Timid hope. Does the Russian naval aviation have a future?
The article offered to the reader is heavy in its texture. And it must be emphasized right away that now, after the change in the leadership of the Marine aviation For the Navy, positive trends have emerged in real solutions to its problems.
However, the article is about problems, and its meaning is to objectively reveal them, not to let them be swept under the plinth (under the pretext of “no money,” “some have responsibility, and others have the possibilities and resources to solve them,” “these problems are now yours, so you and… sweep them up so that they are not (visible) ”). In essence and meaning - to achieve (squeeze) their resolution and elimination.
The prospects and capabilities of Naval Aviation are a topic for a separate article.
Taking into account the specifics of the topic, word-for-word citation is widely used, and, as a rule, not just "Internet resources", but publications that have all the appropriate permissions and approvals from the authorized official bodies.
Previously, the author has repeatedly touched upon the problems of Naval Aviation, since 2007 - articles “Aviation of the Navy. Was. There is? Will be?" and articles of 2018 in the "Independent Military Review" "The fiery sky of the Russian fleet":
However, all this in no way relieves the responsibility of the relevant officials of the Naval Aviation itself.
"Blind Killer Whale"
MAKS-2021 (from TASS publications):
Below the author will show the real cost of all this neuroanalytics, "artificial intelligence" and similar advertising dregs.
I would like to emphasize that on the basis of advertising materials from the developer itself (in principle, we will not give a number of harsh comments on the Kasatka testing network).
At MAKS-2021, at the Radar-MMS stand, an advertising video of the Kasatka complex (photo on the right side of the figure) was played with some digital parameters that fully characterize the real “value” (in quotes) and the inability of Kasatka to actually solve problems by destination.
So, the interval of setting the RSB-16MK radio acoustic buoys of the intercepting barrier is 2 s (screen from the advertising video "Radar-MMS"). With an airplane speed of about 500 km / h, these 2 s also mean a linear interval of buoy placement of about ... 270 m. That is, with an overlap of 0,75, the detection range of a single RGAB turns out to be about 200 m!
As they say - "Repin's picture sailed."
Those who wish can recalculate the theoretical reserve of the RGAB on the plane with the "Kasatka" for its search performance, but there is little practical sense in this - in view of the obvious scantiness of this figure.
After that, it is appropriate to look at the public procurement website and inquire about the volume and cost of contracts for the RSL-16MK buoys (with their shown negligible effectiveness as part of the "newest" (in quotes) search and targeting system offered by the Navy).
As a matter of fact, all this is well known to specialists and has been discussed for a long time both in the special and open press, for example, in the previously mentioned article in NVO:
This raises logical questions - why do we have such PPPs "wrong"? And why are Western planes and helicopters operating very effectively on our submarines (including the latest projects)?
And the answer to these questions will be in the spirit of the times - the head organization on the topic in the Russian Federation was appointed (by the former leadership of Naval Aviation through the relevant structures of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) an office that had never been involved in such work (that is, simply with zero experience and the same scientific and technical backlog ).
Apparently, according to Mr. Antsev, "fully in action" for the search complex - this is "the connection is transmitting something", the screens "show something": take the fleet of the complex (and most importantly - pay)!
Ability to solve problems as intended?
And what is it?
In any case, it is obvious from these statements that the head of the enterprise himself, to put it mildly, does not quite understand. Which, however, is not surprising, since the chief designer of the complex himself (who has neither specialized education nor experience in the subject) has similar problems!
During the military-technical forum "Army-2015", an extremely interesting and useful round table "Marine underwater weapon (IGO): realities and prospects "( link).
... “Magnetometric guidance systems for naval underwater weapons in conditions of massive hydraulic resistance. Theory and Results ",
with whom the actively lobbied magnetometer and (concurrently) chief designer (as of 2015) of the Kasatka complex spoke (and was represented by persons from the Naval Aviation).
There, representatives of the Maritime Aviation "Radar-MMS" who were present (at the round table discussed, among other things, the issues of Naval Aviation, more on this below) was declared as "the lead organization on the subject."
When discussing magnetometric topics directly at the round table, there was a piquant moment when representatives of the Navy and the chief designer himself at first declared about the alleged “impossibility of countering and imitating” magnetometric systems, and an hour later, when discussing the problem of high-speed submarine missiles, “the need to finance simulators for full-scale development of magnetometric guidance channels (MMK) ”. To the author's subsequent question about how this statement correlates with the postulate expressed an hour before these statements about the alleged "technical impossibility" of such an imitation, the answer from the persons of the Navy and the respected chief designer was silence.
Of course, imitation of a magnetic field is not only possible, but has already been realized for a long time. In fact, we have a play on words: SGPD (means of hydroacoustic counteraction) - "hydroacoustic", and MMK - "magnetic", in which the fact that some SGPD also have means of imitation of a magnetic field is completely omitted. Moreover, such cheating (in this particular case, this word accurately characterizes what was happening) does not occur in some lobbies or smoking rooms, but takes place in the highest official documents of promising topics! Unfortunately, the situation is such that today it is not only possible to lie, but, as a rule, it is possible with impunity, including in “high documents” and the highest “decision-makers”.
Returning to the work on search and targeting systems (PPS) of anti-submarine and patrol complexes, there is an opinion that the problem of the patrol aviation of the Navy is allegedly "in the plane", but "there are a lot of those who want to develop the complex" (one of the literal statements on a specialized forum on the Internet) ... Let's call a spade a spade: in this case, we are talking about the mass of those who want to "master the money" for teaching staff, but there are big doubts about the ability of individuals and organizations that have never done this to actually perform the work.
So, in the case of Kasatka, the magnetometer became the chief designer of the search (that is, first of all, the hydroacoustic complex, and secondly - the radar). With a corresponding result. With equal "success" (in quotation marks), one could appoint a cook or a stove-maker.
In this whole situation, the funny thing is that, having already received harsh criticism of everything that was created in Kasatka, and the numbers in advertising, the corresponding "especially effective managers" of "Radar-MMS" solved the problem, so to speak, on a "high methodological level ”- removing the numbers in the new version of the advertising video (with the same plot).
Visually - a new video:
"Old video" (with numbers and names "):
Only here at MAKS-2021 it was the “old video” that was playing at the Radar-MMS stand (photo above).
A two-second dumping of buoys on it is not just a verdict on the Kasatka complex, it is just a shame and disgrace to its developers and leaders of the organization, who for all these years did not bother to figure out what a modern teaching staff is (and exposing this ignorance to the public) !
At the same time, it should be noted that, while harshly criticizing the leadership of "Radar-MMS" in this particular case, it is necessary to note and emphasize their active work in various areas of innovation.
Yes, they were not always successful. Yes, sometimes the necessary and relevant topics were thrown at the moment when the “critical point” had already been passed, and it was already “starting to work out”. Yes, sometimes they were engaged in frankly unfounded fantasies. However, the very fact of their active work for the future (of which there are certainly serious positive results) stands out noticeably in a positive way against the background of our defense industry (and industry), and the question of translating all this positive groundwork into a practical (and financial) plane is the need an objective and critical analysis of all the work of the company - both successes and failures, with a subsequent change in technical policy.
And where did the fleet look, the leadership of the Naval Aviation?
And the answer will be where her ex-chief came after his dismissal from the RF Armed Forces (and where he carefully prepared for himself a "soft chair" for many years) ...
Hanging "Novella"
A logical question arises: what about the really only organization in the Russian Federation - TsNPO "Leninets" and its complex "Novella" (export "Sea Serpent")?
To begin with, the photograph is a modernized Il-38 with anti-ship missiles.
Alas, a photo of the Indian Navy, because our Navy does not need aircraft with missiles. As a matter of fact, he did not need the Novella itself (for the head and promising Killer Whale from Radar-MMS was announced). From article "Anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy: simulated targets and blanks instead of weapons":
The following quote will be appropriate here (direct link to the pdf file on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):
... the generation of targeting data in the training station and the issuance of signals for the control system for the preparation and dropping of search and destruction means, according to information from the RGS. In addition, in the course of flights, a comprehensive assessment of 1HV1 products (radar) was carried out; 1НВ2 (RGS); НВ5 (ТТС) REC "Novella P-38", as well as ... According to preliminary estimates, all test flights are credited.
So, 2018. State tests of the Novella itself were completed back in the 2000s, the first production aircraft of the Navy completed its modernization in 2014 (Indian, with the Sea Serpent - in 2005). To put it mildly, we were not in a hurry to "lift the restriction" of the Act of State Special Tests (there is no talk about new buoys any more), which, given the passionate love for Kasatka advertising brochures, is not surprising.
Yes, in a number of aspects, Novella is outdated, but it is a really working, concretely effective (with a number of reservations) complex, which was made by experienced specialists and an organization that alone had the necessary experience and potential in the Russian Federation.
Moreover, the complex was successful in the foreign market (Il-38SD aircraft of the Indian Navy), despite the fact that, at the suggestion of some bureaucrats, it was simply delivered in a slaughtered form (from the appearance shown and announced at salons and exhibitions). Moreover, there was even a question about the modernization of Tu-142ME aircraft of the Indian Navy under the Sea Serpent, which, unfortunately, was not implemented to a large extent due to the past leadership and a number of specialists of Tupolev PJSC (not always, unfortunately, who understood that "the problems are solved not by the glider, but by the complex").
The consequence of this was that the Russian Tu-142M did not receive a full-fledged modernization (and a number of statements in the media about "Hephaestus" and similar advertising dregs from the point of view of the real tasks of these aviation complexes cause only a sad smile).
Long song "Apatita"
For a long time, the topic of the promising patrol complex "Apatit" has been hanging in the air Link.
Today we have a situation of rapidly dwindling resource of the Il-38 and Tu-142M aircraft and, in fact, we are on the verge of simply losing the patrol and anti-submarine aircraft of the Navy.
Helicopter failure "Kema"
By the senior instructor-navigator of the research department of the combat use of the naval aviation branches 859 of the Center for combat use, Major I.M. Stasik (link, pdf):
The basis for the armament of the Ka-27M anti-submarine helicopter is the radar command-tactical system developed by the JSC "Corporation" Fazotron-NIIR " reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft weapons.
Well, let's deal with the next “unparalleled wunderwaffe”, allegedly “ahead of the helicopters of“ potential adversaries ”in the field of modern electronics.
The first thing to note is that initially the Ka-27 helicopter had the "Octopus" search and sighting system developed by the Kiev Research Institute of Hydraulic Instruments (there were two centers for anti-submarine aviation work in the USSR - in Leningrad ("Leninets") and in Kiev). Yes, the system is imperfect from the height of today, so it was thrown out from the helicopter.
Is it logical
How to say. Taking into account the fact that instead of the old PPS, a new one was never found, and instead of it two crutches were installed - RGA (radio-hydroacoustic equipment) "Kema" and KTS (command-tactical system) with a radar and a lowered GAS (OGAS).
Details on Kema and its analysis - based on the materials on it demonstrated at the Army-2020 forum at the stand of the Naval Aviation of the Navy (here).
What can I say?
There are really no analogues: in terms of rudimentarity and antiquity of this "search crutch" Ka-27M. "Kema" in essence is not even "Berkut" (PPS Il-38 developed in the 60s), but in fact a rollback to "Baku" (Be-12 developed in the late 50s)!
Only passive non-directional buoys simply exclude the possibility of using modern illumination modes, and the parameters of the positioning accuracy of the RGAB are extremely low and do not provide for the formation of an effective spatial antenna array. In fact, we have a "set of single detectors", but with digital processing and recording in separate channels. Moreover, "Kema" does not provide the development of the aiming point of the weapon (about the consequences of this - below).
It is striking that the key features of modern Western teaching staff have been openly written since the beginning of the 90s, but "foreigners are not a decree to us."
However, at the same time, the domestic experience was forgotten, for example, "backlit acoustics" which had already been successfully implemented in the teaching staff since the times of the USSR. Those. forgotten what was once tested, mastered (in series and combat training), is available ("stitched") in the old systems in service (such as "illumination" from explosive sound sources).
The radar developed by "Fazotron-NIIR" is a solid, solid radar from a reputable developer ... only that had no previous experience in solving special anti-submarine missions. For example, the possibility of performing special work of the radar station, which was successfully done by the "old" Ka-27, raises questions, for example, in the memoirs in the "Sea Collection" of Captain 1st Rank V. Zvada, link, pdf.
In 1987, for the first time in combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, the "unconventional method" of detecting a submarine was successfully used using the ship's navigation station and the Ka-27PL helicopter radar station. This was a very promising area of anti-submarine warfare.
An extremely unfortunate decision is to preserve for the lowered Ros-VM Ka-27M an actually old high-frequency antenna (instead of a modern low-frequency antenna that was supposed to be Okeanpribrom).
From the article Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics":
Multi-position distributed operating modes of the modern Western OGAS HELRAS:
Obviously, Ros-VM is not capable of anything like that, it just catastrophically lags behind in characteristics and has a short detection range for submarines.
There is an opinion that the Ka-27M is a "temporary solution", but "very soon" we will have "grace" with the "newest helicopter" "Lamprey".
Therefore, the modernization of the Ka-27M went according to "the most budgetary option, as well as tank T-72 ". Yes, to a large extent this is so (for example, that is why the radar did not have a phased array, but a simple old scheme with a "mirror" antenna was used). However, the T-72B3 tank, with all its shortcomings, has real capabilities to destroy targets, but the Ka-27M has very big problems with this (more on that below).
Rake rake "Lamprey"
Now for the Lamprey.
July 24. TASS:
“Now we are working on the development of a set of design documentation, which will be created by 2023. Last year we received advances and brought them to the suppliers. All technical specifications have also been agreed with each of the suppliers, ”he said.
Earlier, within the framework of the Army-2020 forum, the Russian Helicopters holding signed a development contract with the Ministry of Defense for the promising deck-based Minoga helicopter.
So, "terms of reference have been agreed," "advances have been issued."
Excuse me, but for what ?!
For our objectively, with a scientific and technical basis for the complex, the situation is such that even the TTZ cannot be written on it, there are too many unclear questions that need to be dealt with based on the results of serious and deep tests and special research projects!
Actually, the "assessment of the situation" from "academic and applied science":
AE Borodin (Far Eastern Branch of the Section of Applied Problems under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "Methods for monitoring the underwater situation by advanced aircraft systems (APLK) in a naval network-centric war" (link, pdf):
I emphasize once again that there is simply no groundwork for R&D on the new complex, there are separate experiments, but objectively: just in order to obtain a high-quality product (search complex) in a reasonable and fairly short time, special studies and tests are needed. And getting involved in OCD without them is another gamble, the result of which will be obviously crooked and oblique.
I repeat - "the problems are solved not by the glider (of the aircraft), but by the complex"!
"Shooting milk from wooden machine guns" - about anti-submarine weapons of the Navy
The problem of complete disregard by our Naval Aviation of the practical use of weapons has already been raised - "Anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy: simulated targets and blanks instead of weapons":
Anti-submarine weapons of naval aviation are torpedoes, aviation submarine missiles (APR), gravitational underwater shells: corrected anti-submarine aerial bombs (GPS KAB PL) and conventional anti-submarine aerial bombs.
Taking into account the timing of weapons of the 1st and 2nd generations, only the UMGT-1 torpedo with a water-activated silver-zinc battery and a powerful low-frequency homing system (CLS) "Waterfall" (alas, having extremely low noise immunity) remained in the naval aviation. The service life of the UMGT-1 torpedoes is obviously near-limiting, and the efficiency in the conditions of using the SGPD is extremely low. The use of UMGT-1 is impossible in areas with shallow depths and in the Baltic Sea (due to insufficient salinity for the use of the battery).
That is, the basis of the ammunition is the APR-2, which, although it has an outdated SSN, but with good noise immunity. However, the APR-2 has an extremely short cruising range, and, accordingly, very high requirements for target designation accuracy. Her service life is also close to the limit.
Here it is necessary to emphasize once again that the Naval Aviation of the Navy does not have any statistics on the practical use of UMGT-1 and APR-2. All cases of their practical application are only in the form of periodic industrial tests and the only case of using UMGT-1 in the early 90s at the Pacific Fleet on the initiative of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate of the Navy. In fact, the price of such “combat training” (in quotes) is similar to “voice shooting from wooden machine guns” in the infantry. Of course, replacing the actual firing from a machine gun with a tree and a "tra-ta-ta" voice - and in a nightmare not a single land commander will dream, so high-ranking of them should still ask how the fleet (with its aviation) got to "Life like this" and the complete discrediting of their combat training?
At the same time, taking into account the extremely low noise immunity of the UMGT-1, only APRs are of value for a real war, however, the question of accurate target designation arises sharply on them. This question is quite solvable, already resolved: in the old teaching staff (the times of the USSR) and new ones - the development of experienced specialists ("Novella").
However, for the same Ka-27M, everything turns out very badly. "Kema" does not develop an aiming point, that is, an attack based on the data of passive buoys is impossible. What remains is OGAS - with the development of firing data of the KTS based on its data. The problem here is that the work of the OGAS is not secretive, and since there are no idiots on the submarines, they perfectly understand what will happen after the close operation of the OGAS (with a short range). Accordingly - change of course and evasion ... After which the APR simply does not have enough range in order to compensate for the submarine's evasion.
There are similar problems with GPS.
In general, it was an ingenious invention of the times of the USSR, and the key factor here was the noise immunity factor: if ordinary airborne torpedoes confidently went to the SGPD, having extremely small chances of a real defeat of submarines in combat conditions, then the GPS with high-frequency and vertically oriented SSNs had almost absolute noise immunity, and accordingly - a high probability of hitting a target in real combat conditions (counteraction).
However, it is not just the XNUMXst century, the first quarter of it is already coming to an end, and taking this into account, the GPS themselves look quite antique. The solution, which for a long time not just hung in the air, but was worked out in detail - equipping the GPS with a small-sized propulsive complex with a sharp increase in performance characteristics and efficiency, was never implemented.
Classic anti-submarine bombs, despite the extremely low probability of hitting conventional submarines in the ocean, still remain relevant for shallow depths, hitting submarines lying on the ground and targets such as subversive midget submarines and underwater means of movement of saboteurs.
So, UMGT-1 and APR-2, which were the basis of anti-submarine aircraft ammunition, are not just outdated, but simply at the limit of their service life.
June 24, TASS:
“In the future, to replace the APR-3ME, it is planned to develop a small-sized aircraft anti-submarine torpedo, significantly superior to the existing models in terms of cruising range,” Obnosov said.
Apparently, things are not going well with underwater weapons with KTRV, if torture to the APR-3M series is presented in the media as an achievement.
In essence, the APR-3M is actually transferred to the modern technological base of the APR-3 developed in the 70s - 80s (with a slight increase in characteristics). In the same 90s, much more advanced APRs were developed in the "Region", however, due to a lack of funds, their development was then discontinued in favor of the openly budget APR-3M.
However, the main problem of APR-3M is test statistics.
From the article “The price of a torpedo crew. To ensure the combat capability of the Navy, the cost of testing and shooting is important " L. Bozin, the former head of the torpedo operation department of the 28th Research Institute of the Navy:
Difficult conditions of the application environment categorically require large statistics of torpedo firing, including in situations close to real combat ...
Example: During the testing period of the StingRay mod.1 torpedo, 150 firings were fired. However, it should be borne in mind that during the development of the first modification of the StingRay mod.0, about 500 tests were carried out. Reducing this number of firing for mod.1 allowed the system for collecting and recording data of all firing and the implementation on its basis of a "dry range" for preliminary testing of new CLO solutions based on these statistics.
Mr. Obnosov should have heard on this issue not the so-called “effective managers” of the “Region”, but the chief designer of the APR-3M. This is a very experienced specialist at a respectable age with a quiet voice, whose tough questions managers try very hard not to hear. I believe that after clarifying the situation with the chief designer himself, BV Obnosov's public statements would have been much more accurate and careful.
Here it would be appropriate to recall the 2015 article again. "Marine Underwater Weapons (MPS): Realities and Prospects":
And the result ( link):
Due to the fact that the declared characteristics (for an ultra-small product) have raised doubts among a number of specialists, I will specially cite an excerpt from A.F.Myandin's rough calculations:
The last time it was reported to the decision of the management of the Corporation "TRV" and inclusion in the list of promising jobs in the fall of 2015, but was buried by "effective managers" of the "Region" (the phrase of one of them - "we have so much money now that we do not need anything" ).
Now, after the death of Myandin, we can forget about it, because “starting with what is left” is at least 10 years of hard work with a mass of failures and failures (as it was in reality in recent history on this topic), and today no one of the customers will not allow “to pass this road again”.
Commentary (ibid.) Of an official with the DOGOZ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:
So (while maintaining the existing technical policy of the "Region" and the Concern "TRV"), all that remains is to "eat up" the old groundwork created during the time of E.S.Shakhidzhanov (for more details “Anti-torpedoes. We are still ahead, but they are already overtaking us "), and accordingly for our aviation there is only one option - the maximum forcing of work on the "packet" torpedo (based on experience and the groundwork on the topic "Answer"). This is the only real option, everything else is manilovism.
A lively discussion on this topic developed during the round table. GB Tikhonov, a representative of KMPO Gidropribor JSC, voiced a proposal to carry out a “short R&D” project to develop an aircraft torpedo based on the MGT-1 small torpedo (product 294), a warhead of a broadband mine complex. It is categorically impossible to agree with this proposal, since the new small-sized torpedo of the "Packet" complex has significantly higher performance characteristics, and it is advisable to consider it as a single basic model of a small-sized torpedo of the Navy, with the provision of application from ships, submarines, aviation and as a PLUR warhead. At the same time, for this, it is necessary to introduce telecontrol and anti-torpedo mode on the modernized version of this torpedo (originally built into it in terms of power reserve).
Well, in fact, the Naval Aviation itself should very carefully figure out what kind of cat in a poke she received (and "is there a cat in that bag at all").
The practice of "testing weapons" (specially taken in quotation marks) today is as follows link:
Based on the materials of the video recording of the processes of dropping products from the helicopter, it was established that the products of the KAB PL on the air section of the trajectory worked normally, after splashdown they emitted probing signals and separated from the float in accordance with the specified operating mode. The terms of reference for flight and sea experiments under the Zagon-2 qualification testing program with the participation of specialists from our Center have been completed in full and with high quality.
"All is well, beautiful marquise"?
In the acts - yes.
But in fact, very bad questions arise: why were such tests carried out without a real target submarine?
Yes, at the time of testing there were no running boats in the Black Sea Fleet, but they were in other fleets! The above case is a clear example of outright hack, both with programs and test methods, and simply with the attitude to weapons in our anti-submarine aviation, and here the most stringent measures are needed to bring to life and realize the measure of responsibility and military duty for the task entrusted.
At a minimum, we need extensive testing of all (I emphasize, all: both old and new) weapons of the naval aviation in the conditions of their actual use (including modern SGPD, shallow depths, etc.). Today our naval aviation is practically unarmed.
PS
Calling a spade a spade, all of the above means the actual non-combat capability of the anti-submarine aviation of the Navy.
The point of this article is a public and harsh exposing of acute problems. For their subsequent solution and raking the Augean stables. In the current military-political situation, we simply have no right to be weak.
These facts are only part of the picture of the grave state of the Russian Naval Aviation.
At the same time, I repeat, there are positive changes, and in some cases, very dramatic.
There is also an understanding that "it is impossible to continue living and serving like this." For example, the head of the research department (operation and application of hydroacoustics) of PPI and PLC (MA Navy) Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Tyurkin (link, pdf):
There are opportunities for solving the problems of Naval Aviation (even taking into account the difficult financial situation).
There is still time.
While there is, albeit a little.
The question is in the actions of specific officials.
The author is not familiar with them, but the fact that they decided to take responsibility for the Naval Aviation at a very difficult moment for it characterizes them positively.
We wish them success in this.
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