"It seemed that Moscow was about to fall"

German soldiers are examining Soviet Tanks KV-1 and T-40 from the 42nd Tank Brigade of the Bryansk Front, knocked out on October 3, 1941 near the village of Igritskoye, Sevsky District, Bryansk Region

"Typhoon" - the Germans called the plan of their offensive. Typhoon is a strong wind, a destructive hurricane. The Nazis were going to swiftly bypass Moscow from the north and south, create huge "pincers" and crush the Soviet capital. Thus, create conditions for complete victory in the war.

New offensive of the Wehrmacht along the entire front

After the battle for Kiev (How the Germans took Kiev), the German Headquarters had to determine whether there was enough time and energy to defeat Soviet Russia during the 1941 campaign, thereby continuing the Barbarossa plan.

If it is not possible to crush the military power of the Russians before the onset of winter, then the war will be protracted, which can turn into big troubles. All Berlin's plans, which were outlined after the victory over Russia, will have to be postponed indefinitely. The main forces of the Wehrmacht will be pinned down on the Russian line for at least another year, and on the horizon there will be a threat of war on several fronts and directions. Just what they thought to avoid in Berlin when they started the war with the USSR.

Therefore, the German high command decided to go to maximum efforts to defeat the main forces of the enemy in 1941 and take Moscow. Depriving the Russians of the capital, the main center of industry and communications hub in the European part of the country. Also, the fall of Moscow was supposed to break the morale of the enemy, intensify the processes of decay and decay.

The German army in the fall of 1941, despite serious losses and fierce resistance from the Russians, retained its strategic initiative and was able to continue the offensive.

The Germans still believed in their superiority and invincibility. But it was still impossible to determine when the Russians would run out of strength and reserves. All previous calculations turned out to be wrong.

The Soviet colossus, allegedly on feet of clay, turned out to be steel and fought desperately, throwing more and more divisions into the battle. True, the last divisions that entered the battle seemed worse prepared and insufficiently equipped. Therefore, the Nazis had the hope that these were the last reserves of Moscow, and the critical moment when the Russians would break was near. You just need to push harder, and the last resistance of the enemy will be broken.

As a result, the Nazi leadership decided to continue the offensive and achieve a decisive outcome.

On September 6, 1941, Hitler signed Directive No. 35. Moscow again became the main target of the offensive. Army Group "Center" in the Moscow direction is significantly strengthened. Army Group North returned to the central direction the 3rd Panzer Group of Hoth, transferred its 4th Panzer Group to Göpner and a large number of self-propelled guns and artillery. Army Group South returned to Group Center Weichs's 2nd Field Army and Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. Also, the southern wing of Army Group Center was reinforced by several army corps of Group South.

True, this weakened the strategic groupings of the Nazis in the north and south, where they were supposed to take Leningrad, Donbass, Crimea and the Caucasus. With the available forces, the Germans in the north could not take Leningrad. In the south, the Nazis managed to occupy the Crimea, but the 11th Army got stuck near Sevastopol. Also, the Germans were unable to cross the Don and, fighting heavy battles to the point of complete depletion of forces, were defeated. The Russians launched a strong counteroffensive, the Nazis retreated beyond the Northern Donets, left Rostov-on-Don and retreated beyond the Mius.

Red Army soldiers in position at the bridge on the Western Front. October 1941

Soviet tank KV-1, abandoned near Bryansk

Red Army prisoners in open boxcars near Bryansk

"Typhoon"

The plan for the attack on Moscow was codenamed Typhoon.

It provided for the delivery of three powerful strikes from the regions of Dukhovshchina, Roslavl and Shostka with the aim of dismembering the opposing troops of the Western, Reserve and Bryansk fronts (commanders I.S.Konev, S.M.Budyonny and A.I. Eremenko), encircling and destroying their main forces. Then they had to take Moscow. Mobile units were to cover the Soviet capital from the north and south.

On September 16, 1941, the commander-in-chief of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Bock, ordered the preparations for the Moscow operation.

The 4th and 9th armies, the 4th and 3rd tank groups carried out a breakthrough of the enemy's defense in the direction of Roslavl - Moscow. The 2nd Army was advancing on Sukhinichi and Bryansk. The 2nd Panzer Group was aiming at Bryansk and Orel.

Army Group Center by the end of September 1941 had over 1 million soldiers and officers, 1 tanks and self-propelled guns, 700 thousand guns and mortars, 14 aircraft. 950 divisions were concentrated here, including 77 tank and motorized. This was 18% of the entire infantry and 40% of the tank and motorized forces of the Wehrmacht on the Russian front.

The Soviet high command was also well prepared for the battle for Moscow.

40% of all the forces of the Red Army were concentrated in this direction. Konev's western front (6 reinforced armies) held defenses in the zone from Lake Seliger to Yelnya. The main forces of the Reserve Front of Budyonny (31st, 32nd, 33rd and 49th armies) took up defenses behind the Western Front on the Ostashkov-Selizharovo-Olenino-Spas-Demensk-Kirov line. The 24th and 43rd armies of this front were located next to the ZF in the strip from Yelnya to Frolovka. The Bryansk Front, consisting of three armies (50th, 3rd and 13th), held defenses along the eastern bank of the river. Desna from Frolovka to Putivl.

The three fronts numbered 800 men, about 800 tanks, about 7 guns and mortars, and over 500 aircraft. Moscow was separately defended by a fighter aviation Moscow air defense zone - already in July it consisted of more than 600 aircraft.

In Moscow, 12 divisions of the people's militia were created, which took up defense in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky direction. In July - September 1941, large-scale work was carried out to create the Rzhev-Vyazemskaya and Mozhaisk defense lines with a depth of up to 250 km. The work was carried out by the military, builders and residents of Moscow, Moscow, Smolensk, Tula and Kalinin regions. Hundreds of thousands of people worked daily. However, due to the huge scale of work, the construction was delayed and was completed by 40-60%.

Calculation of the German 50-mm PaK 38 cannon from the 19th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht at the wrecked car on the Varshavskoe highway near the village of Vorobyi. October 1941

German mortars walk past the Pz. Kpfw. IV during the battles at Vyazma

German infantrymen at the Pz. Kpfw. IV. Vyazma area. October 1941

Breakthrough Soviet Defense

When things were still going well in the north and south, the Germans launched an offensive in the Moscow direction.

By the beginning of October 1941, the 9th, 4th and 2nd field armies and 3 tank groups were ready for the offensive. The tank divisions were replenished, the materiel was repaired. The infantry divisions did not have time to fully restore the numerical strength, but the artillery was complete. Strong heavy artillery and numerous self-propelled guns provided the infantry with striking power.

On the night of October 2, 1941, the order of the Fuehrer was read to the troops of the German Eastern Front:

“Finally, the precondition for the last huge blow has been created, which should lead to the destruction of the enemy even before the onset of winter. All preparations, as far as possible for human effort, have already been completed. This time, systematically, step by step, preparations were made to bring the enemy into a position in which we could now inflict a fatal blow on him. Today begins the last, big, decisive battle of this year. "

In a radio speech on October 3, Hitler announced that new operations of gigantic proportions had begun on the Eastern Front 48 hours ago.

"The enemy has already been defeated and will never regain its strength",

- said the Fuhrer.

Fierce battles ensued on the distant approaches to Moscow.

The Germans immediately made great strides. The 2nd Panzer Group launched an offensive on September 30, 1941 in the Bryansk-Oryol direction, to the northeast. She had to, with the strong support of the Luftwaffe, break through to Orel as quickly as possible. Already on October 1, Guderian's tanks broke through the defenses of the 13th Army of the Bryansk Front, took Sevsk and Fatezh. On the 3rd, the Eagle fell. The left wing of the 2nd tank group turns to Bryansk, they go to the rear of the Russian troops, which defended themselves in front of the German 2nd field army of Weichs.

On October 2, 1941, the other armies of Army Group Center, supported by the 4th and 2nd Air Fleets, launched an offensive. The 2nd and 4th armies, supported by the 4th Panzer Group, broke through the Soviet defenses in the Roslavl region. The Nazis laid the foundation for the encirclement of two large Soviet groups: in the south - in the Bryansk region and in the north - in the Vyazma region.

Barricade on Smolenskaya Street in Moscow. Autumn 1941

A column of Soviet armor-piercing soldiers follows Moscow street

The commander of the squad of machine gunners I. I. Karachevtsev of the 1st battalion of Moscow workers conducts classes with the soldiers of the squad. October 1941

Bryansk boiler

Russian troops, defending in the Bryansk region, were attacked by the 2nd Army from the west, and Guderian's tanks entered from the east.

On October 6, the Germans occupied Karachev and Bryansk. The troops of the Bryansk Front were dismembered, parts of three armies (50th, 3rd and 13th were surrounded). Two cauldrons were formed: north (50th Army) and south (3rd and 13th armies) of Bryansk. The withdrawal of the armies of the Bryansk Front began on October 8. The command of the front troops was disrupted, the commander of the front Eremenko was wounded on the 13th. The armies fought to break through the encirclement and exit to their own until October 23.

Petrov's 50th Army made a breakthrough to the east. The commander of the 10th was seriously wounded and died. From the encirclement on October 20, about 6,7 thousand people and the army headquarters escaped to the Belev area. The army had to be formed anew. Kreizer's 3rd army withdrew to the southeast and on the 23rd left in the Ponyri region. We went through the swamps, tanks and vehicles had to be destroyed. The 13th army of Gorodnyansky, after the fuel ran out, abandoned all heavy equipment and property and broke through in the Fatezh area. Front troops and aviation supported the breakthrough. On October 18, the remnants of the army went out to their own. The troops of the 13th Army lost up to 50% of personnel and almost all materiel.

As a result, the control of three armies left the encirclement, the remnants of 18 divisions, having lost almost all heavy weapons and equipment. The losses of the 50th Army were the most severe: no more than 10% of the personnel left the boiler. However, there were practically no reserves in this direction, therefore, having replenished the armies with what they could, they were immediately thrown into battle. The stubborn resistance of the armies of the Bryansk Front in the Bryansk-Oryol direction disrupted the pace of the offensive and pinned down large enemy forces for 17 days. This allowed our troops to prepare a defense in the area of ​​Tula and the Mozhaisk line.

As a result, the Nazis were unable to make a deep coverage of Moscow from the south.

German column on the street of the captured Vyazma

German column on Lenin Street. Eagle. October 3, 1941

Tanks Pz. Kpfw. III and Sd. Kfz. 10 of the 2nd Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht during the offensive on Moscow. October 1941

Vyazemsky boiler

A similar situation developed on the northern flank of the German offensive.

The 4th Panzer Group and the 4th Army, after a breakthrough in the Roslavl region, turned north. The 9th Army, pinning down the enemy from the front, surrounded him from the north, and the 3rd Panzer Group turned south and struck in the rear. On October 7, the Germans, with the forces of the 56th motorized corps of the 3rd tank group from the north, the 46th and 40th motorized corps of the 4th tank group from the south and east, broke through to Vyazma, met east of the city and surrounded significant forces from the Soviet 19 -th, 20th, 24th, 32nd armies and Boldin's group. The Vyazemsky boiler was formed.

The Soviet command began the withdrawal of troops on October 5-6. However, the retreat took place in conditions of partial loss of control and fierce battles, so they did not have time to withdraw the troops.

The commandments of 4 armies, 37 divisions, 9 tank brigades and other units were surrounded. Part of the encircled group was led by the commander of the 19th Army, General Mikhail Lukin. When leaving the encirclement, he was seriously wounded and taken prisoner. Until the end of the war, Lukin was kept in concentration camps and tried to "process", recruit, but he held on with dignity, did not give in. The surrounded Soviet troops fought until October 13-14, pinning up to 28 enemy divisions. Part of the troops was able to break through to their own, with battles went to the Mozhaisk defensive line. The remnants of 16 divisions withdrew from 500 to 2 men. From the remaining divisions, small groups and individual fighters escaped from the cauldron.

As a result, the Red Army suffered heavy losses: according to German data, more than 660 thousand people were taken prisoners in two boilers near Bryansk and Vyazma. The commander of the 24th Army Konstantin Rakutin (a former border guard, fell in battle) was killed, the commander of the 32nd Army Sergei Vishnevsky, the commander of the 20th Army Philip Ershakov (died in a concentration camp) was taken prisoner.

However, the heroic resistance of the encircled Soviet troops allowed the Headquarters to restore the front in the Moscow direction.

It was a huge success for the German army. Nazi propaganda triumphed.

On October 9, 1941, the head of the Imperial Information Directorate stated that

"The outcome of the war is decided, and Russia is finished."

The newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" ("People's Observer", mouthpiece of the NSDAP) on October 13 reported:

“On a vast front, advancing German units are marching and rolling to the east. There are no words to describe the size of the Soviet defeat! "

The German generals were also victorious.

General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, wrote:

“It seemed that Moscow was about to fall.
Everyone in Army Group Center became very optimistic.
From Field Marshal von Bock to the soldier, everyone hoped that soon we would be marching through the streets of the Russian capital. "

Tanks Pz. Kpfw. 38 (t) of the 7th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht during the offensive on Moscow. October 1941

Tank KV-1 from the 4th Tank Brigade of the 1st Special Guards Rifle Corps, knocked out on October 4, 1941 on the northeastern outskirts of the city of Oryol during reconnaissance in force

Battle Continuation

On October 14, the German command issued an order to continue the Moscow operation.

It noted that the enemy was defeated, the remnants of the Russians were retreating. 4th Army and 4th Panzer Group were to strike directly at Moscow, encircling it from the west, south and north. Guderian's 2nd Panzer Army (2nd Panzer Group converted into an army on October 5) was ordered to cover the Russian capital from the southeast, and then from the east. The 2nd Army was ordered to advance on Yelets and Bogoroditsk, covering the southern flank of Guderian's army. Strauss's 9th Army and Gotha's 3rd Panzer Group attacked around Moscow from the north.

The Nazis sought to complete the operation in October, to break the last resistance of the Russians.

Thus, Army Group Center broke through the front, surrounded and defeated the armies of the Bryansk, Western and Reserve fronts. The Germans, using wide gaps in the Soviet defense, quickly moved forward and by mid-October reached the line of Mtsensk, Kaluga, Borodino and Kalinin, that is, they covered two-thirds of the way to Moscow.

Moscow was in mortal danger.

However, the battle for Moscow has just begun. With extraordinary efforts, the Soviet Headquarters restored the defenses on the approaches to Moscow. The closer to the Soviet capital, the more stubborn and stronger became the resistance of the Russians.

So, Lelushenko's 1st Guards Rifle Corps from the Mtsensk region hit Guderian's group. In the area of ​​Mtsensk - Oryol, a fierce battle went on for nine days. German tanks were detained in the Oryol region and were not allowed to break through to the capital in the shortest directions: Oryol - Tula - Moscow and Bryansk - Moscow.

When the defense of the Western and Reserve Fronts collapsed, the way to Moscow was opened for the enemy, and the Headquarters began to transfer divisions from the strategic reserve and neighboring fronts. Before the arrival of the reserve, an emergency mobilization of all possible forces was carried out that could cover Moscow and gain time at the cost of their death. For this, divisions and units of the NKVD, garrisons, destroyer battalions, schools, institutes and academies stationed in Moscow and the Moscow region were involved.

For example, the infantry and artillery schools of Podolsk, the Moscow Military-Political Academy and the Military-Political School, which were ordered to take up defenses near Maloyaroslavets and Mozhaisk, were raised on alert. The consolidated regiment of the military school named after the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, raised in the camps near Solnechnogorsk (1 cadets and 4 guns), went to the Volokolamsk fortified area.

On October 10, the Western and Reserve Fronts were united into one Western Front under the command of Zhukov. He began to create a new defensive front on the Volokolamsk - Mozhaisk - Maloyaroslavets - Kaluga line.

From the strategic reserve and neighboring fronts, 11 rifle divisions, 16 tank brigades and other units are being transferred to this direction. The remnants of the divisions that escaped from the cauldrons were also used. They cover the main directions. At the same time, new armies are being formed: the 5th Army of Leliushenko (in the Mozhaisk direction), the 43rd army of Akimov (the Maloyaroslavets direction), the 49th army of Zakharkin (the Kaluga direction), the 16th army of Rokossovsky (in the Volokolamsk direction).

Already on October 13, fierce battles began in all main directions. The front was generally restored.

Soldiers of the calculation of the Soviet 122-mm corps gun A-19 are preparing a gun for battle at a position near Moscow

Soviet T-34 tanks on the march during the fighting on the Borodino field near Moscow. October 1941

Comments

[ivan2022]

The events of the initial period of the Second World War remind similar events of the Patriotic War of 1812. In mid-September, Napoleon was in Moscow! And the tactics of the Russian army are, by and large, the same. Considering the enormous force of the first blow of the aggressor, there could be no other tactics.
This was followed by the second phase of the war - a gradual transition to the stage at which the main factor was the availability of our own cheap natural resources and low prices for the products of enterprises.
Some parallels with 1812 are relevant in this case as well; after Napoleon got stuck in Russia, he was cut off from the resources of France and could not resist for a long time. Likewise, Hitler was subsequently forced to import raw materials from abroad by sea for years. If he had known in advance about such future problems, he would not have dared to start a war.

The West drew conclusions from the flawed bet on a powerful first strike. Constant psychological pressure and decades of decaying Russian propaganda brought him brilliant results ...
To understand the soul of the enemy is a great thing! What do we see here? The leadership of Russia (after the departure of the Germans Holstein-Gottorp-Romanovs and the first wave of noble-raznochinsky Bolshevism) - for many decades did not understand the psychology of the West, lived with some epic and utopian ideas and did things that cannot be called anything other than manifestations of savage idiocy ... A. Zinoviev wrote about this convincingly in his book "The West".

[Illanatol]

The events of the initial period of the Second World War resemble similar events of the Patriotic War of 1812.

Not in the least. Napoleon turned out to be a very bad strategist, he rejected Berthier's plan (which, incidentally, served as the basis for the Barbarossa plan).
In 1812, it was much easier for the defending side (Russia). The offensive of the Great Army took place in a narrow strip, the direction of its attacks and actions was not difficult to calculate. In 1941, the enemy offensive went in a wide strip, three GA. It was more difficult to calculate the enemy's actions in these conditions ... which of the three strikes is the main one?
In the wars of the past, the defending side had some advantages, even being inferior in strength. In the "war of motors" - the advantage of the attacking side, which owns the strategic initiative. If you have the initiative, you are capable of defeating even a numerically superior enemy who is forced to spread his forces along the entire front, not knowing the direction of the main blows.
In 1812, the enemy had no advantage in mobility, and in 1941? The main superiority of the Wehrmacht was not that it was stronger, but that it was faster, more mobile, having greater opportunities to concentrate forces in the right directions.

"When comparing armies, a fool counts swords and spears, and a sage counts horses and carts."

[silver_roman]

Apparently proceeding from a similar logic, the post-war USSR created tank armies for a quick breakthrough to the English Channel.

[Ingvar K]

What do you smoke to eat? )))))))

[Aurel]

How much abandoned scrap metal was lost.

[210ox]

It's scrap metal in your head. The padded technique was heavily used. Both the Nazis and us. What could not be used was melted down. The only thing left was that it was difficult to take out.

[Alien From]

Recently we went to pick mushrooms (Smolensk region), diggers dug everything up again. On one "cop" they threw 5 122 mm shells, right 500 meters from the village. And there are still countless such stories in the land, as well as fighters ...... Eternal memory to the defenders !!!!

[Alex66]

The entire people, together with the leadership of the country and their children, defended their country, we were united, like a fist, therefore, we were able to defeat the enemy. And now it's even scary to think how disunited we are.

[NSV]

At that time, nothing was lost, and did not go to a private shop! All the metal was reused !!! Yes, not immediately, but put into action!

[bubalik]

,,, from the award list.

[Gardamir]

I would like more photos from our side. Unusual hats on militia-machine-gunners, interesting knapsacks, a little higher in armor-piercing. All this is our history.

[Sling cutter]

Quote: Gardamir

Unusual hats on militia-machine-gunners, interesting knapsacks, a little higher in armor-piercing.

This is a hat, the so-called finca. And the satchel is most likely not statutory, it is possible that it is a school one.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Stroporez

And the satchel is most likely not statutory, it is possible that it is a school one.

School??
This is, apparently, a knapsack of the Red Army arr. 1936. or the 39th,

[Gardamir]

Here's how many interesting things you can learn from one photo. I remember as a child my parents bought an old house, and there was a 1935 map of the Soviet Union pasted on the lid of the chest. It is not at all the Union we know about.

[Sling cutter]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

This is, apparently, a knapsack of the Red Army arr. 1936. or the 39th,

Perhaps. If only one strap comes off.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Stroporez

Perhaps. If only one strap comes off.

nothing came off there. And this is not a "strap", damn it, but a BOILER BELT! (see the Instruction of the Chief of the Quartermaster Directorate of the Red Army!)

[Fitter65]

Quote: Stroporez

And the satchel is most likely not statutory, it is possible that it is a school one.

Collect satchels in the Red Army

Here are the schoolbags of the 1939-41 model.

[Olgovich]

Four months of the war passed, and the Soviet command did not learn how to parry the attacks of tank wedges, predict their directions, and prepare engineering defenses in such places.
And this is despite the fact that on the Western Front, in fact, there was a respite in September and there was time for preparation.

In "Soldier's Duty," Rokossovsky talks about understanding the situation and about attempts to negotiate with neighbors about concentrating forces on tank-hazardous directions, but they were unsuccessful, the troops remained stretched along the front.

The stubborn resistance of the armies. The surrounded Soviet troops fought until October 13-14,

the offensive against the Vyazemskaya group began on October 2. Those. the entire operation with the complete destruction of the gigantic group took only 1-2 days.

At the same time, out of 800 thousand of the grouping, more than 600 thousand were taken prisoner, i.e. the main mass was taken / surrendered, and surrounded by a struggle, there was practically no, which, in many respects, surprises ...
Terrible defeat ..

It is significant that in a more complex situation, already immediately near Moscow, mistakes were taken into account and the actions of the Soviet troops turned out to be more successful ...

[And11]

Really surprising. 12 days for such a grouping is very short. The encirclement, especially in the first years of the war, apparently led to panic and the desire to break free at any cost. The main losses were at the retreating columns, and how many vehicles were thrown ...

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: And11

Really surprising. 12 days for such a grouping is very short. The encirclement, especially in the first years of the war, apparently led to panic and the desire to break free at any cost. The main losses were at the retreating columns, and how many vehicles were thrown ...

These questions haunted me for several decades. And so ... Tolkonyuk's book of memoirs "Wounds heal slowly" was published (there is already on the Internet), where he writes very interesting and unpleasant things for the then commanders. Tolkonyuk was the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of Lukin's 16th army.
So, the surrounded four armies could fight in the cauldron even until spring. Ammunition and food supplies were SHAFT. What was missing was a unified leadership. But it could also be created by assigning general command to one of the four commanders of the armies. Or ... Georgy Konstantinich himself, welcome to his troops. After all, the troops in the cauldron were the western front.
But Zhukov gave the order to break through. Moreover, not to break through in a coordinated manner and under the general command of one of the generals, but simply to break through. After that, Zhukov's order was duplicated in the armies and ... the process of the army's disintegration began right before our eyes. an hour or two later, the former divisions turned into a mass of detachments and groups of soldiers. The officers did not obey, they walked in the crowds as simple companions.
So, Tolkonyuk: "The encircled troops could wait for the counteroffensive in December and join up with the main front. At the same time, the encircled forces would really pull back large forces of the Germans, and not a week, but ALL THE TIME before the counteroffensive."
And further. About 28 German divisions forced to hold the encirclement ring. After the beginning of the collapse of the armies, the Germans reduced this number to 14 divisions.
28 divisions are 40% of the 70 divisions that participated in the Typhoon. It is not difficult to understand how much the pressure of the Wehrmacht would have weakened if these 28 divisions had remained to fight the encircled. I think that the Germans would have advanced no further than Mozhaisk. This means that the cauldron would cut the forces of the attackers into two streams and would not give the opportunity to maneuver the troops, creating a problem similar to the Pripyat problem.

thus ... this article, written in the cheerful spirit of Soviet agitprop, is somewhat inconsistent with the information that has become available in the last 60 years.
Tolkonyuk retired as a lieutenant general.

[Sergey-1950]

Thus, the whole battle for Moscow is a chain of huge mistakes of the military leadership, which ordinary soldiers and officers had to heroically correct.

[place]

Quote: Sergey-1950

the battle for Moscow is a chain of huge mistakes of the military leadership, which ordinary soldiers and officers had to heroically correct.

And then why do "ordinary soldiers and officers" need a command at all?
And why do the people need the State and the government? If even in wartime they were "heroically straightened" - now we need ministries and the entire state. apparatus? Nope ... our people are the most unique, they are so smart that they don't need anything that everyone else needs, but at the same time he manages to live in the richest country in the world in the 21st century at the 72nd place in the ranking of countries after Indonesia ...

[place]

Quote: Sergey-1950

the battle for Moscow is a chain of huge mistakes of the military leadership, which had to be heroically corrected by a simple

Still, it is very curious to know if there was something similar in another country of the world in the history of mankind? So that the "simple", they took and "corrected the mistakes" of generals, commanders, rulers. .... I suppose that in the history of mankind there have never been such ... you know what, like here and now!

[Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko]

Alas, the Germans would not have tolerated the entourage in the cauldrons! They would have been cleared out by SS units or aviation, and, given the lack of experience of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, panic, lack of a unified command and cold weather would have done their job. So I disagree with this general.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko

Alas, the Germans would not have tolerated the entourage in the cauldrons! They would have been cleared out by SS units or aviation, and, given the lack of experience of the Red Army in the initial period of the war, panic, lack of a unified command and cold weather would have done their job. So I disagree with this general.

Wouldn't tolerate. 100 poods. If you knew how right you are !!! But that's all you are right about. The Germans, of course, tried to eliminate the encircled people. The question arises: what were the forces ini had for this?
Do you remember, if you knew it at all, that there were about 600 thousand people around? They were blocked / eliminated at the beginning by 28 German divisions. This is a maximum of 450 thousand, and in fact less, since in the memories of the Germans in the companies there was half of the original composition, and often even less. That is, most likely, there were 300-350 thousand Germans.
The Germans had mobile units, you say ... They did. But 9 tank brigades were surrounded. The tank brigade had over 90 tanks. The losses of these brigades at the time of the encirclement were minimal - they simply did not have time to take part in the battles. Moreover, the encircled troops even have an advantage over the blocking enemy, namely, the defenders are much easier to maneuver on their own - they have shorter routes of transferring their forces. And they demonstrated this in the Korsun-Shevchensky cauldron at the beginning of 1944, when one TD with a hundred tanks was not allowed to dissect their group. The Panzer Division always made it to the threatened sector on time.
Aviation. Yes, this is a problem, but it was in the Moscow battle that it was possible to achieve parity in the air. Our aircraft were based on numerous concrete-coated airfields in the Moscow Military District, while the Germans used field airfields. And the importance of aviation in the fall and winter decreased significantly. Daylight hours are short and the weather is often non-flying.
In addition, air defense forces have significantly increased in comparison with the summer. For example, in tank brigades, per tank, the barrels of the ZA grew 11 times compared to the notorious MK.
Everything suggests that if there was a will, then the encircled group would first have tied up the huge forces of the Germans, and a week later could break through the encirclement. For this it would be necessary to concentrate sufficient forces.
In principle, the Germans could have abandoned a further offensive on Moscow altogether, and have dealt with the elimination of the encircled. Since fate could not provide them with such a gift for the second time.
But the stupid exit order (disorganized and unprepared) was just a tsarist gift to the German command. They were amazed by the actions of the Soviet troops.

[Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko]

I agree with you. Completely, except that the Germans at that moment could completely abandon the offensive on Moscow. No, no and NO! Moscow for Hitler was a super goal, a symbol, and in those days he was ready to throw the last battalion to capture it. And too much was tied to Moscow. No, Turkey would not have entered the war - the Anglo-Saxons were active there. Japan also waited and understood the power of the resources of the USSR and its allies. This is outwardly. But inside the country, the people would have shuddered with the loss of the capital. It is difficult and scary. After all, we then admitted the enemy into the heart of the country. And I think that this was what frightened I.V. Stalin most of all. Therefore, on October 15-16, he did not leave Moscow. And he did the right thing, far-sighted, bold and wise.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko

I agree with you. Completely, except that the Germans at that moment could completely abandon the offensive on Moscow. No, no and NO! Moscow for Hitler was a super goal, a symbol, and in those days he was ready to throw the last battalion to capture it. And too much was tied to Moscow. No, Turkey would not have entered the war - the Anglo-Saxons were active there. Japan also waited and understood the power of the resources of the USSR and its allies. This is outwardly. But inside the country, the people would have shuddered with the loss of the capital. It is difficult and scary. After all, we then admitted the enemy into the heart of the country. And I think that this was what frightened I.V. Stalin most of all. Therefore, on October 15-16, he did not leave Moscow. And he did the right thing, far-sighted, bold and wise.

I do not undertake to assert 100% that the Germans could have necessarily abandoned the offensive on Moscow, but would have engaged in the elimination of the encircled armies.
This is one of the possible scenarios for the development of events.
But this could happen if those surrounded were very active, constantly delivering short blows, not only in the eastern direction. With this behavior, more troops are needed to hold the ring than inside. It’s a paradox, but it’s true. This is due to the fact that it is much easier for those surrounded, imperceptibly and faster to create an advantage in forces in an unexpected place.
Now we count: around 600 thousand were surrounded. Let's say, because of the confusion, 500 thousand will remain until the creation of a strict command and control system for the encircled troops. Not less. And then ... the Germans would have to hold one and a half times more for blocking, or even two. Otherwise, going forward is simply dangerous.
And the ratio of forces in this case would have been 1: 1, or even less.
I believe that the encircled should have been removed from the subordination of the command of the Western Front and subordinated directly to the General Staff. Leaving them under the command of Zhukov-ZF-Zhukov did not dare to give the order to the encircled to defend themselves in the encirclement and prepare an organized breakthrough. He had very few troops left in the way of the Germans and he gave a simple order to exit. According to the principle, someone will come out. With a black sheep, at least a tuft of wool ... And thus killed hundreds of thousands of people and incredibly complicated the defense of the capital.

[Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko]

Sorry, but you, dear, idealize the Red Army in the fall of 1941. So, what do we really have. Semi-escapism-semi-retreat from the border to the suburbs of Moscow, Leningrad, Tula and further down to the Sea of ​​Azov. The lack of complete information about the enemy at the General Staff. Bad mood due to the loss of half of the European part of the country from the people. Leaving vast territories with population, resources and industry to the enemy. Lack of experience among commanders of all levels. The undead Trotskyists in the Red Army, who had to be shot back in 1934-38, and not pulled (examples - Pavlov, Kulik, Stern, Rychagov, Konev and many others) and wait for their betrayal in the war, which we then had.
You've probably seen enough of cheerful modern Russian films about the Second World War, where everything is smooth and straightforward since June 22, ours fought like a pro! But then the question arises - why did we then admit the enemy almost to the Volga?!? This means that not everything was perfect and you don't need to believe the films 100%.
On the "boilers" in the Polar Division I will add my subjective opinion. Of course, you will not agree with me. However, this does not bother me much. So. You think too well of those who are surrounded - from soldiers to marshals. OK. I am throwing you a few questions. Who would supply fuel and lubricants to the encircled people? And food? And ammunition? Who would create a fighter cover for the boilers from the air? Who would create a reliable connection between the encircled people and the ZF headquarters? And the removal of the wounded, or do you think that the encircled people were either healthy or were immediately killed?
Or maybe the ZF should have gone further - to strengthen the grouping of the encircled, supplementing them with fresh units? But this is already absurd - on some days in October 1941, excuse me, there was no front and the road to Moscow was practically open, just the Abwehr (read: a branch of the British MI-5 and MI-6!) And the front-line intelligence of the Germans missed it. And it saved us! No, we were saved by the heroism of all the defenders of the capital, the civilian population, the divisions of the people's militia and other patriots, many of whom remained unknown! It was they who defended Moscow and brought it closer on May 9, 1945. Eternal glory and memory to the soldiers of 1941 - without their steadfastness, our Victory simply would not have happened!

[Sergey-1950]

You have not read the memoirs of Lieutenant General Tolkonyuk recommended by me ... It's a pity. Until you read them, the discussion will feel like a tug of war.
I wrote about air cover above. Read on. About ammunition and supplies in general, too. All this was ACCUMULATED. And thrown.
When the "exit", described by Tolkonyuk, began, the structure of armies collapsed, and then divisions. In this case, the warehouses of the front and armies are thrown. In the best case, passing parts and groups are stocked there.
It is simply ridiculous to read about the entrenched Trotskyists in the army. They were not there. And if someone there was thinking to himself about Stalin or the Soviet system, he had to keep quiet and serve very conscientiously. Because such a person is never sure that he has never blurted out something superfluous. And God forbid him to allow a jamb in his work. Far more dangerous to the cause were their peasant sons. My own uncle, also the son of a peasant, by the way, at the age of 28 passed all the steps of the career ladder (school-platoon commander-company commander) and served as chief of staff of a battalion, that is, he went "under a battalion" and in 41 would have met the war, most likely a major in the post of regiment commander.
But in 1938, a vigilant bastard cleared him out of the army (and from the party). His wife is German, and he refused to part with her.
After Stalingrad and after numerous statements he was returned to the army, as a battalion commander ... Near Kursk. He said that the most thoughtful, reliable officers were from the old, pre-revolutionary school. They had to think well about their actions. He will not be forgiven for putting half a regiment for a village with five houses. But there were such. Read more.
By the way, I don't watch Russian films. It is impossible to watch this dregs. I was brought up on Soviet films. Better not to be removed.
Simply because until the mid-70s, films were shot and the participants in the war were filmed in them. And now films are molded by some left-handed boobies. They do not know and do not understand things that were known even to children in the 50s and 60s.

[Sergey-1950]

As for the ability of the command and the army as a whole to conduct hostilities in October competently ... for three months of the war, experience was accumulated. And there were already plenty of examples of VERY competent conduct of hostilities in October and November. These examples became known to us because these parts did not disappear in the encirclements as in June and July.
Bagramyan writes in his memoirs that after the death of the main part of the troops of the Southwestern Front in the Kiev cauldron, contrary to expectations, there was no confusion and despondency in the armies of the front. "We understood how to fight!" He writes. Science has gone dearly. But the main thing is that understanding has come. Even for the General Staff. Including - how to retreat correctly. "As we stumbled in November, with the abandonment of Kharkov, there was heaven and earth compared to July." (as a result of which the 6th and 12th armies fell into the Uman cauldron).
Second. already at the end of August, that is, after two months of the war, the number of tanks and self-propelled guns among the Germans fell by half. At the same time, 30% was lost irretrievably, and another 20% was constantly being repaired, that is, it was successfully knocked out in battles.
Third. The muddy roads did not allow the Germans to enjoy their main advantage, mobility.
Third, communications stretched to such an extent that this in itself became a limiting factor for the strength of their offensive.
Fourth, the daylight hours were reduced and at the same time the weather was often bad during the day. This made it possible for our troops to march 30-40 km without fear of being hit by bombs.
For example, at the beginning of the war in June, darkness lasted only five hours. In five hours, the infantry could not cover more than 20 km. At the same time, on June 22, and a few days later, the infantry was ordered to march 30-40 km. Moreover, go out at 9 o'clock in the morning. Even in August, the dark time of the day was sufficient to cover these 30 km after dark. And what can we say about October.

[Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko]

The bad weather disturbed both sides equally.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko

The bad weather disturbed both sides equally.

She interferes with the attackers more. It can even make an offensive impossible. The muddy road, as it were, deprives both sides of the tank units and makes it impossible to use road transport.

[Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko]

I won't even argue here! You're right!!!

[Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko]

I will definitely read Tolkonyuk's book the other day, but I will not give up my point of view - we were too weak in the summer and autumn of 1941. Alas. But this is reality.
The Red Army learned to fight until the summer of 1943, although sometimes even later the Germans would snap us on the nose whenever possible. My relatives from the Vladimir and Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod) regions fought and survived. So I know this from their stories in the 1960s and 70s. My mother’s grandfather, however, died here in Ukraine in Volhynia in 1944, not having finished a year before the victory day. My grandfather on the line of the Pope in July 1941 in Belarus in a marching company without a weapon was taken (go!) Into captivity and until January 1945 worked as a farm laborer in the Baltic States, hiding his officer rank. Then the filtration camps, fought in Manchuria with the Japanese, and then they told him - you were with the Germans throughout the war, serve your duty and he was demobilized in the summer of 1950. Yes, and his resentment remained slightly - before the war he was a captain in the artillery, and after the war he was demoted to lieutenant and in the infantry. What was it - a flaw in the personnel department or a general policy towards former prisoners? Okay, what happened was.
I will say about myself briefly: a civil engineer, a resident of Ukraine; military specialty - builder and operator of front-line (tactical) aviation airfields; he finished his service as a captain in the USSR (at that time, we, jackets, were occasionally summoned for half a dime); I have not served in the Ukrainian army, and I will no longer, as I am old in age. I am fond of military history and the history of fortification. In the past, he climbed the "Stalin Line", "Mannerheim Line", visited a couple of pillboxes on the "Arpad Line" in the Carpathians. There are plans to see the "Maginot Line" and "Siegfried Line". In short, so.

[Sergey-1950]

I wish you a pleasant reading of Tolkonyuk's book.
Then I'll write a little about myself. My age is easy to understand by my nickname. Mechanical engineer, at the military department, when I studied at the Institute, three quarters of the teachers were participants in the war. My generation differs from those who were born in the 70s in that we lived and worked among the participants in the war. There were a lot of them and they were still young. What is 45 years old? So, I heard enough of these stories above the roof. In principle, at the age of 20 I already knew the history of the war better than any history textbook. Of course, these stories could not provide a general picture. My storytellers were privates in the war, or at most junior officers, but the pictures they themselves saw ... did not really fit into the officialdom. Moreover, already at the age of 18 I developed a system of questions to check the veracity of the narrative. There were also writers then: he served as a cook, heard something there after the war and passed off as his own.
To check, I LEARNED THE NAMES OF ALL THE FRONTS AND THE NUMBERS OF THE ARMY AND WHERE they were at one time or another. In principle, it turned out to be not so difficult. And if a comrade began to tell how he beat the Germans in the second Ukrainian very 42nd ... then you could not listen further.
About your grandfather ... it's hard to say. Maybe there was something unclear about his case. I met a lot of former prisoners of war who, after being checked, were released and not touched. Major Bakumenko served at our military department. He was in captivity.

[place]

Quote: Sergey-1950

This article, written in the cheerful spirit of Soviet agitprop, is somewhat inconsistent with the information that has become available over the past 60 years.

Well, yes, of course ... Solzhenitsyn, Khrushchev "with comrades" and the memoirs of former Nazis "opened their eyes" ..... everything was bad! True, the "cheerful spirit" is the spirit of any agitprop, not just the Soviet one. Goebbels "invigorated" right up to 1945 ..... Among the Germans, in addition to "cheerfulness", the soldier's allowance also included chocolates with pervitin (an analogue of the modern "screw") .. also well encouraged until massive complications on the nervous system began. ....

The advantage of the "bad Bolsheviks" is only one thing - they were able to organize the release of military equipment, which several times exceeded the capabilities of the Reich.
And so ... yeah ... agitation ... slogans ... vigor ... and so a fool and won the war.

Judging by your outstanding pearls, it is very simple to win the War, anyone can; you just need to "cheer up" and put more compatriots in the grave. And it will trample itself, well, by leaps and bounds, straight to Berlin! It is only in other countries that they create an industry and the most talented win the wars. leaders, but everything is so simple with us ...

[chenia]

Quote: Sergey-1950

the process of the disintegration of the army began right before our eyes. an hour or two later, the former divisions turned into a mass of detachments and groups of soldiers. The officers did not obey, they walked in the crowds as simple companions.

Lack of BP, constant shuffling of personnel for permanent readiness troops. led to the fact that they were not combat-ready. Well, they could not keep the Germans so much that the formations deploying for mobilization formed into combat teams. Level - subdivisions - i.e. platoon. company, battalion. This takes 3-4 months. And it defines firmness.... In 1942 (the same not the best times) we lost two times less prisoners. than half a year in 1941.
And we threw, the newly formed formations which, in a difficult situation, were subject to panic (and this is just what happens most often when moving - all kinds of maneuvers, sitting in a trench are easier to bear). And the Germans in violation of all regulations. it turned out to step with "spread fingers".
And already in the future with them, and with the concentration of forces and means, it did not always pass.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Sergey-1950

So, Tolkonyuk: "The encircled troops could wait for the counteroffensive in December and join up with the main front. At the same time, the encircled forces would really pull back large forces of the Germans, and not a week, but ALL THE TIME before the counteroffensive."

If the encircled waiting for in the cauldrons, then, due to their passivity, they simply cannot pull off large enemy forces. Such a cauldron would simply turn into a "camp for armed prisoners of war," guarded by a dozen second-rate divisions.

Quote: Sergey-1950

But Zhukov gave the order to break through. Moreover, not to break through in a coordinated manner and under the general command of one of the generals, but simply to break through.

The order was given not by Zhukov, but also by Konev. Moreover, by order, all the troops in the cauldron were formally subordinated to Lukin.
But in practice, due to the lack of communications, the commander-19 commanded only his own army. A day later, it was possible to establish contact only with the commander-20, but the next day the Germans cut the boiler between 19 and 20 A.

Quote: Sergey-1950

So, the surrounded four armies could fight in the cauldron even until spring.

Due to the arrival of the encircled troops to Moscow, there is no one and nothing to defend Moscow. I repeat, there is no one and nothing.

© I. Stalin. 08 October 1941

[parusnik]

By the way, there is a vivid example, the so-called Courland cauldron. The Germans had a shaft of weapons and ammunition, they were in no hurry to take them out, the conditions for defense were excellent, forests, swamps, many water barriers.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: parusnik

By the way, there is a vivid example, the so-called Courland cauldron. The Germans had a shaft of weapons and ammunition, they were in no hurry to take them out, the conditions for defense were excellent, forests, swamps, many water barriers.

This prisoner of war camp (400 thousand people) chained the forces of two fronts with a total number of ... 429 thousand. This boiler existed from October 10, 1944 until the end of the war. Seven months. if anyone is not in the know, there have been six attempts to eliminate the boiler. SIX. And all unsuccessful. Why did they try to eliminate him all the time? But because they could hit in an unexpected place and at an unexpected moment. And they would have struck if the Red Army had just sat and waited. These are the inconveniences that an enemy surrounded in such numbers can create.

[Ingvar K]

Probably, the victory marshals were not very fond of remembering their schools in the early years of the war, therefore they left this topic. The reason is the banal low training of the highest command personnel of the Red Army. and if you carefully study their biographies, you can see the lack of experience in leading large connections. The main problem lies in the traditions of the system of training senior military leaders and the system of command and control. The Western school is clearly better.

[icant007]

Quote: Sergey-1950

So, the surrounded four armies could fight in the cauldron even until spring. Ammunition and food supplies were SHAFT. What was missing was a unified leadership.

And here is what Tolkonyuk says:

There was no need for food, because in the surrounded area food could be obtained from local resources: the area was filled with cattle driven from the western regions by Soviet people, and the ripe crop, with a certain organization, could provide food for the personnel for a long time. In addition, the food supplies that were in warehouses and in railway trains, which were overflowing with railway stations, were not fully used. In general, we did not have an extreme need for food. There was some need for ammunition but we did not completely use them up, up to the end of the organized resistance. The need was felt for fuel for the vehicles, and most importantly, for the evacuation of the wounded. So it was not material support that the surrounded troops needed in the first place. They needed, first of all, qualified, firm and authoritative leadership, which, in fact, was not there. "

Paying attention

There was some need for ammunition

Somehow unlike

Ammunition and food supplies were SHAFT.

Maybe I'm reading the wrong Tolkonyuk?

[bairat]

Sorry, with all due respect to the recollections of the head of the operational headquarters, I doubt that in 41, when the ammunition was spent from the wheels, they suddenly created a supply for the 800 thousandth group for six months. The same is with fuels and lubricants and products. Most likely, their absence, reserves, and prompted the leadership to give the order to withdraw. With proper organization, with at least equality in the air, it was quite possible to put together a fist and break through the encirclement. But it turned out how it happened. The science of how to fight dearly was given to us.

[Konnick]

The main losses were at the retreating columns, and how many vehicles were abandoned ... Only the most persistent battles seem to have fought

Interestingly, the divisions of the people's militia showed themselves much better than the regular troops.

Moscow militias don't disappear. The defeated 8th DNO - is drawn on October 16 at the Borodino field. Later, the fighter of this DNO Emmanuil Kozakevich became the author of the notorious story "STAR", based on which the film of the same name was shot.

Three bottoms of the southern direction of the German breakthrough somehow overtake the Germans - and stop them in Naro-Fominsk, near Tarutino, near Belev.

It is more difficult in the northern section. The 2nd DNN, at the cost of heavy losses, breaks through the encirclement of the Reserve Front near the village of Bogoroditskoye. And with surprise he discovers that the armies of the front do not want to leave the encirclement through the prepared passage, pierced by thousands of surrendered lives. The bloodless 2nd DNO was disbanded in December 1941

[Bogalex]

Already 3 years of war will pass, and the German Wehrmacht and its main headquarters will not learn to "fend off the strikes of tank wedges, predict their directions, and prepare an engineering defense in such places."
It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army, isn't it?

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Bogalex

It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army, isn't it?

Yes, a comrade, armed with an afterthought, does not get tired in the comments to furiously stigmatize the leadership of the Red Army for the second article in a row. This is the fruit of many years of painful meditation!

Quote: Sergey-1950

These questions haunted me for several decades.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Quote: Bogalex

It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army, isn't it?

Yes, a comrade, armed with an afterthought, does not get tired in the comments to furiously stigmatize the leadership of the Red Army for the second article in a row. This is the fruit of many years of painful meditation!

Quote: Sergey-1950

These questions haunted me for several decades.

I got the hint. It turns out it is necessary to express indescribable delight with the actions of the Soviet command?

[Bogalex]

The answer is wrong. Try again.

[ivan2022]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Quote: Bogalex

It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army, isn't it?

Yes, a comrade, armed with an afterthought, does not get tired in the comments to furiously stigmatize the leadership of the Red Army for the second article in a row. This is the fruit of many years of painful meditation!

Quote: Sergey-1950

These questions haunted me for several decades.

I got the hint. It turns out it is necessary to express indescribable delight with the actions of the Soviet command?

Whoever won the war is right. And if his, then he is right even if he lost. And if he begins to reason, then it is a stranger. And if a stranger, you must treat him like a stranger. It does not happen otherwise with all normal peoples.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ivan2022

Quote: Sergey-1950

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Quote: Bogalex

It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army, isn't it?

Yes, a comrade, armed with an afterthought, does not get tired in the comments to furiously stigmatize the leadership of the Red Army for the second article in a row. This is the fruit of many years of painful meditation!

Quote: Sergey-1950

These questions haunted me for several decades.

I got the hint. It turns out it is necessary to express indescribable delight with the actions of the Soviet command?

Whoever won the war is right. And if his, then he is right even if he lost. And if he begins to reason, then it is a stranger. And if a stranger, you must treat him like a stranger. It does not happen otherwise with all normal peoples.

Wow!!! Will you put it against the wall? Or, to put it simply, by the road?

[mmaxx]

And the most interesting thing is that the Germans invented all these strikes. And tested and debugged against the Red Army. And they also had all the generals with the old military education, who knew how to fight and smash the enemy. Not like Soviet dropouts and yesterday's peasants. And the soldiers are already in the fifth generation literate. And racially complete. And the Germans did not shoot the color of their nation in the 17th, and did not shoot the color of the new army in the 37th. And what was the technique of the Germans ?! European!
About how!

[place]

Quote: Bogalex

It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army

This is true ! To read the zealous commentators, and it becomes unclear why our soldiers needed some kind of command at all. Generals, why do the people need the State with its useless ministries, if the people themselves, against the will of the chiefs, even wins the war .... that all other peoples of the world need only a burden that prevents us from living.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ort

This is true ! To read the zealous commentators, and it becomes unclear why our soldiers needed some kind of command at all.

This is what I, just like you, took out from the commentary, brilliant in my profundity.

Quote: Sergey-1950

Thus, the whole battle for Moscow is a chain of huge mistakes of the military leadership, which ordinary soldiers and officers had to heroically correct.

In short, the top and middle commanders merged the campaign of 41, dissociated themselves (who did what - who committed suicide, who was taken prisoner), and then "ordinary soldiers and officers" ...... well, and further in the spirit of this nonsense. And if, by the way, all sorts of mediocrity did not interfere with them, then they would heroically fight in cauldrons until ... well, say, until 1943. Or to "Bagration". After all

Quote: Sergey-1950

Ammunition and food supplies were SHAFT.

It's awesome.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ort

Quote: Bogalex

It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army

This is true ! To read the zealous commentators, and it becomes unclear why our soldiers needed some kind of command at all. Generals, why do the people need the State with its useless ministries, if the people themselves, against the will of the chiefs, even wins the war .... that all other peoples of the world need only a burden that prevents us from living.

Why are you twisting? I wrote about the mistakes of the high command. And about the correction of their mistakes by soldiers and OFFICERS. What's wrong with that?

[ivan2022]

Have you ever had to "correct the mistakes" of those who command - in full view of them? At least in peacetime?
..... This is complete nonsense.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ivan2022

Have you ever had to "correct the mistakes" of those who command - in full view of them? At least in peacetime?
..... This is complete nonsense.

I agree with you. Very often this is not possible. And in war they can simply be accused of not following the order. And then unpleasant consequences will follow.
This is the problem of the army, anybody. The subordinates learn on the battlefield, and the higher ones learn from maps and reports. The second method is much slower and requires repeating the same mistakes.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Bogalex

Already 3 years of war will pass, and the German Wehrmacht and its main headquarters will not learn to "fend off the strikes of tank wedges, predict their directions, and prepare an engineering defense in such places."
It's good from the couch, knowing how everything really happened, to talk about the mistakes of operational planning in the headquarters of the Red Army, isn't it?

is this all that can give birth on the topic of the article? as for

Quote: Bogalex

Already 3 years of war will pass, and the German Wehrmacht and its main headquarters will not learn to "parry the strikes of tank wedges, predict their directions.

then calculate the ratio of the sides' forces in 1941 and 1944 and, perhaps, but not the fact, something will come

[zenion]

It is difficult to reach you and already reminds you of how the animals drank vodka. The hare poured himself, the lion and the Giraffe into a glass, well, if the hare said and knocked over, the lion also took a sip, but the giraffe is still rolling down the throat. The hare says to the lion - look, this is a thrill. Finally, the giraffe swallowed it and says to the hare - you are bad, and when is the vomiting ?! It looks like you are going back.

[Illanatol]

Four months of the war passed, and the Soviet command did not learn how to parry the attacks of tank wedges, predict their directions, and prepare engineering defenses in such places.

Prediction alone is not enough. To successfully parry the attacks of tank and mechanized formations, you need to have your own formations comparable in mobility and firepower and, most importantly, have at least a semblance of parity in the air. And the preparation of engineering defense takes a lot of time, which was sorely lacking. In addition, the enemy would not, he would simply change the direction of the attacks, revealing less defended sectors of the front.
To create a truly dense defense (as on the Kursk Bulge) along the entire length of the front (from the Baltic to the Black Sea) would not have had enough resources.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Illanatol

To successfully parry the attacks of tank and mechanized formations, you need to have your own formations comparable in mobility and firepower

nonsense: the tanks did not stop the tank divisions of the Germans near Moscow - read at least Rokossovsky

[Illanatol]

Stop and parry are not synonymous.

[zenion]

Olgovich. So they didn't even know how to use a computer without you. They were lying wrongly on the couch and sitting wrongly near the table. Though not with your help, but still your favorite Westerners have been stuffed in the face. Not just Huhrer, but all of Western Europe, so much so that they immediately jumped under the wing of the Red Army and shouted Hitler Kaput, Bandera Kaput.

[Ashes of Claes]

Almost THULE ..)
Sd.Kfz. 250 with a trailer mounted to the roof. Vyazma, winter.

[Trapp1st]

A column of Soviet armor-piercing soldiers follows Moscow street

[stankow]

The pharmacy is still there!

[Trapp1st]

The pharmacy is still there!

Yes) Nothing much has changed there ...

[faterdom]

For Zhukov, the places where the main areas of battle were unfolded were his small homeland. So the village of Vorobyi (from the photo) on the Varshavskoe highway is located near the intersection of the Varshavskoe and Kievskoe highways near Obninsk, and not far from there is the birthplace of the Marshal.
So in this case, he defended not only Moscow and the Motherland in a broad sense, but also the homeland itself - the country of his childhood, the rivers familiar to him, groves and hills with groves.
In general, everything was in the balance, and the great merit of Leningrad and Sevastopol was that they tied up large forces of the Germans, whom they actually did not call near Moscow.

[helloween]

10 years ago, while picking mushrooms in the Yukhnov area, I came across the remains of trenches with bones ,,, I tried to drip lightly, shells, cartridges ,,,
The most terrible defeat under the ligature ,,, how we survived further ,,,

[voyaka uh]

Then trained personnel units from the Far East approached.
After all, Japan attacked the United States.
And these Japanese plans became known in September (Richard Sorge).
Fresh troops arrived at Moscow in mid-November.
The Germans did not know about them.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: voyaka uh

Then trained personnel units from the Far East approached.
After all, Japan attacked the United States.

After the start of the Typhoon, only 10 divisions were transferred from the Far East. Three of them - to the North-West, to save Leningrad (although the 32nd Rifle Division as a result arrived near Moscow).

Tank, rifle and motorized rifle divisions deployed west in 1941:
59 TD from the 2nd SC, FEF in July is transferred to Smolensk with a simultaneous reorganization of 108 TD.
69 md from the composition of the 2nd spacecraft, FEF in July is transferred to Smolensk with a simultaneous reorganization of 107 TD.
21 RD from the 26th SC of the 1st KA, DVF in August-September is transferred to Karelia, to the southern task force of the 7th Division. AND
26 sd from the 26th sk 1st 11st SC, FEF in August-September is transferred to the North-Western Front, to the XNUMXth Army
32 SD from the 25th A, FEF in September is transferred to the Volkhov, in the 4th division. AND
114 sd from the 36th A, ZabVO in September is being transferred to Karelia, to the southern task force of the 7th division. AND
58 TD from the 1st SC, Far Eastern Front in October is transferred to Moscow, to the 30th A of the Western Front.
60 TD from the 15th A, FEF in October is transferred to the Volkhov, in the 4th division. AND.
78 sd from the 35th A, Far Eastern Front in October is transferred to Moscow, to the 16th A of the Western Front.
82 msd from the 17th A, ZabVO in October is transferred under Moscow, to the 5th A of the Western Front.
92 SD from the 25th A, FEF in October is transferred to the Volkhov, in the 4th division. AND.
93 sd from the 36th A, ZabVO in October is transferred to Moscow, to the 43rd A of the Western Front.
413 sd from the composition of the 1st SC, the Far Eastern Front in October is transferred under Serpukhov to the 50th A of the Bryansk Front.
65 sd from the 36th A, ZabVO in October-November is transferred under the Volkhov and enters the 4th detachment. AND
415 sd from the structure of the 25th A, the Far Eastern Front in November-December is transferred under Serpukhov to the 49th A of the Western Front.
239 sd from the composition of the 1st spacecraft, the Far Eastern Front in December is transferred under Ryazan to the 10th A of the Western Front.

[BAI]

58 TD from the 1st SC, Far Eastern Front in October is transferred to Moscow, to the 30th A of the Western Front.

letter from the Military Commissar of the 58th Tank Division of the regimental commissar Govorunenko, sent to the military commissar of the GABTU KA to the army commissar of the 2nd rank Biryukov 5th of November 1941.:

4. The division arrived at the front in summer uniforms, and the infantry (motorized rifle regiment) was literally torn off. Colds set in. It is difficult to break through the bureaucracy in order to find out where the uniforms can be obtained. 16 A, at the front of which we stand,

in warehouses does not. Addresses to warehouses 350 km away from the front. Same way

and with food. The quartermaster office of the 16th Army addresses to warehouse 395 in Moscow,

and the latter refuses and says that we should be based on the warehouses of the 16th Army. You have to beg for satisfaction.

And already 20.11.1941. Mehlis:

“The 58th Panzer Division, which arrived from the Far East, was defeated due to the criminal leadership, its remnants are concentrated in Voronino. On November 20, the commander of the 58th Panzer Division, General Kotlyarov, shot himself, leaving a note:

“General disorganization and loss of control. The higher staffs are to blame. I don’t want to be responsible for the general mess. Retreat to Yamuga behind anti-tank obstacles, save Moscow. " After signing, this capitulator added: "There are no prospects ahead."

The division had 198 T-26 tanks.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: BAI

letter from the Military Commissar of the 58th Tank Division of the regimental commissar Govorunenko, sent to the military commissar of the GABTU KA to the army commissar of the 2nd rank Biryukov on November 5, 1941 .:

Oh yes ... the famous letter about the mess in ZapFR.

1. 58th TD arrived from the 1st SC. Nobody met. The division began to be unloaded at Orekhovo-Zuevo, three echelons were unloaded, and then three conflicting orders followed, and, finally, unloaded on November 2.11.1941, XNUMX in the mountains. Wedge. All this badly adjusts the commanding staff and has a bad effect on the arriving troops.

Quote: BAI

The division had 198 T-26 tanks.

Hmmm ... isn't it 154 BT and 36 T-26, HT-26 and OT-130? Plus a dozen T-34s received after arriving at the front.
In the losses of the 58th TD, the T-34 is definitely there. And most of the lost tanks are BT-7.

1. Of the 8 T-34 tanks sent to PRB No. 102, 3 tanks that did not reach the division and were returned on the way.
Of the 5 T-34 tanks of irrecoverable losses, 3 were lost on the Volokolamsk direction in the Utishevo, Poseltsevo area on November 18-19.11.41, 2 and 23.11.41 in the Klin area on XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX.
2. Of the 128 BT-7 tanks of irrecoverable losses in the area of ​​Utishevo, Bludi, Poveltsevo, Bortniki, Khrushchevo - 36 in the period 16-17.11.41.
In the area of ​​Teryaeva Sloboda, Shishkino, Golovkovo, Spass - 32 pieces in the period 18-21.11.41.
In the area of ​​Klin, Yamuga, Bolshoe Birevo, Spas-Zaulok - 37 pieces 21-22.11.41.
In the area of ​​Rogachevo, Pokrovskoe, Voronino, Dorshevo - 23 pieces 23-25.11.41.
3. Out of 5 T-26 tanks of irrecoverable losses in the Spas-Torokhovo area - 4 pieces on November 17-19.11.41.
In the Klin area - 1 piece 23.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
4. Out of 15 HT-26 irrecoverable losses in the area of ​​Khrushchevo, Teryaeva Sloboda, Spass, Bludi, Utishevo, Nudol - 13 pieces on November 17-18.11.41, XNUMX.
In the area of ​​Voronino, Yamuga - 2 pieces 24.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
5. Out of 9 OT-130 tanks of irrecoverable losses in the Bludy, Spass, Nudol area - 7 pieces on November 17-18.11.41, XNUMX.
In the Klin area - 2 pieces 23.11.41/XNUMX/XNUMX

[Alexey RA]

And to restore the defense near Moscow, the General Staff of the Red Army transferred formations with the SZN and SWN, used reserves and ordered the encircled people to break through. For it makes no sense to restrain the German second echelons at a time when their forward formations are rushing forward and there is nothing to stop them.
In terms of getting out of the encirclement, the Bryansk front was most fortunate: Guderian, carried away by the capture of Tula, could not normally "surrender the front" to the infantry - and 3, 13 and 50 A managed to break through to their own, albeit with heavy losses.

[Konnick]

10 years ago, while picking mushrooms in the Yukhnov area, I came across the remains of trenches with bones ,,, I tried to drip lightly, shells, cartridges ,,,
The most terrible defeat under the ligature ,,, how we survived further ,,,

I'm not sure if these are traces of the 41st year, rather the 42nd. In the 41st they fought in these places for three days, and in the 42nd months.

[Wertgan]

As it is superficially in this article, the war is presented as an offensive by the Germans on the Russians ... As in elementary school.

[Konnick]

In Moscow, 12 divisions of the people's militia were created, which took up defensive positions in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky direction

It was they who were "contrived" to be placed in the directions of the main blows, on the main roads, Minsk and Varshavskoe highways. And then in the memoirs they justified themselves, they say, they could not determine the direction of the main attacks, and where else the Germans were to advance, through the forest, where Lukin's 16th Army and other personnel formations of the Red Army hid "in ambush".

[place]

Quote: Illanatol

Not in the least. Napoleon turned out to be a very bad strategist, he rejected Berthier's plan

Hitler also turned out to be a bad strategist. He rejected the plan proposed by General Staff analysts. Or do you think that a good strategist is one who loses wars?

[Sergey-1950]

Hitler proved to be an excellent strategist.
It was the attack on Moscow in 1941 that was the most correct. Moscow was the center of the railway network, circular and radial at the same time, of the European part of the country. In terms of transport, the European part would be cut into two parts. War is the first part of logistics. The advance of the Germans to Nizhny Novgorod and Kazan would have been a matter of weeks. And in general, now our railway network would work for the Germans. Many have been writing about this in the last 20 years. You just have to read carefully.

Second. It was Hitler who ordered to die during the Soviet counteroffensive in December. And the generals were against it, they wanted to keep the troops and retreat. And who was right? If then the point of view of the generals would have won, then Soviet troops at the end of January 42 approached Smolensk. And so they did not even reach Vyazma.
(Lesson, though belated to Kirponos-Timoshenko-Shaposhnikov).

Or the choice of the direction of the offensive in the summer of 1942. To the Caucasus. It was he who insisted on an attack on the Caucasus, although his generals believed it was necessary to attack Moscow and did not even hesitate to show by their appearance that his plan was stupid.
And our command thought like German generals and again miscalculated about the plans of the Germans ...

[Illanatol]

The main reason for Germany's defeat was not Hitler's shortcomings as commander.
The plan of the "analysts of the General Staff" would have led to similar results.
One of the reasons for the defeat of the Wehrmacht near Moscow is that the Germans failed to take Leningrad. After the capture of this city, the main forces of GA "North" were to turn south and help GA "Center" take Moscow. But since Leningrad fettered significant forces of the "North", this point of "Barbarossa" was not fully implemented.
As you know, Napoleon's troops (Oudinot's corps) also failed to take Petersburg in 1812. Yes, history repeated itself in some details.

[Altmann]

Be proud of the army and the battles near Moscow!

[Charlie]

And why do the T-34s at the Borodino field go with closed hatches at the mechanics? They never closed them. Or is it a staged photo?

[TatarinSSSR]

Thanks to the author, very interesting and refreshed the memory of history!

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: TatarinSSSR

Thanks to the author, very interesting and refreshed the memory of history!

That's right, refreshed.
For example, I read all this for the first time at Zhukov's, soon, when the first edition of "Memoirs ..." was published. And there, in the same way, inconvenient (for the future marshal and the high command in general) details of the Battle were bypassed.

[Mike_E]

I do not know which of the many-sided Samsonovs' brotherhood writes / reprints this cycle, but thanks. Without going into details and without discussing the scientific value, it is quite an adequate summary of the main events, in my opinion.

[Moskovit]

The author needs to decide whether it is Russian or Soviet. And it will turn out like in the film 28 Panfilovites. Some politically neutral soldiers are howling.

[Sergey-1950]

Dear interlocutors, I would like to address everyone at once.
I recently participated in discussions on this site, but already experienced some dislike for criticizing the actions of the Red Army command. Of course, I don't see anything wrong with that.
Another thing is worse - the participants' poor knowledge of the sources of information and, plus, a reluctance to admit that our army as a whole in 1941 fought badly. She did not realize the potential that she had. After studying, believe me, a very large amount of information (memoirs, analytical materials and primary documents that have recently appeared in digital form), I came to the conclusion that if our high command had not made catastrophic mistakes, the Germans could have reached the greatest distance to the Dnieper. In three to four months.
At the same time, the initial parameters would remain as they were on June 22, 1941.
What is my confidence based on? And you will study how some divisions, corps and even armies fought, which were lucky to act independently, without the petty tutelage of higher comrades. For example, the 100th rifle division of Russiyanov on the Western Front, the 196th rifle division of general Kulikov, then Major V.M. Shatilov, 63 rifle corps of general. Petrovsky in Mogilev. And the actions of the Separate Coastal Army in Odessa. The commander of the 5th Army, Potapov, had a great degree of freedom. And many others. But God forbid to be under the shrewd leadership of the front command, or even more so the General Staff ... It was here that the problems often began.
Tymoshenko, having entered the command of the ZF instead of D.G. Pavlov, as a warm-up ruins two mechanized corps - the 5th and 7th. These were the two LAST full-blooded mechanized corps. D.G. Pavlov, whom the Germans pushed his face across the table, began to act quite adequately. But a new front commander (Timoshenko) came and began to learn from the same mistakes that Pavlov, Zhukov and Kirponos had in the first week of the war.
Why am I writing all this? We need to read more. There is no other way to acquire knowledge. And labeling is not a discussion.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Sergey-1950

poor knowledge of the participants of the sources of information and, plus, a reluctance to admit that our army as a whole in 1941 fought badly.

Easier, easier, comrade. After your pearl that the Germans in the 41st "clicked" our tanks with HEAT shells from the Pak-36, you know, it’s not for you to blame the residents of VO for lack of education! So use your own advice

Quote: Sergey-1950

Need to read more

As for the assessment of the actions of the command of the Red Army in the initial period of the Second World War, if you did not replace, no one here avoids writing about the mistakes and weaknesses of the command, but the analysis and analysis of specific offensive / defensive operations are of interest to the audience.
You, dear, are slipping into hystericalism and obnoxious rhetoric, dragging out the obvious facts with your small drops.

[ivan2022]

"To deprive Mikhailo Golenishchev-Kutuzov of all awards and publicly whip him for being a scoundrel, he surrendered Moscow to the half-fool Napoleon Bonaparte, having lost the shameful battle of Borodino." - signature "Olgovich" - Emperor

[ivan2022]

In itself, the psyche of many compatriots is a pretentious thing! They see the History of the Country in the form of monstrous epics about the soldiers who "won the War in spite of the generals and their rulers", about the "hellish collective farms" where the peasants were driven because the Jew Marx was so written in his book in the 19th century, about the camps where dozens millions of convicts felled forest, which there was nowhere and nothing to take out of the Siberian taiga ...

About. "Soviets", who were not normal people, and went to build cities in the Far East because posters "calling for a feat" hung on the walls of houses ..... They knew how to make rockets, but did not know how to sew shoes or produce sausage .... And a lot of the wildest delirium still lives in the heads of our compatriots.

How can we not recall the article by M. Gorky "On the Russian peasantry" written in 1922, but still relevant today?
And the words "They are exactly the same as they were in the 17th century ..."

[Mike_E]

Enlighten the orphans, why be ashamed? About boots, kulaks, numerous channels and silly prisoners who for some reason felled the forest, and then write their narcotic nonsense, for which they receive a Nobel in literature.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ivan2022

In itself, the psyche of many compatriots is a pretentious thing! They see the History of the Country in the form of monstrous epics about soldiers who "won the War in spite of the generals and their rulers"
... "

I will answer you, as the post is clearly addressed to me.
Dear Ivan, there is no need to ascribe to the participants what they did not say. I say that 1. Our command in the initial period and almost all of 1942 was constantly mistaken about the intentions of the Germans. 2. In the initial period of the war, the first four to five months, behaved stupidly, even when the intentions of the enemy were obvious from his actions. But, as a praise to the Soviet command, I must say that in general it still learned to lead by November 1941. (Although there were recurrences of dubism. For example, Tymoshenko turned out to be unteachable).
3. The Soviet, at the level of armies and fronts, understood how to fight (and how to fight in June) back in July-August, but it took longer to reach the top level. This has long created problems that the fronts could solve if they acted more independently. But you can't rewrite history ...
But most importantly, I agree with you that in spite of the high command, we would not have won. And because of the high command, we would definitely have lost the war, if it, the command, did not learn and do not become clever.

[zenion]

We learned a lot back when we were in school and were in the sixth grade. It was in 57. We had a history teacher who worked in the General Staff. So the departments of the General Staff before the war decided for themselves what to give for those in high standing and what was not needed. Intelligence came in and it ended up in a department where analysts were supposed to review and sort it out. So in this department they decided what to give and what was frivolous. Much of what was considered frivolous, it seemed too fantastic, did not fall into the hands of the authorities and it turned out to be the main thing. My wife's grandfather said that when they were called up, and he fought in the First World War, then in the Red Army he was surprised that many warehouses where uniforms and weapons were supposed to be were empty. From the Vapnyarka station to Kiev itself, the warehouses turned out to be empty. And for several days they did not receive food, except that the train was constantly bombed. How did the Germans know who was in this composition, they were constantly watched and bombed. It was lucky that it got dark and they were not seen so they drove into Kiev. Shoe, clothed, given a weapon and after the bath, fed. He defended Kiev, was wounded. After recovering, he defended Moscow.

[And11]

Yesterday's dispute began over the actions of the troops in the Vyazemsky cauldron. "VO residents" (as it was said here) can continue to boil in anger, but the 800-strong group should not fall apart in 12 days. And 600 thousand prisoners is not normal. This is a loss of control in its purest form. Panic. And who in your opinion, apart from the command, can be to blame for this? Even a breakthrough or withdrawal needs to be prepared, but here it looks like the army has turned into a crowd

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: And11

Yesterday's dispute began over the actions of the troops in the Vyazemsky cauldron. "VO residents" (as it was said here) can continue to boil in anger

The total failure of the military leadership in 1941 is obvious to everyone - the monstrous numbers of lethal and, especially, non-lethal losses speak for themselves. This would be fatal for any army in the world, but, as it turned out, not for the Red Army and the USSR. But, you know, the exaltation with which one verbose comrade "seethes in anger" is not entirely clear. Dropouts and mediocrities, who do not know how to effectively command, unable to predict the OKW's plans in an elementary way, build an effective spy network, or at least competently analyze the available intelligence - what else does he have there? Oh yes - an enchanting idea with armies fighting in cauldrons, provided with ammunition and food to the top.

[Sergey-1950]

I see you ignored the recommended book of memoirs of Lieutenant-General Tolkonyuk. They were published only ten years ago and only a year ago it became available on the Internet for free.
I gave HIS opinion. The opinion of the army headquarters officer. Tolkonyuk writes that surrounded by FOUR ARMIES could fight for months. She was provided with everything. And ammunition and food.
You express YOUR OPINION. Sorry, whose opinion is more valuable? The officer who was in the cauldron, or yours, brought up on the history of the war, recounting those events ... let's say, quite selectively. This manner of presentation took root while the commanders were in high positions for a long time and were alive even longer. But look at how the narrative has become ingrained ...
And I have not exalted for a long time. When I was sinning this. But that was so long ago ...

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: And11

Yesterday's dispute began over the actions of the troops in the Vyazemsky cauldron. "VO residents" (as it was said here) can continue to boil in anger, but the 800-strong group should not fall apart in 12 days. And 600 thousand prisoners is not normal. This is a loss of control in its purest form. Panic. And who in your opinion, apart from the command, can be to blame for this? Even a breakthrough or withdrawal needs to be prepared, but here it looks like the army has turned into a crowd

If the loss ... It was giving up control. The high command and command of the fronts did not understand that it was not always necessary to retreat. Moreover, the war showed that it makes no sense for a large group to retreat, it will be defeated during retreat, it is wiser to stay in the cauldron. There will be more sense from this. 600 thousand is not just a cauldron, it is an area in the ring of enemies. On its territory, with its own population.
Even the Germans' Demyansk cauldron existed for almost half a year. And there were only 100 thousand. Stalingrad boiler - 330 thousand. More than two months. Such boilers distract large forces to block them.
In the Stalingrad cauldron, 250 thousand enemy soldiers and officers were killed and taken prisoner. But by their persistent holding of the cauldron, they thwarted Operation Saturn and saved millions of Wehrmacht soldiers from death and captivity. What if Hitler had allowed the withdrawal of the 6th Army from Stalingrad? Their columns would be smashed in the steppe, and then the soldiers would simply freeze on the way. And Saturn could also be carried out.

[zenion]

You have forgotten that back in the days of the tsar, the same Alexander, who put it - the generals always want to justify themselves.

[pomor23]

Yes ... and countless throughout history, how many times it seemed that everything, we had fallen and will no longer rise, but by the unprecedented feat of the people, their best sons and the prayer of the Mother of God and the intercessor, Russia rose from the ashes and won! ... Eternal memory to all those who defended this land and died for the Motherland and Fatherland!

[Warhead-xnumx]

"It seemed that Moscow was about to fall"
But strike you! - Said the Soviet people and walked a victorious march through the ruins of Berlin!

[silver_roman]

The first and second years were of course terrible. They learned to fight. After the successes near Moscow, there was still a terrible defeat near Kharkov in the 42nd. But where did the Nazis get such training? Are the sluggish ongoing battles in Europe their first-class battle? or did we just do it so badly? Many again blame Stalin and his purges. Although these are all very controversial points.

[zenion]

The whole trouble was that even if there was a cidulka from the General Staff, there was no way to break out and keep the line. Then some generals said I'll show you how to fight and burst into the cauldron where they died. Only after all the fronts from north to south began to fight in concert, it became possible to fool and beat the Germans. And only Stalin, as commander-in-chief, could command all the fronts. He had the General Staff at hand, which, according to intelligence, made decisions where to beat and Stalin sent fortifications there, ordering them from factories and the rear.

[Mykola Kovach]

Lukin is a phenomenal traitor and a rogue! He managed to slip past the tribunal and did not starve with the Germans either. Vlasov is just a boy with glasses compared to him.

[tankoved34]

Gallop across Europe or another rewrite with a hundred times already published information)))