Military Review

On the accuracy of Russian ships in Tsushima and Japanese ships at Shantung

239

In the previous article, due to my modest abilities, I clarified the data of the respected V. Polomoshnov on hits on Russian ships in the battle of Shantung. We are talking exclusively about hits that were achieved by the main forces of the Japanese, that is, 4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers of the 1st combat detachment, as well as the Yakumo that joined them in the 2nd phase of the battle.


In total, according to my data, there were 37 hits in the 1st phase and 104 hits in the 2nd.


How were the Russian ships able to answer?

The performance of the 1st Pacific


In total, according to V. Polomoshnov, the Japanese fleet received 37–38 Russian shells.

However, these statistics include hits on Izumi, Chin-Yen, and destroyers, which are not part of the main force's battle. According to V. Polomoshnov, only 1 shells hit the ships of the 31st combat detachment H. Togo and "Yakumo". From the descriptions given by him, it can be assumed that the maximum number of hits on the ships of the main forces of the Japanese did not exceed 33.


What conclusions can be drawn from the above?

It is quite obvious that in terms of the number of hits, the Japanese squadron won with a devastating score.

But here's what's interesting ...

While the battle was fought at long distances, the Russian squadron responded with one hit to about 3 Japanese ones: 37/12 = 2,91. Perhaps this ratio is even less if some of the shells, the time of impact of which was not recorded, hit the Japanese ships in the 1st phase.

But even if all such hits are attributed to the 2nd phase, then the ratio of Russian and Japanese hits in it will be 5,2 - one Russian shell for five Japanese shells!

It turns out that, depending on when exactly "Sikishima" and "Kasuga" received Russian "goodies", the ratio of Russian and Japanese hits looked like this.

1. In the 1st phase (37 Japanese hits and from 12 to 17 Russians) - 2–2,9 Japanese hits per Russian.

2. In the 2nd phase (104 Japanese hits and from 14 to 20 Russians) - 5,2-7,4 Japanese hits per Russian

Assuming that most of the hits on the Sikishima and Kasuga still belong to the 2nd phase, we see that the short battle did not promise anything good to the 1st Pacific Squadron, which received one round "The Japanese have about 5-6 hits in response.

Oddly enough, but for V.K.Witgeft it would be just better to stay as far away from the ships of H. damage to the Japanese squadron was greater (37 hit in response to 104-1 Japanese).

Cusima



I'm not sure exactly, but it seems that the Japanese squadron in the morning before the battle of Tsushima

I will try to compare the effectiveness and accuracy of Russian fire in the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle and Japanese fire in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung.

The choice may seem strange, but ...

The fact is that the conditions in which these combat episodes took place are to a certain extent similar. At the beginning of the phases, the Japanese did not have serious injuries, the Russians did not have them at all. Distances were comparable, and even if they were marginally shorter in Tsushima, this was more than offset by worse visibility. Finally, the movement of the squadrons was somewhat similar - at the beginning of the battle, both the Russians and the Japanese were in the position of catching up and had to shoot with their port sides at targets located on the left-front.

It is known that in the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle, Russian ships achieved at least 62 hits on the Japanese.


Of course, 62 is noticeably less than 104 hits on Russian ships in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung. In addition, do not forget that the Japanese in the 2nd phase fought 7 ships in the line, and the Russian fleet in Tsushima - 12. It would seem that this irrefutably testifies to the fact that the artillerymen of ZP Rozhdestvensky could not come close to the effectiveness of the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo together with "Yakumo".

But is it?

Ship-watch


If one person worked on one personal plot, and two people worked on the next one, it may seem that twice as much work has been done on the next one. But this will be correct only if they worked for the same time. Well, and if their performance is the same, of course.

But if a person who worked alone bent over the beds for 8 hours, and his neighbors, after working for a couple of hours, sat down to drink, then 8 man-hours were worked in the first section, and only 4. And this means that the work in the first section, twice as much was done, although there were half as many people working there.

Let's try to apply the same approach to the Japanese squadron at Shantung and the main Russian forces in Tsushima.

Regarding the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung, there is some uncertainty, when exactly did it start and when did it end?

The reports of our sailors have different interpretations, but for the most part they indicate 16: 30-16: 45.

As for the end of the battle of the main forces, the respected V. Polomoshnov designated it at about 19:00, but how true is this?

The assessments of the participants in the battle are contradictory.

For example, Schensnovich indicates that the 2nd phase of the battle (in his calculations it was the third) lasted 2 hours and 50 minutes, but he has a lot of oddities with time - for example, he believes that the phase began at 15:40 and ended at 18: thirty.

When the "Tsarevich" was out of order, the "Retvizan" rushed towards the Japanese squadron, and it was at about 18:15 (von Essen's report), then, having walked about 10 minutes in the direction of the enemy, "Retvizan turned around and retreated."

Thus, the intense battle of the main forces could not have ended before 18:30. It is also known that after 18:30 Japanese battleships fired on Russian ships - this is stated in the report of the senior officer of the "Tsarevich".

On the accuracy of Russian ships in Tsushima and Japanese ships at Shantung

In other words, it would not be a mistake to assume that the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung lasted at least 2 hours, but possibly a little more, that is, from 2 to 2,5 hours.

On the part of the main forces of the Japanese, 6 warships of the 1st Combat Detachment and the Yakumo took part in it.

Thus, 7 ships fought for a minimum of 2 hours, from 16:45 to 18:45, which gives a total of 14 ship-hours.

We now turn to the Russian ships.

In total, the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle lasted 82 minutes, from 13:49 to 15:12.

But "Oslyabya" already at 14:15 had a strong roll and was hardly able to conduct effective fire, so it took part in the battle for no more than 26 minutes.

At 14:20 Borodino was knocked out, where he returned 20 minutes later, but out of order he could hardly conduct any effective battle.

At 14:26 the flagship "Prince Suvorov" went out of action, and at 14:40 - "Alexander III" - the time during which they still held out and could inflict some damage on the enemy was approximately 37 and 51 minutes, respectively.

Consequently, only 8 Russian ships of the line fought during the entire 82 minutes of the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle, thereby conquering 656 ship-minutes. The other four ships - "Oslyabya", "Suvorov", "Alexander III" and "Borodino" - participated in it for 26, 37, 51 and 62 minutes, respectively.

In total, the Russian squadron in the 1st phase of Tsushima fought 832 ship-minutes, that is, 13,87 ship-hours.

Despite the fact that in the 2nd phase of Shantung, the Japanese fought 7 ships, and in our 1st phase of Tsushima - 12, taking into account the duration of the phase and the failure of a part of the Russian ships, "recaptured" by the ship-hours from the Russian squadron turns out to be less than that of the Japanese: 13,87 against at least 14.

About hits


Since 7 Japanese ships achieved 104 hits against the Russians, we can say that, on average, each of them achieved 2 hits during the 14,87nd phase.

For the Russian squadron in Tsushima, this figure is 62/12 = 5,17. Almost triple superiority, but this does not take into account the time factor of firing.

But if we recalculate the average number of hits on a ship-hour (that is, how many hits on average were given by one fighting ship during an hour), then the ratio will be completely different: 104/14 = 7,43 for the Japanese and 62 / 13,87 = 4,47 for the Russians. As you can see, the difference is no longer so significant, but still it remains 1,67 times in favor of the Japanese.

But you need to understand that 7,43 hits per ship-hour for the Japanese are, rather, overestimated figures.

Unfortunately, the bulk of hits on Russian ships in the 2nd phase of the battle are not fixed in time. That is, it is indicated that the ship received a hit after 16:30, but it is not indicated exactly what time. And this means that in the 104 hits we took into account, there may well be shells from the 5th combat detachment or "Asams", or those that, although they were fired from the ships of H. Togo, but hit the Russian battleships later than 18:45 ...

Thus, it is quite obvious that the figure calculated by me for the Japanese is the limit, in reality it could be somewhat lower.

This is on the one hand.

On the other hand, there is no doubt that the 4,47 hit per hour calculated for Russian ships in Tsushima is significantly underestimated.


The fact is that the 62 hits I took into account in the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle are only those hits, the time of which was fixed by the Japanese side.

For the entire time of the Tsushima battle, there were 81 such hits, but the fact is that, in addition to them, there were at least 50 more, and possibly more hits, the time of which the Japanese were not recorded.

Without a doubt, a certain number of non-fixed hits hit the Japanese ships in the 1st phase of the battle.

How many?

Alas, we are unlikely to ever find out.

If we assume that non-fixed hits on Japanese ships in Tsushima were distributed in proportion to the time of the battle, then the first phase will have at least 18-19 hits. If we assume that the hits that were not fixed in time were distributed proportionally to the fixed ones, then the 1st Tsushima phase will have at least 38–39 hits.

Thus, it will not be a mistake to assume that in the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle, Russian ships achieved from 80 to 100 hits: in terms of ship-hours, we will get 5,76-7,2 hits per ship-hour.

The truth, most likely, is somewhere in between, but even the smallest of the figures calculated above is close to the performance of Japanese ships at Shantung - 5,76 versus 7,43 hits per ship-hour. The difference is 29%.

But that's not all.

About shooting accuracy


Until now, I have considered the effectiveness of artillery fire, by which I mean the number of hits on enemy ships.

Now let's try to evaluate the accuracy of the Russian artillerymen, demonstrated by them in the 1st phase of Tsushima, in comparison with that shown by their Japanese "colleagues" in the 2nd phase at Shantung.

As I said earlier, the number of hits on enemy ships is directly dependent not only on accuracy, but also on the number of shells fired. And if we see that the Russian artillerymen achieved, on average, 5,76 hits per hour from one ship, and the Japanese - 7,43, that is, 28,9% more, this does not mean at all that the accuracy of the Japanese gunners was 28,9. XNUMX% more than Russian.

Maybe the accuracy was equal, but the Japanese fired 28,9% more shells than the Russians - who knows?

So, the heavy ships of the Japanese, as a rule, fired more intensively than our battleships. If we take the same battle in the Yellow Sea, the Japanese spent an average of 1 rounds of 756-152 mm caliber on one ship of the 305st combat detachment, 33% more than the Russians, whose result was only 569 such rounds per ship. If we compare the consumption of shells in Tsushima, then, according to Gribovsky:

"The ships of NI Nebogatov themselves fired quite intensively, firing ninety 305 mm, about seven hundred sixty 254 and 229 mm, one thousand sixty four 152 mm and about one thousand two hundred and fifty 120 mm shells."

This gives an average of 791 120-305-mm projectiles fired per ship.

The data on the "Eagle" is much more modest - with the best assumptions, he could hardly use up more than 96 - 305-mm and 400 - 152-mm shells.

But the Japanese consumed an average of 1 shells per ship of the 032st combat detachment, that is, 1% more than Nebogatov's ships.

Thus, although I am not able to make a reliable calculation, it should be assumed that in the 1st phase of Tsushima, our ships fired much less intensively than the Japanese at Shantung, and one should assume at least a 30 percent difference.
And this, in turn, means that the Russian ships in the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle fired with approximately the same accuracy as the Japanese ones in the 2nd phase of Shantung.

But that's not all.

I suppose that the accuracy of the Russian ships varied significantly - the four battleships of the Borodino and Oslyabya types fired the most accurately, the other ships of the 2nd armored detachment were slightly inferior to them, and the battleships of the 3rd Pacific were the worst of all to shoot.

The basis for such a hypothesis is the schedule of hits on Japanese ships in combination with the time of failure or destruction of the centralized fire control of Russian ships. It can be assumed that it was Nebogatov's ships in Tsushima that supported the most intense fire, and in the 2nd and 3rd phases of the battle they were close enough to the enemy, but the number of hits that the entire squadron achieved does not indicate that this fire was effective.

If my hypothesis is correct, then it should be assumed that the best battleships of ZP Rozhdestvensky fired more accurately than the main forces of the Japanese at Shantung. If I'm wrong, even then our head battleships in Tsushima fired at least as accurately as the Japanese ships in the 2nd phase of Shantung.

About other conditions


So, in view of the above, we have every reason to believe that the Russian artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific squadron in the 1st phase of Tsushima fired just as accurately, and the lead Russian ships even more accurately than the Japanese in the 2nd phase of Shantung.

But even this statement still does not fully characterize the fighting qualities of the 2nd Pacific Squadron.

The fact is that the shooting conditions for our squadron in Tsushima were much more unfavorable than those of the Japanese at Shantung.

The weather conditions were worse.

On the morning of July 28, 1904, when the battle at Shantung took place, the sea was calm, there was no excitement, but it rose after 14:00.

On the day of the Tsushima battle, the excitement in the morning was strong, but it is very difficult to compare it with what was on July 28 after 16:30. However, in the official stories there is a mention of the fact that on Russian ships the ports of guns on the battery deck flooded with water, nothing like that is said about the Yellow Sea, so, apparently, the excitement in Tsushima was still stronger.

But if the excitement can still be argued, then the visibility in the Tsushima battle was significantly worse than in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

In Tsushima, the Japanese noted difficulties in observing Russian ships at a distance of about 50 cables, and in the Yellow Sea they confidently fired at 60-80 cables and more.

The materiel was worse.

At Shantung, it was much easier for the Japanese to target and control the results of fire to kill, using shells with a large supply of explosives and instant fuses. One can argue for a long time about the effectiveness of Russian shells, but from the point of view of ensuring the accuracy of shooting, our steel high-explosive shells were much worse than the Japanese ones.

The position was worse.

The Japanese ships entered the battle, being, as it were, to the right of the Russian squadron, the position was unprofitable for them, because they had to catch up, moving along our entire formation. But after about an hour the squadrons were already in an equal position, and then the Japanese, having overtaken the lead ships of VK Vitgeft, gained a positional advantage.

Thus, for at least an hour, that is, half of the entire 2nd phase, the Japanese had the advantage of the position.

The Russian ships in Tsushima had a positional advantage only for 15 minutes in the outset of the battle, while H. Togo twisted his loop, unfolding consistently within the reach of our squadron's guns. Then the advantage passed to the Japanese and remained with them until the end of the 1st phase and beyond.

The attempt of "Alexander III" to lead the squadron under the stern of the 1st Japanese Combat Detachment deserves all respect and admiration. But when this battleship turned on the Japanese, our squadron, in fact, found itself under the "crossing T" for the armored cruisers of Kh. Kamimura - the ships of Kh. Togo had never been in such a disadvantageous position at Shantung.

And finally, the most important thing.

The Japanese squadron at Shantung achieved its accuracy by winning the battle.

The Russian squadron at Tsushima demonstrated the same or even better accuracy in losing the battle. The difference is fundamental.

During the 2nd phase of Shantung, the Japanese squadron received two dozen hits from the force, and most of them, 13-14, went to Mikasa. The rest of the ships did not receive any noticeable damage and were beaten by the Russian battleships, as they say, for their own pleasure. Yes, the Japanese had burst barrels, but they still fired more shells than our ships.

At the same time, in Tsushima, our ships fought under the pressure of fire and steel, with which the Japanese fleet crushed them.


What are the 20 hits?

Yes, only "Oslyabya" in less than half an hour of the battle, most likely received more. Of course, there is no way to accurately establish the number of hits on the Russian ships killed in Tsushima, but it is clear that the Japanese fired much more effectively in Tsushima than in the battle in the Yellow Sea.

In other words, if in the 2nd phase of Shantung, the Japanese artillerymen operated in conditions close to the range, then a significant number of ours on May 14, 1904 had to fight, when their ship shook from hits, they blazed around, and the smoke from the fires of the battleship in front covered the sights ... And this, of course, reduced the accuracy of shooting.

There is no doubt that if the ships of Z.P. Rozhestvensky in Tsushima were fired in the same way as at the battleships of H. Togo at Shantung (and even at our battleships at Shantung), then the fire of the 2nd Pacific Squadron would have been much more accurate and more efficient.

And only in one aspect the Russian sailors in Tsushima had an advantage.

In the 1st phase of Tsushima, they had just entered the battle, while the Japanese in the 2nd phase resumed the battle, so the gunners of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific squadrons were still more recent.

But this advantage was comparatively small. The break between the phases of the battle at Shantung was at least an hour and a half, and during this time, of course, one could take a breath.

In addition, one should not forget that behind the shoulders of the Russian squadron there was a long transition from the coast of Annam. And, in general, the transition from Libava did not have a positive effect on the condition of the crews.

Conclusion


The analysis, of course, has a certain number of assumptions. Fully aware of this, I would still venture to assert that:

1. The conditions for effective fire at the 2nd Pacific Squadron in the 1st phase of the Tsushima battle were significantly worse than those of the Japanese main forces during the 2nd phase at Shantung.

2. Regardless of item 1, the 2nd Pacific Squadron fired at least as accurately, and the lead ships were even more accurate than the Japanese.

A simple conclusion follows from this - being in conditions comparable to the Japanese "model of July 28, 1904," the Russian artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific Squadron would shoot no worse than the latter, compensating for the lower rate of fire with better accuracy.

With the light hand of Novikov-Priboy, and other authors, for a long time, among fans of naval history, the opinion dominated that the 1st Pacific Squadron was combat and had a good chance of victory, and that only the death of V.K.Witgeft prevented it from breaking through to Vladivostok.

Many also believed that the Russian squadron in the Yellow Sea would have achieved more if it had managed to get close to the Japanese.

But the effectiveness of the artillerymen of the 1st Pacific Squadron at distances of 23-40 cables, at which they responded with one round for five or six Japanese ones, does not testify to this.

On the other hand, if the artillerymen of the ships of V.K. could reach a hundred, or even more.

And it is possible that in this case, in the battle in the Yellow Sea, we and the Japanese would have gotten an honest draw, and with luck, there could have been a victory, not decisive, of course, but at least "on points."

Продолжение следует ...
Author:
Photos used:
from the site tsushima.su
239 comments
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  1. Ross xnumx
    Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 06: 10
    +2
    I could not fully master this "ship-clock", the accuracy of hits and other conditions ... Sorry, but the events of a century ago in such detail may interest developers of naval combat tactics (or a similar computer game) and shipbuilders. Conclusions were made a long time ago:
    The Russian squadron was defeated because
    the level of combat training and, most importantly, the combat experience of the gunners of the ships of the Japanese squadron was much better than that of the Russian gunners; Japanese ships had a tactical and technical advantage: in the power of artillery fire (910 barrels versus 228), in the rate of fire of guns (360 rounds per minute versus 134), in speed (16-18 knots versus 12-13) and in armor (on average 60 % versus 40%).

    And complaints about the "long transition", the availability of conditions for rest and preparation for battle are similar to the excuses of commentators who, justifying the loss, speak of "flight distance", "time zone difference and adaptation" and "shots on goal" ...
    The main reasons for the defeat are the technical backwardness of the fleet and the lack of tactics that correspond to the realities ...
    And then there is - "the winners are not judged" ...
    There is interesting data on the results of the Tsushima battle:

    And you are also going to continue ...
    Why do you, and, most importantly, do we need this monkey labor?
    1. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 27 September 2021 10: 07
      +5
      Quote: ROSS 42
      The main reasons for the defeat are the technical backwardness of the fleet and the lack of tactics that correspond to the realities ...

      The main reason for the defeat is superiority in the forces of the enemy. Only 6 Russian ships could fight on equal terms with the Japanese. The rest is old stuff and "big gunboats", which can only support the main forces, but are in no way capable of waging an equal battle with the enemy.
      As an example, we can cite two battles - Coronel and Falklands in 1914, when the enemy, having newer ships, destroyed "on paper" an equal enemy.
      But in neither case, I hope, about technical backwardness fleet won't you write?
      Why do you, and, most importantly, do we need this monkey labor?


      If you don't like it, read it. Nobody forces. There are a lot of people on the site who are interested in it.
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 27 September 2021 14: 34
        +3
        About Coronel. The technical one was still lagging behind. The crews of the British were not against the Germans. What's the use of cannons if they shoot in the wrong direction? And Cradock took the fight in conditions when very quickly the Germans were simply not visible. And the Germans, on the contrary. There are still analogies with Tsushima.
        1. Trapperxnumx
          Trapperxnumx 27 September 2021 14: 59
          +2
          Quote: mmaxx
          About Coronel. The technical one was still lagging behind. The crews of the British were not against the Germans. What's the use of cannons if they shoot in the wrong direction? And Cradock took the fight in conditions when very quickly the Germans were simply not visible. And the Germans, on the contrary. There are still analogies with Tsushima.

          But not the fleet. We have the same Nik1 in Tsushima, Navarin and BBO and did not come close to Japanese ships (even from BrKr), but the fleet is still somewhat wider than individual ships or even a separate squadron))
          The Russian fleet had a lot of problems, but to call it technically backward is, IMHO, too much.
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 27 September 2021 15: 12
            +1
            There is no need to argue with this. No wonder, Togo did not pay attention to all the old stuff. Therefore, the battle ended with the defeat of the first detachment. Then everything became meaningless.
            Therefore, I think that there was no point in holding onto the old men for Rozhdestvensky.
      2. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 17: 39
        -7
        Quote: Trapper7
        The main reason for the defeat is superiority in the forces of the enemy. Only 6 Russian ships could fight on equal terms with the Japanese. The rest is old stuff and "big gunboats", which can only support the main forces, but are in no way capable of waging an equal battle with the enemy.

        not true, the Japanese and Togo even had less than six battleships, the advantage of the Japanese is 1 Rodesvensky traitor 2 dozens of destroyers,

        it was the destroyers who decided the case, here's a simple proof: all the Russian ships sank from holes below the KVL ... and if the hero Makarov's idea about dozens of Emeralds (a large single-turret gunboat 2x305) was implemented, instead of 7 clumsy super-expensive battleships that were still shooting all the same with one tower out of two, it would have turned out 30 esmeralds, and a volley of 60x308, then we would have showered the Japanese with shells
      3. unknown
        unknown 27 September 2021 21: 34
        -2
        The Japanese have only four battleships, of which one is outdated, practically analogous to the Sisoy the Great.
        And eight low-speed armored cruisers.
        With 8 "artillery and light shells weighing 95,3 kg.
        We have four new battleships, a new battleship with 10 "artillery, one similar battleship Fuji, two obsolete battleships with 12" artillery, one obsolete battleship with 8 "artillery, and three small battleships with 10" guns.
    2. Bashkirkhan
      Bashkirkhan 27 September 2021 12: 20
      +10
      Quote: ROSS 42

      And you are also going to continue ...
      Why do you, and, most importantly, do we need this monkey labor?

      Well, okay, you haven't mastered the publication, why are you insulting the author. For the sake of self-importance? If you don't like the publication, flow around, the site is full of threads where you can realize your intellectual potential. I am personally interested in the conclusions of the respected Andrey.
      1. Ross xnumx
        Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 12: 31
        -4
        Quote: Bashkirkhan
        Well, okay, you haven't mastered the publication, why are you insulting the author.

        For commanders of an armored train:
        1. He mastered the publication.
        2. The author did not offend, do not attribute your inventions to me.
        3. I do not see the point of such an analysis among non-specialists.
        4. What is the use of such analysis of the defeat? Hero sailors who followed orders cannot be resurrected. You will not see such a battle in our life - the armament of modern warships presupposes a different tactics ...
        It is much more important to find out the reasons for what happened so that this does not happen again in a new incarnation ...
        ==========
        Quote: Bashkirkhan
        I am personally interested in the conclusions of the respected Andrey.

        I doubt. But, if you made a mistake, drop me a link to your synopsis ...
        hi
    3. evgen1221
      evgen1221 27 September 2021 13: 35
      +4
      I agree with Ross42 - you can write infinitely empty articles on comparisons. Artelery battle at sea is a very specific environment - wave, wind, barrel wear, quality and moisture of gunpowder and metal, skill and position of the sun, the number of drops of water and glare on the eyepieces of rangefinders - all these are random and unique non-reproducible factors when fired for one single gun at one single moment of the shot and for another weapon it will be completely different. To write a lot of empty articles on this private alternative is nothing more than graphomania. It is necessary to write about the reasons that led to these hits by Japanese shells on our ships, about what generally led to this. An overview of crew training, tactics and policies, what was done in order not to drag the squadron around the world and to cover those like with these issues. Then there will be more understanding of how to prevent this in the future, and there is little use for the case from comparison and endless recalculations of the number of holes in the sides (it is there, but it is vanishingly small)
    4. Mooh
      Mooh 27 September 2021 13: 59
      +5
      Dear Marshal, of course, we completely agree with you. The author is a monkey, we have become banderlog here. Don't waste your expensive time explaining common truths to us. On the main page, there are extremely interesting topics about the modernization of tanks of the Armed Forces and the interception of something there with something. There, your radiant talent and ingenious eloquence will be appreciated. And here, no plus signs for you, no compliments. Even opponents for an 8-page doctor are almost impossible to find. Come in, dear, come in.
      1. Ross xnumx
        Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 14: 04
        -4
        Quote: MooH
        we of course completely agree with you. The author is a monkey, we have become banderlog here.

        It began ... They say correctly, make a fool pray to God - he will break his forehead.
        Call each other whatever you want. If you want - become, if you want - lard. I expressed my opinion. All rights and freedoms to you. Not everything that pleases you should cause everyone's delight.
        ==========
        Such an interesting topic that half of my messages are in it ... laughing
    5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 September 2021 16: 58
      +4
      Quote: ROSS 42
      And complaints about the "long transition", the availability of conditions for rest and preparation for battle are similar to the excuses of commentators who, justifying the loss, speak of "flight distance", "time zone difference and adaptation" and "shots on goal" ...

      That is, the position of the American WWII admirals, who believed that the formation loses 10% of its combat capability for every 000 miles passed by EMNIP is unfamiliar to you. And why am I not surprised?
    6. unknown
      unknown 27 September 2021 21: 27
      -2
      Supplement to the magazine "Modelist-Konstruktor" "Marine Collection" 2004, number 8, page 23: in July 1904 the battleship "Fuji" could not reach a speed of more than 15 knots. The author repeated the same information in his work "The Triumphants of Tsushima" on page 82.
      Taking into account the enormous fuel overload with which all the Japanese ships of the line entered the battle, as Andrei from Chelyabinsk, who is also the author of this article, repeatedly wrote on the pages of this site, the speed of the first Japanese detachment could not exceed 14 knots.
      The situation is similar with the second Japanese detachment.
      Magazine "Sea campaign" 2006, number 1 (generally the first issue of this magazine). p.20: By September 1904, the Azuma could not reach more than 16 knots, and then only for a very short time.
      The phrase is amazingly constructed. Especially a disclaimer. How many minutes is a very short time?
      And what is the real long-term speed of this very slow-moving ship in the series of these slow-moving cruisers (add the "Garibaldians" here, you won't be mistaken)? For example, "Varyag", after two repairs, could develop 18 knots for a short time, and 14 knots for a long time.
      Taking into account the fuel overload, the second Japanese detachment could not go more than 14 knots.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 September 2021 22: 12
        +3
        Quote: ignoto
        in July 1904, the battleship Fuji could not reach a speed of more than 15 knots.

        Yes. Such "little things" as that:
        1) It is completely unclear where this figure is taken from by the author of the Triumphants.
        2) Before Tsushima, Fuji (like other EBRs) underwent repairs, and was repaired in meropoly for 43 days (December 1904 - February 1905) and there, obviously, he was patched up, including the EI
        You, of course, do not care.
  2. Kote Pan Kokhanka
    Kote Pan Kokhanka 27 September 2021 06: 10
    +3
    Andrew, thank you!
    Regards, Vlad!
    P.s. At the very least, one must remember that Tsushima was the first real battle for Russian sailors, and not even the second for most of the Japanese!
    1. Ross xnumx
      Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 06: 26
      -2
      Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
      At the very least, one must remember that Tsushima was the first real battle for Russian sailors, and not even the second for the majority of Japanese sailors!

      At least one must remember that Russian sailors became victims of imperial ambitions ... Yes, yes, yes !!! And you don't need to hide your head in the sand here.
      Military actions in the struggle for domination in Northeast China and Korea and the redistribution of spheres of influence in the Far East, unleashed by Japan, were supported UK and USA... At the same time, the interests of Russia were promoted by France and Germany and actively opposed Great Britain and Turkey.

      After that, less than ten years pass and Nicholas II "harnessed" to WWI on the side of the Entente against Germany ... What are these jumping and changing clothes in the air?
      Perhaps this "sea carnage" (how else can you call the battle "for nothing" ... even "in response to") was organized in revenge for the incident that took place in Otsu in 1891?

      They are (small undersized) - vindictive and vindictive ... yes
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 September 2021 16: 46
        +5
        Quote: ROSS 42
        At the very least, one must remember that Russian sailors became victims of imperial ambitions ...

        Here people gather who are interested in another question - why they could not realize these ambitions.
      2. alexey sidykin
        alexey sidykin 27 September 2021 17: 35
        +2
        Even not actually imperator, as much as his entourage. The emperor himself was not very interested in anything.
    2. unknown
      unknown 27 September 2021 21: 40
      -4
      And we must also remember that the history of Japan is a fake, copied from the history of England.
      That the real history of Japan began in 1867. with the "Meiji revolution".
      The French, and then the British. everything was created from scratch.
      Estates, management system, industry, education system, language.
      Live magazine CKUNK_69, an article about a country with a painted sun.
  3. Undecim
    Undecim 27 September 2021 07: 35
    0
    I suggest that the author not stop and use the comprehensive statistics accumulated by him in working out the next scenario of possible events.
    On May 27, the Russian 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet and the Japanese Joint Fleet meet in the Tsushima Strait. "Prince Suvorov" and "Mikasa" converge side to side and Admiral Rozhdestvensky and Admiral Togo, in the spirit of the military traditions of antiquity and modern humanism, agree that two ships will converge in a duel to find out the winner - one from each squadron. Whose ship will stay afloat - that will win. The winner takes the defeated prisoners and returns in triumph to his home port.
    Then there is unlimited scope for creativity. After all, if we take only the Russian battleships of the first armored detachment and the Japanese first combat detachment, we get twenty-eight options. That means twenty-eight articles!
    And if we take into account the Russian cruisers of the first rank and Japanese cruisers of the first class, the number of variants and, accordingly, articles rises to 190! An exciting perspective.
    And Shpakovsky can be asked to persuade the artist Sheps to illustrate this heroic naval epic.
    1. Catfish
      Catfish 27 September 2021 14: 06
      -1
      Vic, good afternoon! hi
      A luxurious offer, and if you remember that Russian submarines were present in the Far East at that time, then purely variants appear in an unpredictable amount. request

      The Japanese, at least, were sure that their two battleships were sunk by Russian submarines, or so they write, in any case.
  4. hohol95
    hohol95 27 September 2021 09: 49
    +5
    "Destiny" did not give "golden hits" to our sailors!
    But only a lot of problems!
    Starting from problems in the design of warships and shells to problems with the preparation of the entire "vertical" from a sailor to an admiral!
    It was no better in the land army.
    1. Niko
      Niko 27 September 2021 16: 41
      -1
      Quote: hohol95
      "Destiny" did not give "golden hits" to our sailors!
      But only a lot of problems!
      Starting from problems in the design of warships and shells to problems with the preparation of the entire "vertical" from a sailor to an admiral!
      It was no better in the land army.

      "Fate" did not give Russian sailors not only "golden hits" but also just hits (if we remove various far-fetched assumptions and statistical tricks). There are facts about which my respected author in this series of articles constantly tries not to remember: two fleets met, fired at each other, one in full went to the bottom and was taken prisoner, the second almost WITHOUT DAMAGE, returned home in full force. Several articles give the pleasant impression that everything was not so bad, even good ...
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 September 2021 17: 09
        +7
        Quote: Niko
        There are facts about which my respected author in this series of articles constantly tries not to remember: two fleets met, fired at each other, one in full force went to the bottom

        You are exaggerating slightly. 3 ships out of 12 went to the bottom according to the results of a fire battle (Suvorov was finished off with torpedoes).
        Quote: Niko
        the second is PRACTICALLY DAMAGE-FREE

        So the question is why the Russian squadron in the ZhM, having received 155 shells, was stopped and scattered, and the Japanese, having received 230 hits, remained practically unharmed.
        1. rytik32
          rytik32 27 September 2021 21: 38
          +3
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          So the question is why the Russian squadron in the ZhM, having received 155 shells, was stopped and scattered, and the Japanese, having received 230 hits, remained practically unharmed.

          Andrei, good afternoon!
          The answer to this question lies on the surface:
          1. In Tsushima ours achieved about 30 hits with 10..12 dm shells (https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/58524.html). In ZhM, according to your calculations - 53.
          2. And divide these shells by 6 in the GM and by 12 in Tsushima. The difference in coarse grains is 3,5 times.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 September 2021 22: 07
            +2
            Quote: rytik32
            Andrei, good afternoon!
            The answer to this question lies on the surface:

            Alas, it does not lie.
            Quote: rytik32
            1. In Tsushima ours achieved about 30 hits with 10..12 dm shells (https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/58524.html). In ZhM, according to your calculations - 53.

            First, the bulk of the manual, with all due respect, is not the ultimate truth and interprets some things strangely. For example - a projectile hitting Mikasa, which is described as 12-inch only at the beginning, and then referred to as 12-pound. Naval manual concludes from this conclusion that this is a slip of the tongue, and the projectile was 12-pounder, but with the same success it can be assumed that the author, having recorded the caliber correctly for the first time, later made a mistake (say, making a "memorial" for himself and indicating there 12-pound hit instead of 12-inch) and wrote the wrong caliber.
            I attributed such hits to an undefined caliber, the bulk of the manual - I deleted them from the 12-inch ones unambiguously.
            Secondly, we have already talked with you that the distribution of hits is important, not their number.
            Quote: rytik32
            And you need to divide these shells by 6 in ZhM and by 12 in Tsushima. The difference in coarse grains is 3,5 times.

            Alexey, Oslyabya went to the bottom, having received much less large-caliber shells than Tsesarevich, Peresvet, Sevastopol and Poltava.
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 28 September 2021 12: 53
              +3
              For example - hitting Mikasa, which is described as 12-inch only at the beginning, and then referred to as 12-pound.

              Open the "Mikasa" database and check it.
              Or at least find it on the diagram. And there will be fewer questions.
              Alexey, Oslyabya went to the bottom, having received much less large-caliber shells than Tsesarevich, Peresvet, Sevastopol and Poltava

              And how did you calculate the number of hits in "Oslyabya"? laughing
              You know very few hits. Because you did not dig this topic.
              I dug. I know a lot more hits from large shells than you do.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                28 September 2021 13: 37
                +1
                Quote: rytik32
                for at least find it on the diagram. And there will be fewer questions.

                I found there were no fewer questions.
                Quote: rytik32
                You know very few hits. Because you did not dig this topic.
                I dug. I know a lot more hits from large shells than you do.

                Alexey, your digging in this case is very biased - you take information from dubious sources, like that letter from the "unknown sailor" and accept it as true, although it clearly contradicts other testimonies. Of course, if you count 33 hits in one hole, and seriously focus on the replicas "the battleship is pierced through", then you will have a lot of these hits.
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 28 September 2021 13: 58
                  +4
                  Alexey, your digging in this case is very biased - you take information from dubious sources, like that letter from the "unknown sailor"

                  Since when did the members' memories become dubious sources?
                  You took the number of shells from the "Eagle" received by the Japanese from the Tsushima forums and pass it off as an irrefutable source. laughing
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    28 September 2021 14: 34
                    +1
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Since when did the members' memories become dubious sources?

                    Does the proverb "lying like an eyewitness" say anything?
                    And the solution is very simple - cross-validation and Occam's razor. And if one writes about "the battleship pierced through and through", and the other, who was at the place of the hole, did not see anything like that, and other ships did not receive similar damage, it is obvious that the battleship was not pierced through. If we have reliable information that in some cases the holes from 305 mm in the unarmored side could be relatively small, and in others the burst of a 305 mm projectile could lead to the formation of holes of several square meters, then it makes no sense seeing a hole of several square meters, claim that it was made by several hits.
                    Quote: rytik32
                    You took the number of shells from the "Eagle" received by the Japanese from the Tsushima forums and pass it off as an irrefutable source.

                    Firstly, if you have more accurate data - to use it, let the world know. Secondly, the calculation of the projectile consumption from the Japanese data correlates very well with the actual expenditures of the Russian battleships in the ZhM - if, of course, it is not simplified, but taking into account the actual time during which these guns could fight.
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 28 September 2021 17: 54
                      +2
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And if one writes about "the battleship pierced through and through", and the other, who was at the place of the hole, did not see anything like that, and other ships did not receive similar damage, it is obvious that the battleship was not pierced through.

                      But the hole through and through well explains how the training mines, stacked on the living deck, could have fallen out.
                      Or do you have another explanation for the appearance of mines?
                      Firstly, if you have more accurate data - to use it, let the world know.

                      I have already voiced them. Only there was no refutation.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        30 September 2021 10: 58
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        But the hole through and through well explains how the training mines, stacked on the living deck, could have fallen out.

                        Yes. And through blind holes, Poseidon forbade them to fall out.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I have already voiced them. Only there was no refutation.

                        Have you already refuted Danilov's data?

                        By the way, the source of these data, if you read the Tsushima forums, is Polutov
                      2. rytik32
                        rytik32 30 September 2021 18: 20
                        +1
                        Yes. And through blind holes, Poseidon forbade them to fall out

                        Archimedes)
                        The ship lay down on the port side. A hole in the left. The mines surfaced to the right, i.e. far from the hole. How can they get outside if there is no through hole?

                        Have you already refuted Danilov's data?

                        Have you read his article? He refuted himself)
                        40 12-inch training shells were taken aboard. Unloaded 44.
                        Arithmetic does not converge!
                        And I also posted earlier, 27 were fired at firing.
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        30 September 2021 18: 30
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Archimedes)
                        The ship lay down on the port side. A hole in the left. The mines surfaced to the right, i.e. far from the hole

                        Alexey, are you joking with the poor Jew? :))))))
                        Water was running into the ship - hollow hulls of mines hung around the entire deck. The ship was turning over, it had holes in the deck. Strictly speaking, reasoning as you come to the conclusion - the holes were on the starboard side, the ship lay on the left side, mines surfaced on the starboard side ... how?)))))) Having acquired the ability to levitate? Or after the starboard side sank to the level of holes? So by that time they could emerge from the left deck from the deck on the starboard side.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Have you read his article? He refuted himself)

                        If you are talking about his remarks on the forum, then he refuted himself not in the amount of unloaded ammunition. And in the question it is not clear where the cast-iron shells came from and in their influence on the calculation of the consumption of shells. In my article, I suggested a completely logical option, in which the Japanese could unload exactly as many shells as indicated in the documents
                      4. rytik32
                        rytik32 30 September 2021 22: 42
                        0
                        And in the question it is not clear where the cast-iron shells came from and in their influence on the calculation of the consumption of shells

                        The question is not only in cast iron.
                        Another consumption of only 6 segment 6-inch shells 417-411 = 6 also raises questions.
                        After all, they were supposed to be used in the Gull incident, and helping "Suvorov" to fight off destroyers, and at night.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        1 October 2021 08: 01
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The question is not only in cast iron.
                        Another consumption of only 6 segment 6-inch shells 417-411 = 6 also raises questions.

                        Alexey, the questions, of course, remain, but the point is that these questions do not refute the Japanese documents. There is data on how many shells were received, but these data are not complete (in terms of cast iron), there is data on how many are loaded. The remnants do not contradict - in Gullskoye, only 2 segment shells and 10 high-explosive shells were used up. I cannot be surprised that our sailors preferred to shoot high-explosive at the destroyers.
                      6. rytik32
                        rytik32 30 September 2021 23: 10
                        +1
                        Alexey, are you joking with the poor Jew? :))))))

                        Reading VZh "Oleg"
                        "An armor-piercing projectile flew into the port side and made a through hole in both sides between 128-129s

                        I also took the expense of the Oleg and Aurora shells.
                        "Oleg" 6 "- 593; 75m / m - 333
                        "Aurora" 6 "- 303, 75mm - 1282

                        The difference is at times, although the ships were close by.
                        I admit the consumption of "Oleg" a little more due to the fact that the 6-inch barrels are larger. But not by the same amount!
                      7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        1 October 2021 09: 17
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Reading VZh "Oleg"
                        "An armor-piercing projectile flew into the port side and made a through hole in both sides between 128-129s

                        We read it. And let me ask you, what does this fascinating reading matter have to do with the issue we are discussing?
                        That an armor-piercing projectile could well penetrate the unarmored part of the hull on both sides - never and no one had any doubts. Because he flew through the ship without breaking, the description of which we just see in "Oleg".
                        And when the projectile does not explode, it leaves a hole in the side, at most slightly larger than its caliber. Thus, in order for the shells of mines of the sample 1898 g to fall out of such a hole, "Oslyabya" had to be hit by a projectile, by no means smaller than a 750-mm caliber, but still better than 780 mm, in terms of the diameter of the mine body
                        Please remind me, on which battleship of Japan were the guns of this caliber installed?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I also took the expense of the Oleg and Aurora shells.
                        "Oleg" 6 "- 593; 75m / m - 333

                        Everything is correct. Just keep in mind, please, that "Oleg" fought in Tsushima very intensively, but at the end of the battle all of its 152-mm guns were working properly. But the "Eagle" had a completely different situation - at the end of the 1st phase it could fire only 3 guns on the left side, and fought the entire second phase mainly with them, and in the third phase, only the nasal right turret fired for the most part. , in which the horizontal guidance mechanisms were disabled, so they turned it over by hand.
                        Add to this the fact that the casemate and deck 152-mm mounts of the "Oleg" are much more rapid-fire than the "Eagle" turrets. Taking all this into account, the difference between 593 shells of "Oleg" and 380-400 shells of "Eagle" does not look strange.
                        Please note that "Askold", which either did not reach most of the battle in the Yellow Sea (1st phase) or was behind the battleships (2nd phase) and intensively fought nothing at the end of the battle - and then shot 226 152-mm shells.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The difference is at times, although the ships were close by.
                        I admit the consumption of "Oleg" a little more due to the fact that the 6-inch barrels are larger. But not by the same amount!

                        Alexey, what's the problem?
                        The Aurora's 152-mm guns are one and a half times smaller, and the cruiser fired half as many shells as the Oleg. A difference of 30% per barrel is quite acceptable for ships of the same class.
                      8. rytik32
                        rytik32 2 October 2021 01: 17
                        +1
                        Thus, in order for the shells of mines of the sample of 1898 g to fall out of such a hole, the Oslyabya had to be hit by a projectile, by no means smaller than a 750-mm caliber, but still better than 780 mm, in terms of the diameter of the mine body

                        Or the projectile should explode, right?
                        Just keep in mind, please, that "Oleg" fought in Tsushima very intensively, however, even at the end of the battle, all of its 152-mm guns were functioning properly.

                        Intensely, but not for long.
                        "The cruisers were not fired during the first period of the battle, since, covering the transports, they were out of the enemy's shots."
                        And in the last phase, after 17:00, the cruisers did not participate in the battle.
                        So the Eagle's projectile consumption is abnormally low again.

                        By the way, I summed up the total for hits in “Sevastopol” in WM. I used two descriptions of Essen from "Operations of the Fleet ..." (you can verify that the surface hole near the overhead line at 23-shp is not confirmed by two other sources, therefore I excluded it) and the damage drawing (you do not have it, but the size of the damage is clearly visible on it, by which I determined the caliber).

                        1. The 6-inch tower # 1 has a blow to the edge of the armor. The shell pierced the side, destroyed the cabins and chipped off a piece of armor. 6-dm.
                        2. The 6-inch tower # 3 has a blow to the side armor. Radial cracks, the turbine drain pipe was torn off, the armor pressed in and led, but did not break through. 12-dm.
                        3. In the wardroom, 2 cabins are destroyed. The hole is about 1x2 meters, 12 inches.
                        4. To the battery deck. Minor damage. 6-dm.
                        5. To the battery deck. Minor damage. 6-dm.
                        6. Into the 1st chimney. 6-dm
                        7. Into the 2nd chimney. 12-dm.
                        8. In the casing of the rear chimney. 6-dm.
                        9. At the base of the 6-inch tower. 6-dm.
                        10. At the base of the 6-inch tower. 6-dm.
                        11. To the officers' section of the battery deck. The hole is about 1x2 meters, a 12-inch shell.
                        12. In the spardek. Opposite the foremast. 12-inch armor-piercing.
                        13. The Spardek. Opposite the 2nd pipe. 12-dm.
                        14. Into the bridge and foremast. 6-dm.
                        15. Into the foremast. 6-dm.

                        A total of 15 hits, of which 6 12-dm, 9 6-dm.
                      9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        2 October 2021 10: 54
                        +1
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Or the projectile should explode, right?

                        Armor-piercing - not required, if it hits an unarmored unit. So it is wrong.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Intensely, but not for long.

                        In numbers, please.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        By the way, I summed up the total for hits in “Sevastopol” in WM. Used two descriptions of Essen from "Operations of the Fleet ..."

                        And, of course, Kuteinikov's opinion was completely ignored. Oh well.
                      10. rytik32
                        rytik32 2 October 2021 22: 16
                        +1
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Armor-piercing - not required, if it hits an unarmored unit.

                        Did you not know that it has the same fuse as a land mine?
                        And, of course, Kuteinikov's opinion was completely ignored. Oh well.

                        Again. I have damage drawing of Sevastopol.
                        Why, if you have such a document, focus on literature?
                      11. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        2 October 2021 11: 33
                        +1
                        And the found unexploded 6-inch shell is not considered a hit ...
                      12. rytik32
                        rytik32 2 October 2021 22: 19
                        0
                        Neither Essen nor the draftsmen have yet counted as a hit.
                        Therefore, I cannot accept your position.
                  2. Comrade
                    Comrade 2 October 2021 04: 47
                    +2
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Since when did the members' memories become dubious sources?

                    With your permission, colleague,
                    for example, after the publication of Japanese documents refuting the information of the officers of the Port Arthur squadron - from Lutonin to Schensnovich - who "saw" numerous hits on Japanese battleships.
                    You can add Rudnev to them, remember the Japanese destroyer sunk by the Varyag? And in order not to seem a little, let me remind you of the Japanese destroyer heated by Askold. Or even destroyers.
                    So it turns out that Andrei is right, eyewitnesses' recollections are really dubious, in terms of the shells hit, sources.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      2 October 2021 11: 36
                      +2
                      Greetings, dear colleague!
                      I invite you to discuss the final article of the cycle https://topwar.ru/187623-o-faktore-predopredelivshiem-porazhenie-russkogo-flota-v-cusime.html
                      1. Comrade
                        Comrade 2 October 2021 14: 58
                        +2
                        Thank you for the invitation, dear Andrey!
            2. Maxim G
              Maxim G 28 September 2021 14: 11
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              First, the bulk manual, with all due respect - not the ultimate truth and interprets some things strangely.

              And you have nobody the ultimate truth - no manual bulk, no Sidorenko, no Gribovsky with Melnikov request Apparently this is the reason for the appearance of the ship-clock, as the highest unit of measurement of the genius of the victim of the circumstance of ZPR.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                28 September 2021 14: 38
                +3
                Quote: Maxim G
                And you have nobody the ultimate truth

                Documents :)))) Although yes, and they require verification.
                Quote: Maxim G
                apparently this is the reason for the appearance of the ship-clock, as the highest unit of measurement

                What to do if many people do not understand that it is important not only the number of ships that fight, but also the time during which they fight it. You didn't understand this even after my explanations.
                At the same time, man-hours or man-days as a measure of time worked has been used for centuries since the 19th, if not earlier.
                1. Maxim G
                  Maxim G 28 September 2021 15: 32
                  -2
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  What to do if many people do not understand that it is important not only the number of ships that fight, but also the time during which they fight it. You didn't understand this even after my explanations.
                  At the same time, man-hours or man-days as a measure of time worked has been used for centuries since the 19th, if not earlier.

                  Units of measurement are intended to be standardized, i.e. we know what km is and what an hour is.
                  Labor costs can also be standardized approximately, for example, when performing some identical work.
                  How it is possible to standardize a ship-hour in even one battle is incomprehensible to the mind what .
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    30 September 2021 11: 35
                    +2
                    Quote: Maxim G
                    Units of measurement are intended to be standardized, i.e. we know what km is and what an hour is.

                    What is the exact word you do not understand in the phrase "ship-hour"? Judging by the fact that you know about the hour, you probably don't know the word "ship"?
                    Quote: Maxim G
                    Labor costs can also be standardized approximately, for example, when performing some identical work.

                    There is such a thing as a production rate. So it is she who is standardized, but in life it can be either over- or under-fulfilled. People are non-standard :)
                    Quote: Maxim G
                    How can you standardize a ship-hour in even one battle

                    Where did you manage to see standardization? Do you understand the meaning of this word? Standardization is the activity of establishing rules and characteristics for the purpose of their voluntary reuse. Did I deduce the rate of hits on the RYAV ship somewhere? :)))))
                    If one person, after working for 8 hours, collected a bucket of berries, and the second, having worked the same amount - only half a bucket, then the second worked twice as bad. What does standardization have to do with it?
              2. Oleg Zorin
                Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 14: 50
                0
                Does the ultimate truth exist? Believe it or not, Lobachevsky's parallel lines can intersect and 2x2 = 4 is also not a postulate wink
        2. unknown
          unknown 27 September 2021 21: 42
          0
          Livejournal naval manual, as I understand it, your eternal opponent, or you are not his essence.
          Since 2017 - THIRTEEN materials on the shell issue, numerous comments on each material.
        3. Niko
          Niko 27 September 2021 22: 35
          -2
          The answer is obvious (in the opinion of one of the commentators) "the fate of the" golden hits "did not present." And what is interesting: not under Shantung, not under Tsushima, not under Sarych, and if you think about a single war, not a single time ... she is all FATE to blame, and we are great fellows, and we shoot better than the Japanese in your opinion
  5. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 27 September 2021 10: 02
    +4
    The material is, as always, a plus yes drinks
    Some in the comments criticize the author for the so-called "monkey work". But they forget that the author is only trying to get to the bottom of the truth, trying to refute the myths established in modern literature, because not even a true opinion expressed by a person on the basis of his subjective views, but successfully thrown into the masses, can divert conclusions from the truth aside. So the author is digging, analyzing, presenting his conclusions to our court.
    I would add psychology to the general equation. If the Japanese approached the battle at Shantung not yet confident in themselves (the loss of two battleships, some other beating of the Russians), then the Russians were already actually losing. They were morally subconsciously suppressed by the course of the war, which was not in their favor. I would even say from the very first day. The loss of a mediocre number of ships, the loss of the Commander, the virtual absence of combat training, failures on land. All this sits in your head and when you enter the ring, you simply lose heart with the first jabs. The Russians in the PA lost to the enemy, who went into battle with the desire to win. When you set yourself the task of breaking through at random, then you should not be surprised at the result, when your "maybe" stumbles upon a harder "it will be in my opinion" and you shoot in panic at the most tense moment so disgusting that even the author scratches his turnip seeing this. You wave your arms in impotence, shaking the air. This is where the stunningly low accuracy of hits at the apogee of the Battle in the Yellow Sea on 28.07.1904/XNUMX/XNUMX comes from. But when the Japanese were catching up and were still behind, it was already clear that they were in the mood to fight. EMNIP, when we were analyzing this fight several years ago, I said that we had not to go limp, but to use our advantageous tactical position in front of the Japanese, put our "crossinq T", concentrate fire on "Mikasa" and who knows how we turned would be history .. but it is, my personal opinion
    The Japanese approached Tsushima in the rank of favorites, with the experience of victories. They went out to sea as for the last battle. We are already psychologically defeated (and sending Nebogatov's detachment to reinforce the Squadron looks like a gesture of despair), hoping to endure once again in time, forgetting that the enemy can present tactical surprises. Which is what happened - thanks to their superiority in speed, the Japanese fought with part of the 2TOE, leveling the superiority in heavy guns of the latter.
    So the much better accuracy of the 2TOE in comparison with the 1TOE did not play any role. This accuracy would have played a role if 2TOE were in the battle at Shantung. But it was not enough under the conditions proposed by the Japanese under Tsushima. Therefore, the psychological stability of the Russians, who still hit the Japanese throughout the battle, only indicates that we prepared for the battle, trained, but technically the enemy turned out to be stronger. He was faster (speed), his blows were more significant (the quality of the shells), and if 1TOE with a good blow just collapsed in the second round, then 2TOE fought, almost completely dying, fighting almost the entire duel ...
    All this, of course, is the lyrics. You can analyze the results as much as you want, draw conclusions. Dream, if only, but the truth is that any positive aspects can be crossed out by other factors that bring them to nothing. Undoubtedly, the remarkable accuracy of the Russians trained during the campaign in the outset of the battle turned out to be meaningless, because the number of shells hitting the target during this period of time was not enough to disable at least the Japanese flagship. But the semblance of success is psychologically inspiring. So it turned out that even if the accuracy of the Russians proved by the author under Tsushima did not lead to even local positive success in battle in view of the worse material and technical condition of the Russians. The admission of nothing to change the fact only sweetened the pill of defeat. Yes, the 2TOE shot better than the 1TOE, yes, it was morally better prepared. But the result is known request
    We look forward to continuing good hi
    1. Ross xnumx
      Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 11: 28
      -2
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Some in the comments criticize the author for the so-called "monkey work".

      Some people are curious that analysis using different units of measurement known to a “narrow circle of specialists” and a hypothetical analysis can bring new things into the alignment of events a century ago. This is tantamount to discussing the Battle of Marathon in terms of the statistics of Olympic marathon champions.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      But they forget that the author is only trying to get to the bottom of the truth, tries to refute established in modern literature myths.

      You know, you ran into a grateful reader in the field of knowledge of the truth. And I like to read myths (fairy tales of the peoples of the world) from the age of six. Tell one of these myths or provide a link to the material. I would be very grateful.
      hi
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 September 2021 16: 44
        +5
        Quote: ROSS 42
        Some people are curious that analysis using different units of measurement known to a “narrow circle of specialists” and a hypothetical analysis can bring new things into the alignment of events a century ago. This is tantamount to discussing the Battle of Marathon in terms of the statistics of Olympic marathon champions.

        I can't even imagine how you got such a comparison. The firing efficiency of 2 squadrons is compared in more or less comparable conditions. What kind of Olympians are there?
        1. Ross xnumx
          Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 17: 22
          -2
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          The firing efficiency of 2 squadrons is compared in more or less comparable conditions.

          What is the purpose of comparing the incomparable? Why are you so stubborn. What kind of ships are there? If:
          the level of combat training and, most importantly, the combat experience of the gunners of the ships of the Japanese squadron was much better than that of the Russian gunners; Japanese ships had a tactical and technical advantage: in the power of artillery fire (910 barrels against 228), in the rate of fire of the guns (360 rounds per minute vs 134), in speed (16-18 knots versus 12-13) and in booking (on average 60% versus 40%).

          What is there to analyze, what is there to climb with a microscope and calculate hits? You shoot me from a distance of 100 meters with a pistol, and I thrash with a Kalash ... Who cares about this hypothesis, when everything has long been disassembled and sucked. And you still reproach me with the comparison? And with what to compare?
          ==========
          Maybe someone is comfortable with this. I am sure that many are interested in how many arrows and from what distance were fired in the Battle of Kulikovo ...
          For history, the reasons for the event, its actual action and the results (why the victory was won or why they were defeated) are important. Convince me that your topic is interesting to the majority. read your work in history class.
          ==========
          After all, why should I make excuses for your Sisyphean labor? Explain that science will not forgive me for such a boorish attitude to such historical facts. Prove that every user of the site is obliged to know what you have stated, close to the text ...
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 27 September 2021 19: 29
            +7
            Quote: ROSS 42
            After all, why should I make excuses for your Sisyphean labor?

          2. Kote Pan Kokhanka
            Kote Pan Kokhanka 27 September 2021 20: 42
            +7
            Quote: ROSS 42
            After all, why should I make excuses for your Sisyphean labor? Explain that science will not forgive me for such a boorish attitude to such historical facts. Prove that every user of the site is obliged to know what you have stated, close to the text ...

            I'll pick up independent ones I will answer for the Author. To each his own, someone to catch the hype from the hype (enjoying the srach on the branch), some cannot live without slogans and declarations (even white for the tsar-father, even red for comrade Stalin), who cannot live without fairy tales Mila (Nasonov, Fomenko, etc.), fourth - give cartoons or pictures, fifth - candy wrappers, sixth - serials with a long-playing duck in the color of childish surprise, and so on. The editors are already out of their skin to please all the "hamsters" wishlist, and they are all capricious "red is not red" - "white is not white" !!!
            At the same time, many people forget one thing "writing is work" and the work is not easy! To find fault with and scold, especially the Author, who took the last "evil" from the "good" forum member 15 minutes of blood time! Atu - him, atu ... !!!
            Grew up, you are a normal man, well, if you have Andrey (the author) across your throat - do not read or comment.
            Yes, Andrei got carried away with mind games. To whom the clock ships were not included, but this does not mean that he does not have his own reader. I largely disagree with the Author and your emotional presentation is much closer to me, but frankly Andrey's approach is interesting and has the right to develop. Any systematization of knowledge is a step forward.
            So, taking into account the conjugation of the parties, it is possible to continue the development of the variable mathematical model. Whether it is reliable, definitely not. The author understands this - definitely yes! Why does he keep doing this? I think Andrei is sitting at an altitude of 300 meters above sea level and a thousand miles from the latter, in his heart is more than a man and longs for steel battleships plowing the vast blue ocean. His works are his song, the song of a mountain man with a sea soul, and if you Dear Ros do not hear it, this does not mean that it is not there!
            hi
          3. PPD
            PPD 28 September 2021 20: 44
            +1
            Why climb there with a microscope and calculate hits? You shoot me from a distance of 100 meters with a pistol, and I am hitting with a Kalash ...

            There is such an uncle in the USA - he loves to shoot very much, he uploads an interesting video (he forgot his name).
            So he somehow put everything out of a revolver with a barrel of a couple of centimeters, which were used as targets. Whole reel on target with 1 miss.
            1 shot - 1 ball.
            Our distance was 100-150 meters. If not further.
            So, I do not recommend meeting you with him, that with Ak, that Pkm.
            Even if he is with this fart.
            And he probably has more authentic trunks.
            We don't even talk about Arki.
            Morality is simple - you need to be able to shoot and master tactics.
            You look and then you will not have to clutch your head with a shout - "this has never happened and here it is again."
            If you approach such things, who is interested, you can gallop far.
            Remember, for example, what numbers were engraved on the signs of the Petrovskaya Guard.
            The Amperator was not too lazy to delve into this.
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 September 2021 19: 29
        +3
        Quote: ROSS 42
        Tell one of these myths or provide a link to the material. I would be very grateful.

        It is enough to read "Epilogue" by Novik-Priboy. But this is a kind of classic, many, having read it, take the author's statements as truth.
        Here, the quality of ammunition, and the respected Rytik, rangefinders, and overloads were already understood (the Japanese, by the way, all went into battle with overloads of coal). Dear Andrei Nikolayevich understands about "untrained" gunners in the last articles (including this one). hi
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 27 September 2021 14: 27
      +4
      So, after all, catching up, the Japanese themselves substituted themselves under the coverage of the head. While you are walking along the line, you get consistently from everyone. If Vitgeft had also pressed the flagship of Togo, then even at a lower speed, this crossing would have turned out.
      But ... Those who don't even try to find a chance are unlucky.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 September 2021 17: 06
        +4
        Quote: mmaxx
        If Vitgeft had also pressed the flagship of Togo, then even at a lower speed, this crossing would have turned out.

        This was easily parried by turning to the right, while Togo turned from catching up to being ahead. Not an option
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 28 September 2021 16: 12
          +3
          I'm good at maneuvering. For sailing races. Consider?
          Vitgeft crushes Togo's head. For how long is Togo in coverage. 1 against 2 - 3. Dodges. The Russians are leaning back. The distance increases. Moreover, we need to travel a smaller distance, since the radius of the arc is smaller. That either leaves and God bless him or begins to turn on Vitgeft. What happens? Falls under concentrated fire again. And so, until it finally outstrips the Russian squadron. The British wrote that the real superiority in speed was 0,5 knots. And there it is not far from the evening / night. The weaker one needs to fish in troubled waters.
          You can write the same recipes for Rozhdestvensky. In those conditions of visibility, it was possible to break away if the speed was well, at least a little, more. At least 12. Well, I developed the first detachment on rebuilding 11. 9 knots - this is for the slaughter. It's just a complete misunderstanding of nothing at all. And depriving the squadron of every chance of success. Foolish hope to survive under fire. Instead, even the Japanese high-explosive shells smashed our battleships. After Tsushima, no one tried to shoot high-explosive at the armor. Even the Japanese.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            30 September 2021 11: 22
            0
            Quote: mmaxx
            I'm good at maneuvering. For sailing races. Consider?

            Easily
            Quote: mmaxx
            Vitgeft crushes Togo's head. For how long is Togo in coverage.

            Vitgef crushes Togo's head and ... wins nothing. Togo is already walking along the Russian system and nothing prevents him from concentrating fire on Mikasa. That is, the coverage you are writing about does not add anything to the power of Russian fire. The only thing he helps is to bring the Russian head EBRs to the sharp corners of the Japanese system, so that the latter are left to be devoured by the end ones.
            Quote: mmaxx
            For how long is Togo in coverage. 1 against 2 - 3. Dodges.

            Not at all. To make coverage, you need to cross the course of the Japanese squadron, and before it in the outset of the battle - about 4 miles. Togo simply turns to the right and at the end of the turn is in front of the right of the Russian squadron. That is, at the end of the turn, Vitgeft simply gives up its positional advantage to the Japanese - and now nothing prevents them from concentrating fire on the flagship.
            Quote: mmaxx
            The Russians are leaning back. The distance increases.

            One question - why all this, if the same lapel can be made after Togo catches up with the Russian system? The coverage maneuver recommended by you is harmful for the Russian squadron, and a lapel in a small circle can then be performed without it
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 30 September 2021 14: 40
              +1
              Draw everything on a piece of paper.
              I know your position: everything was useless.
              I have a great idea of ​​maneuvering and what 1 difference knot is. What is the pace at which the catch-up or the advance occurs.
              There are many options for vigorous maneuvering. But they must be in the head. For example, under the same Jutland, the ratio of forces and speed of ships was generally not in favor of Germany. Unlike the battles of the main forces in the RYA. But they erupted and escaped.
              You can't ignore the little things in a war. The Japanese have taken everything into account. Warriors.
              In general, the Japanese are an example of how one should not rely on Nicholas the pleaser.
              Once again: if our admirals did at least something, they would not be reprimanded for defeat. And when they resign themselves to the circumstances and doomedly go into battle, there will never be any sense. And at Rozhestvensky with 9 nodes, everything was useless. Therefore, if you take his side - "it was possible only in this way", then the result is obvious. Complete ignorance of the Russians led to defeats.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                30 September 2021 15: 04
                +1
                Quote: mmaxx
                Draw everything on a piece of paper.

                So many times I have already painted. But you obviously did not draw. Otherwise, how did you get the coverage of Togo's head in this position?

                Quote: mmaxx
                I have a great idea of ​​maneuvering and what 1 difference knot is. What is the pace at which the catch-up or the advance occurs.

                So explain :)))) So far, your explanations are unsatisfactory, since the maneuvers you recommend do not lead to the results you expect.
                Quote: mmaxx
                There are many options for vigorous maneuvering.

                But it's not a fact that these options will be better. Sometimes, in order to choose the best option, you need to do nothing.
                Quote: mmaxx
                For example, under the same Jutland, the ratio of forces and speed of ships was generally not in favor of Germany. Unlike the battles of the main forces in the RYA. But they twisted and twisted.

                In fact, in terms of maneuvering, Jutland was a convincing victory for the British :)))))
                Hipper essentially won the artillery battle with Beatty, but it was Beatty who, with his maneuver, made it so that Hipper did not fulfill his main task and was unable to timely detect the main forces of the enemy. As a result, Scheer buried his dreadnoughts in the center of the British system - only Jellicoe's indecision did not allow turning the winning position into the defeat of the Hochseeflotte. The fact that Scheer then again contrived to substitute himself and was forced to throw his battle cruisers on the British battleships, just to withdraw the main forces from under the blow, can also hardly be attributed to the luck of the German maneuver :)
                Quote: mmaxx
                You can't ignore the little things in a war. The Japanese have taken everything into account. Warriors.

                The Japanese had a carriage and a small cart. In fact, the 1st phase in WM is almost a textbook on how not to fight the main forces. Including thanks to Witgeft's maneuvers
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  30 September 2021 17: 40
                  0
                  The ambiguity turned out
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  In fact, the 1st phase in WM is almost a textbook on how not to fight the main forces. Including thanks to Witgeft's maneuvers

                  I meant that the Japanese maneuvered badly and merged the fight in this phase, but Vitgeft maneuvered well
                2. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 2 October 2021 09: 33
                  0
                  According to this picture. Prepare. Togo will also catch up a little and 3 rumba to the right. He is actually in coverage now. Only the distance is great. If you go out passively, then you need to shy away to the right by more than 3 rumba. If the nerves are in order and the damage is small, then you can shorten the distance. But the coverage will get even bigger.
                  At the same time, Vitgeft will introduce a larger number of barrels into battle. And Togo will have half of the Russian head trunks. If you have an eye, you can do this without training.
                  In any case, the fight does not become a tram.
                  Well. and then I wrote a situation with a reverse course change, if Togo catches up and, in turn, gives up.
                  It should also be borne in mind that course changes are not immediately visible.
                  I answer late, because I look and write more often on the phone, and there I do not always adequately see the answer to the comment.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    2 October 2021 10: 51
                    +1
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    Togo will also catch up a little and 3 rumba to the right.

                    As a result, you give Togo the opportunity to get closer to our lead one faster, but there will still be no coverage - as it comes closer, it will lie on the same 3 rumba to the right, and will be in front-right of the Russian squadron.
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    At the same time, Vitgeft will introduce a larger number of barrels into battle.

                    It is already at its maximum. Vitgeft fought in practically the same position that Togo preferred in Tsushima.
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    And Togo will have half of the Russian head trunks.

                    Complete fantasy, excuse me.
                    In reality, Togo was catching up, walking along the Russian system, and Witgeft beat him with his whole side. The superiority of Witgeft was maintained until Togo came out on the traverse of the Tsarevich Mikasoy, here the equality of position turned out, and then Togo overtook and gained an advantage.
                    Any turn towards the Japanese of Vitgeft did not increase the power of his fire, but reduced the time during which the Japanese would reach the traverse of the Tsarevich. Rapprochement in this case would be unambiguously harmful, with the exception of the option in which Witgeft would go to Togo crossing T, or at least to such a course angle at which only part of the artillery would operate at Togo.
                    But Vitgeft could not have achieved this by any twist. Even in a straight line (a 90-degree turn), he would have to walk 4 miles before crossing. At the same time, such an attempt of his was easily parried by Togo with a movement along a small circle, that is, with the same turn to the right.
                    After that, Togo already received the advantage of the position, and if he turned to the right at a smaller angle than Witgeft, he would also have a rapprochement that was beneficial for him.
                    If you try to decompose your proposed maneuver into figures, you will see that Togo has more than enough time to react.
                    After turning Togo, Vitgeft had only one option - to turn left again, but this would put his gunners in an uncomfortable position, since if the distance was reduced, the angle to the Japanese could be too sharp to shoot at them with the whole side.
                    In general, such a movement did not give Witgeft any tactical gain, but constant shuffling to and fro created known problems for his artillerymen
                    1. mmaxx
                      mmaxx 2 October 2021 11: 18
                      +1
                      It was possible to cover Togo's head. In general, while he walked along the line, he received and received. And somehow he didn't care. Would give something additional coverage or not, one can argue. Maybe not. Or maybe they managed to knock out "Mikasa". But .... Everything was as it was. And only two shells decided everything. But close range gave an advantage to our shells.
                      In any case, if you have accepted a battle, you must still try to fight it. Vitgeft didn't care. He didn't really need to go to Vladik. Solid but.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        2 October 2021 11: 21
                        +1
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        Togo's head coverage could be done

                        It is forbidden. Distance and speed were not allowed.
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        And only two shells decided everything.

                        They didn’t decide anything. By the time the Tsarevich was knocked out of action, the Russian squadron could no longer go to Vladivostok
            2. mmaxx
              mmaxx 30 September 2021 15: 28
              +1
              Yes, and Shantung is not Tsushima. The Japanese have a superiority of 0,5 knots No.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                30 September 2021 16: 34
                +1
                Quote: mmaxx
                Yes, and Shantung is not Tsushima. The Japanese have a superiority of 0,5 knots

                At least two, but rather a lot more. Remember the time during which the Japanese caught up with Vitgeft after the 2nd phase, despite the fact that Vitgeft walked at 13 knots and even tried to accelerate to 15
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 1 October 2021 03: 00
                  0
                  In the fragment from Parks, the figure was given as 0,5 knot. This is information from the Japanese. They held "seminars" in the UK on combat experience. The problem was the same as ours. Someone was lagging behind.
                  In general, they constantly write about 15-16 nodes in Tsushima. But it can't be. It is almost full, but for some it is full speed. They do not walk for a long time on such moves. And the coal is leaving at a terrible speed. Therefore, counting on the defeat within more than one day, Togo had to simply save coal. And shells, by the way, too.
                  In general, paper specifications obscure real analysis.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    1 October 2021 07: 50
                    +1
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    In the fragment from Parks, the figure was given as 0,5 knot.

                    Parks is wrong
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    This is information from the Japanese. They held "seminars" in the UK on combat experience.

                    Read Abo, I did not see anything like that there.
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    In general, they constantly write about 15-16 nodes in Tsushima. But it can't be.

                    Why all of a sudden? Just exactly like the truth. Japanese EBRs gave 18 plus the maximum, and here they are after the repair - why not give them 15 squadron ties?
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    This is almost full, but for some, full speed.

                    They did not have an EBR with a 15-knot stroke. Fuji passed at some point, yes, but he was being repaired in front of Tsushima.
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    And the coal is leaving at a terrible speed.

                    Therefore, the coal on the Japanese ships was heaps of.
                    Quote: mmaxx
                    Togo just had to save coal.

                    Should not. At large moves, he could burn well 200, maybe 250 tons per day, but he had a full supply or close to it
                    1. mmaxx
                      mmaxx 2 October 2021 09: 38
                      0
                      Stock, stock, but the stokers are not iron. The Japanese, of course, are stubborn. And he obviously counted on Togo for more than one day.
                      Arranged the first squadron of the race to Vladik. It worked for everyone. Although, undoubtedly, the English mechanisms are better. The question is that the Japanese did not have to strain. They were given everything.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        2 October 2021 10: 24
                        +1
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        Stock, stock, but the stokers are not iron.

                        Well, ours threw a lot more - and nothing.
      2. Oleg Zorin
        Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 15: 09
        +2
        Let me put in my point. In the understanding of Witgeft ("not a naval commander" by his own definition), Togo, catching up with the squadron, put himself almost in crossing-T, only so to speak not in "face", but in "profile". Probably Vitgeft did not want the best.
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 1 October 2021 03: 09
          +1
          The most interesting thing is that when I wrote this a year or two ago, they showered me with slippers. laughing laughing
          Now many are talking about it. For some reason, everyone used to see maneuvering as something one-sided. There is a victim, she goes straight. And the predator, it goes out to the head and the skiff. And right here is that crossing t. Aha. Sailing fleet maneuver. But in its pure form Rozhestvensky ALLOWED to do it.
          But the fight is two-sided. And there is always an opportunity to use this difference when there is a difference in speed.
    3. unknown
      unknown 27 September 2021 21: 46
      -4
      Part of the "elite" of Russia did not need a victory in the RYAV.
      Since 1896, there was a process of bankruptcy of the country.
      By 1917, most of the assets had been removed.
      The royal debts are hanged on the remaining population.
      The allegedly murdered Nicholas II ruled Britain under the name of George the Fifth until 1936.
  6. 27091965
    27091965 27 September 2021 13: 43
    +5
    Dear Andrey, thanks for an interesting article.

    Oddly enough, but for V.K.Witgeft it would be just better to stay as far away from the ships of H. damage to the Japanese squadron was greater (37 hit in response to 104-1 Japanese).


    Once again, we are faced with a weak training of senior command personnel, the death of VK Vitgeft and the injury of ZP Rozhestvensky led to the inaction of other officers who could take command. You can, of course, refer to the instructions and regulations, but in this regard I would like to quote the words of my first chief of staff, at the beginning of my service, "The combat manual is not a dogma, but a guide to action." Without prepared and ready to take command of officers, in the event of the death of the commander or severe injury, the subunits begin to act independently, without assessing the general position of all subunits or ships in battle, and this leads to the loss of general control, and as a result to defeat or to heavy losses in battle. This happens even if one unit or ship shoots many times better than others.
    1. A_Mazkov
      A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 14: 17
      +3
      According to the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky, the transfer of command in battle was to be carried out in such a way that the commanders of the new battleships, marching at the head of the column, were to take command of the squadron one by one.
      So it was.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 27 September 2021 15: 11
        +2
        Quote: A_Mazkov
        According to the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky, the transfer of command in battle was to be carried out in such a way that the commanders of the new battleships, marching at the head of the column, were to take command of the squadron one by one.
        So it was.


        Dear Anton, I proceed in my opinion from what I had to face myself, so my opinion is based only on my personal participation in certain events, there may be other views, but we cannot change the foundations of commanding subunits, but our responsibilities impose we have a certain responsibility not only for the personnel, but also for the result of the battle, and the responsibility cannot be removed from us by any circumstances, so that it is not rain, snow or wind. When giving orders before engaging in battle, the commander, regardless of his position, must understand what order he is giving, he must understand what he requires from subordinates or units entrusted under his command. The commander is obliged to consider all possible scenarios of events and for this he has enough officers, and a simple transfer of command to the next commander of the ship, even if he is a captain of the first rank, is not about anything.
        1. A_Mazkov
          A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 15: 41
          0
          In another commentary, I already wrote that the whole plan of Rozhdestvensky was to advance towards Vladivostok in battle ("to act together against the enemy battleships, maneuvering so as to move north as far as possible").
          What are the possible variants of events?
          1. 27091965
            27091965 27 September 2021 16: 23
            +4
            Quote: A_Mazkov
            act together against enemy battleships, maneuvering so as to move north as far as possible. "


            And what kind of maneuvering of the 2nd Pacific Squadron can you say, one speed, one course. Unfortunately, Z.P. Rozhestvensky created ideal conditions for the Japanese squadron for shooting, while he went to the head of the squadron, taking concentrated fire on his ship, thereby exposing all the officers of his headquarters to enemy fire, who could, in the event of his injury, and the real maneuvering to lead the squadron after his "failure", he deprived the squadron of command.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              27 September 2021 16: 42
              +2
              Quote: 27091965i
              And what kind of maneuvering of the 2nd Pacific Squadron can you say, one speed, one course.

              Why? He did not hesitate to turn :)))) In principle, while Rozhestvensky was in command, it is difficult to criticize his maneuvers - he steered a course for rapprochement in order to take advantage of the Togo loop, then, seeing that the Japanese were pressing on his head, circles "- the only way to somehow parry the actions of a faster enemy
              1. 27091965
                27091965 27 September 2021 17: 48
                +3
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Why? He did not hesitate to turn :)))) In principle, while Rozhestvensky was in command, it is difficult to criticize his maneuvers - he steered a course for rapprochement in order to take advantage of the Togo loop, then, seeing that the Japanese were pressing on his head, circles "- the only way to somehow parry the actions of a faster enemy


                Dear Andrey, I will not explain to you what the operational department at the headquarters is, but I will try to explain to you with a simple example what ZP Rozhestvensky did. The division, I think this is the most acceptable example, due to the presence of various weapons systems, deployed on the ground and took up combat positions, while the enemy makes attacking actions on the positions occupied by the division. And now the order has been received to carry out a counterattack and the command of the division is in charge of it. After this counterattack, the division practically loses its command personnel. Do you really think that she will be able to fully conduct military operations in the future? These will be the actions of disparate units, which will eventually be destroyed. This happened with the 2nd Pacific Squadron.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  27 September 2021 21: 35
                  +2
                  Good evening, dear Igor!
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  And now the order has been received to carry out a counterattack and the command of the division is in charge of it.

                  Alas, this is the very aspect that distinguishes naval war from land war. The general can send soldiers to their death, the admiral can only send stories. If we look at how the Japanese acted, we don't see much of a difference.
                  In essence, they put the admiral on the lead ship of the detachment and tried to put the admiral-junior flagship at the end, so that if it was necessary to turn everything suddenly, the detachment would remain under the admiral's command. These are all the main differences, perhaps.
                  Quote: 27091965i
                  Do you really think that she will be able to fully conduct military operations in the future? These will be the actions of disparate units, which will ultimately be destroyed.

                  I cannot agree :)))) As far as I remember, even in WWII, divisions' actions in the offensive were often not directly controlled by the headquarters. Much more often, commanders received local tasks within the framework of a general plan and carried out them independently.
                  The headquarters in a naval battle could not help too much, and the squadron did not remain without command. Quite the opposite - if you look at Felkerzam (who also died), Nebogatov and the commanders of warships, it was from the latter that one should expect the most competent command of the squadron if Rozhestvensky was put out of action. The officers of the headquarters were experts in their field, but in no case it is impossible to say that, say, Clapier-de Colongg would have commanded better than Bukhvostov. The largest ship he commanded is the training Peter the Great.
                  So, on the contrary, I would say that Rozhestvensky disposed of the issues of the command quite optimally
                  1. 27091965
                    27091965 28 September 2021 09: 52
                    +1
                    If we look at how the Japanese acted, we don't see much of a difference.

                    Admiral Togo secured himself with a speed advantage.

                    In essence, they put the admiral on the lead ship of the detachment and tried to put the admiral-junior flagship at the end, so that if it was necessary to turn everything suddenly, the detachment would remain under the admiral's command. These are all the main differences, perhaps.


                    I disagree, already at the English exercises, the admiral is in the second detachment, on the third ship. In addition, the admiral's presence on the lead ship was a tactic of the sailing fleet when there was a need to "catch the wind" and all maneuvers depended on the wind, so the admiral was on the lead ship, otherwise it was simply not possible to control the squadron in the sailing fleet.

                    So, on the contrary, I would say that Rozhestvensky disposed of the issues of the command quite optimally


                    I also disagree with this. Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky was to conduct a battle that essentially decided the outcome of the war, given such an importance, the headquarters had to work out various possible options 25 hours a day. Leading transports ZP Rozhestvensky initially put himself at a disadvantage, depriving the squadron of minimal room for maneuver. In the event of the victory of the Russian squadron in battle, there was an opportunity later to calmly conduct the transports to Vladivostok. In the event of a defeat and breakthrough of a part of the fleet, the transports had to independently reach Vladivostok, they had enough coal reserves.

                    As far as I remember, even in WWII, the actions of a division in an offensive were often not directly controlled by the headquarters. Much more often, commanders received local tasks within the framework of a general plan and carried out them independently.


                    The local task can be changed, there is a need for constant adjustments and possible changes in the actions of units depending on what is happening on the battlefield, without the headquarters, which understands what is happening in the battle on the scale of the entire division, this is not feasible, this also applies to the battle of squadrons and fleets.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      28 September 2021 10: 17
                      0
                      Quote: 27091965i
                      Admiral Togo secured himself with a speed advantage.

                      Alas, we did not have such an opportunity
                      Quote: 27091965i
                      I disagree, already at the English exercises, the admiral is in the second detachment, on the third ship.

                      "Oslyabya" was the fifth in a row, that is, practically in the middle of the formation of 12 ships. He was the first to die.
                      Quote: 27091965i
                      In addition, the admiral's presence on the lead ship was a tactic of the sailing fleet when there was a need to "catch the wind" and all maneuvers depended on the wind, so the admiral was on the lead ship, otherwise it was simply not possible to control the squadron in the sailing fleet.

                      Likewise, in the RYAV, the possibilities to control from the middle of the formation were only in peacetime. Remember the state the Japanese brought "Peresvet" (again in the center of the formation) - there was nothing to raise orders, I generally keep quiet about the radio - it did not have the required reliability then
                      Quote: 27091965i
                      Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky was to conduct a battle that essentially decided the outcome of the war, given this importance, the headquarters had to work out various possible options 25 hours a day.

                      Dear Igor, nevertheless, the role of plans for the ground forces and for the sailors is very different. For the same division, it is extremely important how, when in the direction of what and for what purposes to develop the offensive. At sea in the ERA era, when you have a slow-moving squadron, and you see the enemy almost twice the distance at which you can shoot, plans significantly lose their meaning. Even if you plan, the enemy will see your plans with superior speed, and if this does not suit him, he will move away to return again, starting the battle in the position he needs.
                      Quote: 27091965i
                      Leading transports with him Z.P. Rozhdestvensky initially put himself at a disadvantage

                      Yes, he did not put :)))) The transports did not prevent him from going at a higher speed in battle. Well, I would break away from them a little, what's the big deal? In addition, the squadron maneuvers in battle, changes course, and even at a higher speed will move towards Vladivostok no faster than a slow-moving transport going straight to the target. Another question is that the safe speed for the squadron was within 9-11 knots.
                      Quote: 27091965i
                      The local task can be changed, there is a need for constant adjustments and possible changes in the actions of subunits depending on what is happening on the battlefield, without the headquarters, which understands what is happening in battle on the scale of the entire division, this is not feasible

                      Now yes. And in WWII, our division commander was often forced to go around the regiments in the evening to understand what had happened during the day of the fighting.
                      1. rytik32
                        rytik32 28 September 2021 11: 42
                        +2
                        "Oslyabya" was the fifth in a row, that is, almost in the middle of the formation of 12 ships

                        "Oslyabya" at the moment of opening fire was the first ship of the left column.
                        And in general - the ship closest to the Japanese. Therefore, he grabbed the most at the beginning of the battle.
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        30 September 2021 10: 59
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        "Oslyabya" at the moment of opening fire was the first ship of the left column.
                        And in general - the ship closest to the Japanese.

                        Yes, the distance between him and the Eagle, as well as the Sisoy, was measured in kilometers laughing
                    2. mmaxx
                      mmaxx 28 September 2021 16: 15
                      +1
                      Still, before the advent of VHF, it was probably unrealistic to command from the middle of the formation. Everything is too slow in the war at sea.
                      1. 27091965
                        27091965 28 September 2021 18: 33
                        +1
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        Still, before the advent of VHF, it was probably unrealistic to command from the middle of the formation. Everything is too slow in the war at sea.

                        A rehearsal ship was a ship assigned to rehearse signals. That is, to repeat them after the ship that raised the signal (usually the flagship, which often had a rehearsal ship abeam), for greater reliability and acceleration of signal reception by distant ships.
                      2. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 28 September 2021 23: 42
                        +2
                        And there should be several of them, each flagship. Under Tsushima, only Emerald rehearsed with the Russians. Kept on the traverse of Suvorov, then Borodino. For some reason, the pearls immediately dumped to the cruisers (following another order of the ZPR), Nebogatov did not have a rehearsal vessel at all.
                      3. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 29 September 2021 22: 25
                        +2
                        I got it wrong, so I’ll correct myself. The emerald was just on Nebogatov's traverse, with Nikolai, and rehearsed the signals for the whole fight. Suvorov was supposed to have Zhemchug work, but he fled. But Oslyabi had no one, apparently the tutor did not rely on the second flagship.
                      4. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 30 September 2021 06: 56
                        0
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        But Oslyabi had no one, apparently the tutor did not rely on the second flagship.

                        Why would a dead flagship need a rehearsal ship?
                      5. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 30 September 2021 21: 34
                        +2
                        The second flagship did not immediately become dead. Again, the second detachment still needs to be controlled, even from Oslyabi, even from Suvorov. It works as a trainer ship in both directions.
              2. A_Mazkov
                A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 18: 49
                +2
                2 rumba to the right,
                return to NO23,
                4 rumba to the right.

                He didn't really maneuver.
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                  27 September 2021 21: 43
                  +2
                  Quote: A_Mazkov
                  He didn't really maneuver.

                  He maneuvered just a lot, and even before the battle. The result of these maneuvers was the notorious "Togo Loop", as a result of which the Japanese admiral brought his squadron into battle by far not the best way. Not that all this was Rozhdestvensky's cunning plan, but nevertheless, his maneuvers still gave our advantage in the first four hours of the battle. This is the first thing.
                  Second. You write
                  Quote: A_Mazkov
                  2 rumba to the right,
                  return to NO23,
                  4 rumba to the right.

                  It seems to you that this is not enough. But Togo made about the same number of maneuvers during the same time - after the "loop" he turned SO79 and then - SO73
                  1. A_Mazkov
                    A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 23: 23
                    +1
                    I'm not talking about "a little - a lot", but about the fact that it was a mistake to return to NO23.
                    As far as I remember, it was then that they lost both rangefinders, interrupted and wounded a bunch of people in the wheelhouse, including Rozhdestvensky.
                  2. mmaxx
                    mmaxx 30 September 2021 14: 47
                    +1
                    Andrey! Togo maneuvered by DOING battle. Maybe ekspromtom, but it was an initiative. And the fight was planned. And Rozhdestvensky under the yoke of circumstances. And no need to talk about the won outset of the battle. He did not win it. For the entire battle, the Russian squadron did not lose its combat effectiveness as fast as at the beginning of the battle.
                    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      1 October 2021 09: 38
                      +1
                      Quote: mmaxx
                      Andrey! Togo maneuvered by DOING battle. Maybe ekpromtom, but it was an initiative. And the fight was planned.

                      Please show me the plan that Togo brought to his subordinates.
                      Quote: mmaxx
                      And Rozhdestvensky under the yoke of circumstances

                      Naturally, because his speed did not give him the opportunity to impose initiative
                      Quote: mmaxx
                      And no need to talk about the won outset of the battle. He did not win it.

                      Precisely what he won.
                      Quote: mmaxx
                      For the entire battle, the Russian squadron did not lose its combat effectiveness as fast as at the beginning of the battle.

                      I'm sorry, but the facts are stubborn, and do not confirm this your postulate.
                      1. mmaxx
                        mmaxx 1 October 2021 10: 25
                        +1
                        On the last question: the drowning of "Oslyabi" and the rendering of "Suvorov" incapacitated are the consequences of the brilliant plan of the ZPR.
                        Of course, I will not give Togo's plans. Problems with languages. But the way the units maneuvered, including from the rear in the front, is a novelty that everyone knew what to do. And vice versa. All of our people did not know what to do. In addition to "go to Vladivostok"
                      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        1 October 2021 15: 32
                        +1
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        On the last question: the drowning of "Oslyabi" and the rendering of "Suvorov" incapacitated are the consequences of the brilliant plan of the ZPR.

                        No. No position of the Russian squadron could prevent the Japanese from firing at the Russian flagships. Perhaps if the Russian squadron would have put the KRossing T on the Japanese, but without superiority in speed, one cannot even dream of this.
                        That in Tsushima, that under Shantung, the main blow fell on the flagships.
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        Of course, I will not give Togo's plans. Problems with languages. But the way the units maneuvered, including from the rear in the front, is a novelty that everyone knew what to do.

                        You will not bring, not because of the knowledge of languages, but because of the lack of plans. And maneuvering "back in front" was achieved very simply - the Japanese had two admirals for each detachment, one on the lead ship, the other on the end ship. If Togo commanded the turn "all of a sudden", then the command passed to Rear Admiral Mies (flag on Nissin), that's all.
                        Well, if Togo had two admirals per detachment, then Rozhdestvensky had as many as 2 admirals for 3 detachments.
                        Quote: mmaxx
                        And vice versa. All ours didn't know what to do

                        Taking into account the real maneuvering of the Russian squadron in Tsushima, the term "did not know what to do" does not apply to it at all. Only one attempt to pass under the stern of the 1st combat detachment, which Bukhvostov started what is worth
                      3. mmaxx
                        mmaxx 1 October 2021 17: 22
                        0
                        Look at the maneuvering schemes of the Japanese. And the two admirals from different ends have different heads. And they thought the same way. Why would it suddenly? And Togo had such an idea! Probably from the bulldozer: why not put the admiral at the end? Suddenly it will come in handy!
                        The most interesting thing is that no one forbade the ZPR to appoint someone who was in the conning tower of the next battleship as the squadron commander for the duration of the battle. Nobody knows at all. But the rest of the mind was not enough. So we didn't have enough admirals. And ideas. If there are thoughts, then there will be people who fulfill them. No one could prevent Rozhdestvensky, far from Peter, from doing everything he needed. Under the threat of a difficult battle, none of the appointed would have engaged in showdowns among themselves. Ber now became Felkersam in fact. And he would have done quite well if he had not died. Cap. 1 people do not become people without admiral's ambitions.
                        And the maneuvering of Bukhvostov (or someone else) says that there were smart people in the squadron. And they showed at least something when the Japanese finally nailed Rozhdestvensky.
            2. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 17: 22
              -1
              Quote: 27091965i
              Unfortunately, Z.P. Rozhestvensky created ideal conditions for shooting for the Japanese squadron,

              and ran away beforehand
            3. A_Mazkov
              A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 19: 03
              0
              Once again: The whole idea was that in case of detection, moving in one wake column heading for Vladivostok to fight.
              Rozhestvensky apparently believed it was not entirely clear from what considerations that his squadron would be able to "endure" the fire of the Japanese, and maybe even inflict some damage on the enemy.
              Based on this, the instructions to the commanders of the ships were appropriate.
              Due to the lack of any other ideas from the squadron commander, the staff officers cannot help.
              If you do not have a battle plan, then you simply have nothing to inform your subordinates!
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                27 September 2021 21: 45
                +1
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                Once again: The whole idea was that in case of detection, moving in one wake column heading for Vladivostok to fight.

                Not heading towards Vladivostok, but towards Vladivostok - to keep the squadron strictly on NO23 Rozhestvensky was not going to and did not do it in battle.
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                Rozhestvensky apparently believed it was not entirely clear from what considerations that his squadron would be able to "endure" the fire of the Japanese,

                The results of the battle in the GM directly suggested such tactics.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 30 September 2021 14: 48
                  +1
                  The success of this tactic was evident long before Tsushima. request
            4. unknown
              unknown 27 September 2021 21: 48
              +1
              From a technical point of view, the Japanese had no advantage in speed.
              Rozhdestvensky provided the Japanese with a tactical advantage in speed.
        2. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 17: 23
          0
          Quote: 27091965i
          Dear Anton, I proceed in my opinion from what I had to face myself, so my opinion is based only on my personal participation in certain events, there may be other views, but we cannot change the foundations of commanding subunits, but our responsibilities impose we have a certain responsibility not only for the personnel, but also for the result of the battle, and the responsibility cannot be removed from us by any circumstances, so that it is not rain, snow or wind. When giving orders before engaging in battle, the commander, regardless of his position, must understand what order he is giving, he must understand what he requires from subordinates or units entrusted under his command. The commander is obliged to consider all possible scenarios of events and for this he has enough officers, and a simple transfer of command to the next commander of the ship, even if he is a captain of the first rank, is not about anything.

          all true!
        3. mmaxx
          mmaxx 30 September 2021 14: 42
          +2
          It was not customary for Russian admirals to inform their commanders about their plans. To us, spoiled Sov. The authorities cannot understand this. Maybe there were no plans?
          1. Maxim G
            Maxim G 1 October 2021 08: 14
            0
            This is regulated by the Naval Regulations, and ZPR violated it again.


            Yes, and the same Nebogatov with his officers discussed plans for a campaign if they could not connect with Rozhdestvensky.
            Reading of the Flag Captain of the headquarters of the Commander of the 2rd Armored Detachment of the Captain XNUMXnd Rank Cross.

            Returning to the assumptions about the sailing of the detachment, in case of failure, regarding the meeting with the 2nd squadron, I must mention that, although there was no written plan for a separate breakthrough to Vladivostok, daily conversations with the admiral's cabin concerned this main concern of the flagship and gradually worked out , after making all the calculations and picking up the maps, the route of an independent hike to Vladivostok.
            This plan was simple and consisted of the following:

            In view of the fact that the daily consumption of coal on armadillos is ber. the defense was stubbornly demanding the flagship’s requirements all the time and, already in Djibouti, it was brought up to 32 - 30 tons (sometimes Apnksin also has 28 tons), and the full fuel supply, instead of the normal one in 380 tons, was increased to 520, it was possible to pass without risk without renewing the fuel supply on the armor. ber. defense up to 3000 miles (15 X 30 = 450 tons; 15 days by 200 miles = 3000 miles). This led to the assumption, if we do not know where the 2th squadron is, to go, after the third rendezvous near Singapore, first to Turan Bay on the Annam Shore and there again try using the telegraph to find out where the 2th squadron is. Two German steamers with coal, about which I have already spoken, were sent there.
            If they didn’t know anything, it was decided to go through the Balintang Canal to the northern islands of the Philippine archipelago and there, using deaf bays, coal could not be loaded from its transports.
            Upon exiting from there, it was supposed to tow armadillos ber. defense over a distance of 1500 miles by transport, exactly to the Yokohama parallel, 200 - 250 miles from the Japanese coast. At this point, tugboats would have been handed over and all the ships under their pairs should have passed the 8 nodal passage through the 4 Kuril Pass and, having climbed north to the coast of Sakhalin, try to load more coal so that they could then go along Sakhalin and through the Laperuzov Strait in full swing. From the Korsakov post it was supposed to cross the Sea of ​​Japan at the shortest distance to our seasoned coast and then go along it to Vladivostok.
            Hope was assigned mainly to the thick fogs prevailing in May; it was decided to send the transports around Sakhalin at the mouth of the Amur River, ordering them to unload there, and in extreme cases, throw away so much cargo that the sediment allowed to enter the estuary.
            Both Rear Admiral Nebogatov and I considered this plan to be the only possible one for our detachment, since it was considered completely unthinkable with small forces and in view of the proximity of the main Japanese base - Sasebo, to go through the Korean and even Sangar straits.
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 1 October 2021 09: 08
              0
              Ndaa ... I shouldn't have chased the Russian admirals. It is a pity that fate gave Nebogatov such a kick, leaving him in his hands a completely hopeless business. From which there was not a single good way out.
              In general, a normal example, just normal headquarters work. All options must be calculated in advance. And no one writes about something like that in Rozhdestvensky. Either everything was lost or not.
              1. Maxim G
                Maxim G 1 October 2021 09: 36
                0
                General outline of the questions proposed by the Investigative Commission for the Tsushima battle to the interviewed witnesses and institutions of the Naval Department.

                To clarify the planosity of the battle.

                10) Was there a basic idea of ​​the battle with the enemy (battle plan) and what exactly was it.
                How it was supposed to operate with battleship detachments, cruiser detachments and destroyers.
                11) Was the battle plan sufficiently developed. How it was supposed to find out in advance about the forces and structure of the enemy.
                12) Was the battle plan discussed in the meeting of flagships and captains and was it generally known to these people.
                13) Was the squadron commander given any guidance to the junior flagships before the battle and communicated his thoughts on the deployment of the battle plan.
                14) Was the protection of transports included in the battle plan when they were separated from the squadron?

                Testimony of the former Commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, Vice Admiral, retired Rozhestvensky.
                10) The goal that the squadron pursued during the breakthrough through the Korea Strait determined the essence of the battle plan: the squadron had to maneuver in such a way that, acting on the enemy, as far as possible, move north.
                The battleships in three detachments were to act together against the enemy battleships; the cruisers Zhemchug and Izumrud, with four destroyers, were supposed to repel attempts at mine attacks on the battleship line (because of the smoke) from the side opposite to the location of the enemy's main forces. The rest of the cruisers and five destroyers were to be used by the orders of the cruiser commander to protect transports and to help injured and fallen battleships against enemy cruisers and destroyers.
                11) It was known that the enemy could oppose our main forces - an equal number of armored ships, which have an advantage in speed and in the power of artillery; our cruisers - double the number of cruisers; and our destroyers - the overwhelming superiority of the mine fleet. It was clear that, due to the relative speed of the Japanese battleships, the initiative in choosing the relative location of the main forces, both for the start of the battle and for its various stages, as well as in the choice of distances, would belong to the enemy. It was expected that the enemy would maneuver in a wake formation in battle. It was assumed that he would take advantage of the speed of movement and will seek to concentrate the action of his artillery on our flanks.
                The second squadron had to recognize the Japanese initiative in action in battle, and therefore, not only about the advance development of the details of the battle plan in its different periods, as in a previously forged two-way maneuver, but also about the deployment of forces for the first strike could not be. and speech.
                12 and 13) All the personnel of the squadron were aware of the urgency of a breakthrough into Vladivostok, that is, the goal pursued by the battle in the Korean Strait, determined by this goal, the essence of the battle plan and the purpose of each detachment. All flagships and commanders had, not only instructions in orders and circulars about maneuvers, which could be to a certain extent violated, or frustrated by the intentions of the enemy, but also practice in these maneuvers. All officers and gunners knew that one should strive to concentrate artillery fire on the ship at which the flagship was firing, unless the commander took it upon himself to deviate from this rule or if another target was not indicated by the flagship.
                All the way, the squadron took every opportunity to learn how to act in battle.
                There was no meeting of flagships and captains to discuss a detailed battle plan, because there was no development itself.
                14) The transports left with the squadron at the last transition had to move away from it before the start of the battle.
                Their protection, as already mentioned, was granted to the initiative of the cruiser commander.

                PS For Nebogatov it would be ideal not to connect with Rozhdestvensky - I think he would have come to Vladivostok on the sly, without incident.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 1 October 2021 10: 21
                  +1
                  Yes. It would be better if they had not met.
              2. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 1 October 2021 21: 41
                -1
                Quote: mmaxx
                And no one writes about something like that in Rozhdestvensky. Either everything was lost or not.

                Did not have. What is curious, but according to the position of the battle plans, it seems like Semenov had to prepare. However, this excessively talkative husband does not even stutter about his plans for the Tsushima battle for some reason.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 2 October 2021 07: 33
                  0
                  Yes wush ... There would have been something to talk about ... Apparently, there was nothing.
                  I remember the crew on our An-12. The man was choleric and left the impression of being narrow-minded. But it turned out that he had all the data on fuel consumption in any mode and load on his plane. Therefore, he could always answer any question about the fuel for any raklad. That's the impression! Small but headquarters. In the 90s, when kerosene was only sold in cash, it was critically important.
                  What prevented you from having well-grounded plans? Then they would not call Rozhdestvensky narrow-minded now. Otherwise, he thought that it was right across the Tsushima Strait and there were no other options. Only there is no evidence of considering such options.
      2. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 17: 27
        -2
        Quote: A_Mazkov
        According to the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky, the transfer of command in battle was to be carried out in such a way that the commanders of the new battleships, marching at the head of the column, were to take command of the squadron one by one.

        this is an amazing proof of the betrayal of Rozvensky, who launched the fleet in a column one at a time ... imagine the infantry going into battle in a column one by one, and not in a chain ... while mockingly appointing each next suicide bomber going out alone on the enemy ... a corporal posthumously ... for this Zhukov would have shot the commander and would have done the right thing
        1. Rurikovich
          Rurikovich 27 September 2021 18: 53
          +3
          Quote: vladimir1155
          proof of the betrayal of Rozvensky, who launched the fleet in a column one by one ...

          Lord, people, why don't you want to think in a complex way, but consider only something that you don't like !? request How many sticks have been broken about the fact that Rozhdestvensky built his actions on the basis of the course and results of the battle at Shantung! That he was still dominated by the ORDER to break through with all his might to Vladik
          The Admiralty's order read: "Now that Port Arthur has fallen, the Second Squadron must completely restore our position at sea and prevent the enemy army from communicating with its country."

          Now imagine that you are given an order to seize the sea and defeat the Japanese with the forces that you have? But this follows from the Order ...
          Rozhestvensky proceeded from the fact that he would withstand the battle in the line having even a lower speed, but the advantage in heavier guns, and provided that the Japanese would fight in a classic battle, the line would be the most optimal. And since Rozhestvensky was given the task of mastering the sea, then proceeding from this, he went with the transports necessary for the existence of the squadron. Consequently, the speed was at the slowest speed. THAT'S ALL! You cannot consider all Rozhdestvensky's actions as his personal whims! He, the military man, was given a task, and how he would carry it out is his business. Knowing that Felkerzam was dead, and Nebogatov was amalgamated with his squadron, but not with the entire squadron, he had only a line left, which would presumably fight in a line with the yapps. At that time, no one could have imagined that the Japanese would SO take advantage of their speed advantage. And they simply created an advantage on the head of the column, excluding almost half of the Russian ships from the battle of the main forces. If under Shantung the length of the column was 6 ships, then under Tsushima it was 12! Already in the course of the battle, as a result of maneuvering, the Togo ships periodically passed in front of the Russian formation, but due to their higher speed, they again exerted pressure only on the head, excluding the end ones. That is why the Russians hit a little at all for a short time, and the Japanese concentrated fire for a longer time all one by one.
          Who knew that the PA would fall, that Rozhestvensky would be reinforced in the form of Nebogatov's old stuff with shot guns. That you will have to drag transports with you, bringing the speed to an obscene walking speed, that Russian shells are much worse in their effect than Japanese shells, albeit high-explosive ...
          For some reason, no one considers EVERYTHING IN WHOLE, but only disassemble that the thread is one - like the Christmas traitor and that's it. He's a sucker, mediocre ...
          And put yourself in his place, you are our couch. Well, you will leave the transports, well, you will bring the speed to 12-13 knots, well, you will begin to act in the form of three detachments. But there will be a problem - how will you coordinate the actions of your units under different circumstances? Are you so fused that you understand each other perfectly? What will you do when, as a result of a successful maneuver, you briefly win a position for the main forces, and Togo, using even a smaller, but advantage in speed, hits the weakest unit (as he planned at the beginning)? You will rush to the aid or throw, breaking through with the main forces. And are you ready to take responsibility for your actions ?? Will you be responsible for abandoning the transports you need (if successful)? Why did you break through with part of the forces? And so many why ...
          So, the easiest way to be clever is having an afterthought. But what would you actually do with an Order from above, with only the knowledge that was available at that time?
          The same thing ...
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 22: 58
            -2
            Quote: Rurikovich
            At that time, no one could have imagined that the Japanese would SO take advantage of their speed advantage. And they simply created an advantage on the head of the column, excluding almost half of the Russian ships from the battle of the main forces. If under Shantung the length of the column was 6 ships, then under Tsushima it was 12!

            I didn’t understand anything from your opus, firstly he was walking not in a line, but in a column, confusion in your concepts, and secondly, the order did not follow to go into battle in a marching column, although I’m not a strategist, but I would obviously not let transports into battle, but would have left them in the rear, they would have built everyone with a sickle, in the middle a single-turret battleship, two-turreted to the right and left of it so that they hit with both towers, along the edges of the cruiser sickle giving them the task of suppressing enemy destroyers, and anti-torpedo combat ... it is foolish not to think that the Japanese will not take advantage of their speed advantage, and you are mistaken that no one could have imagined this, the enemy usually uses his advantages and you need to take them into account, unless of course you are a schizophrenic or the enemy is not a schizophrenic, (and both Togo and Rodesvensky were not schizophrenic, which is why I conclude that he was a traitor), it is even more stupid not to use their advantages, for example, having more battleships, and more large-caliber guns, if they went and not in a column, in a chain (front), which is the standard of the offensive, then the speed of movement of the Japanese does not matter, because one way or another we suppress them with our artillery, and if we do not use our artillery, giving the ships to them one by one, cross-firing, then this is pure betrayal
            1. Rurikovich
              Rurikovich 27 September 2021 23: 44
              +1
              Quote: vladimir1155
              he walked not in a line, but in a column

              Nobody says "column ships", but they say ships of the line. From the classic battle of one column with another. On the map it is schematically that the column is that the line. I don't see the difference
              Quote: vladimir1155
              if they went in a line and not in a column, in a chain (front), which is the standard of the offensive,

              The formation of the front with an increase in the distance of the battle is not optimal, because. reduces the power of fire by half wink In battles, linear forces are practically not used. So the thoughts of all sorts of couch admirals like "like hawks rush to the enemy and smash him into pieces" are like childhood dreams lol The front line is convenient as an intermediate one for tactical maneuvering. The turn "all of a sudden" is the same turn through the front line. With the formation of the front, the destroyers can approach the enemy at high speed, then make a turn by 8 points, fire a torpedo salvo, turn again by 8 points and leave the front formation. But in the battle of linear forces, the front formation is never used due to the leveling of this maneuver by the enemy by a simple shift at speed to the side. Moreover, your front line is still transformed into a column when moving towards the enemy. In this case, you will receive onboard volleys from the enemy, cutting yours in half. lol
              so do not tell me about the formation of the front in a battle with an enemy who has superior speed
              Quote: vladimir1155
              but I would obviously not let the transports into battle, but would leave them in the rear

              Thus, practically destroying them, since in the absence of their bases, the rear is enemy waters smile
              Quote: vladimir1155
              I would have built everyone with a sickle, in the middle a single-turret battleship, two-turreted to the right and left of it so that they hit with both towers, along the edges of the cruiser sickle giving them the task of suppressing enemy destroyers, and anti-torpedo combat.

              laughing good Laughed notoriously laughing
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 28 September 2021 12: 49
                -4
                Quote: Rurikovich
                say the battleships. from the classic battle of one column with another. On the map it is schematically that the column is that the line. I don't see the difference

                here is the same thing that you don’t understand anything, the wake column is intended for long voyages, but the line and battleships not along the Tsushima Strait were supposed to be located across, suppressing the enemy with fire, this is the basics, and look exactly across the strait were the ships of Togo
                1. Rurikovich
                  Rurikovich 28 September 2021 13: 35
                  +3
                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  and look exactly across the strait were the ships of Togo

                  Hmmm ... belay what ...
                  1. Vladimir1155
                    Vladimir1155 28 September 2021 13: 37
                    -1
                    Quote: Rurikovich
                    Hmmm

                    well, it is clear that you have no words, for you finally realized that you were wrong and that you didn’t know the basics of tactics and strategy!
                    1. Oleg Zorin
                      Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 15: 32
                      0
                      Dear, you are talking wild nonsense, that's why they refuse to comment on you
                      1. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 30 September 2021 15: 55
                        -1
                        Quote: Oleg Zorin
                        refuse to comment

                        well, you do not refuse to comment, write here, for two, you just have nothing to say, but you want your word to be the last and play a child's game ... "I was the last one to say, I am so knowledgeable and so smart that I can't explain I will become you little people "= your right to do this, but you will not fool me on empty show-offs, there is nothing to tell you, so you puff out your cheeks from impotence
                      2. Oleg Zorin
                        Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 16: 12
                        +1
                        I am not commenting. I state this sad fact
                      3. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 30 September 2021 17: 49
                        -1
                        Quote: Oleg Zorin
                        I am not commenting.

                        no, you are just commenting ... only now you have no arguments ... some show-off
                      4. Oleg Zorin
                        Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 19: 20
                        0
                        The Dunning-Kruger effect ... I think this is close to you ...
                      5. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 30 September 2021 21: 45
                        -1
                        Quote: Oleg Zorin
                        The Dunning-Kruger effect ... I think

                        to the point! this is about you, it is you who have inflated self-esteem and self-confident omniscience, so high that you write down ... and all your statements = only interjections, "hmm", "what nonsense", "I state" (it is not known what you you state such a great thing covered in darkness, but that you are unsuccessfully trying to make a good face in a bad game, you are trying to hide your incompetence behind puffing out your cheeks and arrogance, so screaming that you are not even able to connect two words except for the language of the cannibal ellochka "hmm", "hoho" "I (great and terrible) state") .... and you cannot give any arguments ... but if you do .... you are a "specialist"! then you will get into a puddle, because this is just not about me a modest mechanic, but about you, the all-knowing "stating meaningful hmm" and self-confident in your infallibility and imaginary rightness, which, I reasonably doubt ...
                        The Dunning-Kruger effect is a metacognitive distortion, which consists in the fact that people with a low level of qualification make erroneous conclusions, make unsuccessful decisions, and at the same time are not able to realize their mistakes due to a low level of their qualifications [1]. This leads to the emergence of overestimated ideas about their own abilities. (this is about you and about your beloved like-minded "strategist" Rozhdestvensky, a coward and a traitor who ruined a whole fleet and many people with his self-confident stupidity (betrayal))

                        Highly skilled people, on the other hand, tend to underestimate their abilities and suffer from a lack of self-confidence, considering others to be more competent. Thus, less competent people generally have a higher opinion of their own abilities than is characteristic of people who are competent (who, moreover, tend to assume that others evaluate their abilities as low as they do). Also, people with high skill levels mistakenly believe that tasks that are easy for them are also easy for other people.
                    2. Rurikovich
                      Rurikovich 1 October 2021 10: 07
                      +1
                      Quote: vladimir1155
                      well, it is clear that you have no words, for you finally realized that you were wrong and that you didn’t know the basics of tactics and strategy!

                      Vladimir, how many we have seen and read on VO of such strategists from God that this is exactly what you described
                      Although I am not a strategist, I would obviously not let the transports into battle, but would have left them in the rear, I would have built everyone with a sickle, in the middle a single-turret battleship, two-turreted to the right and left of it so that they hit with their both turrets, along the edges of the cruiser sickle giving them the task of suppressing enemy destroyers, and anti-torpedo combat

                      it is really impossible to read without tears with laughter lol
                      And I really don't want to comment. yes request
                      Several years ago, I, and Andrey from Chelyabinsk and a couple of good and adequate colleagues, tried to enlighten one "universal genius" of strategy and tactics, the great classifier of warships. He had a new nickname every month, because because of his nonsense and rudeness, they were constantly banned. Then he amused us notably. Can you imagine what he was carrying? Ships of the same project, designed to perform a certain range of tasks, he suddenly belonged to different classes and performed different tasks. I don’t remember specifically, but there was such nonsense. Up to the fact that the "Pearl" and "Emerald" were ships for different functions, such as one for guarding the squadron, and the second for reconnaissance. He had five ships of the same type could be built for completely different tasks. laughing Consequently, the tactics of battles were drawn based on this, without mentioning logic and common sense.
                      That is why your system as a "sickle" causes only a smile. In a nutshell, Togo would have smashed it with even less harm to himself than under the canon Tsushima
                      Don't try to be smarter than everyone else, especially sitting on the couch. smile hi
                      1. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 12: 15
                        -1
                        Quote: Rurikovich
                        Several years ago, I, and Andrey from Chelyabinsk and a couple of good and adequate colleagues, tried to enlighten one

                        respected story about a certain guy whom you "tried" to comprehend ... has nothing to do with me and the issue under discussion ..... you are trying to speak your teeth, tell me about Antarctica ..., but the question is as simple as a traffic jam, a mistake = Rozhdestvensky's crime, it is obvious that he did not line up the ships in a line perpendicular to the strait, and accordingly did not assign each of the three (with a stretch of four) the battleships of Togo by the way, three Russian battleships per one, Togo had only one decent battleship, and the rest were would have been bombed by our fire 1 to 3, the second mistake = Rojesvensky's crime was that the light cruisers were not used to fight destroyers, but mockingly went where there were no destroyers and were fenced off from their targets (destroyers) by our battleships ... if your concept is not accurate, then prove it, and the reference to Andrey from Chelyabinsk does not scare me, this is not a courtyard dispute with the indication of certain authorities with all due respect to Andrey, I smashed him (and also Timokhin with Klimov, who joined them) in the aircraft carrier theme, and even more so I will defeat you
                      2. Rurikovich
                        Rurikovich 2 October 2021 22: 30
                        0
                        Quote: vladimir1155
                        respected story about a certain guy whom you "tried" to comprehend ... has nothing to do with me and the issue under discussion.

                        Judging by your obstinacy, I would not say wink lol
                        Quote: vladimir1155
                        and the question is as simple as a traffic jam, a mistake = Rozhdestvensky's crime, it is obvious that he did not line up the ships in a line perpendicular to the strait, and accordingly did not assign each of the three (with a stretch of four) the battleships of Togo, by the way, along the line, three Russian battleships per one, Togo has only one there was a decent battleship, and the rest would have been bombed by our fire 1 to 3

                        Even Nikolasha is resting here request I will reveal one truth - the ships move during the battle! And speed remains one of the KEY factors in combat. Only in the brains of couch admirals can ships be placed perpendicularly and smash the enemy 1 to 3 laughing
                        Quote: vladimir1155
                        the second mistake = Rojesvensky's crime was that the light cruisers were not used to fight destroyers, but mockingly went where there are no destroyers and were fenced off from their targets (destroyers) by our battleships ...

                        Even if we take a purely cruiser, then our 7 (Monomakh, Donskoy, Oleg, Aurora, Svetlana, Zhemchug and Izumrud) - we do not take the Almaz yacht with its 75mm cannons - 15 Japanese cruisers opposed! Needless to say, breaking away from their battleships, "smash" the destroyers of the cruiser would have been destroyed much faster than they held out in battle. Given that if the number of units is 2-fold superiority, the number of trunks is 120-203 mm - 1.7 times. But don't forget about 2 x 203mm on Kasagi and Chitose. The question is who will smash who, you are our winner laughing request
                      3. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 4 October 2021 00: 16
                        -1
                        Quote: Rurikovich
                        I will reveal one truth - the ships move during the battle!

                        A sofa expert would need to know that they are moving, then they are moving .... only they can only move from the opponents or to him, there is no third option, if they walked forward by three, they would be bombed, but if they ran away. ... then this is what we need, "the Japanese fleet is scattered and running, and we are triumphantly moving to Vladik" ... so your idea somewhere you read about speed is empty ...
                        As for the cruisers, I offered them to bomb or disperse the destroyer detachments, you read me inattentively .... and if you had to fight the Japanese cruisers, the battle would be difficult, but it would not have been in vain. some of the Japanese would have drowned, delayed the time, and then our battleships would have joined by drowning all the Japanese battleships, the Japanese fleet would have been sunk, and not the Russian, if they had acted on my tactical proposal (in general, something obvious to anyone who thinks at least) and not yours with the traitor and the Rus Rodesvensky knowingly losing and generally absurd, schizophrenic
                      4. Oleg Zorin
                        Oleg Zorin 2 October 2021 21: 28
                        +1
                        It seems it was "Kolenka" laughing
                      5. Rurikovich
                        Rurikovich 2 October 2021 22: 04
                        0
                        Uh-huh, Nikolasha laughing
          2. mmaxx
            mmaxx 1 October 2021 09: 14
            +1
            Yes, yes, yes ... A tear is coming from the oppression of problems on the bolarin Zinovy. Rafting during a semicircular trip, nuuuu ... no way. The fact that there was nothing does not mean that it was impossible. THIS DOESN'T HAPPEN if the commander is normal. And if he could not even teach the squadron to walk without lights with his matyuga, then ..... They all have the same subordinates.
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 1 October 2021 21: 47
              +2
              Quote: mmaxx
              Rafting during a semicircular trip, nuuuu ... no way.

              This, by the way, is most shocking. Well, okay, they haven't learned to shoot, there are few shells and laziness. But you still have to swim together, whether you want or want. And for 8 months of living together, board by board, you can't learn how to maneuver !? And the first one who fooled in a battle with a maneuver was Rozhdestvensky himself! Well, it’s impossible to accept this as a norm ... It’s an amazingly solid tree to the waist you have to be so that you don’t even learn this .. Alas ..
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 2 October 2021 07: 42
                +1
                This is amazing. That's the whole squadron and that's it. There are no other options. But she already cannot be controlled at such a distance normally.
                All exercises and joint maneuvers are from the bottom up. First the ship, then the detachment. Then the whole squadron. And teach how to maneuver the regiment without teaching it from the platoons? No one will succeed. And all the subordinate commanders will be idiots. And you yourself will turn into a neurotic.
                I think that the figure of 9 knots came from the fact that only at such a speed the squadron could move more or less together. The convoys were moving at such a speed. From a huge herd of transports with incomprehensible commands. It is necessary to be able to bring personnel to such a herd.
                1. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 2 October 2021 20: 36
                  0
                  Quote: mmaxx
                  I think that the figure of 9 knots came from the fact that only at such a speed the squadron could move more or less together.

                  The figure 9 knots was taken from the transports. Rozhestvensky himself said that if they didn’t give me a bunch of fast transports, I wouldn’t be able to fight faster than 9 knots. (This is in his testimony) Well, that's what he did. Of course, he did not think about the fact that normal commanders of the convoy with them did not drag into battle. He has nothing to think apparently ..
        2. unknown
          unknown 27 September 2021 21: 53
          -1
          Perhaps Rozhestvensky outplayed himself.
          People of this year (sign) are considered the most intelligent.
          They make excellent commanders, for example Zhukov and Rokossovsky.
          But, the type of thinking is the most difficult, mystical.
          Choosing the right decisions - they become heroes.
          Choosing the wrong one - expect a complete collapse.
        3. Oleg Zorin
          Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 15: 26
          0
          Earlier, you quite reasonably noticed that war at sea is very different from war on land.
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 08: 33
            0
            Quote: Oleg Zorin
            war at sea is very different from war on land.

            that is, you say that only on land they walk in a chain, in a front line, but at sea they go into battle in a wake column without rebuilding into a line?

            when sinop and gangut fought at sea in front, and not in a column one by one
      3. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 27 September 2021 19: 06
        +1
        Quote: A_Mazkov
        According to the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky, the transfer of command in battle was to be carried out in such a way that the commanders of the new battleships, marching at the head of the column, were to take command of the squadron one by one.

        Felkerzam is dead, Nebogatov is in command of his detachment, despite the fact that the Japanese in the outset of the battle were firing at two flagships, as at Shantung. The question is - who should be in command if the flagship leaves the side, based on the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea? So the battleships led the squadron in turn, proceeding from the general order .. I repeat (already my tongue hurts to say that it is easy to say using afterthought) that it was supposed to simply withstand the battle with non-critical losses based on the knowledge known at that time based on the results of the 1TOE experiment. Not today, known to you and me, but those known to Rozhdestvensky
        1. A_Mazkov
          A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 19: 25
          +2
          What was assumed was assumed.
          But the fact that the situation had changed dramatically became clear to those in the Suvorov's wheelhouse at 14.00, at the latest at 14.05!
          Ignatius suggested changing the course. And Semyonov came to the wheelhouse with a similar request.
          So, there was not and there is no ignorance and afterthought.
          It was necessary either to take risks and increase the speed, or so and go in a small circle from the coverage of the head.
          Perhaps Rozhestvensky was simply confused, or maybe he could not correctly assess the situation.
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 27 September 2021 21: 25
            +2
            Quote: A_Mazkov
            So, there was not and there is no ignorance and afterthought.

            Have you also been to the Suvorov's cabin?
            Let me remind you that according to the official version, in response to the remark of the headquarters officers that the Japanese were targeting and it would be necessary to change the course, Rozhestvensky replied that we were targeting. As I understand it, he carried out the order, and without a fight, in this case, it cannot be carried out. And if you will with every hit
            [/ quote] [quote = A_Mazkov] either take the risk and increase the speed, or just walk away in a small circle from the coverage of the head.

            then a pretzel with a long column of 12 ships will not wind up.
            And now on the merits. When the battle is being fought by one column or detachment at comparable speeds and, most importantly, the OBJECTIVES ARE DISTRIBUTED BETWEEN SHIPS, when one matelot is fighting against another at the enemy, then a change in course to escape from under fire is still welcome if you keep the formation as a whole. Beatty and Hipper at Jutland. Then you yourself are forced to re-shoot in accordance with the change in distance. We will not consider the Coronel and the Fonklands - there a couple fought with a couple.
            Therefore, during the run to the south, the ships could stay in formation for a long time, competing in the skills of artillery officers. Since they fought almost according to the classics. Here, the quality of the shells, where these shells fell, the caliber, and the reservation were already involved. But the point is that they fought the way Rozhestvensky intended.
            Under Tsushima, the flagships were the main target. Therefore, head coverage due to speed led to the fact that "Suvorov" was in the focus of the Japanese squadron. The priority target was the flagship of the Russians, and therefore he received much more than if the principle was one-on-one. The lapel did not solve anything. it was possible to briefly knock down the zeroing, but the Japanese were ahead and with a simple turn-around made the situation even more aggravated. After all, the whole main day's battle was reduced to the turn-ups from the enemy of some and the turn-arounds with the shooting of the head of the others. Some, due to the superiority of speed, were constantly ahead. The essence did not change - the concentration of fire, as far as possible, on the head.
            The classics did not happen. Therefore, turn away or tear the distance - nothing would change. Each change in the course of the "Suvorov" would lead to throwing of the ships following it. And at the very outset, incapacitate the Russian "Mikasu", who knows how the battle would have developed. As a result, Rozhestvensky went to the last, until the more powerful Japanese shells inflicted more damage on the flagship than the 20 shells that hit the Japanese flagship before the Suvorov failed. That's all.
            1. A_Mazkov
              A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 22: 54
              +1
              I was not in Suvorov's wheelhouse, but Semyonov was. Moreover, he came with a request to change the course, since due to the fire, smoke and course, the stern guns could not shoot at Mikasa.
              It also takes time to overtake and cover the head of Togo. Moreover, Togo does not have so much of it. We must manage to defeat the main forces before dark. And the weather plays against Togo, fog (the Japanese lost our squadron 2 times because of this).
              The RIF has a different task: not to let the yapas beat themselves up and hold out until dark. Quite a doable task.
              And why would the change of course by the flagship lead to the throwing of the rest of the ships? So they would have followed him in one column, as planned. When Alexander III changed course, no one rushed about and was not lost.
              After 14.00, the question of an impulse to Vladivostok was no longer raised, here only it could be a question of the safety of the squadron and to exhaust the Japanese more.
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 27 September 2021 23: 54
                +2
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                Moreover, Togo does not have so much of it. We must manage to defeat the main forces before dark.

                The next morning, May 15, Togo, with its main forces, again met the remnants of the Russians wink
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                The RIF has a different task: not to let the yapas beat themselves up and hold out until dark. Quite a doable task.

                AND? It's one thing to hold out with all your might (albeit with damage), it's another thing that before dark it was -4 units. Rozhestvensky planned to endure, but under the conditions proposed by the Japanese, this is simply impossible. request
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                And why would the change of course by the flagship lead to the throwing of the rest of the ships?

                I was referring to the change by the ship of the distance to shoot down the enemy's sighting. When the flagship changes course, everyone will usually follow the flagship (unless otherwise agreed in advance). When "Suvorov" was out of order and it became clear that it was damaged, the squadron that had rushed after it went after "Alexander". Now imagine that the flagship began a frequent change of course to get out of fire? ...
                1. A_Mazkov
                  A_Mazkov 28 September 2021 00: 03
                  -1
                  If the flagship periodically turns to one side, then nothing will happen.
                  The Japanese in general, when they were shot at, described the coordonat, nothing fell apart!
                  We Borodino, apparently due to problems with the steering wheel, was out of order, so what?
                  So he and the fire, falling out of the column, did not stop at the same time.
                  1. Oleg Zorin
                    Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 15: 48
                    0
                    The flagship cannot change course until the ENTIRE squadron has completed the maneuver. This is the fundamental principle of the time. In addition, the ZRP had every reason to believe that it was he who bears the main burdens of the battle, and it is impossible to shoot down the sighting of other battleships
                    1. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 1 October 2021 17: 58
                      +1
                      Quote: Oleg Zorin
                      The flagship cannot change course until the ENTIRE squadron has completed the maneuver. This is the fundamental principle of the time.

                      But it only applies to complex evolutions.
                      Periodic flaps of the flagship in one direction are not.
                      If, with such a simple maneuvering, the admiral fears that his squadron will lose formation, then that is not a squadron, but some kind of gathering of fishing schooners.


                      Quote: Oleg Zorin
                      In addition, the ZRP had every reason to believe that it was he who bears the main burdens of the battle ...

                      Well, the flagship is a priority target, who's arguing with that.


                      Quote: Oleg Zorin
                      ... and it is impossible to shoot down the sighting of other battleships

                      So we have warships with professionals on board, or a bunch of fishing schooners?

                      "It was expected that the enemy would maneuver in battle in a wake formation. It was assumed that he would take advantage of the speed of movement and would seek to concentrate the action of his artillery on our flanks (ZP Rozhestvensky)."

                      And why is everyone poking into some kind of "afterthought" if Togo did exactly what Rozhdestvensky had intended?
                      And if Togo's actions were so obvious for Rozhdestvensky, then what was planned? How did he (Rozhdestvensky) intend to counter the action of artillery on our flanks?
            2. mmaxx
              mmaxx 30 September 2021 15: 16
              +2
              I'll shake it up for last. Nevertheless, even if we had disabled Mikasu, then knowing from the Japanese war and the subsequent ones how the Japanese are fighting, I am sure that they would not have looked up. Then Togo would have moved to another battleship and drove on. He had a spare flagship in every squad. And Rozhestvensky did not trust his commanders.
              1. Oleg Zorin
                Oleg Zorin 30 September 2021 16: 15
                +1
                Of course, the Japanese commanders are unlikely to give up even in the event of Togo's death. I dare to assume that the outcome of the battle would have been the same. There were too many factors on the side of the Japanese.
            3. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 12: 30
              0
              Quote: Rurikovich
              then a pretzel with a long column of 12 ships will not wind up.

              Obviously, however, understanding this obvious fact, you (O captain, obviousness = brilliant and incomprehensible), stubbornly insist on the correctness of the movement in a column that fetters 11 ships out of 12 ???? ... truly a blind person cannot lead a blind person, neither will both fall into a pit
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 1 October 2021 13: 12
                +1
                In this case, the squadron was in one column, controlled from one center, therefore, in any case, the maneuvers of the leader were carried out .. Whether it was right or not is no longer important. Sitting and guessing on the coffee grounds, what would happen if I didn't see the point. The Russians set their goal at this time to go to Vladivostok, therefore, taking into account the technical condition of the ships of the squadron and the task at hand, the speed and construction of the ships were chosen. The Japanese set a battle as their goal, because it was the division of the main forces into two detachments with separate command, but submission to a common idea. Therefore, due to superiority in speed and better controllability, the Japanese fought the battle at their own discretion. That's all.
                1. Vladimir1155
                  Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 13: 53
                  -1
                  Quote: Rurikovich
                  The Russians set their goal at this time to go to Vladivostok, therefore, taking into account the technical condition of the ships of the squadron and the task at hand, the speed and construction of the ships were chosen. The Japanese made it their goal to fight

                  Colonel Dotsenko, you and Rozvensky think .... that you can just walk past the enemy fleet being in a state of war, and prepared for battle for you? ... I will not repeat your previous arguments, "m = yes", "laughed" , "what nonsense", ..... just stating the fact of your deep wrong, bordering on the loss of all common sense, ....
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 September 2021 21: 45
            +1
            Quote: A_Mazkov
            It was necessary either to take risks and increase the speed, or so and go in a small circle from the coverage of the head.

            Which was ultimately done by Rozhdestvensky. What is the problem?
            1. A_Mazkov
              A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 22: 31
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Quote: A_Mazkov
              It was necessary either to take risks and increase the speed, or so and go in a small circle from the coverage of the head.

              Which was ultimately done by Rozhdestvensky. What is the problem?

              He turned 2 rumba, but after 5 minutes returned to course NO23.
              I don't know what his plan was, but he definitely aggravated the situation.
        2. rytik32
          rytik32 27 September 2021 21: 23
          +5
          I will repeat (already my tongue hurts, saying that it is easy to speak using afterthought) that it was supposed to simply withstand the battle with non-critical losses based on the knowledge known at that time based on the results of the 1TOE experience.

          Only in order to endure, as ITOE did, it was necessary as well as ITOE:
          1. Go 13 ... 14 knots.
          2. Actively maneuver.
          3. Get rid of operational overload.

          The fact that Rozhestvensky did not even think about it perfectly demonstrates his naval "talents"
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 27 September 2021 21: 54
            +1
            Quote: rytik32
            Only in order to endure, as did ITOE, it was necessary as well as ITOE

            Welcome hi ITOE initially went for a breakthrough, therefore it did not drag transports with it. 1 TOE, the task was set to seize the sea, therefore Rozhestvensky dragged with him everything he needed with transports.
            Quote: rytik32
            Go 13 ... 14 knots.

            Uh-huh, just walking with such a speed 1TOE Togo still caught up wink
            Quote: rytik32
            Maneuver actively.

            Within what limits? Everybody says that you have to maneuver! Tell us, how do you see this maneuvering given the enemy's superior speed? They dodged - it did not help, All the same, Togo was in front ...
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 27 September 2021 22: 13
              +2
              Good evening!
              2 TOE, the task was set to seize the sea, therefore Rozhestvensky pulled with him everything he needed with transport

              But it was possible to send transports around Japan?
              Still, there was no task of "escorting the convoy."
              Uh-huh, just walking with such a speed 1TOE Togo still caught up

              But the defeat did not work.
              Tell us, how do you see this maneuvering given the enemy's superior speed? Dodged - it did not help, Anyway, Togo was ahead

              Who dodged?
              Rozhestvensky made only one turn at about 14:00, approximately 4 rumba. The rest of the maneuvers are questionable.
              An effective maneuver against coverage is to keep the enemy behind the traverse all the time, turning from the enemy by 2 points, as soon as he goes to the traverse.
              1. Rurikovich
                Rurikovich 27 September 2021 22: 31
                +2
                Quote: rytik32
                An effective maneuver against coverage is to keep the enemy behind the traverse all the time, turning from the enemy by 2 points, as soon as he goes to the traverse.

                Uh-huh, a few of these turns and you're already going in the opposite direction. The enemy, having done "all of a sudden", returns due to the advantage in speed back and again stands in front of you. Have already passed smile
                1. rytik32
                  rytik32 28 September 2021 12: 57
                  +2
                  In fact, the Russian squadron got out of coverage without any problems when an intelligent commander was at the head. For example, at about 16:15 (rus), they turned away from the enemy, made a loop, and only caught up with Togo after almost 1,5 hours ...
                  And in theory, after the RYAV, the issue was considered in the Marine Collection. Is it possible, having an advantage in the course of 2 knots, to realize the fire advantage? The conclusion from the article is impossible.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    28 September 2021 13: 38
                    +3
                    Quote: rytik32
                    And in theory, after the RYAV, the issue was considered in the Marine Collection. Is it possible, having an advantage in the course of 2 knots, to realize the fire advantage? The conclusion from the article is impossible.

                    And the British on the maneuvers of 1901-03 concluded that it is very possible. This is somewhat more significant than the article in the MC
                    1. rytik32
                      rytik32 28 September 2021 15: 12
                      +4
                      Then voice the conclusions made by the French and the Americans.
                2. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 28 September 2021 16: 24
                  0
                  It still buys time. You can put out fires, pump out water. Repair the holes. Even without such maneuvering, there were pauses in battle when Togo lost our squadron. Based on the afterthought, there would be little sense. But then no one knew the outcome of the battle and it was necessary to try. Knowing this, now we would not say that Rozhestvensky was leading the squadron to the slaughter.
              2. Maxim G
                Maxim G 29 September 2021 12: 35
                +1
                There are a lot of options:
                1. Low-speed transports, which are loaded with all unnecessary from combat ships, together with Nebogatov's detachment go around Japan.

                2. Transports are sent to more neutral ports, on auxiliary cruisers (in fact, armed high-speed cargo ships) everything is unloaded from them and everything superfluous from combat ships, together with Nebogatov's detachment they go around Japan (when danger appears, they can give full speed and if even try to fight back, there will be no serious forces there anyway).

                3. After the successful transition of the main squadron to Vladivostok, transports or auxiliary cruisers in the role of transports make their way there around Japan, this option in case there is a shorter interval between the passage of Nebogatov's detachment and the transition of 2 TOE.
                For example, Nebogatov with his entire detachment (he is trained, floated together, has tolerable artillery training, rangefinders are verified) can come around Japan through the La Peruz Strait to Vladivostok before 2TOE.
                Instead of one "Russia", there will be, albeit not the best quality, but still a detachment of linear forces, with numbered destroyers, submarines.
                It is possible to prepare, together with the local sailors, an operation to meet the main squadron and at the same time make demonstrations, distracting the strait to which 2 TOEs will go.
                1. Vladimir1155
                  Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 12: 40
                  -1
                  Quote: Maxim G
                  It is possible to prepare, together with the local sailors, an operation to meet the main squadron and at the same time make demonstrations, distracting the strait to which 2 TOEs will go.

                  By the way, it is a wise proposal, given that Togo has only one strong, two decent, and one weak battleship, then dividing it into two or three detachments reduces its effectiveness to the same battleship in the detachment
          2. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 12: 36
            -1
            Quote: rytik32

            The fact that Rozhestvensky did not even think about it perfectly demonstrates his naval "talents"

            surely, it was an official who floated a qualification in a marikiz puddle, the very concept of building a column, assigning a poor person to a cruiser and creating a second column for him (a second department, but worse than his beloved so that everyone can see my greatness against his background), this is all official logic, he became skilled in it, squeezing the real naval commander Makarov away from the St.
        3. rytik32
          rytik32 27 September 2021 21: 27
          +1
          Quote: Rurikovich
          The question is - who will command in the event of the flagship out of action, based on the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea?

          This is an open secret.
          Makarov had long believed that the admiral should be on a high-speed cruiser next to the flagship.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 September 2021 21: 57
            +3
            Quote: rytik32
            Makarov had long believed that the admiral should be on a high-speed cruiser next to the flagship.

            Apparently, that's why he died at "Petropavlovsk"
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 12: 49
              -1
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Apparently, that's why he died at "Petropavlovsk"

              your statement is unacceptable, First of all, Makarov is a hero and died heroically, did not sit out his pants in Chelyabinsk, but rushed to the rescue of his own. that's why he died ... Secondly, the battleship Petropavlovsk was blown up by laying a charge in the cellar, it was a terrorist attack similar to the explosion of Empress Maria, and Novorossiysk. battleships did not damage. Thirdly, the denial of the hero's feat should make you think about the state of your conscience, lack of patriotism and about art.
              3. Dissemination of information expressing obvious disrespect for society about the days of military glory and memorable dates of Russia associated with the defense of the Fatherland, as well as desecration of the symbols of military glory of Russia, insult to the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland or humiliation of the honor and dignity of a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, committed in public -
              shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of up to three million rubles, or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of up to three years, or compulsory works for a term of up to three hundred and sixty hours, or corrective labor for a term of up to one year, or compulsory labor for a term of up to three years with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years, or imprisonment for the same period with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to three years.
              (Part 3 as amended by the Federal Law of December 05.04.2021, 59 N XNUMX-ФЗ)
              (see the text in the previous wording)
              4. Acts provided for in part three of this Article, committed by a group of persons, by a group of persons by prior conspiracy, or by an organized group, or using the mass media or information and telecommunication networks, including the Internet, -
              shall be punishable by a fine in the amount of two to five million rubles, or in the amount of the wage or salary, or any other income of the convicted person for a period of one to five years, or compulsory labor for a term of up to five years, with deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to five years, or imprisonment for the same period with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for up to five years.
          2. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 27 September 2021 22: 02
            +2
            So Sheer did not go ahead of his formation, and in the middle wink
            Quote: rytik32
            Makarov had long believed that the admiral should be on a high-speed cruiser next to the flagship.

            Good. Now describe in detail how Makarov would carry out high-quality control of his ships in a changing environment? When visibility deteriorates? He is behind the formation of battleships and does not see what is happening with the enemy. if he is in front of the formation, then it becomes a target for the fire of battleships in the presence of the admiral's flag. As a result, he needs to be out of the range of the battleships' fire, which leads to a deterioration in the visibility of the situation on the battlefield.
            In those days, the radio was not such a reliable source of control that it could be trusted, and flag signals when controlling from a ship rushing somewhere to the side may not reach subordinates. Therefore, the example is not constructive. smile
            1. rytik32
              rytik32 27 September 2021 22: 26
              +3
              Quote: Rurikovich
              which leads to a deterioration in the visibility of the situation on the battlefield

              This is only if the weather is foggy. A special case. In those days, visibility was much farther than actual artillery fire.
              But from the wheelhouse, when you can't raise your head, you really can't see anything.
            2. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 1 October 2021 13: 02
              0
              Quote: Rurikovich
              Now describe in detail how Makarov would carry out high-quality control of his ships in a changing environment? When visibility deteriorates?

              typically bureaucratic logic, "officers" who have never fought, but who know what subordination and order are, and for their subordinates, "I can’t know."
              Before the start of the battle, all possible options are considered, the admiral instructs the senior officers, ending with the phrase "if unforeseen situations arise, act according to the situation." This is the essence of the Suvorov-Ushakov method, to place competent commanders and even sailors of soldiers everywhere, give them the right to make independent decisions (mind is good, but two is better), "every soldier know your maneuver," obedient, so that they do not look smarter than you, and indicate to everyone everything up to the length of the hair, and if there is no radio communication, then everything = give up, "after all, you can't get it"
          3. Maxim G
            Maxim G 28 September 2021 08: 23
            +3
            This was even enshrined in the charter.


            It is out of order, it could be unambiguously according to the Naval Regulations.
            A high-speed cruiser could be one of our most modern armored cruisers (they are high-speed ones and can, if anything, hold out under fire): "Bayan", "Thunderbolt" or not purchased Garibaldian.
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 28 September 2021 16: 28
              +1
              Are we talking about Tsushima? Not? In general, as practice shows, the cruiser simply passes in front of the battleship. A couple of arrivals and you may not have time to leave.
              1. Maxim G
                Maxim G 28 September 2021 17: 27
                0
                Armored cruiser.
                Let me remind you that the Italian-built "Nissin" and "Kasuga" were in the same formation with the squadron battleships.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 30 September 2021 15: 22
                  0
                  Yes. At the end of the line. And they hardly fired at them. And what happened to Asama from one shell? One. And this cruiser carried the Varyag through one gate, almost preventing others from fighting.
                  1. Maxim G
                    Maxim G 30 September 2021 15: 33
                    +2
                    And in the Maritime Regulations it is about being out of order.
        4. unknown
          unknown 27 September 2021 21: 54
          0
          There were clearly few admirals in the squadron.
          1. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 23: 35
            +1
            Well, if you compare with the Japanese, then yes, really not enough. Oddly enough, both Togo and Kamimura had junior flagships.
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 28 September 2021 16: 27
              +1
              So they also knew what to do. What a twist! Unprecedented for the Russian fleet. One admiral in the head, the other in the tail, and both know what to do and can lead the squad.
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 27 September 2021 14: 22
      +4
      The main problem of our command for all our admirals was the complete non-planning of the battle. Follow me and that's it. No meetings, no plans. What for? The admiral is immortal.
      Result: Subordinates don't know what to do. And we must, here Rozhestvensky gave at least some crutches: to follow the head. But nothing else.
      1. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 15: 15
        +3
        The main problem of our command for all our admirals was the complete non-planning of the battle. Follow me and that's it. No meetings, no plans. What for? The admiral is immortal.
        Result: Subordinates don't know what to do. And we must, here Rozhestvensky gave at least some crutches: to follow the head. But nothing else.


        The plan, in short: to break through to the north, fighting off the enemy, since the initiative would still come from the Japanese.
        Like so.
        1. unknown
          unknown 27 September 2021 21: 55
          +3
          An erroneous tactical decision that turned out to be a complete collapse.
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        27 September 2021 16: 39
        +1
        Quote: mmaxx
        And you must, here Rozhestvensky gave at least some crutches: to follow the head. But nothing else.

        And he had no choice. By the way, if you look at the biography, you get the feeling that one could expect better command from the commanders Alexander and Borodino than from Nebogatov.
        1. A_Mazkov
          A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 18: 39
          +4
          And here Andrey, I do not agree with you.
          What exactly was Nebogatov doing wrong?
          1. Maxim G
            Maxim G 27 September 2021 21: 38
            0
            Considering that he was not an independent commander (after all, he only received the order to go to Vladivostok, the order to transfer command to him did not reach him), he did everything like this, if we discard the afterthought (like where Togo took the squadron or that he had to stay closer to the Japanese coast).
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            27 September 2021 21: 55
            +2
            Quote: A_Mazkov
            And here Andrey, I do not agree with you.

            Why? The same Bukhvostov at least had the experience of commanding a modern battleship. Nebogatov has the most powerful ship under command - Nakhimov.
            1. A_Mazkov
              A_Mazkov 27 September 2021 23: 04
              +2
              And what does this have to do with the squadron commander?
              Nebogatov seems to have had experience in leading training units of the Baltic and Black fleets.
              He brought his detachment to join 2TOE. He supported the main forces with the fire of his ships. Except for the muddy story with the transfer of command, then on May 14 I did everything right.
              What is worse than Bukhvostov then?
              1. Maxim G
                Maxim G 28 September 2021 08: 12
                +2
                Quote: A_Mazkov
                Except for the muddy story with the transfer of command, then on May 14 I did everything right.

                There is nothing muddy there, it is enough to open the Naval Regulations of 1901 and see how it should have happened.


                1. A_Mazkov
                  A_Mazkov 28 September 2021 11: 57
                  +4
                  Quote: Maxim G
                  Quote: A_Mazkov
                  Except for the muddy story with the transfer of command, then on May 14 I did everything right.

                  There is nothing muddy there, it is enough to open the Naval Regulations of 1901 and see how it should have happened.



                  Well, "... There was no conditional signal about the transfer of command in the event of the failure of the Squadron Commander and the flag-captain.
                  But, if such was installed, then it would be necessary to establish in the future the methods of its transfer from the ship on which the masts were shot down and, on the fired deck of which, there is no way to hold on for the device of temporary devices for signal production. "
                  Which seems logical.

                  "... My flag was not raised on the Buinom, because the wounded flag-captain felt unable to command the squadron and considered it necessary to immediately transfer command to the next senior flagship.
                  On the battleship "Emperor Nicholas I" they did not raise my flag, as I conclude from the subsequent movements, because the commander of the 11rd battalion detachment, having received the order to take command of the squadron, was not disposed to this, finding, probably, that the command of the squadron would have tied the movement of his flagship: according to the testimony of the participants in the battle, knowing about the helpless position of "Suvorov" and the death of "Oslyaby" - the flagships of the armored squadron, for a long time did not see the signal about the transfer of command to him, which was raised on the "Buinom" and rehearsed cruising squad; and when the content of this signal was communicated to him by a verbal order transmitted by the commander of the destroyer approaching the side of "Nikolai I", then, having entered (not before the removal of the main enemy forces) in the head of our surviving battleships, he added speed to full speed, developed XNUMX½ knots, at what speed, no doubt, he could not keep the remaining squadron united and soon lost it. "

                  Nebogatov asserted: "I did not receive a notification about the transfer of command by Admiral Rozhdestvensky to me; at about 5½ pm, the flag officer Lieutenant Sergeev reported to me that a destroyer had passed on board, the commander of which, by voice and semaphore, transmitted the following:" Admiral Rozhdestvensky ordered you to go to Vladivostok. "
                  At about 5 pm, not seeing the orders of the Squadron Commander, and also, not having any information about the fate of his senior, Rear Admiral Felkerzam, I decided to take course NO 23 °, indicated before the battle and leading to Vladivostok, in pursuance of which , raised the signal "Course NO 23 °", which signal was received by the XNUMXrd armored detachment; the leading two battleships "Borodino" and "Eagle", although they did not respond to my signal, but maneuvered so that they were inclined to the assigned course. "

                  As far as I remember, 2TOE and 3TOE had different systems of flag signals, so maybe Nebogatov is not lying, just in the confusion of the battle Rozhestvensky's signal was not heard.
                  And Nebogatov was not even aware of the death of Fölkersam.

                  Although Aleksey Silych described the Tsushima battle in a very odious way, he was right: they planned badly, but they did it as it turned out.

                  And how can the Naval Regulations help here?
                  1. Maxim G
                    Maxim G 28 September 2021 12: 32
                    +1
                    I meant that Rozhdestvensky and the headquarters violated the order of transfer of command described in the Naval Regulations - there was no conditional signal, Rozhdestvensky’s headquarters was removed from command, and Nebogatov did not find out about the elder’s death after the Rozhdestvensky flagship.
                    As a result, Nebogatov intervened and raised the signal on Nikolai 1, repeating Rozhestvensky's order to go to Vladivostok, not even considering himself an independent commander.
                    Those. In my opinion, the story here is just not muddy - Nebogatov has nothing to do with it at all.
                    1. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 28 September 2021 12: 44
                      0
                      A, clear.
                      I did not immediately understand your idea.
                      But it still turns out: Bardak!
                      1. Maxim G
                        Maxim G 28 September 2021 13: 04
                        +1
                        The fact that the squadron was inadequate became clear even during the Hull incident).
                      2. A_Mazkov
                        A_Mazkov 28 September 2021 13: 12
                        +1
                        Yeah ... Dogger-Banky somehow really shitty came out ...
            2. rytik32
              rytik32 27 September 2021 23: 50
              +3
              And Rozhestvensky has the most powerful - "Vladimir Monomakh" laughing
        2. unknown
          unknown 27 September 2021 21: 56
          0
          Rozhdestvensky had a choice.
          It is a mistake to solve a tactical task with strategic tools.
      3. Ross xnumx
        Ross xnumx 27 September 2021 17: 33
        +1
        Quote: mmaxx
        The main problem of our command all our admirals was complete non-planning of the battle.

        Loss of control of the squadron. If the commanders of the ships presented their tasks according to the previously prepared plans of action, then the changing situation during the battle could not be taken into account. This is exactly how the Japanese individually gouged the Russian fleet.
        Understand correctly, you cannot throw yourself with bare heels against a checker. No one canceled the science of winning. And there is no need to talk about the confusion and cowardice of the Japanese. It was in this country that the kamikaze appeared. It was here that there was strict obedience to the emperor.
        I have said and will repeat. The blame for the defeat of Russia in the Russian-Japanese war lies entirely with the sovereign-emperor - a slob and slobber who could only give commands ...
        1. unknown
          unknown 27 September 2021 21: 59
          +1
          After WWII, the Americans analyzed the actions of the kamikaze on the basis of such a discipline as psycholinguistics. Kamikaze appeared not from courage, but from doom, confusion.
  7. mmaxx
    mmaxx 27 September 2021 14: 18
    +2
    Tsyfir is curious, but no more. It remains to agree that we won on points. Only now the Japanese had EBR only 4. And they piled on ours notably. For any number.
    It remains to ask: why 1TOE, shooting badly, and this is a fact, did not lose a single ship. And why did 2TOE allow such a defeat, having a fairly uniform composition of the main forces, comparable to the main forces of Togo?
    1. Trapperxnumx
      Trapperxnumx 27 September 2021 15: 25
      +3
      Quote: mmaxx
      And why did 2TOE allow such a defeat, having a fairly uniform composition of the main forces, comparable to the main forces of Togo?

      So there was no homogeneous composition of 2TOE. The maximum of the first 6 ships can be considered quite close - relatively new, modern artillery. The rest are on hand.
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 28 September 2021 05: 08
        0
        About them and speech. The first five. The Japanese have four. Whatever one may say, Nissin-Kasuga and Kamimura's squadron are in the wings. If our battleships were engaged in them, then they would not be enough for a long time. The main battle is 4 Japanese battleships + 4 Italians against our 2 and Oslyabya. The rest of our ships suffered little.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 September 2021 16: 35
      +3
      Quote: mmaxx
      It remains to ask: why 1TOE, shooting badly, and this is a fact, did not lose a single ship

      The Japanese in Tsushima fired more accurately + Togo was afraid to get close for half a day. By the time he approached, there were a couple of hours before dusk.
      At the same time, Peresvet received serious damage (similar to those from which Oslyabya died) and the Tsarevich was knocked out of action. If the battle continued, ITOE would not have been good either.
      1. unknown
        unknown 27 September 2021 22: 11
        -2
        "Oslyabya" was more overloaded in construction than "Peresvet".
        Therefore, his carapace could not fulfill its role.
        Before the battle, it should have been unloaded as much as possible.
        And not to substitute, finding the enemy in time, and rebuilding in time from marching to combat formation.
        Some funny people, comparing "overexposures" with "underdeveloped", prefer the latter. Well, yes, with light "colonial" shells weighing 95,3 kg versus 225 kg 10 "guns.
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 28 September 2021 16: 39
          +1
          Despite the 10 "main caliber" Peresvet "and" Pobeda "honestly won back in Arthur. I have not heard any special complaints about their weakness. Anything is better than asamoids and macaroni.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 1 October 2021 21: 55
            +1
            Quote: mmaxx
            Anything better than asamoids and pasta.

            Strictly speaking, putting on Asams 10 "was not a particular problem. In extreme cases, reduce the average caliber by a couple of guns. Here the Japanese also slowed down, the ships turned out to be under-armed, like most Russians. Bayans are the same. Compare their weapons in the RYA and in WWI,
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 2 October 2021 07: 47
              +1
              You have to come to everything. Already from the first experience, they laid down Tsukuba with 12 "barrels at once. Because they looked at the war with open eyes. Everywhere, we, the Japanese, the British observers have the same conclusion: against large ships anything less than 12" is useless ...
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 28 September 2021 05: 13
        +1
        He was not afraid to get closer. It was a deliberate tactic. I’ll come home and take off the scans from an absolutely foreign book by O. Parks.
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 28 September 2021 15: 51
          +1
          Here is a scan. What do I like about this text?
          1. That he largely coincides with my opinion laughing laughing Although it is wrong to check history with logic.
          2. Parks is not an expert on RJV. He is simply writing within the English opinion of that war. The opinion is outside and uninterested. And they are almost members. Poke your nose into events during and after




        2. mmaxx
          mmaxx 28 September 2021 15: 51
          +2

          The last file. I didn't fit where I needed to.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            1 October 2021 09: 44
            0
            I'm sorry, but the text itself shows Parks' extremely weak acquaintance with the fight in WM, which, in general, is completely unsurprising.
            Quote: mmaxx
            He was not afraid to get closer. It was a deliberate tactic.

            Nobody says she was unconscious. But she was wrong. Togo was afraid to get close and tried to stop the Russians from a long distance, which he completely failed. As a result, he managed to lose the position and clinch on unfavorable terms.
            By the way, Parks has nothing contradictory.
            1. mmaxx
              mmaxx 1 October 2021 13: 50
              +2
              I believe that fighting at an advantageous distance for oneself is not a fear. War is not an area where everything is chivalrous. And in general, the word fear is not applicable to the Japanese.
              And about the disadvantage: in what place and when did Togo lose? In the worst case, and now that we know everything, we can only talk about justified risk, on the verge of genius. Like the risk of Napoleon at Austerlitz.
              I took a chance, and victory! I took a risk and a complete rout, which was not! Do you understand? There were no such routines.
              That is, neither under Shantung nor under Tsushima there was even a talk about the term all-in. Togo just pressed on the pimple. That is, in both cases, the victory was achieved very easily.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                1 October 2021 15: 23
                +1
                Quote: mmaxx
                I believe that fighting at an advantageous distance for oneself is not a fear.

                The problem is that it was not beneficial to Togo. He spent a significant part of daylight hours, did not cause significant damage to the Russian ships, preventing their breakthrough, and, moreover, instead of blocking Witgeft's path to Vladivostok, he ended up 7-10 miles behind Witgeft.
                Quote: mmaxx
                And in general, the word fear is not applicable to the Japanese.

                They are the same people, no need to absolutize them
                Quote: mmaxx
                And about the disadvantage: in what place and when did Togo lose? In the worst case, and now that we know everything, we can only talk about justified risk, on the verge of genius. Like the risk of Napoleon at Austerlitz.

                Answered above. Togo had to risk it later, catching up with the Russian squadron - and this risk is not a glimpse of genius, but retribution for his own mistakes made earlier.
                Quote: mmaxx
                That is, neither under Shantung nor under Tsushima there was even a talk about the term all-in.

                When Shantung - very much even went. And if Witgeft's gunners had fired like Rozhestvensky's, it is very likely that Togo would have lost the battle.
                In fact, Shantung was won by the Japanese despite Togo's maneuvers.
                1. mmaxx
                  mmaxx 1 October 2021 17: 11
                  0
                  What about the English speakers ?: Fortune loves the brave.
                  Fortune loves the one who deserves victory.
                  And if only, if only .... In general, the Japanese shot better. They didn't need accidents. We maneuvered better. They wanted to win. And that's all. They were rewarded.
    3. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 17: 20
      -1
      Quote: mmaxx
      why 1TOE, shooting badly, and this is a fact, did not lose a single ship. And why did 2TOE allow such a defeat, having a fairly uniform composition of the main forces, comparable to the main forces of Togo?

      because the traitor Roesvensky led the ships not in a line, but in a column, giving them to the Japanese one by one
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 28 September 2021 14: 04
        +1
        If a traitor had placed a formation in the front, then Togo, having an advantage in the course, would have dismantled this beauty from the edges and would not have suffered any losses at all.
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 28 September 2021 17: 47
          -3
          Quote: mmaxx
          would disassemble this beauty from the edges

          on the edges there would be rather high-speed cruisers, they would have had time to finish off the Japanese destroyers before Togo's approach, or the destroyers would have rushed to run towards Togo across the board. and then the Russian cruisers would leave because the cruisers are faster than Togo, from the other flank our cruisers would simply enter the Sea of ​​Japan (which would be needed), transports would rush behind them, and Togo would go to the edge of the Russian battleships standing in a row and alone would fight them, and the rest of our battleships began to go into his rear, sweeping away the Japanese gunboats and cruisers, and freeing up the passage for transports and Russian cruisers who would engage in the destruction and dispersal of Japanese destroyers ... so it was not in vain that he stood in the middle ( on his only battleship against 8 Russians of which 4 were of the Borodino type) and would not have engaged in cruisers on the flank, but would have had to cut wall to wall with the whole front ... this reminds the feat of Kolobanov, who with one tank destroyed an entire column of Nazi tanks, but the truth was that the Germans walked through the swamp in a column and could not turn off the narrow road ... but Rosesvensky walked along a wide strait and was entirely to blame for being amazed and for the opportunity to line up the front he had
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 28 September 2021 21: 01
            -1
            the Japanese had three 2xbash battleships, but only one decent one. and the rest played with the Russians, we had 4 very powerful battleships, and the rest are not worse than the Japanese
    4. unknown
      unknown 27 September 2021 22: 01
      -2
      Yes, there are only four battleships, of which one is outdated.
      And eight low-speed armored cruisers, each of which could not alone withstand not only the new battleships, but also the outdated ones.
    5. Kayuk
      Kayuk 28 September 2021 20: 25
      +2
      It remains to ask: why 1TOE, shooting badly, and this is a fact, did not lose a single ship. And why did 2TOE allow such a defeat, having a fairly uniform composition of the main forces, comparable to the main forces of Togo?

      That is why we are here trying to understand this, and the author is also trying to establish it with his articles .... They fired badly and held out until the evening, they fired well here, but lasted 40 minutes. The paradox, however ...
  8. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 27 September 2021 17: 19
    -4
    Thanks to the respected Andrey from Chelyabinsk for a detailed analysis that irrefutably proves my idea that the reason for the defeat in Tsushima was the pre-planned betrayal of Gr. Rozhesvensky, who intentionally launched the squadron with a wake column instead of the line and cowardly treacherously escaped before the start of the battle, which correlates with two terrorist attacks 1 explosion of an armored vehicle Petropavlovsk for the murder of the hero Admiral Makarov, 2 explosion and the murder of the hero Kondratenko. These two deaths, along with the betrayal from St. Petersburg, decided the outcome of the war.
  9. alexey sidykin
    alexey sidykin 27 September 2021 17: 29
    0
    The topic is interesting but described as in the military department. But here, after all, they are not cadets or students of the military academy.
    1. unknown
      unknown 27 September 2021 22: 05
      -1
      There is a lack of objective analysis of the aspect ratio.
      It is objective, and not following the generally accepted version.
      In recent years, a lot of information has appeared that allows you to look at the real balance of forces from a slightly different angle. OBJECTIVE.
  10. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 27 September 2021 21: 56
    0
    Complete nonsense, you can't say otherwise. They came up with some kind of fabulous ship-clock, multiplied it by the coefficient of the author's imagination, divided it up "fraternally" and got, as usual, one and a half digger. fool

    The analysis, of course, has a certain number of assumptions. Fully aware of this, I would still venture to assert that:


    It was more correct to immediately and honestly write that all the figures given in the article by the author are exclusively the author's speculations and were taken from the ceiling.

    What does he even add and divide here !? The number of hits on the ships of the Russian squadron is unknown! Even Eagle, the sole survivor, does not give us accurate information. According to different sources, the number of hits differs significantly! The time of the hits is all the more unknown. There is no doubt that there were hundreds of hits on the battleships of the first detachment, but exactly when and how many no one knows.

    What kind of dregs with some kind of per-minute calculation of the time of the armadillo's activity? Who said that when they got out of order, they immediately stopped shooting? Yes, there was no building as such! From the very first minutes, when Rozhdestvensky "cut off" the 2nd and 3rd detachments, they huddled together, and so they moved on in a heap for most of the first phase of the battle, only gradually and approximately joining one another and changing places when in this The damaged battleships that rolled out of the front ranks were built in a pile. And not only from the first, there and in the middle and the loss of control and circulation, some wrote out.

    Our Andrey boldly divides one unknown number by another fictitious number and tries to make grandiose conclusions from this .. Frankly speaking, this level of the article is shocking .. Just a set of incoherent letters and numbers presented in a scientific form. And after all, a lot of fans praise IT as usual!
  11. rytik32
    rytik32 27 September 2021 22: 01
    +3
    I will post here the opinions of one of the officers of the Eagle

    The main reason for the low accuracy is that Rozhdestvensky himself violated his orders.
    Having lost the position before the start of the battle due to the lack of reconnaissance and stupid maneuvering, he, wishing to improve, made a new gross mistake: he ordered the entire squadron to open fire. As a result, "Suvorov" began to hit, and the rest saw only the wall of splashes. When "Mikasa" suppressed "Suvorov" with fire (there is a record about this in the "Mikasa" database), the hits stopped. That's the whole secret of 15 "successful" minutes. Almost no one fired at "Alexander", "Borodino" and "Orel" during those 15 minutes. So it’s impossible to write off the cessation of hits to suppress their fire.
    And to deduce the average accuracy is not a rewarding task. "Suvorov" shot for four. The officers of "Eagle" directly write that they did not see where they were beating, that is, they could only be hit by a miracle.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      27 September 2021 22: 13
      +3
      Quote: rytik32
      The main reason for low accuracy

      It lies in the fact that, judging by the number of hits on Japanese ships, there was no
      1. rytik32
        rytik32 27 September 2021 22: 29
        +6
        The accuracy of the Russian fire in Tsushima must be compared with the accuracy of the Japanese fire in Tsushima.
        And then it turns out alas and ah!
        Comparison with other battles is incorrect due to completely different conditions of firing. It's like comparing the accuracy in battle at Cape Sarych and at the Bosphorus. The same ships fired completely differently because the conditions were different.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          28 September 2021 13: 42
          +2
          Quote: rytik32
          The accuracy of the Russian fire in Tsushima must be compared with the accuracy of the Japanese fire in Tsushima.

          Quote: rytik32
          Comparison with other battles is incorrect due to completely different conditions of firing.

          Already these two phrases completely contradict each other, since the conditions in Tsushima for the Russian and Japanese sailors were obviously different.
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 28 September 2021 05: 26
      +1
      Togo took a chance. Although it was necessary under the terms of the start of the battle. On his noose, he exposed himself to concentrated fire. Adjustment is not adjustment, but Mikase has flown in a lot, and probably from everyone. But Rozhestvensky played along with Togo with all his might. Slowed down, which helped Togo to get into the head as quickly as possible and, out of the best intentions, gave the order to hit on the head. In the absence of training in conducting such fire, he did not even imagine the consequences of such an order. That is, Rozhestvensky was engaged in the leadership of artillery preparation in the Russian fleet at the cave level. And then a hail of shrapnel, wounds, knocked down halyards, etc., etc.
      In general, Togo's plan to knock out the flagship was 110% successful.
  12. Pojuella
    Pojuella 30 September 2021 23: 39
    0
    123
    Quote: Trapper7
    Quote: ROSS 42
    The main reasons for the defeat are the technical backwardness of the fleet and the lack of tactics that correspond to the realities ...

    The main reason for the defeat is superiority in the forces of the enemy. Only 6 Russian ships could fight on equal terms with the Japanese. The rest is old stuff and "big gunboats", which can only support the main forces, but are in no way capable of waging an equal battle with the enemy.
    As an example, we can cite two battles - Coronel and Falklands in 1914, when the enemy, having newer ships, destroyed "on paper" an equal enemy.
    But in neither case, I hope, about technical backwardness fleet won't you write?
    Why do you, and, most importantly, do we need this monkey labor?


    If you don't like it, read it. Nobody forces. There are a lot of people on the site who are interested in it.
  13. Vanya Smith
    Vanya Smith 1 October 2021 19: 24
    0
    There is a gross error in comparing the accuracy of hits at Shantung. The idiotic, and actually criminal, order of Vitgeft to shoot the entire squadron at Mikasa is not taken into account. Moreover, from the tables above, it can be seen that this order was in effect at both stages of the battle. Squadron firing at one target has never been practiced. This was the first time the Japanese were concerned about it following the results of Shantung. Russian ships uselessly kneaded the water around the most protected enemy ship with shells, unable to adjust fire according to signs of falling. The Japanese, however, fired most of the battle individually, beating all the Russian ships fairly evenly.
    And the Russians, at the second stage of the battle, from Sevastopol did not see Mikasa at all and shot almost at random, determining the distance to the matelot and introducing a correction to the target by eye. And Poltava was still further Sevastopol. And these, by the way, were the two best shooters of the Russian squadron.
  14. grak33
    grak33 9 November 2021 11: 18
    -3
    at Shantung

    There is no such geographic point on planet Earth.
    Does not exist.
  15. Elturisto
    Elturisto 23 November 2021 20: 28
    0
    Studying history is necessary in order to take into account the mistakes made earlier. There is no analysis of mistakes. There is no understanding that the battle is only the final stage of economic confrontation. And what we see is an attempt to whitewash a mossy monarchical country where individual rights were worthless. maybe a modern combat-ready fleet in a country where degenerate noblemen beat up sailors, their comrades-in-arms and hold them for speechless cattle. This is the main historical lesson of the RYAV. But history, as you know, does not teach anything - the concession for cutting down the Korean forest of Admiral Abaza replaced the concession for Timchenko's Syrian phosphates. The same slogans, the same grips, the same methods ...