Who are you, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis?

237
Who are you, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis?

It is no secret that at the beginning of the war, the command staff of the Red Army showed itself not in the best way, to put it mildly. Just like in Finnish, our generals made mistakes in calculating their own and enemy's forces, with the directions of attacks, thoughtlessly following orders, or, on the contrary, sabotaging them. Not all and not always, of course, but the fact is the fact - those who led the Red Army in 1941, by 1945 were at best on the sidelines. For a war, this is a normal phenomenon - it carries out the most terrible, but at the same time the most effective selection of personnel. Voroshilov, Budyonny, Timoshenko, Pavlov, Kirponos and many others did not pass this selection. Someone died, someone was prosecuted and shot, and someone, after terrible military disasters, was pushed further away, to tertiary areas.

Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis did not pass this selection, but unlike Pavlov, who became an innocent victim of the regime, from Khrushchev, who became the Head of the USSR, from Timoshenko, who lived in satiety and peace, Mekhlis appears before us as a kind of devil who shot the poor Red Army soldiers in batches, undoubtedly smart and talented generals, so to speak, our Hindenburgs, and in general, as one newspaper put it, the shadow of Stalin and his punitive ax.



In fact, everything is not entirely true, or rather not at all. Mekhlis was a man of his era, and his era began in 1889 in Odessa, in the family of a bookbinder. It was a turbulent time, and for the Jews it was twice as turbulent. The Pale of Settlement, prohibitions on education and professions were in effect, preserving the narrow world of communities, from where young people were eager for freedom for a new life. Our hero was no exception, who received a fairly good education - an unfinished commercial school and work as a clerk and teacher. Of course, like many young men of that time, politics, joining the socialist party "Poalei Zion", participation in Jewish self-defense and arrest for possession weapons... In 1911 - the army, where Lev Mehlis got into the artillery, fought in the First World War. Some biographers write about the officer rank, some do not, Mekhlis himself said about himself, without going into details:

“In 1911 I was taken to the service and assigned to the artillery. I spent the entire imperialist war at the front. Since 1915, I have participated in the work of underground socialist circles. I joined the party in 1918, but actually became a communist three years earlier under the influence of older comrades who opened my eyes. "

Whatever it was, it is difficult to call a person a coward and a fool, and the revolution, and the war, and then the Civil war, where the commissar of the 46th rifle division was wounded:

“Mekhlis is a brave man, capable of inspiring inspiration during a battle, strives to the dangerous places of the front. But as a politician he has no political tact and does not know his rights and responsibilities. "

With tact, Lev Zakharovich was bad all his life, but with courage, as in the battle at Genichensk, where he led the fighters into the attack, everything is fine. Mehlis himself was just a fan of discipline, about which he personally wrote:

"The more the discipline is shaken, the more arbitrary measures one has to resort to to impose it, which do not always give positive results."

And as a fan of a personal example for the fighters:

“The army commissar of the 1st rank put the editorial staff on a truck - a former Leningrad taxi, gave several soldiers to guard:“ Break through ”. And they broke through the still fragile ice of the lake. And Mekhlis himself, together with the division commander, led its way out of the encirclement ... Seeing that ours could not bring down the Finnish barrier by the road, Mekhlis placed the soldiers in a chain, got into the tank himself and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and a machine gun. The soldiers followed. The enemy was shot down from his position. "

Doesn't sound like a tyrant and opportunist, does it? During the Great Patriotic War, Mekhlis did not change his habits:

“In one of his mouths he found the order to attack. He, without hesitation, stood at the head of the company and led it along. None of those around him managed to dissuade Mehlis from taking this step. It was very difficult to argue with Lev Zakharovich ... "

And he did not change until his death, when already on his deathbed he was thinking about the matter:

“I am perfectly aware that I am already standing with one foot in the grave and that the day is not far off when the other foot will also be there. I'm not afraid of death. As a materialist, I am aware of its inevitability, but what is the use of being afraid of the inevitable? I am afraid of another, that I will die without completing my work, the last important work of my life. "

At the same time, his career was not as simple and impetuous as is commonly thought. In 1920, after being wounded, he met Stalin and became his assistant. Iosif Vissarionovich himself was then not a strong and large size, and only one of the assistants ... From 1926 to 1930, Mehlis studied, studied seriously and efficiently, eventually becoming a red professor. And only in 1930 his career began - he became the editor of the newspaper "Pravda", the main newspaper of the country. He will work there until 1937.

Repression


Much has been written about how Mehlis massacred those who disliked Stalin; less is said about the fact that Lev Zakharovich almost repressed Joseph Vissarionovich. After the suicide of his wife Nadezhda Alliluyeva, it was Mehlis who conducted the investigation, interrogating the murder suspect, Stalin, several times. According to the recollections, he spent it seriously, without fools, remember Khrushchev:

"He was truly the most honest man, but somewhat crazy, which was expressed in his mania to see enemies and pests everywhere."

And so he participated, of course, even the names of the victims were preserved. Here in Saratov, he ordered the arrest of three perpetrators of pollution of the Volga River with oil products from a local refinery, where an unsettled technical process was launched, causing an environmental disaster; in Leningrad at Lenenergo, the leadership went on trial, which ignored the regular death of workers due to violations of labor protection; in Belarus, the chief was shot just because of the contamination of grain intended for processing into flour, of course, on a wholesale scale. Or brigade commander Vinogradov - led the division into an encirclement and fled to the rear, shot in front of the formation of those who remained from the division. There was also politics - Mehlis massively expelled political workers from the army after he became the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army. How much the dispersal of openly snickering professional talkers influenced the army - judge for yourself. For the rest, he did not have the same height in order to influence processes and make decisions based on faces.

Rather, Lev Zakharovich is Stalin's personal inspector, who was thrown all his life where a master's eye is needed. First the media, then the army, then the Finnish war, in 1940 - state control, on the eve of the war - again the Political Administration of the Red Army, 1942 - the Crimean Front and demotion to corps commissars, then the PMC of the fronts, and after the war - the Minister of State Control until 1949, when he was overtaken by a stroke and a heart attack at the same time. Lev Zakharovich died on February 11, 1953, less than a month before the death of his boss, whom he respected simply infinitely:

“Everyone knows Comrade Stalin as the closest comrade-in-arms and brilliant successor of Lenin's cause. But few are able to fully comprehend the size of Stalin's contribution to the construction of the Soviet state and world socialism. "

Why he was not loved


And where do you like an auditor, especially an honest and incorruptible one? Especially one who cuts the truth-uterus, not embarrassed by conventions? Whom they listen to, and who is quick to kill? It was he who wrote the devastating report on the Western Front, and he characterized the unflattering Crimean front. And who will love for this:

“As a result of the criminal cowardice of Lieutenant Colonels Svetlichny and Glushkov, on the night of July 20 of this year, units of the 134th Rifle Division, which were surrounded, lost: about 2000 personnel (fled from the 1st and 2nd detachments), some of them got captured by the enemy; two artillery battalions, two regimental artillery batteries, a lot of artillery shells, more than 10 machine guns, about 100 horses and weapons were left to the Germans. "

At the same time, to say that Mekhlis was a kind of ideal, of course, also does not work out - always noticing and noticing shortcomings, he did not always know how to correct them, and the disaster in Crimea is an example of this. Lev Zakharovich was sent there as a representative of the Headquarters, and he, criticizing a lot and rightly, did not correct, but worsened the general situation, and did not prepare the troops for defense. For which he paid harshly, despite the fact that the main fault was still with General Kozlov, who, as a commander, was obliged to take action, and to report disagreements with a representative of the Headquarters to Moscow.

The person who replaced him at the post of Head of the Political Administration expressed himself well about our hero:

“Mekhlis is a strict, demanding, sometimes even harsh party leader. They say a lot about him. Not everyone likes exactingness. "

I will add from myself - not only to taste, but not everyone is capable, it is always difficult with such leaders, they demand from "a" to "z", they do not have an understanding that something may not go according to plan, but they and will not absolve themselves of responsibility and will not substitute a subordinate.

Mekhlis was also demanding of himself, his wife spent the whole war as a doctor in a military field hospital, and his son fought. And the Crimean failure, which he considered his own, was justified by work for wear and tear, work that brought him to disability and death. And then those whom he controlled came to power ... And a legend appeared about a tyrant and a psychopath who killed thousands of people, disrupted front operations, an unprincipled opportunist, a coward and an intriguer, Stalin's six. It's so nice to kick the Dead Lion ... And it's even more pleasant to add a note of anti-Semitism today, claiming that Mehlis was killed / removed by Stalin, and this despite the fact that for the last three years half of his body has not really worked after a severe stroke.

And for me, Lev Zakharovich was a fanatic - a fanatic of the idea that in those years captured the minds of millions. He lived for her sake, did everything for her, eradicating any outrages and qualifying them as counter-revolution, for her sake he died, burning himself to the end. And the judges of such people are clearly not contemporaries who suffered from his honesty, but descendants, moreover, distant ones, when the passions of that era finally subside.
237 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +16
    21 September 2021 18: 11
    ... Russia is a country with an unpredictable past.
    1. +46
      21 September 2021 18: 33
      All you need to know about Mehles is expressed in Stalin's message: “You adhere to the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very comfortable, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the General Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot. You, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If “the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack in the morning,” and you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, then so much the worse for you. This means that you have not yet realized that you were sent to the Crimean Front not as the State Control, but as a responsible representative of the Headquarters.

      You demand that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you can not know that we do not have in reserve Hindenburg ... If you used attack aircraft not for side effects, but against tanks and enemy manpower, the enemy would not break through the front and the tanks would not pass. You do not need to be Hindenburg to understand this simple thing, sitting for two months on the Crimea Front »1.

      Mehles was a lot to criticize, but not to take responsibility
      1. +31
        21 September 2021 18: 37
        K. Simonov in the book "Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation" (1979) tells about a conversation with G. Zhukov:
        In May 1956, after A. Fadeev's suicide, I met Zhukov in the Hall of Columns, in the presidium room, where everyone who was to stand guard at Fadeev's coffin gathered. Zhukov arrived a little earlier than the time when he was supposed to stand on the guard of honor, and it turned out that we talked with him for half an hour, sitting in a corner of this room. The topic of the conversation was unexpected both for me and for the circumstances in which this conversation took place. Zhukov talked about what worried and inspired him then, shortly after the XX Congress. It was about restoring the good name of people who were captured mainly in the first period of the war, during our long retreats and huge encirclements ... the formula: "Everyone who was captured is a traitor to the homeland" and justified it by the fact that every Soviet person facing the threat of captivity was obliged to commit suicide, that is, in essence, he demanded that all the millions of those who died in the war be added several million suicides.


        Military historian Yuri Rubtsov in his book “Stalin's Alter ego. Pages of the political biography of L.Z. Mekhlisa "describes the character of the head of the political department:
        Mekhlis, on the other hand, often preferred a behind-the-scenes game, skillfully draped his personal dislike for his opponent with ostentatious concern for the interests of the cause. Being an inflexible person, besides being inferior to most military leaders in intellectual terms, not to mention operational-strategic training, he could not keep up with the dynamism of hostilities, and he judged the situation at the front, the plans and actions of commanders and other officials in a straightforward, simplistic manner. ... He pressed hard on the political side. And, importantly, he skillfully exploited Stalin's passion, known to him since the 20s, for unspoken, undercover, as they say now, methods of solving personnel issues. For which, without a doubt, we condemn the majority of those with whom we brought Lev Zakharovich on the roads of life
        1. +17
          21 September 2021 18: 55
          Quote: Crowe
          Yuri Rubtsov in his book ...

          Well, Yuri Viktorovich Mekhlis is grateful to his death. He has been covering this topic for more than thirty years. He defended two dissertations on Mehlis - a candidate's and a doctoral one, he has published books about him, by the way, good ones. A lot of materials are still few and generally unknown. So there is something for thinking people to read about Lev Zakharovich now.
        2. -3
          21 September 2021 19: 02
          K. Simonov in the book "Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation" (1979) tells about a conversation with G. Zhukov:
          - yeah, one is a court writer, and the other is a prominent representative of the army generals. Let me remind you that all the army authorities hated Mehlis, because they could not forgive themselves for the fear that they once experienced in front of him ...
          1. +18
            21 September 2021 19: 30
            Andrey
            You're right. In Europe, JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN and the RED WORKERS-PEASANT ARMY are accused with might and main of destroying the Nazis and their allies and of course for driving such a sweet Hitler to suicide who, if he had a shortage only in relation to the Jews, and even then not everyone in a row, like how. After all, there were the same Jews in the army and in the aviation.
            In present-day RUSSIA, Vlasov's followers seized power. And what can they say? So they shoot films that distort the events of the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR, publish books of frank BREKHUNOV.
          2. -12
            21 September 2021 20: 29
            Quote: faiver
            Let me remind you that all the army authorities hated Mehlis, because they could not forgive themselves for the fear that they once experienced in front of him ...

            They were afraid, they were afraid. So it was not clean in their souls.
            1. +6
              22 September 2021 13: 37
              I have met Stalin's phrase somewhere: "..If you want to ruin the case, entrust it to Mekhlis ..". Nevertheless, Stalin kept Mehlis by his side, because he was loyal to him to the core ...
              1. +3
                23 September 2021 11: 14
                Stalin did not have such a phrase.
              2. +13
                23 September 2021 13: 12
                And somewhere I met the phrase of I.I. Stalin: "Well, this drunkard Yeltsin!"
          3. +4
            21 September 2021 22: 44
            In Simonov's ego trilogy (in the last part) "The Living and the Dead", Mekhlis was bred under the name Lvov. Actually, Mehlis, in my opinion, is something like Arakcheev.
            1. +9
              22 September 2021 02: 15
              By the way, they also invented many different injustices about Arakcheev.
            2. +1
              24 September 2021 13: 00
              Quote: motorized infantryman
              In Simonov's ego trilogy (in the last part) "The Living and the Dead", Mekhlis was bred under the name Lvov. Actually, Mehlis, in my opinion, is something like Arakcheev.

              There is such a thing. In "The Last Summer" under the PMC of the front by Lvov, Mehlis is clearly meant. There are direct indications to this in the book. But Simonov's attitude to Lvov (Mekhlis) is very ambiguous in the book: along with negative, many positive features are mentioned. I think that Simonov knew what he was writing about. The man (Mekhlis) was clearly not easy and his activity was definitely not appreciated. But against the background of current leaders, he looks very positive for me.
          4. +4
            22 September 2021 02: 14
            yeah, one is a court writer, and the other is a prominent representative of the army generals.
            That's right! good And again, it should be noted that all this was said after the XXth Congress, when it became "fashionable to kick lions", twisting everything and embellishing!
            1. +2
              23 September 2021 10: 44
              Quote: militarist63
              And again, it should be noted that all this was said after the XXth Congress, when it became "fashionable to kick lions", twisting everything and embellishing!

              We quickly rebuilt under "Nikita". I remember well how much mud poured out of the "journalistic and writer's" mouths.
          5. +5
            22 September 2021 15: 04
            Quote: faiver
            K. Simonov in the book "Through the Eyes of a Man of My Generation" (1979) tells about a conversation with G. Zhukov:
            - yeah, one is a court writer, and the other is a prominent representative of the army generals. Let me remind you that all the army authorities hated Mehlis, because they could not forgive themselves for the fear that they once experienced in front of him ...

            That is, there was no such decision about prisoners?
        3. +8
          22 September 2021 08: 29
          So it was Mehlis that forced Zhukov to sign Order 270 of August 16, 1941?
        4. +1
          24 December 2021 00: 23
          A mediocre slime. and chutzpist
      2. +11
        21 September 2021 18: 52
        but no responsibility
        - like this? He took responsibility and took upon himself, the other question is that he did not have knowledge ...
      3. +2
        22 September 2021 11: 09
        Quote: Cympak
        You adhere to the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very comfortable, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the General Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot.

        For almost half a year, Mekhlis sought to remove Kozlov from the post of the front commander - just for his inability to command. Moreover, the candidacy for his post was nearby - so that Comrade Stalin was wrong to sneer about the Hindenburgs.
        1. +9
          22 September 2021 11: 36
          From whom did the IVS receive the report on Mehlis's inaction? He saw a negative result and greeted him according to the principle - you were put in charge there, you are responsible for the defeat. But LZM did not know how to command troops, he is a political worker. I could have roused the fighters to attack, but there was no way to lead the front. Stalin's own mistake. Therefore, he did not repress, because he realized that he had screwed up himself.
      4. -1
        23 September 2021 12: 58
        "... I spent the entire imperialist war at the front. Since 1915, I have taken part in the work of underground socialist circles ..."

        If he spent from 14 to 15 at the front, then this time (one year) can hardly be called the ENTIRE WAR. Brehliv was this Bundist Mehles.
        And since 1915 he was a rebel underground fighter, which means a traitor who, together with other underground fighters, shattered the front, and led Russia to a loss ...

        "Mehlis placed the soldiers in a chain, got into the tank himself and, moving forward, opened fire from a cannon and a machine gun ..."
        What a MANY-HANDED "talent" is sitting in it!
        He got into the tank himself, probably for driving? Moving forward he fired from a cannon, and jumping from place to place fired from a machine gun ...
        Eight-winged Seraphim was probably this intriguer, provocateur and evil Cerberus ...
        And lead the tank and fire from all the guns at the same time and monitor the road, assess the situation, make a decision ...

        "... was a man of his era, and his era began in 1889 in Odessa, in the family of a bookbinder ..."

        What else to expect from a bookbinder. He worked with books, so he was just a master of writing and no more
        1. 0
          26 September 2021 22: 55
          Yes, there was no choice at that time. Manstein to outplay in operational terms whoever could. We had a twofold advantage, so we thought that there was not enough solid hand, plus the directive of the military commander-in-chief on the offensive. Then 'Bustard Hunt' ...
        2. 0
          27 December 2021 19: 22
          If you don't know))) in the tanks there was a DT machine gun paired with a cannon, and in some also in the back of the tower. PS Alternatively, the gifted also give us on a shovel the so-called. "tank" Porokhovshchikov RKMP))) where the proletarian in a birdhouse on one caterpillar also shoots from a machine gun Maxim, slowing down with his feet.
        3. -1
          10 January 2022 12: 42
          Quote: vlad106

          "... was a man of his era, and his era began in 1889 in Odessa, in the family of a bookbinder ..."

          What else to expect from a bookbinder. He worked with books, so he was just a master of writing and no more

          .....
          Wrong, not a master of writing .. BUT THE GREAT Hans Christian Andersen. Storyteller
      5. 0
        24 September 2021 14: 02
        Quote: Cympak
        Mekhlis was a lot to criticize, but not to take responsibility
        I'm not sure if this is true, but nevertheless: "General GF Samoilovich, Hero of the Soviet Union testifies:"
        Coming to Stalin, Mehlis fell to his knees: "Comrade Stalin! Order to shoot this Stupid Jewish Head." Stalin: "Since we will see such self-criticism"
        .
        But there is evidence of his petty tyranny.
        https://maxpark.com/community/2039/content/1980056
        I met with Mekhlis on the Volkhov front in the fall of 1942. Our 849th artillery regiment of the 294th rifle division took up positions in the area of ​​Naziya station. We waged active hostilities, restraining the enemy's offensive to the southern bank of Ladoga, and even tried to reach the Neva and break the blockade of Leningrad. At that time I was in my twenty-first year and I was the chief of artillery equipment of the regiment with the rank of senior technician-lieutenant. One of my most important tasks was to provide the regiment with ammunition. They had to work at night, when the German aviation was inactive. I had two lorries at my disposal, artillery depots were located near Volkhov. It was raining that night, it was very dark, and the appearance of aircraft was out of the question. We drove with the headlights on, although I knew it was forbidden.
        At a bend from the destroyed village of Putilovo, a beam of light fell on an armored car and two cars, five or six people in cloaks were standing next to one. One of them raised a hand, demanding to stop. As soon as I got out of the cockpit, an officer came up to me and shouted: “Hitler's accomplice! You illuminate the vehicles of the front command! "
        I did not have time to say anything in my defense, when a shot rang out, I was doused with heat, deafened. I almost drew a pistol from its holster, but heard a voice:
        - Comrade army commissar, calm down ... He understood ...
        - Go ahead of the car and show the way! - the shooter shouted to me.
        I instantly dived into the darkness, and the frightened driver jerked the car so hard that he nearly hit me.
        As soon as we drove off, the cars turned on bright lights and, turning around, drove to the rear. Five to six kilometers remained to the front edge.
        It was only in 1959 that I accidentally found out that Mekhlis had shot at me, and that the chief of staff of the Volkhov front, General M.N.Sharokhin, saved me. And it happened like this.
        Once I happened to be with Colonel-General Sharokhin on a business trip in Leningrad. In the evenings in the garrison hotel, we recalled the battles for Leningrad, and I told him that incident near Putilovo.
        “This is who, it turns out, he saved that night ... If I hadn't taken away Mehlis's hand in time, he would have easily killed you. You violated an important order of the war council on camouflage measures. Moreover, it was at the front line ...
        I did not specify that it was far from the leading edge. It was raining and the night was dark.
        “You're in luck,” the general said. - But I remember that in the same autumn we went to the observation post to watch the offensive of two divisions. Nothing was visible from our observation post. The offensive stalled. The connection was interrupted. I see two officers running. I did not have time to tell Mekhlis that these were messengers from the divisions. He jumped out of the trench and, running up to one of them, shot him. I grabbed Mekhlis by the hand, began to calm him down, and he shouted: "Death to the alarmists!"

        Man, like many people in principle, is, of course, far from unambiguous. There are black stripes, there are also light stripes, there are also gray-brown-crimson ones.
        1. -1
          10 January 2022 12: 51
          Quote: Seal
          l G.F. Samoilovich, Hero of the Soviet Union: "
          Coming to Stalin, Mehlis fell to his knees: "Comrade Stalin! Order to shoot this Stupid Jewish Head." Stalin: "Since we will see such self-criticism"
          .
          But there is evidence of his petty tyranny.
          https://maxpark.com/community/2039/content/1980056
          I met with Mekhlis on the Volkhov front in the fall of 1942. Our 849th artillery regiment of the 294th rifle division took up positions in the area of ​​Naziya station. We waged active hostilities, restraining the enemy's offensive to the southern bank of Ladoga, and even tried to reach the Neva and break the blockade of Leningrad. At that time I was in my twenty-first year and I was the chief of artillery equipment of the regiment with the rank of senior technician-lieutenant. One of my most important tasks was to provide the regiment with ammunition. They had to work at night, when the German aviation was inactive. I had two lorries at my disposal, artillery depots were located near Volkhov. It was raining that night, it was very dark, and the appearance of aircraft was out of the question. We drove with the headlights on, although I knew it was forbidden.
          At a bend from the destroyed village of Putilovo, a beam of light fell on an armored car and two cars, five or six people in cloaks were standing next to one. One of them raised a hand, demanding to stop. As soon as I got out of the cockpit, an officer came up to me and shouted: “Hitler's accomplice! You illuminate the vehicles of the front command! "
          I did not have time to say anything in my defense, when a shot rang out, I was doused with heat, deafened. I almost drew a pistol from its holster, but heard a voice:
          - Comrade army commissar, calm down ... He understood ...
          - Go ahead of the car and show the way! - the shooter shouted to me.
          I instantly dived into the darkness, and the frightened driver jerked the car so hard that he nearly hit me.
          As soon as we drove off, the cars turned on bright lights and, turning around, drove to the rear. Five to six kilometers remained to the front edge.
          It was only in 1959 that I accidentally found out that Mekhlis had shot at me, and that the chief of staff of the Volkhov front, General M.N.Sharokhin, saved me. And it happened like this.
          Once I happened to be with Colonel-General Sharokhin on a business trip in Leningrad. In the evenings in the garrison hotel, we recalled the battles for Leningrad, and I told him that incident near Putilovo.
          “This is who, it turns out, he saved that night ... If I hadn't taken away Mehlis's hand in time, he would have easily killed you. You violated an important order of the war council on camouflage measures. Moreover, it was at the front line ...
          I did not specify that it was far from the leading edge. It was raining and the night was dark.
          “You're in luck,” the general said. - But I remember that in the same autumn we went to the observation post to watch the offensive of two divisions. Nothing was visible from our observation post. The offensive stalled. The connection was interrupted. I see two officers running. I did not have time to tell Mekhlis that these were messengers from the divisions. He jumped out of the trench and, running up to one of them, shot him. I grabbed Mekhlis by the hand, began to calm him down, and he shouted: "Death to the alarmists!"

          ?? !!
          Yes, he is this "kneeling" is also a schizophrenic. Psychopath. And a coward.
          I can imagine how many people he shot. Probably a relative of the executioners - Trotsky-Bronstein, Sverdlov and other Bela Kuns, Zemlyachek, Frum Khaikin, Krylenok, Dybenok, Sof Gerber who destroyed the Russian people in millions ...
      6. 0
        10 January 2022 10: 41
        Karpov in the book, the commander cites excerpts from Shtemenko's memoirs, Mehlis, instead of helping, the leadership hangs out, those Mehlis, as a representative of the Headquarters, should silently observe that the KF is controlled from Tbilisi. Further, Shtemenko claims that they knew the day of the offensive in the General Staff of the Red Army, front-line reconnaissance established this for sure, this was reported to the troops, but neither Mekhlis nor Kozlov took action. on the offensive of the Germans on May 7-10. Mekhlis says that the offensive will begin tomorrow, May 15, and demands to correct the orientation. The question was on what number did Shtemenko orientated Kozlov when he said that the General Staff of the General Staff knew the day of the offensive in advance.? If on 8, then why did Kozlov on May 8 prepare troops for May 7-10? Someone is holding back. In Stalin's telegram, the main words were not about the rotten position of Mehlis, but about why, if the whole situation indicated an offensive, he did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, he limited himself to criticism. That is, Stalin reproaches Mehlis for not taking over the leadership. By the way, in Kharkov, which Kozlov left and left again to Manstein, Mekhlis was not there. Karpov, citing these documents in his book, makes the wrong conclusion, well, if Shtemenko writes like that, then Mekhlis is to blame, and Shtemenko, as one of the heads of the General Staff Department, wants to shift his miscalculations and the miscalculations of his subordinates to Mekhlis. Mekhlis was a great critic, but he could not take over the leadership of the troops, from the word he could not at all.
    2. +9
      21 September 2021 20: 51
      Quote: Andrey Moskvin
      ..Russia is a country with an unpredictable past.

      ... and the future ...
    3. -10
      21 September 2021 21: 19
      Quote: Andrey Moskvin
      ... Russia is a country with an unpredictable past.

      What's unpredictable?
      1. +5
        22 September 2021 03: 19
        What was considered almost dogma is declared a delusion, and tomorrow we are told again that it was not so. This is me so clumsy. And there are plenty of suitable topics. As the late Shebarshin wrote, "New times require new mistakes." hi
    4. +3
      22 September 2021 07: 04
      So the famous motto of historians: "The future is beyond our control, but the past depends on us!" request
      1. -1
        22 September 2021 15: 29
        What historians are you citing for us? Whose will it be more accurate?
        There was a motto "We write history ourselves!", But it certainly has nothing to do with your historians.
        1. +4
          22 September 2021 15: 51
          but it certainly has nothing to do with your historians.

          And what kind of my historians do you mean, my own? I don’t have those. But, judging by the fact that you immediately become personal, I am dealing with another urya-patriot who "writes the history of his country himself." Make no mistake, you don’t write a damn thing, but only repeat common propaganda phrases embedded in your cranium by those who benefit from it.
          By the way, personally, I do not cite any historians as an example for you, I gave a common phrase for all members of the forum about how in many countries, including ours, some "historians" write "history" by order of the authorities. If this did not immediately reach you, then it is not my fault, but yours.
          Yes, and you shouldn't identify yourself with everyone
          What kind of historians do you cite to US as an example?
          , You, this is far from everything on this site and in our life.
    5. 0
      22 September 2021 15: 28
      Have you learned to predict the past? Teach us too ... :)
    6. +1
      24 September 2021 12: 11
      that and the future, in general, in a black smoke screen!
    7. 0
      28 September 2021 23: 42
      are you from ukraine?
      from a country without a past?
  2. +3
    21 September 2021 18: 20
    It was difficult times, hard, etc., and it is difficult to evaluate certain persons for their actions in our time.
    There is little information, the archives will give little too. The contribution or damage to the country of these people can only be assessed relatively
    Here and undercover events wagon + trolley.
    1. +5
      21 September 2021 18: 47
      Yes, the easiest thing now is to criticize and vilify a person. As well as to extol. Personally, I read different things about Mehlis, mostly negative.
  3. 0
    21 September 2021 18: 21
    Quote: Andrey Moskvin
    ... Russia is a country with an unpredictable past.

    And an unpredictable future ...
    But the people here are iron and soulful
  4. +2
    21 September 2021 18: 34
    The Pale of Settlement was in full swing, bans on education and profession, conserving the narrow world of communities

    How scary to live.
    And right there
    Our hero, who received pretty good education

    Don't you find a contradiction? )))
    1. +4
      21 September 2021 19: 01
      Quote: lucul
      Don't you find a contradiction? )))

      in Russia at that time, the percentage rate of the maximum permissible share of representatives of any nationality in the total number of students in educational institutions was in force. Naturally, in Odessa, it was difficult for a Jew to get into some especially prestigious educational institutions.
    2. +3
      21 September 2021 19: 04
      Mekhlis strictly asked both the commanders and the big bosses, so people generally do not like to be responsible, those bosses often blame their subordinates, and they themselves are, as it were, inviolable, they have a status, and then they also shot the general in front of the formation as an ordinary soldier, of course other generals will not like it when someone starts to reward them for their deeds
      1. +15
        21 September 2021 20: 56
        And what was he not given for the Crimea on business? It was also necessary to shoot in front of the formation, and then how to deprive others of life, then "this is for business", and how he got around, then "oh, but this is not me"
        1. 0
          22 September 2021 11: 41
          The front command was getting rid of. Generals and officers of the Red Army. Mekhlis did what he could. He was a political worker and had no military education. Demand from the one who identified him as a member of the WSF.
      2. +2
        21 September 2021 23: 06
        Quote: agond
        took and the general was shot in front of the line


        by August 20, the army, "having lost more than 50% in killed and wounded, was so demoralized that it ran indiscriminately" - a member of the military council of the 34th Army of Warriors. (from a report to the Headquarters)
        The 34th Army lost almost all of its artillery, and out of 86 thousand combatants by August 28, only about 20 thousand people remained ...
    3. +5
      21 September 2021 19: 13
      We find .. But how could it be otherwise ... For example, a Jew is a miner. laughing
      1. -1
        23 September 2021 18: 05
        and googling Jewish miners, Heroes of Socialist Labor and Knights of the Order of Lenin, is it weak?
        but what about the fact that, in terms of the number of Heroes of the Soviet Union, Jews are in 4th place after Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, even though the last 1.5 years of the war there was an unspoken but strict instruction to refrain from presenting Jews to this title ?
        Smart commanders tried to get around this. recording real heroes, especially those who died, in other, titular nationalities
        1. +2
          23 September 2021 18: 48
          Somehow you have a hard time with humor laughing I was not going to offend the Jews in any way - I have a lot of friends from this people. And a slight mockery among friends is in the order of things.
        2. -1
          24 September 2021 16: 55
          There are also vegetarian wolves. So what ?
          And this is where:
          "even though during the last 1.5 years of the war there was an unspoken but strict instruction to refrain from presenting Jews to this title?"
          ??
          And forgive me, as some commanders could write a Red Army soldier, even a deceased, into a different nationality, if they had personal documents and, first of all, a Red Army book, in which on the second page, in the "General information" section, item No. 3 was the column: "Nationality"? And there were also party and Komsomol registration documents, if the fighter was wounded - information about his nationality remained in the hospitals, and by itself, that the special officers knew perfectly well what nationality the fighter Isaac Shapiro was. hi .
          by the number of Heroes of the Soviet Union, Jews are in 4th place
          I would look not by the number of awards, but by the number of accomplished feats. And getting into the award lists for some people was not at all tricky business.
          In the USSR as a whole and in the Red Army in particular, the principle of the so-called "proletarian internationalism" has always triumphed.
          Including in the issue of submission to awards.
          Let's simulate the situation. For example, from the headquarters of the division to the headquarters of the corps sent a list for awarding orders and medals of 700 people. Including:
          - Russians - 420;
          - Ukrainians and Belarusians - 100;
          - Tatars - 50;
          - Transcaucasians (Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis) - 34;
          - Kazakhs - 32;
          - Central Asians (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens, Kyrgyz) - 30;
          - Bashkirs, Udmurts and representatives of other Volga, Kama and other peoples - 28;
          - Balts and Moldovans - 4;
          - Jews - 2
          But Corps Headquarters says the list should be reduced to 400 people.
          And then the Army Headquarters declares that the list should be reduced to 300 people.
          And then there is the Front Headquarters.
          Question: how many Jews will remain on the final list.
          The answer probably needs to be given taking into account what nationality prevailed among the clerks and political workers in the headquarters of all levels.
          With this in mind, the list of awardees could well have remained ..... 4, or even 5 Jews. hi
          The same is true for the Armenians. No wonder they say that the Armenians are the second Jews.
    4. -1
      21 September 2021 21: 32
      Quote: lucul
      Don't you find a contradiction? )))

      well, six classes of comm. school Nik.1-th - it's not so bad, I guess.
    5. 0
      22 September 2021 17: 28
      An unfinished commercial school. This is an analogue of a Soviet vocational school, not even a technical school or an institute. Yes, he worked as a clerk and a teacher-educated at least a minimum of people were few, and there were fish for fishlessness and cancer.
      1. +1
        23 September 2021 18: 00
        Well, Zhukov "did not go through academies" and had 4 classes of a parish school and experience of working as a furrier's assistant.
        But what about the Napoleonic marshals?
    6. 0
      28 September 2021 23: 51
      He did not consider himself a Jew. Two years of work in Zion probably instilled a persistent aversion to his fellow tribesmen.
  5. +17
    21 September 2021 18: 38
    The fact that he himself sat down at the tank, that he himself went on the attack at the head of the company, speaks only of personal courage and decency. But the leader also needs intelligence, which he did not have. As shown by the Crimean catastrophe.
    Rokossovsky, for example, was no less brave than him, but did not fulfill the duties of a commander as a marshal.
    1. +14
      21 September 2021 18: 50
      Mekhlis was not a trained military general, he is a political worker and it is clear that he could cope at the level of a comrade, and then, alas ...
    2. +10
      21 September 2021 20: 38
      Quote: alavrin
      As shown by the Crimean catastrophe.

      There is one of the outstanding people of the military counterintelligence, who was respected not only in the KGB, but also in the army, and who wrote an excellent book "The Truth About SMERSH". Here is what L. Ivanov writes about this bastard, because of whom the Crimean catastrophe of 1942 occurred:
      Among the high-ranking military officials found guilty of the Kerch tragedy in the spring of 1942 was the head of the Chief Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar of the 1st rank L.Z. Mekhlis (1889-1953). Mekhlis did not spare people, was known among the command as a man
      sharp, decisive, with an unbalanced character and almost unlimited powers, who acquired the fame of the organizer of quick reprisals, which is why some officers and generals were simply afraid of him.
      LZ Mehlis - a participant in the First World War, when he served in artillery units. In 1918 he joined the CPSU (b). As a commissar of a division, brigade and group of forces, he took part in the Civil War. The energy and persistence of L. Mekhlis were noticed by I. Stalin, and after graduating from the Institute of Red Professors, he became the head of the press department of the Central Committee and at the same time a member of the editorial board of Pravda. In 1937 he was appointed head of the Main Political Directorate. Employees of this department highly appreciated their boss, noted his exceptional efficiency, diligence, discipline, authority, which this organization won under Mehlis.
      Without a military education and little understanding of the army leadership, L. Mekhlis believed that even strategic tasks could be solved by hard work, toughness and voluntarism. Disregarding the opinion of specialists and officials, often demanding that the assigned task be completed through the heads of direct superiors, which created confusion in the work, he nullified the initiative of managers of various ranks, and introduced an atmosphere of suspicion and nervousness by his appearance. He even delved into special issues and gave direct commands to repair tanks.
      Even horses and weapons could not be distributed on the Crimean front without L. Mehlis's instructions! He ruled whatever orders he saw, often limiting himself to literary editing.
      As energetically as superficially, he tried to resolve personnel issues. So, on the Crimean front, he did not like the chief of staff of the front, Major General F.I.Tolbukhin, the future Marshal of the Soviet Union. In early March, he secured his release. L. Mekhlis tried to remove the front commander, General DT Kozlov. In a telegram to I. Stalin, he gave him just a boorish description. For which he received a real rebuke from the leader. In fact, pushing D. Kozlov from the leadership of the army, L. Mehlis, despite his personal courage and management, could not solve many priority tasks, could not organize defense with sufficient forces.
      On May 14, he gave Stalin the following telegram: “The battles are going on on the outskirts of Kerch, from the north the city is bypassed by the enemy. We make our last efforts to delay the enemy. Parts spontaneously retreat. The evacuation of equipment and people will be insignificant, we have disgraced the country and must be damned. "
      K. Simonov, who knew L. Mekhlis personally and was interested in his complex figure, wrote: “I was told that after the Kerch catastrophe, when Mekhlis came with a report to Stalin, he, not wanting to listen to him, said only one phrase:“ Be you are damned! " - and left the office. "
      1. +8
        21 September 2021 20: 49
        Quote: ccsr
        ...about this bastard, because of which the Crimean catastrophe of 1942 occurred:

        hi
        1. +11
          21 September 2021 21: 25
          Strange article ...
          Like an attempt to "whiten" a long and well-known ... bad person. The author found a couple of examples and is trying to build an image of an incorruptible, courageous and decisive leader.
          One Crimean catastrophe was supposed to become a fat point in his career and life! Moreover, it would be better if he put it himself! The dead have no shame at all!
          1. +14
            21 September 2021 21: 48
            One Crimean catastrophe was supposed to become a fat point in his career and life!
            - And the Kharkiv disaster should not have put a fat point on Khrushchev's career? Who should have been in command in the Crimea? Kozlov, but the arrival of Mehlis put him into a stupor, and Mehlis himself could not cope, and he could not cope ...
            1. 0
              22 September 2021 11: 26
              Quote: faiver
              - And the Kharkiv disaster should not have put a fat point on Khrushchev's career?

              Khrushchev, unlike Mehlis, did not hold any positions in the NCO before the war, did not know the problems of the army, did not participate in exercises, and did not know how to lead the troops. So at least you can forgive him. But Mehlis showed his dirty essence even before the war, and many military men wrote about this in their memoirs. So it is not clear why Stalin felt sorry for him - at least he could have sent him to the front as a regimental political instructor, to atone for his guilt, it would have been an instructive example for the rest of the military leaders.
            2. +3
              22 September 2021 17: 36
              Moreover, Khrushchev was also responsible for the Kiev and Barvenkovo-Lozovo disasters, as a result of which hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers and a lot of military equipment were lost. And the lists of repressions provided to Stalin by Khrushchev when he was the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU (b) and the first secretary of the CP (b) of Ukraine are off scale, they even outraged Stalin. And his report at the 20th congress? ...
          2. +4
            22 September 2021 03: 18
            Moreover, it would be better if he put it himself!

            You're right, Igor. hi And where did his fundamental honesty go in this case?
            Mekhlis is a dogmatist, i.e. I was not capable of thinking creatively, and such people in leadership positions are simply harmful.
          3. +4
            22 September 2021 08: 40
            Quote: Leader of the Redskins
            One Crimean catastrophe was supposed to become a fat point in his career and life! Moreover, it would be better if he put it himself! The dead have no shame at all!


            What are you - such people do not shoot.
            Mekhlis, without understanding, equated millions of captured soldiers of the Red Army with traitors to the Motherland, only for the reason that they did not voluntarily give up their lives for the mistakes of their commanders, turned out to be mentally weak, to put a bullet in his head for the mediocre collapse of the Crimean front entrusted to him.
            This cruelty towards others and base weakness towards oneself is an eternal shame for Mehlis!
          4. 0
            29 September 2021 00: 00
            After a strategic breakthrough to the Southwest, Crimea was doomed.
            Is that to exchange a million fighters WITH THE BEST RESULT. Well, the Romanians would have lost a million more people.
            For the Germans, Crimea is the first-born Germany, the fatherland "for the price of which we will not stand"
      2. +8
        21 September 2021 23: 00
        K. Simonov wrote: “I was on the Kerch Peninsula in 1942. The reason for the most shameful defeat is clear to me. Complete distrust of the commanders of the army and front, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mekhlis, a man illiterate in military affairs ... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers. He pushed heavy artillery and army headquarters to the forefront. Three armies stood at the front 16 kilometers, the division occupied 600-700 m along the front, nowhere and never after have I seen such a saturation of troops. And all this mixed into a bloody mess, was thrown into the sea, died only because the front was commanded by a madman ... "(Simonov K. History lessons and the duty of a writer // Science and Life. 1987. No. 6).
        1. +1
          22 September 2021 10: 16
          Quote: Avior
          Complete distrust of the army and front commanders, tyranny and wild arbitrariness of Mekhlis, a man illiterate in military affairs ... He forbade digging trenches so as not to undermine the offensive spirit of the soldiers.

          This is the "sixties" Simonov and the publication of the times of perestroika. The absence of defense organization is not confirmed by documents. But the low level of discipline is confirmed in the units that simply did not follow the orders to strengthen the defense.
          The state of defense of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division was not brilliant. A check carried out in the division for the execution of order No. 143 on strengthening the equipment of positions a few days before the German offensive (the report is dated May 7) showed: "the trenches and communication passages were made very narrow and in places small", the parapets were not decorated, there were primitive loopholes only some of the fighters.
          © Isaev
          1. +1
            22 September 2021 11: 32
            Quote: Alexey RA
            This is the "sixties" Simonov and the publication of the times of perestroika. The absence of defense organization is not confirmed by documents.

            There is no need to blame everything on perestroika, because much later, a participant in those events, L. Ivanov, described the tragedy in this way, the culprit of which was personally Mehlis:
            Kerch tragedy
            I had a chance to go a lot on the roads of the Great Patriotic War. I fired the first shots at the enemy at the border at three in the morning on June 22, 1941, when the Soviet people still did not know that the war had already begun ... I happened to be present at the signing of the surrender in Karlshorst, among the first to learn that the greatest war in history is over our victory.
            But neither in the defending Odessa, nor in the bleeding Stalingrad, nor near Berlin, which we inherited at such a high price, was it so desperately hard, so hopeless, so insulting as in 1942 under the Kerch blockaded by the Germans...
    3. +6
      21 September 2021 21: 01
      If there was an airplane next to it, it would also jump at the helm.
      It's like often in award documents, if you write the truth, then at the top it will be considered worthy only of "gratitude", and not medals-orders, so they paint 3-4-5 episodes, of which one is real, and the rest ...
    4. 0
      23 September 2021 11: 20
      The Crimean front was commanded by Kozlov.
      Not Mehlis. At that time, the Red Army, in principle, had neither technology, nor generals, nor resources to solve the Crimean problem. They will appear after Stalingrad.
  6. +6
    21 September 2021 18: 53
    As the saying goes: "who cannot work, he teaches, who cannot work or teach, leads." As a result, Mehlis did not cope very well with the latter either.
  7. +6
    21 September 2021 18: 54
    Mehlis was not a military leader, but he was a Jew and naturally "drank all the water."
  8. 0
    21 September 2021 18: 58
    For commanders of a high rank, the level of an army commander, a front commander, personally with a revolver in an attack, it is not so important to raise a battalion. It is more important to have intelligence and knowledge of how to fight units of tens and hundreds of thousands of fighters.
    So Voroshilov, Mekhlis and Budyonny, even with personal courage, clearly took a wrong place. Due to limited knowledge and skills in military affairs. Unfortunately, the potentially competent commanders of the Red Army in 1937-39 were stupidly shot
    1. +18
      21 September 2021 19: 14
      Are you sure they were "potentially literate"? To be honest, I doubt the leadership talents of Tukhachevsky and his entourage. But, I emphasize, this does not concern their tragic fate, but only the issue of their professional suitability.
      1. -1
        21 September 2021 19: 22
        I am sure that those commanders who served in the imperial army in the First World War after graduating from military schools and academies had the basis of knowledge that allowed them to learn new skills. And yet, yes, Tukhachevsky was in the military-strategic plan three heads steeper than Voroshilov and Budyonny
        1. +10
          21 September 2021 19: 33
          Three heads? Well, the divisional commander from him might be not bad, but one thing is to fight the Kolchak troops decomposed by the Bolshevik agitation, and the other - with the regular, albeit hastily, troops of the Polish army. I also think that you will not mention the tale of the Khrushchev times that the "bloody tyrant Stalin" deliberately exposed the left flank to the attack of the Poles.
          1. +3
            21 September 2021 21: 21
            If, hypothetically, a command-staff game was carried out in the 30s, not even natural maneuvers. For the "blue" Voroshilov, Budyonny, Mekhlis, Kulik and others. ex. civilian horsemen, and for the "red (yellow)" Tukhachevsky, Egorov and others shot in 37-38, I am sure that the "red side" would definitely win.
            -----
            My main idea is not in the personalities with specific names, but in the fact that the Russian officers, who went through the imperial military universities and grew from staff captains and colonels of the tsarist army into generals and marshals of the Red Army in 1941, would have fought better than the Marshals of the Red Army, (Voroshilov, Budyonny and so on). They also flew the career ladder, bypassing many positions, not acquiring military experience and not having a military education base. The only plus point is personal devotion.
            1. +2
              22 September 2021 10: 36
              Quote: xomaNN
              For the "blue" Voroshilov, Budyonny, Mekhlis, Kulik and others. ex. civilian horsemen, and for the "red (yellow)" Tukhachevsky, Egorov and others shot in 37-38, I am sure that the "red side" would definitely win.

              Read Smirnov - "Great maneuvers". It describes well the real state of affairs with the combat training of units and formations entrusted to the "genius commanders" who were repressed in the 30s - Yakir and Uborevich. Maybe their theoretical concepts were good, but they could not organize training of personnel and control over them in the districts entrusted to them.
              Summing up the work of the BVO and KVO troops at the Belarusian and Polesie maneuvers, A.I.Sedyakin revealed the main, in our opinion, vice of the Red Army of the era of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich: "Tactical training of troops, especially a soldier, squad, platoon, vehicle, tank platoon company, does not satisfy me. But they will fight, take victory in battle, success "by the horns." : "We sometimes hover on a very large operational-strategic scale, and what will we operate on if a company is not good, a platoon is not good, a squad is not good?"
              © Smirnov
              In a KSHU with ideal "units", the future shot might have won. And in real life, with real units of the Red Army, the first-comers would have won, who would have switched to "manual control in the command language."
              Quote: xomaNN
              My main idea is not in the personalities with specific names, but in the fact that the Russian officers, who went through the imperial military universities and grew from staff captains and colonels of the tsarist army into generals and marshals of the Red Army in 1941, would have fought better than the Marshals of the Red Army, (Voroshilov, Budyonny and so on).

              Oh yes ... the Russian officer corps had a wealth of experience in managing mechanized formations and interacting with aviation. smile
              In the best case, it would be like in France, where qualified officers with the experience of the "last war" made exactly the same mistakes in the management of the BTV as our dropouts from the non-commissioned personnel.
              1. +2
                22 September 2021 17: 37
                .... the officer corps had a wealth of experience in managing mechanized formations and interacting with aviation

                And why do you put the Russian officer corps on the same regiment with the French and not with the German?
                German officers most often in World War I and in the 1s went through all the steps of a military career - platoon-company-battalion-regiment-division, etc. ... And in 30% of cases they had a basic military education + various courses. And they did not have their own 90 years.
                1. +1
                  23 September 2021 15: 38
                  Quote: xomaNN
                  And why do you put the Russian officer corps on the same regiment with the French and not with the German?

                  Because the army of commanders named after von Seeckt of the USSR does not shine under any development of events. Namely, the Wehrmacht owes it to the presence of trained officers.
                  But such an army is possible only in a country that does not need to defend against anyone - for the combat power of the Reichswehr was near-zero, it was precisely a big study.
                  And when building a classic defense army, we get an analogue of France or Poland.
            2. +2
              23 September 2021 11: 25
              Tukhachevsky was a green summer by Soviet standards with extremely little front-line experience. He lost his only encounter with a more or less regular army. What's behind these conclusions?
            3. +1
              24 September 2021 10: 25
              Quote: xomaNN
              My main idea is not in the personalities with specific names, but in the fact that the Russian officers, who went through the imperial military universities and grew from staff captains and colonels of the tsarist army into generals and marshals of the Red Army in 1941, would have fought better than the Marshals of the Red Army, (Voroshilov, Budyonny and so on).

              In France, generals graduated from educational institutions, grew into generals gradually, had WWI experience at levels from the regiment and above. From this they fought better in 1940 ??? shchaz ... Hitler met a month
        2. Cat
          +10
          21 September 2021 21: 52
          And yet, yes, Tukhachevsky was in the military-strategic plan three heads steeper than Voroshilov and Budyonny

          In order to appreciate the "military-strategic" genius of Tukhachevsky, it is enough to read his works on the relevant topic. You will learn a lot of new things. For some reason, for some reason I remember this pearl:
          The work of the combined-arms headquarters should be largely transferred to the aircraft. Only this living method can make it possible to intervene in a timely manner in the course of actions and direct them in accordance with the general situation. In particular, the method of control by "guidance" by aviation should be widely used. In a fast-paced battle, there is not enough time to formulate orders, transmit radiograms, and to accept and study these orders. It is much easier to show the new direction of the offensive, anywhere an emerging threat from the enemy, and so on, using conventional signs from an airplane.
          (C) M. Tukhachevsky, "Martial Art", 1935.
          Can you imagine Soviet headquarters on airplanes in 1941?
          1. +5
            21 September 2021 23: 28
            Much is written by Tukhachevsky
            In this passage, it is more likely written about the method of command and control of troops, and not the transfer of headquarters to aircraft.
            Tukhachevsky had other works that would be useful to read before 1941.
            Germanic views on the conduct of modern warfare

            Von Seeckt {210} was the first in German military literature to pose: the question that "the goal of modern strategy will be to achieve [233] a solution with the help of mobile, high-quality, capable of operating forces without or before the masses start to move." {211}. ..
            Ludendorff, ... in the same way considers it necessary to have an invasion army to disorganize the enemy's defense on his territory and deliver sudden lightning strikes ... the outbreak of war to upset his military organization. For this purpose, first of all, air forces should be used, then fast-moving, that is, primarily motorized forces. These mobile forces must be followed by large masses of troops to create a solid base for the operation .... “The emergence of new weapons can give the struggle a completely different turn. At present, one can imagine a war that suddenly begins with methods capable of destroying the first echelon of the enemy's military forces, disorganizing his mobilization and destroying the vital centers of his power. "

            "The weapons of such a war already exist," adds Marshal Pétain, and points out that this method is especially popular in Germany.

            or is this
            The creation of a deep battle, that is, the simultaneous defeat of the enemy's battle formation throughout its depth, requires tanks, on the one hand, to push through or escort the infantry, on the other hand, to timely penetrate into the enemy's rear both to disorganize the latter and to to cut off his main forces from the reserves he has. This deep tank breakthrough should create an obstacle in the enemy's rear to which his main forces should be pinned and where his main forces should be destroyed. At the same time, this breakthrough must destroy the enemy's artillery, disrupt communications and capture his headquarters.
            1. -2
              22 September 2021 10: 46
              Quote: Avior
              Tukhachevsky had other works that would be useful to read before 1941.
              Germanic views on the conduct of modern warfare

              Von Seeckt {210} was the first in German military literature to pose: the question that "the goal of modern strategy will be to achieve [233] a solution with the help of mobile, high-quality, capable of operating forces without or before the masses start to move." {211}. ..
              Ludendorff, ... in the same way considers it necessary to have an invasion army to disorganize the enemy's defense on his territory and deliver sudden lightning strikes ... start a war to upset his military organization
              .

              He-he-he ... that's how the pre-war doctrine was built on the counteraction of this concept of "two armies". It was believed that the attack would be carried out by the invading army before the completion of the mobilization of the main forces - everything, like in Tukhachevsky. The result is known.
              Now, if Tukhachevsky wrote that the attack would be carried out by an army already mobilized under the cover of a war with another enemy, transferred to the border in a time frame insufficient to mobilize and concentrate the Red Army ...
              Quote: Avior
              or is this
              The creation of a deep battle, that is, the simultaneous defeat of the enemy's battle formation throughout its depth, requires tanks, on the one hand, to push through or escort the infantry, on the other hand, to timely penetrate into the enemy's rear both to disorganize the latter and to to cut off his main forces from the reserves he has. This deep tank breakthrough should create an obstacle in the enemy's rear to which his main forces should be pinned and where his main forces should be destroyed. At the same time, this breakthrough must destroy the enemy's artillery, disrupt communications and capture his headquarters.

              And that was - in theory. At the December meeting of 1940, the course and results of the command and control department on the offensive of the mechanized corps and its introduction into the breakthrough were one of the main topics discussed. The problem was that everything was bad with the practical implementation until 1942 - the artillery and infantry were lagging behind, the rear, due to insufficient carrying capacity and the passability of trucks, swelled to astronomical proportions and barely crawled along the roads.
              1. 0
                22 September 2021 10: 54
                Tukhachevsky could not get to practice in 1942, as you understand.
                And the blitzkrieg is described accurately enough. But Tukhachevsky was shot, as a result, in 1941, all this became news for Tymoshenko and others
                1. +3
                  22 September 2021 12: 25
                  Quote: Avior
                  And the blitzkrieg is described accurately enough.

                  Blitzkrieg by Tukhachevsky is described incorrectly - he made a strategic mistake. There will be no invading army and the main forces that came up later - the attack will be made at once by all forces mobilized in advance.
                  We just built a defense in the expectation that the "invasion army" would go first, and at first we would only have to fight back from it. In the meantime, the invading army will fight the covering army, there will be a "mobilization race" on both sides. So Tukhachevsky's ideas lived on, despite his execution.
                  1. +2
                    22 September 2021 12: 37
                    Since 1937, since the execution of Tukhachevsky, the situation has changed. But nobody really took this into account. Just as they did not take into account the blitzkrieg factor - the rapid defeat of the enemy before the mobilization of his forces for the war.
                    Only by a miracle and by the size of the country they resisted in 1941.
                    Moreover, with the execution of Tukhachevsky and other military personnel, they began to destroy the elements created by them - the reactive institute, the partisan movement organized in the form of military DRGs, and so on. It remains to be seen what sacrifices it cost us.
                    Well at least Tukhachevsky's tanks were not melted down and the tank factories were not closed. But the fact that they were senselessly lost at the beginning of the war is an obvious fact.
                    1. +2
                      22 September 2021 13: 35
                      Quote: Avior
                      Moreover, with the execution of Tukhachevsky and other military personnel, they began to destroy the elements created by them - the reactive institute, the partisan movement organized in the form of military DRGs, and so on.

                      The reactive institution has largely destroyed itself - by misappropriation of funds and denunciations.
                      Quote: Avior
                      But the fact that they were senselessly lost at the beginning of the war is an obvious fact.

                      Not obvious. Tukhachevsky's tanks are a generation of the early 30s, which became obsolete by the second half of the 30s. Spain was the last nail in the coffin of the same T-26, the release of which continued only because there were no alternatives. Having exhausted their modernization potential, Soviet tanks of the second generation turned into targets for enemy "mallets".
                      In short, since 1937, since the execution of Tukhachevsky, the situation has changed.
                      1. +2
                        22 September 2021 22: 37
                        The reactive institution has largely destroyed itself - by misappropriation of funds and denunciations.

                        Denunciations can destroy something only when someone uses them to destroy. The epic with the change of charges Korolev, with a complete leapfrog, clearly shows what was more important - denunciations or a desire to destroy the institute. When they did not want to collapse, they did not pay attention to denunciations.
                        In short, since 1937, since the execution of Tukhachevsky, the situation has changed.

                        you say that the tank forces were perfectly organized at the beginning of the war, it was just that Tukhachevsky built unusable tanks, is that the whole problem? about the fact that they continued to be built and after 1937 I do not even mention.
                        The rocket institute destroyed itself, the tanks are useless, and the organized, prepared army partisan movement unraveled itself, so that with the beginning of the war you had to do the same in haste all the time from random people?
                      2. 0
                        23 September 2021 15: 56
                        Quote: Avior
                        you say that the tank forces were perfectly organized at the beginning of the war, it was just that Tukhachevsky built unusable tanks, is that the whole problem?

                        No. I affirm that Tukhachevsky's tanks were already completely outdated for 5 years by the beginning of the war. And, according to the mind, it was necessary to send them for re-equipment into armored personnel carriers and special vehicles. At least, this would not create the illusion of the leadership of the USSR having powerful armored vehicles with thousands of tanks.
                        Quote: Avior
                        about the fact that they continued to be built and after 1937 I do not even mention.
                        I wrote about this:
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Spain became the last nail in the coffin lid of the same T-26, the release of which continued only because there were no alternatives.

                        For our GABTU, even the LT vz. 35 seemed a promising tank in terms of replacing the T-26.
                      3. +1
                        23 September 2021 21: 28
                        No. I claim that Tukhachevsky's tanks by the beginning of the war

                        Suppose the T-26 - yes, the suspension and the engine did not pull additional weight, but the BT - quite, there were different shielding options, from 1,5 to 2,9 tons in weight. The question is where the NGO was looking in 1939-1940.
                      4. +2
                        24 September 2021 11: 12
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        Suppose the T-26 - yes, the suspension and the engine did not pull additional weight, but the BT - quite, there were different shielding options, from 1,5 to 2,9 tons in weight.

                        BT has one problem - transmission. Not only will you have to throw out the wheel drive, but you also need to do something with a simplified gearbox. And the checkpoint is everything, just the plant. And the KhPZ has no extra capacity (all the more so - the checkpoint was considered the most complex unit of the tank), plus it has a hot time with the T-34.
                        In addition, on tests of a shielded BT in August 1941, the following shortcomings were revealed: "pecking" when driving over rough terrain, difficulties with turning, especially on a hard surface, a decrease in the average travel speed to 26,7 km / h due to overheating liquids in the cooling system, a problem with the evacuation of the crew and visibility (the mechanic drive hatch disappeared).
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        The question is where the NGO was looking in 1939-1940.

                        At KhPZ, kicking him with all his might, so that he would bring to mind and put in the T-34 series. In 1940, it dawned on denunciations that the plant was deliberately delaying the start of serial production of the T-34 in order to close the plan with simple and mastered BT.
                      5. 0
                        24 September 2021 22: 52
                        BT has one problem - transmission.

                        This is in the maximum weight, more than a hundred shielded BT +1,5 tons were running on the Far East. EMNIP was tested with more than 800 km mileage, on different roads, successfully. The problem with the gearbox, if you are talking about a 3-speed, have solved.
                        At KhPZ, kicking him with all his might, so that he would bring to mind and put in the T-34 series.

                        The T-34, even in 1942, cannot become the main operational tank in the RKK, even with the implementation of production plans, which were regularly disrupted.
                  2. +3
                    23 September 2021 11: 34
                    Blitzkrieg he described as a method of quick surprise strike, which will not give the enemy the opportunity to mobilize their resources for the war.
                    In the meantime, the invading army will fight the covering army, there will be a "mobilization race" on both sides. So Tukhachevsky's ideas lived on, despite his execution.

                    that, it was not known in 1941 that the army of the Germans had already been mobilized? What is the "mobilization race"?
                    But actually, until 1943, Germany lived in peacetime. They were transferred to a military track only after Stalingrad and Goebbels' famous speech about total war.
                2. 0
                  23 September 2021 11: 27
                  Yes. For the French and British generals too.
            2. -2
              22 September 2021 11: 41
              Quote: Avior
              Tukhachevsky had other works that would be useful to read before 1941.

              It was stupidity to read all this, because this is theoretical research, not supported by practice. Another author correctly noted here, pointing out the main mistakes in the preparation of the Red Army before the war:
              Quote: Alexey RA
              “The tactical training of troops, especially a soldier, squad, platoon, vehicle, tank platoon, company, does not satisfy me. But they will fight, take victory in battle, success“ by the horns. ”I expressed this idea even more clearly (already after the execution of the "talented military leaders" on November 21, 1937) S.M. Budyonny: “We sometimes hover on a very large operational-strategic scale, but what will we operate on if the company is not good, the platoon is not good, the squad is not good?"

              And there was no need to read the "works" of Tukhachevsky before the war, it would be better if our commanders carefully studied the intelligence reports on the actions of the German troops after 1939, since there was enough materials, just not everyone's hands reached them.
              1. +1
                22 September 2021 12: 11
                Sorry, but the thread in the thread is completely different, specifically about the understanding of the situation by Tukhachevsky.
                He could not analyze the actions of the Germans in 1939, because in 1937 he was shot.
                As for Budyonny, this is a question for him - why is his company not suitable?
                From June 1937 to August 1940, S.M.Budyonny commanded the troops of the Moscow Military District, at the same time from 1939 he was a member of the Main Military Council of the NKO of the USSR. In addition, since 1939 he was Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR. Since August 1940 - First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR.
                1. -5
                  22 September 2021 13: 06
                  Quote: Avior
                  Sorry, but the thread in the thread is completely different, specifically about the understanding of the situation by Tukhachevsky.

                  He didn't understand her, otherwise he would not have expressed the idea of ​​creating 100 thousand tanks - he generally lived in a different universe, for which he deservedly suffered, after messing with weapons at his post.
                  Quote: Avior
                  He could not analyze the actions of the Germans in 1939

                  Moreover, there was no need to predict what he had no idea about, because some of the military took his fantasies seriously. And Budyonny was right - it was the commanders of companies, battalions and regiments who decided the outcome of the war, because only they trained personnel and led them during "local battles", during which they first destroyed the best parts of the Wehrmacht, and then led the advancing units themselves. ...
                  1. 0
                    22 September 2021 14: 08
                    ... He didn't understand her, otherwise he would not have expressed the idea of ​​creating 100 thousand tanks.

                    Don't need to be taken out of context
                    But in reality, even those 25 thousand tanks that he left behind could not be used effectively - they were profiled in the first months of the war.
                    Well at least the tank industry he created was not destroyed, as they did with jet weapons, so after the war the Germans had to copy
                    1. +2
                      22 September 2021 18: 22
                      The question of 25 tagnoks in the Red Army before the war had long been resolved. So many of them did not exist. 000 - this is the number of tanks produced by the USSR industry since 25000 - 1918 Russian Renault tanks, then there were 15 MS-600, there were BT-1 (decommissioned by the 1s). The credit went to 40 T-3300 tankettes with one machine gun (even weaker than the German T-27, which the Germans did not consider as tanks), amphibious machine-gun T-1, T-37, T-38, two-turret machine-gun T-40, which by 26 year became obsolete and were gradually removed from service. We eliminate the losses in the conflicts at Khalkhin Gol and in Finland (about 1941 vehicles in total), minus the 2000 tanks supplied to Mongolia, 400 tanks to China, 1000 tanks from Spain. Before the start of the war in the Far East, the USSR held 400 tanks against the Kwantung Army (4000 of them were transferred against Germany in 2000), 1941 introduced to Iran to ensure the southern routes of the Lend-Lease, simply worn out during exercises (depreciation rate for mechanical devices-2000 % in year) . In general, there were about 10 tanks in the Western districts, and only the mediocrity of the command (Mehlis was not there in the first 5500 months of the war! Korobkov) did not even allow the disaster to be dampened. By the way, K K Rokossovsky also lost the mechanized corps, which he commanded.
                      Source of the number of tanks - "Encyclopedia of Tanks" edited by Colonel-General of Tank Forces Mayev 2002
                      1. +3
                        22 September 2021 18: 49
                        Question - Whose mechanized corps survived until the fall of 1941? Rokossovsky's guilt in the loss of the corps (under-formed, understaffed and poorly managed from above) - no!
                      2. -2
                        23 September 2021 16: 45
                        And you demand from Mehlis that he shoot himself for the Crimean catastrophe. And how does one differ from the other? Moreover, Mekhlis is a political worker, and not a combat commander, but Rokossovsky graduated from the Academy of the General Staff before the war.
                      3. -1
                        22 September 2021 22: 14
                        the number of tanks we have for 1941 has been known for a long time - about 25 thousand pieces. However, Stalin spoke 24 thousand to the American ambassador.
                        what about
                        "Encyclopedia of Tanks" edited by Colonel-General of Tank Forces Mayev 2002

                        Give a link to this book for a start.
                      4. +1
                        23 September 2021 13: 51
                        Quote: Avior
                        the number of tanks we have for 1941 has been known for a long time - about 25 thousand pieces.

                        This figure was launched by Meltyukhov, who counted 4,5 thousand tankettes as tanks and weighing from 2,9 to 3,2 tons, that is, almost like a modern jeep. The armor of these "tanks" was pierced by the armor-piercing rifle cartridges of the Germans, so you should not at least include this figure in the total number of spacecraft tanks - this is just a distortion, as well as the fact that Meltyukhov "forgot" to take into account 4,5 thousand captured French tanks in service Wehrmacht in the total number of tanks in Germany.
                      5. -1
                        23 September 2021 16: 39
                        Do you need the title of the book, the year of issue and the author of a little Fato?
                      6. -3
                        23 September 2021 21: 00
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        Source of the number of tanks - "Encyclopedia of Tanks" edited by Colonel-General of Tank Forces Mayev 2002

                        I'm not going to delve into these data and dispute something, but the question of the number of spacecraft was raised long before Mayev, including by military leaders of a higher rank:
                        In the same 1968, under the heading "secret" was published the work of Marshal MV Zakharov "On the Eve of the Great Trials", which provided a number of more objective data on the size of the Soviet armed forces, numbering by the beginning of the war 5 people and were in service according to as of June 1, 1941, 13 serviceable tanks (excluding T-37, T-38, T-40 and flamethrowers). In addition, the appendices to the work provided information from the mobilization plan on the availability of military equipment as of January 1, 1941. Accordingly, by that time the Red Army had 95 guns and mortars, 039 tanks and 26 aircraft [263]. It is clear that all this information was also not used in the open press. The book itself became available to a wide range of researchers only in 56.

                        The only question is what types of tanks Zakharov took into account and who gave him the data at the GABTU, especially given the fact that he was an NGSH at one time.
                      7. 0
                        24 September 2021 15: 47
                        "I'm not going to delve into this data and dispute something,"
                        But I got it. I give information. Tankette T-27 (copy of the British Carden-Loyd) -3300 units MS-1 (T-18) tanks -950 units-k WWII removed from service, amphibious tanks T-37-1090 tanks units, T-12 tank-in series did not go, the T-24 tank - 25 pieces, were used as pillboxes, the TG tank (Grotte tank) - did not go into the series, the heavy two-tower T-100 and SMK tanks did not go into the series, the T-38-1382 floating tanks, two-turret machine-gun tanks T-26 (modernization of British Vickers 6-ton) -1626 units, removed from service for the Second World War, were used as spare parts donors, single-turret cannon T-26 tanks - 9665 units, high-speed tanks BT-2 (modernization of Christie's tanks) - 600 units, removed from service for WWII, were used as spare parts donors, BT-5-1884 tanks, BT-7 and BT-7M-5700 tanks, T-40-709 amphibious tank, T-50-63 light tank pieces (did not go into a large series due to the great complexity and low-tech in serial production), three-turret medium tank T-28-411 pieces, wheeled three-turret tank T-29 was not serially built, there were only prototypes, medium tank T -34 1939 - before the war, they managed to produce 1284 pieces, a heavy five-turret tank T-35 - 61 pieces, a heavy tank KV-1-before the Second World War managed to release about 600 pieces, heavy tanks KV-2-330 pieces. We take a calculator. Total - 29653 tanks. Minus the decommissioned and machine-gun tanks 29653 minus 8732 = 20921. It was all numbered. From here we subtract 400 for Spain, 2000 losses (CER, Khalkhin Gol, Finland), 1000 for China, 400 for Mongolia, 2000 for Iran, 2000 remained in the Far East. Total-7800. Subtract 20921 = 7800 from 13121. From here we subtract 10% worn out during exercises in the pre-war period, this is 1382 pieces. We get 10739 vehicles in the net remainder. Not all of them were concentrated in the western districts.
                        We will proceed from this figure.
                        Germany. T-1 and Lukhsy do not count by analogy with Soviet machine-gun tanks. T-2-293 pieces, Czechoslovak 35T-424, Czechoslovak 38T-1411 pieces, T-3-before the Second World War, 2800 pieces were produced, T-4-before the Second World War was about 400 units were produced, self-propelled guns based on T-1-192, assault guns III - before the Second World War, about 400 units were produced, 4500 French tanks, about 900 British tanks (Hort's corps in France, expeditionary corps in Greece) .Total: 5520 German and Czechoslovak plus 5400 Anglo-French. We have 10920 pieces. Yes, not all of them fought against the USSR - they were in the occupation forces or fought against the Soviet partisans (mainly French Somua and Hotchkiss) - according to the performance characteristics they did not fit into the tactics of the Wehrmacht, they were in North Africa.
                      8. -3
                        24 September 2021 18: 56
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        Minus the decommissioned and machine-gun tanks 29653 minus 8732 = 20921.

                        As you should be aware, decommissioned tanks can be on the main register until new equipment arrives, if they have not exhausted their resource and are in working order. No one will allow commanders to reduce combat readiness until new standard equipment arrives - this was the case in the SA. As far as is known, the TB-3 aircraft were removed from the armament of bomber aviation even before the war, and transferred to transport, but with its beginning they were returned to service again and they flew on missions with a bomb load. So, without knowing all the subtleties, it is so easy to subtract 8732 from the total number is hardly appropriate.
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        We get 10739 vehicles in the net remainder. Not all of them were concentrated in the western districts.
                        We will proceed from this figure.

                        It is quite possible, although I think that not all the numbers you have given are the same, for example, about Spain:
                        So, in his last monograph "T-34" IP Shmelev, a recognized specialist in the history of armored vehicles (BTT) in our country, reports that 362 tanks were sent to Spain, and according to other sources, only 347.

                        Shpakovsky informs about this in his book, you can check with him, he writes here.
                      9. 0
                        25 September 2021 16: 25
                        Shpakovsky is grossly mistaken. Much more was shipped, but England was seizing Soviet ships with cargo for the Republicans in its ports as a non-interference policy, and German submarines sank Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. 367 vehicles were just what the Republicans received.
                        "As you should be aware, decommissioned tanks can be on the main register until new equipment arrives, if they have not exhausted their resource and are in working order."
                        And we are not talking about whether or not they are on the main register, but about the combat value of these tanks. You will insist, I will add 3300 T-1 tanks to the number of German tanks (they also did not represent combat value, but they were also on the main register , were used as tractors and training tanks), Romanian, Italian, Dutch, Belgian, Greek, Polish trophies. Each of these numbers seems to be a trifle, but in the East there is a saying "An extra straw breaks the back of a camel."
                      10. -3
                        25 September 2021 18: 49
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        Shpakovsky is grossly mistaken.

                        Let him know about it and you can discuss with him here - I just referred to his text, so I see no reason not to believe him without his comments on your words.
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        And we are not talking about whether or not they are on the main register, but about the combat value of these tanks.

                        Actually, it was about quantity, because you gave the numbers that needed to be subtracted.
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        .Will insist

                        I gave you an example with TB-3 - will you insist that they did not participate in the bombing after June 22 due to the fact that they were removed from the armament of bomber aviation?
                        Quote: Boris Epstein
                        Each of these numbers seems to be a trifle,

                        I do not argue with this, I just do not understand why you famously minus 8732 units, without even delving into the fact that some of them could fight against the Germans. Why, then, are your numbers better than those quoted by Shpakovsky on Spain?
                      11. 0
                        26 September 2021 09: 25
                        "It was actually about quantity, because you gave the numbers that needed to be subtracted."
                        You don't understand honesty. No problem. Correcting the number of calculations, adding 3300 tanks to the Germans and 3300 tanks from the USSR. What changed?
                        "I gave you an example with TB-3 - will you insist that they did not participate in the bombing after June 22 due to the fact that they were removed from the armament of bomber aviation?"
                        TB-3s were not removed from service. There were bomber air divisions armed with TB-3s and trained crews. They were not used as donors, but were kept in a ready state, in contrast to the withdrawn from service tanks. They took part in Khalkhin Gol, in Finland in 1939-1940 and in the first year of the Great Patriotic War, and only in 1942 (one thousand nine hundred and forty-two) they were removed from service. When the Boston supplies went under Lend-Lease. You twist again.
                        And I didn’t talk about TB-3 with you. ...
                        "I do not argue with this, I just do not understand why you famously minus 8732 units, without even delving into the fact that some of them could fight against the Germans."
                        In the same way, as most of the T1 (larger than the T-26 machine-gun, BT-2, since they were released 5-6 years earlier than the T-1) could fight against the USSR. But here you are again juggling. The USSR began to produce tanks much earlier than Germany (since 1918, and Germany, since 1934, is there a difference? We do not consider the First World War.) And use them in battles (1929 - the conflict at the Chinese Eastern Railway) and in exercises. depreciation (amortization) was significantly higher. In general, even from previous disputes with you, I understood that you will never admit the truth.
                    2. 0
                      22 September 2021 18: 38
                      Quote: Avior
                      But in reality, even those 25 thousand tanks that he left behind could not be used effectively.

                      And how to use them effectively if they had a small resource, poor booking, did not have two-way communications, and the entire infrastructure for supporting the armored forces was in its infancy. Maybe it would be better if they produced fewer tanks, but improved their characteristics by reducing funds for the production of 25 thousand tanks, reducing their number to at least 12-15 thousand?
                      1. +2
                        22 September 2021 22: 16
                        Tukhachevsky was shot 4 years before the war, no one bothered to improve the infrastructure. He, of course, made many mistakes, but was he not the only one in the Red Army?
                      2. +1
                        23 September 2021 11: 29
                        What should have been done? Improved. As they could, as they could, for what was enough.
                      3. +1
                        23 September 2021 14: 03
                        Here is Tukhachevsky, how he could improve.
                      4. 0
                        24 September 2021 01: 34
                        And who is arguing?
                      5. -2
                        23 September 2021 13: 57
                        Quote: Avior
                        Tukhachevsky was shot 4 years before the war, no one bothered to improve the infrastructure.

                        If mistakes are made at the strategic level, then they cannot be corrected even in five years - this is an axiom. That is why Tukhachevsky's mistakes could not be corrected before the start of the war, and as another author correctly noted
                        Quote: Cormoran
                        What should have been done? Improved. As they could, as they could, for what was enough.
                      6. +1
                        23 September 2021 16: 31
                        Tanks are a mistake?
                        What you don’t know ...
                      7. -3
                        23 September 2021 16: 42
                        Quote: Avior
                        Tanks are a mistake?
                        What you don’t know ...

                        It was not the tanks that were a mistake, but their nomenclature and underdevelopment in the pre-war years, and led to the fact that the Germans, with a smaller number of armored vehicles, pogrom us at the beginning of the war.
                        You draw conclusions as in that joke - drink vodka, there will be no worms ...
                      8. 0
                        23 September 2021 17: 06
                        So everything was in order with the organizational structure? And with the application.
                        And these tanks were simply not T-72s. Unfinished .....
                        The further, the stranger, as Alice said ...
                      9. -3
                        23 September 2021 17: 39
                        Quote: Avior
                        So everything was in order with the organizational structure?

                        The organizational structure is a consequence of the country's ability to produce this or that type of weapon in a certain amount. So, the country's capabilities are primary, and then there is the consideration of the concepts of a future war. And their application depended on these parameters and on combat training - this is the third component of the combat readiness of troops. It cannot be otherwise, at least according to Soviet military science.
                      10. +1
                        23 September 2021 18: 16
                        The organizational structure of the tank forces is actually
                  2. +2
                    23 September 2021 20: 37
                    Brezhnev once said that the war was not won by the generals, the war was won by the colonels. And he knew what he was saying. I have read one front-line soldier for a long time and he wrote - captains and majors reign on the battlefield, the bosses are far away.
                    1. 0
                      10 January 2022 11: 57
                      The film They Fought for the Motherland were forbidden to rent, there was not a single general in the frames, the Central Committee decided to show the film to Brezhnev hoping for his support, because he ended the war as a general, but Brezhnev did not support the Central Committee, saying that the colonels won the war.
              2. +2
                22 September 2021 12: 30
                Quote: ccsr
                And there was no need to read the "works" of Tukhachevsky before the war, it would be better if our commanders carefully studied the intelligence reports on the actions of the German troops after 1939, since there was enough materials, just not everyone's hands reached them.

                The problem was that in these reports, pearl grains of truth lay in a huge pile of disinformation dung, often indistinguishable from the truth.
                And the biggest problem was that it would be better for our generals to carefully study, for a start, at least the Statutes. Because most of the problems of the first years of the war were associated with the fact that the Charter was neglected at all levels, and wild crutches were invented instead. But the Charter is the basis for planning and conducting combat operations, and only after studying it can one proceed to all kinds of improvisations (in cases where the charter actions cannot give the desired result).
                1. -1
                  22 September 2021 13: 22
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  The problem was that in these reports, pearl grains of truth lay in a huge pile of disinformation dung, often indistinguishable from the truth.

                  There was no such problem, then some unscrupulous figures came up with this to justify themselves before the story, and now this nonsense was picked up by some anonymous authors on this forum. Here is an example of a text from FEBRUARY 10, 1939, two and a half years before the war:



                  And where is the misinformation here that could be misinterpreted by our generals?
                  It is even indicated here about the testing of prototypes of helicopters - is this not the highest level of reconnaissance?
                2. -5
                  22 September 2021 14: 04
                  most of the problems of the first years of the war were associated with the fact that the Charter was neglected at all levels


                  It is obvious that Tukhachevsky is not to blame for this - he was already shot in 1937.
                  And even his legacy - huge tank potential, could not dispose of
          2. +4
            22 September 2021 17: 45
            I am sure that, if desired, there are an order of magnitude more "pearls" in the articles of Budyonny and Voroshilov. Moreover, their "work" as a whole is a chatter about the role of the CPSU (b) in victories and the role of the leader. And not the strategy and tactics of the troops.
            And the new generation of Soviet generals-marshals (Zhukov, Rokossovsky, etc.), by the method of mistakes of their own and those of others, learned to fight and win in two years. So far, all the "civilian horsemen" in the rear did not command the troops. Because both Stalin and the GKO in the first months became clear about their "zero" effectiveness as commanders
        3. -2
          22 September 2021 17: 41
          Yeah. Tukhachevsky in Poland showed himself in all colors. How many soldiers and commanders lost the Red Army because of his gross mistakes?
        4. +2
          23 September 2021 16: 19
          Especially Tukhachevsky's military leadership manifested itself during the suppression of the Tambov uprising, no one, either before or after him, thought to poison the peasants with gases.
      2. +7
        21 September 2021 20: 48
        Quote: alavrin
        To be honest, I doubt Tukhachevsky's leadership talents

        How Tukhachevsky destroyed his armies on the Vistula
        https://topwar.ru/174266-kak-tuhachevskij-pogubil-svoi-armii-na-visle.html
  9. +3
    21 September 2021 18: 59
    Jews, Jews, only Jews around ... V. Vysotsky
  10. -9
    21 September 2021 19: 24
    In the history of Russia, Mehlis is the most slandered and slandered, after Benkendorf and Arakcheev. But in reality, he was not the commander of combat units, although he is credited with the failure of the army in the Crimea. Mehlis was the commander of the Stalinist political instructors. Hence the slander against him with the coming to power of Khrushchev. I will repeat myself once again, you will compare the Mekhlis political instructors with the Epishev’s political commissars and you will understand why the former under the command of Mehlis helped save the USSR in the war, and the latter, under the command of Epishev, did not help save the country even when no one attacked the USSR ..
    And what, you want that for that on Mekhlis you didn’t pour slop of slander? As under Khrushchev and now. Or they pretended, as under Brezhnev, that Mehlis meant little ...
    1. +3
      21 September 2021 19: 58
      Of course, the easiest thing now, like under Khrushchev, is to blame everything on Stalin and Mehlis.
      Of course, they were guilty of something, but somehow it does not work to drain all the slops of the system of relations on them.
      And Khrushchev was not involved in the anger of Crimea and a lot of things in Ukraine? Maybe a dog rummaged around here?
    2. +6
      21 September 2021 20: 44
      Quote: north 2
      why the first under the command of Mehlis helped save the USSR in the war

      Are you seriously? It turns out that hundreds of thousands of deaths in the early years do not count? Mekhlis and his political instructors saved the country? Schizophrenia!
      Quote: north 2
      and the latter, under the command of Yepishev, did not help save the country even when no one attacked the USSR ..

      Where were you in those years? The KGB got fucked up, and they were the "vanguard of the party".
      1. 0
        22 September 2021 19: 45
        and who, the KGB or the army, shot from tanks the building of the so-called White House? Two pair of boots, that of the army, that of the KGB, did not help preserve the country. If you have not yet contributed to the death
        THE USSR..
      2. +2
        23 September 2021 20: 46
        The KGB is the eyes and ears of the state and nothing more. The special services can also be compared with a guard dog in the owner's yard. The owner will say face and she will bite, say mung to the booth in the booth, will sit in the booth. If the brains are rotten, then neither the ears nor the eyes can do anything. Too many of the country's leadership turned out to be those who were tired of being our comrades, but wanted to become masters. The heads of the population were littered and everyone wanted to live like in Germany, like in America.
    3. +4
      21 September 2021 21: 14
      Quote: north 2
      in fact, he was not the commander of combat units, although he is credited with the failure of the army in the Crimea. Mehlis was the commander of the Stalinist political instructors.

      Above was Stalin's direct speech on this matter:
      Quote: Cympak
      All you need to know about Mehlis is expressed in Stalin's message: “You adhere to the strange position of an outside observer, not responsible for the affairs of the Crimean Front. This position is very comfortable, but it is rotten through and through. On the Crimean front, you are not an outside observer, but a responsible representative of the General Headquarters, responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obliged to correct the mistakes of the command on the spot.

      and hereinafter.
      Well, good, good - he is not guilty, in Crimea everything is by itself .... Well, you like to stick to Malenkov's maxim that every mistake has a name and a position. And what about the Crimean mistake?
      Quote: north 2
      In the history of Russia, Mekhlis is the most slandered and slandered, after Benkendorf and Arakcheev

      "Most".... laughing The figure of Mehlis is of the wrong scale, and certainly not from the category of "controversial" - a political valet, a dull campaigner, a product of the system, a chainsaw with a mandate - as an object of slander or opportunistic speculations, he is not particularly interesting at all.
      Quote: north 2
      and the latter under the command of Epishev

      Yes, this has something to do with it ?? You decided to compare them according to the degree of mediocrity?
  11. +9
    21 September 2021 20: 20
    A lot of things were hung on Mehlis, that our generals did not like to be honest. “We arrived in Kerch on 20.01.42. We found the most unattractive picture of the organization of command and control of the troops ... The Front Commander Kozlov does not know the position of the units at the front, their condition, as well as the enemy groupings. None of the divisions have data on the number of people, the presence of artillery and mortars. Kozlov leaves the impression of a commander confused and unsure of his actions. None of the leading front workers since the occupation of the Kerch Peninsula was in the army ... ”But who of the generals, after such an objective telegram, felt sympathy for Lev Zakharych. Here is the characterization of the Crimean Front commander, General Kozlov, given by Mekhlis "insane, lazy," a devoured gentleman of men ", is not interested in operational issues, he regards trips to the troops as" punishment ", is unknown in the front troops, does not use authority, does not like painstaking, everyday work ". Everything written was true. As a representative of the Supreme Command headquarters, Mekhlis tried to do a lot, because the troops on the Crimean front mainly consisted of people of Caucasian nationality. "Here, replenishment comes exclusively from Transcaucasian nationalities. Such a mixed nationality of the divisions creates enormous difficulties. ” I ask you to send it with special speed, to provide a replenishment that is Russian and trained, for it will go immediately to work. Give a personal instruction to Kovalev (early. VOSO of the People's Commissariat of Defense), monitor the progress of the replenishment. Please let me know by wire when and where the replenishment is coming from .. " Mekhlis was well aware of the combat value of military units staffed exclusively with national cadres. This is what was reported about the state of the Azerbaijani division on the eve of the Iranian campaign, "the personnel ... literally lie for a whole day and do nothing except for individual shooting and occasional classes in political training and the material part of weapons." The commanders lived a separate life from their units and often did not know either their own personnel or the location of the fighters loitering around the garrisons. Shortly before this, the division made a long pedestrian transition to a new deployment location, during which the units stretched for tens of kilometers, mixed and lost all military appearance. On the way, dozens of rifles and machine guns were lost ... ”On the Crimean Front, the situation with the national formations was the same. So the tragedy of the Crimean Front had objective reasons, and not a bike about the tyranny of Mehlis launched in the days of Khrushchev. He did not absolve himself of responsibility. On May 4, 1942, after the defeat of the Crimean Front, Mekhlis said: "It is not the fighters who are to blame, but the leadership .... We have disgraced the country and should be damned. "And this is what General of the Army Gorbatov writes about him." At every meeting with me, up to the liberation of Orel, Mehlis did not miss the opportunity to ask me any question that could lead to a dead end. I answered simply and probably not always the way he wanted. However, it was noticeable that, albeit with difficulty, he was changing for the better his former attitude towards me.
    - I have been looking closely at you for a long time and I must say that I like you as an army commander and as a communist. I followed your every step after your departure from Moscow and what I heard good about you, I did not quite believe. Now I see that I was wrong. "
    Gorbatov A. V. "Years and Wars" Not every high-ranking chief admits that he is wrong. And after the war, he spoiled a lot of blood for all the party bureaucrats who liked to gag at public expense. Even before the war, he wool them "Lev Zakharovich managed to give a hand to many, naturally causing fear and hatred of the higher bureaucracy.
    The People's Commissar for Light Industry, the People's Commissar for State Farms, the People's Commissar for the shipbuilding industry, the People's Commissar for the oil industry, got 303 rubles from the salary of the People's Commissar of the Navy, which he ate at the expense of the money allocated for social welfare, went to the People's Commissar of the Meat and Dairy Industry and even the Prosecutor General , who, at the request of Mehlis, was forced to prosecute his thieving heads of departments. "He was a man of his time.
    1. 0
      22 September 2021 11: 52
      Quote: Unknown
      Here is the characterization of the Crimean Front commander, General Kozlov, given by Mekhlis "insane, lazy," a devoured gentleman of men ", is not interested in operational issues, he regards trips to the troops as" punishment ", is unknown in the front troops, does not use authority, does not like painstaking, everyday work ". Everything written was true.

      It’s strange, but it probably didn’t occur to you that it was precisely with such characteristics and reports that Mekhlis laid a straw for himself in Stalin’s eyes, so that later he could blame General Kozlov for his failures.
      Those who have served a lot in the army know this trick very well, and know who uses it. And normal commanders, arriving from Headquarters, and having such powers as Mekhlis, begin to correct the identified errors, and not to screw up their predecessors. And they do not deal with such garbage as repairing tanks or distributing horses, as Mehlis did, but solve operational tasks that correspond to the level of his position. That is why Mekhlis was hated in the troops - blatant incompetence and, at the same time, complete disrespect for professional military knowledge, which served as the basis of the Crimean tragedy.
      1. +1
        22 September 2021 12: 41
        Quote: ccsr
        It’s strange, but it probably didn’t occur to you that it was precisely with such characteristics and reports that Mekhlis laid a straw for himself in Stalin’s eyes, so that later he could blame General Kozlov for his failures.

        And then there was no need to dump. Kozlov's characteristic
        "Lazy, stupid", "a gluttonous master of men." He does not like painstaking, everyday work, he is not interested in operational issues, travel to the troops is "a punishment for him." He is unknown in the front forces, does not enjoy authority. Besides, "dangerously deceitful."
        was given after the front led by him successively failed the February and March offensives, losing almost all the tanks that Mehlis had with such difficulty knocked out of Headquarters.
        February offensive:
        Thanks to the arrival of tanks from Iran and the efforts of Mehlis to strengthen the front with new tanks, the troops in the Crimea were significantly reinforced with armored vehicles. The 39th and 40th tank brigades each had 10 KB, 10 T-34 and 25 T-60. 55th and 56th tank brigades from Iran - 66 T-26 and 27 flamethrower tanks each. The 226th tank battalion consisted of 16 KV tanks.

        The rain that began again made the roads impassable. The lack of skills to hack prepared defenses was not compensated by the presence of a large number of tanks. By March 2, the front troops had lost 93 tanks in unsuccessful attacks.

        After the first unsuccessful offensive, 39 KB, 2 T-6 and 34 T-11 remained in the 60th tank brigade, in the 40th tank brigade - 2 KB, 7 T-34 and 21 T-60, in the 229th tank battalion - 4 SQ.

        March offensive:
        From 13 to 19 March, the 56th tank brigade lost 88 tanks, the 55th - 8 tanks, the 39th - 23 tanks, the 40th tank brigade - 18 tanks, the 24th tank regiment - 17 tanks, the 229th separate tank battalion - 3 tanks.

        In the 39th tank brigade, there were 4 tanks (2 KB and 2 T-60), in the 40th - 13 tanks (all light), in the 56th - 31 tanks, in the 24th tank regiment - 4 tanks, in 229th separate tank battalion - 2 KV tanks.
        © Isaev
        1. -2
          22 September 2021 13: 39
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Kozlov's characteristic

          It was given by Mehlis, you would better give those characteristics of Kozlov that were given to him before the war and after its start by other bosses, and not those who covered up their mistakes with them.
          Quote: Alexey RA
          knocked out of the Headquarters by Mehlis with such difficulty.

          All this garbage - it was not Mekhlis who knocked out, but simply an opportunity arose, so they delivered the tanks to the Crimean Front according to the requests of the front armored service. Isaev may have done a "heroic" act, but who knows this cuisine, he is unlikely to believe in such a version.

          Quote: Alexey RA
          By March 2, the front troops had lost 93 tanks in unsuccessful attacks.

          I don’t know what Isaev found in this, but we must look at what period so many tanks were lost, and for what reason, because Mekhlis sent them into battle, he got into the leadership of hostilities there since January 20. By the way, Kozlov successfully led the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation of 1941-1942. and somehow he did well without Mekhlis. Can you give him a characterization for this operation?
          1. +2
            22 September 2021 14: 29
            Quote: ccsr
            All this garbage - it was not Mekhlis who knocked out, but simply an opportunity arose, so they delivered the tanks to the Crimean Front according to the requests of the front armored service. Isaev may have done a "heroic" act, but who knows this cuisine, he is unlikely to believe in such a version.

            On January 23, 1942, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General A.M. Vasilevsky, informed L.Z.Mekhlis that as requested by the latter and on the instructions of a member of the State Defense Committee, Comrade G.M. Malenkov, 450 light machine guns, 3 thousand PPSh submachine guns, 50 mortars of 120 mm and 82 mm caliber each are released to the front. On the way there were two divisions of M-8 rocket launchers. Also promised were medium and KV tanks, anti-tank rifles and cartridges for them, other weapons and equipment.

            In January 1942, the same KVs had to be "knocked out" - for the head plant was recovering from the consequences of the evacuation, and the back-up plant produced 1941 KVs in December 190, and 1942 in January 216.
            Quote: ccsr
            I don’t know what Isaev found in this, but we must look at what period of time we lost so many tanks.

            From February 27 to March 1.
            Quote: ccsr
            By the way, Kozlov successfully led the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation of 1941-1942. and somehow he did well without Mekhlis.

            Just as a result of Kozlov's leadership of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (from Tbilisi), Mehlis was sent to Crimea.
            And the results were as follows: Kozlov, after the landing, began to deploy troops in accordance with the offensive plan developed by the Caucasian Front led by him. He stretched his forces along the front and did not prepare for a German counter-attack. As a result, the Soviet offensive was thwarted, and the landing troops came under attack from Manstein's four calculated divisions.
            The German offensive began on January 15, and by January 18 the Germans had completely occupied Feodosia. The Germans announced the capture of 10 thousand prisoners, 177 guns and 85 tanks. Under the blows of Manstein's troops, the 44th Army was forced to withdraw. The commander of the army, General A.N. Pervushin, was seriously wounded, a member of the Military Council A.G. Komissarov was killed, the chief of staff, Colonel S.E. Rozhdestvensky, was wounded. General I.F. Dashichev took over the command of the army.
            The commander of the Caucasian Front D.T. Kozlov gave the order to retreat to the Parpach Isthmus, to the so-called Ak-Monai positions.

            That's the whole success of Kozlov.
            1. -3
              22 September 2021 18: 31
              Quote: Alexey RA
              In January 1942, the same KVs had to be "knocked out" - for the head plant was recovering from the consequences of the evacuation, and the back-up plant produced 1941 KVs in December 190, and 1942 in January 216.

              The Crimean frot was not the only one at that time, and moreover, it was not the most important in the first half of 1942. So then the General Staff itself, without Mehlis, decided where the tanks would be needed in the first place, that's why you shouldn't believe that at the simple request of Mehlis, everything was decided.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              Just as a result of Kozlov's leadership of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation (from Tbilisi), Mehlis was sent to Crimea.

              So it has already ended successfully - Kozlov was not removed from his post with a demotion, and this speaks about everything. Well, the fact that the Germans regrouped and launched an offensive is natural. But the point is not even this, but the fact that, according to L. Ivanov, the actions of Mekhlis brought disorganization in the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, and this was the main reason for the defeat of our troops.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              That's the whole success of Kozlov.

              I do not claim that this was a commander of the level of Rokossovsky, but the fact that he was prevented from leading the Mehlis front is confirmed by many eyewitnesses of those events, and this best confirms the guilt of this scoundrel.
              1. +1
                23 September 2021 15: 51
                Quote: ccsr
                The Crimean frot was not the only one at that time, and moreover, it was not the most important in the first half of 1942.

                And at the same time, he received 46 KV for the February offensive.
                Quote: ccsr
                But the point is not even this, but the fact that, according to L. Ivanov, the actions of Mekhlis just introduced disorganization in the defense of the Kerch Peninsula, and this was the main reason for the defeat of our troops.

                Without Mehlis, Kozlov also fought not so much - the defeat of 44 A and the loss of Feodosia are an example of this.
                1. -4
                  23 September 2021 16: 24
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  And at the same time, he received 46 KV for the February offensive.

                  And the fact that since January Mehlis has already ruled there, you probably no longer take into account when analyzing the unsuccessful actions of the Crimean Front.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  and the loss of Feodosia is an example of this.

                  Yes, they could not organize at that time the supply 100 km from Kerch of the units fighting there - the open steppe and the superiority of the German aviation made this impossible.
                  I am not saying that Kozlov was a military genius, but he was a professional in his field, and Mekhlis was just a swindler who got involved in the political agencies of the Red Army, did not understand it, and only introduced disorganization in the organization of command and control.
              2. +2
                24 September 2021 01: 31
                Does anyone here really imagine the Kerch Peninsula in winter and spring? There, the T-26 happened to be loaded on the tower.
      2. +1
        22 September 2021 19: 08
        Quote: ccsr
        It’s strange, but it probably didn’t occur to you that it was precisely with such characteristics and reports that Mekhlis laid a straw for himself in Stalin’s eyes, so that later he could blame General Kozlov for his failures.
        Those who have served a lot in the army know this trick very well, and know who uses it. And normal commanders, arriving from Headquarters, and having such powers as Mekhlis, begin to correct the identified errors, and not to screw up their predecessors. And they do not deal with such garbage as repairing tanks or distributing horses, as Mehlis did, but solve operational tasks that correspond to the level of his position. That is why Mekhlis was hated in the troops - blatant incompetence and, at the same time, complete disrespect for professional military knowledge, which served as the basis of the Crimean tragedy.

        It’s strange that it occurred to you that a man like Mekhlis would seek an excuse for himself in front of I.V. Stalin. He was not like that. If a man on the front line has no fear, then why should he tremble before the Supreme. Because in the Red Army generals and senior officers knew this trick, denunciations of each other grew, and the war came, it turned out that they could not fight and did not want to. Denunciations are easier to write than to fight the Germans. Normal commanders, is this Kozlov or the commander of the 44th Army Chernyak? Here is a characteristic on them "Chernyak. An illiterate person, incapable of leading the army. His chief of staff, Rozhdestvensky, is a boy, not an organizer of troops. One may wonder whose hand introduced Chernyak to the rank of lieutenant general." did him good, in two years he will prove himself in Hungary. Where did Kozlov prove himself after the Crimea? " I wrote that the commander of the Southern Front, DT Kozlov, was largely to blame for the failure of the operation to liberate the Crimea in 1942, for which he was suspended from work. But DT Kozlov is an honest and loyal general. He did not cope with the duties assigned to him as a front commander only because this position was beyond his power. When DT Kozlov was appointed deputy front commander, he worked successfully.

        - Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky Life's work, 2nd edition, revised. - M .: Politizdat, 1975. - P.590 This is the opinion. Mehlis came to Mertskov during the Tikhvin operation, sort of like checking. Shook the rear, restored the combat effectiveness of 4 rifle divisions. He lifted his spirits, organized supplies, in fact did not allow the final encirclement of Leningrad to be carried out. Stalin recalls him, and the verified Meretskov on January 5, 1942. writes a letter to Stalin. And asks for more

        "Leave the inspector for a while, to completely restore order in his troops!" That's it, he asks to leave. I repeat once again, Mehlis was a man of his time, and made many enemies among the generals, but he also has merits. And that the soldiers received everything that was supposed to be at the front is his merit. "Mekhlis on the Volkhov front was mainly engaged in political work and organizing supplies with everything necessary. It is fair to say that he did a lot to prepare for Operation Iskra." Also Meretskov.
        1. -3
          22 September 2021 20: 02
          Quote: Unknown
          It’s strange that it occurred to you that a man like Mekhlis would seek an excuse for himself before I.V. Stalin. He was not like that.

          Yes, of course he was a "hero" and did not shoot himself after tens of thousands of people died through his fault, unable to cross the Kerch Strait.
          Quote: Unknown
          If a person at the forefront has no fear, then why should he tremble before the Supreme.

          Pavlov also distinguished himself in Spain, he was also not considered a coward, but he tried to blame others. Why was Mehlis better?
          Quote: Unknown
          Red Army generals and senior officers knew this trick, denunciations of each other grew, and war came, it turned out that they could not fight and did not want to.

          And who then won the Germans?
          Quote: Unknown
          When DT Kozlov was appointed deputy front commander, he worked successfully.

          If it were not for Mehlis, who prevented him from leading the front, he could have distinguished himself in the defense of the Kerch Peninsula and would have successfully defended it.
          Quote: Unknown
          "For a while, leave the inspector to completely restore order in his troops!" That's it, he asks to leave.

          Maybe he himself did not want to get dirty with executions by the verdict of the tribunals, so he asked to leave this scoundrel, who did not care about human destinies because of his ambitions and who generally did not consider military personnel to be people. Where did you find in the memoirs the true motives of the authors when the question is about their personal responsibility?
          Quote: Unknown
          I repeat once again, Mehlis was a man of his time, and made many enemies among the generals, but he also has merits.

          Beria, Yezhov, Yagoda were also people of their time and they also have merits, but you are unlikely to argue that the benefits of their actions exceeded the harm they brought to our country.
          One should not confuse the merits of such people with their personal bloodthirstiness - this cannot be hidden from history, and our people know how to separate the wheat from the chaff. Mehlis is from the same breed, and this was noted not only by those who suffered from him, but also by simple witnesses of his actions on the same Crimean front.
          1. +2
            22 September 2021 21: 25
            Quote: ccsr
            Yes, of course he was a "hero" and did not shoot himself after tens of thousands of people died through his fault, unable to cross the Kerch Strait

            Everyone has to shoot like that. First, Admiral Oktyabrsky, for the failure of the evacuation of the Crimean Front troops, did not provide watercraft. Kuznetsov, the People's Commissar of the Navy, sent by the headquarters to help the naval commanders. Due to their fault, a lot of soldiers remained in Kerch. .. About Kozlov has already been said. Yes, after the war he blamed completely others "Thank you very much for not forgetting the old disgraced general. My opal has lasted for almost 25 years.

            The events of those days often come to my mind. It is hard to remember them especially because the blame for the death of all our regiments lies not only with us, the direct participants in these battles, but also with the leadership that was exercised over us. I do not mean the profane in the operational art of Mehlis, but the commander of the North Caucasian direction and the Headquarters. I also mean Oktyabrsky, who, in fact, did not fight, but prevented Petrov from fighting and built tricks on the Crimean Front ...
            I am very sorry that I did not lay my head there. I would not have heard injustices and insults, for the dead have no shame ... "
            1. -2
              23 September 2021 12: 56
              Quote: Unknown
              Shoot like that for everyone.

              No, of course, this is unrealistic - not everyone had a conscience to answer for their mistakes like the same Vlasov, for example.
              Quote: Unknown
              It has already been said about Kozlov. After the war, he blamed completely different people.

              Are you not surprised that Kozlov's opinion fully coincides with the opinion of a direct participant in those events, military counterintelligence officer Major General L. Ivanov, who is an authority for all those who were associated with this service and SMERSH during the war?
              Quote: Unknown
              So, stop repeating hackneyed tales about tyrant Mehlis

              Do you believe these were bikes? Oh well..
              1. 0
                23 September 2021 23: 54
                Quote: ccsr
                No, of course, this is unrealistic - not everyone had a conscience to answer for their mistakes like the same Vlasov, for example.

                If not really, then there is nothing to talk about. And in general, the generals of the Red Army, with rare exceptions, did not like to shoot. Efremov alone did it, the rest preferred captivity, or the mercy of the Soviet regime, and their souls for the killed soldiers did not hurt.
                Quote: ccsr
                Are you not surprised that Kozlov's opinion fully coincides with the opinion of a direct participant in those events, military counterintelligence officer Major General L. Ivanov, who is an authority for all those who were associated with this service and SMERSH during the war?

                I also had to read A. Drabkin's "I Remember", including the memoirs of L. Ivanov. His view of Mehlis smacks of tendentiousness, there is a desire to blame his mistakes, as the head of a special department, on a higher management, and his salvation from Kerch smacks of fantasy. But God will judge him.
                Quote: ccsr
                Do you believe these were bikes? Oh well.

                Yes, these tales do not correspond to reality, and were launched in Khrushchev's time, by generals who crossed paths with L.Z. Mehlis, then picked up and added in literary form by the writer K. Simonov. The writer himself had no friction with him.
                1. 0
                  24 September 2021 00: 37
                  Yes, these tales do not correspond to reality, and were launched in Khrushchev's time, by generals who crossed paths with L.Z. Mehlis, then picked up and added in literary form by the writer K. Simonov. The writer himself had no friction with him.

                  Many dreamed of making Mehlis the scapegoat for the defeat of the Crimean Front. But there were objective reasons for our defeat and not Mehlis, and not Kozlov, and even Zhukov and Rokossovsky could not have resisted Manstein there.
                  Mekhlis is still a political worker and he made his contribution to the history of the war. The famous photograph "Death of a Soldier" was taken by his protégé Anatoly Garanin literally days before the start of Operation Hunt for the Bustard, who was provided with explosives and Red Army soldiers for filming. Garanin usually accompanied Mehlis on trips, he was with him then in the Crimea. When Mehlis fell into disgrace, the career of a front-line photojournalist ended, there are no more military photographs of him, these last



                  Garanin is in a winter hat with lowered ears and an overcoat with a camera on his chest, he is dressed so in May so that he does not get cut by splinters of stones when shooting, on his left is the sapper officer who controlled the explosive machine, in the last picture he is at the bottom right waiting for the moment when it is necessary to make an explosion. We can say this is the co-authors of this picture.
                2. -5
                  24 September 2021 11: 46
                  Quote: Unknown
                  Efremov alone did it, the rest preferred captivity, or the mercy of Soviet power, and their souls for the killed soldiers did not hurt them.

                  It’s not you and I’m not to judge their motives, but you flirted about one general, because only in 1941-1942. there were seven of them.
                  https://zen.yandex.ru/media/id/5e1583f18f011100ad29add4/sem-sovetskih-voenachalnikov-zastrelivshihsia-v-19411942-godah-6050980e0a7d51654ae3123e
                  Quote: Unknown
                  I also had to read A. Drabkin "I remember"

                  You are not embarrassed to equate the opinion of this person with the participants in the battles of the Crimean Front -
                  Writer and screenwriter Artem Drabkin has published 20 books of memoirs of the war veterans of the Great Patriotic War.
                  Are you trying to refute eyewitness testimony with the text of someone who was not there at all?
                  Quote: Unknown
                  His view of Mehlis smacks of tendentiousness, there is a desire to blame his mistakes, as the head of a special department, on a higher management, and his salvation from Kerch smacks of fantasy. But God will judge him.

                  It is strange that no one refuted the memoirs of L. Ivanov, and the same Drabkin. By the way, he was in the thick of things, and his position was not as big as you think. What makes you think that he was the head of a special DEPARTMENT if he had at least two steps less position:
                  I was then a battalion operative and took part in this work within the limits of his possibilities.

                  So he just saw what the foolishness of Mehlis led to, and wrote about it in detail in the book.
                  Quote: Unknown
                  Yes, these tales do not correspond to reality, and were launched in Khrushchev's time, by generals who crossed paths with L.Z. Mehlis,

                  Strange, but you apparently do not know when L. Ivanov wrote and published his book, and it is a pity that you attribute to him the opportunism of the Khrushchev period. God is your judge ...
                  1. +1
                    24 September 2021 13: 57
                    Quote: ccsr
                    It’s not you and I’m not to judge their motives, but you flirted about one general, because only in 1941-1942. there were seven of them.
                    https://zen.yandex.ru/media/id/5e1583f18f011100ad29add4/sem-sovetskih-voenachalnikov-zastrelivshihsia-v-19411942-godah-6050980e0a7d51654ae3123e

                    We need to understand the issues. Kirpanos did not shoot himself, how he died and where, no one knows. The reference to this topic says "In a number of cases, allegations about the commanders who shot themselves are categorical, although the circumstances of their death are still unclear until the end." So let's not talk about it. Kopets why he shot himself, there are also enough versions, to remove Efremov, there are three left, the motives of which are still not clear. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, 78 generals who commanded the troops of the Red Army were captured by the Nazis for various reasons. 26 of them could not stand the torture or were shot in German captivity. The remaining 52 were repatriated to their homeland after the victory over Germany. 32 of them were repressed. In the Vlasov case, five major generals and 25 colonels were executed by hanging in the Soviet Union. There is no need to look for motives. In peacetime, the army is an expensive pleasure, and requires increased attention. The country and the people are tearing away from themselves the latter, so that the troops do not need anything, but with one condition, during the war, it must protect the people and the country, and first of all this applies to the generals and officers.
                    Quote: ccsr
                    You are not embarrassed to equate the opinion of this person with the participants in the battles of the Crimean Front.

                    Quote: ccsr
                    It is strange that no one refuted the memoirs of L. Ivanov, and the same Drabkin. By the way, he was in the thick of things, and his position was not as big as you think. What makes you think that he was the head of a special DEPARTMENT if he had at least two steps less position:

                    Firstly, the memoirs differ about the memories, and secondly, this is "Well, they didn't know how to fight yet, there was an order -" disturb the German. "What does it mean to" disturb "? To attack every day. So what? Mekhlis was a member of the Military Council: he thought of himself that he was “Stalin’s envoy.” He was a natural scoundrel, he didn’t understand military affairs, but he caught the commander. Kozlov was such a smart man, he was Here, he says, "Stalin's envoy" and commanded all the time! There is no experience! And so many troops in density! [Demonstrates.] The Crimean front was the most saturated of the entire Soviet-German line of contact. [German] - will definitely kill someone. " It is surprising to hear such things from the authorized special department of the battalion, whose functions included monitoring the political and moral state of the unit;
                    the identification of persons whose activities were qualified by Soviet law as a state crime - treason, espionage, sabotage, terrorism;
                    the identification of counter-revolutionary organizations and groups of people leading anti-Soviet agitation;
                    conducting investigations on state crimes under the supervision of the prosecutor's office with the transfer of cases to military tribunals. Well, the story of the rescue from Kerch also deserves attention, "that's it, the end, the Germans have already approached again. But what can we do? We have to shoot again! Well, where? We need to be on the pier. I just sat on it, and then there was a motor:" puff-puff-puff "... The last fishing! And he already knew me. The guys threw me from their hands, sat down, I said:" Fast! " And - already aimed fire at us, shelling. So, about five people were killed, or about six - I don't remember ... wounded ... and there was some kind of small box with tools - I somehow contrived, bent like this, lay down ... in general, he stayed alive. " With all due respect to the veterans, they also loved to bend, but one should not blame for this, one must understand them.
                    Quote: ccsr
                    Strange, but you apparently do not know when L. Ivanov wrote and published his book, and it is a pity that you attribute to him the conjuncture of the Khrushchev period. God is your judge.

                    It was written at the present time, probably in 2009, and was also edited in the right direction.
                    1. -5
                      24 September 2021 14: 13
                      Quote: Unknown
                      We need to understand the issues.

                      Quote: Unknown
                      There is no need to look for motives

                      Do you find a contradiction in one paragraph of your answer?
                      Quote: Unknown
                      ... With all due respect to the veterans, they also loved to bend, but one should not blame for this, one must understand them.

                      I do not argue with this, which is why I try to study the opinions of different authors, especially front-line soldiers, so as not to have a false idea. But about Mehlis, almost all the authors I read responded negatively - did they all not understand this issue either? I find that hard to believe.
                      Quote: Unknown
                      It was written at the present time, probably in 2009, and was also edited in the right direction.

                      It means that there is no smell of Khrushchev's conjuncture here, so in this respect the author is spotless. It's good at least this ...
                      1. 0
                        24 September 2021 19: 51
                        Quote: ccsr

                        Do you find a contradiction in one paragraph of your answer?

                        I do not find.
                        Quote: ccsr
                        I do not argue with this, which is why I try to study the opinions of different authors, especially front-line soldiers, so as not to have a false idea. But about Mehlis, almost all the authors I read responded negatively - did they all not understand this issue either? I find that hard to believe.

                        I also read different authors, and about Mehlis there are so many rumors, fictions, gossip at the level, I heard there, and here they talked. But the generals, who were in close contact with him at the front, spoke of him with restraint, giving him his due in putting things in order in the rear of the fronts, where he was at that time. He was especially disliked by the rear officials, including General Khrulev. It was from them that a story began about the tyranny of Mehlis, overgrown with various gossips.
                        Quote: ccsr
                        It means that there is no smell of Khrushchev's conjuncture here, so in this respect the author is spotless. Already good at least that.

                        Nothing of the kind, the very Khrushchev conjuncture, diluted with new memories, and old rumors, as it is fashionable to say "not when not published."
                      2. -4
                        24 September 2021 20: 20
                        Quote: Unknown
                        He was especially disliked by the rear officials, including General Khrulev. ...

                        Khrulev fought with Mehlis in Crimea?
                        Quote: Unknown
                        It was from them that a story began about the tyranny of Mehlis, overgrown with various gossips.
                        This hardly applies to L. Ivanov - he actually saw the result of Mehlis's activities and described everything as he saw it with his own eyes.
                      3. +1
                        25 September 2021 05: 55
                        Quote: ccsr
                        Khrulev fought with Mehlis in Crimea?

                        So you study different authors so as not to have a false idea about the activities of this or that figure.
                        Quote: ccsr
                        This hardly applies to L. Ivanov - he actually saw the result of Mehlis's activities and described everything as he saw it with his own eyes.

                        Here is just to him, and treat. The authorized special department of the battalion, in no way can assess the actions of the representative of the headquarters of the Supreme Command, the wrong level. And most importantly, he describes the failure of the evacuation from Kerch, while he does not blame Oktyabrsky, Kuznetsov, Isakov and the commander of the KVMB Frolov for the mess with the floating craft they made. , at least in the battalion where he was. And so in the role of an extra "And then the battalion withdrew in an organized manner with battles to Kerch. And near Kerch - everything got mixed up. Hundreds of thousands - and no command! No command, nothing! It's like a crowd in the bazaar. And officers, and colonels, soldiers - in a heap ... Such despair, so morally difficult ... well, go crazy. " From his memories. At the same time, he does not blame the command of the Southern Front and personally the PMCs of the Zaporozhets or Korniyets front for the 1941 retreats. It is not necessary to present the book "The Truth About Smersh" as "the ultimate truth" about the personality of L.Z. Mehlis. Read other sources, documents, they are available today.
                      4. -3
                        25 September 2021 18: 41
                        Quote: Unknown
                        at the same time, he does not blame Oktyabrsky, Kuznetsov, Isakov and the commander of the KVMB Frolov, the mess with the floating craft that they made

                        And nothing that it was another People's Commissariat, not subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Defense?
                        So the mess that occurred in relations between the NCO and the NKVMF in Crimea is just a consequence of the big mistake that the country's leadership made on the eve of the war, removing the sailors from the subordination of the NCO. It is simply ridiculous to blame one of the admirals for this - any other, in a similar situation of dual power, would hardly have decided something radically.
                        Quote: Unknown
                        Yes, and he himself, as a special officer, must stop the panic that gripped the troops, at least in the battalion where he was

                        And he coped with this successfully, since his career after that did not end in this position.
                        Quote: Unknown
                        It is not necessary to present the book "The Truth About Smersh" as "the ultimate truth" about the personality of L.Z. Mehlis. Read other sources, documents, they are available today.

                        I have provided a link to this book, and you can bring a book where the exploits of Mehlis are described in order to change your opinion about him?
                      5. +1
                        26 September 2021 03: 59
                        Quote: ccsr
                        And nothing that it was another People's Commissariat, not subordinate to the People's Commissariat of Defense?
                        So the mess that occurred in relations between the NCO and the NKVMF in Crimea is just a consequence of the big mistake that the country's leadership made on the eve of the war, removing the sailors from the subordination of the NCO. It is simply ridiculous to blame one of the admirals for this - any other, in a similar situation of dual power, would hardly have decided something radically.

                        What does the other people's commissariat have to do with it? It is not necessary to shift from a sore head to a healthy one. When everything is postponed, and the naval leadership acts wisely, then the evacuation is successful, the example of Odessa on the face. And when through one place, then it turns out, as in Kerch. A distinctive feature of the officers, everyone is to blame, except for themselves. A little over a year later, the Germans, without a fleet in the Black and Azov Seas, successfully evacuated from the Caucasus to the Crimea, and our generals with admirals only stated this fact, "On September 4, 1943, the Fuhrer accepted the decision to leave the Kuban bridgehead and evacuate the 17th Army to Crimea. Despite all our efforts, the Germans managed to leave for Crimea by October 10 without heavy losses. " evacuation, and of course Mehlis is to blame.
                        Quote: ccsr
                        And he coped with this successfully, since his career after that did not end in this position.

                        There was no smell of any success, and there are questions about how I got my feet out of there. It is necessary to type Drabkin "I remember", and read what he said, and not what was edited in the book.
                        Quote: ccsr
                        I have provided a link to this book, and you can bring a book where the exploits of Mehlis are described in order to change your opinion about him?

                        There is no need for such references to a book that is written in the form of fiction. If something has gone into your head, it is impossible to convince. Can you still give a list of references to familiarize yourself with this topic? Seek, all sources are open. On the edge, you can read Rubtsov's "Mekhlis. The Shadow of the Leader". Although it was written in a biased manner, in the spirit of the present time, at least there are facts, documents, and not a free retelling of a participant in the events.
          2. +6
            23 September 2021 16: 57
            I will argue that Beria did a lot to strengthen the borders of the USSR, and the border troops held back the Germans on June 22 for a very long time, giving the army time to prepare to repel the strike, some outposts fought for up to a month already in the rear of the Germans. In my opinion, very little is said about the role of Beria in the first days of the war, his NKVD border troops, for some reason no one bothered him to keep the outposts in full readiness to repel an attack, the army should also be ready, but the generals could not reach the level of combat readiness and mobility of troops, like the border guards of Beria.
            1. -1
              27 September 2021 19: 16
              "In my opinion, very little is said about the role of Beria in the first days of the war, his NKVD border troops."
              ===
              I can tell you that the border guards of the times of the USSR ALWAYS respected him.
              And just as the airborne troops call themselves the troops of Uncle Vasya, so many border guards of the times of the USSR called themselves the troops of Lavrenty Palych.
              Although the name of Beria was slandered and completely unpopular.
  12. +7
    21 September 2021 20: 41
    and he, criticizing a lot and justly, did not correct, but worsened the general situation, and did not prepare the troops for defense. For which he paid dearly ..

    How did he pay? Tens of thousands of our fathers and grandfathers on the Kerch Peninsula paid with their lives for his foolishness. Thousands of lives and one!
    1. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 18
      "Tens of thousands of our fathers and grandfathers on the Kerch Peninsula paid with their lives for his foolishness. Thousands of lives and one!"
      ==
      Mekhlis DID NOT FORBID the soldiers to dig trenches. FORBIDDEN Kozlov!
      Come on, repay Kozlov for his nonsense!
  13. -1
    21 September 2021 21: 11
    Mehlis was a product of his time, an ideological Bolshevik and fanatic, one of Stalin's close associates, the image of Mehlis in the film "War in the West" is very well shown, each era has its own heroes
    1. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 20
      "The image of Mehlis in the film" War in the West "is shown very well, each era has its own heroes"
      ===
      How much nonsense in many of these films - horror!
      And it seems that the films are not bad in general, but some of the mise-en-scenes are just lies!
  14. +1
    21 September 2021 21: 24
    Simonov wrote a lot about Mehlis, read "Different days of the war". It was not his business to command, Leo did not know how. He was a political worker with high powers and the same conceit. In Russia, such people at all times were called tyrant. Lev is personally responsible for the disaster in the Crimea, after which he had to shoot himself. Tens of thousands of people died due to his personal fault, and a bullet in the head would be atonement. I didn't have enough courage.
    1. -1
      21 September 2021 21: 34
      Quote: Borisych
      Leo is personally responsible for the disaster in the Crimea, after which he had to shoot himself.

      Gold words. While here, it seems, has not yet been said by anyone)
      1. +5
        21 September 2021 22: 09
        And Kozlov was not supposed to shoot himself? He was to command the troops. And after Kharkov, Khrushchev, Malinovsky, Tymoshenko should not have shot themselves? And Oktyabrsky for Sevastopol?
        1. +1
          9 January 2022 20: 22
          Many can be added to Zhukov for the 33rd army of General Efremov, Efremov shot himself while wounded, was buried by the Germans, after the war, during the reburial, it turned out that the Germans, paying tribute to his courage, did not remove the gold watch from the body. General Petrov left the troops in Sevastopol, Efremov was also offered to fly away, but he stayed with the remnants of the army to the end.
    2. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 23
      "Leo is personally responsible for the catastrophe in Crimea, after which he had to shoot himself. Tens of thousands of people died due to his personal fault, and a bullet in the head would be redemption. He lacked courage."
      ==
      Prove that it is Mehlis who is "personally responsible"!
      As far as I know, I trained the troops, located exactly the front headquarters, which was located almost in Tbilisi. 500 km from the front. And Mekhlis FORCED Kozlov to move the headquarters closer to the front. Only this fool Kozlov with the general's collar tabs could not be helped by anyone. And it was Kozlov who SHOULD shoot himself, not Mehlis.
      Well, after all, they explain and prove everything to you fools, but again Mehlis is to blame for everything.
  15. +3
    21 September 2021 21: 33
    And for me, Lev Zakharovich was a fanatic - a fanatic of the idea that in those years captured the minds of millions. He lived for her sake, did everything for her, eradicating any outrages and qualifying them as counter-revolution, for her sake he died, burning himself to the end. And the judges of such people are clearly not contemporaries who suffered from his honesty, but descendants, moreover, distant ones, when the passions of that era finally subside.(C)
    And I agree with the author on this issue. who we are. to judge, what was at least half a century before us. And what will say in half a century, those who will be after us? Yes, the next day you will be guilty if you stumble. Maybe it is rightly said in the Scripture: do not judge, that they will not be judged. We weren't living at the time. How to judge what you have not your own understanding, but by the stories of others. Hammurabi sv ....... whose uttermost, however, depending on what point of view, however, his laws are still being studied by law students. So who is he? Therefore, as it seems to me, history should simply be accepted, studied, drawn conclusions, but judged, guided by the point of view that arose after 50, and as a rule more than 100 years after the events occurred - nonsense on vegetable oil, especially if it is the point of view of the ruling part of society. By the way, in the USA, at the honorary army cemetery of Arlington, there is a monument to the general (I do not remember his last name), who surrendered Fort Washington in the war between England and the colonies. However, the monument stands, no one pours shit, a distinctive feature - a boot with a spur. There is no portrait, but the tombstone stands.
  16. -3
    21 September 2021 21: 56
    It is these Mehlises that our country lacks now.
    1. 0
      22 September 2021 08: 53
      Quote: Gueuze Ulenspiegel
      It is these Mehlises that our country lacks now.

      laughing
      the place of the Jewish political instructor, licking the master's hand and barking at the master's enemies, was taken by Solovyov.
      1. -1
        27 September 2021 19: 25
        "the place of the Jewish political instructor, licking the master's hand and barking at the master's enemies, is taken by Solovyov."
        ==
        And I thought there were fewer fools.
        I was wrong.
        I'm sorry.
  17. -1
    22 September 2021 02: 48
    Written right to the point! Mekhlis was looking after the commanders and, accordingly, they did not like him. And, as Mukhin wrote, he went to Stalin without an invitation.
    1. +3
      22 September 2021 06: 11
      Quote: amat22
      And, as Mukhin wrote, he went to Stalin without an invitation.

      To Stalin, bypassing Poskrebyshev ... Ha, ha, ha ...
  18. -1
    22 September 2021 06: 10
    Who are you, Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis?
    The son of his time ... "Commissar in a dusty helmet", who rose thanks to the revolution from "rags to riches"
  19. 0
    22 September 2021 08: 50
    The author tries unsuccessfully to whitewash someone who does not deserve it.

    Many people, behind ostentatious cruelty, hide an insignificant, pitiful essence.

    Mekhlis indiscriminately called the soldiers of the Red Army who surrendered to captivity traitors to the homeland, only for the fact that they did not voluntarily commit suicide, for the mistakes of the commanders. Mehlis himself, being a representative of the rate and bearing personal responsibility for the collapse of the Crimean Front, did not find the courage to put an end to his career - which better than words characterizes his insignificant personality.

    No matter how hard the author tries to whitewash the personality of Mehlis, he does not deserve oblivion - life and posthumous reprimands of descendants to such nonentities!
    1. -2
      22 September 2021 09: 54
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      Mekhlis indiscriminately called the soldiers of the Red Army who surrendered to captivity traitors to the homeland, only for the fact that they did not voluntarily commit suicide,

      A link, a hundred! On the basis of what specific orders from the command did Mehlis demand "commit suicide"? Although in Japan it would be normal for a samurai ...
      You will understand the main thing here; if in the Army the representative of the People's Commissariat of Defense requires the commanders to shoot themselves, he tramples on the legality established by the State and this is not the Army and not society, but a bunch of serf lackeys and lawless ones ...
      If there is no such thing now, then even more so it could not be.
      1. +1
        22 September 2021 10: 36
        Quote: ivan2022
        Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
        Mekhlis indiscriminately called the soldiers of the Red Army who surrendered to captivity traitors to the homeland, only for the fact that they did not voluntarily commit suicide,

        A link, a hundred! On the basis of what specific orders from the command did Mehlis demand "commit suicide"? Although in Japan it would be normal for a samurai ...
        You will understand the main thing here; if in the Army the representative of the People's Commissariat of Defense requires the commanders to shoot themselves, he tramples on the legality established by the State and this is not the Army and not society, but a bunch of serf lackeys and lawless ones ...
        If there is no such thing now, then even more so it could not be.

        Captivity as a sentence
        How the famous Order No. 270 was prepared - a document that put prisoners of war on a par with traitors

        Lev Mekhlis presents the text of the draft order of the USSR People's Commissar of Defense N270
        https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4318180
        Such a cannibalistic draft order was prepared by Mehlis - in relation to the families of those who surrendered -
        Stalin did not like the draft: he skimmed out the preamble, categorically did not accept the main, operative part.
    2. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 27
      "No matter how hard the author tries to whitewash the personality of Mehlis, he does not deserve oblivion - lifelong and posthumous censure of descendants of such nonentities!"
      ==
      Oh yeah!
      And who are the judges? The crap generals and their singers?
  20. -4
    22 September 2021 09: 56
    My father told me when, during the Battle of Rzhev, Mehlis with three adjutants ran along the trains with newly arrived soldiers and personally shot one person from the carriage to speed up the disembarkation, and the adjutants reset their pistols. And then they lined up platoon columns and accompanied by an orchestra for German machine guns. My father spent his whole life trying to find out "why", and never did.
    1. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 28
      Lies!
      Mehlis was not a fool.
  21. +4
    22 September 2021 13: 09
    “And the judges of such people are clearly not contemporaries who suffered from his honesty, but descendants, moreover, distant ones, when the passions of that era finally subside.” - Russian liberals will never let the passions of that era settle in the foreseeable future. This is the raison d'être of their existence.
  22. +2
    22 September 2021 13: 51
    It is strange that Tymoshenko was on the list of incompetent military men.
  23. -4
    22 September 2021 14: 33
    Stalin's wife was killed. It's hard to shoot yourself with a broken larynx. Mehlis is a Jew and that says it all. The institution of commissars led the country to severe defeats, it was not for nothing that it was abolished. If Mehlis had been shot in 1941, there would have been no Crimean massacre in 1942. And throughout the war he prevented General Petrov from fighting.
    1. +1
      24 September 2021 15: 18
      And throughout the war he prevented General Petrov from fighting

      Have you read Karpov?
  24. +1
    22 September 2021 14: 58
    Little by little, the veil of perestroika hassle is leaving people who at least sometimes read a hundred besides advertising brochures.
  25. +6
    22 September 2021 15: 15
    Pavlov, who became an innocent victim of the regime


    In fact, open the front to the enemy, and then turn on the fool, is this an innocent victim of the regime? And why were neither Tymoshenko, nor Budyonny, nor many others who showed themselves unimportant, were not shot? This is not to mention the fact that everything in the industry was also thwarted, but people who showed incompetence were simply transferred to lower positions.
    1. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 31
      "Neither Budyonny, nor many others who showed themselves to be unimportant, were not shot?"
      ==
      And in what way did Budyonny show himself "unimportantly" and in about the same way as Pavlov?
      By the way: after the war, there were numerous investigations into the activities of the generals during the war. Some were shot. The same Gordov, for example, on whose conscience Stalingrad and many other "achievements".
  26. -1
    22 September 2021 16: 25
    Mekhlis called himself zhyd parhaty and asked Stalin to shoot himself
  27. +3
    22 September 2021 17: 04
    Unreliable units turned out to be in Crimea. National divisions. We scattered at the first shelling. They opened the front. Kind of like Armenian or what? Here is the answer who is to blame. Another thing is who authorized their creation and presence at the front. And who should find out the mood in the troops. Is it Mehlis?
    1. +2
      22 September 2021 18: 48
      Quote: zimzinov
      Unreliable units turned out to be in Crimea. National divisions. We scattered at the first shelling. They opened the front. Kind of like Armenian or what?

      Unfortunately, this was also:
      It should be noted that the Crimean Front included many representatives of the Caucasian peoples, among them Armenians, Georgians, Azerbaijanis. The latter fought especially badly. Many of them deserted in droves.
      To the question: "Why did you run?" they all had the same answer: "Kursak (stomach) is sick." Many in the trenches froze, although the frost did not exceed 4-5 degrees. Going into the attack, they tucked the rifle under the armpit, their hands into the sleeves of their greatcoats and forward. If one of them was killed or wounded, then those who were nearby stopped, sat on the ground, forming a living circle, and expressed
      his grief with plaintive cries: "Wai, wai, wai ...". The enemy, seeing a motionless group of soldiers, opened aimed fire and quickly destroyed everyone.
      At the front, Azerbaijanis were contemptuously called “Yaldash”, although this word in Azerbaijani means “comrade”.

      The truth about SMERSH
      L. Ivanov
      1. -1
        27 September 2021 19: 33
        Yes, the national divisions "distinguished themselves".
        After that, the divisions were never recruited in the same way as in the Caucasus in 1941.
        The division was always based on the Slavs, primarily the Russians.
    2. 0
      23 September 2021 11: 38
      Sevastopol, among others, was also liberated by national divisions. There are monuments to them. By the way, it was Mehlis who demanded Russian-speaking replenishments for the KF, he sounded all the bells.
    3. +4
      24 September 2021 01: 22
      Kind of like Armenian or what?

      No, the Georgian 63rd Mountain Rifle Division. Unlike the 77th Azerbaijani Mountain Rifle, which showed heroism in these battles, the 63rd Guards Rifle Division became one of the culprits of the defeat. There were many defectors, and then they surrendered en masse. The division was then formally disbanded. The main breakthrough of the German troops was made just through the positions of this division. The Ju-87 attack aircraft drove the mountain riflemen to the bottom of the trenches near the beach beyond Feodosia and they did not see the boat landing at that moment, our defenders did not even detonate the land mines on the beach, prepared in case of landing.

      The coastal partly swampy strip was not considered a threatened area. However, according to E. Meinstein's plan for Operation Hunting the Bustard, this area ended up in the zone of the main attack of the German-Romanian troops. In addition to air strikes and a frontal offensive, a German boat landing was landed in the rear of the division by the forces of one battalion of the 436th Infantry Regiment of the 132nd Infantry Division, which increased the general panic and disorganization

      This is from wikipedia. There were 28 rubber assault boats in total and there was a 3-point excitement, two boats sank in the surf wave.
      The division covered the anti-tank ditch. The Germans quickly captured the coast and with the help of a sapper company quickly made passages in the ditch for tanks. And the tanks were the newest T-IV, with 75-mm long-barreled guns, which had never participated in battles before, these guns pierced the armor of the KV and T-34 even at long distances, which was very important in the Crimea with its steppes. The front was broken through, and then the Luftwaffe destroyed communications centers and headquarters, the location of which had not been changed for months, our two armies turned into crowds of armed people and Mehlis had nothing to do with it.
  28. +3
    22 September 2021 17: 36
    - “The commander of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General Kachalov, being surrounded with the headquarters of the group of forces, showed cowardice, surrendered to the German fascists. The headquarters of Kachalov's group came out of the encirclement, part of Kachalov's group fought their way out of the encirclement, and Lieutenant-General Kachalov preferred to surrender, preferred to defect to the enemy "



    The formal reason for this accusation was the testimony given to the military investigator on August 9, 1941, after leaving the encirclement, a member of the Military Council of the 28th Army, Brigadier Commissar Kolesnikov and the head of the political department of the army, Regimental Commissar Tereshkin.

    After interrogation, they were summoned personally to L.Z. Mekhlis, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Although they told Mekhlis who spoke with them that they did not even admit the thought that General Kachalov could surrender to the enemy, the "chief political instructor" of the Red Army immediately accused them of "political infancy." And from their testimony given earlier, it followed that the commander of the army on August 4, 1941 picked up one of the German leaflets-passes dropped from the plane and with the words "maybe it will come in handy" put it in his pocket, and then, at the most critical moment of the battle, left on the tank towards the enemy. True, Kolesnikov added that he took it all as a joke. But no one paid attention to such a "trifle" anymore, and from that time on in all documents regarding General Kachalov the same phrase will appear: "under dubious circumstances, drove a tank towards the enemy." his harsh text personally for the commander of the 270th Army, General V.Ya. Kachalova no longer mattered. The night tank battle near the village of Starinka on August 28, 4 was the last in his military biography. He died as a result of a direct hit of a shell in a tank, when, at the head of the remaining and thinning parts of his army, he tried to break through the encirclement and retreat to the Desna River, where the troops of the Reserve Front were stationed.

    Nevertheless, this order took place, and since Stalin himself was its editor-in-chief, in subsequent years the name of Kachalov continued to be persuaded in other orders and directives as a traitor and traitor. And no one dared to express a different opinion, even if there were good reasons for that. Moreover, at the end of September 1941, a trial was organized in absentia over the commander, the verdict of which stated: “Kachalov during the hostilities of units of the 28th Army on the Western Front on August 4, 1941 in the area of ​​the city of Roslavl near the village of Starinka, leaving his troops and using the tank at his disposal, he went over to the side of the enemy. " And therefore - execution! But the matter did not end there. Taking into account the "gravity of the crime committed by Kachalov," the military board also issued a ruling on bringing to criminal responsibility all adult members of his family. By a special meeting of the NKVD of the USSR on December 27, 1941, the general's wife, E.N. Khanchina-Kachalova and her mother - E.I. Khanchina, as close relatives of the "traitor", were sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 8 years each.
  29. 0
    22 September 2021 17: 43
    The Almighty has mercy on intercourse in service with such honest and, most importantly, principled political fighters.
    Save and preserve the next generations of defenders.
  30. +3
    22 September 2021 21: 30
    All previous revolutions in Europe before the Great October Revolution in Russia, as a rule, ended in a military counter-coup. In the 18th -19th centuries, power in Russia changed directly or indirectly with the help of the guards regiments.
    Therefore, the Bolsheviks closely watched the Army, keeping it in the iron grip of political administration. From here came Voroshilov as a People's Commissar of the commissars and Mekhlis as the head of the political administration.
    In general, it is stupid to be inside the pro-general myth, about white and fluffy officers and evil Cerberus politicians who prevented them from saving their homeland.
    1. +1
      23 September 2021 21: 16
      Not so long ago I read something written by one person. In his younger years, he asked his long-fought grandfather about the war. And once his grandfather told him - remember, out of five commanders in a muddy situation, four will be scum. Of the five political instructors, only two. Whether this is so or not, I don’t know. But I know that the Germans mercilessly shot precisely the political instructors and said that it was on them that the resistance of the Russians rests.
    2. -1
      27 September 2021 19: 39
      "From here came Voroshilov as a People's Commissar of the Commissars"
      ==
      By the way, he was a quite competent People's Commissar. If not for the general sabotage, it would have been great in general. No wonder he held almost all international events, where he showed himself excellently.
      And it was under his command that the troops of the North-Western Front NEVER were surrounded. And the FIRST powerful counterattack was struck near Soltsy by the troops of his front.
  31. 0
    23 September 2021 08: 58
    "Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis did not pass this selection, but unlike Pavlov, who became an innocent victim of the regime ..."
    Read on, the desire is gone ...
  32. +2
    23 September 2021 13: 07
    "... Russia is a country with an unpredictable past."
    Russia is a country with a forgotten past.
  33. +4
    23 September 2021 15: 10
    indiscriminately, and extremely dismissively said about Kirponos, he does not deserve such
    but about Khrushchev - on the contrary, it is too pompous, but he was Kirponos' political instructor and survived thanks to Mehlis
  34. +4
    23 September 2021 17: 33
    Thank you for a truthful and honest article about a wonderful person,
    , a selfless Bolshevik who has been poured with mud for so many years.
    The article clearly says about this:

    i] ".. And then those whom he controlled came to power ... And there was a legend about a tyrant and a psychopath who killed thousands of people, thwarted front operations, an unprincipled opportunist, a coward and an intriguer, Stalin's six. It's so nice to kick a dead lion. .. And it is even more pleasant to add a note of anti-Semitism nowadays, claiming that Mehlis was killed / removed by Stalin, and this despite the fact that for the last three years half of his body has not really worked after a severe stroke. "[/ I]

    In exactly the same way, Beria was blackened in the mass consciousness, "forgetting" that the FIRST REAL AMNESTY WAS AFTER ITS APPOINTMENT, NARKOM, that for many years he was the main engine for the development of the atomic theme and rocketry. Well, the creator and leader of the Red Army Trotsky, the entire Civil War, the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, was trampled into the mud. Many were blackened, even more of those who were completely forgotten or blatantly deleted from our history.

    The truth sprouts anyway. 60 years of denigrating STALIN and his authority is now the best example.

    By the way, until the end of his life, Mehlis and his family, in all positions, lived in a communal apartment. Many such examples at that time, not to mention the present?

    Many years ago I talked with the former general controller of the People's Commissariat of State Control. He said: the most severe demand of the People's Commissar of Mehlis was - no attempt at personal, material contacts with those being checked, even in small things. You couldn't even take a match to light a cigarette.

    Selfless BOLSHEVIK ...
  35. +2
    23 September 2021 21: 56
    Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis did not pass this selection, but unlike Pavlov, who became an innocent victim of the regime


    After that, you don't have to read ...
  36. -2
    23 September 2021 23: 58
    The author of this opus does not own the material. His writings have no factual basis ... Citing the example of Kirponos or Budyonny, one should at least get acquainted with their biographies and activities during the Second World War. As for Mehlis, I will say briefly - "a time-consuming vulgarius" walking over the head towards his personal well-being.
    1. 0
      24 September 2021 01: 24
      Owns. But about "personal well-being" I would like to know more.
      1. +2
        24 September 2021 14: 30
        He does not own it, because he is engaged in manipulation and distortion ... "Personal well-being" in this case is a subjective concept for Mehlis. Or do you think that Mekhlis was like Dzerzhinsky, had one sweater, a set of military uniforms and an overcoat? Mekhlis remained afloat with all his might, with the country's top leadership and feeding trough. At the same time, he did not in any way embarrass himself with morality, when he accused people of crimes and brought them under death sentences, bypassing Soviet legislation and law ...
        1. -1
          25 September 2021 22: 02
          So Iron Felix is ​​also by no means
          I was NOT an altruist-non-silver person !!!
          And right in 1918, they, together with
          spouse, went to rest in
          ... Switzerland, where in the photo
          from Zurich he is dressed according to the latest
          the then European fashion, like
          that London dandy :-))
          1. 0
            27 September 2021 19: 50
            Oh, you are writing the wrong thing ... As far as I know, in 1918 Dzerzhinsky was for a short time in Switzerland from where he took his wife and sick son, with whom he left for Soviet Russia ... In Switzerland, Dzerzhinsky's wife ended up in 1912 year. For party work, having previously visited Krakow and Vienna. And only in 1917 in the Soviet mission in Bern ...
    2. -2
      27 September 2021 19: 40
      "As for Mehlis, I will say briefly -" a time-consuming vulgarius "walking over the head towards his personal well-being."
      ==
      Lies!
      1. 0
        29 September 2021 22: 12
        "What is your evidence?" (with)
  37. -1
    24 September 2021 01: 31
    Must be a scarecrow!
  38. 0
    24 September 2021 14: 34
    A muddy personality, this Mekhlis ... Nobody ever remembered him with a kind word ... Especially after Pavlov's case ...
  39. -2
    25 September 2021 04: 36
    His stupidity has thousands of lives.
    1. 0
      27 September 2021 19: 43
      And how many lives are on Zhukov's conscience?
      For his only order not to EVACUATE KOMSOSTAV'S FAMILIES AND TO RETURN ALL EVACUATED heads of families to their places of service - he had to shoot himself after the war.
      How many thousands of lives of women and children were worth his order to stop the evacuation?
  40. -2
    25 September 2021 21: 54
    A little WRONG the wording
    here in the title ...
    When Leiba was sitting as a secretary in the reception
    mustachioed Uncle Yosi, then Uncle Yos adored,
    passing by, pin up over Leiba:
    -Who do you serve, the king of beasts ???
    -To you ! And only you, Joseph Vissarionovich !!! :-)
  41. +1
    27 September 2021 15: 06
    Now these are the ones that are lacking. At least one.
  42. -1
    27 September 2021 19: 13
    The crap generals crap Mehlis.
  43. -1
    28 September 2021 13: 46
    Quote: Konnick
    And throughout the war he prevented General Petrov from fighting

    Have you read Karpov?

    Not only. Mekhlis is a Trotskyist, which means an enemy. Many of them remained in the army by 1941. And mostly innocent people were shot.
  44. -1
    28 September 2021 15: 23
    Zionists of all stripes began to rewrite history. So Mekhlis, who destroyed tens of thousands of Russian people, turned out to be acting for the good and happiness of this people. Another Jew believes that Hitler, a brave soldier, the third, declares with impunity that the Russian heroine Kosmodemyanskaya, crazy and before being hanged, danced on the podium. Most of the bloody executioners of the Russian people are being rehabilitated. It turned out that the executioner of the Russian people was Stalin, who saved the people from bloody genocide in the 30s. The Russian people will understand and each will be given a true place in the crimes against the Russian nation and other peoples of the Soviet Union.
  45. +1
    1 October 2021 11: 28
    I am sure that for many people the image of Mehlis was formed thanks to feature films about the war ..) Where he looks like an inquisitor on the heads of the valiant generals of the red army. Probably, if such a person was not useful and needed by the pragmatic Stalin, then the leader would not keep such a person in the highest political cage of the country. As you know, Stalin was scrupulous in the selection of personnel.
  46. 0
    15 October 2021 14: 01
    All of them are the executioners of the Russian people. They created a fanatical system, and the people were used to maintain their power under the slogans of their care. And so on for many decades. While their ideology continues to exist, nothing good will happen for most people in the country.
  47. 0
    27 October 2021 08: 54
    Mehlis is an illiterate, arrogant, cynical, petty despod brought up in the Sadukean ideology. His crimes do not fit into the framework of any law, except for his personal "revolutionary" devotion to comrade. Stalin. Therefore, he would easily put the author of this eulogy about himself against the wall and personally shoot in the presence of his colleagues for extolling his (Mehlis) personality. The author is not at all aware of the methods and values ​​of the time. The Leader was in charge everywhere and in everything. It is clear that history is the servant of politics and this weathervane was trying to catch the spirit of our time. There is no history here.
  48. 0
    16 November 2021 09: 57
    God forbid to run into such a comrade.
  49. 0
    19 November 2021 02: 30
    "but unlike Pavlov, who became an innocent victim of the regime"
    Is this Pavlov an innocent victim? An illiterate creature that destroyed the Western Front. A person who did not fulfill the Directive of 18.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX. In many scientific works, he is even accused of betrayal.
    And what kind of "regime" is the author talking about? Again bad Stalin prevented the brilliant Pavlovs, Rychagovs and Laktionovs from victoriously completing the defeat of Germany by June 23rd.
  50. +1
    7 December 2021 13: 04
    "Pavlov is an innocent victim" - he threw away reading another rubbish about that war.
  51. 0
    7 December 2021 19: 10
    An attempt to whitewash the scoundrel. For the Crimean operation he should have been shot immediately. And so, he killed tens of thousands of people.
  52. 0
    14 December 2021 08: 00
    but unlike Pavlov, who became an innocent victim of the regime
    author-->author-->author, are you sure that this is an “innocent victim” of the regime...?
  53. 0
    19 December 2021 05: 25
    "... Voroshilov, Budyonny, Timoshenko, Pavlov, Kirponos and many others did not pass this selection....."
    end of quote.
    hmm
    Who knows, if Karpov and Kirponos had survived 1941, then perhaps they would have been marshals in 1945.
    After all, a number of other generals, in 41-42, could have fallen under the rink of repression; for example, future marshals Eremenko and Bagramyan.
  54. 0
    22 December 2021 08: 45
    Questions begin from the very first phrases. Mekhlis is not a general or commander, and therefore putting him on a par with those who “didn’t live up to the trust” is simply stupid. Mehlis - Commissioner. Stalin's watchful eye at high headquarters. What do you know about him? He was devoted to Stalin to the last flake of dandruff. Pathologically honest and did not recognize any compromises. The one who could not be asked to “close his eyes” to the hungry and undressed Red Army soldiers. Who could not be bought with vodka, a bathhouse and accommodating girls. Question: could the generals love such a person? The one who revealed all their mistakes and mistakes, all their bungling, all their omissions in working with personnel? Yes, the only thing they could feel for him was fierce hatred. Which came in very handy for Lenka the corn farmer. So the general’s hatred for such a position is not a minus, but, on the contrary, an indicator of the highest efficiency.
    Lev Zakharovich would be one of the icons of Stalinism. But everything died for him in May 1042 in Crimea. Everyone blames him alone, as if he could not defend Crimea alone, although he had a heroic horse, a treasure sword, and all the strength of Mother Earth. Is it okay that there was a whole front there? And there’s a whole commander for this front? Is Mehlis Kozlov to blame for being stupid as a plug and mediocre to the point of genius? Kozlov gives the order to build a defense, but doesn’t even bother to check whether anything has been built or not. Kozlov pulls out the troops in one echelon, spreading the anti-tank forces along the entire front in a thin line. Kozlov has neither rear defense lines nor reserves. But Mehlis is to blame. He did not stop Manstein’s tanks with his mighty chest, nor did he shoot down Richthofen’s aircraft with spitting. At the same time, there is a clear contradiction in the testimony. Kozlov, who has not won a single battle in his life, smears that Mekhlis actually removed him from his post and replaced him with himself, and Stalin reproaches Zakharych for the “rotten position of an outside observer.” Am I the only one who thinks that someone is lying somewhere? Who? Is it really Stalin? Yes, it seems that nothing like this has been noticed about him. So, Kozlov? This is more like the truth. He raked it off his fat ass, blaming it on the Headquarters representative. Although COMMISSIONER Mehlis should not have drawn arrows on the map for Kozlov. So I think that the defamation of Mehlis is simply an integral part of Khrushchev’s slanderous campaign against Stalin.
    And who is to blame? You will be surprised, but there is an answer. The Germans are to blame. The combined military genius of even all absolutely commanders of the Crimean Front is not worth even one eyelash of Manstein. Uncle Erich simply knew how to fight better than anyone else in Crimea in May 1942. And his assistants were a match for him. So the question is not whether it was possible to resist, but only whether it was possible to lose with a less devastating score. Don't know. I am not an armchair military genius and I don’t presume to judge whether I could have done a better job or not. But I think that hanging all the dogs on Mehlis alone is simply vile.
  55. -1
    28 December 2021 08: 06
    Levik did not know how to fight, but he was sure, only to death.
  56. The comment was deleted.
  57. The comment was deleted.
  58. 0
    30 June 2022 17: 21
    Why did Mehlis have to fix anything there? He is, yes, an auditor, a controller and, if necessary, a judge. But he is not a general, not a commander. Another thing is that he had to achieve the removal of Kozlov.