Timid hope. Does the Russian naval aviation have a future?

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The article offered to the reader is heavy in its texture. And it must be emphasized right away that now, after the change in the leadership of the Marine aviation For the Navy, positive trends have emerged in real solutions to its problems.

However, the article is about problems, and its meaning is to objectively reveal them, not to let them be swept under the plinth (under the pretext of “no money,” “some have responsibility, and others have the possibilities and resources to solve them,” “these problems are now yours, so you and… sweep them up so that they are not (visible) ”). In essence and meaning - to achieve (squeeze) their resolution and elimination.



The prospects and capabilities of Naval Aviation are a topic for a separate article.

Taking into account the specifics of the topic, word-for-word citation is widely used, and, as a rule, not just "Internet resources", but publications that have all the appropriate permissions and approvals from the authorized official bodies.

Previously, the author has repeatedly touched upon the problems of Naval Aviation, since 2007 - articles “Aviation of the Navy. Was. There is? Will be?" and articles of 2018 in the "Independent Military Review" "The fiery sky of the Russian fleet":

... the problems of our naval aviation are not really technical, but organizational. Let's start with the fact that the research organization of naval aviation is included not in the structure of the Navy, but in the Aerospace Forces (and the relationship between "ship" and "aviation" organizations is an extremely painful issue), and ending with issues of banal funding. The obvious priority of the Navy is submarines (in relation to which there are many questions on various kinds of problems and efficiency of spending). A much lower priority is surface ships, and aviation is simply in the role of a stepdaughter.

However, all this in no way relieves the responsibility of the relevant officials of the Naval Aviation itself.

"Blind Killer Whale"


MAKS-2021 (from TASS publications):

“The Kasatka search and sighting system is a large-scale project, which consists in integrating all kinds of elements of modern equipment on board any carrier: aircraft, helicopter, ekranoplan, drone. The composition of the Kasatka equipment is impressive: radar, magnetometric, electron-optical, radio-hydroacoustic and other systems, data processing from which is carried out by an information and control system based on a modern computing platform, ”the executive director of Radar MMS told TASS during MAKS-2021 Ivan Antsev.


“The software of the Kasatka complex is built according to the most modern principles using artificial intelligence and neuroanalytics. Thanks to the use of artificial intelligence, the Kasatka PPK has incorporated technologies that provide self-learning, ”Antsev said. According to him, "Kasatka" regularly undergoes modernization, during which the complex integrates modern technologies in the field of information processing, graphics, cartography, as well as new equipment.

Below the author will show the real cost of all this neuroanalytics, "artificial intelligence" and similar advertising dregs.

I would like to emphasize that on the basis of advertising materials from the developer itself (in principle, we will not give a number of harsh comments on the Kasatka testing network).

At MAKS-2021, at the Radar-MMS stand, an advertising video of the Kasatka complex (photo on the right side of the figure) was played with some digital parameters that fully characterize the real “value” (in quotes) and the inability of Kasatka to actually solve problems by destination.


So, the interval of setting the RSB-16MK radio acoustic buoys of the intercepting barrier is 2 s (screen from the advertising video "Radar-MMS"). With an airplane speed of about 500 km / h, these 2 s also mean a linear interval of buoy placement of about ... 270 m. That is, with an overlap of 0,75, the detection range of a single RGAB turns out to be about 200 m!

As they say - "Repin's picture sailed."

Those who wish can recalculate the theoretical reserve of the RGAB on the plane with the "Kasatka" for its search performance, but there is little practical sense in this - in view of the obvious scantiness of this figure.

After that, it is appropriate to look at the public procurement website and inquire about the volume and cost of contracts for the RSL-16MK buoys (with their shown negligible effectiveness as part of the "newest" (in quotes) search and targeting system offered by the Navy).

As a matter of fact, all this is well known to specialists and has been discussed for a long time both in the special and open press, for example, in the previously mentioned article in NVO:

The extreme obsolescence of the PPS is the main drawback of our anti-submarine aviation. At the same time, we still consider hydroacoustic buoys (RGAB) as separate (single) hydroacoustic stations. Our “field of buoys” is a set of single receivers, while in the West, already in the 1980s, the transition to joint complex processing of signals from the RGAB field as from a single antenna began, that is, RGAB became a “sensor”. This technical solution has dramatically increased the search performance of anti-submarine aircraft. With the advent of low-frequency RGAB-emitters (LFA) in the early 1990s, detection of the lowest-noise submarines was ensured.

This raises logical questions - why do we have such PPPs "wrong"? And why are Western planes and helicopters operating very effectively on our submarines (including the latest projects)?

And the answer to these questions will be in the spirit of the times - the head organization on the topic in the Russian Federation was appointed (by the former leadership of Naval Aviation through the relevant structures of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation) an office that had never been involved in such work (that is, simply with zero experience and the same scientific and technical backlog ).

July 6, 2015. At the naval show in St. Petersburg, the operation of the search and sighting complex "Kasatka" in real time from the Il-114 was demonstrated for the first time, "Vzglyad" reports with reference to the director of "NPP Radar MMS" Ivan Antsev. “The Killer Whale search and sighting complex was presented at the salon, which we first showed fully in action. During the demonstration flights, our IL-114 laboratory aircraft transmitted information in real time to the ground, directly to our stand during demonstration flights over a broadband channel, ”said the director.

Apparently, according to Mr. Antsev, "fully in action" for the search complex - this is "the connection is transmitting something", the screens "show something": take the fleet of the complex (and most importantly - pay)!

Ability to solve problems as intended?

And what is it?

In any case, it is obvious from these statements that the head of the enterprise himself, to put it mildly, does not quite understand. Which, however, is not surprising, since the chief designer of the complex himself (who has neither specialized education nor experience in the subject) has similar problems!

During the military-technical forum "Army-2015", an extremely interesting and useful round table "Marine underwater weapon (IGO): realities and prospects "( link).

List of reports (in the order of presentation):
... “Magnetometric guidance systems for naval underwater weapons in conditions of massive hydraulic resistance. Theory and Results ",

with whom the actively lobbied magnetometer and (concurrently) chief designer (as of 2015) of the Kasatka complex spoke (and was represented by persons from the Naval Aviation).

There, representatives of the Maritime Aviation "Radar-MMS" who were present (at the round table discussed, among other things, the issues of Naval Aviation, more on this below) was declared as "the lead organization on the subject."

When discussing magnetometric topics directly at the round table, there was a piquant moment when representatives of the Navy and the chief designer himself at first declared about the alleged “impossibility of countering and imitating” magnetometric systems, and an hour later, when discussing the problem of high-speed submarine missiles, “the need to finance simulators for full-scale development of magnetometric guidance channels (MMK) ”. To the author's subsequent question about how this statement correlates with the postulate expressed an hour before these statements about the alleged "technical impossibility" of such an imitation, the answer from the persons of the Navy and the respected chief designer was silence.

Of course, imitation of a magnetic field is not only possible, but has already been realized for a long time. In fact, we have a play on words: SGPD (means of hydroacoustic counteraction) - "hydroacoustic", and MMK - "magnetic", in which the fact that some SGPD also have means of imitation of a magnetic field is completely omitted. Moreover, such cheating (in this particular case, this word accurately characterizes what was happening) does not occur in some lobbies or smoking rooms, but takes place in the highest official documents of promising topics! Unfortunately, the situation is such that today it is not only possible to lie, but, as a rule, it is possible with impunity, including in “high documents” and the highest “decision-makers”.

Returning to the work on search and targeting systems (PPS) of anti-submarine and patrol complexes, there is an opinion that the problem of the patrol aviation of the Navy is allegedly "in the plane", but "there are a lot of those who want to develop the complex" (one of the literal statements on a specialized forum on the Internet) ... Let's call a spade a spade: in this case, we are talking about the mass of those who want to "master the money" for teaching staff, but there are big doubts about the ability of individuals and organizations that have never done this to actually perform the work.

So, in the case of Kasatka, the magnetometer became the chief designer of the search (that is, first of all, the hydroacoustic complex, and secondly - the radar). With a corresponding result. With equal "success" (in quotation marks), one could appoint a cook or a stove-maker.

In this whole situation, the funny thing is that, having already received harsh criticism of everything that was created in Kasatka, and the numbers in advertising, the corresponding "especially effective managers" of "Radar-MMS" solved the problem, so to speak, on a "high methodological level ”- removing the numbers in the new version of the advertising video (with the same plot).

Visually - a new video:


"Old video" (with numbers and names "):


Only here at MAKS-2021 it was the “old video” that was playing at the Radar-MMS stand (photo above).

A two-second dumping of buoys on it is not just a verdict on the Kasatka complex, it is just a shame and disgrace to its developers and leaders of the organization, who for all these years did not bother to figure out what a modern teaching staff is (and exposing this ignorance to the public) !

At the same time, it should be noted that, while harshly criticizing the leadership of "Radar-MMS" in this particular case, it is necessary to note and emphasize their active work in various areas of innovation.

Yes, they were not always successful. Yes, sometimes the necessary and relevant topics were thrown at the moment when the “critical point” had already been passed, and it was already “starting to work out”. Yes, sometimes they were engaged in frankly unfounded fantasies. However, the very fact of their active work for the future (of which there are certainly serious positive results) stands out noticeably in a positive way against the background of our defense industry (and industry), and the question of translating all this positive groundwork into a practical (and financial) plane is the need an objective and critical analysis of all the work of the company - both successes and failures, with a subsequent change in technical policy.

And where did the fleet look, the leadership of the Naval Aviation?

And the answer will be where her ex-chief came after his dismissal from the RF Armed Forces (and where he carefully prepared for himself a "soft chair" for many years) ...

Hanging "Novella"


A logical question arises: what about the really only organization in the Russian Federation - TsNPO "Leninets" and its complex "Novella" (export "Sea Serpent")?

To begin with, the photograph is a modernized Il-38 with anti-ship missiles.


Alas, a photo of the Indian Navy, because our Navy does not need aircraft with missiles. As a matter of fact, he did not need the Novella itself (for the head and promising Killer Whale from Radar-MMS was announced). From article "Anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy: simulated targets and blanks instead of weapons":

Moreover, even a relatively modern (and quite efficient) "Novella" went to the fleet "castrated" - without all the prescribed nomenclature of new RSAB.

The following quote will be appropriate here (direct link to the pdf file on the website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation):

On March 26, 2018, the Center began special flight tests of the Il-38N aircraft to remove the restrictions of the State Special Test Act.
... the generation of targeting data in the training station and the issuance of signals for the control system for the preparation and dropping of search and destruction means, according to information from the RGS. In addition, in the course of flights, a comprehensive assessment of 1HV1 products (radar) was carried out; 1НВ2 (RGS); НВ5 (ТТС) REC "Novella P-38", as well as ... According to preliminary estimates, all test flights are credited.

So, 2018. State tests of the Novella itself were completed back in the 2000s, the first production aircraft of the Navy completed its modernization in 2014 (Indian, with the Sea Serpent - in 2005). To put it mildly, we were not in a hurry to "lift the restriction" of the Act of State Special Tests (there is no talk about new buoys any more), which, given the passionate love for Kasatka advertising brochures, is not surprising.

Yes, in a number of aspects, Novella is outdated, but it is a really working, concretely effective (with a number of reservations) complex, which was made by experienced specialists and an organization that alone had the necessary experience and potential in the Russian Federation.

Moreover, the complex was successful in the foreign market (Il-38SD aircraft of the Indian Navy), despite the fact that, at the suggestion of some bureaucrats, it was simply delivered in a slaughtered form (from the appearance shown and announced at salons and exhibitions). Moreover, there was even a question about the modernization of Tu-142ME aircraft of the Indian Navy under the Sea Serpent, which, unfortunately, was not implemented to a large extent due to the past leadership and a number of specialists of Tupolev PJSC (not always, unfortunately, who understood that "the problems are solved not by the glider, but by the complex").


The consequence of this was that the Russian Tu-142M did not receive a full-fledged modernization (and a number of statements in the media about "Hephaestus" and similar advertising dregs from the point of view of the real tasks of these aviation complexes cause only a sad smile).

Long song "Apatita"


For a long time, the topic of the promising patrol complex "Apatit" has been hanging in the air Link.

... the idea of ​​creating a patrol complex for the Navy on the basis of a Tu-214 aircraft is far from new and goes back to the mid-1990s. Then the patrol aircraft based on the Tu-214 won the competition against the Tu-170PRLTs aircraft and the A-42 amphibious aircraft developed by the Beriev Design Bureau. Based on the results of this competition, the creation of a patrol complex based on the Tu-214 aircraft was determined by government decree No. 61-10 of February 19, 1996.

Today we have a situation of rapidly dwindling resource of the Il-38 and Tu-142M aircraft and, in fact, we are on the verge of simply losing the patrol and anti-submarine aircraft of the Navy.

Helicopter failure "Kema"


By the senior instructor-navigator of the research department of the combat use of the naval aviation branches 859 of the Center for combat use, Major I.M. Stasik (link, pdf):

Since 2016, a massive supply of modernized Ka-27M helicopters has begun to the naval aviation of the Navy. The modernized machine is equipped with modern systems for processing and transmitting information over secure channels in real time. The updated helicopter in the field of modern radio electronics is ahead of similar helicopters of our "potential adversaries".

The basis for the armament of the Ka-27M anti-submarine helicopter is the radar command-tactical system developed by the JSC "Corporation" Fazotron-NIIR " reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft weapons.

Well, let's deal with the next “unparalleled wunderwaffe”, allegedly “ahead of the helicopters of“ potential adversaries ”in the field of modern electronics.

The first thing to note is that initially the Ka-27 helicopter had the "Octopus" search and sighting system developed by the Kiev Research Institute of Hydraulic Instruments (there were two centers for anti-submarine aviation work in the USSR - in Leningrad ("Leninets") and in Kiev). Yes, the system is imperfect from the height of today, so it was thrown out from the helicopter.

Is it logical

How to say. Taking into account the fact that instead of the old PPS, a new one was never found, and instead of it two crutches were installed - RGA (radio-hydroacoustic equipment) "Kema" and KTS (command-tactical system) with a radar and a lowered GAS (OGAS).

Details on Kema and its analysis - based on the materials on it demonstrated at the Army-2020 forum at the stand of the Naval Aviation of the Navy (here).


What can I say?

There are really no analogues: in terms of rudimentarity and antiquity of this "search crutch" Ka-27M. "Kema" in essence is not even "Berkut" (PPS Il-38 developed in the 60s), but in fact a rollback to "Baku" (Be-12 developed in the late 50s)!

Only passive non-directional buoys simply exclude the possibility of using modern illumination modes, and the parameters of the positioning accuracy of the RGAB are extremely low and do not provide for the formation of an effective spatial antenna array. In fact, we have a "set of single detectors", but with digital processing and recording in separate channels. Moreover, "Kema" does not provide the development of the aiming point of the weapon (about the consequences of this - below).

It is striking that the key features of modern Western teaching staff have been openly written since the beginning of the 90s, but "foreigners are not a decree to us."



However, at the same time, the domestic experience was forgotten, for example, "backlit acoustics" which had already been successfully implemented in the teaching staff since the times of the USSR. Those. forgotten what was once tested, mastered (in series and combat training), is available ("stitched") in the old systems in service (such as "illumination" from explosive sound sources).

The radar developed by "Fazotron-NIIR" is a solid, solid radar from a reputable developer ... only that had no previous experience in solving special anti-submarine missions. For example, the possibility of performing special work of the radar station, which was successfully done by the "old" Ka-27, raises questions, for example, in the memoirs in the "Sea Collection" of Captain 1st Rank V. Zvada, link, pdf.

In 1987, for the first time in combat service in the Mediterranean Sea, the "unconventional method" of detecting a submarine was successfully used using the ship's navigation station and the Ka-27PL helicopter radar station. This was a very promising area of ​​anti-submarine warfare.

An extremely unfortunate decision is to preserve for the lowered Ros-VM Ka-27M an actually old high-frequency antenna (instead of a modern low-frequency antenna that was supposed to be Okeanpribrom).



From the article Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics":

And if Western helicopters are capable of providing new OGAS and multi-position joint work with BUGAS and aviation (RGAB), then even the newest ships of Project 22350 have an upgraded Ka-27M helicopter, on which essentially the same high-frequency OGAS Ros remained (only digital and on a new element base), as on the Soviet Ka-27 helicopter of the 80s, which has absolutely unsatisfactory performance characteristics and is incapable of either working together with the Minotaur or "illuminating" the RGAB field. Simply because they work in different frequency ranges.

Multi-position distributed operating modes of the modern Western OGAS HELRAS:

Timid hope. Does the Russian naval aviation have a future?

Obviously, Ros-VM is not capable of anything like that, it just catastrophically lags behind in characteristics and has a short detection range for submarines.

There is an opinion that the Ka-27M is a "temporary solution", but "very soon" we will have "grace" with the "newest helicopter" "Lamprey".

Therefore, the modernization of the Ka-27M went according to "the most budgetary option, as well as tank T-72 ". Yes, to a large extent this is so (for example, that is why the radar did not have a phased array, but a simple old scheme with a "mirror" antenna was used). However, the T-72B3 tank, with all its shortcomings, has real capabilities to destroy targets, but the Ka-27M has very big problems with this (more on that below).

Rake rake "Lamprey"


Now for the Lamprey.

July 24. TASS:

The Russian Helicopters holding has coordinated the terms of reference with the suppliers for the project of the promising sea-going helicopter Minoga. Andrey Boginsky, General Director of the Russian Helicopters holding, told TASS at MAKS-2021.
“Now we are working on the development of a set of design documentation, which will be created by 2023. Last year we received advances and brought them to the suppliers. All technical specifications have also been agreed with each of the suppliers, ”he said.
Earlier, within the framework of the Army-2020 forum, the Russian Helicopters holding signed a development contract with the Ministry of Defense for the promising deck-based Minoga helicopter.

So, "terms of reference have been agreed," "advances have been issued."

Excuse me, but for what ?!

For our objectively, with a scientific and technical basis for the complex, the situation is such that even the TTZ cannot be written on it, there are too many unclear questions that need to be dealt with based on the results of serious and deep tests and special research projects!

Actually, the "assessment of the situation" from "academic and applied science":

AE Borodin (Far Eastern Branch of the Section of Applied Problems under the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences) "Methods for monitoring the underwater situation by advanced aircraft systems (APLK) in a naval network-centric war" (link, pdf):

... the solution is to introduce the "distributed detection" method into domestic RGS, which makes it possible to fully realize the technical advantages of aviation platforms ... A prerequisite for the creation of a CGS based on the proposed method is the organization of complex fundamental and applied research aimed at creating the necessary scientific and practical groundwork. An obstacle to the introduction of the method of spatial detection in the nuclear submarine is the fragmented nature of the existing scientific and technical groundwork.

I emphasize once again that there is simply no groundwork for R&D on the new complex, there are separate experiments, but objectively: just in order to obtain a high-quality product (search complex) in a reasonable and fairly short time, special studies and tests are needed. And getting involved in OCD without them is another gamble, the result of which will be obviously crooked and oblique.

I repeat - "the problems are solved not by the glider (of the aircraft), but by the complex"!

"Shooting milk from wooden machine guns" - about anti-submarine weapons of the Navy


The problem of complete disregard by our Naval Aviation of the practical use of weapons has already been raised - "Anti-submarine aviation of the Russian Navy: simulated targets and blanks instead of weapons":

In order not to "spoil the statistics", the Naval Aviation went to a complete refusal to use new practical torpedoes (with homing systems on and their real guidance at target submarines), replacing them with throwing torpedo shells.

Anti-submarine weapons of naval aviation are torpedoes, aviation submarine missiles (APR), gravitational underwater shells: corrected anti-submarine aerial bombs (GPS KAB PL) and conventional anti-submarine aerial bombs.

Taking into account the timing of weapons of the 1st and 2nd generations, only the UMGT-1 torpedo with a water-activated silver-zinc battery and a powerful low-frequency homing system (CLS) "Waterfall" (alas, having extremely low noise immunity) remained in the naval aviation. The service life of the UMGT-1 torpedoes is obviously near-limiting, and the efficiency in the conditions of using the SGPD is extremely low. The use of UMGT-1 is impossible in areas with shallow depths and in the Baltic Sea (due to insufficient salinity for the use of the battery).

That is, the basis of the ammunition is the APR-2, which, although it has an outdated SSN, but with good noise immunity. However, the APR-2 has an extremely short cruising range, and, accordingly, very high requirements for target designation accuracy. Her service life is also close to the limit.

Here it is necessary to emphasize once again that the Naval Aviation of the Navy does not have any statistics on the practical use of UMGT-1 and APR-2. All cases of their practical application are only in the form of periodic industrial tests and the only case of using UMGT-1 in the early 90s at the Pacific Fleet on the initiative of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate of the Navy. In fact, the price of such “combat training” (in quotes) is similar to “voice shooting from wooden machine guns” in the infantry. Of course, replacing the actual firing from a machine gun with a tree and a "tra-ta-ta" voice - and in a nightmare not a single land commander will dream, so high-ranking of them should still ask how the fleet (with its aviation) got to "Life like this" and the complete discrediting of their combat training?

At the same time, taking into account the extremely low noise immunity of the UMGT-1, only APRs are of value for a real war, however, the question of accurate target designation arises sharply on them. This question is quite solvable, already resolved: in the old teaching staff (the times of the USSR) and new ones - the development of experienced specialists ("Novella").

However, for the same Ka-27M, everything turns out very badly. "Kema" does not develop an aiming point, that is, an attack based on the data of passive buoys is impossible. What remains is OGAS - with the development of firing data of the KTS based on its data. The problem here is that the work of the OGAS is not secretive, and since there are no idiots on the submarines, they perfectly understand what will happen after the close operation of the OGAS (with a short range). Accordingly - change of course and evasion ... After which the APR simply does not have enough range in order to compensate for the submarine's evasion.

There are similar problems with GPS.

In general, it was an ingenious invention of the times of the USSR, and the key factor here was the noise immunity factor: if ordinary airborne torpedoes confidently went to the SGPD, having extremely small chances of a real defeat of submarines in combat conditions, then the GPS with high-frequency and vertically oriented SSNs had almost absolute noise immunity, and accordingly - a high probability of hitting a target in real combat conditions (counteraction).

However, it is not just the XNUMXst century, the first quarter of it is already coming to an end, and taking this into account, the GPS themselves look quite antique. The solution, which for a long time not just hung in the air, but was worked out in detail - equipping the GPS with a small-sized propulsive complex with a sharp increase in performance characteristics and efficiency, was never implemented.

Classic anti-submarine bombs, despite the extremely low probability of hitting conventional submarines in the ocean, still remain relevant for shallow depths, hitting submarines lying on the ground and targets such as subversive midget submarines and underwater means of movement of saboteurs.

So, UMGT-1 and APR-2, which were the basis of anti-submarine aircraft ammunition, are not just outdated, but simply at the limit of their service life.

June 24, TASS:

The Tactical Missile Armament Corporation (KTRV) has begun mass production of the latest APR-3ME anti-submarine anti-submarine missiles, KTRV General Director Boris Obnosov said in an interview with TASS at the 10th International Maritime Defense Show (IMDS-2021). According to the head of KTRV, work is underway to create new models of aircraft anti-submarine torpedoes.

“In the future, to replace the APR-3ME, it is planned to develop a small-sized aircraft anti-submarine torpedo, significantly superior to the existing models in terms of cruising range,” Obnosov said.

Apparently, things are not going well with underwater weapons with KTRV, if torture to the APR-3M series is presented in the media as an achievement.

In essence, the APR-3M is actually transferred to the modern technological base of the APR-3 developed in the 70s - 80s (with a slight increase in characteristics). In the same 90s, much more advanced APRs were developed in the "Region", however, due to a lack of funds, their development was then discontinued in favor of the openly budget APR-3M.

APR-3M (right) and dropping by a helicopter of the PLA Navy APR-3E (mid-90s)

However, the main problem of APR-3M is test statistics.

From the article “The price of a torpedo crew. To ensure the combat capability of the Navy, the cost of testing and shooting is important " L. Bozin, the former head of the torpedo operation department of the 28th Research Institute of the Navy:

A serious drawback in the development of torpedoes in the USSR is the small volume of tests, as a result of which this type of weapon was produced with serious flaws. The massive use of torpedoes during combat training was essentially a continuation of state tests. In the first five to six years of mastering this weapon fleet serious shortcomings are discovered and various modifications are made, including to achieve the technical characteristics declared during the development. There are a lot of examples of this.

Difficult conditions of the application environment categorically require large statistics of torpedo firing, including in situations close to real combat ...

Example: During the testing period of the StingRay mod.1 torpedo, 150 firings were fired. However, it should be borne in mind that during the development of the first modification of the StingRay mod.0, about 500 tests were carried out. Reducing this number of firing for mod.1 allowed the system for collecting and recording data of all firing and the implementation on its basis of a "dry range" for preliminary testing of new CLO solutions based on these statistics.

Mr. Obnosov should have heard on this issue not the so-called “effective managers” of the “Region”, but the chief designer of the APR-3M. This is a very experienced specialist at a respectable age with a quiet voice, whose tough questions managers try very hard not to hear. I believe that after clarifying the situation with the chief designer himself, BV Obnosov's public statements would have been much more accurate and careful.

Here it would be appropriate to recall the 2015 article again. "Marine Underwater Weapons (MPS): Realities and Prospects":

... a critical problem is people, at the level of Chief Designers, who are able to pull on themselves new topics and directions. In fact, the topic of new work is objectively determined by the presence of the Chief Designer or Scientific Director of the research work, who is really able to do the Case. There is an extremely limited, literally piece number of such people, often these people are of a great age, and it is critically necessary not only to "launch the topic", but to do it in such a way that talented youth can be connected to it and teach it from the "bison". If we fail to do this, we will lose the "bison", and with them we have touched off in a number of directions.

And the result ( link):

10.01.2020/2015/7. When I wrote this in XNUMX, I meant absolutely specific people. One of them, Arseny Fyodorovich Myandin, passed away on January XNUMX ... Not just a person left, not just “part stories", A huge scientific and technical backlog was covered (to a large extent - still of the Soviet era). For "Region" this is, to put it mildly, "knockdown" ... You can forget about the promising "SuperPackage" (an ultra-small product of which was supposed to have a speed of more than 65 knots and a range of about 5 km (the idea of ​​the product and the models for using the complex is mine, but the calculations for the module, speed and range - Arseny Fedorovich, still 2012), and about a lot of other things ... One feeling - seething rage on the faces, strangling promising topics until their meaning is lost due to the death of key developers ...

Due to the fact that the declared characteristics (for an ultra-small product) have raised doubts among a number of specialists, I will specially cite an excerpt from A.F.Myandin's rough calculations:


The last time it was reported to the decision of the management of the Corporation "TRV" and inclusion in the list of promising jobs in the fall of 2015, but was buried by "effective managers" of the "Region" (the phrase of one of them - "we have so much money now that we do not need anything" ).

Now, after the death of Myandin, we can forget about it, because “starting with what is left” is at least 10 years of hard work with a mass of failures and failures (as it was in reality in recent history on this topic), and today no one of the customers will not allow “to pass this road again”.

Commentary (ibid.) Of an official with the DOGOZ of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:

Another of the "bison" KB-1 Research Institute PGM - NPO "Region" left. Very, very sad news. The blessed memory of AF Myandin ... You know, it seems to me that for the current "Region" this is not a knockdown - as developers, they have been deeply knocked out for 10 years already. And the degradation of the "Region" as a developer is, unfortunately, a natural result of the choice made in favor of the development of the "Region" mainly as a serial enterprise ... In the abbreviation GNPP, the letter N is superfluous. Sad.

So (while maintaining the existing technical policy of the "Region" and the Concern "TRV"), all that remains is to "eat up" the old groundwork created during the time of E.S.Shakhidzhanov (for more details “Anti-torpedoes. We are still ahead, but they are already overtaking us "), and accordingly for our aviation there is only one option - the maximum forcing of work on the "packet" torpedo (based on experience and the groundwork on the topic "Answer"). This is the only real option, everything else is manilovism.

A lively discussion on this topic developed during the round table. GB Tikhonov, a representative of KMPO Gidropribor JSC, voiced a proposal to carry out a “short R&D” project to develop an aircraft torpedo based on the MGT-1 small torpedo (product 294), a warhead of a broadband mine complex. It is categorically impossible to agree with this proposal, since the new small-sized torpedo of the "Packet" complex has significantly higher performance characteristics, and it is advisable to consider it as a single basic model of a small-sized torpedo of the Navy, with the provision of application from ships, submarines, aviation and as a PLUR warhead. At the same time, for this, it is necessary to introduce telecontrol and anti-torpedo mode on the modernized version of this torpedo (originally built into it in terms of power reserve).

Well, in fact, the Naval Aviation itself should very carefully figure out what kind of cat in a poke she received (and "is there a cat in that bag at all").
The practice of "testing weapons" (specially taken in quotation marks) today is as follows link:

On the basis of the "Decision on the procedure for conducting a flight and sea experiment of qualification tests of KAB PL products" approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy on September 10.09.2014, 16 and in accordance with the "Program of qualification tests of KAB PL products" at sea ranges of the Black Sea Fleet in the period of October 31–2014, XNUMX qualification tests of KAB PL were carried out. The program of control flight tests provided for the dropping of five corrected bombs of the KAB submarine of practical execution ... The pilot ships provided the installation of a marker buoy, a hydroacoustic receiver, direction finding and buoyancy of the splashdown points of products, search, sprinkling and lifting of products from the ground.
Based on the materials of the video recording of the processes of dropping products from the helicopter, it was established that the products of the KAB PL on the air section of the trajectory worked normally, after splashdown they emitted probing signals and separated from the float in accordance with the specified operating mode. The terms of reference for flight and sea experiments under the Zagon-2 qualification testing program with the participation of specialists from our Center have been completed in full and with high quality.

"All is well, beautiful marquise"?

In the acts - yes.

But in fact, very bad questions arise: why were such tests carried out without a real target submarine?

Yes, at the time of testing there were no running boats in the Black Sea Fleet, but they were in other fleets! The above case is a clear example of outright hack, both with programs and test methods, and simply with the attitude to weapons in our anti-submarine aviation, and here the most stringent measures are needed to bring to life and realize the measure of responsibility and military duty for the task entrusted.

At a minimum, we need extensive testing of all (I emphasize, all: both old and new) weapons of the naval aviation in the conditions of their actual use (including modern SGPD, shallow depths, etc.). Today our naval aviation is practically unarmed.

PS


Calling a spade a spade, all of the above means the actual non-combat capability of the anti-submarine aviation of the Navy.

The point of this article is a public and harsh exposing of acute problems. For their subsequent solution and raking the Augean stables. In the current military-political situation, we simply have no right to be weak.

These facts are only part of the picture of the grave state of the Russian Naval Aviation.

At the same time, I repeat, there are positive changes, and in some cases, very dramatic.

There is also an understanding that "it is impossible to continue living and serving like this." For example, the head of the research department (operation and application of hydroacoustics) of PPI and PLC (MA Navy) Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Tyurkin (link, pdf):

... there is a need to urgently create completely new aviation complexes that meet modern requirements. To do this, it is necessary ... to adopt a new aviation patrol complex for solving: search tasks, anti-submarine tasks, shock and special tasks, and air reconnaissance tasks. As a platform for the complex, provide for both aircraft and helicopter carriers. Each of them should have a modern onboard multifunctional radio-electronic complex, built on the principle of "open architecture" in a modular design. The most important property of the complex should be information and technical compatibility with ship, coastal and aviation systems of reconnaissance, detection and target designation, thus the information and control system should be integrated into a single information space of the Navy, while having modern certified software and high-speed information exchange channels; the hydroacoustic subsystem should function both on new passive and active multistatic principles of operation, which ensure prompt detection of the underwater situation in large water areas, and on simpler, but previously well-tested spectral and energy methods.

There are opportunities for solving the problems of Naval Aviation (even taking into account the difficult financial situation).

There is still time.

While there is, albeit a little.

The question is in the actions of specific officials.

The author is not familiar with them, but the fact that they decided to take responsibility for the Naval Aviation at a very difficult moment for it characterizes them positively.

We wish them success in this.
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  1. +1
    18 October 2021 05: 39
    But in fact, very bad questions arise: why were such tests carried out without a real target submarine?
    Maybe not everything is so bad, maybe it was "throw" tests, as part of the qualification?
    Based on the materials of video recording of the processes of dropping products from a helicopter, it was established that the products of the KAB PL on the air section of the trajectory worked normally, after splashdown they emitted probing signals and separated from the float in accordance with the specified operating mode.

    But the author knows better, and if he is right, then very gentle conditions for testing naval weapons are "provided."
    1. +6
      18 October 2021 10: 33
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      But in fact, very bad questions arise: why were such tests carried out without a real target submarine?
      Maybe not everything is so bad, maybe it was "throw" tests, as part of the qualification?
      Based on the materials of video recording of the processes of dropping products from a helicopter, it was established that the products of the KAB PL on the air section of the trajectory worked normally, after splashdown they emitted probing signals and separated from the float in accordance with the specified operating mode.

      But the author knows better, and if he is right, then very gentle conditions for testing naval weapons are "provided."

      Thanks to the respected Maxim Klimov for the sharp questions, this was to be expected if the topic of naval aviation was raised after surface ships, but it should be ahead. They don't make planes early, neither do PLO complexes, they just saw. The main problem of the fleet is Kuzya, everyone is interested in him and billions are cut for him, and for everything else, crumbs are left to drink, without result, and without the attention of the Ministry of Defense. The PLO complex needs to be ordered by two or three teams, and the best one should be chosen. The fleet is rapidly aging, what's the state of the polynomial? and in fact 1155 is already in its fourth decade, what is the combat effectiveness of the basis of the anti-submarine fleet, despite the fact that new ships are almost never built, and there is no anti-submarine aviation and is not planned. Shall we rely solely on the invisibility of SSBNs? yes it is, but not unlimited.
  2. +5
    18 October 2021 06: 20
    Russia does not have naval aviation, it has coastal aviation.
  3. -57
    18 October 2021 06: 29
    Oh, Klimov has surfaced! You don't have to read, don't waste your time! All the same, he will not write anything sensible.
    1. +18
      18 October 2021 06: 35
      Quote: avg avg
      Oh, Klimov has surfaced! You don't have to read, don't waste your time! All the same, he will not write anything sensible.

      Certainly ! everything is good with us! Hurrah !
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      2. +8
        18 October 2021 06: 58
        As I understand it, according to new trends, the phrase "artificial intelligence" is applied almost to a sledgehammer?
    2. +12
      18 October 2021 06: 54
      avg avg-and you are forced to read? A person raises serious problems, something that the authorities ignore, because of this Klimov and Timokhina and glue different labels, instead of at least listening to their opinion !!!
      1. -9
        18 October 2021 15: 50
        PLO for the Ministry of Defense is not a priority, and the fleet is in third place, how much money is allocated for it, created and released. All this anti-submarine aircraft in real combat operations will be useless, since the enemy's air defense and air force will knock it all down if modern radars enter the zone of action, hundreds or more kilometers away, they see this concerns our American and everyone else, and in the future, nuclear submarines and anti-aircraft systems will appear as means of constant protection and hello to all these subsonic flying troughs stuffed with ultra-expensive equipment. Yes, again, in real combat operations, neither their submarines nor ours will approach each other's shores - why risk submarines and crews with modern missiles and so they allow attacking the enemy from long distances.
        1. -3
          18 October 2021 16: 26
          Quote: Vadim237
          All this anti-submarine aircraft in real combat will be useless, since the enemy's air defense and air force will knock it all down if modern radars enter the zone of action, hundreds or more kilometers away, they will see this applies to our American and everyone else

          I also thought about this, wrote that surface ships would not survive without an umbrella of coastal aviation, you write the same about low-speed PLO aircraft ..... indeed PLO aircraft are vulnerable, although an order of magnitude faster than surface ships, taking into account, for example, on Donbass turned out to be too vulnerable to front-line aviation, up to a complete rejection of its use ... However, aviation still has, it seems to me, prospects, it is very fast and can simply move away from missiles at speed, release false targets, and if we we are talking about the sea, then we need to take into account that the source of threats to aviation (surface ships) themselves are more vulnerable than it is assumed that we destroy them with strike aircraft, and thereby save the low-speed aircraft of the ASW ... this incidentally leads to the conclusion that the fleet is completely useless in the Baltic and in the Sea of ​​Japan, because there on the shores there will be a lot of air defense and anti-ship missiles. The fleet is very vulnerable in the Black Sea Fleet, and only the oceans give the fleet a chance to exist, because the vulnerable surface ships of the enemy and its weak carrier-based aircraft by definition can be destroyed by our coastal means and coastal strike aircraft, so that the PLO aircraft could work and even ships PLO (though we almost do not have them on the oceans, for the admirals collected them all for the sake of warm places, where they are useless, that is, on closed small seas, and they do not develop aviation at all) ... what do YOU ​​think about my arguments? I am interested in your opinion because I see you are not afraid to think, and think boldly and outside the box, in contrast to the stubborn pink ponies, sectarians of aircraft carriers, who are afraid not only to get out of the blinkered narrow-minded "I can not know" but are not even able to think with their heads. only splashing saliva swear and try to take a chorus
        2. -1
          18 October 2021 22: 26
          the time of arrival of the rocket to the target is important. from 2-3 thousand km to which enemy submarines can approach from different points to any target on our territory, we simply will not have time to react in any way.
          1. -6
            19 October 2021 17: 30
            "The time of arrival of the missile to the target is important." What kind of missiles if subsonic Tomahawks - they will fly a distance of 1000 kilometers for an hour, and in the presence of over-the-horizon radars and radars for low-flying targets at long range, all these missiles will be instantly detected and with the introduction of the Prometheus air defense system, including in the Arctic and the Far East, the nearest to For us, ICBM launches will be fraught with missile losses during launch, the closer they launch, the easier it will be to detect and destroy. We simply will not have time to react to any goal on our territory. You just got stuck in the 70s and 80s, then you might not have time to react, but now they monitor all this on an ongoing basis and are ready, and the technical means of detection, as well as the defeat, have significantly improved the entire airspace of Russia is covered by a unified air defense missile defense system.
        3. +5
          19 October 2021 08: 10
          Quote: Vadim237
          All this anti-submarine aircraft in real combat will be useless since the enemy's air defense and air force will knock it all down if they enter the zone of action

          I don’t know why you make such a conclusion; apparently, you have special knowledge, unknown to us. Perhaps you even know the main task of anti-submarine aviation, and the areas of its implementation? You will share your knowledge with us, I wonder ...
          1. -7
            19 October 2021 17: 47
            This is elementary - we will declare war on us all military aircraft will be shot down when approaching our borders and no matter where they will take off from Japan from Alaska from other islands of action of enemy anti-aircraft missiles in such conditions it will be impossible to very light targets for the Air Force and Air Defense similar to ours they will not fly into their coverage area. And SSBNs and the areas of the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk will be enough to launch missiles, although they can launch them from the pier into the lung within a few minutes.
            1. +3
              19 October 2021 17: 52
              Quote: Vadim237
              It's elementary

              Yes, I have to note that the volume of your knowledge is simply enormous, but could you please focus on my question:
              Quote: Bez 310
              Perhaps you even know the main task of anti-submarine aviation, and the areas of its implementation?

              If you know about this, please share.
              1. -2
                21 October 2021 17: 56
                I answered you, its use will be useless in the event of a declaration of war on us, since enemy submarines will not swim towards us - they will use missiles at a considerable distance across our territory - then why the heck would the PLO aircraft increase and pour huge funds into it? Enemy submarines are best dealt with by their own submarines.
                1. +3
                  21 October 2021 18: 11
                  Quote: Vadim237
                  enemy submarines will not swim towards us - they will use missiles at a considerable distance across our territory

                  I understand you mean enemy ballistic missile submarines. And here you are right. But I am you now
                  somewhat strained - these boats are NOT the object of our submarine's actions.
                2. 0
                  21 October 2021 18: 12
                  With enemy submarines

                  That is, the enemy's BPA will not work on our boats? Will the approaches to the bases be mined?
                3. +1
                  25 October 2021 06: 35
                  This is what modern education does to people.
    3. +22
      18 October 2021 07: 07
      Quote: avg avg
      You don't have to read, don't waste your time! Anyway, he won't write anything sensible

      Why is that? There is an understanding of the problem, and actions have begun in this direction. The question is - with what speed and efficiency?
    4. +9
      18 October 2021 09: 08
      You won't write anything sensible, only nonsense.
      1. -1
        18 October 2021 11: 04
        And Klimov is aware that graphics are not reality and that "reset every 2 seconds" is not 200 meters, but simply a display of what and how it works? If we are talking about "enveloping barrier-5" then everything is connected with the regime, and not with blindness ... these buoys have a range of 2 km
        1. +2
          19 October 2021 01: 22
          Answer from Klimov:

          Lying Barbariska, you habitually talk nonsense, knowing nothing and not understanding the topic.
          The question about the detection range is not a question for the buoy, it is a question for the COMPLEX (which includes the buoys - sensors). COMPLEX - slag.
          As for the range, the same 16 buoys and distances much more than "2 km" were shown.
          IN EXPERIMENTS.
          To whom neither "Kasatka" nor "Kema" had any relationship
          1. -4
            19 October 2021 08: 53
            laughing Klimov in his repertoire ... i.e. the complex can detect with one buoy, but it can no longer be with others ... in general, I suspect that he has a standard approach - I saw a video somewhere and dashed off an article ... it will be funny when new information comes up and Klimov is wrong ... well, how before with missiles)
            1. +1
              19 October 2021 11: 30
              It’s much funnier to look at it when you’re right. Does this happen? laughing
              1. -3
                19 October 2021 12: 23
                laughing Well, I was right about the construction of corvettes when I said that in the coming days they would announce the construction of the additional series 20380/20385 at Amur and others, although Klimov stated that I did not know anything and that they would not build and order new 0/5 and that they would build 20386 only ... I was right in that story with "the target was not shot down by an anti-aircraft missile", when Klimov in front of the locomotive ran through you to spread an article without waiting for a banal record from the exercises ... So yes, I was right at least a couple of times) Well, I was also right when Klimov was running around with the idea of ​​hanging Onyxes on the Su-34 for the MRA, and in response to my words about for the naval ones, they will cut lightweight hypersounds about which they will announce in the near future, he again slipped into insults .. Or is it something else?)
                1. +1
                  19 October 2021 13: 22
                  Well, I was right about the construction of corvettes when I said that in the coming days they would announce the construction of the additional series 20380/20385 at Amur and others, although Klimov stated that I did not know anything and that they would not build and order new 0/5 and that they would build 20386 only


                  Link? About 0/5 new ones have been known for a long time, if that. I want to look at the dialogue.

                  I was right in that story with "the target was not shot down by an anti-aircraft missile", when Klimov in front of the locomotive ran through you to spread an article, without waiting for a banal record from the exercises


                  He was in a hurry then, but generally speaking, the MO reported so crookedly that I also regarded their message as he did.

                  Well, I was also right when Klimov rushed about with the idea of ​​hanging Onyxes on the Su-34 for the MRA, and in response to my words about for the naval ones, they will cut lightweight hypersounds, which will be announced in the near future


                  Take a note on how they will announce, summarize, okay?
                  1. -2
                    19 October 2021 13: 27
                    laughing so I have nothing else to do than look for old articles and comments from another profile) about "reported crookedly" - so it might be worth waiting for information, and not building a superman and wearing panties over pants? soldier
          2. +2
            19 October 2021 19: 53
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Lying Barberry

            with all due respect to both disputing parties, and my lack of understanding of the essence of the issue, you still cannot slip into kindergarten name-calling
            1. +1
              21 October 2021 12: 35
              laughing this is Klimov ... what do you want
      2. +11
        18 October 2021 11: 46
        I just don’t understand one thing, it’s not easy to sink an aircraft-carrying 340-meter monster, because reconnaissance / target designation / presence of forces and means in the region ... but after all, sinking a modern nuclear submarine is even more difficult! And their (nuclear submarine) "partners" are building, and at a fairly good pace. How could one abandon such an important topic as anti-submarine means of search and combat? After all, this topic should in fact be equated with a strategic one. For the SSBNs of the adversaries, and our SSBNs have not yet lost their relevance in global containment, and who said that they would not be drowned, if anything ...
        1. +7
          18 October 2021 11: 59
          The funny thing is that the threat from the aircraft carrier is very ghostly, and where it is, possible opponents with ground airfields are doing well. But the submarines are atamite and not very, a direct and obvious threat in all theaters. Moreover, it is actively developing technically and increasing in number.
          1. -11
            18 October 2021 15: 56
            Yes, so technically advanced that recently one such in the United States crashed into something, the boat will go either for repair or for write-off.
            1. +3
              18 October 2021 20: 48
              Crashed into a non-radiating and unmarked object. Someone might not crash into the same situation
              1. -5
                19 October 2021 17: 59
                Well, here is the way out for our anti-submarine defense - from enemy submarines in the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk - to make thousands of reinforced concrete pillars 120 meters long and with horizontal support and install them on the bottom in a vertical position in places known only to us and to everyone else that everything is blocked - after that, what kind of nuclear submarine will go there, and if it will go through the same thing as happened with the US nuclear submarine - and it will be much cheaper than spending hundreds of billions of rubles on PLO aircraft.
        2. -4
          18 October 2021 21: 10
          probably because at hour X all SSBNs will simply move away from the piers a bit and stand still waiting for the launch command. For you can shoot at the enemy from the pier. Those. no need to hang out in the oceans. Here torpedo tubes should scour the seas-oceans in search of targets.
          1. +5
            19 October 2021 07: 27
            They will be covered long before that. On moderation there is an article with a scenario of a nuclear attack on the Russian Federation, stay tuned.
            1. 0
              21 October 2021 15: 18
              All these scenarios are reports of the military to the people and the authorities. Those. they simply show that they are serving, and not in shesh-besh in the smoking-room they are hacked for days.
              Which air defense system do you "trust" 100%?
              I am sure that it is 100% not a single one, and in case of a massive impact it is so good if 60-75%. Right?
              So the bourgeois reason is the same.
              Here is the scenario, we will attack these Russians!
              So in response they fire their missiles.
              What if we don’t shoot them all ?!
              Moreover, GDP once said that the Russian Federation will not figure out which rocket is flying in our direction. This means that in response we will begin to shoot nuclear ones.
              Then let the scenario be, but we will not implement it. Serve on.
              Afraid ....
              And the most important thing! What for?
              the color revolution is cheaper than war, and much safer. And the result in general can be much more effective. That was the country of Libya, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Moldova, Yugoslavia, etc. and so on, and there is none. And "oil" can be pumped.
              But the missiles are needed. So. Just in case.
        3. 0
          18 October 2021 22: 27
          window dressing. counting on the fact that there will be no war
      3. -10
        18 October 2021 14: 10
        Why on "you"? They didn’t seem to have drunk at brotherhood.
        1. +4
          18 October 2021 15: 41
          At you)) .. a miracle that jumped in for a second, shit and also indignant that you weren’t talking to him ...)))
        2. +2
          18 October 2021 20: 49
          Did not deserve
      4. -10
        18 October 2021 17: 20
        looked at all your publications. Resume-pro-Western lackey.
        1. +7
          18 October 2021 20: 49
          Of course, patriots are those who send unarmed people into battle, and those who are against are traitors, yeah.
    5. 0
      28 November 2021 12: 08
      Oh, how, Klimovites
  4. +4
    18 October 2021 06: 51
    Maxim! Problems are purely technical, because R&D has not been carried out for a long time due to lack of funding, and for the fleet there is an adaptation of the aviation that was created in the USSR, and not the creation of what exactly the fleet needs! As a result, we get planes and helicopters "yesterday"!
    1. +6
      18 October 2021 09: 10
      Something has been done and is being done. But it hasn't gotten going yet.
      1. 0
        20 October 2021 10: 38
        When a journalist is in charge of space, no less miracles will happen on the water.
        And animal husbandry, yes!
  5. +2
    18 October 2021 06: 56
    There is also an understanding that "it is impossible to continue living and serving like this."

    They do not have such an understanding, because they served and they live, as practice shows, where “there, in the clouds of dreams and dreams, in their own life, separated from the common being”.
    Yes ... They (as they believed) are doing well. And some do not even know what is "good" and what is "bad".
    "Money must be made, money ..."
    None of them will consider your appeal ...
    1. +4
      18 October 2021 09: 09
      No, the slight positive progress actually began with the departure of Kozhin. The chance, so to speak, has dawned and it is not for nothing that the article has such a title.
      But whether anyone will use this chance is still an open question.
      1. +5
        18 October 2021 17: 32
        I am reading your and Klimov's articles. There are good ones in terms of educational programs like me, there are also for a narrower audience. It would be great if you write an analogue of the cycle about sea battle, but on PLO. And if to expand on the confrontation between the "coast" and the submarine, the view from both sides, then in general!
  6. +4
    18 October 2021 07: 58
    We do not have naval aviation as such. Reduced. As there is no sensible fleet, it was also reduced. Very expensive. Money is gentle to another.
    1. -10
      18 October 2021 16: 01
      There are hypersonic anti-ship missiles, there is a program for the development of combat nuclear submarines, but everything within the means of anti-aircraft missile defense in modern conditions is not worth it to spend hundreds of billions of rubles on it.
      1. +8
        18 October 2021 16: 38
        Quote: Vadim237
        There are hypersonic anti-ship missiles, there is a program for the development of combat nuclear submarines, but everything within the means of anti-aircraft missile defense in modern conditions is not worth it to spend hundreds of billions of rubles on it.

        Are you going to launch hypersonic anti-ship missiles and non-aerial vehicles directly from the piers?
        Because already at the exit from the base, their carriers will be waiting for "Virginia" or "Elk". And in order to detect and drive them away, as well as to avoid meeting with them when going to the launch area (and in general, to know - what is spinning near our shores and can in which case please us with the launch of an SLCM), we need an anti-submarine aircraft. Because the fleet will not receive any other means of ASW in the next ten years - with our timing for building ships.
        1. -8
          18 October 2021 19: 48
          It is possible to launch Bastions from the shore, for which - Zircon has a container unification with Onyx. There is an airborne OTRK Dagger on the MiG 31, they can cover a large enough area. And it will be possible to launch ICBMs from the pier, this is the main task of all SSBNs, and from where it is all launched, the main thing is to launch - and if the Virginias themselves smell fried in our waters, they will not poke in again, no one will risk boats. In the next 10 years, our fleet will receive all the Ash trees and the NPA that are now being built and tested, and everything that is now being modernized and repaired from submarines - whatever one may say, no one has been with us either for 10 years or for 20 30 or more years will not fight on the seas and oceans.
          1. +3
            19 October 2021 01: 23
            It is possible to launch Bastions from the shore, for which - Zircon has a container unification with Onyx.


            Is the range enough? What kind of people, they can't even use a calculator ...
            1. -3
              19 October 2021 18: 07
              Why is this not enough - Zircon has declared from 1000 to 1500 for Onyx, up to 800 km for Dagger 2000 on the Mig 31 carrier - the first can arm the entire island in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and not a single enemy ship will sail there on the North Arctic. and among the nuclear submarines there are no suicides to meddle alone without cover in combat conditions.
          2. +2
            19 October 2021 05: 27
            Quote: Vadim237
            no matter how you say it, no one with us, either for 10 years, or for 20 30 or more years, will not fight on the seas and oceans.

            Why do you think so?
            Quote: Vadim237
            It is possible to launch Bastions from the shore, for which - Zircon has unification of the container with Onyx. There is an airborne OTRK Dagger on the MiG 31, they can cover a large enough area.

            On the Premier League too? But on surface targets in order to shoot them, you need to find them. With what?
            1. -5
              19 October 2021 18: 09
              There are already over-the-horizon radars and satellite detection of ships - you have a feeling that you are stuck in the last century.
              1. +3
                21 October 2021 11: 13
                Over-the-horizon radars. Tell us how they detect surface and submarine ships.
                My past century does not know how to do this.
                1. -2
                  21 October 2021 18: 11
                  I wrote about surface ships and not about the nuclear submarine "Sunflower - short-range over-the-horizon short-range radar station. Designed to detect surface and air targets at a distance of up to 450 km." Designed for use in coastal systems for monitoring surface and air conditions within the 200-mile economic zone. Volna (GP-120) is an over-the-horizon radar of the far zone. Designed to detect surface and air targets at a distance of up to 3000 km. "Russia is developing a mobile radar station" Laguna-M ", which will be able to track more than 200 surface targets within a 200-mile zone" Yes, and the satellite Leana has five satellites, and in real combat operations the nuclear submarine alone without air cover and from other surface ships will not trample into battle. Why did you decide so? - Yes, because there are nuclear weapons, including in the fleet, which in the event of an attack on us will be used against the attackers - therefore, any attack on us will become suicidal. "My last century does not know how to do this" - It really does not know - but not the century and you personally do not know.
                  1. +1
                    25 October 2021 06: 40
                    It is clearly seen that apart from modern school education you have nothing. Explain anything ... well, how can you explain to a person who studies on Wikipedia
          3. +2
            19 October 2021 15: 13
            Quote: Vadim237
            It is possible to launch Bastions from the shore, for which - Zircon has unification of the container with Onyx. There is an airborne OTRK Dagger on the MiG 31, they can cover a large enough area.

            Well, here's your opponent at sea:

            Loading - from 12 to 40 KRMB, depending on the modification. And there are about 50 units built and planned for construction.
            Now tell us - how will you deal with this with the help of anti-ship missiles and OTRK?
            Quote: Vadim237
            And the ICBM can be launched at the pier, this is the main task of all SSBNs and where it all starts from, the main thing is to launch

            If SSBNs stand at the piers during a threatened period, they can be written off immediately. Because in the absence of an ASW, both our SSBN bases have every chance of receiving a full bus of guests from close range or a flock of unobtrusive SLCMs. And that's all - with such a time of arrival, we simply will not have time to deliver a retaliatory strike.
            Quote: Vadim237
            and the Virginias themselves, if they smell fried, will not meddle in our waters

            And what will drive them out of there? Ancient "Albatrosses" who still remember dear Mikhail Sergeevich? Eight Il-38s for all fleets? Or a dozen running frigates - also for all fleets?
            Quote: Vadim237
            In the next 10 years, our fleet will receive all the Yaseny and NPA that are now being built and tested, and everything that is now being upgraded and repaired from the submarines

            The fleet will receive less ash than even Boreyev. And the repaired SSNS ... what are the chances that the repairs will be completed on time, and will not be postponed until decommissioning? I am not even talking about how many SSNNs our potential adversary will receive for the same time.
            But we, of course, will not simplify the life of our submariners - and we will give up PLO aviation. And rightly so - really, why do we need a means that can control the underwater situation in fairly large areas of the sea, promptly reconnoiter the places of possible contacts with targets and hit these targets themselves?
            *sarcasm off
            1. -4
              19 October 2021 18: 24
              Loading - from 12 to 40 KRMB, depending on the modification. And there are about 50 units built and planned for construction.
              Now tell us - how will you deal with this with the help of anti-ship missiles and OTRK? - Subsonic Tomahawks found how to scare the air defense and even shoot them down from an anti-aircraft gun - no sense from all subsonic missiles, all the more so over the water surface.
              Because in the absence of PLO, both our SSBN bases have every chance of getting a full bus of guests from close range - all air defense bases are covered, this whole bus will be shot down and you need to be a real daredevil to attack the submarine base in the hope that you will not be found by a surface ship or you will not stumble on the enemy's nuclear submarines - there are definitely no such daredevils in the US army with their skin and a submarine, no one will risk so much.
              And rightly so - really, why do we need a means that can control the underwater situation in fairly large areas of the sea, promptly reconnoiter the places of possible contacts with targets and hit these targets themselves?
              * sarcasm off - Its efficiency, as it was low, will remain so, and it makes no sense to spend a lot of money on it, the submarine is best able to detect another submarine, it is necessary to develop NPA and build nuclear submarines as well as PLO ships.
              1. +1
                19 October 2021 19: 30
                Quote: Vadim237
                Subsonic Tomahawks found how to scare the air defense and even shoot them down from an anti-aircraft gun - no sense from all subsonic missiles, even more so over the water surface.

                Are you sure you read my post carefully? Start will be close range... In the absence of an anti-submarine submarine, the enemy's SSNS can generally fire an SLCM salvo from 20-30 miles away - and the air defense simply does not have enough time to defeat all targets.
                Moreover, they can use subtle SLCMs against us - some kind of LRASM reverse conversion with a Tomahawk guidance system.
                Quote: Vadim237
                all air defense bases are covered, this whole bus will be shot down and you need to be a real daredevil to attack a submarine base in the hope that you will not be found by a surface ship or you will not stumble upon an enemy nuclear submarine

                What surface ship? Which submarine? A dozen frigates and a dozen SSNS in 10-15 years for two fleets - that's all. We have no OVR, and there is nothing to keep the close approaches to the bases of the fleet.
                Moreover, without aircraft, there will be no early warning PLO at all - surface ships can learn about the presence of enemy nuclear submarines only by approaching anti-ship missiles.
                And yes, for fifty Virginias, our ten Ashes will be extremely dangerous. Especially taking into account the well-known troubles with GAS, torpedoes and counter-torpedoes.
                Quote: Vadim237
                such brave souls in the US army definitely do not have their skin and a submarine so no one will risk it.

                If there is a chance to exchange 3-4 nuclear submarines for 40% of the enemy's strategic nuclear potential, be sure that the executors will be found.
                And all these stories about cowardly, pampered Yankees are very reminiscent of Japanese propaganda before WWII. Everyone remembers how it ended for the Japanese.
                Quote: Vadim237
                Its effectiveness, as it was low, will remain so, and there is no point in spending a lot of money on it, a submarine can best be detected by another submarine.

                Just count the area controlled by the fields of the RSAB, exposed from the plane, and the area monitored by the submarine on a silent move during the same time. And the reaction time to contact is "somewhere over a hundred miles." At a nominal expense and normal performance characteristics of the RGAB, and not like ours - "golden capercaillies" who put a teaspoon per hour.
                In addition, the aircraft has the main advantage - it is invulnerable to nuclear submarines.
                1. The comment was deleted.
                  1. 0
                    21 October 2021 19: 36
                    Quote: Vadim237
                    Now, target designation for the CD for VO systems takes several seconds - they will fly these 20-30 miles for several minutes during this time, they will knock everyone

                    You are confusing an air defense system with a laser. Taking into account the cycle "detection by control center - capture - launch - aiming missiles - defeat - new detection", the real operating range of the air defense missile system on the so beloved primary combat missile systems and the real probability of defeat - about 20-25 SLCMs may fail.
                    Quote: Vadim237
                    to the place where the missiles take off according to the coordinates of the same radar, you can aim tactical missiles of the same Iskander and cover it at the time of launching the missiles

                    It's too late to lock up the stable when the horses are stolen. ©
                    The sea seeded by the SSC will not negate the fact of the destruction of the SSBN base with everything that was on it.
                    Quote: Vadim237
                    This is the same subsonic Tomahawk - which simply has improved EPR characteristics, but they are not in service with nuclear submarines, and they are not invisible for new radars.

                    Radar detection - yes. The problem is that sees an eye, yes a tooth is numb - they are unobtrusive for radars responsible for the use of weapons, including divisional radars zrdn.
                    Quote: Vadim237
                    Here, and 10% is enough in response to turn the enemy's territory into HELL, which in turn makes it senseless to attack SSBNs and destroy them - one hell of your ass will come with the same attack on our strategic forces.

                    Read VO - after all the reductions in all our strategic nuclear forces, there is not enough even to solve one of the tasks: destroying the enemy's nuclear potential or causing unacceptable damage to the population and infrastructure. Time total vitrification ended with the USSR.
        2. +1
          19 October 2021 05: 23
          Precisely, hypersonic missiles on submarines, which cannot be detected in any way or anything due to the lack of ASW aircraft.
          1. -3
            19 October 2021 18: 26
            If I wrote anything about the destruction of surface ships and the fact that without the cover of onnykh submarines will not meddle.
            1. 0
              21 October 2021 11: 10
              We do not have an ocean-going fleet as such. Judging by what you wrote, our submarines will not go anywhere. They will stand by the wall.
              1. 0
                21 October 2021 18: 44
                There is no distant ocean, but there is one capable of protecting its coastal zones and seas.
      2. +1
        19 October 2021 05: 21
        Are you serious?
  7. +10
    18 October 2021 08: 40
    The right pebble in the garden of parade lovers and roast pigs in front of TV cameras.
  8. -4
    18 October 2021 09: 03
    if there is a weapon, we have something to answer; if not, this is Ukraine. you can only hawk
  9. +24
    18 October 2021 09: 23
    Unfortunately, the author of the article is right in everything.
    The problems of our anti-submarine aviation began a long time ago,
    but they worsened not only with the transition to "wild capitalism" and
    practice of "assimilation of budgetary money", but also with the practice of assigning
    chief chief of all naval aviation fighter pilots,
    who not only know nothing about anti-submarine aviation, but
    do not even try to understand her needs, focusing entirely on
    "destructive component", which generally contradicts common sense
    meaning.
    So that readers correctly understand the attitude of the MA command to
    anti-submarine aviation, I will cite the statement of one Hero of the Russian Federation,
    lieutenant general, about the anti-submarine aviation of the association, which
    he commanded: "Shed-hoofed aircraft". And this attitude is still
    since then it can be seen in the actions of the MA leadership.
    Now the anti-submarine aviation of the Navy is used only in parades
    and for demonstration flights in the distant regions of the World Ocean,
    since using it for its intended purpose, the command of the MA does not
    not only does not know how, but is also afraid, due to low efficiency and weak
    the training of flight personnel in the search for IPL.
    1. +1
      19 October 2021 01: 24
      The problem is not in the "fighters".
      The second part will be about this.
      The deck eroy, who recently left for a "soft chair", was one of the first heinous deeds he did - strangling our most promising deck vehicle ...
      1. +2
        19 October 2021 08: 04
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The problem is not in the "fighters".

        You know better, yeah ...
        And it's stupid to talk about the deck car, where is that deck?
        I am not a supporter of discussing specific people, everything is there
        their motives are clear - money and a sweet life, discuss
        we need problems and ways to overcome them.
  10. +5
    18 October 2021 09: 56
    There is still time
    Nobody can guarantee this. And for naval aviation, if everything is so sad, insulting and alarming.
  11. +12
    18 October 2021 10: 04
    The author is a plus. No matter how hard you try, the problems are still there. Therefore, they must be raised, analyzed and resolved in the interests of the country's defense capability. Yes soldier
  12. -1
    18 October 2021 13: 39
    Yes, sailors are somehow not very successful with manned aircraft ... Maybe it's time to immediately switch to unmanned aircraft?
    1. +3
      18 October 2021 15: 32
      There is no doubt that unmanned aircraft will be very important in the future of the Russian Navy. With the time every combat ship, and even submarines are likely to carry and to use them. A complete range of UAVs of every size that can allow it, is likely to be adopted by the Russian Navy.

      It opens new options for the Russian Navy, but in fact, it would not be a replacement of the manned aircraft in most of the cases.
      1. +1
        18 October 2021 16: 35
        Quote: eehnie
        There is no doubt that unmanned aircraft will be very important in the future of the Russian Navy.

        do you think the traditional aircrafts have loose the any meaning?
  13. +4
    18 October 2021 14: 49
    Joke.
    Two men are walking. A woman walks in front of them.
    One of the men keeps repeating to himself under his breath: "Oh, what teeth! Oh, what teeth!"
    The second one is perplexed: "What teeth ?! You didn't even see her face."
    To which the first responds: "These are the teeth you need to have to eat such an ass!"

    According to the content of the article: "What kind of" teeth "you had to have for our naval aviation to be in such an ass ?!"
    By "teeth" everyone understands what they understand ...
  14. +5
    18 October 2021 14: 54
    Naval aviation is orders of magnitude more important and efficient than the fleet.
    It is in it that you need to invest strength and resources.
  15. +10
    18 October 2021 15: 00
    And here the author raises the topic of anti-submarine aviation only! And we still don't have MRA as a class! In the past, each fleet had one MRA division! And now, not now, of course, but long ago, the remains of the aircraft were transferred to the Aerospace Forces. There is no MPA at all on the fleets! And the question of any alternative (su-24 and su-35 are not MRA) is not considered at all.
    It seems to me alone that all this sadness with submarines, and with AWACS, and with RTR and electronic warfare aviation is a consequence of an implicit, hidden from the public sphere, compromise with a "probable adversary" in the interests of preserving their "Faberge", "kids", " houses "and other assets located abroad.
    Otherwise, how is it all !!! explain?
    1. +4
      18 October 2021 15: 36
      Quote: Alex_Bora
      In the past, each fleet had one MRA division!

      The Pacific Fleet had two MRA divisions - 25 mrad and 143 mrad.
    2. -8
      18 October 2021 16: 05
      There will be - as soon as large UAVs are launched into series and MRAs will appear - after the Aerospace Forces are saturated with them.
      1. +5
        18 October 2021 16: 16
        Yeah, "... or the donkey dies, or the padishah dies"
        1. -6
          18 October 2021 19: 49
          Are you in a hurry somewhere? And the most important thing is why you are in a hurry to fight on the seas and oceans, even in the most distant future, no one will be with us.
  16. +2
    18 October 2021 16: 39
    With all due respect to the knowledge of Mr. M. Klimov and his ability to write excellent articles on naval topics, I am nevertheless concerned about the question for whom and why these articles are written. If for the readers of VO, then it is not clear what the author expects from these readers, After all, nothing depends on them in terms of solving the problems indicated by the author. And those on whom something depends are unlikely to accept such articles as a guide to action. They also have their own governing documents. and your own considerations. And these considerations often have nothing to do with the needs of the Russian Navy and are primarily aimed at satisfying someone's selfish interests. And such interests are satisfied quite simply.
    First, in the media, at various exhibitions and forums, there is advertising that is well financed by such "interested parties", which they are trying with all their might to bring to the attention of those who make decisions on financing the development and manufacture of the next "wunderwolf". Then, upon receipt of funding, these "interested parties" "give birth" to something and all this ends, as a rule, with "premature" samples of military equipment and weapons. And this applies to ALL types of the RF Armed Forces, not just the Navy.
    Naturally, as in every rule, this rule has exceptions, as a result of which decent models sometimes get into service. But most of them are not something fundamentally new, but more or less modernized samples of the USSR era.
    In general, if in the West advertising is the engine of commerce, then in our country advertising is the engine for cutting state money between clever and super-wise "interests". And the scale of this cut can be the envy of any West.
    There, the sawing takes place, as a rule, at the tender stage. But when the tender is over and the contractor is selected, rather strict control is established over the spending of the allocated funds, and those caught in the misuse of these funds can be punished very harshly.
    But these are their problems. We would somehow solve ours. And it seems to me that VO is not exactly the tool with which you can eliminate "problems in the assay tent".
    And to supply a potential adversary with unnecessary information is somehow not comme il faut.
    In the days of the USSR, both the authors of such articles, and the overly knowledgeable, but speech incontinent members of the forum would have long been led to the wall with the poster "The Enemy Eavesdrops", and possibly to a slightly different wall.
    1. +1
      19 October 2021 13: 24
      Answer from Klimov:

      Articles on VO (specifically Klimov) are read, incl. in "high offices".
      Specifically, this can be absolutely precisely stated that Evmenov has already read (and some higher ones).
      The entire article was written not just on open materials, but on materials from the Ministry of Defense itself. do not like it - complain.
      The influence of these articles IS.
      As for the reference to Myandin's product, the materials on it were unclassified, and with regard to the publication of the draft of the calculations by the author, this was done deliberately and on purpose - FOR GOOD REASONS
  17. +5
    18 October 2021 17: 05
    The attitude towards naval aviation can be seen at least from the fact that 60 years ago all naval aviation schools - flight, navigational, technical and engineering schools - were completely liquidated.
    They are sent there "on a leftover principle."
    No one is particularly eager to serve in the MA, there are few places in the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet, and they are not particularly eager to serve in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet.
    All research institutes and NGOs dealing with this topic have long been in decline.
    It would be good only in Ukraine
    On the basis of the once powerful Kiev "Hydra" and several NGOs, which have been abroad for a long time in an unfriendly, to put it mildly, country, shopping and snack centers and residential complexes have long been perched. It's good though.
  18. +3
    18 October 2021 17: 53
    Thanks to the Author for a responsible, reasoned and courageous civil position!
  19. +2
    18 October 2021 18: 38
    Thanks to the author for a great article. You and Timokhin are doing a great job showing the real situation in the Navy and exposing the actions of officials falling under the most serious articles of the Criminal Code. It is sad that these persons are not rendered harmless and do not sit on the dock, and this makes them more and more.
  20. 0
    19 October 2021 14: 02
    The relation between the Russian Naval Aviation and the Russian Aerospace Forces is not something avoidable. There are strong areas where synergistic measures are applied and can be intensified, especially in the referred to technical issues and in the referred to the necessary common standards. Full independence of the Naval Aviation is unrealistic.

    Unlike other countries, the Russian Naval Aviation has available advanced combat platforms in order to put the necessary equipment onboard. This is a strong source of advantage for the Russian Naval Aviation. This option was intensely used at the time of the Soviet Union. One clear example of it is the Tu-95/142. Appliying just this view, the Russian Naval aviation very likely have high interest in the Tu-PAK-DA, and even can help in its design, in order to assure compatibility. Also the Russian Naval aviation very likely have high interest in the Su-57, in the new project of combat helicopter (surely unmanned by the end), in the new long range UAV Altayr / Altius, and in every other unmanned aircraft of every size ... We can expect all them and others to be compatible with the Russian Naval Aviation potential applications since the design stage.

    In the refered to the anti-submarine aircrafts, for long range land based anti-submarine aircrafts, the logical combat platforms at this point would be the Tu-PAK-DA and the Altayr / Altius unmanned aircraft, and for shorter range shipborne solutions, the logical combat platforms would be the future combat helicopter / surely unmanned by the end) under development, the Su-57 for aircraft carriers, other shipborne unmanned aircrafts, and the Ka-50/52 in its naval variant.

    In the referred to the long range maritime patrol, the same platforms emerge again for both cases, long range land based platforms and shorter range shipborne platforms.

    All these options are fairly superior, much more combat capable than the current proposals exposed in the article. In the refered to the platforms proposls included in the article, they are conceptually outdated for combat roles. As example, when the serial production of the Altayr / Altius UAV / UCAV has been launched, there is not option for other long range land based platforms in the competition, except for the Tu-PAK-DA. In fact combat ships in the future very likely only will carry combat air based platforms, manned or unmanned. The practice of addapting auxiliary platforms for use in the frontline, is dangerous for the crews today (like we saw with the case of the Il-20) and can be considered finished in the refered to the adoption and procurement of new material.

    The total exhaustion of the Be-6/12 first and the Il-38 later, is basically a consequence of a natural process, almost completed in the case of the Be-6/12, and advanced in the case of the Il-38. Russia simply is exhausting them by the right way and is moving forward. Actually the Russian Armed Forces have enough material in the reserve to replace instantly both and remove them from active service.

    In fact the complains about the use of both, in the referred to the age of the platforms and the age of the systems inside would end instantly, with the total exit of both. Certainly, the mechanical reserve of the last units of Be-6/12 is small enough to allow to think in a fast total exit by the way of the help to allies like Syria. In the case of the Il-38, its use is likely to be increased until total exhaustion, and some help to allies if necessary.
  21. 0
    19 October 2021 18: 52
    Silly question: why the main manufacturers of such machines - the United States use the B-737, the Japanese are similar ... but in the Russian Federation they cannot make machines based on the Tu214? The aircraft is produced, completely local ... and the submarines and AWACS are not to say that we have a lot.
  22. 0
    21 October 2021 18: 16
    Russia has a peculiar economy, perhaps this is our path, which we have been looking for for so long.
    Only those enterprises will survive, which will come under the control of the state, where people work for a good salary.
  23. 0
    25 October 2021 18: 04
    There remains great respect for the author, who elaborated the question in detail and constructively. And to adequate security officials, who, I hope, will draw conclusions.

    > Unfortunately, the situation is such that today it is not just possible to lie, but, as a rule, it is possible with impunity, including in “high documents” and the highest “decision makers”.

    Here we are talking about workers with their mouths, a vacancy dream of an abundance of crooks
  24. 0
    7 December 2021 16: 05
    As always, a good, objective article. Now the Commander-in-Chief has outlined the task in Sochi ... he probably gave out instructions and we will wait for the result.

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