficial and from pieces of different topics.
      History of the SS, Abwehr, partisans of the Red Army and special forces of the USSR ( smile not Russia) ... is very, very specific and extensive and a superficial picture about them does not provide reliable information.
      I was more interested in the story of the Abwehr and Sudoplatov's guys ... such a fascinating reading about the characters in their ranks ... no modern action movie can compare with this.
      Who wants to find real and not fictional stories about them in the Internet.
      1. +2
        21 October 2021 08: 22
        Oil-buttered article.
        1. AUL
          +5
          21 October 2021 16: 22
          Quote: bandabas
          Oil-buttered article.


          Along with the previous army, a new one was created, even more modernized, with increased mobility and combat capability, personally loyal to the Fuhrer, ready to carry out any order and die for the leader.
          Doesn't this remind you of anything?
    2. +7
      21 October 2021 06: 46
      Skorzeny - SS

      Is Skorzeny a branch of the military? lol
      1. +9
        21 October 2021 06: 54
        Is Skorzeny a branch of the military?

        The Fuhrer's favorite ... his personal miracle weapon ... he is still a rascal.
        I read his memoirs ... smile nothing supernatural ... arrogance plus luck.
        He threw his subordinates and flew away with Mussolini for Hitler's awards ... and this is an officer ... where is the officer's honor.
        1. +12
          21 October 2021 06: 58
          I read his memoirs ...

          I read it too. And I found nothing but self-praise.
          1. +5
            21 October 2021 09: 19
            Quote: Luminman
            I read it too. And I found nothing but self-praise.

            An ordinary middle-class saboteur who wants to show himself as a "god of war".
            It is better to read memoirs from a private to a captain, they do not stick out themselves, and describe the war as the hardest work in the world, and do not pretend to be heroes with a cross around their necks.
        2. +4
          21 October 2021 13: 10
          Quote: Lech from Android.
          He threw his subordinates and flew away from Mussolini for Hitler's awards ... and this is an officer ... where is the officer's honor

          Correctly noticed.
          a man without conscience and honor! Besides, he is a renegade and a scoundrel. After the war, without a twinge of conscience, he collaborated with the Israelis. Was a "kept woman" of theirs special services.
          He gave his "friends" in exchange for immunity.
      2. +1
        21 October 2021 07: 02
        Quote: Luminman
        Is Skorzeny a branch of the military? lol

        What is it ?! Cavalier, not held true laughing , the Order of the "Hundred Musketeers" pulls at least a company! tongue
        1. +8
          21 October 2021 07: 20
          at least a company pulls!

          Judging by his memoirs, he alone could replace the entire Wehrmacht wink
    3. +8
      21 October 2021 07: 58
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      By the way, the SS, with all the selection and all the supplies, at first fought much worse than the Wehrmacht!
      That's for sure, the losses were much higher than in the Wehrmacht - this was noted by many generals. And the first 10 divisions were essentially elite, while the rest were much worse in quality.
    4. 0
      21 October 2021 10: 30
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      By the way, the SS, with all the selection and all the supplies, at first fought much worse than the Wehrmacht!

      Yes, they were supplied with the devil understand how, and they took there, too, goddamn it, most of the recruits from the occupied territories went to the SS ... But the allied (including Soviet) propaganda after the war made the SS elite of the elite, and the Wehrmacht - hordes of incredible well and modernly equipped soldiers ... All for the sake of justifying their mistakes, but in fact the Germans simply prepared well for the war, and not only talked about it, because the Maginot Line was impregnable only in words (many pillboxes were not fully equipped or simply could not withstand a direct hit shell) - half in general was a very mediocre light fortifications ... and they did not finish it ... the British practically did not have an efficient army, the Benelux countries generally pretended that their war would not affect ... In our country they were chasing the numbers in the army, turning a blind eye to real efficiency, modernity and its state in general ...
      1. +6
        21 October 2021 10: 38
        Quote: parma
        Yes, they were supplied with the devil understand how

        Not German! The same Sturmgevers were the first in the SS, a new uniform in the SS, tanks in the SS!

        Quote: parma
        they took there too, goddamn it, most of the recruits from the occupied territories went to the SS
        These "recruits" are strictly volunteers, and went to the national SS divisions, such as "Charlemagne", so there is no need to tell "for the poverty of the SS".
        1. +9
          21 October 2021 12: 47
          Nevertheless, despite the motivation, political "savvy", and the fact that the SS leadership, using the "administrative resource", knocked out the best material supplies and military-technical innovations for their troops, the SS troops in the Hitlerite armed forces remained of the lowest quality until 1944. second-rate units and subdivisions.
          The quality and level of training and personnel and command were extremely low. As a result, they demonstrated the greatest success in atrocities against the population and prisoners. The German command was forced to saturate the SS troops with command personnel from the Wehrmacht in order to somehow raise their level.

          The fact that, since 1944, the level of the SS troops began to look better against the background of the Wehrmacht than before, is connected not with the qualitative growth of the SS, but with the decline in the quality of the Wehrmacht as a result of knocking out the best cadres and the admission of conscripts to the military forces in the non-combatant categories. Of course, against the background of disabled infantry regiments in France, even the wretched Hitler Youth division looked good.

          It is even funnier to read about the successes of the German "special forces". During the entire war, the Germans could not and did not even want to create specialized reconnaissance and sabotage units, similar to Soviet or British ones. Even in military intelligence, they used conventional line units and relied mainly on force reconnaissance (which was recognized as an extreme case in the Soviet troops and among the Western allies). This inertia and arrogant retrograde of the German command largely determined the complete failure of German intelligence at all levels, which managed to overlook everything that was possible.
          1. +3
            21 October 2021 15: 17
            Quote: El Barto
            The quality and level of training and personnel and command were extremely low. As a result, they demonstrated the greatest success in atrocities against the population and prisoners. The German command was forced to saturate the SS troops with command personnel from the Wehrmacht in order to somehow raise their level.

            I agree about the savagery of the SS, but to overlook the fact that in the SS the selection according to physical criteria was much stricter than in the Wehrmacht is not worth it, as well as the motivation of the composition, which by the way explains, in part, the high losses. Those. tactical training and command were weak, hence the losses, but physical fitness and moral stamina ensured resilience in battle.
        2. +1
          21 October 2021 13: 47
          Quote: Vladimir_2U
          Not German! The same Sturmgevers were the first in the SS, a new uniform in the SS, tanks in the SS!

          They didn’t fit all the newest and best, and everything was not the charter, let's say so ... yes, a lot of this was very good and promising, but a lot was also frankly terrible ... it was the SS (and purely German ones too) that used the lion's share of trophies and alterations (the same 9x19 PPSh, Italian tanks after the surrender of pasta) ...
          Quote: Vladimir_2U
          These "recruits" are strictly volunteers, and went to the national SS divisions, such as "Charlemagne", so there is no need to tell "for the poverty of the SS".

          I'm not talking about the "poverty of the SS", but about the fact that they were staffed with ideological and motivated fighters, whose fighting qualities were often not the best ...
    5. 0
      24 November 2021 19: 35
      At first, the SS had so-so supplies, and they gradually increased in size. LSSAH became a division only in the summer of 1941
  2. +1
    21 October 2021 06: 01
    conspirators were among the military elite
    And how could they harm the Soviet power!
    1. +1
      21 October 2021 16: 12
      And how could they harm the Soviet power!
      and then rehabilitated as "innocent convicts!" Although ... they did harm to Soviet power ..
      1. +1
        22 October 2021 00: 27
        Quote: Region-25.rus
        they did harm to Soviet power ..

        And now it is being credited ...
  3. 0
    21 October 2021 06: 18
    I was confused by the title. And we need an army of soulless warriors who are sown by partisan detachments? At the beginning of the war, a spontaneous partisan movement arose. It was an uprising against the occupation. After that it took the forms that we know about. Without straining your brains, create a robot warrior. Only the human mind is able to act in difficult times. What the author wanted to say, I did not understand.
    1. +3
      21 October 2021 11: 39
      At the beginning of the war, a spontaneous partisan movement arose.

      Who told you that it is spontaneous? Ours left detachments and groups organized by either party organs or the NKVD during the retreat. The spontaneous movement was quite organized. The quality of their organization at the beginning of the war is another matter. But the organization was, and was at the highest level of power
      The main tasks of the partisan movement were outlined in the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) "To the Party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions" dated June 29, 1941 No. 624 and the Decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated July 18, 1941 "On organizing the struggle in the rear troops ". The most important directions of the struggle behind enemy lines were formulated in the order of the NKO of the USSR JV Stalin of September 5, 1942 No. 00189 "On the tasks of the partisan movement."
      .
    2. 0
      30 December 2021 10: 56
      Partisan detachments are mainly groups of the NKVD-MGB and GRU, which were thrown in for sabotage work, and then overgrown with a local population and encircled people. There are few exceptions.
  4. +12
    21 October 2021 06: 30
    It turns out the SS troops are just special forces laughing Samsonov, a black dog, washes to white. laughing
    1. +13
      21 October 2021 06: 52
      Yes, it sounds strange, the SS is special forces, it sounds very strange. The SS is a Nazi combat unit and a strike force composed of the Nazis. They were designed as "elite", but it does not mean that "this is some kind of a prototype of the future."
      1. +4
        21 October 2021 07: 01
        The SS is a Nazi combat unit, and a strike force composed of the Nazis

        Simply put, these are party troops
        1. +4
          21 October 2021 15: 56
          Quote: Luminman
          Simply put, these are party troops

          Probably it would be correct to call them the Ideological Troops, history knows the facts when the Wehrmacht treated humanly the local population, while the SS troops carried out massacres anywhere.
      2. +4
        21 October 2021 14: 56
        Good afternoon, Edward! smile
        Most of the candidates who entered the cadet schools have already been selected by the SA, SS or Gestapo

        As far as I remember, after Hitler slammed SA, the people from there moved to the Wehrmacht in the ranks that they had at the bottom, i.e. Untersturmführer became an army lieutenant. , in fact, in SA, they initially recruited front-line soldiers who had real experience of fighting in the First World War, and then they recruited green youngsters.
        I was especially pleased with the news about the recruitment of people from the Gestapo to the Junker schools, and you see serious uncles, burdened by their family, in line for the lieutenant's shoulder straps. laughing
        As for the SS, they had their own officers' schools and trained cadets only in them.
        1. +4
          21 October 2021 15: 50
          Constantine
          good evening!
          Of course!
          Moreover, it is difficult to call the SS the prototype of the future special forces, and there were special units in the SS, but as many have written here: the SS are party troops, including to counterbalance the army opposition.
          Best regards,
          hi
      3. +3
        21 October 2021 17: 37
        Good evening, Edward! .. I remembered that this article was written by that Samsonov, who for 10 years "hunted" on the website of the Independent Military Review and wrote openly anti-Soviet articles. smile And so, not a pleasant article, with a brown tint. That is why such films are made when, after a battle, a Soviet tanker who escaped from captivity shakes hands with a captured SS-tanker.
    2. +4
      21 October 2021 07: 03
      Quote: parusnik
      It turns out the SS troops are just special forces

      While reading, I wondered if Verkhoturov was the author? But no. Was surprised.
    3. +6
      21 October 2021 08: 14
      For a newcomer in the team of authors, it is perpendicular to both the SS and the waffen-SS. I still did not understand what special forces were - the guards of concentration camps or the composition of the nominal formations at the fronts.
    4. The comment was deleted.
  5. +2
    21 October 2021 06: 32
    Quote: Vladimir_2U
    The Germans just had everything taken apart and torn apart,
    "Brandenburg" army, paratroopers - Luftwaffe, Skorzeny - SS

    In the article it was written:
    The secret of the German lightning war is in the excellent interaction of different types of troops
    1. +1
      21 October 2021 07: 05
      Quote: Xlor
      In the article it was written:
      The secret of the German lightning war is in the excellent interaction of different types of troops

      And also in the article it was written;

      by the beginning of the war we didn’t have unified special forces... And the Germans, showing intelligence and resourcefulness, used our and their experience (partisans in Africa during the First World War), created the troops of the future, special forces, special operations forces.
  6. +8
    21 October 2021 06: 56
    Quote: Lech from Android.
    I was more interested in the story of the Abwehr and Sudoplatov's guys ... such a fascinating reading about the characters in their ranks ... no modern action movie can compare with this.


    According to Sudoplatov, you can read Sudoplatov himself. Why read Samsonov about Sudoplatov?
    1. +2
      21 October 2021 07: 04
      According to Sudoplatov, you can read Sudoplatov himself. Why read Samsonov about Sudoplatov?

      Each has its own shortcomings ... of course, I have already said an article that is too superficial.
      For a serious article, you need to study the archives and documents of that era ... study the sources ... and this is not an easy job.
      Alas, Comrade Samsonov, as I see it, prefers not to go deeper than generally known information for unprepared readers.
      Most VO readers know a lot more ... you can't disappoint them like that. hi
      1. +1
        21 October 2021 23: 56
        The author of the article could, at least for fun, fly through the thought of the book "Barracks". It was written by an officer of the SS Panzer Forces. So he wrote that everything was done with a bang, thoughtlessly. Where ordinary units lost 15% of the regiment, the SS lost 40-60% of the regiment. Only after the SS lost half of their tanks at the Kursk Bulge, then Himmler was summoned to the carpet by Hitler and received a thrashing. He said that he needed living soldiers, not the corpses of heroes. The author of the book "Barracks" fought in the Kursk Bulge and lost his leg there in a tiger. After treatment, he could no longer fight and was sent as an instructor to the SS tankers school. There he already inserted the brains of the recruits how to fight, but it was already too late.
    2. +3
      21 October 2021 13: 25
      Alas. It will not work to read Sudoplatov himself, because he did not write anything. And the book written by American journalists, allegedly in his words, is "scandals, intrigues, investigations (c) Ren-TV
  7. +14
    21 October 2021 07: 04
    The Japanese army was well trained, disciplined, and had extensive military experience.

    Great military experience, this is the capture of China, divided into parts?
    All the time, it is surprising that they were disciplined and trained, and these, and the "poorly trained", with bad commanders of the Red Army, defeated them all.
    Yes, I forgot about their "convenient form", and our uncomfortable?
    Although all experts noted that the form of the Red Army was superior to the same German form in all respects.
    Which is only good for modern renovations.
    It is more logical to write about the parameters of the German army without epithets and enthusiasm: the pros and cons. And it turns out that the namts had an "algorithm" of victories, but we, as it were, did not?
    A kind of inferiority complex in front of the "great arias".
    As it hurts the ear, and the memory of the ancestors who defeated them ...
    My grandfathers, like millions of their fellow citizens, were definitely not worse prepared than ss-non-humans ...
    But there is a "logic of war" and it is not always on the side of the heroes.
    1. +3
      21 October 2021 13: 41
      It is hard to say. Anything has happened. Personally, for example, I am amazed at some facts of the combat activities of our troops in 1942 on the southern wing of the front.
      The documents contain simply amazing facts of stupidity, passivity and cowardice of individual commanders of the tactical and operational-tactical level. Not commanders, but battalion-regiment-division link.
      However, for example, both Parsegov and Oktyabrsky also distinguished themselves.
      The appearance of Order N227 is not surprising at all. Absolutely justified. And rightly so, they got rid of such personnel in command positions.
      Despite the fact that there was no such thing either earlier in 1941, or later, or in other sectors of the front at the same time
      1. +4
        21 October 2021 14: 16
        Alex,
        good day,
        and this is some kind of extraordinary exception to the rule? So it was only in our army in history? Or is the whole history of wars about it? Or were the Germans always cheerful and cheerful, proactive and adventurous?
        I have always been for objectivism in history. There have been many, many "jambs" in the army of all times and peoples, but because we are human beings, and if we were cyborgs and we would "jam", robots will probably fight correctly.
        And regarding the grave mistakes in command and control, nevertheless, we judge the war by the results, and not by the intermediate results, in 1812 in September everything was quite sad, cannot be compared with 1941, the French entered the capital, but we ended the war 4 years later in Paris, as in 1945 in Berlin.
        hi
      2. +3
        21 October 2021 15: 10
        Quote: El Barto
        It is hard to say. Anything has happened. Personally, for example, I am amazed at some facts of the combat activities of our troops in 1942 on the southern wing of the front.
        The documents contain simply amazing facts of stupidity, passivity and cowardice of individual commanders of the tactical and operational-tactical level. Not commanders, but battalion-regiment-division link.

        Here it is also necessary to take into account that outstanding negative examples are included in the same orders "to eliminate deficiencies" as examples. Like the sergeant who being sent on reconnaissance, he crawled to the German dugout and, not knowing what to do next, crawled back - having got in this way in 1941 in the order of the Direction level.

        Anyway, if you look at the documents, the war on either side appears to be a mess. And whoever has less mess will win. EMNIP, Ulanov in LJ had trophy docks about the actions of "Brandenburgers" - DB "Sudden raid on the bridge over the Dniester near Mogilev-Otaki". The first impression after reading was "what is this - the same ?! belay ".
        Before the offensive, communication was to be established through Lieutenant Oldershausen with the Brandenburg company, which is located in battle formation on the north-eastern edge of the copse. Lieutenant Oldershausen did not find the company in the indicated starting area. From a chance officer of the Brandenburg company, Oldershausen learned that the Brandenburg company was on alert in another copse, 2-3 km behind. Oldershausen indicated to the officer that the starting area, which was ordered to occupy, was in front, to which the lieutenant said that he would report this to his commander. A second attempt to establish contact with Brandenburg Company at 1.00 on 7.7 was unsuccessful. The company could not be found.

        Through the reconnaissance patrol, it was established that the Brandenburg company, which took a position in the bridgehead between the cyclist squadron on the right and the motorcycle rifle squadron on the left, leaving no cover, completely cleared its positions. The squadron commander received this intelligence result about 12 hours. The squadron lay with unsecured flanks. His position was very clearly visible to the enemy from the ridge.
    2. The comment was deleted.
  8. +5
    21 October 2021 07: 11
    The main role will be played not by multi-million armies, but by small mobile, well-armed and specially trained strike units. They will break through the enemy's defenses with quick blows, block it and destroy it.

    The pink dream of commanders and rulers of all times.

    In reality, everything is decided by the poorly trained, but huge mass of the militia. recourse
    1. -6
      21 October 2021 07: 19
      In reality, everything is decided by the poorly trained, but huge mass of the militia.

      Yeah ... Pashtuns in sandals kicked out high-tech US soldiers from Afghanistan with a crash. belay
      Wonders .
      1. +14
        21 October 2021 07: 23
        Pashtuns in sandals kicked high-tech US soldiers out of Afghanistan with a crash

        High-tech armed US soldiers from Afghanistan were kicked out not by illiterate Pashtuns, but by the internal political situation in the country and high costs of the war
        1. -2
          21 October 2021 09: 56
          it was not illiterate Pashtuns who kicked out of Afghanistan, but the internal political situation in the country and high costs of the war

          Oh well ... why don't the Americans get out of Syria because of their internal political situation ... somehow this thesis does not fit in with Syria.
          1. +4
            21 October 2021 10: 57
            why then the Americans from Syria do not crawl out because of their internal political situation ...

            Well, it's probably worth starting with the fact that in Syria, US troops are supporting their allies - the Kurds. Who are themselves very motivated and have a very high fighting spirit.
      2. +2
        21 October 2021 17: 29
        Lehe
        In reality, no one * kicked * the Americans from Afghanistan. There the Mujahideen got along well with each other and with the Americans. All * graters *, those in * sandals *, were ONLY for the division of money from the United States, and of course for drugs. The Americans made all their military sorties only to reconcile the money-deprived, raging sandlet wearers. Co-payments for drugs were a nice bonus and nothing more.
        As soon as money for Afghanistan ceased to be allocated, then there was nothing to share. Drug money is much less than the appetite of the US military. Here are the Americans and * got ready for the exit *.
    2. +5
      21 October 2021 08: 56
      In reality, everything is decided by a poorly trained, but a huge mass of the militia

      This huge mass amounted to millions of prisoners of war ...
      In the 41st, Moscow was not surrendered precisely thanks to well-trained units and formations, such as Vatutin's task force, in which the leading role was played by Rotmistrov's 8 TBRs and 46 separate MCPs, created from experienced people with combat experience. This task force did not allow to bypass Moscow from the north on the move, and if the 21 TB brigade with a select staff had not been deprived of motorized infantry, then Kalinin would not have surrendered. From the south, Moscow, in the most difficult days, was covered by the 1st Guards Corps of Lelyushenko, which included airborne forces, 4 TBR, 11 TBR, 36 MCP and 36 NKVD border regiment. The names of Lelyushenko, Katukov, Lavrinenko, Burda are widely known.
      All these units and formations became guards. Rotmistrov, Katukov,
      Lelyushenko and Vatutin became famous commanders.
      1. +3
        21 October 2021 09: 56
        thanks to well trained parts and connections

        And what's the use?
        Kalinin passed, Oryol and Bryansk too.
        As Wikipedia writes:

        During the Oryol-Bryansk operation, Soviet troops retreated to a depth of 210-250 km, lost up to 85-90% of personnel, all heavy weapons and vehicles.

        And already the militia fought back. wink
        1. +1
          21 October 2021 10: 14
          Kalinin passed, Oryol and Bryansk too.
          As Wikipedia writes:

          But they inflicted heavy losses, and near Mtsensk there was a fear of T-34 tanks, it was there that a commission came from Berlin to inspect the destroyed 11 TBR tanks. And most importantly, they gained time before the divisions arrived from the Far East.
          1. +5
            21 October 2021 10: 44
            But they inflicted heavy losses, and near Mtsensk there was a fear of T-34 tanks, it was there that a commission came from Berlin to inspect the destroyed 11 TBR tanks. And most importantly, they gained time before the divisions arrived from the Far East.

            There is such a country - Switzerland. There are no special forces and shock battle groups and in the ranks of everything 3,5 thousand military personnel.

            However, no one has attacked Switzerland for a couple of centuries.

            Maybe because in the hands of the ordinary population (militias laughing ) 2 million pistols alone?

            Or because:

            Once a year a summons arrive, a uniform, a backpack, and a weapon are taken out of the closet, and it is not Michael Isenring, a programmer, a loving husband and father of two, who leaves the apartment, but Hauptmann Isenring.

            Or is it because students go to Mac like that? love
            1. +2
              21 October 2021 14: 24
              Or maybe they take into account the possibility of undermining tunnels in the mountains and the loss of money stored in Swiss banks ???
              1. +4
                21 October 2021 14: 50
                Or maybe they take into account the possibility of undermining tunnels in the mountains and the loss of money stored in Swiss banks ???

                And that too. But if they had not had the right army, there would have long been those who would have wished to rummage through the banks. laughing
                1. +1
                  21 October 2021 18: 29
                  The Fuhrer wanted to "put his paw" into the Swiss "purse", but he was dissuaded.
                  And not only the military ...
                  Switzerland is not a steppe or a plain, but mountain ranges. For their "conquest" and preparation is needed other than how to "conquer" the steppe.
                  1. +1
                    21 October 2021 21: 50
                    Not at all. Neither the mountains have anything to do with it (for some reason, the mountains did not interfere with the capture of Norway), nor the Swiss army, which was nothing special.

                    Switzerland was not captured for the same reasons that Sweden or Spain was not captured. Why capture a formally neutral, but essentially 100% friendly state, the authorities of which are closely connected with the authorities of the 3rd Reich and are very close ideologically?

                    And when it was necessary, neither the mountains nor the belligerent Swiss did not interfere with the capture of Switzerland. Which the French did with ease in their time. And then whose only troops did not wander around Switzerland, sorting out relations among themselves.
                    1. 0
                      21 October 2021 23: 57
                      The German "number One" had a desire to "include" the Swiss into the "bosom of the Aryans", but he was persuaded.
                      And so - Operation Tanenbaum was ready by 1940!
                      From May 10 to June 8, 1940, the Swiss Air Force shot down 11 Luftwaffe aircraft - 6 He111 and 5 Me110!
                      The Swiss themselves lost 1 Me109E and its pilot.
                      1. +1
                        22 October 2021 12: 14
                        The historical logic is clear - after all, Switzerland was once part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. And the same Germans live there.
                        However, it was more profitable to have at hand such an "offshore" for shady dealings, and under the Reich the country immediately dropped out of world trade under the sanctions of the allies.

                        And by the way, yes. There are no large mountains in Switzerland from the West from France and from the North from Germany. Completely tank-accessible directions. In terms of theater of operations - the main industrial regions - Basel, Zurich and Bernschina could be seized without problems, especially since the majority of the population there and the authorities sympathized with Germany and Hitler
                      2. 0
                        22 October 2021 12: 33
                        It was not for nothing that there were 4 "expeditions" of Swiss medical workers to the Eastern Front under the "signboard" of the Red Cross. With secret agreements about whom to treat and who not to approach!
                        On the website warspot.ru there is an article in 2 parts with the memories of Swiss doctors and nurses about their arrival in the occupied territory of the USSR.
          2. +5
            21 October 2021 13: 08
            Quote: Konnick
            But they inflicted heavy losses, and near Mtsensk there was a fear of T-34 tanks, it was there that a commission came from Berlin to inspect the destroyed 11 TBR tanks.

            This Guderian's bike has long been taken apart. There was no commission for the T-34 - there was a commission to study the experience of using German tanks on the Eastern Front.
            And the "fear of T-34 tanks" appeared in German generals only in their memoirs - it was necessary to somehow justify the failure near Moscow. In October 1941, they had a completely different opinion about the T-34:
            The Soviet T-34 tank is a typical example of backward Bolshevik technology. This tank can not be compared with the best examples of our tanks, made by the faithful sons of the Reich and have repeatedly proved their advantage.
      2. 0
        21 October 2021 10: 11
        This huge mass amounted to millions of prisoners of war ...

        It was the regular army that was captured.
        Which was then freed by the militia. laughing
      3. +3
        21 October 2021 11: 45
        On 11 TBR yesterday they wrote on warspot.ru ...
        Read ...
        And about the attitude of its commanders to the actions of the Katukov brigade!
        1. +1
          21 October 2021 13: 13
          Thank you for an interesting article. But I disagree a little. The main losses of 11 TBR suffered when trying to destroy 7 Katyusha installations
          remaining in Mtsensk, namely 5 T-34 tanks, 5 KV-1 tanks, 65 wounded, 16 killed and 84 soldiers and officers were missing (wikipedia). Not when creating a corridor for 4 TBRs, but during a raid into Mtsensk following two reconnaissance groups of the 4th TBR, with the same tasks, one of which suffered losses already when approaching the city, and the second, under the command of Burda, left after 3 days without losses. In the photo next to the Katyusha T-34 from 11TBr. And about the attitude, none of the 11 TBRs knew how their comrades died and possibly blamed Burda and his reconnaissance group.
          1. +1
            21 October 2021 14: 26
            And you ask the author of the article questions. And perhaps he will provide more data on those events.
        2. +1
          23 October 2021 15: 47
          https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=93RWFLLh3uE&feature=youtu.be
          Watch this video from Archive Revolution. Very interesting, there are many unknown details about the battles near Orel and Mtsensk.
  9. +10
    21 October 2021 07: 28
    The French made their main bet on the "Maginot Line" - a powerful line of fortifications on the border with Germany. The French generals assumed that the Germans would not be able to overcome it, at this time France would mobilize all forces, receive help from England, and a trench war would begin again, as during the First World War. The Nazis beat the enemy's headquarters with a blitzkrieg strategy, mobile formations simply bypassed the most powerful fortified areas of the enemy, broke through to the rear, and caused a wave of panic and horror. As a result, the French garrisons surrendered already in the deep rear of the German army, or the fighting was going far away from the French strongholds.

    Again this is the story about the Maginot Line, worn to holes by the propagandists of the lower middle level.
    And the whole article is some kind of indigestible mixture of propaganda clichés.
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. +5
      21 October 2021 07: 49
      And the whole article is some kind of indigestible mixture of propaganda clichés.

      I support
      About forty years ago I read Skorzeny's memoirs for the first time and since then I have been hearing a set of these clichés about "the great German special forces" for the same forty years.
      hi
      1. +2
        21 October 2021 08: 24
        Quote: Eduard Vaschenko
        about forty years ago I read Skorzeny's memoirs for the first time

        Oh-oh-oh, this is a song! laughing I chel, however, in a clumsy translation into the language of native aspens, tk. I don't speak Spanish, but only once. The desire to re-read the heroic memoir did not arise. I still don’t understand what kind of cretin stuck to him the label “Saboteur No. 1 of all times and peoples”.
        1. +5
          21 October 2021 08: 47
          I still don’t understand what kind of idiot put the label "Saboteur No. 1 of all times and peoples" on him.

          That's right!
          And naturally I read my memoirs in Russian, they were published in the USSR, I don't remember the year of publication, around the 70s. The book is still alive, the binding is only frayed)))
          hi
        2. +6
          21 October 2021 08: 48
          what kind of cretin stuck him the label "Saboteur number 1 of all times and peoples"

          This he stuck to himself in his memoirs and numerous interviews that he handed out after the war.
        3. +2
          21 October 2021 08: 56
          So he attached it to himself, with his memumar, and then went for a walk. Soviet cinema also contributed. The series "Liberation", "Soldiers of Freedom", there are still a couple of films from the 60s. I don’t remember the names, but in one of the films I starred a Soviet intelligence officer in the "enemy's nest" A. Romashin.
      2. +4
        21 October 2021 11: 00
        I read in the early 70s, a book published in the mid 60s and it seems like in the GDR in Russian. In the library was, but just in the 70s of such a plan, books and books about the Gulag were confiscated for destruction. The grandmother worked in the library and wore to read.
      3. +1
        21 October 2021 15: 44
        In the early sixties, a book by Julius Madera (GDR) was also translated,

        We foolishly kept secret everything about the "Berezino" operation, when our people outright beat the same Skorzeny the people learned only in the nineties.
  10. +9
    21 October 2021 07: 39
    Are the SS death camp guards SWAT?
    SS Sonderkommando are special forces?
    SS Panzer Divisions are Special Forces?

    The definition of the SS has long been given, these are paramilitaries National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), that is. detachments of the Nazis.
  11. Eug
    +2
    21 October 2021 07: 48
    I have always believed that for a high-quality mastery of military affairs, training should be based primarily on the interest of the student. Then discipline becomes a perceived necessity. It is clear that in reality, much is not so, but at least elements of interest must be present.
  12. +8
    21 October 2021 07: 59
    The author, Dr. Mengele and other fanatics are also "special forces"? Those who watered General Karbyshev with his comrades, is it also "special forces" with icy water in the cold? Who drowned the last descendants of the Habsburgs in a pit with guano, also "special forces"? Are we romanticizing and heroizing the SS troops? When the article was written "the boys with bloody eyes" did not stand?
  13. +1
    21 October 2021 08: 04
    So, thanks to various "perestroika", by the beginning of the war we did not have a single special forces. And the Germans, having shown intelligence and resourcefulness, used our and their experience (partisans in Africa during the First World War), created the troops of the future, special forces, special operations forces.
    It was based on the experience of assault units with PMA. And then, the Germans had the special forces regiment "Brandenburg-800" from the Wehrmacht. And SS divisions, something like the guard, shock troops - well, not special forces (reconnaissance and sabotage operations behind enemy lines)
  14. +3
    21 October 2021 08: 09
    It is not surprising at all the praise (and not in the case) of SS members and admiration for Beria in one material
  15. -5
    21 October 2021 08: 10
    "Pope" of the SS troops, the commander of the SS division "Das Reich" SS Gruppenführer Paul Hausser

    Pope of the Waffen-SS - Joseph "Sepp" Dietrich - veteran of the Great War, attack aircraft, tanker (ZhK 1,2kl), Freikor, "beer putschist", Munich unemployed, NSDAP member, bodyguard and chauffeur of the Fuhrer, deputy of the Reichstag, SS Gruppenfuehrer - 17 March 1933 in front of the barracks. Imp. Augusta Victoria on Friesenstrasse gathered a group of 117 people. This was the birth of the LSSAH - Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler.

    Made a career from sergeant major to general.
  16. +7
    21 October 2021 08: 27
    The SS troops were not special forces. They were created as security detachments of the top of the NSDAP. After all, Hitler always expected a trick from the army elite, and had every reason for that, which happened on July 20, 44. The system of training the Wehrmacht troops was always high, Bruno Wintser writes about this in his book. The Wehrmacht also had elite units, such as the Great Germany division, and the Hermann Goering division in the Luftwaffe, which was later reorganized into a corps. The combat value was represented somewhere by 12 SS divisions, the rest were so-so. For example, Manstein wrote: “No matter how bravely the divisions of the SS troops always fought, no matter how wonderful successes they achieved, there was still no doubt that the creation of these special military formations was an unforgivable mistake. -of officers, the SS troops were out of action so quickly that it was impossible to reconcile with this. The blood they shed was in no way paid off by the successes achieved. It is clear that the troops cannot be blamed for this. The blame for these unnecessary losses is borne by those who formed these special formations for political reasons, despite the objections of all authoritative authorities of the ground army. "After the war, the role of the SS troops was already inflated, as a prototype of the common European army.
  17. BAI
    +4
    21 October 2021 08: 37
    1.
    from traditional methods of training soldiers, did not torture with marches, drill and outfits for the kitchen.

    Combat training is traditionally a strong point of the German army (Wehrmacht).

    Something the author was too clever.
    2. The SS troops began to represent a real force only in 1942. Until 1941 and in 1941 in our memoirs there was not a word about them, in German memoirs there were mediocre reviews. Since 1942, when they were given the best personnel and the best material and technical support, they went up the hill. And the experience appeared, superimposed on the ideological motivation that they always had.
    3. Skorzeny has done a big job near Moscow.
    1. BAI
      +1
      21 October 2021 08: 53
      And to call the troops of the future - the SS (recognized as war criminals - Nuremberg), this is generally prohibitive. That is, the SS are the future of the armies of the whole world, including Russia? M. b. the author wants to revise the results of the 2nd World War and the decision of the Nuremberg Tribunal? What do we want after that from Kolya s Urengoy?
  18. +9
    21 October 2021 09: 14
    At the beginning of the article, having udidev "Only on Khalkhin-Gol in the summer of 1939 Soviet (Russian)"It immediately became clear whose article. As usual, victory means Russians, defeat means advice."

    And the author should decide all the same Steiner or Steiner and not to confuse the Waffen SS with the general SS.
  19. +2
    21 October 2021 09: 29
    He believed that the war of the future would be completely different from the First World War. ... The main role will be played not by multi-million armies, but by small mobile, well-armed and specially trained strike units. They will break through the enemy's defenses with quick blows, block it and destroy it.

    Yes, the pepper is clear, yeah. Weiss's plan was apparently not carried out by an army of one and a half million. Von Bock and Rundstedt would be very surprised to learn that they, it turns out, commanded "small mobile strike units" and not the GA.
  20. +4
    21 October 2021 13: 46
    The first SS divisions were distinguished by their high cohesion and combat effectiveness.

    Oh yes ... the SS "Nord" division (formed on the basis of the 6th and 7th regiments of the SS "Death's Head" division) distinguished itself with a particularly high cohesion and combat capability, which in July 1941 managed to suffer heavy losses in the first offensive (up to 20% among the attacking units), and the 1st battalion of the 7th regiment of the division, when Soviet tanks appeared in panic, fled from the battlefield, and the fugitives were detained only near the location of the headquarters of the 36th corps.
    A few days before the battle, the divisional commander reported on the appallingly low level of training of the division entrusted to him:
    In the section "Assessing the capabilities of the division commander," he explicitly listed all the disadvantages, including the complete lack of combat training, both individual and collective. In addition, he wrote that commanders and personnel were not responsible for insufficient training, since they were not given the opportunity undergo appropriate combat training at the proper level. In the opinion of the divisional commander, most commanders, from company to regimental, had a very vague (if any!) Idea of ​​the methods of modern warfare. The division's artillery fired only once, and never in cooperation with the infantry.
    In turn, the infantry commanders never acted with the support of artillery. The anti-tank crews never fired from their weapons, like the anti-aircraft gunners. No joint exercises were conducted to work out combat interaction. There was a shortage of supplies and support personnel (the shortage of qualified officers was especially serious), and motorized transport represented a motley set of machines of various makes and models, which made their maintenance and repair a real nightmare.

    Taking into account the fact that the regiments of the division were not re-formed, but were entirely transferred from the "Dead Head", one can imagine the level of training of all "elite troops". laughing
    1. +3
      21 October 2021 13: 49
      Quote: Alexey RA
      one can imagine the level of training of all "elite troops".

      And yet

      Here is a certain author on topvar
      In underpants with ESES runes
      (Although it is clear that not an Aryan)
      Again breeds polite:

      “Oh, the genius of the gloomy Teutons!
      All of us, who have been eating soup with bast shoes,
      He led straight to Star Wars
      From the age of bow and sling! "
      hi
  21. +5
    21 October 2021 15: 33
    For some reason, Ilya Grigorievich Starinov is completely forgotten. His talented operations in Spain were to blow up tunnels and bridges, and in the Great Patriotic War, to blow up headquarters, commandant's offices, and Gestapo departments with radio bombs.
    1. 0
      21 October 2021 15: 49
      Quote: Boris Epstein
      Ilya Grigorievich Starinov. His talented operations in Spain to blow up tunnels and bridges

      Hadji-Umar Mamsurov, "Macedonian Xanthi"
    2. +1
      21 October 2021 17: 52
      Exactly, the Samsonov and SO office could have given a couple of lines to the domestic heroes for a change.
  22. +3
    21 October 2021 16: 10
    There are at least three Samsonovs.
    So don't be surprised.

    The author is not describing the SS, but the Waffen-SS.
    Which is not the same thing.

    The tactics of acting at the front in small groups, filtering through the front line, were equally among the Wehrmacht and the Waffen-SS.

    The best divisions were considered not the SS, but the Wehrmacht's grenadier divisions.
  23. +1
    21 October 2021 17: 50
    Oh let me disagree with the author regarding the fact that we fought according to outdated schemes. Yes, the entire Civil War in terms of tactics is one continuous blitzkrieg! Quite often, flanking bypasses with highly mobile and fast cavalry behind enemy lines and repelling the same passages to their rear and flanks with the same lightning speed. If it comes to that, then the tactics of what will later be called the German blitzkrieg are precisely the Germans who spied on us during the times of friendship, creatively adjusting them to their capabilities and needs. And you, in addition to development (BT tanks and amphibious amphibians are just from this series), also supplemented your defense with URs. The Germans had better coordination of actions and radio communications, plus even a deployed full force grouping against incomplete peacetime divisions is not the same thing than fighting against the same but already deployed and full complement with a division (the result, however, could be different in oncoming battles first wave however).
  24. +1
    21 October 2021 20: 06
    The author does not deal with the interpersonal relationship between the SS as an organization and the Waffen SS.
  25. +1
    21 October 2021 20: 38
    Well, bullshit! The Waffen SS have never been any elite of the military! From the fact that they recruited racial and loyal soldiers to the Fuhrer, their combat training did not differ from the rest of the armed forces. But the armament and command and control were lame, not primarily in isolation from the direct subordination of the Vermata.
  26. -4
    22 October 2021 10: 19
    Interesting article. Thanks to the author.
  27. -2
    22 October 2021 11: 17
    The article is essentially devoted to an issue that has come to the surface in recent years. Namely, the Germans created a very effective tactic for breaking into enemy defenses. They organized the interaction of artillery, infantry, tank units and aviation and brought this interaction to perfection.

    For many decades, the authors gave various explanations that did not explain anything, and most often confused the reader. Although an accurate assessment of this tactics is given, for example, by Katukov, "On the edge of the main blow." But as can be seen from history, the insight of units cannot change the actions of the bulk. It took many months when, after receiving many knockout blows, an understanding came about why this was happening and how to act among a wide mass of officers and in the top leadership of the Armed Forces.
    The article describes not only the tactics, but also the tools of this tactic.
    Would recommend to everyone for reading.
    1. 0
      22 October 2021 15: 14
      This tactic was developed in the USSR by Triandafillov. After his death, Tukhachevsky tried to continue this topic, but he succeeded in a hunchback. The mechanized corps on Tukhacheskiy were oversaturated with tanks, but there were completely no armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, there were not enough artillery tractors, trucks, tankers, there were few motorized infantry. It was also weak with radio communication. All this was noted in the "Act of acceptance and transfer of the Red Army from the People's Commissar Voroshilov to the People's Commissar Timoshenko." And at the beginning of the war, army commanders were afraid to use radio communications, fearing radio interception.
      1. -1
        22 October 2021 18: 37
        Quote: boris epstein
        This tactic was developed in the USSR by Triandafillov. After his death, Tukhachevsky tried to continue this topic, but he succeeded in a hunchback. The mechanized corps on Tukhacheskiy were oversaturated with tanks, but there were completely no armored personnel carriers, self-propelled guns, there were not enough artillery tractors, trucks, tankers, there were few motorized infantry. It was also weak with radio communication. All this was noted in the "Act of acceptance and transfer of the Red Army from the People's Commissar Voroshilov to the People's Commissar Timoshenko." And at the beginning of the war, army commanders were afraid to use radio communications, fearing radio interception.

        No, you are talking about something completely different. Like Zhukov, too, in his memoirs.
        You mean a deep sweep operation. But in order to reach a great or shallow depth, you must first break the defense. But with this we were very bad. Attempts to even flank attacks against the Germans unprepared for defense ended very sadly. And the attack on the prepared defense of the German infantry ended in a uniform beating. Unlike the Germans, who turned defense hacking into technology owned by the battalion commanders.
        1. +1
          23 October 2021 13: 49
          Everything is much simpler. Deep operation and continuous operation are already at least the operational-strategic level.
          In this case, we are talking about combined arms combat... The theory and foundations of combined arms combat were well known and developed in the Red Army. Moreover, the post-war SA achieved perfection and still serve as an example for most armies in the world. For example, the notorious "multi-domain battle" of the Americans is nothing more than a combined-arms battle, creatively reworked for modern technology.
          Nevertheless, at the first stage of the war, the Germans were superior to us in this element. First of all, due to psychological preparation and discipline of l / s. It is the good technique of combined arms combat that explains their tactical successes, and not the choice of some unique miraculous tactical techniques.
          Then, during the war, the situation changed to the opposite.
          I don't want to act as Captain Obvious, but many people have confusion in their heads and they often look for something mysterious instead of simple and clear explanations.
          1. -3
            23 October 2021 19: 51
            Quote: El Barto
            Everything is much simpler ...
            In this case, we are talking about combined arms combat... The theory and foundations of combined arms combat were well known and developed in the Red Army. Moreover, the post-war SA achieved perfection and still serve as an example for most armies in the world.

            There was a theory, and the foundations were developed ... And even known. Officers and generals who graduated from the Academy. Frunze and the General Staff. Only now, the knowledge of the theory by the commander of a division or corps (if they have knowledge, that is, they have) should be introduced into the regiments and battalions. And not just to educate the commanders and their chiefs of staff, but to teach their regiments and battalions to conduct this very combined-arms battle. Only here is a question that superpatriots will not like very much: how can a unit or unit learn to interact with tanks if there are no tanks in the rifle division. From the word at all. The tanks, the ones that were, were taken to create monstrous mechanized corps, moreover, in completely insane quantities, I mean the number of mechanized corps.
            Martirosyan says (and we have to agree with him on this) that the NPO and the General Staff were preparing for a counter-blitzkrieg. they say, if we are touched, then we "rattling armor, sparkling with the brilliance of steel, rush into a furious campaign." At the same time, even the optimal structure of the MC was not thought out. The speed of the transported artillery did not correspond to the tasks of the TD and MK ... It lay on the surface. As practice has shown, everything in them was absurd, but it turned out in the "field". The size of the MK, their structure, the inability to use radio communication, or even its absence, the insufficient number of means of evacuation and repair, refuelers, FOR ... And most importantly, understanding how to conduct a combined-arms battle. Not even that. There was no understanding that the battle should be combined arms and necessarily with the support of aviation.[b] [/ b] Otherwise nothing will work.
            Well, it would be fine just that. All the same, tank troops are a young type of troops.
            But damn it, the use of artillery! In 1942 !!! year it took in the order of the Supreme Command to explain that it is necessary to organize artillery support in the offensive. A huge number of commanders of regiments, divisions and even corps, and after a year of war, had a completely wild idea of ​​the role of artillery: they conducted artillery preparation and were resting. As a last resort, if the weapons are poorly suppressed and, if ordered, the artillery preparation can be repeated. If the projectile is brought up. And to conduct constant artillery reconnaissance and promptly respond to the appearance of fire weapons ... et-that, damn it, it's difficult. The infantry regiment commander yells into the tube obscenities and demands to destroy the firing points, which were not suppressed and new, in the depths, and the artillery commander will not understand why they are attached to him. Such irresponsibility for the destruction of fire weapons in the enemy's defense led to shooting in areas, that is, to nowhere, unwillingness to conduct reconnaissance of enemy artillery and squandering ammunition.
            The cost of this remarkable mastery of the theory and fundamentals of combined arms combat was huge and unjustified losses.

            Quote: El Barto

            Nevertheless, at the first stage of the war, the Germans were superior to us in this element. First of all, due to psychological preparation and discipline of l / s. It is the good technique of combined arms combat that explains their tactical successes ...

            Eh ... The psychological training in the Red Army is higher, it was wonderful. In my opinion, such a moral and psychological level of the army of the first days of the war was achieved again only during the defense of Stalingrad. And that army of the first days of the war, possessing simply fantastic moral and psychological qualities, was destroyed by the command with its "most advanced views" and the stupidity of commanders at a lower level. Fortunately, not all commanders of units and formations turned out to be confused.
            I apologize to those who hold different views.
            1. +1
              23 October 2021 20: 41
              There was a theory, there was a foundation

              Which? According to the current theories In the 30s, the combined arms battle of a group of DD tanks was meant at a distance of 10-20 km from the line of contact. A group of long-range tanks is a tank corps, a mobile compound.
          2. -2
            23 October 2021 20: 27
            Quote: El Barto
            we are talking about combined arms combat. The theory and foundations of combined arms combat were well known and developed in the Red Army.

            This is true. Only now this knowledge has disappeared somewhere. During the first weeks of the war, many commanders and military leaders, "academicians", commanded as if they had not even studied at the school.
            And what is the "peak" of military-scientific thought: the mechanized corps. Which had to be disbanded by the decision of the Headquarters of 10.07 ... Due to the complete insanity of their structure and the absence of everything that should be in and around the MK. The mountain gave birth to a mouse. But there was a theory.
            1. +1
              23 October 2021 20: 31
              Only now this knowledge has disappeared somewhere.

              Punchinel's secret, in a ratio of 1: 4 it is difficult to fight, the Germans also did not really succeed wink
              Due to the complete insanity of their structure

              There was no mobile formations in spacecraft appeared only in June 1940.
              1. -2
                23 October 2021 21: 43
                Quote: strannik1985
                Only now this knowledge has disappeared somewhere.

                There was no mobile formations in spacecraft appeared only in June 1940.

                Are you serious. And who participated in the liberation campaign in September 1939. First Equestrian of Comrade Budyonny?
                1. +1
                  24 October 2021 03: 38
                  Are you serious.

                  Absolutely, the spacecraft as a whole assessed the experience of using army groups as negative. Can you remind me what Budyonny had to do for the 25th TC?
              2. +2
                24 October 2021 01: 06
                Here was a very intelligible and sane article on this topic on VO:
                "... The reason was that the new provisions were not legalized by the charter, which was issued in the form of a draft at the beginning of the war, by that time the conditions of armed struggle for our army were much more difficult than they were supposed to. Therefore, the troops studied and acted on the basis of the 1936 Provisional Field Manual. A relatively narrow circle of commanders and staffs managed to study the new provisions set forth in the guidelines of the People's Commissariat of Defense and textbooks, and few people mastered them while driving troops in exercises.

                The second reason was that the deployment of a large number of formations was carried out mainly at the expense of the assigned personnel, trained on the basis of the territorial training system. This composition did not possess the knowledge that would allow it to quickly master new forms of armed struggle. Finally, in 1941-1942. the material basis of the battle and the operation changed, which required different recommendations and provisions. It caught up with the pre-war one in about 1943, when it became possible to introduce much of the previous theory into the practice of implementing a breakthrough and develop it further on the basis of the richest experience of the Great Patriotic War. "
                https://topwar.ru/92865-sovetskaya-voennaya-teoriya-proryva-oborony-protivnika-nakanune-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny.html
                1. 0
                  24 October 2021 13: 17
                  Quote: El Barto
                  Here was a very intelligible and sane article on this topic on VO:
                  "... The reason was that the new provisions were not legalized by the charter, which came out in the form of a draft at the beginning of the war, by that time the conditions of armed struggle for our army were much more difficult than they were supposed to. ... the troops studied and acted on the basis of the Provisional Field Manual of 1936. The new provisions set forth in the guidelines of the NKO and textbooks managed to be studied by a relatively narrow circle of commanders and staffs, and few people mastered them while driving troops in exercises.

                  The second reason was that the deployment of a large number of formations was carried out mainly at the expense of the assigned personnel, trained on the basis of the territorial training system. ...
                  https://topwar.ru/92865-sovetskaya-voennaya-teoriya-proryva-oborony-protivnika-nakanune-vtoroy-mirovoy-voyny.html

                  This is all true. But this is what surprises me.
                  By all appearances, the military leadership did not have a clear idea of ​​what and how to do when it starts.
                  We were preparing, as it were, for two different wars.
                  On the one hand, they quickly created an impressive static defense (SD), on the other hand, they created 29 MKs, which in such a number and with such a nominal number of tanks in each MK would have only an offensive mission.
                  (the fact that neither one nor the other was created is already understood). I'm interested in something else. It turns out that the command after the defeat of France had a stupor in his head.
                  The fact that one cannot prepare for two types of wars at the same time, they studied it when they commanded divisions. But it was so.
                  And the second thing. Preparations for each of these two wars were conducted in such a way that each of them also failed.
                  For example, what one decided to build SDs on the very border. After all, even then, many officers understood that they could have time to borrow.
                  MK in September 1939 showed the inability to even make marches. They were eliminated. And suddenly, after the defeat of France, it was decided to revive them. What, during these six months, something has changed in the heads of the military and in technology? Or did the command find out some magic word?
                  No, mindless copying of the Wehrmacht corps. You can write many sheets about this.
        2. 0
          23 October 2021 16: 16
          What does Zhukov have to do with it? When Triandafillov developed his theory, the Wehrmacht was in its infancy, and GK Zhukov commanded a division. German generals took a lot from Triandafillov's developments, in particular, the theory of deep operation, that is, the same detours and encirclements. And Zhukov on Khalkhin-Gol broke into the Japanese defense on Mount Bain-Tsagan, surrounded and defeated the Japanese group on the eastern bank of the river.
          1. -1
            23 October 2021 20: 16
            Quote: boris epstein
            What does Zhukov have to do with it? When Triandafillov developed his theory, the Wehrmacht was in its infancy, and GK Zhukov commanded a division. German generals took a lot from Triandafillov's developments, in particular, the theory of deep operation, that is, the same detours and encirclements. And Zhukov on Khalkhin-Gol broke into the Japanese defense on Mount Bain-Tsagan, surrounded and defeated the Japanese group on the eastern bank of the river.

            Zhukov writes that the priority of developing the theory of deep operation belongs to the spacecraft.
            Well, you are our dear Georgy Konstantinich, if you knew everything about the strategy of the Germans, why did you let them get to Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev? Armed with such and such knowledge, you should have foreseen the actions of the enemy even before he thought of something.
            1. +1
              23 October 2021 20: 33
              Well, you are our dear

              NGSH has no right to start a war laughing NGOs too wink
              Chewed dozens of times and still the same thing ...
              1. -2
                23 October 2021 21: 02
                Quote: strannik1985

                The NGSH has no right to start a war, nor does the NCO.

                I explain for those who are especially intelligent. Zhukov was at the post of the General Staff for more than a month from the start of the war. During this time, the Germans approached Leningrad, Kiev and took Smolensk.
                1. +1
                  24 October 2021 08: 02
                  I explain for those who are especially intelligent.

                  Are you not familiar with such words as mastering a strategic (offensive) initiative, preemptive deployment?
            2. 0
              24 October 2021 14: 23
              Another great ukr? When was G.K. Zhukov appointed Chief of the General Staff? In February 1941, what could have been changed throughout the country during this time, if accumulated over the years, including with the participation of Tukhachevsky and company. And radical transformations were needed. Look on the Internet for the "Act of the Transfer of the Red Army from the People's Commissar Voroshilov to the People's Commissar Timoshenko" and read it carefully. Maybe you will understand.
              1. -1
                24 October 2021 16: 03
                Quote: boris epstein
                Another great ukr? When was G.K. Zhukov appointed Chief of the General Staff? In February 1941, what could have been changed throughout the country during this time, if accumulated over the years, including with the participation of Tukhachevsky and company. And radical transformations were needed. Look on the Internet for the "Act of the Transfer of the Red Army from the People's Commissar Voroshilov to the People's Commissar Timoshenko" and read it carefully. Maybe you will understand.

                You write everything correctly. But with all this, it was possible at least on the 22nd to act adequately (reasonably). But the same Zhukov was attacked by some kind of eclipse. After all, he is his so-called. counterstrike slammed half of the mechanized corps that were generally in the western districts.
                I carefully studied this issue and I believe that initially he wanted to destroy the foe. Dashing kaval ... that is, with a tank strike. Having no idea what these mechanized corps, tank and mech divisions and tank regiments are generally capable of. The repeated phrase "the mechanized corps did not have the opportunity to concentrate and had to enter tank units by battalion ..." it should be read like this: "not even being able to organize a human march, having no idea where the regiments and battalions are located, the corps command simply did not control the situation . and tank battalions, bumping into the enemy, entered into battle. Without reconnaissance, without information about the enemy and neighbors, and having no connection with the command. "
                1. 0
                  24 October 2021 16: 11
                  You would be in June 22, 1941, when the border provocation or a real war is still unknown. All the rest is afterthought. Time was playing on the enemy. The counterstrike had to be applied immediately, preventing the enemy from regrouping and digging in. Do you know that in fact World War II began not on September 2, 1, but on August 1939, when the Wehrmacht assault battalion, without receiving an order to postpone the attack on Poland, seized the Jablunkovsky Pass and neither the Polish army nor the diplomatic protests of the Poles failed to remove it from anywhere? Read the "War Diary" by Halder.
                  1. -1
                    25 October 2021 00: 30
                    Quote: boris epstein
                    Time was playing on the enemy. The counterstrike had to be applied immediately, preventing the enemy from regrouping and digging in.

                    What was the need for a (counter) strike?
                    Read the articles by Alexei Ivanov about Soviet intelligence. According to the RM, it turned out that the Wehrmacht troops located at the Soviet border did not have shock mechanized formations - mechanized corps and tank groups. And apparently, the General Staff and Zhukov had the idea to crush the invading enemy troops until they brought up their most effective mechanized units. The decision suggested itself: where were our main mechanized corps? In Ukraine. The GC went there to personally organize everything. He was so confident in the correctness of his plan that he ordered the 9th and 19th mechanized corps, which did not even reach the tank divisions, to rush at all stages.
                    But ... it turned out that even enemy infantry copes with our tanks quite successfully. The Wehrmacht's PD had 75 anti-tank guns, and also anti-tank rifles in large numbers. And also the dominant enemy aircraft, which intensively cut through the Soviet tank and non-tank columns.
                    All these colorful pictures are scattered in the memoirs of Rokossovsky, Ryabyshev, Popel, Baghramyan and many others.
                    But most importantly, the management of mechanized corps and divisions in mechanized corps was ... to put it mildly, not entirely satisfactory. Apparently, seeing that because of the actions of the Luftwaffe, large columns have every chance to evaporate on the march, the commanders of divisions and regiments began to split their formations and units into smaller units, battalions.
                    Because what was the main task for the commanders of corps and divisions? Arrive at the appointed point and at the desired time. And, of course, not just to arrive at the headquarters, but also to bring the army. But, with the training to use radio communications, the fear to use it, since the raid followed immediately, the absence of a regulatory service (they guessed later), someone from the TB arrived first, and someone fell through like hell. Wait for at least half of the troops to gather? ... First, the surprise factor is lost, or they will start bombing at the concentration point ... And they ordered the battalion to attack. Whom, why, what forces are there? ... The main thing is to attack. And since the artillery was teleported in the tail, the artillery barrage was either canceled or carried out by tank guns, stupidly consuming the ammo of tanks ...
                    In the course of the play, it became more and more obvious that no crushing blow was being obtained. The mechanized corps simply bind the advancing enemy in battle.
                    But this also happens through one place. There is a uniform destruction of tank formations.
                    And since there were thousands of tanks, it naturally took several days to destroy them all. In this sense, indeed, the blow (and none of it counter-) stopped the German offensive for a week. I do not know when, immediately or after some time, this shameful act was called a "counterstrike" that almost saved the country.
                    1. -1
                      25 October 2021 16: 33
                      “According to the RM, it turned out that the Wehrmacht troops located at the Soviet border did not have mechanized shock formations - mechanized corps and tank groups.” Have you even read the history of the Great Patriotic War on the top? two-Guderian and Gotha, in the South-Kleist.
                      Army Group North included 23 infantry, 3 tank and 3 motorized divisions.
                      Army Group Center consisted of 34 infantry, 1 cavalry, 9 tank, 6 motorized divisions, and 2 motorized brigades.
                      Army Group South included 25 infantry, 5 tank and 4 motorized divisions, plus 11 German army-7 infantry divisions, 3rd and 4th Romanian armies-13 infantry divisions and 9 brigades, and 8th Hungarian corps-4 infantry brigades. Halder, War Diary.
                      According to the staff, the German tank division had a two-battalion tank regiment. Each battalion has 4 companies of 22 tanks, for a total of 176 tanks. Plus, the division had a reconnaissance battalion consisting of 2 or 3 tank companies of 22 tanks, from 44 to 66 tanks, an anti-tank division, 3 companies of 14 self-propelled guns, total in a tank division from 220 to 236 tanks and 42 self-propelled guns.
                      17 tank divisions with an average of 230 tanks - In the motorized division there was a battalion of self-propelled guns-3 companies of 14 vehicles and an anti-tank battalion-1 company of heavy anti-tank self-propelled guns and 2 companies of anti-tank self-propelled guns. In companies of 14 vehicles. In total, the motorized division had 84 self-propelled guns. The infantry division had a company of self-propelled guns-14 vehicles.
                      Since 1943, it was allowed to have 17 tanks in a company.
                      We count. It turns out only 3910 tanks and 2954 self-propelled guns. Not enough for you ?!
                      Did you serve in the army? Do you have an officer rank? If not, then it is not for you to judge whether counter-attacks are needed or not. There is military science, which is divided into strategy and tactics. So in the section Tactics there is a postulate that it is necessary to fend off breakthroughs by the enemy of his front with concentric counterattacks UNDER THE BASE of the wedge, which Zhukov tried to do, and in general. The USSR needed to gain time for the evacuation of industry and the cadre army in 1941 with its courage, gave the country this time by self-sacrifice. The factories were relocated, specialists, valuable equipment, raw materials were evacuated ... Without this, there would have been no Victory. Although I realized that it is useless to explain this to you. In general, do not try to judge what you do not know.
                      1. 0
                        25 October 2021 21: 46
                        You write about tank groups, the number of tanks and self-propelled guns from the Germans ... in fact. But this became known much later ..
                        And on June 22, when Georgy Konstantinovich went to the SWF, he knew nothing of this. His knowledge of the enemy was based on RM. Neither he nor the General Staff knew anything about the tank groups or the number of motorized corps even on June 23rd. Such a "well thought-out" system for collecting and transmitting information existed then.
                        So, believing in the reliability of the intelligence data provided by RU as in the integrity of the Virgin Mary, he began to organize this strike.
                        You understand that.
                        For the first at least three days, the military leadership lived in complete confidence that it had an undoubted superiority in mechanized forces. And it would be a sin not to take advantage of this. If the situation corresponded to the ideas of the Civil Code and the command as a whole.
                        Unfortunately, his ideas were very different from reality.
                        I really didn't want to write all this. This truth hurts. But the wounds are healing. The truth remains. We have been fed the myth of this counterstrike for a very long time.
                        But in fact, everything was much sadder ...
                        In this "remarkable" operation, a huge number of tanks crashed, and almost all of their SWF. And then there was not even a company of tanks to eliminate the Okuninovskiy pladarm.
                        Read from Baghramyan.
                        If the command of the South-Western Front had at least a tank division in the Senyar, the Germans would not have been able to close the ring east of Kiev. During the first weeks of the war, it dawned on our luminaries of military theory that only tanks could stop the actions of the enemy's motorized corps. Artillery on mechtyag (on tractors) teleported at a speed of 4 km / h and never had time, horse-drawn artillery was destroyed by aircraft on the march (horses were killed, guns had to be thrown) and only tanks turned out to be an effective means of fighting tanks and, in general, with mobile enemy units ... Fast self-propelled guns. But the command of the South-Western Front did not have tanks ...
                    2. -1
                      25 October 2021 16: 35
                      Your rating is minus 634. You shouldn't be allowed to comment on a cannon shot in general. Whose clone?
                      1. -1
                        26 October 2021 16: 47
                        There are more minuses, 642 .. You are going the right way, not a comrade!
            3. 0
              24 November 2021 19: 52
              The deep operation was developed by Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky, Svechin, Varfolomeev, Isserson. Only Isserson lived until 1941, and then in the camps
          2. 0
            24 November 2021 19: 51
            Dragging, sweeping and maneuvering is a traditional style of German warfare since the days of Frederick the Great. In this regard, German doctrine (which has never been a blitzkrieg, there was no such word in German works) is only a logical development of traditional German thinking, taking into account the latest technical developments.

            Deep operation and German doctrine are generally two different things that have similarities only because they are obvious.

            One of the striking differences is that a deep operation was initially created on the condition that the enemy may not have open flanks, while German doctrine, in the absence of the enemy's flanks, begins to limp.
            1. 0
              25 November 2021 11: 25
              Quote: Ol Willy
              The deep operation was developed by Triandafillov, Tukhachevsky, Svechin, Varfolomeev, Isserson. Only Isserson lived until 1941, and then in the camps

              Quote: Ol Willy
              Dragging, sweeping and maneuvering is a traditional style of German warfare since the days of Frederick the Great. In this regard, German doctrine (which has never been a blitzkrieg, there was no such word in German works) is only a logical development of traditional German thinking, taking into account the latest technical developments.

              All the time this topic comes up about a deep operation ... And about the fact that all this was known for a long time, it is understandable ... Here is G.K. in his memoirs he writes about that.
              But all this is casting a shadow on the fence.
              Many debaters cannot understand the difference between a deep operation and the tactics of the Germans to break into the defenses. Once again: the problem in 1941 and 1942 was the ability of the Germans to penetrate the spacecraft defenses with 30% probability. They did this with the help of perfectly organized interaction of infantry, artillery, aviation and tanks. After breaking through our defenses, the Germans could carry out a deep operation. Mobile connections. But first it was necessary to break through the front. They had (fortunately) no more than XNUMX divisions of mobile units. And the rest - the infantry - were simply not capable of a deep operation, since they were moving on foot.
              If you study the course of the war in the first two months of the war, it turns out that the deep operation carried out by the Germans was ... only ONE. Namely, Belarusian in the first week of the war. In Ukraine, for example, they did not carry out any deep operation due to the absence of a second tank group. And nevertheless, in two months they not only reached the Dnieper, but also created bridgeheads. Reading the memoirs, the picture of the dam, which is holding back the enemy with the last bit of strength, is very vividly presented. And the Germans did not need any deep operation for this.
              1. +1
                25 November 2021 12: 56
                Yes, the Germans did not carry out any deep operations for they did not even have such a concept. A deep operation provides for an operational level, and the Germans did not have the very concept of an operational level - this is Svechin's invention.
                This is precisely where many of the problems of the Germans in the war lie. On a tactical level, the Germans were the best in that war. At the strategic level, they were not even average. And the operational level was not recognized at all. Look at Rommel's operations, for example: he was extremely good at tactics, he simply ignored issues of the operational level, which is why he got into harsh batches.

                The Germans generally avoided "hacking" the defense as such, because the whole essence of their doctrine was to prevent swatting with the forehead against the wall and to emphasize the enveloping maneuver. The problems of the Germans with breaking the defense without open flanks became evident near Kursk.
                The Eastern Front of 1941-42 is essentially a war of mobile units with open flanks; such a war requires, in fact, mobility and a high level of coordination between the branches of the armed forces. The Wehrmacht had it - the Red Army does not, in fact, and the reasons for the defeats of the spacecraft become obvious.
                German doctrine was tied to the high mobility of strike forces, which made it possible to achieve a decisive concentration of forces in the most vulnerable directions for the enemy - which required good military intelligence and communications to determine these most vulnerable spots. As soon as mobility disappeared and the effectiveness of reconnaissance decreased significantly, the German victories were also gone.
                1. +1
                  25 November 2021 22: 24
                  Willie, albeit not in a straight line, but our points of view are converging.
                  I do not agree with you that the Germans did not know how to carry out deep operations. They could, as best they could. The Bialystok, Minsk, Kiev, Vyazemsky and Bryansk boilers are the best proof of this. If there were one, well, two boilers, then it could be attributed to luck with operational illiteracy. But five !!! huge cauldrons ... it speaks of the skill of the performers. And where I agree with you is that they fought competently. They did not hit the wall like a ram, they tried to look for weak spots in the defense, they loved to attack at the joints, instantly used the open flanks. And I must say that half of these opportunities were provided by our commanders. Those who did not take good care of the flanks, withdrew their units without informing their neighbors and often without coordinating with their command ... the list is very long. When the main shortcomings in command and control were gradually eliminated, it became hard for the Germans.
  28. +1
    22 October 2021 12: 04
    However, in 1937-1938, partisan-sabotage detachments and groups were disbanded, caches and caches were liquidated, many experienced personnel were repressed.
    this branch was supervised by Tukhachevsky. And apparently not by chance - having connections with the German General Staff (up to working for him)) Tukhachevsky was able to discern the importance and usefulness of the idea, which was being fully embodied by the Germans.
    The defeat (and it was a complete defeat) of the partisan-sabotage forces was one of the most terrible pre-war mistakes. Well, Starinov was not shot ...
    1. 0
      22 October 2021 23: 56
      Quote: Mikhail3
      However, in 1937-1938, partisan-sabotage detachments and groups were disbanded, caches and caches were liquidated, many experienced personnel were repressed.
      this branch was supervised by Tukhachevsky. And apparently not by chance - having connections with the German General Staff (up to working for him)) Tukhachevsky was able to discern the importance and usefulness of the idea, which was being fully embodied by the Germans.
      The defeat (and it was a complete defeat) of the partisan-sabotage forces was one of the most terrible pre-war mistakes. Well, Starinov was not shot ...

      This structure has not yet been described. Or it may not be studied.
      the fact is that these units or detachments were deeply conspiratorial. That is, two or two people in the district could know about them. But it was they who were subjected to repression. If the defendant reported a secret structure, then the investigators could have no doubt that this was the personal army of the district commander, naturally, to seize power. After all, no one knew anything about them.
      If the person under investigation did not inform the investigators, then sooner or later one of the saboteurs fell into the hands of the NKVD and reported what he knew. And then the investigation launched the case of an underground organization.
      1. 0
        23 October 2021 08: 33
        No) the NKVD made a lot of failures, mistakes, etc. etc. But these people have never been fools. And of course, no district commander knew anything about these people) Of course, they had silk shoes and other emergency identification systems, but that's all.
        In general, all these units were defeated as Tukhachevsky's personal army. By the way, this was the logic. They had to work, receiving orders strictly from Moscow, for which they had several communication channels that did not need any intermediate links. But where did the orders come from? From Tukhachevsky's headquarters, of course. Imagine thousands of well-equipped, trained, completely secret fighters, ready to obey the orders of the headquarters. Tukhachevsky's headquarters ... To what extent does their loyalty extend, and to whom does it belong? Question.
        However, no one bothered to take over control. To merge these guys with the NKVD troops, for example, arrange a rotation, pass through a fine sieve ... Instead, they were identified thanks to the registration, and, without further ado, they shot. It is terrible to imagine what damage the USSR suffered as a result of these shootings.
  29. +2
    22 October 2021 23: 26
    Dear colleagues!
    On this topic, I recommend investigative journalism, of the Soviet period,
    called "Maxim does not get in touch."
    Based on the diary of SS officer Neumann.
    There is also about the training of the SS and about the training of sabotage groups of the Red Army.
    Blessed memory of our heroes - young men and women, they were not even 20 years old !!! - Were not afraid to compete with heavily armed and trained Essians!
    1. 0
      23 October 2021 08: 37
      I read Skorzeny. His training, and the preparation of the SS, this is some kind of rest camp) A gang of pathetic amateurs compared to
      Quote: Don Analyst
      boys and girls, they were not even 20 years old!

      The pinnacle of Skorzeny's preparation is a ten-kilometer cross, seemingly even without weapons)) ...
      The USSR destroyed the partisan structure before the war. And he began training his special forces during the war. And immediately, right there, he surpassed all these naughty-play "werewolves" in teaching technique.
      1. 0
        23 October 2021 10: 25
        That's just, they began to create them when the Germans stood near Moscow. Although, according to the idea, these units were supposed to make it impossible to advance to a depth of more than 200 km. The detachments were supposed to destroy the enemy's transport and, first of all, the fuel trucks.
  30. +2
    23 October 2021 01: 16
    So, comrade Samsonov - but to say that under the Austrian lock-up - no fights ...
    And as for the special forces ... you do not think that if you take OSNAZ - then to put it mildly - to compare with the Germans - but there is no one. Shootstaffs are assholes, policemen. Huntsmen ... Well, too, you know, they were discharged in black, you know where the border was not passed? And the rangers were driven in the ass by the Northern Fleet. Emanarot. A man with a scar? Yes, a couple of local, sabotage operations. Well, let's at least then remember Kovpak - and think about it. who is cooler
  31. 0
    23 October 2021 16: 00
    always the loser wants to belittle the winner's victory, and make his defeat accidental or due to some force majeure.
    Therefore, you should not pay attention to the memoirs of any skorzeny and other shortcomings. You need to write about your heroes and not forget!
    You can write whatever you want about the Germans. But they again received a dyule from our grandparents.
    Not in the first place.
    All these stories about how smart they were and what kind of discipline they have with technique - just from a doggy turd.
    Discipline in SA from 43 to 45 was. And in partisan units. Where there was no discipline, the personnel quickly ended.
    About the technique. KV, T-34, PPSh, Il 2, SVT 40, Yaki 1-9 and LA 5F, 7. ISU 152 and Su 76, Katyusha and Andryusha and much more. That's who had the technique! Which the Germans tried to copy the whole war by the way.
    And in the partisan workshops they did everything. From the repair of weapons to the creation of IEDs, superior to serial ones.
    And the most important thing. People! People!
    from a simple grandfather of a partisan and a soldier with PPSh (Matrosov and the like) to tankers and pilots (Balabanov, Gastello)
    AND MILLIONS OTHERS.
    About 20 years ago I thought. After Afgan, our people are not the same. Not capable of what the ancestors did.
    And suddenly!
    Chechnya.
    Just a huge amount of feats, courage and courage. Both single and mass (6th company)
    And even here and now.
    From a simple soldier who went out with a machine gun on the road 080808 (open well-exposed area, i.e. if the rodents began to shoot, he would have died 100%) and a corporal in Syria, who was left alone in a combat-ready state, but did not chicken out and did not abandon his own, to Filippov, who blew himself up and his enemies with a grenade!
    Author! You need to write about your own. On the organization of divisions with 12 people in the territory occupied by the enemy, On the passage through the Alps, On the attack of actually already dead soldiers, On the Varyag, Port Arthur, the Brest fortress, the Storm of the Seelow Heights, On Prokhorovka, On the sky of the 43rd over the Kuban, On Stalingrad. Both TD and TP and MANY MANY OTHERS.
  32. 0
    23 October 2021 19: 30
    Quote: Saboteur
    After Afgan, our people are not the same. Not capable of what the ancestors did.

    Come on. How many people have gone to Donbass? What, is not this heroism? There was a man sitting somewhere in the Stavropol Territory, what does it really matter to him that the fascists will establish their rule in Donetsk? But no, he put on a "slide" and whistled his chest under the bullets, and not one like that, not ten or a hundred. Not by order, not for the grandmother, like some Jerzy Dzhevulsky, who guarded Turchynov in Slavyansk ...
  33. 0
    27 November 2021 12: 13
    Unfortunately, the article is dust and sugar.
    What "ideal" were the SS troops. DIRECT TO STAY !!!!
    And about the fact that a simple "bast shoe" soldier of the Red Army was attached to these ideal golds by a simple "bast" soldier of the Red Army, it was said in passing, at the end of the article.
    Conclusion: article like a blurry orgasm, score 3 ----.
    For re-examination
  34. 0
    April 30 2023 23: 52
    The fact is that there was a struggle for power. Stalin eliminated the "fifth column", the Trotskyists (How Stalin defeated the "fifth column" and saved the people from defeat in the Great Patriotic War). Obviously, the conspirators were among the military elite. The fall of every Trotskyist, revolutionary internationalist was accompanied by a purge of his entourage and team.

    Yes, the author, well, you are a stupid person! But nothing that Stalin himself was a revolutionary?