How Soviet mechanized corps prevented the Germans from taking Kiev on the move

Soviet Tanks T-34 and BT-7, abandoned on the road near the village of Cheremoshnya north of Zolochev. It is most likely that the T-34 tanks were abandoned due to malfunctions. Obviously, the vehicles belong to the 10th Panzer Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front

On June 29, 1941, the Germans switched from defense to offensive, trying to free the communications of the 48th Motorized Corps and defeat Popel's Russian tank group. The fierce battle lasted for several days, Soviet tanks dug into the ground (there was no more fuel) became a steel fortress for the enemy.

June 28, 1941 The enemy repels a counterattack

Command of the Southwestern Front (Tank battle in the Dubno - Brody area, Part 2) on that day issued order No. 018, according to which mobile formations were to counterattack together with the rifle corps pushed out from the depths. The mechanized corps were finally supposed to get the support of the infantry.

In particular, the 37th Rifle Corps, which had no active missions and simply stood in positions with the front to the west, moved north to the junction of the 15th and 8th mechanized corps. The 36th Rifle Corps received the task of operating against the southern wing of the German group. The 15th mechanized corps was still advancing on Berestechko.

The German command continued to transfer reserves in order to parry the threat that arose on the southern wing of the 1st Panzer Group. Almost all the infantry divisions that followed the tank formations were moved to the south.

As a result, in the Berestechko area there were infantry divisions, whose dense defenses were difficult to overcome, and not weak barriers at the junction of tank and army corps.

The main role in the counterattack on June 28 was played by Anikushkin's 37th Panzer Division, which had not previously taken part in battles and retained its combat potential. More than 200 T-34, BT and T26 tanks remained in its composition. However, there was a shortage of personnel: there were just over 200 thousand people for 4,1 tanks.

Due to the lack of vehicles, 3,5 thousand people remained in the area of ​​the division's base - the city of Kremenets. The division lacked trucks and special vehicles. Because of this, most of the division's artillery pieces, twenty-one 122-mm howitzers remained at the base. This significantly reduced the combat capabilities of the mobile unit. Most of the tanks were light BT-7s and lacked infantry and artillery support. There was also no support from the artillery regiments, which were subordinate to the front.

In the middle of the day on June 28, one of the most massive BT attacks in the initial period of the war took place, the 37th division crossed the Styr River near Stanislavchik. The capture of the crossing itself was carried out by the 37th motorized rifle regiment, its success was developed by the 73rd and 74th tank regiments. The tanks could no longer force the next river, Ostrovka.

German anti-tank defenses knocked out the leading BT in the same place. And our troops did not have artillery to suppress the enemy anti-tank defense. The 37th motorized rifle regiment, which also had weak artillery support, also suffered heavy losses - about 60% of its personnel. The regiment commander, Major Shlykov, and his deputy, Major Schwartz, were killed. In fact, the 37th regiment was defeated.

Fotchenkov's 8th Panzer Division, subordinate to the 15th Corps (part of the 4th Mechanized Corps), fought on the right flank of the counterstrike in the Okhladuva area. Our tankers were unable to penetrate the defenses of the German 297th Infantry Division. The 10th Panzer Division was also unsuccessful. The Germans successfully held back the attacks of our tanks with strong artillery fire.

Defective Soviet T-34 tanks abandoned near Zolochev

Heavy tank T-35, abandoned due to a malfunction on the Sasov-Zolochev road. This vehicle is from the 67th Tank Regiment of the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. According to the act for the lost T-35 of the 34th Panzer Division, tank No. 200-5: “On 3.07.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, the Avar suffered. cor. per. per. the brake band was burned, rendered unusable, the weapons were removed in the Zolochiv region. "

The threat of encirclement and death of the 8th mechanized corps

Ryabyshev's 8th mechanized corps received the task of advancing on Rovno and ripping open the defense of the southern flank of the German tank wedge to almost the entire depth. The Germans had here the 111th Infantry Division in Dubno, the 16th Panzer and several infantry divisions on the flanks of our 8th Corps.

On the morning of June 28, units of the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions of the 8th Corps, already seriously drained of blood in previous battles, continued their attack on Dubno. They broke through the enemy's defenses and came close to the city. In the footsteps of the advance group of Popel, other parts of the mobile unit were drawn to the city. However, the forces of the 7th Motorized Division and the remnants of the 12th Panzer Divisions (Ryabyshev's group) had by this time lagged behind the forward detachment of Popel by 20 km. In the afternoon, units of the 75th Infantry and 16th Panzer Divisions wedged into this gap. Ryabyshev's group with heavy fighting continued the offensive and reduced the gap with the forward forces to 10 km. Stubborn battles continued until evening, but our troops were unable to break through the enemy's strong defenses.

By nightfall, the 8th mechanized corps was divided into two parts and partially surrounded. Popel's group was blocked west of Dubno. Ryabyshev's group also found itself under the threat of encirclement.

The breakthrough of the 8th mechanized corps to Dubno and the unsuccessful offensive of the 15th mechanized corps led to a large gap between them. The gap between the 212th motorized division of the 15th corps north of Brody and Ryabyshev's troops northeast of the city was filled with the forces of the German 57th infantry division.

By evening, the Germans had thrown back our 212nd Division and occupied Brody. The 7th motorized division was covered from three sides: from the side of Kremenets and Kozin, the enemy's 16th tank division pressed on it, from the north - the 75th infantry division, and the 57th division intercepted communications at Brod. The positions of Ryabyshev's group were shot through by German artillery, and it was subjected to raids by the Luftwaffe. Ryabyshev began to withdraw his troops to the southeast.

By nightfall, the 7th motorized division and part of the 12th tank division left the cauldron in the area southeast of Brody. There were about 2 thousand soldiers with five tanks and ten guns. True, lagging tanks and subunits dangled along the roads in the Lvov region. Therefore, by July 1, under the command of the 8th mechanized corps, there were already more than 70 KV and T-34, more than 130 BT, T-26 and T-40, about 20 armored vehicles.

Popel's group was completely surrounded. The tankers of the 34th and 12th Panzer Divisions had no hope of outside help. Ryabyshev's group had already been defeated and retreated. The German 16th Panzer Division closed the exit route. The Germans quickly built up a strong anti-tank defense, had strong support. aviation... Therefore, it turned out to be more difficult to break through than to reach Dubno. The attempt of Popel's group to break through back to join the rest of the corps ended in failure.

German soldiers inspect the Soviet tank BT-7, knocked out on the street in the town of Ostrog. A vehicle from the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 16th Army. Presumably, a vehicle from the 16th Panzer Regiment of the 109th Motorized Division.

Soviet tank KV-2, abandoned on the road near the city of Rivne during a march as a result of a breakdown or lack of fuel. A vehicle from the 41st Panzer Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps

Other directions

Meanwhile, the German 11th Panzer Division continued to wage a heavy battle at Ostrog with Lukin's group (parts of the 109th Motorized Division of the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 57th Panzer Division). The 213rd motorized rifle division of the 19th mechanized corps was also included in Lukin's group.

In this sector, the Russians had air supremacy that day: the aviation of the South-Western Front made 400 sorties on a rather small sector of the front. The Nazis had a hard time. German planes have not yet changed airfields and flew from Poland. The Ostrog area was the furthest from the Luftwaffe bases.

In general, the situation in the Dubna direction was in favor of the Germans. The 19th mechanized corps Feklenko left Rovno. On June 29, the 19th corps took up defensive positions on the river. Goryn.

The breakthrough of the Germans to Ostrog caused anxiety in the Soviet Headquarters.

The 19th Army, which was part of the Army Group of the Reserve of the High Command, was instructed to concentrate in the Kiev area. The Kiev fortified area was subordinate to the commander of the 19th Army I.S.Konev.

On the left flank, Muzychenko's 6th Army, which controlled most of the 4th Mechanized Corps, successfully held back the onslaught of the German 17th Army. Russian rearguards, reinforced with tanks, stopped the enemy, and the main forces of the 6th Army successfully retreated to the east.

Soviet heavy tank KV-2, abandoned in Zolochev due to a malfunction. The tank was parked on the current Ternopil street - at the beginning of the highway to Ternopil. A vehicle produced in November-December 1940 from the 8th or 12th Panzer Division

German soldiers next to a Soviet T-34 tank knocked out on Surmichi Street in Dubno

June 29. Going on the defensive and heroic resistance of the Popel group

The command of the South-Western Front, seeing that there were no obvious results of the counterattack, issued Order No. 0025, which was dominated by the phrases “withdraw,” “firmly defend,” “withdraw to the line.” The mechanized corps is supposed to be put into reserve.

Kirponos and Purkaev were sure that the Germans would turn south from Ostrog, and they tried to gather mobile units into a fist in order to fend off a new enemy blow. Therefore, the divisions of the 36th rifle corps, located southeast and south of Dubno (about 10 km from the Popel tankers), were not sent to help the troops of the 8th mechanized corps, which continued to occupy key communications in the rear of the German offensive and went into the rear 11 36st Panzer Division. Although the 34th corps could be used for the release of the 12th and XNUMXth tank divisions and the development of the strike in the Dubno area.

On the 29th, the Germans switched from defense to offensive, trying to free the communications of the 48th Motorized Corps and defeat the Russian tank group.

All day Popel's tankers fought off enemy attacks. The Russians did this very successfully, the Germans suffered losses and rolled back. But on the whole, the situation was almost hopeless.

Popel's group was pressed against the swampy valley of the Ikva River and blocked from the north by the 44th Infantry Division, from the east by the 111th Infantry Division occupying Dubno, from the south by the 16th Panzer Division and from the west by the 57th Infantry Division. From the rest of the 8th mechanized corps, Popel's group was already separated by more than 30 km, occupied by the enemy.

The battle lasted several days, Soviet tanks dug into the ground (there was no more fuel) became a steel fortress for the enemy.

The German command had to transfer troops from the northern flank of the 1st tank group against the 8th mechanized corps. Therefore, there was a pause in the battles in the Lutsk region.

The enemy was unable to advance further in the sector of the 5th Soviet Army. Parts of the 6th Soviet Army were quietly retreating to the east. The retreat of the army was covered by the counterattacks of the combat groups of the 4th mechanized corps (32nd tank division). Active and rather effective counterattacks by our new types of tanks allowed our troops to avoid the cauldron in Lvov.

During the night, units of the 32nd Panzer Division fought back through Lvov, they had to fight not only with the Germans, but also with the Ukrainian Nazis. Thus, our troops in the Lvov direction escaped encirclement.

The Germans had to reinforce the 17th Field Army of the 9th Panzer Division from the 14th Motorized Corps. The 9th division launched an offensive north of Lvov, posing a threat to the rear of the 15th mechanized corps.

However, on the evening of the 29th, the 15th mechanized corps, which had been fighting since June 23, began to withdraw to the front reserve. Its withdrawal from the north was covered by the 212th motorized division, which was stationed south of Brody. And the blow of the German 9th Panzer Division was met by our 8th Panzer Division. Therefore, the 15th mechanized corps avoided the boiler.

At Ostrog, the German 11th Panzer Division continued to repel the attacks of the Soviet troops. Also, the positions of the Germans were ironed by Soviet aviation.

On the northern flank of the German wedge, the command of the South-Western Front began preparing another one by strikes by the forces of Potapov's 5th army - the 9th, 19th and 22nd mechanized corps. The plan was to strike in the general direction of Mlynów, a settlement 15 km north-west of Dubno.

However, the divisions of the 9th and 19th corps had already been drained of blood in previous battles. Therefore, the 22nd mechanized corps was the main striking force. His 41st Panzer Division, which had previously participated in battles only in separate units, as of June 30, consisted of more than 120 tanks (mainly T-26) and 12 guns. The 19th Panzer Division of the 22nd Corps had already been knocked out, leaving 16 tanks in it. The 215th motorized division also suffered heavy losses in previous battles and had only 15 tanks and 12 guns.

The counterstrike was scheduled for July 1. The moment was very favorable, the Germans concentrated their main forces and attention in the Dubno area. The defense of the northern wing was weakened. But the combat capability of the Soviet corps was already low, and they did not have support from the southern flank, so that the blow would achieve serious results.

A knocked-out Soviet tank KV-2 with a torn barrel, tractors and artillery abandoned in the floodplain of the Zolotaya Lipa River in the village of Dunaev, Peremyshlyansky District, Lviv Region, about 20 km south of Zolochev. The barrel of the tank was blown up by its own crew. Vehicle from the 12th Panzer Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps

German soldiers are photographed on the armor of a Soviet T-35 tank, abandoned in the village of Bely Kamen, Zolochiv district, Lviv region. According to the act for the lost T-35s of the 34th Panzer Division, tank number 183-3 “Engine accident. The tank was abandoned by the crew in Belo-Kamenka on 30.06. Weapons and ammunition were removed from the vehicle and buried. " A vehicle from the 67th Panzer Regiment of the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps

30 June. Retreat

The 6th Army continued to retreat east.

The backbone of the retreating 6th Rifle Corps was the tanks of the 4th Mechanized Corps, and the retreat of the 37th Rifle Corps was covered by the combat vehicles of the 15th Mechanized Corps. The 37th Panzer Division with its counterattacks thwarted all the Nazis' attempts to disrupt the planned withdrawal of our infantry.

As a result, it was not possible to immediately withdraw mobile units to the reserve of the front. They were bound by battle and could not abandon the rifle divisions. True, if it was possible to restrain the enemy with counterattacks, then the situation in the air was different. The Luftwaffe literally smashed and burned the retreating columns of our army.

The acting commander of the 15th mechanized corps, Colonel Ermolaev, wrote in his report:

"The highway east of Zolochev, which is packed with burning cars of countless columns, was especially brutally bombarded."

On the evening of June 30, the Soviet Headquarters permitted the withdrawal of the armies of the South-Western Front to the old border of 1939.

At 23 o'clock, the headquarters of the South-Western Front ordered the troops to withdraw to the line of the fortified areas: Korostensky, Novograd-Volynsky, Shepetovsky, Staro-Konstantinovsky, Proskurovsky and Kamenets-Podolsky, in order, relying on them, to organize a solid defense.

Soviet heavy tank KV-1, abandoned on June 28-29, 1941 on the Ptichye - Verba highway, on the northeastern outskirts of the Verba village, Dubnovsky district, Rivne region. A vehicle from the 1st battalion of the 67th tank regiment of the 34th tank division of the 8th mechanized corps

The last counterattack

On the morning of July 1, 1941, the 20th Panzer Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps of Rokossovsky from the Klevan, Orzhev line struck the enemy and by 15 pm advanced 10-12 km. The Katukov division pressed the enemy's 25th motorized division. However, in connection with the general withdrawal of the armies of the front, this success was not developed.

In the evening, the division was ordered to withdraw. The 35th Panzer Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps also attacked successfully, but at night it received an order to retreat to its original lines.

The most powerful blow to the northern flank of the 1st tank group was inflicted by the 22nd mechanized corps, which at that time had 13 men, about 190 guns, more than 150 tanks (including 15 KV-2 tanks) and more than 20 armored vehicles.

Our troops struck at the junction of the 3rd motorized corps, which reached the Goryn line, and the 298th infantry division near Lutsk. The Germans had weak cover in this sector: the 44th Infantry Division fought in the Dubno area with the Popel group, the 299th Division was also directed to the south. Therefore, Pavlov's 41st Panzer Division quite easily penetrated the weak formations of the enemy and advanced south to 20 km. In the evening, the Soviet tankmen were 15 km north of Dubno.

However, in the evening, an order came for the division and the entire corps to withdraw. The retreat was accompanied by heavy losses: German aviation intensified, bridges in the rear were destroyed.

The 215th Motorized Division, following the 41st Panzer Division in the second echelon, also successfully advanced, providing the left flank and rear of the corps. The 215th Motorized Infantry Division also received an order to retreat and retreated under heavy Luftwaffe attacks. The 19th Panzer Division, advancing in the direction of Mlynów, met with stronger enemy resistance, but also moved forward.

On 2 July, the division had to engage the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler motorized brigade of the SS. The Germans launched a sudden and powerful blow to the flank and rear of the 19th Panzer Division. Our troops withdrew to their original positions with heavy losses. As a result, the success of the 22 Mechanized Corps' counterattack was of a local nature, the Germans quickly closed the gap with SS units.

The 19th mechanized corps could not launch an offensive that day, since the forces of the previously battered 40th Panzer Division fought defensive battles on the Goryn River. The division, which became de facto a rifle division (lost its tanks), fought off the advanced units of the German 14th Panzer Division. The 43rd Panzer Division of the 19th Corps also fought a successful defensive battle. Nevertheless, the German command gradually strengthened the edge of the wedge.

Muzychenko's 6th Army continued to retreat.

Its troops joined up with the 36th and 37th rifle corps that came from the depths, which changed the bloodied old divisions to the front. At the same time, the Germans launched an offensive with superior forces from the west and north. The 6th Army, without the support of the remnants of the 4th and 15th Mechanized Corps, would have been crushed. Our troops fought successful deterrent battles in the Zolochev area.

Soviet heavy tank T-35 and light tanks BT-7, knocked out near the Verba-Ptichye highway. In the foreground is a heavy T-35 tank. Behind the T-35 tank there are two damaged BT-7 tanks. Vehicles from the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps. A column of heavy half-track Sd.Kfz.8 tractors with German 211-mm mortars of the 1918 model (21 cm Mrs 18) of the OKH reserve is moving along the highway

Results

The counterattacks of our mechanized formations made it possible to avoid the encirclement of our armies in the Lvov direction.

The German command had to halt the breakthrough in the central sector, abandon tank and infantry divisions to fend off counterattacks by Soviet armored forces, and eliminate the threat to the rear and flanks of the 1st Panzer Group in the Dubno area.

As a result, the main forces of the 5th and 6th armies were able to avoid encirclement and destruction, and retreated to a new defensive line.

Soviet troops were defeated in border battles. This is due to a number of reasons.

The Germans fought better, had a lot of experience in agile, fast war. Errors of the Soviet command at the corps-army-front level. The best organization of German mobile units, where tanks were constantly supported by infantry, artillery and aviation. Better communication and organization. The Soviet mechanized corps were "raw": the lack of trained command and tank personnel, the problem of communications, the lack of artillery, air defense and anti-tank equipment. The defeat of the Soviet Air Force, which could not fully support our tankers. Lack of interaction with the infantry (during counterattacks).

Nevertheless, the strikes of the Soviet troops brought down the pace of the enemy offensive in the southern strategic direction, and made it possible to avoid a catastrophe immediately at the initial stage of the war (as on the Western Front). Therefore, the Soviet Headquarters could now transfer troops from the internal districts to the central direction, re-creating the destroyed Western Front. The South-Western Front at the very least, but held out, which made it possible to transfer the 16th and 19th armies to the central sector of the Soviet-German front.

Also, from the very beginning of the war, the Germans realized that in Russia the war would be different: they fought to the death and forced themselves to be respected as an enemy. The Russians suffered heavy losses in men and equipment, but held out as long as they could, and then retreated to new lines and fought again. This was not Poland or France.

The broken tower of the Soviet heavy tank KV-2, blown up in the village of Podluzhie, Rivne region, on the road between Verba and Dubno. Vehicle from the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps

Comments

[Finches]

Rokossovsky's recollections of June 26 are curious: "On June 26, by order of the commander of Potapov, the corps launched a counterattack in the direction of Dubno. They were brought into battle separately and on the move, without taking into account the state of the troops, which had been fighting a strong enemy for two days already, without taking into account their distance from the area of ​​probable encounter with the enemy. " Zhukov, who arrived at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front, insisted on the execution of the order of the Headquarters on the application of a counterstrike by mechanized corps, but in my opinion, Purkaev's point of view was more mature. He proposed stubborn battles to restrain the enemy's advance, and in the meantime to organize the forces of rifle and mechanized corps, which make up the second echelon, a solid defense in the depths of the front line of operations. Stopping the enemy at this line, gain time to prepare a general counteroffensive ... The Red Army was just learning how to fight ...

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Finches

He proposed stubborn battles to restrain the enemy's advance, and in the meantime to organize the forces of rifle and mechanized corps, which make up the second echelon, a solid defense in the depths of the front line of operations. Stopping the enemy at this line

Yes, Baghramyan has it in his memories. Characters: Vashugin, Kirponos, Purkaev. Date: June 22, afternoon. On the table there is an order to capture Lublin by the end of the 24th.

[Finches]

And at Zhukov's! Vashugin took responsibility for this counterstrike, shot himself! Did not survive the defeat of the mechanized corps.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Finches

And at Zhukov's! Vashugin took responsibility for this counterstrike, shot himself! Did not survive the defeat of the mechanized corps.

The march of the 8th MK on June 22 to Sandomierz speaks of the good preparation of the mechanized corps and the maturity of its command. But unfortunately for the 8th MK, his tasks were repeatedly changed and he was forced to march 3-450 km in 500 days (with a permissible 250) and, in addition, the PMC of the South-Western Front Vashugin, a man stuck in the representations of the Civil War, intervened in the actions of the corps commander Ryabyshev.
As a result, the corps, which, according to its potential, was capable of dividing one motorized corps of the Wehrmacht into two, or even three, (of the two available to the Wehrmacht), achieved much less results. Vashugin is generally the apotheosis. How could such a person with the outlook of a regiment commissar end up in the command of a district / front?

[Bar1]

The mechanized corps were finally supposed to get the support of the infantry.

this, this is generally a revelation.
Mechanized corps entered the battle in parts, tanks separately, infantry separately.
Well, "planning". The Germans were fighting in an organized and well-coordinated manner, and ours fought not as it should be for greater efficiency, but as it was necessary.
Here it is even stupid to go down to the level of command of armies, corps and divisions: you can clearly see the complete failure of the command of the highest Moscow level - the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff.
from the previous article.

Ryabyshev's corps (a Don Cossack who fought in the First World War and the Civil War) numbered more than 30 thousand people, 932 tanks and 172 armored cars. The almost 500-kilometer march was difficult, along congested roads, under bombing. Therefore, it was completed only in the afternoon of June 25th. On the way, the corps lost almost half of the equipment due to breakdowns and lack of fuel

this order should be subjected to the most close analysis by historians, who gave the order, when, what is the reason for such a decision, and not get off with general words (weak, inept leadership, lack of communication means)?

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Bar1

this order should be subjected to the most careful analysis by historians, who gave the order, when, what is the reason for such a decision

So Ryabyshev received the order to move to Sambor from the commander-26 Kostenko. The order to march back to Muzychenko is from Kirponos. Regarding traffic, of course, there is another sad story. Especially touching, damn it, is an episode from Ryabyshev's memoir about the traffic jam in Stryi, where the commanders decided to stop and drop in to their families and, naturally, "the farewell was delayed" (c).

[Bar1]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

So Ryabyshev received the order to move to Sambor from the commander-26 Kostenko. The order to march back to Muzychenko is from Kirponos. Regarding traffic, of course, there is another sad story. Especially touching, damn it, is an episode from Ryabyshev's memoir about the traffic jam in Stryi, where the commanders decided to stop and drop in to their families and, naturally, "the farewell was delayed" (c).

Yeah.
The order for the advancement, it is not clear where the commander of the 26th army, Kostenko, gave, and the order for the return withdrawal was already the chief of staff of the Southern Military District Kirponos himself, and the corps of the 6th army of Muzychenko was reassigned.
Ryabyshev does not analyze the reasons for such actions, he simply states, but this is the case when they suddenly began to change horses not in the crossing.
The picture does not become clear, for a 500 km march with the loss of combat capability by tanks due to loss of motor resources and waste of fuel, commanders and staff officers of 26th ar., 6 ar. and YUVF. But for WHAT reasons we gave such contradictory orders, we do not know.
At what level did the failure to understand the military situation occur?

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Bar1

At what level did the failure to understand the military situation occur?

Well, if we consider that at this time Comrade Zhukov was at the South-Western Branch of the South-Western Branch, then we can assume that the failure occurred

Quote: Bar1

the top-level Moscow level, which is the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff.

[Bar1]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Well, if we consider that at this time Comrade Zhukov was at the South-Western Branch of the South-Western Branch, then we can assume that the failure occurred

in the previous topic on the Dubna battle, I argued with one local frame about the essence of the order of the "RED" package. The content of the order and its authors. My opinion is that the order in the red package for the mechanized corps level is the prerogative of the General Staff.
In general, modern historians Martirosyan and Isaev do not use the contents of, say, the archive of the Ministry of Defense or the archive of the General Staff, if any, but also use all sorts of memoirs and recollections of generals.
It turns out that until all the archives are OPEN and all orders are analyzed, then we will never fully understand the picture of the defeat of our troops, but we will argue here endlessly.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Bar1

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

So Ryabyshev received the order to move to Sambor from the commander-26 Kostenko. The order to march back to Muzychenko is from Kirponos. Regarding traffic, of course, there is another sad story. Especially touching, damn it, is an episode from Ryabyshev's memoir about the traffic jam in Stryi, where the commanders decided to stop and drop in to their families and, naturally, "the farewell was delayed" (c).

Yeah.
The order for the advancement, it is not clear where the commander of the 26th army, Kostenko, gave, and the order for the return withdrawal was already the chief of staff of the Southern Military District Kirponos himself, and the corps of the 6th army of Muzychenko was reassigned.
Ryabyshev does not analyze the reasons for such actions, he simply states, but this is the case when they suddenly began to change horses not in the crossing.
The picture does not become clear, for a 500 km march with the loss of combat capability by tanks due to loss of motor resources and waste of fuel, commanders and staff officers of 26th ar., 6 ar. and YUVF. But for WHAT reasons we gave such contradictory orders, we do not know.
At what level did the failure to understand the military situation occur?

Why don't we know? The explanation for this is in the book of memoirs by Popel. If you compare the dates of the events, then you can guess the very thing.
First, the corps moved to Sambor in accordance with the order of Kom. 26th Army Kostenko, in the strip of which the corps was located.
But in the meantime, Zhukov arrived in Ternopil to organize an attack on Lublin. The 5th and 6th armies were supposed to participate in the strike, so the 8th MK was transferred to the neighboring 6th army of Muzychenko. While they were preparing the strike, they finally realized that what was needed was not a strike on Lublin, but a counterstrike into the flanks of a German tank wedge. And much more to the east of Lviv.
Day by day, the purpose of the use of troops changed, hence all this throwing.
Ultimately, all this happened because the General Staff, based on the disinformation from RU, could not assume that the Germans had a tank group that could trample on Ustilug.

[stim]

This is not one order, but several orders, and each subsequent one contradicted the previous one.
By the evening of June 22, according to the order of the commander of 12A, 8 microns were concentrated in the Sambir forests. I quote Ryabyshev: "Lieutenant Colonel Tsinchenko reported on the situation:
- The corps troops are concentrated in the areas indicated by them. The crews are putting in order the material part, refueling the cars. There are 700 tanks in the starting area, ready for battle. The rest of the vehicles from among those in service with the corps were left for overhaul at the locations of the units. The corps personnel are ready to carry out a combat order. At that time Lieutenant Colonel A.K.Blazhei from the headquarters of the 26th Army hurriedly approached me. We stepped aside, and he handed me an order from the commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel-General MP Kirponos. The corps troops were to make a return night march along the same broken road, to reach the area east of Lvov by dawn on June 23 and be placed at the disposal of the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General I. N. Muzychenko. So, after a 70-80-kilometer march to the west, without resting, we had to make a 120-kilometer march to the east. By 23 o'clock on 12 June, a significant part of the tank subunits concentrated in the indicated areas. But some units were still on the way. I drove up to the headquarters of the 6th Army. Commander of the army, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko, who came out to meet him, shook hands firmly. According to the plan of Lieutenant General IN Muzychenko, we were to concentrate in the forest southeast of Yavorov, to coordinate our actions with the commander of the 6th Rifle Corps, Major General II Alekseev. On the morning of June 24, go on the offensive and by joint efforts push the enemy back across the state border. Exchanging views with Colonel Kokorin, we went out onto the road. At that moment, a passenger car drove up to us, and Lieutenant Colonel Losev, the head of the corps reconnaissance, got out of it. I remember that I involuntarily looked at my watch. They showed 22.00 p.m. Losev reported that he had brought a package from the front headquarters.
This was a new order from the commander of the Southwestern Front, according to which, by the end of the day on June 24, the troops of the 8th mechanized corps were to concentrate in the area of ​​the city of Brody, and on the morning of June 25 to strike at the tank group of Nazi troops in the direction of Brody, Berestechko. By this time, only the forward detachments of the corps divisions approached the Yavorov area, and the main forces were still on the march. The next day, June 25, by 15 o'clock the advance detachments of the corps reached the city of Brody, and by the end of the day the main forces of the corps were concentrated in the indicated area. Here we have summed up the results of our four-day intense 500-kilometer march along the roads of war. The results were disappointing: a large number of tanks of old designs were out of order and could not reach the concentration area. Tanks T-35, for example, were all left on the routes. Not all of them arrived and the flamethrower tank battalion (T-26) of the 24th tank regiment of the 12th tank division. Remained on the roads and other tanks of old designs. By this time, large defects appeared in the KV tanks. Their brake bands from frequent turns with prolonged continuous movement overheated and failed. "....
“Nevertheless, I was pleased with the results of the battle on June 26. The enemy suffered significant losses, we possessed the initiative, the situation was developing in our favor. The troops were ready from the morning of the 27th to strike at the enemy's flank and rear. On the morning of June 27, continue the offensive. The battle formation of the corps' troops was in line with the plan, no regrouping was required. All this foreshadowed unconditional success. But this plan did not have to be implemented. On June 27, at about 4 am, General V.P. According to this order, the troops of the 8th Mechanized Corps were withdrawn to the rear behind the battle formations of the 36th Rifle Corps. Thus, we did not succeed in building on the success achieved on 26 June and delivering a crushing blow to the flank of General Kleist's tank group. formations of our corps did not have to carry out. Brigadier commissar A.I.Mikhailov, who handed me a new order from the front commander, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos. The troops of the 6th Mechanized Corps were to drive the Nazis out of the city of Dubno, and then go over to a perimeter defense in the Dubno, Smordva, Pelch area in anticipation of a general offensive by the front troops.

[stim]

Quote: Bar1

Mechanized corps entered the battle in parts, tanks separately, infantry separately.

The tasks for the mechanized corps were set without taking into account the required time for marches, and in these conditions it depended a lot on the commander of the mechanized corps, who had to choose or execute the order on time due to a decrease in combat effectiveness due to lagging artillery and infantry, or raise the issue of postponing the execution of the order to concentration of the main forces of the corps, including artillery and infantry. I will quote Ryabyshev: “The columns went at maximum speed. Unfortunately, the corps artillery following them on tractor traction lagged significantly behind, the difference in speed delayed the general concentration of troops. and because the convoys were hit by enemy aircraft. Our anti-aircraft gunners fired at them quite effectively. On the march they shot down four aircraft ...
the floodplain of the Slonówka River for two kilometers turned out to be very swampy and impassable for tanks. It was possible to advance only along a single road, and the bridge across the river was blown up, and the approaches to it were under heavy enemy artillery fire. The commander of the 12th Panzer Division, Major General T.A.Mishanin, seeking to push the Germans away from Slonówka and seize the bridgehead, brought in motorized infantry into battle. Supported by artillery fire from divisional, corps artillery and tank guns, the infantry ford crossed the river, attacked enemy positions and seized a bridgehead. Our sappers immediately began to rebuild the bridge and build gates across the swamp.
By 11 o'clock the bridge was ready. Soon, heavy tanks crossed to the opposite bank of Slonówka and supported the infantry offensive. "Here is a vivid example of the correct conduct of a battle by a mechanized corps. But delaying the execution of a combat order, the corps commander took great responsibility and took great risks. Let's turn to Popel's memoirs:
“It was Tsinchenko who noticed the cavalcade of passenger cars, slowly, groping along the forest road.
- Comrade General!
Ryabyshev turned around, picked up his cap from the ground, pulled on his overalls and with a somewhat solemn step moved towards the lead vehicle. A short black-mustache soldier emerged from it. Ryabyshev drew himself up:
- Comrade member of the Military Council of the front ... The doors of the cars slammed. More and more new faces appeared before us - colonels, lieutenant colonels. Some I recognized - the prosecutor, the chairman of the Military Tribunal ... From the back of the lorry that closed the column, soldiers jumped out.
The one to whom the corps commander addressed, did not listen to the report, did not raise his hand to his temple. He walked, crushing the bushes with his polished boots, straight towards Ryabyshev. When he approached, he looked up into the wrinkled, high-cheekbone face of the corps commander and in a voice choked with rage asked:
- How much did you sell for, Judas?
Ryabyshev stood in line in front of the member of the Military Council, taken aback, could not find anything to say, and we all looked in confusion at the short, well-cut corps commissar.
Dmitry Ivanovich spoke first:
- You would have listened, comrade corps ...
- You, a traitor, the field court will listen. Here, under the pine tree, we will listen and shoot by the pine tree ... "
Not every commander of the mechanized corps was ready to take such a risk, and therefore tanks fought without the support of artillery and infantry.

[Bar1]

Quote: stim

... I will quote Ryabyshev: "

yes, this episode is played out in the film "Battle for Moscow"



cm 1h11m.15s

[Niko]

But in fact, I wonder what would have happened if in those first days they had not thrown whole corps boldly but absolutely unprepared and thoughtlessly at the mercy of the Germans, and after these "type of planned counterstrikes" the machines would not have been abandoned, but had taken the hulls back, given to the Germans Stretch communications even more, and having carried out elementary preparation (including receiving real intelligence) would have struck a week or two later on the detached, exhausted, without ammunition, German units?

[Finches]

In the pre-war period, very little attention was paid to such a type of battle as defense! "To beat the enemy on foreign territory ..." Plus confusion and lack of a clear understanding of the situation!

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Niko

Did they take the corps back, let the Germans stretch their communications even more, and, having carried out elementary preparations (including receiving real intelligence), would have struck a week or two later on the detached, exhausted, without ammunition German units?

well, this is approximately what Purkaev suggested.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Niko

But in fact, I wonder what would have happened if in those first days they had not thrown whole corps boldly but absolutely unprepared and thoughtlessly at the mercy of the Germans, and after these "type of planned counterstrikes" the machines would not have been abandoned, but had taken the hulls back, given to the Germans Stretch communications even more, and having carried out elementary preparation (including receiving real intelligence) would have struck a week or two later on the detached, exhausted, without ammunition, German units?

The question is, who would be faster - our retreating mechanized corps or the German advancing tank groups? And what losses will be in this withdrawal - in a situation where the closure service and the rembats are physically unable to pick up and put on the move all the lagging equipment in time, and the artillery also physically does not keep up with the tank columns.
Lead in advance? This means giving up the borderland to the Germans, who will pass it in a couple of days.
In the absence of our mechanized corps, the Germans will ditch our border infantry with their own mechanized units and transfer the boilers to their infantry. And in this case, this process will take them much less time. And then they will reveal the deployment of our MK and will deal with them.
To withdraw all forces from the border area in advance, limiting ourselves to forward detachments? This did not work even in 1942 with the mobilized and experienced Red Army - the forward detachments weakened the divisions from which they were allocated, but they themselves turned out to be too weak to delay the enemy in any way.

What about real intelligence - we are talking about the Red Army, which in the third month of the war managed to lose an entire enemy tank group for how many days, and exactly during the time it delivered a critical strike? And a month later, lose a tank group again, but already in the central sector - with approximately the same consequences?

[Niko]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Niko

But in fact, I wonder what would have happened if in those first days they had not thrown whole corps boldly but absolutely unprepared and thoughtlessly at the mercy of the Germans, and after these "type of planned counterstrikes" the machines would not have been abandoned, but had taken the hulls back, given to the Germans Stretch communications even more, and having carried out elementary preparation (including receiving real intelligence) would have struck a week or two later on the detached, exhausted, without ammunition, German units?

The question is, who would be faster - our retreating mechanized corps or the German advancing tank groups? And what losses will be in this withdrawal - in a situation where the closure service and the rembats are physically unable to pick up and put on the move all the lagging equipment in time, and the artillery also physically does not keep up with the tank columns.
Lead in advance? This means giving up the borderland to the Germans, who will pass it in a couple of days.
In the absence of our mechanized corps, the Germans will ditch our border infantry with their own mechanized units and transfer the boilers to their infantry. And in this case, this process will take them much less time. And then they will reveal the deployment of our MK and will deal with them.
To withdraw all forces from the border area in advance, limiting ourselves to forward detachments? This did not work even in 1942 with the mobilized and experienced Red Army - the forward detachments weakened the divisions from which they were allocated, but they themselves turned out to be too weak to delay the enemy in any way.

What about real intelligence - we are talking about the Red Army, which in the third month of the war managed to lose an entire enemy tank group for how many days, and exactly during the time it delivered a critical strike? And a month later, lose a tank group again, but already in the central sector - with approximately the same consequences?

The corps thrown into these famous counterattacks were not in contact with the Germans during the first days, but moved at an accelerated pace towards the front, losing equipment, artillery and repair parts even on the way to the FRONT. Those. if they were taken back and not thrown forward, they could retreat at a fairly calm pace, regroup, and if they die, then with real benefit and not from the desire of local commanders to report to Stalin in order to cover their personal ass (in terms of containing the Germans, it could bring much more benefit a void of an extra hundred or two kilometers, so that they hurry forward, and realizing that they will be met by a really prepared defense, they lose equipment on the marches and not we. )

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Niko

The corps thrown into these famous counterattacks were not in contact with the Germans during the first days, but moved at an accelerated pace towards the front, losing equipment, artillery and repair parts even on the way to the FRONT. Those. if they were taken back and not thrown forward, they could move away at a fairly calm pace, regroup and if they die, then with real benefit and not out of the desire of local commanders to report to Stalin in order to cover their personal ass

We withdraw the 4th MK - the defense of the 6th A Muzychenko collapses. And the rear of the departing 4th MK is catching up with the Germans. And along with it, the columns of the 8th MK fall under attack.
PPD 4th MK - Lviv. PPD of the 8th MK - Grudek and Stryi. This is the mechanized corps of the border armies (6th and 26th).

Quote: Niko

in terms of deterring the Germans, a void of an extra hundred or two kilometers could bring much more benefit, so that they hurry forward, and realizing that they will be met by a really prepared defense, they lost equipment on the marches and not us

Alas, it's 1941. The Germans passed the loss of equipment on the march back in 1938 - and made conclusions. The ambush is that at an artillery speed of 3-5 km / h, our SDs physically do not have time to take up defenses before German tanks pass through the border vacuum in 2-4 days to their positions. It will turn out either "Typhoon", or Vistula-Oder, on the contrary - when there is a line of defense, and there was no time to fill it.

Quote: Niko

And in the end, they would have been met, albeit with a counterattack, but ready-made units in full force, and with

The result of the reconnaissance in the KOVO strip was the disruption of the strike on the 1st TGr: the reconnaissance slept through the tanks where they were, but reported their presence where they were not, and the command of the direction began to hastily move the MK.
I am not talking about the impact of the 6th MK ZOVO, which led to his death in the German infantry. But everything was also planned on the basis of intelligence.

[Usher]

Quote: Niko

But in fact, I wonder what would have happened if in those first days they had not thrown whole corps boldly but absolutely unprepared and thoughtlessly at the mercy of the Germans, and after these "type of planned counterstrikes" the machines would not have been abandoned, but had taken the hulls back, given to the Germans Stretch communications even more, and having carried out elementary preparation (including receiving real intelligence) would have struck a week or two later on the detached, exhausted, without ammunition, German units?

Wouldn't work. It is necessary to restrain constantly.

[Niko]

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

[Usher]

Quote: Niko

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

So what to do? As they could and did so, it is you here on the couch arguing. And then when the minutes count. No connection, no experience. They did what they could. No need to speculate here. It was yes it was. Everything!

[Niko]

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

So what to do? As they could and did so, it is you here on the couch arguing. And then when the minutes count. No connection, no experience. They did what they could. No need to speculate here. It was yes it was. Everything!

Indeed, all historians to the Solovki, all writers to the zone, everyone who dares to comment on the register, memoirists, by the way, will also have to ... and only the Victory Day is allowed to be celebrated

[Usher]

Quote: Niko

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

So what to do? As they could and did so, it is you here on the couch arguing. And then when the minutes count. No connection, no experience. They did what they could. No need to speculate here. It was yes it was. Everything!

Indeed, all historians to the Solovki, all writers to the zone, everyone who dares to comment on the register, memoirists, by the way, will also have to ... and only the Victory Day is allowed to be celebrated

What are you in a bunch of interfering with? A? Did I write about this? Hello? Don't make it up for me here! I said that it is easy for you to talk from the couch here. And people at that time fought as best they could and as best they could. And they didn’t coward, didn’t argue "it is necessary it is not necessary". While you are deciding and weighing, the German will go around and into the "cauldron".

[Niko]

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

So what to do? As they could and did so, it is you here on the couch arguing. And then when the minutes count. No connection, no experience. They did what they could. No need to speculate here. It was yes it was. Everything!

Indeed, all historians to the Solovki, all writers to the zone, everyone who dares to comment on the register, memoirists, by the way, will also have to ... and only the Victory Day is allowed to be celebrated

What are you in a bunch of interfering with? A? Did I write about this? Hello? Don't make it up for me here! I said that it is easy for you to talk from the couch here. And people at that time fought as best they could and as best they could. And they didn’t coward, didn’t argue "it is necessary it is not necessary". While you are deciding and weighing, the German will go around and into the "cauldron".

There were just people, different, and reasoned, and were afraid, and cowardly, and heroically, and if those who should also THINK ... sorry, but don't forbid thinking today

[Usher]

Quote: Niko

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

So what to do? As they could and did so, it is you here on the couch arguing. And then when the minutes count. No connection, no experience. They did what they could. No need to speculate here. It was yes it was. Everything!

Indeed, all historians to the Solovki, all writers to the zone, everyone who dares to comment on the register, memoirists, by the way, will also have to ... and only the Victory Day is allowed to be celebrated

What are you in a bunch of interfering with? A? Did I write about this? Hello? Don't make it up for me here! I said that it is easy for you to talk from the couch here. And people at that time fought as best they could and as best they could. And they didn’t coward, didn’t argue "it is necessary it is not necessary". While you are deciding and weighing, the German will go around and into the "cauldron".

There were just people, different, and reasoned, and were afraid, and cowardly, and heroically, and if those who should also THINK ... sorry, but don't forbid thinking today

Why are you repeating my words? We thought and came to the conclusion that we must contain, not retreat.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Usher

Quote: Niko

Well, they held back (if we take away our patriotic pathos) mainly captured German brigades to which they could deliver intact equipment practically without losses and delays. The mechanized corps were not intended to contain, they inflicted counterattacks, or rather had to. But in fact they threw like brushwood into the fire with efficiency 5 %

So what to do? As they could and did so, it is you here on the couch arguing. And then when the minutes count. No connection, no experience. They did what they could. No need to speculate here. It was yes it was. Everything!

There are no complaints about soldiers and officers (in general). There are many complaints about the command of the spacecraft and the fronts. It was he who gave impracticable or frankly stupid orders, canceled them, gave new ones and made such a mess that it’s just your hair to move when you read the memories of real participants.
There were about five thousand tanks on the South-Western Front against a thousand from the Germans, and we had MORE medium and heavy ones. In theory, taking into account the best organization in the Wehrmacht, full radio frequency, the experience of their tankers, our mechanized corps had to destroy the 1st TGr into dust. At the same time, their own losses could amount to two or even three thousand. Yes, even all five thousand. But the Germans would have no tanks left and they would not be able to advance. The very course of the war would have changed. But instead of this, our command destroyed huge forces and - it was written here correctly - instilled in the German soldier confidence in their victory.

[Crowe]

Something the author began to repeat himself often: the same theme, the same text, the same photographs ..

[The leader of the Redskins]

And the patriotic mood is the same.
When we were taught the history of the battles of the Second World War at the military school, the teachers noted not only heroism and courage, but also the misconduct of the leadership, weak logistics and intelligence.
And it turned out like that equally and that, and that.
And Samsonov has more slogans than critics.
It's like reading a heavily edited memoir of the edition somewhere in the 70s of the last century.

[Catfish]

It's like reading a heavily edited memoir of the edition somewhere in the 70s of the last century.

Is very similar.
But this is the first time I saw a photo of a torn off KV tower with a torn gun, thanks to the author for it. This happens if sand is poured into the barrel and shot, it seems that the crew themselves blew up their car.

[The leader of the Redskins]

Yes, it ripped gorgeous. We also had a similar case in the training battalion, moreover, through the fault of the command. So there, only at the cut of the trunk, the "rose" was formed.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Sea Cat

But here is a photo of a torn off KV tower with a torn gun I saw for the first time,

he is from a different angle?

[Catfish]

So I say - impressive.

But the hunter could have gone deaf.

[Konnick]

It's like reading a heavily edited memoir of the edition somewhere in the 70s of the last century.

Not only, sometimes it seems written from somewhere from afar, it looks like plagiarism or a German wrote-

On June 29, 1941, the Germans switched from defense to offensive, trying to free the communications of the 48th Motorized Corps and defeat Russian tank group Popel.

Farther

On this site русские on that day they had air supremacy: the aviation of the South-Western Front made 400 sorties on a rather small sector of the front.

[gorenina91]

How Soviet mechanized corps prevented the Germans from taking Kiev on the move

- Personally, I still did not understand anything ... - from this topic proposed by the author ...
- Constantly discussed ... - mechanized corps ... mechanized corps ... mechanized corps ...
- Yes, even one mechanized corps ... - this is such a force that I never dreamed of ... - This is about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns; about 250 guns and mortars; nearly 2000 military vehicles; about 18000 troops, etc.
- In fact, it is a small separate army that is capable of independently performing combat missions ... - to strike, act in defense and counter attacks ... - with its own material and technical base + on its territory (where their warehouses and arsenals are located) ... - And several mechanized corps are generally such an "ambush" for enemies ...
Here the author gives arguments that they say ... - German anti-tank artillery inflicted very great damage on our tank units ... - And what kind of artillery was it ??? - the Germans had the opposite ... - then they had rather weak anti-tank guns ... - and very often their fire was rather ineffective ... - And the German tank guns were rather weak - and also could not seriously resist the armor of our tanks .. - And then the Germans still did not have "tank analogues" (so to speak) - our KV-1 and Kv-2 tanks (and the T-34 too) ... - With KV tanks - the German artillerymen do not " could handle "... - their fire for KV was just" mosquito bites "...
- It's just that the illiterate command of the Red Army by these our mechanized corps (inept leadership, abandoned serviceable equipment) led to such a sad result ...

[Catfish]

- Yes, even one mechanized corps ... is such a force that I never dreamed of ...

You see, a big pile of tanks, these are not tank troops yet. Lack of interaction, and most importantly, the lack of normal communication, corresponding to modern mechanized warfare. As an example, the Germans had radio stations on every tank and with almost every regiment a Luftwaffe liaison officer moved in the offensive, who, if necessary, immediately summoned and guided the planes. CONNECTION ! Well, the lack of experience of our commanders, the shock of defeat, etc.

[chenia]

Quote: Sea Cat

Lack of interaction, and most importantly, the lack of normal communication, corresponding to modern mechanized warfare.

This is a tertiary factor.
The defeat of the BTV was determined when, on the extremely imperfect structure of the MK, they began to replicate it (up to 30 MK). And this is a breakdown of the BP and personnel leapfrog. As a result, more than one MK (and the first stage too) were not combat-ready.
And all these activities were done deliberately. Here is the lobbying desire to knock out more funds, create more positions and has led to such a result. As an excuse, I will say that they thought there would be no war in 1941, but by 1942 they thought to polish the structure. I learn more and more that the TP problem was understood at all levels, but this structure was specially expanded (it never gets worse).
And communication - three tanks in a platoon (P / S at KV), and everything is already controllable (both the company and the battalion).

[Maki Avellevich]

Quote: Sea Cat

You mean, a big pile of tanks, these are not tank troops yet. Lack of interaction, and most importantly, the lack of normal communication, corresponding to modern mechanized warfare.

what did the general staff do in the pre-war years?
it turns out that the tanks were produced immeasurably, but there was no interaction and communication.

I don’t believe in the total stupidity of Soviet generals, do you have an explanation for your diagnosis?

[Catfish]

Dmitriy I have no explanations, it is almost impossible to get into the general's "skin", especially of that troubled time. I think that the emphasis on the number and lack of a clearly expressed doctrine of the use of tank forces played an equally important role here. Because the German "blitzkrieg" is one thing, and our "deep operation" is completely different, where almost a decisive role in moving forward was played by the alteration of the European railway track to ours and absolutely unimaginable for a mobile war instruction on the interaction of tanks with cavalry, i.e. e. tanks support this cavalry.
By the way, the generals knew how to learn from us, when they were not prevented from doing this, the Manchurian operation against the Kwantung Army is still the standard of a real "Blitzkrieg" and is studied in almost all Military Academies in the world.

[Bar1]

Quote: Maki Avellievich

I don’t believe in the general stupidity of Soviet generals, do you have an explanation for your diagnosis

When a smart but subordinate commander is given a bad order, then obeying the order, this smart commander becomes as foolish as the one who gave him. This is called military subordination.

[chenia]

Quote: Bar1

when a smart but subordinate commander is given a bad order,

By the way, the idea is not so bad, here is no execution. If . this was carried out by the Red Army arr. late 1943 We would have been on the Vistula (there were our tank formations, there were more than any in the subsequent battle). The Germans were completely unprepared for defense, and it would be something reminiscent of the Crimea (1942) on the contrary. Is it that the high level of tactical training and training of the Wehrmacht troops (at that time, then it began to fall, although it remained the highest until the end of the war), could somewhat soften these powerful counterattacks.

[Sergey-1950]

This was ... um ... a disadvantage of our army. Called eyewash. Well, who prevented before the war from checking one mechanized corps on the march. Give the order to march 100 km in, say, 5 hours and turn around at a given line. To save material resources, it was possible to carry out not the entire MK, but one tank division, and leave the second in position.
Here a lot would be clearly seen. How equipment breaks down on the march, and repair services are too weak. How hopelessly behind the artillery, which has a speed of 5 km / h. What confusion and fuss arises during deployment due to radio communications. Yes, a lot of things could be seen and understood. And learn a lot. But they took care of the motor resource ...

[Andrey VOV]

It is one thing a corps according to the staff schedule, the number of equipment and personnel, another thing is a fact. The absence and clear interaction of infantry and tanks has already been spoken about many times. There was support for artillery, yes, there were guns, but there were no normal tractors for them, and as a result, the tanks themselves, the infantry itself, the artillery itself, we are generally silent about aviation.
German anti-tank artillery calmly took BT and T26, as well as T3 tanks knocked them out at once. T34 and KV .. A third of the brocheg for those reasons, and the German women slicked them like nuts ..
It was smooth on paper, but forgot about the ravines.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: gorenina91

How Soviet mechanized corps prevented the Germans from taking Kiev on the move

- Personally, I still did not understand anything ... - from this topic proposed by the author ...
- Constantly discussed ... - mechanized corps ... mechanized corps ... mechanized corps ...
- Yes, even one mechanized corps ... - this is such a force that I never dreamed of ... - This is about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns; about 250 guns and mortars; nearly 2000 military vehicles; about 18000 troops, etc.
...
Here the author gives arguments that they say ... - German anti-tank artillery inflicted very great damage on our tank units ... - And what kind of artillery was it ??? - the Germans had the opposite ... - then they had rather weak anti-tank guns ... - and very often their fire was rather ineffective ... - And the German tank guns were rather weak - and also could not seriously resist the armor of our tanks .. - And then the Germans still did not have "tank analogues" (so to speak) - our KV-1 and Kv-2 tanks (and the T-34 too) ... - With KV tanks - the German artillerymen do not " could handle "... - their fire for KV was just" mosquito bites "...
- It's just that the illiterate command of the Red Army by these our mechanized corps (inept leadership, abandoned serviceable equipment) led to such a sad result ...

Irina, it is very positive that you are trying to understand this topic.
But you have some gaps in your knowledge of the subject that you can easily overcome.

First. The mechanized corps of the summer of 1941 is not 300 tanks, but 1021 tanks (by state). Not all MKs had such a number of tanks, but most had hundreds of tanks in an amount close to 1000. The Panzer Division alone had 375 tanks per staff. And there were two of them in the mechanized corps. Even in the mechanized corps had a mechanized division, which had ... 275 tanks. Not bad?!
Second. About PT artillery of the Germans. They had 37 mm guns. But, damn it, the shells for them were cumulative and they, shells, that is, clicked all our medium tanks, which were in the overwhelming majority of the Soviet MK. For the T-34 and KV, 88 mm anti-aircraft guns had to be used.
In total, the Wehrmacht's PD had only 75 PT guns.
The result of the actions of the PT artillery was that ONE INFANTRY DIVISION of the Wehrmacht stopped the 6th MK of the Zapfront. True, with the help of aviation ... But what's the difference ... This mechanized corps had more than 400 T-34 and KV, and even a quarter of this amount would be enough to break through the front of the PD. But the confusion of the command and, in particular, of the organizer of that "counterattack" General-Leith. Boldina led to the death of the strongest MK of the Red Army with a zero result.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Second. About PT artillery of the Germans. They had 37 mm guns. But, damn it, the shells for them were cumulative and they, shells, that is, clicked all our medium tanks, which were in the overwhelming majority of the Soviet MK.

By the events described in the article, the Wehrmacht did not have cumulative rounds for the Pak-36. Stiel-Gr. 41 appeared in the army only in February 42nd. And you don't just need this trick - "click". You, apparently, have little idea what eggs the German artillerymen had to have in order to "click" at a distance of 130m (this is the maximum range for a moving target) of the T-34? A muzzle-charged grenade. The flight path of which is mysterious.
Clicking a lot?

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Quote: Sergey-1950

Second. About PT artillery of the Germans. They had 37 mm guns. But, damn it, the shells for them were cumulative and they, shells, that is, clicked all our medium tanks, which were in the overwhelming majority of the Soviet MK.

By the events described in the article, the Wehrmacht did not have cumulative rounds for the Pak-36. Stiel-Gr. 41 appeared in the army only in February 42nd. And you don't just need this trick - "click". You, apparently, have little idea what eggs the German artillerymen had to have in order to "click" at a distance of 130m (this is the maximum range for a moving target) of the T-34? A muzzle-charged grenade. The flight path of which is mysterious.
Clicking a lot?

HEAT shells first appeared in Spain. But neither then, nor later did they manage to get these shells (if such a task was set at all), nor to guess on what principle such a shell works. And only during the counter-offensive near Moscow were the warehouses of these shells seized and everything became clear.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Sergey-1950

HEAT shells first appeared in Spain.

What does Spain have to do with it? You rub in the lady that the 37mm "mallet" during Barbarossa allegedly "clicked" our BT with cumulative shells. So, in the summer of 41, there was no cumulative ammunition for the Pak-36.

Quote: Sergey-1950

It was only during the counteroffensive near Moscow that the warehouses of these shells were seized and everything became clear.

What exactly became clear?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Sergey-1950

First. The mechanized corps of the summer of 1941 is not 300 tanks, but 1021 tanks (by state). Not all MKs had such a number of tanks, but most had hundreds of tanks in an amount close to 1000. The Panzer Division alone had 375 tanks per staff. And there were two of them in the mechanized corps. Even in the mechanized corps had a mechanized division, which had ... 275 tanks. Not bad?!

Yeah ... and for all this utterly gluttonous horde - at best, 25-30% of the state's refueling tankers (mainly in the first eight MKs). The rest of the fuel and oil - carry it in barrels on trucks. Which are also missing.
Oh yes, the district's fuel is only listed in the district, but it is stored for the most part extraterritorially, in the tanks of an oil refinery somewhere in Maykop. Because the industry promises tanks only in 1942, and the same aviation gasoline (BT, T-26 and T-28 were fed by Grozny or Baku B-70 / KB-70) cannot be put on the ground.

The mechanized corps also has artillery. Which does not keep up with him. Because, at best, it is being pulled by Stalingrad tractors, which back in 1940 were recognized by the GAU as unsuitable even for divisional artillery and were adopted only because there is nothing else anyway. These tractors even earned a mention at the Meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940:

MG Khatskilevich: On the use of artillery in a breakthrough. Quite often the question was posed to me like this: "Why don't you use your artillery?" Our commander of the troops is not particularly sympathetic to this matter. Why? Three howitzer regiments in 84 howitzer guns could support the artillery, but the artillery does not always need it, it does not always need our artillery means, especially since we have the STZ-5 tractor in the artillery, which delay the movement. Our artillery, armed with these tractors, has little mobility and lags behind wheeled vehicles and tank formations.
(From the Presidium: 30 km per hour).
M. G. Khatskilevich: Theoretically, this is so, but practically it does not give such speed.
(From the Presidium: He is not pulling this system.)
M. G. Khatskilevich: Yes, he does not pull this system.

And in the worst case, the mechanized corps artillery is pulled by caterpillar agricultural tractors. With their speed of 3-5 km / h.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Sergey-1950

First. The mechanized corps of the summer of 1941 is not 300 tanks, but 1021 tanks (by state). Not all MKs had such a number of tanks, but most had hundreds of tanks in an amount close to 1000. The Panzer Division alone had 375 tanks per staff. And there were two of them in the mechanized corps. Even in the mechanized corps had a mechanized division, which had ... 275 tanks. Not bad?!

Yeah ... and for all this utterly gluttonous horde - at best, 25-30% of the state's refueling tankers (mainly in the first eight MKs). The rest of the fuel and oil - carry it in barrels on trucks. Which are also missing.
Oh yes, the district's fuel is only listed in the district, but it is stored for the most part extraterritorially, in the tanks of an oil refinery somewhere in Maykop. Because the industry promises tanks only in 1942, and the same aviation gasoline (BT, T-26 and T-28 were fed by Grozny or Baku B-70 / KB-70) cannot be put on the ground.

Alexey, you are right. The larger the camp, the more difficult the tasks of its material support. In those conditions, the task was simply impossible because of the actions of the Luftwaffe. And there were other reasons as well.

That is, the very idea of ​​creating such huge mechanized corps was flawed in principle. The army command was stricken with a disease called gigantomania. I must say that this disease arose long before the war - remember Tukhachevsky with his 100 thousand tanks. The idea is crazy ... Only 28 thousand tanks are also not much less. At the same time, the commanders of tank divisions, and even more so the mechanized corps of corps, did not have a normal path from the commanders of tank platoons and tank companies. They became commanders of regiments, brigades and divisions in the cavalry. This is also not bad, but still another matter.
And the question arises: who in general came up with such a structure of mechanized corps? And which one decided to create 29 mechanized corps? Where in the body were these calculations carried out?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Sergey-1950

That is, the very idea of ​​creating such huge mechanized corps was flawed in principle. The army command was stricken with a disease called gigantomania.

There is rather another disease - "to do better". A mech corps of three 3 divisions was quite possible. It was in 1940 that we were given a keyhole to see how large mechanical connections work in practice.
The problem is that we took not the best version of the armored vehicle structure, and even reflected in the distorting mirror of reconnaissance, and began to improve it.

Quote: Sergey-1950

And the question arises: who in general came up with such a structure of mechanized corps? And which one decided to create 29 mechanized corps? Where in the body were these calculations carried out?

And what else to do if intelligence constantly scares the German tank industry with the release of 15-18 thousand tanks a year? We now know that the Reich industry will reach these figures only in 1944, after the "mobilization of Speer", and then it was believed that the Germans were mobilizing industry already for the war with the USSR.

Thus, Germany has an approximate monthly production of 1000-1200 units, the main type of which is "T-III" - "T-IV" with 30-mm and 40-mm armor.
The Skoda factories with an estimated production capacity of 150-75 tanks such tanks from 21 to 100 mm; the Ursis plant (formerly Poland), where the serial production of an 38-ton tank was launched in the amount of 50-60 tanks per month.
In a total approximate amount, the monthly output will give the German army 1300-1550 tanks, not taking into account the release of the factories that are coming into operation in the occupied territory of France.
Of course, the production of such a number of tanks will to a certain extent be limited by the availability of material, but such a production capability must be borne in mind.

© Ulanov /
Shein

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Second. About PT artillery of the Germans. They had 37 mm guns. But, damn it, the shells for them were cumulative and they, shells, that is, clicked all our medium tanks, which were in the overwhelming majority of the Soviet MK. For the T-34 and KV, 88 mm anti-aircraft guns had to be used.

The Germans had more than a thousand 50-mm anti-tank guns. For which the booking of the T-34 and even the KV was not a problem. According to the results of domestic tests of trophy anti-tank vehicles (Gorokhovets proving ground from October 9 to November 4, 1942):

50-mm anti-tank gun PaK.38, ordinary armor-piercing:
The 75-mm sheet normal showed the back strength limit of 700 m, the through penetration limit of 400 m. That is, starting from a distance of 700 m and closer PaK.38 can penetrate unshielded HF armor, with 400 m it is guaranteed to break through.
The 45-mm sheet along the normal showed the through penetration limit of 1500 m, at an angle of 30 degrees to the normal 1300 m.
That is, PaK.38 confidently hits the T-34 in the side and the tower at any real combat distance.

50-mm anti-tank gun PaK.38, sub-caliber:
The 75-mm sheet normal showed the back strength of 870 m, the through penetration of 740 m, at an angle of 30 degrees to the normal of 530 and 470 m, respectively.
The 45-mm sheet along the normal showed the through penetration limit of 1300 m, at an angle of 30 degrees to the normal 700 m.

© D. Shein

[Konnick]

Second. About PT artillery of the Germans. They had 37 mm guns. But, damn it, the shells for them were cumulative and they, shells, that is, clicked all our medium tanks, which were in the Soviet MK the overwhelming majority

The cumulative ones were used by the Germans from the winter of the 42nd, in January-February.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: gorenina91

this is such a force that I never dreamed of ... - This is about 300 tanks and self-propelled guns

What, nafig, ACS in MK in 1941? And not 300 tanks, but at least 2.5 more.

[alekc75]

the text is strange, then Russian, then Soviet troops. as if a non-Russian author !!!

[parusnik]

An interesting moment when the author writes about the victories of the Red Army, it is Russian in his articles, when about defeats, it is Soviet.

[Olgovich]

As a result, the main forces of the 5th and 6th armies were able to avoid encirclement and destruction, and retreated to a new defensive line.

At the cost of the defeat of mechanized corps, the loss of thousands of precious tanks and trained personnel ...

[A. Privalov]

As a result, the main forces of the 5th and 6th armies were able to avoid encirclement and destruction, and retreated to a new defensive line.

What can I say ... It was a very difficult time.
The 6th Army will die in the Uman cauldron ...
The forces that remained from the 5th will be captured near Kiev ...

Bless the memory of those who died and survived in that terrible war ...

[Sergey-1950]

No encirclement threatened the 5th Army. The praise of the counterattack that thanks to him the 5th Army escaped the encirclement, it is like saying to the enemy they were not allowed to reach Baikal. Otherwise ...

[A. Privalov]

Quote: Sergey-1950

No encirclement threatened the 5th Army. The praise of the counterattack that thanks to him the 5th Army escaped the encirclement, it is like saying to the enemy they were not allowed to reach Baikal. Otherwise ...

What now ...
The 5th, as part of the South-Western Front, had a standard path for that time - with the hardest battles, slowly retreat to Kiev. They kept what they could.
On September 13, Tymoshenko still assured Stalin that Kiev could be held, but the Germans took Lokhvitsa and Lubny on the 14th.
On the 15th, the pincers will close, the entire command and control of the SWF will be surrounded, communication with the armies remaining outside the ring will be lost ...
Kirponos will still try to break through to the east, but Kiev's troops will leave on the 19th, on the 20th he will die himself, and the remnants of the 5th Army and all of its command, just west of Lokhvitsa, will be captured ...

[Sergey-1950]

Counterstrike by mechanized corps is the most disgraceful act (and unfortunately not the only one) of the Soviet command in the initial period of the war. About 5 thousand tanks were destroyed with dubious results.
At the same time, the urgency of the 1st Panzer Group of the Wehrmacht was not even weakened. She was RETAINED FOR A WHOLE WEEK !!! The greatest achievement of a military genius !!! We won a whole week !!! A week !!!!!
In recent years, they stopped (finally) comparing the millimeters of the armor of the Pz-II and T-26 / BT-2 or BT-5 and the width of the tracks of the T-34 and German tanks, and paid attention to the poor availability of radio communications. And it is right. A tank without a radio station is a blindfolded hero
But the communication problem is part of an even bigger problem. Namely, the weakness of the command and control system of formations, armies and higher in general. It includes, first of all, the LEVEL OF COMMANDING UNDERSTANDING how to fight in a given situation. In turn, this level includes UNDERSTANDING the role of reconnaissance, the same radio communications, when and how to use tank formations (there was a complete failure here).
Third. A total lack of understanding of the capabilities and plans of the Germans. This is due primarily to the failure of intelligence, which swallowed misinformation and submitted it to the top. But this could also happen due to the complete unpreparedness of the Soviet command to conduct a modern war. Well, or to the war imposed by Germany.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Sergey-1950

It includes, first of all, the LEVEL OF COMMANDING UNDERSTANDING how to fight in a given situation. In turn, this level includes UNDERSTANDING the role of reconnaissance, the same radio communications, when and how to use tank formations (there was a complete failure here).
Third. A total lack of understanding of the capabilities and plans of the Germans ..

It’s a triumph of afterthought.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Quote: Sergey-1950

It includes, first of all, the LEVEL OF COMMANDING UNDERSTANDING how to fight in a given situation. In turn, this level includes UNDERSTANDING the role of reconnaissance, the same radio communications, when and how to use tank formations (there was a complete failure here).
Third. A total lack of understanding of the capabilities and plans of the Germans ..

It’s a triumph of afterthought.

That is, it is impossible to criticize the actions of the Soviet command? Did I understand you correctly?

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Sergey-1950

That is, it is impossible to criticize the actions of the Soviet command? Did I understand you correctly?

Why is this excessive exaltation and a set of platitudes?

[deddem]

Quote: Sergey-1950

But the confusion of the command and, in particular, of the organizer of that "counterattack" General-Leith. Boldina led to the death of the strongest MK of the Red Army with a zero result.

Uh-huh, only the sensible De Gaulle at one time ditched his division with heavy tanks in exactly the same way and with the same zero result.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: deddem

Quote: Sergey-1950

But the confusion of the command and, in particular, of the organizer of that "counterattack" General-Leith. Boldina led to the death of the strongest MK of the Red Army with a zero result.

Uh-huh, only the sensible De Gaulle at one time ditched his division with heavy tanks in exactly the same way and with the same zero result.

I don’t care about De Gaulle. What does De Gaulle have to do with here? Your reasoning is similar to the old Soviet joke: "You don't have oil in stores." "And you kill blacks."

[gorenina91]

How Soviet mechanized corps prevented the Germans from taking Kiev on the move

- Do not give "on the move" ...
- Damn ... - Yes ... on the contrary ... - the defeat of the Soviet mechanized corps "out of the blue" ... with very small losses for themselves ... - all this gave the German generals "to catch the courage"; to assure German soldiers of their "invincibility" and "faith in their commanders" (which is so important for a belligerent invading army) ... - German soldiers saw with their own eyes the abandoned powerful Soviet tanks and other equipment; which could simply crush them all and wipe them off the face of the earth ...
- And these our mighty mechanized corps were supposed to knock out, burn the advancing German equipment (tanks, etc.); destroy the personnel of the German advancing army (and the German troops were very, very dangerous for the troops of the German army ... - stretched out over monstrous distances in foreign territory, which was very dangerous for the invading German army) ... - And in general .. - to disrupt the entire plan of the further offensive of the German army; inflicting monstrous irreparable damage to her ... - and thereby - generally depriving her of the opportunity to continue the war against the USSR ... - It turned out that the Germans did not have free military reserves ... - at such a long distance ... - and - on foreign territory ... - And the German generals ... - were also not brilliant and made monstrous mistakes during the offensive ... - And only the mediocrity of our command raised them to the rank of "great commanders" ...
- I repeat once again ... - the Red Army had everything to inflict a colossal blow on the advancing German troops and luring them a little deeper into the territory of the USSR; cut them off from their communications (well, how many German units (tank and others) that had broken through "lured" deep into Russia could hold out without fuel and lubricants and ammunition) ??? - they were simply doomed ... - to surrender ...
- But instead ... - our tanks and other equipment were abandoned and a huge (several million soldiers) part of the Red Army surrendered ...

[helloween]

but about the strongest mech corps in the USSR, this is the 4mech corps. By June 22, 1941, there were 979 combat vehicles in the corps, including 414 T-34 and KV-1 tanks [1]. This is a terrible force !! but killed in a two-day battle! and the Germans had no rivals equal to the KV and T-34 among the tanks! and we had the advantage and suffered such a defeat

[gorenina91]

but about the strongest mech corps in the USSR, this is the 4mech corps. By June 22, 1941, there were 979 combat vehicles in the corps, including 414 T-34 and KV-1 tanks [1]. This is a terrible force !! but killed in a two-day battle! and the Germans had no rivals equal to the KV and T-34 among the tanks! and we had the advantage and suffered such a defeat

- Yes, that's right ... - And after this - even ordinary Germans believed in their "invincibility" ... - That was very dangerous ... - And only by 1943-1944 it began to reach the Germans ... - that soon they themselves will come full of "tryndets" ... - And they should have "realized" all this already in June 1941 ...

[stim]

Quote: Bar1

The order to advance, it is not clear where the commander of the 26th Army Kostenko gave,

8 MK moved to the area of ​​the settlement. Sambir according to the pre-war plans of the General Staff of the Red Army for the implementation of Directive No. 3 of the NKO of 22.06.1941. This is clearly seen in Popel's memoirs: "The tanks were rushing strictly to the west, to Przemysl, leaving behind them symmetrical rows of scars." “The morning order came from the headquarters of the army, which we were part of. There at those hours they still could not know how the situation would develop, but, proceeding from quite probable assumptions, we moved our corps south of Przemysl to cover the route to Sambir-Ternopil-Proskurov. From this area it was possible to go over to the offensive, to strike at the flank of the enemy's Przemysl grouping. "

[xomaNN]

It's hard to see German photos (those reptiles had as many cameras as smartphones now) of abandoned Soviet tanks. As monuments of miscalculations of the command and rear of the Red Army.

[Givi Jalagoniya]

It is most likely that the T-34 tanks were abandoned due to malfunctions - What is in service ?! So synchronously out of order, like gymnasts-synchronized swimmers ?!
And on the T-35 the brake band was out of order - what, they were afraid to accidentally crush some German without brakes ?!
I see that the Soviet tankers had to turn off the brakes, and reverse, and in the towers the hatches for the locks from the outside should be closed! And let them go to the pot, as in childhood! Moreover, under Stalin there should have been a happy childhood for everyone!

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Niko

But in fact, I wonder what would have happened if in those first days they had not thrown whole corps boldly but absolutely unprepared and thoughtlessly at the mercy of the Germans, and after these "type of planned counterstrikes" the machines would not have been abandoned, but had taken the hulls back, given to the Germans Stretch communications even more, and having carried out elementary preparation (including receiving real intelligence) would have struck a week or two later on the detached, exhausted, without ammunition, German units?

To take where and most importantly why?
First, we must not forget that on the first day of the war, the high command and the command of the district were confident that they were opposed by less weak German forces than the Soviet side. This is the result of RU "work". Otherwise, there would not have been a plan to strike as much as Lublin (Poland) two days after the German attack. Only the confidence in complete superiority in BT forces can explain such an absurd order from the point of view of the current reader.
This also explains the throwing of the 8th MK along a huge triangle. Popel writes that the Germans have not bombed the corps columns since June 24. Apparently, they decided that the corps itself would cease to exist due to equipment breakdowns and a lack of fuel. And they weren't very wrong about that.
Second. Well, the Soviet command did not know about the real forces that were opposed to them and, most importantly, about the ability of the Germans to fight ... But why in this case it was necessary to forget about the elementary rules for the use of tank formations and formations in general? Reconnaissance, secrecy of preparation, surprise of the strike / -s ...
Stealth and surprise were out of the question, since enemy aircraft monitored the location of the MK columns in real time. The MK itself and their divisions were not given time for basic enemy reconnaissance. Even worse, our planners drove one of the divisions of the 8th mechanized corps along such a route that it had to cross five swampy rivers and one tank regiment got stuck in the swampy area.
Where is it good?

Of course, I am not inclined to consider everyone in the military leadership as fools. But the decision-making system led to the issuance of stupid orders. Foolish !!! There is simply no other word for it.

[stim]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Otherwise, there would not have been a plan to strike as much as Lublin (Poland) two days after the German attack.

This plan appeared not two days after the German attack, but much earlier. To implement this plan, mechanized corps were created and their locations were chosen. The idea behind Directive No. 3 is clear and understandable. After the Soviet-Finnish war, and especially after the German blitzkrieg in France, it became clear that there was nothing to oppose defense to the massive use of tanks and aircraft. No matter how strong the defense, it will be broken through, since nothing prevents the enemy, who has the initiative, from choosing a place to strike. and create the necessary transfer of manpower and resources. The General Staff of the Red Army did not have information where the German troops would strike, but could only guess, but even in the supposed areas, due to their length, to create a deeply echeloned defense, like the one that was in 1943 near Kursk, the Red Army would not have enough strength and means. A more reasonable alternative to linear defense was the creation of several powerful mechanized corps of about 1000 tanks in each and placing them in the Lviv Bialystok ledges, since there were enough tanks in the Red Army to form these corps. In this case, wherever the enemy was striking, they would be parried by DEEP FLANGE strikes of the Soviet mechanized corps, which significantly reduced the offensive capabilities of the German troops and made it possible to mobilize the Red Army.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: stim

Quote: Sergey-1950

Otherwise, there would not have been a plan to strike as much as Lublin (Poland) two days after the German attack.

This plan appeared not two days after the German attack, but much earlier. To implement this plan, mechanized corps were created and their locations were chosen. The idea behind Directive No. 3 is clear and understandable. After the Soviet-Finnish war, and especially after the German blitzkrieg in France, it became clear that there was nothing to oppose defense to the massive use of tanks and aircraft. No matter how strong the defense, it will be broken through, since nothing prevents the enemy, who has the initiative, from choosing a place to strike. and create the necessary transfer of manpower and resources. The General Staff of the Red Army did not have information where the German troops would strike, but could only guess, but even in the supposed areas, due to their length, to create a deeply echeloned defense, like the one that was in 1943 near Kursk, the Red Army would not have enough strength and means. A more reasonable alternative to linear defense was the creation of several powerful mechanized corps of about 1000 tanks in each and placing them in the Lviv Bialystok ledges, since there were enough tanks in the Red Army to form these corps. In this case, wherever the enemy was striking, they would be parried by DEEP FLANGE strikes of the Soviet mechanized corps, which significantly reduced the offensive capabilities of the German troops and made it possible to mobilize the Red Army.

All this is so ... at first glance, the plan seems to be reasonable ... But ... In fact, a counter-blitzkrieg was planned. And for this it was necessary to be convinced of the ability of mechanized corps to conduct successful hostilities. And they didn’t even do the minimum, they didn’t teach them to make marches. The march, on which half of the non-technician is lost due to breakdowns, is not a march, but self-destruction. But the march is the most important element of the conduct of hostilities. And nothing prevents the training to be carried out in peacetime.
True, in peacetime, all the same, the vulnerability from enemy aircraft would not have been tested.
Night marches WERE PROHIBITED by the charter.
The reliability of radio connection management has not been verified.
They did not eliminate the glaring discrepancy between the speed of movement of the MK artillery and tanks.
There was an unreasonable variety of tanks in divisions. This further reduced the possibility of their repair.
These problems lay on the surface and they could be eliminated, or even not created (as different types).
Thus, the command was going to fight with a conventional rifle, without checking it at the shooting range.

[Sergey-1950]

In addition, the General Staff and the command of the districts somehow naively believed that the wire connection would still work reliably. As if in the newly annexed territories there could not be hostile elements and simply agents of the enemy. And who, then, was caught in the forests?

[stim]

Quote: Sergey-1950

And they didn’t even do the minimum, they didn’t teach them to make marches. The march on which half of the non-technician is lost due to breakdowns is not a march, but self-destruction.

If, when making a march, half of the equipment is lost due to breakdowns, then this is from the low reliability of equipment and a small motor resource and has nothing to do with the ability to make marches.

Quote: Sergey-1950

Night marches WERE PROHIBITED by the charter

Nevertheless, 8 MK made marches at night.

Quote: Sergey-1950

The reliability of radio connection management has not been verified.

There is nothing to check here, the radio communication means available at that time did not allow to ensure the management of connections due to insufficient bandwidth of radio communication channels. At that time, both we and the Germans did not have direct-printing equipment capable of working on the radio, as well as automatic classified equipment.

Quote: Sergey-1950

We did not eliminate the glaring discrepancy between the speed of movement of the MK artillery and tanks

In the USSR, there were no high-speed diesel engines and, accordingly, high-speed tractors, they fought with what they had.

Quote: Sergey-1950

An unreasonable variety of tanks in divisions was allowed.

The variety of tanks in divisions is due to the peculiarities of their use. Heavy tanks with anti-cannon armor were designed to break through enemy defenses with unsuppressed anti-tank guns, light tanks with bulletproof armor to suppress machine-gun emplacements. There was a process of rearmament, tanks of old designs were gradually replaced by new ones.

Quote: Sergey-1950

These problems lay on the surface and they could be eliminated.

Yes, it could have been eliminated, but by the end of 1942.

[Golden Horde]

if we compare the forces and means of the Red Army (list of armies, corps and divisions), the dates of events (from 22.06.41 to the beginning of July 41) and the geography of battles (Lviv, Lutsk, Rovno, Brody, etc.), then one conclusion suggests itself that all these armies, corps and divisions were at the time of the beginning of the war at the very border. In this regard, the following question arises, what did these troops do at the very border, if, according to the mobilization plan, the main forces and assets of the 1st echelon should be at least 200 km from the border, in order to avoid an unexpected invasion of the enemy and their defeat at the very border.

[Golden Horde]

I can imagine what kind of eyes the Germans had when they saw such monsters as the KV or T-35, where none of their tanks could compete even with the T-34, which was already 1.105 pieces ?! And now the roads are littered with the listed tanks, which could not oppose anything to the organization of interaction of tanks, artillery, infantry and aviation of the Germans, although they were in the minority and materially worse off.

[Eug]

The key mistake was that the Germans did not turn South from the Island, and the counterattack (after marches to the initial line for the counterattack) fell into the void .. The Germans went further, and it was possible to forget about the impact on their wedge from the South direction - no fuel, no motor resources already did not have. The same mistake was made on the Western Front - the Germans closed their wedges not near Baranovichi, but much more to the east - near Minsk.

[zharkoy50]

Look in more detail about these battles in the book TANK MARCH http://www.tankm.ru/ Zharkiy F.M. - Deputy commander of the 88 (51) separate heavy tank regiment in 1942-1945. The book is on the site of the same name.