"Seawulf" and the rock: you really have to be able to!
The Americans grab their heads, who are simpler, ask questions, who have certain knowledge, are trying to figure out how this could happen in general. That is, to answer them. But the overall situation is pretty funny.
One of the three Seawulf-class attack submarines, SSN-22 Connecticut, returned from a cruise to the South China Sea in a state, to put it mildly, precluding further use of the submarine for its intended purpose in the near future.
The boat somehow hobbled to Guam, where everyone was stunned by the damage.
There is a collision with something or someone under water. The extent of the damage excludes a drunk whale or a school of brutal sharks. So it was either a ship or something even more substantial like a reef or an island.
Everyone was delighted by the information that the reactor was not damaged and no one died on board. Such an evasive presentation suggests that there are non-fatal casualties among the crew. Accordingly, "Connecticut" kissed the unknown object, as they say, from the heart.
What exactly happened to Connecticut is still a mystery, it is known that the Americans know how to keep their secrets. But in recent days, many authors of specialized media have expressed their utter bewilderment about how a multibillion-dollar nuclear submarine equipped with an advanced tracking sensor system, in fact, one of the best submarines in the world, could so easily make a collision with something underwater. ...
Yes, this is a very urgent question: how could a modern submarine, stuffed with various systems, find itself in such a situation?
In reality, underwater navigation requires many skills, including a very detailed knowledge of the immediate surrounding area. This is a complex process, the orientation of the boat in space under water, and there are only two components that can provide the boat with a safe route: the most detailed maps and the navigator's knowledge of the area, and the use of sonar. As the navigator to the charts, so to the sonar must be accompanied by the calculation of operators who understand their business.
Currently, boats use sonars in the forward-down-side directions of the boat, which makes it possible to “see” the environment quite well. Modern low-frequency short-range sonars allow their operators to see and distinguish a wide variety of underwater objects, from mines to other boats. Or, as an option, sunken ships and underwater reefs.
A typical high frequency high resolution sonar can see up to 5 meters. True, its disadvantage is that its work can be detected from twice the distance. However, modern American sonars cope with the task of detecting the situation quite normally.
But here such an option arises: since the enemy, guided by the operation of the high-frequency sonar, is able to localize the submarine using it. Accordingly, a boat using high frequency sonar can not only be detected, it can be pursued without being noticed.
This feature leads to the fact that American boats, while in unfriendly waters controlled by China or Russia, rarely use high frequency sonar.
If bottom mapping sonars confirm the position of the submarine on the map, then there is less need for high frequency sonar, which, by sending impulses forward, can allow the enemy to determine the position of the boat.
The US Navy maps are the most accurate maps in use today. They are, of course, digital, but with the obligatory duplication on paper. Of course, you have to update them, but it's worth it. Ideally, every US Navy submarine has the most recent map that accurately reflects the reality outside the hull.
In practice, Americans have found that this is not always the case. In some parts of the world, the distance between soundings is tens of meters, these "blind" zones can hide topographic formations, which may suddenly appear in the area followed by a submarine.
If the submarine is operating in an area where the presence of imaginary enemy submarines is possible, then the crew usually refuses to use high-frequency sonar to check the surrounding topography. This means that the submarine relies on the accelerometer and vertical depth sonar to calculate the ship's position.
This type of navigation has very minor bugs, but it does. Moreover, these errors may well get worse over time. In the end, the submarine can go a hundred meters or more from its true position. The error grows over time until the next navigation fix. There are ways to fix the position of a submarine that do not use high frequency sonar, but they do not show what topography might be hidden between soundings on a real map.
The South China Sea is a very difficult region.
Not only do the depths "jump", there are a large number of topographic objects in the sea from the reef to the island, submarines of Vietnam, China, the USA and other countries are always present in the sea. Australia, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan have submarines, so several submarines from different countries may well operate in the region at the same time.
So the collision of submarines in the South China Sea is quite a reality.
The Americans note with displeasure that along with countries that are willing to cooperate and disclose their plans for the use of submarines (Australia and Vietnam in the first place) and coordinate their operations in order to secure their submarines, there are also countries that do not. ...
Naturally, such countries primarily mean China. It's clear.
And here a very peculiar situation turns out: the boats of the United States and China, being in a very busy area of the South China Sea, do not use high-frequency sonars, so as not to be detected.
Submarines can and will hide in noisy areas to mask their signature with background noise. This means that two submarines can pass very close to each other, and neither of them will hear the other if the background noise is loud enough to mask both submarines.
And there is also the prospect of the appearance of patrol unmanned submarines in the world's waters. Or drums, like the declared Russian Poseidon. There is a sense in the use of such ships, unmanned submarines will be able to operate in very shallow or dangerous waters, which a nuclear submarine is not capable of. An unmanned submarine, controlled remotely or with the help of artificial intelligence, will be able to perform certain tasks without risking the lives of the crew, which will not be on board.
As unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned underwater vehicles are a very real future.
Let's go back to the South China Sea.
This is a very, very difficult region for diving. The region has high tectonic activity, the bottom topography is constantly changing, there are a lot of areas with shallow depths, with sharp drops in depths, with tectonic structures that rise from the bottom to the surface.
In general, it is a very difficult region for underwater navigation. Especially volcanic structures, which, if not detected in time, can cause big trouble for a submarine. An abrupt change in the depth of the bottom beneath a submarine may not give it enough time to maneuver away from the near-vertical change in topography directly ahead.
At the moment, there is no data on what the American boat collided with, with such a tectonic structure, or with another submarine. Both options are possible, but since not a single bit of information about submarine repairs as a result of accidents from other countries has leaked into the public domain, it can be concluded that Connecticut has cut itself into a rock. Alas, that does not do the crew any credit.
The question arises: what did Connecticut forget in the South China Sea?
The answer is simple. Study and adaptation of the crew to a possible theater of operations. It is no secret that relations between the United States and China are far from ideal, and therefore in order to be ready for any development of the situation. Therefore, the presence of American boats training crews in the realities of the South China Sea looks quite normal.
So how the clash happened, if it becomes public, it will still be very far away. The fact that Connecticut was able to return on its own suggests that the crew on the ship is competent and ready for such situations. Another question is that this crew was able to admit this at all.
In fact, everything that happened after the collision with an unknown (flatter the Americans) object fits into standard procedures.
In the case of the Connecticut, the boat must immediately go into shallow water and maintain positive buoyancy on the differential in the event of flooding of the compartments. All compartments are required to report the presence of damage and loss among the crew. In the event of flooding or fire as a result of a collision, the consequences will have to be eliminated by the crew.
The boat is required to communicate over secret encrypted channels with a coordination center in the District of Columbia.
Upon entering shallow water, the duty officer must determine whether it is safe to surface immediately. If it is safe, the submarine will rise directly to the surface and assess the situation there. All this happens in a matter of seconds.
If the hull is damaged in any way, the submarine is prohibited from diving. The same prohibition applies in the event of damage to the sonar dome or suspicion of damage to ballast tanks. Even if the damage is not visually visible, the boat will not sink anymore. The instructions are for sailing to the nearest friendly port on the surface.
Naturally, the main attention will be paid to the state of the nuclear power plant and nuclear weapons (if any) on board. But the main emphasis will be on checking the state of the atomic reactor. The pumps and valves serving high pressure and high temperature systems are very rugged and designed to withstand impacts, but systems will be tested on every system in the engine room to ensure nuclear safety.
And now the boat will come to the port. On our own. What will happen next?
What will happen next is that the boat commander will be removed from command at the earliest opportunity. An officer from the submarine squadron to which the ship that had an accident belonged is appointed as the interim submarine commander. As a rule, this is an officer not from the boat's crew.
Further there will be an investigation, which includes the boat commander, navigator, assistant navigator and officer of the watch. Most likely, these officers will be suspended from their duties during the investigation. Sonar operators may also be investigated.
The investigation will review equipment performance, surveillance logs, and impact activities to determine who else will need to be disciplined.
I repeat that judging by the fact that the boat crawled to Guam, the crew knew very well what and how to do in such a situation. However, the fact that the Seawulf-class submarine, costing just astronomical sums, found itself in such a situation, suggests that the crew obviously knew and could not do everything.
You can sympathize with the Americans. It is very unpleasant to gouge such a boat. On the other hand, as practice shows, training crews to sail in such difficult areas as the South China Sea should start from quieter places.
Otherwise, all inventions, the latest sonars, sensors and sensors - everything will be useless. And the tears of American taxpayers over the next ditched billions will be a fully justified consequence.
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