On the effectiveness of the shooting of the main forces of the Japanese in the battle at Shantung

Before the final article, which concludes my "Tsushima" cycle, devoted to the effectiveness of the shooting of Russian and Japanese forces, I think it is right to digress a little and try to compare the effectiveness of Russian and Japanese fire in Tsushima and at Shantung.

Of course, you need to compare like with like.

And, of course, the skirmishes in the 1st phase of the battle at Shantung, which were conducted mainly at a distance of 60 cables or more, are completely unequal to those in Tsushima. But the second phase of the battle on July 2, 28 began at 1904–40 cables and was gradually reduced to 45, and in the case of the "Retvizan" - even to 24. Therefore, we can say that the conditions in the 17nd phase of the battle on July 2, 28 were to a certain extent similar to those in which the squadrons of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky and H. Togo fought in the 1904st phase of Tsushima, in which the battle began at a distance of no more than 1 cables.

Of course, there were also significant differences, and I will touch on them later.

But we will start by determining the number of shells that hit the Russian ships in the battle of the main forces in the Yellow Sea.

Alas, the question of the number and time of hits on Russian ships in the battle in the Yellow Sea, and in other battles of the Russo-Japanese War, is still open. In order to dot all the “i's” here, you need to work hard in the archives, but, unfortunately, I don’t have such an opportunity: for some reason unclear to me, naval archives are not available in every Russian city. Thus, I can only analyze the available data, in other words, the official history, reports and testimonies of officers of the 1st Pacific Squadron, works of eyewitnesses, as well as the work of modern historians.

As a basis, I take V. Polomoshnov's monograph "The Battle of July 28, 1904 (Battle in the Yellow Sea (Battle of Cape Shantung)." Naval history is grateful to him from the bottom of our hearts, but nevertheless, in my opinion, in some cases the data presented by the respected V. Polomoshnov need clarification and further elaboration.

Before starting the analysis, I present V. Polomoshnov's data without any of my corrections:

V. Polomoshnov divided the hits to the Russian ships into those that occurred before the beginning of the 2nd phase of the battle, that is, before 16:30, and after it began. This is not exactly the kind of grouping that I need, since after 16:30 the Russian ships took part in several separate clashes, including the breakthrough of cruisers and night attacks of destroyers. I am only interested in those hits that the Russian ships received in the 2nd phase of the battle of the main forces, respectively, they will need to be isolated from the general statistics.

"Tsarevich"

Regarding the statistics of hitting the flagship of Rear Admiral V.K.Witgeft, presented by V. Polomoshnov, I would like to make only one clarification.

The esteemed author attributed one of the two hits of 305-mm shells to the second chimney of the Tsarevich during the second phase of the battle. At the same time, we have eyewitness testimony that this hit was received prior to the start of this phase.

This was reported by the commander of the "Tsarevich" Ivanov 1st and Lieutenant Knorring.

In view of the above, I am transferring one shell hit to the Tsarevich from phase 2 to phase 1.

"Retvizan"

As for the Retvizan, everything is rather confusing, if only because its commander Schensnovich indicated a different number of hits on the ship. So, in a report to the temporarily commander of the Pacific squadron, Schensnovich reported 21 hits on July 28, but then he indicated 23. Probably, the latest data are correct, especially since Schensnovich gave good details on them.

It is noteworthy that such a division of the battle on July 28 is very different from the generally accepted one. However, it is quite obvious that only the last 9 shells hit the Retvizan after 16:30, that is, after H. Togo caught up with the Russian squadron, and the battle resumed.

Accordingly, I reduce V. Polomoshnov's data for the 2nd phase from 11 to 9 hits.

As for the statistics of large-caliber shells that hit the Retvizan, it is not easy to figure it out: there are few explanations for individual hits, and the available information is contradictory.

Therefore, I will start with those of them for which there are no discrepancies in the sources.

There are three of them: two in the 1st phase and one in the 2nd.

For all three hits, the opinion of I.V. Polomoshnov is confirmed by the description of the damage given by Shchensnovich, and I have no other documents that could refute this.

The 1st phase includes the hit of a large-caliber projectile that smashed the commander's cabin and two more cabins. Schensnovich does not indicate the caliber of the projectile, but, taking into account the hole 2 * 2 m, it should be assumed that it was a 305-mm projectile. NN Kuteinikov points out the same, and I have no reason to object.

Also in the 1st phase, a 305-mm projectile hit the Retvizan in the deck at the stern, which is why it was pierced, while the next deck was also pierced by shrapnel. This is probably taken from N.N.Kuteinikov, who claimed that the hit was 305 mm.

In the 2nd phase of the battle (after 16:30), a heavy shell hit the 305-mm bow turret: in terms of the nature of the damage it was no less than 254-mm, but, most likely, it was still a XNUMX-inch shell.

Regarding the rest of the hits, unfortunately, there is no such clarity.

Take, for example, a large-caliber projectile that damaged the 51 mm armor plate that protected the waterline in the bow of the battleship, and opened water access to the infirmary and the conductor's wardroom. In the description of the damage to the Retvizan, Schensnovich indicates that this shell hit in the 1st phase of the battle, but in his report to the temporary commander of the Pacific squadron - that the hit was after 17:10. According to V. Polomoshnov, the "Retvizan" received this damage in the 1st phase, and I think the same, because the report was written "hot on the trail", it was dated July 29, 1904, and the damage was described in a document drawn up on August 5 of that the same year, that is, "with a cold head."

Another 305-mm shell hit the lower casemate of the 152-mm gun. Armor 127 mm gave 2 cracks, one of them is through. According to N.N.Kuteinikov, the projectile was 305 mm, which can hardly be questioned. According to V. Polomoshnov's description, shell fragments disabled the fire control devices on the starboard side. If this is the case, then Retvizan received this hit in the 2nd phase, since, according to Schensnovich, these devices were out of order in the 2nd phase of the battle.

But I have not found data that would allow to confirm or refute the statement that the devices were broken by fragments of this particular shell. So - I leave him in the 2nd phase, but I cannot vouch for it.

Another heavy 305-mm projectile hit the first chimney of the Retvizan. V. Polomoshnov indicated that this hit occurred in the 2nd phase of the battle, but Schensnovich indicates that both smoke works were damaged in the 1st phase of the battle, and not in the second.

Total: V. Polomoshnov indicated 12 hits to the Retvizan in the 2nd phase, of which 3 were 305-mm, but I come to the conclusion that these figures are more modest - 9 hits, of which 2 were 305-mm.

"Victory"

V. Polomoshnov, according to his own words, took the descriptions of the damage of this ship from R. M. Melnikov: according to his data, 11 shells, including 4 of 305-mm caliber, hit this battleship. Of these, one 305-mm hit the ship in the first phase of the battle, the rest - in the second.

Unfortunately, only 9 hits are described in detail in the report of the commander of the ship Zatsarenniy. However, it follows from the context that the Pobeda commander described in the report only those Japanese hits that led to the formation of holes in the hull or deck. But there were others, about them Zatsarenny spoke like this:

“The outer side of the closed batteries, in places protected by armor, was not pierced anywhere; only a few radiant spots of burnt paint indicated the places where the shells hit and burst. "

Accordingly, the canonical 11 hits can be questioned: for nine of them we have a detailed description, and “several” in Russian is usually not equivalent to “two”. It can be assumed that there were 12-13 hits in Pobeda or even more. On the other hand, it is quite possible that R. M. Melnikov, using the archival data, found that some of these hits were fragmentation, and therefore did not count them.

Now let's look at the number of heavy shells hitting the ship. Two of them, in my opinion, are completely reliable - one shell knocked out a seven-pound plug from the 229-mm armor belt, the second - pierced the 102-mm armor of the upper armor belt. Only 305-mm Japanese shells were capable of this.

But about the rest of the hits - there are doubts.

V. Polomoshnov believes that the shell that hit the unarmored hull of the battleship in the area of ​​the living deck in the bow and caused flooding of the bow mine apparatus had a caliber of 305 mm. I strongly doubt that this is so: the projectile left a hole only 25 * 32 inches, that is, 64 * 81 cm, and of the internal damage, only a depressed bulkhead between two cabins and shrapnel damage to two ventilation pipes are mentioned. In my opinion, this indicates, rather, a 152-mm projectile.

The fourth and last hit by a 305-mm projectile, according to V. Polomoshnov, the ship received in the stern. Here's a description of this hit:

"A 12-caliber projectile hit the side between the upper and battery decks, pierced the skin and exploded in the flag captain's cabin. In the place of the rupture, all furniture, linen, clothing were destroyed, and pieces of fabric were brought to the opposite side, where part of them fell into the ventilation box-shaped pipe. A large splinter pierced two corrugated light bulkheads, a ventilation pipe, a side plating shield, and fell, reaching the opposite side.

Apparently, the above description was taken from N.N.Kuteinikov's book, since the above passage is quoted from it almost word for word.

As you can see, the description is very detailed and replete with many details, but there is one caveat - there is not a word about this hit in the description of Zarenniy's damage.

Accordingly, there is already one of two things.

Perhaps N.N. Kuteinikov made some mistake, for example, he pointed out that he hit another ship, which, in my opinion, is highly doubtful.

On the other hand, the version that Zatsarenny missed this damage is also unlikely: his "Description" was presented on August 12, 1904, that is, it seems to have been written not in the heat of battle, but cold-headed, according to the results post-battle inspection of "Victory".

Nevertheless, I am inclined to consider this a mistake of Zatsarenniy, since the commander after an unsuccessful battle had a lot of trouble, and writing explanatory notes "upstairs" could be perceived as an unnecessary burden.

From the above, we can conclude that even the most detailed documents of the past, no matter how official they are, are sometimes not completely reliable and need to be cross-checked.

Thus, out of 4 hits of 305-mm, which V. Polomoshnov indicates, I am absolutely sure of three.

But there is one more hit that I tend to consider 305 mm, and this is No. 3 in the description of Zarennoy.

The projectile hit the rear chimney, pierced both the chimney and the casing, and the dimensions of the hole in the chimney were 12 * 9 feet or 2,75 * 3,65 m. In my opinion, the indicated dimensions correspond exactly to a twelve-inch projectile.

Thus, I am inclined to believe that Pobeda received at least (but possibly more) 11 hits in battle, of which 4 were 305-mm, although these are not the hits indicated by V. Polomoshnov.

And also I doubt their distribution over the phases of the fight.

According to V. Polomoshnov, in the 1st phase of the battle, a 305-mm projectile hit Pobeda, knocking out the plug from the 229 mm of the ship's armor belt and causing flooding of the coal pit and three compartments, and all other hits occurred during the 2nd phase ... However, Zatsarenniy's description directly states that the hit to the main armor belt occurred not in the 1st, but in the 2nd phase of the battle. On the other hand, Zatsarenny in his report to Rear Admiral Loshchinsky indicates that in the 1st phase of the battle, 75-mm guns Nos. 9 and 11 were damaged by shrapnel.

So, according to the description of the damage done by Zatsarenniy, the specified guns are mentioned only once, when describing hit No. 5. True, this refers to damage to the semi-pads of these guns, but still it can be assumed that the guns themselves were damaged by this hit.

However, hit number 5 was hardly 305 mm: the hole from this projectile is relatively small, 66 by 48 inches or 167 * 122 cm, which is more typical of a 203 mm, perhaps 254 mm projectile, but hardly more. Therefore, in my distribution of hits, I take into account one hit on Victory with a caliber of "203 mm and above" before the beginning of the 2nd phase, and the rest of the hits during it.

In view of the above, I believe that the number of hits in the 2nd phase of the battle V. Polomoshnov indicated correctly - 10, but of them there were 4 caliber 254-305-mm, and according to V. Polomoshnov - only 3.

Of course, the dear reader has the right to draw other conclusions.

"Peresvet"

Canonical can be considered 37 hits, listed in a copy of the clipping of the artillery form of the battleship, and from there already got into the work of the historical commission on the description of actions fleet during the war of 1904-1905.

However, I only take 34 hits into account. Since one of the listed (among the 37th) was fragmentation, from a shell that exploded next to the ship, and the other two were achieved by Japanese destroyers during night attacks. Consequently, 34 direct hits remain on the share of Togo's heavy ships.

Another nuance - V. Polomoshnov believed that a 305-mm projectile hitting the foremast above the navigator's cabin and destroying Barr and Stroud's rangefinder landed in Peresvet before the start of the 2nd phase. I am not sure about this, because the artillery form signed by Cherkasov explicitly states that in the first phase only one shell hit the battleship.

On the other hand, further the same Cherkasov indicates that the range finder was destroyed "at the beginning of the battle", that is, it contradicts itself. I admit that "at the beginning of the fight" may refer to the beginning of the second phase, when the fight resumed, but I fully admit that I could be wrong in this matter.

Nevertheless, I believe it is legitimate to reduce the number of hits to "Peresvet" in the 1st phase of the battle from two to one, transferring it to the 2nd phase. In this case, in the 2nd phase, 33 shells hit the ship, 12 of them with a caliber of 254-305 mm.

Sevastopol

One thing is absolutely certain - in the 1st phase of the battle, "Sevastopol" was hit by 305-mm shells in the armor belt. All the rest, alas, raises questions.

When analyzing the damage to Sevastopol, V. Polomoshnov, unfortunately, contradicted himself: in one place he claimed that a total of 17 shells hit the ship, of which 7 were heavy (one was 305 mm, the rest were 254-305 mm), with six 254-305 mm hitting the battleship in the 2nd phase. However, he further wrote that there were up to 20 hits in Sevastopol, of which there were 305-mm. However, perhaps this is just a typo, since literally in the very next sentence he writes: “Out of nine hits with a caliber of 10 -dm one was armor-piercing. "

Von Essen, the commander of the Sevastopol, directly indicated only 3 hits with large-caliber shells. However, this cannot be considered an exhaustive list, since von Essen, like Schensnovich, focused on the description of damage, and not on the calibers of the shells that caused them - for the most part, he does not specify the caliber of the shell that caused this or that damage. Thus, von Essen's information should be supplemented by other sources, such as N.N.Kuteinikov, for example. The latter still had the opportunity to personally observe the places where the shells hit.

So, in addition to the very first hit with a 305-mm caliber, von Essen points to two more hits in the vertical plates of the armor belt: one in front of the 152-mm turret, the second behind the other turret. At the same time, von Essen points out that the hit "behind" was a large-caliber projectile, and the second broke off the upper corner of the 5-inch slab.

At the same time, N.N.Kuteinikov reports that the indicated plate was hit by two 305-mm shells, which exploded on the upper edge of the plate, pressed it, broke off a part and cut the unarmored side with fragments. Of course, it is not easy to believe that two shells hit the same plate: but the descriptions of the damage are such that it was really possible to diagnose the hits of two shells from them.

Another large-caliber shell (by von Essen) hit near the waterline and destroyed the wardroom. V. Polomoshnov counted it as a 305 mm, and I completely agree with that.

In total, there are 5 quite reliable hits with a caliber of 305 mm, but then questions begin.

V. Polomoshnov claims that according to the results of the examination of the Sevastopol in Port Arthur, 3 more hits were found in its armor belt below the waterline, as a result of which the frames were bent and the armor bolts flowed. In principle, such damage is quite consistent with hits from 305-mm high-explosive shells.

Another 12-inch hit on V. Polomoshnov is a ricochet from the roof of the bow turret of the main caliber, as a result of which a "furrow" about an inch deep and about 6 inches long remained on the turret. But this is most likely a banal mistake - the fact is that in the book by N.N.Kuteinikov, which was used by a respected author, this projectile is listed as 12-centimeter (12 c / m), and not 12-inch (12 dm) ... Or, perhaps, V. Polomoshnov did it deliberately, suspecting a typo in N. N. Kuteinikov. I tend to attribute this shell to an unknown caliber.

In total, 9 hits with a caliber of 305 mm are recruited. In fact, there could have been more of them, since some of the other hits on the ship are characterized by the extensive damage that suggests large-caliber shells. And, perhaps, there were fewer of them, if any of the four listed last hits were less than 305 mm.

With that said, I settled on 20 hits, including at least 5 high-caliber shells.

"Poltava"

I cannot add anything about this ship to the data provided by V. Polomoshnov.

"Askold"

According to V. Polomoshnov, the ship received 10 direct hits, not counting close explosions.

But he received 8 of them during the breakthrough of cruisers, that is, outside the battle of the main forces, which means that we are not interested in them.

But the first two hits on "Askold" happened before the beginning of the second phase, and V. Polomoshnov defined them as one 2-mm projectile (into the chimney) and one hit of an indeterminate caliber.

Reitenstein, in a report to the governor of September 1, 1904, indicated that the second projectile was 305-mm, and the same opinion was held by midshipman Medvedev, arguing that other calibers, due to the long range, would not reach the cruiser. There is also evidence that the 152-mm guns of "Askold" during this period of the battle could not reach the enemy.

The shell hit completely destroyed the chief navigator's cabin (the box with the chronometers miraculously survived), but that was all. Thus, this, of course, could have been a 305-mm projectile, but it could have been 203-254-mm.

I will classify it as "203mm or higher" hits, since it is obvious that this shell was heavy.

"Diana"

The cruiser received 2 hits.

One shell of an unknown caliber hit the Temperley arrow at 17:20, the second, of a large caliber (according to V. Polomoshnov - 254 mm), hit the ship at 19: 20-19: 40.

Thus, the first hit refers to the 2nd phase of the battle, while the second shell hit the ship after the end of the battle of the main forces, and I do not take it into account.

"Novik"

This cruiser was damaged by two shells, but they hit it during the breakthrough of Reitenstein's cruisers, that is, they do not belong to the battle of the main forces.

Conclusions

After all the changes made, the hits on the Russian ships received by them in the battle of the main forces were distributed like this:

In the first phase of the battle, the Japanese achieved a relatively small number of hits, but most of them were 1-254-mm caliber, which is not surprising given the large distances in this phase.

In the second phase, the Japanese, as they say, went for broke. Overtaking the formation of Russian battleships at a relatively short distance, H. Togo put himself in an extremely disadvantageous tactical position, but he simply had no other way to stop the Russian squadron before dark. The bet on the skill of the Japanese gunners has fully justified itself - the number of hits with a caliber of 2-254 mm in comparison with the 305st phase increased by 1, and all hits by 1,65.

All in all, the gunners of the 1st Combat Detachment and Yakumo in the 2nd phase of the battle planted 104 shells into our ships.

The indicated figure does not claim to be absolute accuracy.

Perhaps a couple or three of the indicated 104 shells hit the Russian ships from the guns of the 5th Combat Detachment, or Asama achieved a hit, then the effectiveness of the Japanese main forces would be slightly lower.

On the other hand, it is possible that more shells hit Pobeda than is generally believed, so I think 104 hits in the 2nd phase is very close to the truth.

How did the Russian artillerymen respond?

To be continued ...

Comments

[Kayuk]

Greetings, Andrey Nikolaevich!
As usual, "Plus" for the article and look forward to continuing!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Good day!

Quote: Kayuk

waiting for the continuation!

I'll try to post it today, so it may well be that this week will go to the main

[Rurikovich]

A plus.
The fight itself we, EMNIP, analyzed in the cycle of the same name a few years ago
In this comparison, it would be appropriate to say about the quality of the ammunition used by both sides. Ships die or fail not from the number of hits, but from the destruction caused by the shells that hit. For the victims of the exam, I will clarify that the same "Lion" at Jutland received a cloud of hits, but returned to the base, and a number of its brothers went to the bottom almost at the beginning of the battle from a couple of shells that hit. Conclusions - no matter how many shells and which ones hit, it is also important WHERE a specific shell hits. Therefore, I hope, the respected colleague will take into account the quality of the damage inflicted on the opponents in accordance with the number of hits. Although indirectly from the analysis of the Tsushima cycle, we know that the Russian shells, the same armor-piercing, though they penetrated the armor and decently mowed the crew, to critical damage, influencing the state of the ships, the ability to be in the ranks, therefore, on the course of the battle itself, they did not. With rare exceptions ("Asama" under Tsushima).
Therefore, personally, I consider the number of hits in the same linkage with the quality of ammunition and comparable damage.
And the very result of the battle at Shantung suggests that the quality of the Japanese hits was higher than the quality of the Russians. And if we take into account the preponderance of the Japanese in the number of hits (which the author will talk about in the next article), then the result is logical
C y
PS Sorry for spoilers

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Andrew!

Quote: Rurikovich

Therefore, personally, I consider the number of hits in the same linkage with the quality of ammunition and comparable damage.

This, undoubtedly, is so, and someday I will do this, which, again, threatens to result in a cycle of that length :))) (I wonder if I will ever get to the analysis of the performance characteristics of the Russian-Japanese ships, or not? old age, probably ...) But now my task is more local - I want to compare the accuracy with which the Japanese and ours fired in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung with the accuracy that our battleships achieved in the 1st phase of Tsushima. This leads ... to some pretty interesting conclusions.

[27091965]

Good afternoon.
Dear Andrey, thanks for the article.

But now my task is more local - I want to compare the accuracy with which the Japanese and ours fired in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung with the accuracy that our battleships achieved in the 1st phase of Tsushima. This leads ... to some pretty interesting conclusions.

In this question, you will have to deal with "unavoidable errors", but it is very difficult to determine the quality of the manufacture of weapons, the manufacture and storage of charges for the weapons. This also had an impact on shooting accuracy, I can only wish you success in considering this issue, but difficulties arise here due to the very small amount of information on this topic.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Good day, dear Igor!

Quote: 27091965i

In this question, you will have to deal with "unavoidable errors", but it is very difficult to determine the quality of the manufacture of weapons, the manufacture and storage of charges for the weapons.

This is undoubtedly true. But now I am solving a much simpler problem :) I am trying (and, alas, rather superficially, since there is a problem with numbers) to compare the firing accuracy of the sides in several battles. And so far I do not even attempt to analyze in detail the reasons why some were shooting more accurately.
To tell the truth, I do not think that the quality of the guns and propellants had a serious impact on the accuracy, but I cannot strictly prove my point of view.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

To tell the truth, I do not think that the quality of the guns and propellants had a serious impact on the accuracy, but I cannot strictly prove my point of view.

As for the charges, therefore, there are enough works on the issue, but I will only touch on Percy Scott so far. In May 1902, practice firing was conducted at the English South China Station, there were few shells hitting the shields, the firing was stopped. Since the gunners were experienced and well trained, the charges were checked. Measurements of control shots using pressure gauges revealed an increase in pressure, after adjusting the sights to take into account changes in pressure, the shooting results improved significantly. It was determined that the presence of ships in tropical waters leads to a change in the properties of gunpowder or cordite in the charges and it was recommended for ships under these conditions to periodically check the charges, control shots with pressure measurement, and adjust the sights and firing tables.
I have not seen any mention of such checks being carried out at the Second Pacific Squadron.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Thank you, very interesting information!
But, unfortunately, little can be "squeezed" out of it.

Quote: 27091965i

It was determined that the presence of ships in tropical waters leads to a change in the properties of gunpowder or cordite in the charges.

I cannot agree. Not the location of the ships, but the storage conditions of the charges - that's what is important. For the British, this should read "finding ships in tropical waters, taking into account the prevailing storage of charges." How did the British store the charges, how did ours? What kind of gunpowder were used (up to cutting / grains could be affected)? How long were British supplies in the tropics, how storage time affects the change in chemical. properties? And a million more questions that do not allow extrapolating the results of the British firing on 2TOE

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I cannot agree. Not the location of the ships, but the storage conditions of the charges - that is what is important.

The technical level at that time was not yet the "crown of creation", and given the level of construction of ships in Russia, various conclusions can be drawn. There is a lot of literature on this issue, but it is mainly in English, available in the period 1890-1905.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: 27091965i

The technical level at that time was not yet the "crown of creation", and given the level of construction of ships in Russia, various conclusions can be drawn.

The cellars of the Russian battleships of that time were equipped with an air conditioning system. The temperature and humidity in the cellars were measured every day and recorded in a special journal. According to the testimony of the artillery officers, there were no serious problems, the air conditioners did not work perfectly, but on the whole they coped.

This is a consequence of the choice of pyroxylin as the main explosive. Initially, they knew about the high requirements of pyroxylin to storage conditions, therefore the ships themselves are not ideal, but they did not forget to build in the cooling system of the cellars.

[27091965]

Quote: Saxahorse

The cellars of the Russian battleships of that time were equipped with an air conditioning system. The temperature and humidity in the cellars were measured every day and recorded in a special journal. According to the testimony of the artillery officers, there were no serious problems, the air conditioners did not work perfectly, but on the whole they coped

Dear Saxahorse, accurate data is needed in this matter, in my opinion, Arbuzov has a mention of the temperature in the cellars when the squadron moves, you need to look. For the French, the temperature in the cellars should not exceed 30 degrees, it is necessary to deal with this issue in more detail, but in chemistry I am not strong, so I will see what the experts of those years write about this.

[Maxim G]

It would be great if you covered any issue on the Russo-Japanese War by writing an article).

[27091965]

Quote: Saxahorse

The temperature and humidity in the cellars were measured every day and recorded in a special journal. According to the testimony of the artillery officers, there were no serious problems, the air conditioners did not work perfectly, but on the whole they coped.

Dear Saxahorse, I looked at the works of that time on the issue of storage and chemical stability, they identify 8 reasons why changes in the properties of charges can occur, temperature is just one of them. Some of these reasons are production related.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: 27091965i

temperature is just one of them. Some of these reasons are production related.

This is true. Alas, the chemical processes in the charge do not end with military acceptance. The same evil shimoza reminded of this more than once. But the conversation began with the effect of temperature on accuracy. This is a really noticeable value, it should be tracked in the shooting tables in later times.

[27091965]

Quote: Saxahorse

... But the conversation began with the effect of temperature on accuracy. This is a really noticeable value, it should be tracked in the shooting tables in later times.

" The Ordnance Department found that smokeless propellants change their properties in charges during storage. A compression test was proposed. Compression continues until a small crack forms on the side. A good propellant must be able to withstand over 40% compression. Less than 40% of the gunpowder creates excessive pressure when firing the guns. ... Shooting confirms these changes. This is due to various external factors and changes in temperature ranges, this is due to the changes that have occurred in this powder during storage, this leads to an increase in pressure and a variable burning rate, which affects the accuracy of fire. The Ordnance Department suggested that these compression tests be done regularly prior to firing whenever possible.. "1903.

Various methods of control have been proposed.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: 27091965i

Various methods of control have been proposed.

Not too smart by the way. Changing the physical characteristics is quite an extreme option. It is no coincidence that the British urgently changed the grades of gunpowder following the results of WWI.

[anzar]

Measurements of control shots using pressure gauges revealed an increase in pressure, after adjusting the sights taking into account the change in pressure ...

Such changes in the properties of charges, as well as a bunch of other parameters (charge temperature, air temperature !, wind ....) are corrected precisely sighting... In your example, does it mean that the British did not see the place where your shells fall, preferring to fiddle with pressure gauges and correct firing tables? Under different batches of gunpowder on different ships? This is a strange approach, because the number of amendments is already considerable.
And cordite is much more prone to change in properties over time. than (Russian) pyroxylin powder.

[27091965]

Quote: anzar

In your example, does this mean that the British did not see the place where their shells fell, preferring to fiddle with pressure gauges and correct the firing tables?

Dear anzar, in the English fleet, for that period of time, two types of practice shooting were considered the main ones, "prize shooting" and "long-range shooting", it could also be called "combat shooting". The case I have cited refers to "prize shooting", with these firing the distance to the target was indicated by special buoys, usually it was from 1200 to 1600 yards. The ship went out to the buoy level and opened fire. A small number of hits, in the presence of well-prepared calculations, forced to stop the shooting and try to find out the reasons for such shooting. The range of up to 1600 yards was due to the fact that at this distance the gunner could see the results of his shooting.

[anzar]

.. refers to "prize shooting", during these firing the distance to the target was indicated by special buoys, usually it ranged from 1200 to 1600 yards

It's clear uv. Igor, no zeroing was carried out, the distance is known, the ship was shooting at a fast pace, there is no time for correction ...
Strange exercise, no better than barrel shooting.

[27091965]

Quote: anzar

Strange exercise, no better than barrel shooting.

This exercise was necessary to improve the coordination and professionalism of the gun crew.

[rytik32]

Good afternoon, Andrey!
Thanks for the good summary article.

This leads ... to some pretty interesting conclusions.

Do you plan to compare the accuracy of the Russians and the accuracy of the Japanese in the 1st phase of Tsushima?
If anything, I can throw in the data.
Based on the new data, I re-estimated the number of hits in Oslyabya. Moreover, using two different methods, I came to approximately the same figures.
1. Compared the damage to "Peresvet" and "Oslyaba" according to the criteria of "hitting the overhead line area", "disabled guns" and "killed". And multiplied the number of hits recorded in "Peresvet" by the resulting difference.
2. The frequency of hits on the "Oslyab", indicated in the memoirs of one well-known warrant officer from the "Eagle", was multiplied by the duration of the concentrated fire on the battleship.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, Alex!

Quote: rytik32

Do you plan to compare the accuracy of the Russians and the accuracy of the Japanese in the 1st phase of Tsushima?

No :)) I want to compare the accuracy of the Russians in the 1st phase of Tsushima and the Japanese in the 2nd phase of Shantung. Conditions are somewhat similar, although the Japanese have better under Shantung.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

1. Compared the damage to "Peresvet" and "Oslyaba" according to the criteria of "hitting the overhead line area", "disabled guns" and "killed".

Let's test this technique on another ship. Here, for example, considering the number of people killed at Mikasa in Tsushima - 8 people and at least 31 hits, we get 3,875 shells per 1 dead crew member. In the ZhM on Mikasa, 36 people died * 3,875 = 139,5 hits. In reality, it is 21-22, the error is more than 600%.
Somehow not impressive, to be honest.

[rytik32]

error - more than 600%

Well, the reason is well known.
In the ZhM, there were much more hits from large-caliber shells.
So they are 600% more efficient.
And this is nothing surprising to me.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Well, the reason is well known.
In the ZhM, there were much more hits from large-caliber shells.
So they are 600% more efficient.

In fact, this is only one aspect. Another

on Mikasa, according to the experience of the battle at Shantung, the servants of 76-mm guns took their places according to the combat schedule only immediately before the opening of fire, when the distance was about 4 m. This can explain the low specific (per hit) losses in the Mikasa crew: in the first part of the battle, when the Japanese ships received most of the hits, Togo's flagship was farther from the Russian ships than others, and its 500-mm cannons rarely opened fire

But, for example, statistics on a ship that only got hit by large shells

one can compare, for example, the losses of the Lion at Dogger Bank (16 hits by 280-mm and 305-mm shells, 1 killed, 20 wounded) and Jutland (13 hits by 305-mm shells, 99 killed, 51 wounded). At the same time, the difference was mainly determined by one single "bloody" hit at Jutland - the Q tower.

[rytik32]

in the first part of the battle, when the Japanese ships received most of the hits, the flagship of Togo was farther from the Russian ships than others, and its 76-mm cannons rarely opened fire

That's not true.

But, for example, statistics on a ship that only got hit by large shells

Yeah, from a completely different time
Andrey, I want to ask why you didn't use the same meticulous approach when calculating the consumption of projectiles?
We would compare the consumption of the Eagle's shells with the consumption of other 2TOE ships. On ships 1TOE.
Or, if the resulting value suits you, then why doubt it?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

That's not true.

Questions to naval_manual, copied and pasted from him.

Quote: rytik32

Yeah, from a completely different time

And it makes no difference. The fact is that, in addition to the caliber and power of the projectiles, the losses are greatly influenced by the places of impact of the projectiles and the location of the crew at the time of the battle.

Quote: rytik32

Andrey, I want to ask why you didn't use the same meticulous approach when calculating the consumption of projectiles?

Used.

Quote: rytik32

We would compare the consumption of the Eagle's shells with the consumption of other 2TOE ships. On ships 1TOE.

Compared. The Eagle's projectile consumption is quite in the 1TOE statistics. And on 2TOE, except for "Eagle" there is no data and there is nothing to compare with.

Quote: rytik32

Or, if the resulting value suits you, then why doubt it?

Alexey, are you sure that you are talking to me now? :))))

[rytik32]

The fact is that, in addition to the caliber and power of the projectiles, the losses are greatly influenced by the places where the projectiles hit and the location of the crew at the time of the battle.

I agree here. The influence is there. But there were no obvious lachots in Oslyabya. There was a shell that knocked out almost everyone in the tower. There was one who knocked out the entire casemate. But such hits were not only in "Oslyabya" ...

for 2TOE, except for "Eagle" there is no data and there is nothing to compare with

There is also Nikolai and BBO.

I want to compare the accuracy with which the Japanese and ours fired in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung with the accuracy that our battleships achieved in the 1st phase of Tsushima.

Andrey, can you also compare with the accuracy of our fire in the 2nd phase of Tsushima in order to equalize the impact factor of Japanese fire?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

I agree here. There is influence.

Glad to the consensus. I note that this influence is very large - for example, quoting the naval-manual

"Sikishima" got the bloodiest hit at 15.20 - a 305-mm shell exploded on the middle deck, under the left aft casemate of the upper deck. This shell killed 11 and injured 13 people.

That is, one shell killed more on the Sikisim than all 31 or even more Russian shells on Mikas. And, although the naval-manual believes that there were fewer 305-mm hits to Mikasa than is generally believed, it still recognizes at least 6 such hits.

Quote: rytik32

There is also Nikolai and BBO.

So this is not the 2nd squadron. And with her, as I have already said many times, an obvious anomaly - they shot a lot, they didn't really hit anyone. According to reports, the BRBO, on average, managed to shoot more than any EBR in the LM. And the exhaust is near-zero, judging by the number of 120 and 254-mm shells hit. To be honest, I generally have vague doubts about the consumption of the 3TOE projectiles.
The eagle is of the same type to the other three Borodinians. The eagle was under fire, unlike BRBO. Eagle has no big discrepancies with the statistics of the consumption of our EBR shells in the LM. Therefore, it looks much more reasonable as a reference point.

Quote: rytik32

Andrey, can you also compare with the accuracy of our fire in the 2nd phase of Tsushima in order to equalize the impact factor of Japanese fire?

I do not understand, please clarify

[Maxim G]

The 3rd armored detachment began to fight before the rest of the squadron - a firefight with Japanese cruisers.

His flagship shot down the sight of the Japanese and, accordingly, hit worse himself.

Well, he was at the beginning of the battle in the tail, gradually moving towards the head of the column, to what extent he could ensure the accuracy of aiming after some time from the beginning of the battle, it is not clear (the rangefinders were upset).

[Maxim G]

I forgot to add that by the end of the day's battle there were undershoots in small battleships, apparently due to wear and tear of the guns (V.Yu. Gribovsky "Way of the Cross of Nebogatov's detachment").

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Maxim G

3 armored detachment began to fight before the rest of the squadron -

Uh ... what? !!! :)))

Quote: Maxim G

His flagship shot down the sighting of the Japanese and, accordingly, he himself hit worse

I can't even recommend you to go to alternativehistory.com. You and there will be laughed at with such statements

[Maxim G]

V.Yu. Gribovsky "Way of the Cross of the Nebogatov Detachment"

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Uh ... what? !!! :)))

On the morning of May 14, 1905, on the first day of the Tsushima battle, Japanese reconnaissance cruisers appeared. At about 11 am, the battleships of the coastal defense of the 3rd detachment, mistaking an accidental shot from the Eagle as a signal to open fire, from a distance of about 40 cables fired at the cruisers of Vice Admiral S. Deva, who were watching the rebuilding of the squadron into battle formation. The Japanese retreated. The fire of Russian ships, which fired up to 35 shells, was stopped by order of Z. P. Rozhdestvensky. From "Ushakov" and "Apraksin" we observed the rupture of a shell fired from the forward turret of "Senyavin" between the tubes of the cruiser "Chitose", but judging by Japanese sources, there were no hits on their ships.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I can't even recommend you to go to alternativehistory.com. You and there will be laughed at with such statements

Japanese ships, finding themselves under fire, evaded hits by maneuvering. The Russians, on the other hand, tried to maintain a constant course, which at low speed (9 knots) allowed the enemy to literally bombard them with shells. Only "Emperor Nicholas I" maneuvered under enemy fire, which was personally controlled by NI Nebogatov from the bridge. The Iwate's fire on this battleship turned out to be ineffective - only two hits. The first 152-mm shell hit the ship twenty minutes after the start of the battle, making a hole in the unarmored side under the left forward 152-mm cannon.

In another topic, I have already told you about this and Alexey Rytik cited the source of this statement - the "Sea" magazine, 1912, no. 7, p. 158.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Maxim G

At about 11 am, the battleships of the coastal defense of the 3rd detachment, taking an accidental shot from the Eagle as a signal to open fire, fired at the cruisers of Vice Admiral S. Deva from a distance of about 40 cables.

Yes. And how did you manage to conclude from the above

Quote: Maxim G

3 armored detachment began to fight before the rest of the squadron

The cruisers were fired at not only by 3TOE, but also by the rest of the ships.

Quote: Maxim G

In another topic, I have already told you about this and Alexey Rytik cited the source of this statement - the "Sea" magazine, 1912, no. 7, p. 158.

So-so source, to be honest. I can find a lot of "revelations" about Russian-Japanese in such publications.

[Maxim G]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The cruisers were fired at not only by 3TOE, but also by the rest of the ships.

Armored detachments 1 and 2 barely fired.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

So-so source, to be honest. I can find a lot of "revelations" about Russian-Japanese in such publications.

Meanwhile, historians use it, and data on a small number of hits on the battleship N.I. this is confirmed.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Maxim G

Armored detachments 1 and 2 barely fired.

This fire contact was very short, the Japanese immediately retreated, so little EVERYTHING was firing at them, including 3TOE

Quote: Maxim G

Meanwhile, historians use it, and data on a small number of hits on the battleship N.I. this is confirmed.

Firstly, there is no information about any active maneuvering by Nebogatov in the reports or testimonies of the Investigative Commission (at least those that I see, that is, which are attached to the official history). Secondly, the small number of hits is explained not by Nebogatov's maneuvers, but by the fact that almost no one fired at his ships.
Gribovsky, unfortunately, has a lot of inaccuracies.

[Maxim G]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

This fire contact was very short, the Japanese immediately retreated, so little EVERYTHING was firing at them, including 3TOE

It was the 3rd armored detachment that fired in the main, as is said, if I remember correctly in the documents on the Nebogatov case.

If you look at the documents on the Tsushima forums, it also turns out that it was mainly the small battleships, plus Donskoy and Monomakh, who were shooting.

Reading of Rank 2 Captain Artschwager.
During this time, the Japanese, following a converging course with us, gradually approached us and, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, when they approached our traverse (about 10 hours 10 minutes), from a distance of more than 40 cables, they opened fire, at which on a shot from the battleship "Borodino" (actually from the "Eagle" -MG) answered: the III detachment of battleships, as well as the cruisers "Vladimir Monomakh" and "Dmitry Donskoy". Our formation at that time was, as shown in drawing No. 2. Some time after the opening of fire, there was a signal from the battleship "Prince Suvorov": "Do not throw shells for nothing." The Japanese cruisers soon turned all at once to the left by 8 points and quickly disappeared. The entire shooting lasted eight minutes; from our bow turret a shell hit the second Japanese cruiser in the middle at the very pipes, which was also noticed from the battleship Admiral Apraksin, then it was transmitted from it by semaphore to the battleship Emperor Nicholas I.

In another broader work, Gribovsky talks about the shooting of the coastal defense battleships and "Prince Suvorov" and "Oslyabya".
"Taking an accidental shot from 6" of the Eagle tower as a signal to open fire, Oslyabya, the battleships of the III detachment and "Prince Suvorov" fired at the Japanese cruisers and forced them to retreat hastily. The shooting of Russian ships, unsuccessful, like the enemy's return fire, was stopped by a signal from Z.P. Rozhestvensky "do not throw shells."

Kostenko speaks about this in his memoirs:
“At this time, at about 15 minutes, an accidental shot from the left middle 6-inch tower of the" Eagle "struck at the head cruiser, at which the turret was aimed. Distance - 39 cables. This shot was taken by the rest of the ships as a signal for The tail battleships of the 10rd detachment "Senyavin", "Ushakov" and "Apraksin", which were closest to the enemy, at a distance of about 3 cables, immediately opened vigorous fire from 32-inch guns.

Together with the officers of the "Eagle" I went to the ship's poop to see the plot of the battle.

The shells of the ships of the 3rd detachment immediately began to lay down very well. It was reported from the command bridge that there was one hit on the flagship cruiser. Following the 3rd detachment, the Oslyabya opened fire when it walked around the head left column of the Nikolai.

The enemy immediately began to answer. Its shells fell in front of the Eagle; apparently, the shooting was carried out at the "Suvorov". There were no hits. The exchange of fire lasted about ten minutes. Then the enemy cruisers turned "suddenly" to the left and began to retreat quickly. From our ships, the fire was immediately stopped at the signal of the admiral: "Do not throw shells for free."

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Firstly, there is no information about any active maneuvering by Nebogatov in the reports or testimonies of the Investigative Commission (at least those that I see, that is, which are attached to the official history). Secondly, the small number of hits is explained not by Nebogatov's maneuvers, but by the fact that almost no one fired at his ships.
Gribovsky, unfortunately, has a lot of inaccuracies.

The fact that he is not in these documents does not mean that he was not at all (for example, at night, Nikolai 1, on the orders of Nebogatov, dodged the torpedo with a maneuver, that is, he understood that he had to maneuver in battle).

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Secondly, the small number of hits is explained not by Nebogatov's maneuvers, but by the fact that almost no one fired at his ships.

It does not seem that almost no one fired at the flagship of the 3rd armored detachment (note the damage to the nasal bridge, where Nebogatov was in battle) ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Maxim G

It was the 3rd armored detachment that fired in the main, as is said, if I remember correctly in the documents on the Nebogatov case.

We read the testimony of the same Slavinsky
About 11 a.m. 15 minutes. there was an accidental shot from the left middle 6 "tower.

The gunman pointed the gun at the Japanese cruiser Chitose and pulled the trigger, forgetting that he was on the “tovs”. There were more shots from us, but the ships following us immediately opened fire on the cruisers. The battleships of the coastal defense developed a particular intensity of fire.

и

The exchange of fire lasted only 8-10 minutes.

Shcherbachev

At 11 o'clock. 15 minutes. from the left middle 6 "turret of the battleship" Oryol "an accidental shot was fired at the" Kasagi ", the former rumba 3 behind the traverse, cables at 40." Oslyabya "and the ships of the left column also opened fire.

Quote: Maxim G

The fact that he is not in these documents does not mean that he was not at all

Do you even understand what speed maneuvers are for evading artillery fire? :))) It is necessary to constantly play with speed - increasing it, then decreasing it. BRBO should have gone crazy from the tension, trying to follow "Nikolai" while maintaining the required gaps in the ranks. And where are the references to this?

Quote: Maxim G

It does not seem that no one fired at the flagship of the 3rd armored squad ...

Compare with the hits on the "Eagle", on which the Japanese rarely focused their fire that day. Will we remember about one and a half hits in BRBO, or will we replace it for clarity of the question?

[Maxim G]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The gunman pointed the gun at the Japanese cruiser Chitose and pressed the trigger, forgetting that he was on the “tovs”. There were more shots from us, but the ships following us immediately opened fire on the cruisers. The battleships of the coastal defense developed a particular intensity of fire.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

At 11 o'clock. 15 minutes. from the left middle 6 "tower of the battleship" Eagle "an accidental shot was made at the" Kasagi ", the former rumba 3 behind the traverse, cables at 40." Oslyabya "and the ships of the left column also opened fire.

Thank you for confirming my words.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Do you even understand what speed maneuvers are for evading artillery fire? :))) It is necessary to constantly play with speed - increasing it, then decreasing it. BRBO should have gone crazy from the tension, trying to follow "Nikolai" while maintaining the required gaps in the ranks. And where are the references to this?

They are newer than Nicholas 1 and are not inferior in speed to him. Remind you that they stayed together all night (except for the knocked-out Ushakov), leaving the battlefield at the highest possible speed.
Mentions in the magazine "More" (and Nebogatov himself spoke about the night mine attack).
And in general, after the "Suvorov" was knocked out and the squadron was led by Bukhvostov and Serebrennikov, she maneuvered - not separately, but together, and because of these maneuvers no one went crazy.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Compare with the hits on the "Eagle", on which the Japanese rarely focused their fire that day. Will we remember about one and a half hits in BRBO, or will we replace it for clarity of the question?

I am comparisons head-on I don’t do it. ships of 1, 2, 3 armored detachments were in different places in the convoy, at different times they began to shoot (the same zeroing, albeit not long, and the actual opening of fire on the line forces), behaved differently during the battle.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Maxim G

Thank you for confirming my words.

If you consider the fact that 2TOE fired at cruisers in parallel with 3TOE as confirmation of your words

Quote: Maxim G

3 armored detachment began to fight before the rest of the squadron

I can only admire the breadth of your imagination
"He knew how to take a polite refusal for warm approval" (c)

Quote: Maxim G

They are newer than Nicholas 1 and are not inferior in speed to him.

This is not a question of speed, it is a question of "stop machine - full speed ahead." Eberhard behaved in a similar way (slowing down, accelerating) near the Bosphorus under the fire of Goeben. Therefore, in the report of Eustathius there are references to the fact that they entered the battle at 12 knots, then reduced the speed to 10 knots, then raised to 12 knots.

Quote: Maxim G

Remind you that they stayed together all night (except for the knocked out Ushakov), leaving the battlefield at the highest possible speed.

At first, you would still somehow figure out how the speed maneuver to break the fire was different from following in a certain direction

Quote: Maxim G

And in general, after the "Suvorov" was knocked out and the squadron was led by Bukhvostov and Serebrennikov, she maneuvered - not separately, but together

Believe it or not, she maneuvered under the guidance of Rozhdestvensky, both before the battle and during it.

Quote: Maxim G

and no one went crazy from these maneuvers.

First, these were maneuvers to change course, not speed. Secondly, these maneuvers were noticed and reflected in the reports.
Reducing the speed in the beginning of the battle is mentioned all over the place. But there is no mention of the need to "adjust" to the speed-changing "Nikolay" - no.

Quote: Maxim G

I don't make forehead comparisons

Exactly what you are doing. You declare that 2TOE ships were hit, because they did not maneuver, but Nikolai maneuvered, so little was hit on him. And when I remind you that little was shot at him, for some reason you immediately stopped comparing

[Maxim G]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Exactly what you are doing. You declare that 2TOE ships were hit, because they did not maneuver, but Nikolai maneuvered, so little was hit on him. And when I remind you that little was shot at him, for some reason you immediately stopped comparing

And you re-read my first post about what it was - it was about the fact that the shooting of the 3rd armored detachment cannot be compared with the 1st, that's why and why.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

If you consider the fact that 2TOE fired at cruisers in parallel with 3TOE as confirmation of your words

The left squad - this is 3 armored and cruisers - before rebuilding in one column. True, as far as I understand, the shootout took place after that.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Do you even understand what speed maneuvers are for evading artillery fire? :)))

You have a lot of phrases in this post about "speed maneuvers".
And why do you ascribe to me, what I did not say (by the way, in a book dedicated to the coastal defense battleship "Admiral Ushakov", Gribovsky says something else: "The first 152-mm shell hit" Emperor Nicholas I "more than 20 minutes after the start of the battle, having made a hole in the unarmored side under the left forward 152-mm cannon. But the Japanese did not have time to "fill" the battleship with shells. and the commanders of Japanese ships after the first hits. ")?

PS It is known how the squadron "maneuvered" while Rozhestvensky was in command, and what its rebuilding in the fog and passivity in battle led to.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Maxim G

And you re-read my first post about what it was - it was about the fact that the shooting of the 3rd armored detachment cannot be compared with the 1st, that's why and why.

In fact, there are no such words there. But, can you now explain what you mean?

Quote: Maxim G

The left squad - this is 3 armored and cruisers - before rebuilding in one column.

We read ONCE AGAIN the testimony of the officers of the "Eagle"

More shots from us but there were but the ships following us immediately opened fire on the cruisers.

In your opinion, "Eagle" led the left column? How then

"Oslyabya" and the ships of the left column also opened fire.

Let's all the same read everything, and not just individual fragments confirming your point of view.

Quote: Maxim G

You have a lot of phrases in this post about "speed maneuvers".
Why do you ascribe to me, something that I did not say

So, in your opinion, "Nikolay" changed courses, or what? !!!! Honestly, I didn't even expect this from you. Here is what Gribovsky writes

Japanese ships, finding themselves under fire, evaded hits by maneuvering. The Russians, on the other hand, tried to maintain a constant course, which at low speed (9 knots) allowed the enemy to literally bombard them with shells. Only "Emperor Nicholas I" maneuvered under enemy fire, which was personally controlled by NI Nebogatov from the bridge. The Iwate's fire on this battleship turned out to be ineffective - only two hits. The first 152-mm shell hit the ship twenty minutes after the start of the battle, making a hole in the unarmored side under the left forward 152-mm cannon.

The whole question is that at the indicated time the 3TOE ships were forced to slow down, almost to zero, and there could be no "dodging by turns" in nature.
Commander Senyavin

When the XNUMXst battalion detachment entered the head of our column, the detachments of our column had to reduce the speed almost to small, and in general, the wake line was somewhat upset.

That is, I fully admit that then someone (not Nebogatov?) Wanted to pass off need as a virtue, and show forced maneuvers as a tactical plan, but ...

Quote: Maxim G

So did the commanders of the Japanese ships after the first hits. ")?

Yes, not at all. If a Japanese ship fell under the cover, it made a coordinate, and went out of order, moving in the same direction, then returned

[Maxim G]

Part 1

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In fact, there are no such words there. But, can you now explain what you mean?

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

In your opinion, "Eagle" led the left column? How then

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

We read ONCE AGAIN the testimony of the officers of the "Eagle"

No need to ascribe to me what I did not say.
Let's turn to the readings (first the battleship "Eagle").

Testimony of Lieutenant Slavinsky.
About 9½ hrs. in the morning on the left, almost on _ | _ out of the haze, the silhouettes of 4 ships, sailing the same course with us, appeared. Apparently they were: "Itsakushima", "Matsushima", "Hashidate" and "Chin-Yen". On a signal from "Suvorov" - I and II armored detachments increased their speed to 11 knots and began to overtake the rest of the ships of the squadron, which continued to go with the same 9 knot speed. The Japanese old cruisers that appeared on the left soon disappeared completely behind the gloom, and behind our _ | _ again on the left, but much closer to them, a detachment of cruisers swayed: Chitose, Kasagi, Nitaka, Tsushima. He walked at a great pace and quickly overtook us. We have sounded a combat alarm. On the right, along the course of the squadron, a steamer appeared. The Zhemchug came out to meet him and drove him away with a blank shot. Returning to service, he raised the signal: "Japanese steamer." 10 hours 30 minutes. the commander ordered the team to have lunch at the guns.
11 hours on a signal from "Suvorov" I and II armored detachments turned 2 rumba to the left. About 11 a.m. 15 minutes. there was an accidental shot from the left middle 6 "turret. The gunman aimed the gun at the Japanese cruiser Chitose and pulled the trigger, forgetting that he was on the" tovs ". There were more shots from us, but the ships following us immediately opened fire on the cruisers. The battleships of the coastal defense developed a particular intensity of fire. The enemy cruisers began to respond, but immediately turned suddenly to the left and soon disappeared into the fog. The firefight lasted only 8-10 minutes. A signal was raised from "Suvorov": "Do not throw shells for nothing." At 11 o'clock. 30 minutes. from "Suvorov" the signal: "Have 8 knots to move." "I and II armored detachments turn 2 points to the right, all of a sudden." The squadron lined up in one wake column, with transports in the back, and "Pearls", "Emerald" and destroyers on the right.

What can be seen from these testimonies is a shot from the "Eagle", then fire from the ships following it (it is not said that "ALL" ships fired, but it is specified that the small battleships fired especially intensively).

Testimony of Warrant Officer Shcherbachev 4th.
About 5 hours. in the morning On May 14, the 2nd Pacific Squadron, under the flag of Vice Admiral Rozhdestvensky, entered the Tsushima Strait. The weather was foggy. Thick haze covered the horizon and reduced its visibility to 4 miles. The horizon line was very unclear. The wind was SW 3 - 4, roughness about 3-4 points. The wave was short and frequent.
The squadron marched in two columns: the right column was made up of I and II armored detachments, left III armored and cruising detachments. The reconnaissance detachment walked 15 cables ahead of the squadron. "Pearl" and "Izumrud" - 15 cables to the right and left, outside the column. The transports went between the columns. Floating hospitals walked behind the cables at 80, on the outer shells of the tail ships. The torpedo boats were kept by the flagships. The distance between the columns was about 8 cables. The squadron move was 9 knots.

The formation of the squadron is the same as at 5 o'clock. in the morning, only the reconnaissance detachment goes to the rear of the squadron and the transports have lagged behind, so that the lead, "Anadyr", is on the traverse of the "Eagle".

11 hours 10 min. The right column, at the signal of the admiral, turned 2 points to the left to line up in front of the left column, in line with her. At this time, "Matsushima", "Itsukushima", "Hashidate" and "Chin-yen" were barely visible in the needle ahead of the left traverse, about 80 cables.
"Pearl", "Izumrud" and the destroyer squad began to move to the right side of the XNUMXst armored detachment, and the XNUMXnd destroyer squad lined up to the right of the transports.
At 11 o'clock. 15 minutes. from the left middle 6 "tower of the battleship" Eagle "an accidental shot was fired at the" Kasagi ", the former rumba 3 behind the traverse, about 40 cables. Oslyabya and the ships of the left column also opened fire. There were no more shots from the Eagle. The enemy began to answer. The firefight lasted about 8 minutes. I did not see any hits from our side, although the shells fell pretty well. Enemy shells fell by undershoots and overflights. There were no hits.
About 11 a.m. 25 minutes shells from the targeting detachment of Nebogatov began to fall very close and the enemy cruisers, turning suddenly to the left by 8 points, retreated 60 cables and again lined up in one wake column on a course parallel to us. From our side, the fire was stopped at the signal of the admiral: "Do not throw shells for free."

From these testimonies it is possible to clarify who fired: "Oslyabya" and the ships of the left column (which included the 3rd armored detachment and cruisers, again, I draw your attention, we are not talking about all the ships of the left column).

Further, there are other indications (those that I have already given earlier and others additionally).
Description of the battle senior. artil. officer, Lieutenant Gertner 1st.
At 10 o'clock, on a signal from the Suvorov, the team was given lunch.
Soon the cruisers began to noticeably approach and approached 40 cables, as a result of which fire was opened on them from the squadron. The 1st and 2nd detachments barely fired. The 3rd detachment supported fairly frequent fire.
The cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" did not fire, since the 3rd detachment was in the alignment with the enemy, and in the intervals between the ships it was also not possible to shoot for lack of sufficient time for the gunners to get used to the position of the enemy ships, which sometimes showed up in the intervals 3rd detachment. There was no short alarm.
The 3rd detachment continued to fire heavily, as a result of which a signal was sent to it from the Suvorov: "Do not throw shells." A few minutes later, the enemy cruisers, firing, retreated. There were no hits either from Japanese ships or from ours. After this battle, lunch was given to the 2nd watch.
The 3rd detachment entered the wake of the 2nd, so all the battleships went in the same wake column.

Again we see that the ships of the 3rd armored detachment were shooting mainly.

A report from Michman Rozhdestvensky.
On the morning of May 14, we saw a Japanese light cruiser on the right shell. He was so close that we could make out that it was "Izumi". "Oslyabya" asked permission to "fight the enemy", but the admiral did not allow. Quite a long time passed when, on a signal from the Suvorov, the towers were pointed at it, but the cruiser, having obviously sufficiently examined our formation, at that time was already withdrawing, continuously telegraphing.
At 11 o'clock in the afternoon, several enemy cruisers appeared on the left traverse. The admiral raised the "combat alert" signal and began to describe the XNUMXst and XNUMXnd armored detachments to the left, wishing to build one wake ahead of the third armored detachment and cruisers. At this time, the ships of the III armored detachment opened fire on the enemy and, it seems, quite successfully, since fire appeared on one of the cruisers, and they, firing very unsuccessfully, began to lean to the left and leave. The firing lasted 8 minutes, until the admiral raised the signal "do not throw shells."

The shooting of other ships, except for the 3rd armored one, is not mentioned at all, apparently due to the fact that it was he who was shooting in reality.

Reading of the Corps of Engineers-Mechanics of the Fleet Captain Rodionov 2.
At 9 o'clock. in the morning on the right, the enemy again appeared, in the number of three ships going into the wake and, as I recall, also on a course parallel to us; they were ordered to aim, but not shoot. At 11 o'clock. of the day, the same ships appeared on the left side, but they were already, as I remember, counter-courses with us and approached quite close. The guns were also aimed at them, and when they caught up with the III armored detachment, he opened fire on them - the enemy responded, but from both sides the shooting was ineffectual; after which the enemy disappeared.

The same thing again.

Testimony of Warrant Officer Baron G. Ungern-Sternberg.
At 11 o'clock. 30 minutes. there was a signal from the Suvorov: “I am changing course to the right by 20 °; I will shoot at the Izumi. At the same moment, four Japanese cruisers appeared from the left side, rapidly approaching, following almost the same course with us and approached at a distance of 32 to 6 cables. A shot was fired from the Eagle at the cruisers (Tshitoze, Kasagi, Itsukushima and Hashidate), after which "Apraksin", "Senyavin" and "Ushakov" from all their guns opened fire on these ships, but, on a signal from "Suvorov": "do not waste shells", the fire was stopped and we went to the old course.

[Maxim G]

Part 2

Report of the corps fl. navigators Colonel Osipov.
At 11 o'clock. 15 minutes. in the morning from the battleship "Eagle" was fired at the enemy cruisers, and behind him opened fire and the 3rd squadron; the fire lasted no more than 5 minutes, at 11 and a half in the morning the enemy cruisers began to retire to the north and hide. At noon we were at φ = N 34 ° 01 ', L = N 129 ° 42'. Signal from the battleship "Prince Suvorov": "course northeast 23 ° east." According to the armor signal. "Oslyabya", following the movement of the Admiral, changed course to northeast 23 ° East.

Testimony of Captain 2nd Rank Ivkov.
At 10 o'clock in the morning, behind our left traverse, through the darkness we saw 4 Japanese cruisers heading the same course with us; the distance to them was about 4 miles. Sounded the alarm and several of our battleships opened rare fire on them. The admiral signaled: "Do not drop shells." After 2 - 3 minutes these cruisers suddenly turned to the left and quickly disappeared.

Testimony of Lieutenant Ovander.
As far as I remember, at the same time with esc. armor "Suvorov" was the signal: "II and III armored. detachment, line up in battle formation. I armor. detachment, turn sequentially to the right by 8 points. " What were the signals to cruisers and transports, I don't remember at all.
III armored. the detachment delayed the formation, and therefore, when at 11 o'clock. 12 minutes the first shot rang out and a firefight ensued with the enemy cruisers on the left, then the location of our main forces was approximately as follows:

I is armored. detachment to the right and ahead of II armor. detachment, and esk. armored. "Eagle" has not yet managed to turn to the right, and III is armored. detachment to the left of II armored. detachment and esc. armored. "Nicholas I", approximately, abeam esc. armored. "Oslyabya", at a distance of about 4 cables.
As far as I can remember, the first shot was from the esc. armored. "Eagle", and then picked up Sh armor. detachment. The enemy answered. When this shootout began, it was with esc. armored. "Suvorov" was the signal: "Do not scatter shells." As a result of this signal, from our side the fire was stopped, and the enemy, suddenly turning 8 points, to the left, disappeared behind the horizon. The distance in the columns between our ships was exactly 2 cables. The described exchange of fire lasted for about 12 minutes. and was at the beginning of 12 o'clock.

Reading of Rank 2 Captain Artschwager.
During this time, the Japanese, following a course converging with us, gradually approached us and, at about 10 o'clock in the morning, when they approached our traverse (approximately 10 hours 10 minutes), from a distance of more than 40 cables, opened fire, to which, after a shot from the battleship "Borodino", responded: the III detachment of battleships, as well as the cruisers "Vladimir Monomakh" and "Dmitry Donskoy". Our formation at that time was, as shown in drawing No. 2. Some time after the opening of fire, there was a signal from the battleship "Prince Suvorov": "Do not throw shells for nothing." The Japanese cruisers soon turned all at once to the left by 8 points and quickly disappeared. The entire shooting lasted eight minutes; from our bow turret, a shell hit the second Japanese cruiser in the middle near the pipes, which was also seen from the battleship Admiral Apraksin, then it was transmitted from it by semaphore to the battleship Emperor Nicholas I.

Description of the battle of Lieutenant Baron Taube.
At 11 o'clock. 20 minutes. 6 a shot was fired from 6 "guns from the battleship" Eagle " on the front of the cruisers, having heard which, on the battleships of the coastal defense and "Nicholas I" indiscriminate fire was opened on the enemy. This fire was opened earlier than the "short alarm" and lasted only about a minute and a half, since, at the very first shot, there was a signal from "Suvorov": "Do not throw shells for nothing" and the shooting stopped. About 85 shots were fired from all ships and several hits were visible. I personally saw the hit of a 10 "shell from the Senyavin on the second enemy cruiser between the pipes, which was then reported there by semaphore. The enemy detachment, when opening fire from our ships, immediately turned, all ships suddenly, to the left and retreated to a distance about 60 cables, responding with a few shots, most of them undershoots.

Testimony of Warrant Officer Zatursky.
When, at about 11 o'clock, the Japanese cruisers approached 40 cables, the first shot was fired from the Nikolai, and our entire left column opened fire on the enemy. The exchange of fire lasted no more than 4 - 5 minutes. Two hits were noticeable in one of the Japanese cruisers, after which the entire detachment turned "suddenly" to the left of the rumba by 4 and disappeared.


Testimony K.I.-M. Fleet Captain Ilyutovich.
At about eleven o'clock, on the left we were overtaken by a detachment of Japanese cruisers, which were in full swing. I could hardly see them in the fog. Before that there was an order on the semaphore: "Problem" to go to "Pearl" and stay abeam of the battleship "Eagle". From the ships of Admiral Nebogatov, who were closest to the enemy detachment, opened fire, to which the Japanese cruisers responded weakly and, overtaking us, disappeared into the fog. They did not shoot from Suvorov, and there was a signal: "Do not throw shells for free."

Well, etc. You can read other testimonies more, but the following can be traced - mainly ships from the 3rd armored detachment were fired.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

They

Quote: Maxim G

Well, etc. You can read other testimonies more, but the following can be traced - mainly ships from the 3rd armored detachment were fired.

Maxim, one thing follows from all these quotes - BOTH squadrons fired, although it looks like the 1st armored 2TOE did not fire, or fired very little.
Accordingly, your reply

Quote: Maxim G

The 3rd armored detachment began to fight before the rest of the squadron - a firefight with Japanese cruisers.

Wrong. In addition, the fire contact was very short-lived (12 minutes maximum, but rather less) and could not affect anything at all.

Quote: Maxim G

Those. Apparently, Gribovsky means just the coordinate.

And Nikolai did not make any "coordonates" - well, there is not a word about it in the reports. I understand that Gribovsky wrote about this. He wrote a lot about what :))) The question is, where did he get this data, and he often took it out of his head - for example, getting into Russian battleships.
Coordinate, that would be understandable, is a complete violation of the logic of maneuvering inherent in Russian squadrons, since Nebogatov's flagship was supposed to be out of order, and the rest of the ships had to somehow guess that he was doing the coordinate and stay on the same course. If the entire 3TOE followed Nikolai, then the squadron would have followed a "snake", which would be reflected in the reports in one way or another.

Quote: Maxim G

"Answer.
The magazine "More", 1912, No. 7, p. 158.
It just described how "Nikolai" maneuvered, knocking down the Japanese zeroing, incl. speed.

But, for example, the testimony of the Dobrotvorsky Investigative Commission

Perhaps the admirals' assumptions would have come true if the Japanese had not acquired detonating grenades, long-range mines. and submarines, since without these items it was impossible to do it at all: no battles at a long distance, no destructive fires, no knocking down of masts and pipes, no blowing off guns, no injuries of many people in towers and casemates, no sinking of battleships.

Just to understand the value of other evidence. The saying "lies like an eyewitness" did not arise out of nowhere

Quote: Maxim G

I don't see any problems here, such a maneuver can be done carefully, especially since the 3rd armored detachment was well-coordinated.

Why did he maneuver so badly on joint maneuvers with 2TOE? :)))

Quote: Maxim G

In the modern era, numerous falsifiers have added to this "cocktail" trying to "rehabilitate" the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron, Vice-Admiral Rozhestvensky, and "prove" that he de "deceived Togo" and "won the outset of the battle" and the like nonsense.

I'm sorry, but Sidorenko is not the ultimate truth ...
Rozhdestvensky, perhaps, did not deliberately deceive Togo, but the fact is that Togo entered the battle at a disadvantage for himself. Given its superiority in speed, the Russian squadron was supposed to receive a crossing T and the death of the head battleships in the first 40 minutes of the battle.

[rytik32]

That is, one shell killed on "Sikishima"

1. Such scatter is characteristic of damage Japanese ships with Russian shells. Because hits were few, especially with large caliber. In the case of hits on Russian ships, the distribution of, for example, hits of 100 shells will be more even.
2. The death toll is not the only estimate I have used.
3. I used another, completely independent way of estimating the number of hits.

a clear anomaly - they shot a lot, they didn't really hit anyone

Four ship (according to "Ushakov" also has an estimate) - this is an anomaly, and one "Eagle" is the rule?
Sounds very strange.
It would also be possible to analyze the information on the consumption of shells on the Sisoi, Navarino, Nakhimov - they are at least approximate, but there.

Eagle has no big discrepancies with the statistics of the consumption of our EBR shells in the LM. Therefore, it looks much smarter as a reference point.

I do not understand, please clarify

For example, "Peresvet" lost its rangefinder at the beginning of the battle. Naturally, the accuracy of his fire decreased. Therefore, it is not very correct to compare the accuracy of a slightly beaten 1TOE and a fresh 2TOE.
Well, do not forget the question of distance https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/47557.html

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Such scatter is typical for damage to Japanese ships by Russian shells. Because hits were few, especially with large caliber.

Remind about the difference in the losses of "Russia" and "Gromoboi"?
"Sevastopol" and "Poltava" in the FM received a similar number of hits (20 and 25, respectively, of which 9-10 and 11 are heavy). 12 people were killed on the "Poltava", on the "Sevastopol" there were no casualties.

Quote: rytik32

Four ships (according to "Ushakov" also have an estimate) is an anomaly, and one "Eagle" is a rule?

Not this way. Eagle + 6 EBR of those who fought in ZhM - a rule, 3TOE - an anomaly.

Quote: rytik32

It would also be possible to analyze the information on the consumption of shells on the Sisoi, Navarino, Nakhimov - they are at least approximate, but there.

Consider not - we usually overestimated the consumption of shells, if it was not possible to count them in a calm atmosphere ("Eagle", "Varyag")

Quote: rytik32

For example, "Peresvet" lost its rangefinder at the beginning of the battle. Naturally, the accuracy of his fire decreased. Therefore, it is not very correct to compare the accuracy of a slightly beaten 1TOE and a fresh 2TOE.

Quite the opposite - this 2TOE very quickly lost rangefinders and centralized fire control, unlike 1TOE where only Peresvet had problems (Retvizan at the very end)

Quote: rytik32

Well, do not forget the question of distance https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/47557.html

As you can see from the bulk manual, in the 2nd phase the distances are comparable

[rytik32]

Remind about the difference in the losses of "Russia" and "Gromoboi"?

You can remind me if you don't know the reason for this difference :)

"Sevastopol" and "Poltava" in the ZhM received a similar number of hits (20 and 25, respectively, of which 9-10 and 11 are heavy)

Can you list 20 hits in Sevastopol?

There are only 15

Not this way. Eagle + 6 EBR of those who fought in ZhM - a rule, 3TOE - an anomaly.

And many people in the ZhM fired a runaway at the rangefinder in order to have the same consumption as on the 2TOE ships?

I will still give data on some other ships.

Navarin
"From my cannon I made about 40 shots"despite the fact that" At the beginning of the battle we could not shoot from 6 "cannons and before the death of" Oslyabya ", not a single shot from 6" guns was fired, since the enemy was in the bow and only the bow tower could shoot "

The consumption of 6-inch shells for the "Eagle" you got on average a little less 30 shells on the gun.

At the same time, "Navarin" has old Brink cannons with a low rate of fire and small aiming angles.

Nakhimov
"Up to ½ of the total stock of high-explosive shells was used up during the battle"
Those. about the same 40 shells on the trunk.
The Nakhimov also has old Brink cannons with a low rate of fire and low aiming angles.

Those. "Eagle" is a deviation!
No other 2TOE ship had a similarly "low" projectile consumption... Either you thought wrong ...

As you can see from the bulk manual, in the 2nd phase the distances are comparable

It seemed to you.
Here is the author's conclusion:

In general, the differences between Tsushima and Shantung are visible, and they are very large.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

You can remind me if you don't know the reason for this difference :)

Crew accommodation, Alexey :))))

Quote: rytik32

Can you list 20 hits in Sevastopol?

Yes I can. And, in fact, he did it in the article - it is a pity that you did not read it.

Quote: rytik32

There are only 15

Aleksey, this list does not include 305-mm guns hitting the roof of the bow turret (but the trail remains), as a result of the inspection of the ship, 2 shells hit the edge of the armor, and not one, and one 6-inch shell was found unexploded on the ship. In addition, according to Polomoshnov's data, 3 more shells hit the armor belt without piercing it.

Quote: rytik32

And many people in the ZhM fired a runaway at the rangefinder in order to have the same consumption as on the 2TOE ships?

In the 2nd phase, they also shot fugitives. What is the difference? :)))) By rangefinder, by sighting - this affects the accuracy, and not the rate of rapid fire.

Quote: rytik32

I will still give data on some other ships.

Thank you!

Quote: rytik32

Navarin
"I fired about 40 shots from my cannon" despite the fact that "At the beginning of the battle we could not shoot from 6" cannons and until the death of "Oslyaby", not a single shot from 6 "cannons was fired, since the enemy was in the bow and could shoot only the bow tower "
The consumption of 6-inch shells for the "Eagle" you got on average a little less than 30 shells per gun.

Alexey, this is exactly the case when the "average temperature in the hospital" turned out. The Russian squadron in Tsushima most of the time fought on the left side, despite the fact that some of the guns on it were out of order. So the average consumption of shells on the main firing side is at least one and a half to two times more. Therefore, the intensity of Navarin's shooting is obviously BELOW the "Eagle" :)
In fact, the data of Nakhimov and Navarin confirm my calculations.

Quote: rytik32

It seemed to you.
Here is the author's conclusion:

It seemed to you, Alexey. The author's conclusion concerns BATTLES AT SHANTUNG IN GENERAL, and I'm only talking about the 2nd phase

[rytik32]

Alexey, this list does not include 305-mm guns hitting the roof of the bow turret (but the trail remains)

Yeah, from a 120-mm projectile :)
Those. most likely the damage was received during shelling in the PA, and not in combat.

2 shells hit the edge of the armor according to the results of the inspection of the ship. In addition, according to Polomoshnov, 3 more shells hit the armor belt without breaking through

And what was this inspection? Where can you read it? Have you seen him yourself?

and one 6-inch shell was found unexploded on the ship

Why couldn't it be a projectile that caused damage from the above list?

Therefore, the intensity of Navarin's shooting is obviously BELOW the "Eagle" :)

Right. And according to your calculations - higher! Here is Larionov's data on about 100 shells per gun - just right!

The author's conclusion concerns the BATTLE AT SHANTUNG IN GENERAL

Only the author does not know about it:
"I chose time intervals of about an hour and a half, for Shantung - from the beginning of the second phase, for Tsushima - from the beginning of the battle."

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Yeah, from a 120-mm projectile :)

Or not 120 mm, but from six or twelve inches

Quote: rytik32

Those. most likely the damage was received during shelling in the PA, and not in combat.

Probably all the same, during the shelling of the PA, this hit would have been noticed :))

Quote: rytik32

And what was this inspection? Where can you read it? Have you seen him yourself?

You can read this description from Kuteinikov, he writes in sufficient detail.

Quote: rytik32

Why couldn't it be a projectile that caused damage from the above list?

Because he was lying in a lifeboat

Quote: rytik32

Right. And according to your calculations - higher!

According to my calculations, it turns out that the guns of the "Eagle" most of all participating in the battle fired one and a half to two times more shells than the 30 you calculated. That is 45-60. Navarin - 40. What's the problem?

Quote: rytik32

"I chose time intervals of about an hour and a half, for Shantung - from the beginning of the second phase, for Tsushima - from the beginning of the battle."

We look at the numbers.
Tsushima, the beginning of the battle
Fuji
14.11 - Oslyabya, 6 200 m
The rest of the Japanese battleships are further on the Russian system than Fuji. Asahi seems to be closer, but shows
14.12 - opened fire, 7 m, lead ship
Shantung, the beginning of the second phase
"Sikishima"
17.38 - 8 m, opened fire from 500-inch guns
Fuji is next in front of him.
7.36 - 7 800 m, 12-inch and 6-inch guns for the first ship
The accuracy of determining the distance - plus / minus bast shoes - Sishikima goes behind Fuji, in two minutes the distance should have been reduced, but where there ... And Asahi and Mikasa EBR are closer to the Russians.
Tsushima, Asahi
14.22 - 5 700 m
14.34 - at a distance of 4 m opened fire from 700-pounder guns
14.36 - 4 600 m
14.41 - second enemy ship, 4 m
14.48 - the first enemy ship, 5 600 m
14.51 - 5 200 m
14.52 - stopped firing (?)
The rest of the battleships are farther from the Russians.
Shangung, Fuji (third in order)

17.53 - fourth ship, 9 m
17.55 - the mainmast of the fourth ship is shot down
18.00 - at the fourth ship the foremast is shot down, the target is the third ship, 8 m
18.14 - the same target (?), 8 600 m
18.16:6 - started firing 8-inch guns from a distance of 100 XNUMX m
18.27 - third ship, 7 300 m
18.31 - fourth ship, 7 m
Judging by the distances, the numbering comes from the last Russian ship in the ranks. Accordingly, Poltava and Sevastopol are closer, and the two head EBRs of the Japanese are even closer :))))
The distances are again comparable.
18.47 - fifth ship, 6 m
18.49 - fifth ship, 5 m
19.00 - (???), 5 200 m
19.02 - distance to head 5 m
somewhere here fuji is the closest to the Russians (when Togo was overtaking the formation)
In Tsushima, the closest EBR is Shikishima
15.09 - first ship, 4 100 m
15.13 - 3 700 m
15.14 - type "Borodino", 3 100 m
15.15 - 2 500 m
15.16 - 2 300 m
15.17 - 2 500 m
15.18 - 3 000 m
15.21 - stopped firing 12-lb guns, 3 m
15.25 - target - "a burning ship with a downed pipe", 4 m
15.27 - 5 500 m
That is, with the exception of a short-term rapprochement, when Alexander went to break through - again comparable

[rytik32]

Or not 120 mm, but from six or twelve inches

And where did you read about 6-dm or 12-dm? At Kuteinikov, the size is indicated unambiguously.

You can read this description from Kuteinikov, he writes in sufficient detail

Please remind the page number. I have not found.

According to my calculations, it turns out that the guns of the "Eagle" most of all participating in the battle fired one and a half to two times more shells than the 30 you calculated. That is 45-60. Navarin - 40. What's the problem?

I reread your article. There is no division into port and starboard.
But even if we take your figures of 45 ... 60 shells, and subtract 50 minutes from the time before the death of Oslyabi, when the Oryol fired and the Navarin did not, it turns out that the Navarin fired much more intensively. than "Eagle" (number of rounds per minute).
Which proves once again that your calculations have nothing to do with reality.

Judging by the distances, the numbering comes from the last Russian ship in the ranks.

Well, you gave out a pearl!

That is, with the exception of a short-term rapprochement, when Alexander went to break through - again comparable

The numbers directly contradict your conclusions.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

And where did you read about 6-dm or 12-dm? At Kuteinikov, the size is indicated unambiguously.

The question is, he measured the size from a pothole an inch deep and six inches long. In addition, you should know, since you are reading Sidorenko, how often there is a confusion of 12 inches and 12 cm, 12 inches and 12 pounds.

Quote: rytik32

Please remind the page number. I have not found.

page 82-83

Quote: rytik32

I reread your article. There is no division into port and starboard.

Did I say that there is? I referred to the article for a different reason.

Quote: rytik32

But even if you take your numbers 45 ... 60 shells,

Of which there may be more, as I thought offhand

Quote: rytik32

and from the time subtract 50 minutes before the death of the Oslyabi, when the Oryol fired and the Navarin did not, it turns out that the Navarin fired much more intensively than the Eagle (the number of shots per minute).

In numbers, please. How many Navarin shot, how many - Eagle left and right side. Time of gun failure, average rate of fire, approximate number of shots ... If you made an assertion, prove it.

Quote: rytik32

Which proves once again that your calculations have nothing to do with reality.

So far, there is no refutation from you. I can do this calculation, no problem. But why do I have to count your ideas all the time?

Quote: rytik32

Well, you gave out a pearl!

Laughter for no reason ... You would at least read what is written.
Fuji, Shantung. The squadron of the Japanese, if anything, CATCHES the Russians
17.44 - second ship, 8 400 m
17.46 - 8 600 m, stopped firing from 6-inch guns
17.53 - fourth ship, 9 m
Suppose the numbering is correct, number 1 is the Tsarevich, and so on. Then how did the distance to the fourth ship turn out to be greater than to the second after 9 minutes of pursuit?
This time. Second, if the numbering comes from the Tsarevich, then the distances are all the more comparable.

Quote: rytik32

The numbers directly contradict your conclusions.

You read them, do not limit yourself to the conclusions of Sidorenko :))))))

[rytik32]

The question is, he measured the size from a pothole an inch deep and six inches long. In addition, you should know, since you are reading Sidorenko, how often there is a confusion of 12 inches and 12 cm, 12 inches and 12 pounds.

Here is Kuteinikov.

This fragment also describes the damage evidently caused by shelling from the shore. So there is no reason at all to consider hitting the roof as the result of a fight in the GM.

page 82-83

There is no.

In numbers, please. How many Navarin shot, how many - Eagle left and right side. Time of gun failure, average rate of fire, approximate number of shots ...

Let the "Eagle" open fire at 13:55. There is nowhere later.
The death of "Oslyabi" is 14:45. Here's a 50 minute difference.
At about 15:05, the fight ended. In total, the 6-inch "Navarina" was fired for about 20 minutes. "Eagle" -
Further, a fight with the left flank somewhere from 15:45 to 16:15. Another 30 minutes.
Total average rate of fire "Navarin" 0,8 rounds per minute. Which is pretty good for his guns.
For the "Eagle" let's take the time of release of 2 guns at 14:30 and another one at 15:00. The total is 453 minutes, if the time of the possibility of firing all the guns on the left side. Or 348 rounds at a rate of fire similar to that of the Navarin, ie. 0,8 rounds per minute.
How many shells then remain on the starboard side?

Again. Larionov's data about about 100 shots per barrel from 6-inch guns is much more realistic.

In the meantime, we have data on the combat shells taken. There is no data on the taken training courses.
The Dogger Bank has an expense. 13 6-inch shells.
There is an expense on the exercises

How many shells the Japanese removed "is known" only from the translation of a person who does not know Japanese. Do you at least know the code of the document in jakar? I'm not kidding, I'll try to translate it myself.

Then how did the distance to the fourth ship turn out to be greater than to the second after 9 minutes of pursuit?

The squadrons weren't sailing on parallel courses - that's the simple answer.

You read them, do not limit yourself to the conclusions of Sidorenko :))))))

I read.
And Vladimir Sidorenko has nothing to do with these conclusions.

[Maxim G]

Quote: rytik32

How many shells the Japanese removed "is known" only from the translation of a person who does not know Japanese. Do you at least know the code of the document in jakar? I'm not kidding, I'll try to translate it myself.

Can you tell us in more detail what kind of translation it is and what kind of data?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

This fragment also describes the damage evidently caused by shelling from the shore. So there is no reason at all to consider hitting the roof as the result of a fight in the GM.

Except those that the reports from Sevastopol do not mention damage during the bombing? But they should have been mentioned on other ships

Quote: rytik32

There is no.

the very bottom of page 82 - "At the same time, two 12-inch shells exploded on impact on the upper edge ..."

Quote: rytik32

Let the "Eagle" open fire at 13:55.

Clearly, I’m counting again.
Let the fire be open at 13.52 and last for 80 minutes in the first phase. At the very beginning of the battle, most likely only 2 6-inch towers were firing - the left bow and middle towers, and the aft one started firing only when the group of stern guns concentrated on the anti-ballistic missile system opposite. Okay, let's ignore it.
So, in the 1st phase we have potential 6 * 80 = 480 gun-minutes. Of these, minus 20 cannon-minutes - the failure of the left 152-mm gun in the Slavinsky tower, the damage was corrected and minus about 50 cannon-minutes from 14.40-14.50 when the bow left turret was knocked out and about minus 15 cannon-minutes for the jammed right gun in tower near Ryumin. Total - 395 cannon-minutes from the port side in the 1st phase.
The second phase - about 42 minutes on the left side, on which only 3 firing guns remained and it is not a fact that the aft tower fired the entire phase. So we have 126 gun-minutes maximum. There, the starboard side still fired at the 3rd and 4th detachments, but not much, and the bow turret received significant damage after the very first shots and could only rotate manually. Okay, let's give all 6 guns on the starboard side 20 minutes each, for a total of 246 cannon minutes in the 2nd phase.
The third phase lasted roughly 80 minutes, and all 6 guns on the starboard side could take part in it, but only 15 shots were fired from the right-middle. The aft tower also appears to have been quickly damaged, as Ryumin, taking control of the fire

When they finished the fight on the port side, I went to the conning tower to find out about the damage and where to go. I found a senior officer there, with his head bandaged, and midshipman Sakkelari and lieutenant Shamshev, whom he replaced for dressing.

reported

During my fire control, we fired very rarely: only two 12 "towers and the right bow 6" were in operation, in which before that all the servants had been withdrawn twice and she was on manual action.

Accordingly, we put the same 15 shots on the aft turret as on the middle one, and we get 160 cannon-minutes of the bow turret + 30 shells from the rest of the turrets.
Accordingly, it turns out that the battleship fired 801 cannon-minutes (in reality, apparently, less) during this time, it consumed 350-370 six-inch shells. Consequently, the port gun, which fought during the 1st and 2nd phases without interruption (120 minutes), could shoot something about 53-56 shells (actually - more), while the "Navarin" gun shot " about 40 "
Taking into account the fact that Navarin fought not 6 minutes in the first phase from his 80-inch guns in the first phase, but about 32 minutes, the gun in question fired not 120, but 72 minutes in two phases.
In total, the Eagle turns out to be approximately 0,45 rds / min, the Navarino gun - 0,55 or less (for example, with 38 shots, which is actually also "about 40" we have 0,53), that is, within the statistical error.
That is, even such a result no longer allows us to speak about the refutation of my theory. The fact that the rate of fire of the old Navarin gun turned out to be comparable to the new gun of Kane is not surprising, given that the "old woman" was casemate, and Kane was in the turret, which significantly reduced the rate of fire.
But even such a result is obtained only if you forget about the sad fact for your theory that Stepan Kuzmin, to whose testimony you refer, writes about "about 40 shells" for the ENTIRE battle.
That is, he could have fired several shots even before the main forces met (at the cruisers, after an accidental shot from the "Eagle"), and it is absolutely certain that he fired at the end

At the first mine attack at 10 pm, I fired segment rounds from my cannon.

And, for example, assuming that Kuzmin fired 38 shells from his gun, 7 of them at destroyers, we get a rate of fire of something about 0,43 - that is, just below the "Orlov" one.

Quote: rytik32

Again. Larionov's data about about 100 shots per barrel from 6-inch guns is much more realistic.

I will refrain from sarcasm.

Quote: rytik32

Do you at least know the code of the document in jakar? I'm not kidding, I'll try to translate it myself.

I'll try to find. In my opinion, somewhere there was a link to this number, not mine, but on Tsushima, or somewhere else.

Quote: rytik32

The squadrons weren't sailing on parallel courses - that's the simple answer.

Alexey, here it is much more difficult to resist sarcasm. Please indicate these "non-parallel" courses. I suggest - if the account was conducted from the Tsarevich, then the result

17.44 - second ship, 8 400 m
17.53 - fourth ship, 9 m

should add up taking into account the fact that the approach speed was 62 m / min maximum (the difference in speed is 2 knots) and during the specified time the squadrons approached from the force by 450 m.

[rytik32]

Andrey, why didn't you check the technique on Russian ships in the ZhM?
Because it "works"?
We look at the losses.
"Peresvet" has the most killed - and hits it the most.
Then "Tsarevich" and "Poltava" - and then they go on hits.
Victory has about 4 times fewer deaths than the almost identical Peresvet. And the shells hit her about 4 times less!
The technique works :)
And you began to compare with Japanese ships and even climbed into WWI. Why when is the answer on the surface?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Andrey, why didn't you check the technique on Russian ships in the ZhM?
Because it "works"?

She does not work:)
Retvizan and Tsesarevich received almost the same number of hits, but twice as many were killed on the Tsesarevich. Suppose there is dependence only on heavy shells, twice as many of them hit the Tsarevich. But then what to do with Sevastopol and Poltava, which received an almost equal number of hits, despite the fact that there were no losses on the first, and 12 people on the second?

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I want to compare the accuracy with which the Japanese and ours fired in the 2nd phase of the battle at Shantung with the accuracy that our battleships achieved in the 1st phase of Tsushima.

Then we wait, sir, with impatience.

[anzar]

+ + +

I wonder if I'll ever get to the analysis of the performance characteristics of the ships of the Russian-Japanese, or not

Isn't it possible parallel to "artillery and shells"? )) And it would be good in comparison with Japanese (British). For example, why, at lower powers, the brites developed more speed. Or "passport" and real range ...

[lodochnik2000]

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Фруд,_Уильям
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_model_basin
S

[anzar]

lodochnik2000 ..... Frude, _William

I know this, but by this time everyone knew it for a long time.

... The first Russian experimental pool was built in St. Petersburg, in New Holland in 1894.

AND? Rather eating "national features of the projects" The Franks have even worse noses. towers br. cruisers are so shifted forward that often the muzzle of the cannon almost dangled in front of the stem
You can write a lot, but Andrey will do it better, because he said that he wants to get there "before analyzing the performance characteristics of the ships of the Russian-Japanese .."

[Comrade]

Dear Andrey, thank you for bringing up a very interesting topic!

This is one of the eternal topics that will probably never be closed.
As a follow-up to the discussion, a couple of words on the merits.

"Tsarevich"
Regarding the statistics of hitting the flagship of Rear Admiral V.K.Witgeft, presented by V. Polomoshnov, I would like to make only one clarification.

Alas, the monograph "Fight on July 28, 1904" lacks a number of hits on Russian ships.
Offhand a couple of examples.
On the "Tsesarevich", a ricocheting shell broke the wall-stag, and in the indicated source there is not a word about it.
Also, the next, quite serious hit in the flagship is not mentioned there.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Comrade!

Quote: Comrade

As a follow-up to the discussion, a couple of words on the merits.

Always happy!

Quote: Comrade

Alas, the monograph "Fight on July 28, 1904" lacks a number of hits on Russian ships.

Agree

Quote: Comrade

On the "Tsesarevich", a ricocheting shell broke the wall-stag, and in the indicated source there is not a word about it.

And here, and in case of damage to the propeller, we are not talking about direct hits, but I try to take them into account. I had a desire to remove the ricocheting Japanese shell, the head of which hit the Tsesarevich, but I didn’t do it.

[Comrade]

Hello, dear Andrey!

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

if the propeller is damaged, it is not a direct hit

Why
This is how, for example, a Japanese projectile could, having passed through an approximately six-meter water column, hit the propeller blade.

In one of the old issues of the Marine-Rundschau magazine there is an article dedicated to getting into the "Tsarevich". Several schemes, a short description of the hits.
The Germans in the article call the same canonical number of 15 hitting 12 '' shells, which can be found in domestic pre-revolutionary sources. They put the Tsarevich in a dry dock and repaired it. Of course, the Germans had more than enough opportunities to examine the damage to our battleship. It is in view of these circumstances that the data of the Germans, and moreover coinciding with the Russians, inspire more confidence in me than the opinion of modern authors, who saw the damage to the "Tsarevich" only in pictures.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

a Japanese projectile could, having passed through about six meters of water, hit the propeller blade.

The shells do not have a bad habit of conserving significant energy after passing through 6 meters of water. This is a complex witchcraft. And the angles of incidence can be such only at huge angles of elevation. None of the Japanese other than Kasuga are seen to be able to shoot steeper than 15 degrees.

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

The shells do not have a bad habit of conserving significant energy after passing through 6 meters of water.

Learn, learn materiel, old buddy.

A documented historical fact.

On May 24, 1941, a German shell hit the battleship Prince of Wales on the starboard side.
a) the projectile covered a distance of about 80 feet in the water column (24,4 meter);
b) the inlet was below the water level at a distance of about 28 feet (8,5 meters);
c) the angle of entry of the projectile was 10 °;
d) the projectile, overcoming obstacles, passed 12 feet inside the ship (3,65 meter);
e) the projectile was found in good condition, but without a ballistic cap.

Picture for clarity (the place of the shell hit is marked with an asterisk)

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

Picture for clarity

"There are miracles! There the devil wanders!" (with)
In war, anything happens, but most of these fantastic tales are gross mistakes and all the same fantasy of eyewitnesses.

Water, incompressible liquid. Of course, you can overcome 24 meters in water. Sinking quietly ..

Stop fantasizing otherwise I will ask Gridasov to comment.

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

most of these fantastic tales are gross mistakes and the same fantasy of eyewitnesses.

Old man, your "vysera" are beginning to get bored, so I propose a deal.
Yours truly lays out here the official report, drawn up at the shipyard in Devonport, addressed to the Admiralty.
The report details under what circumstances the discussed projectile got into the battleship Prince of Wales, what were the consequences of the hit, where and how it was found, measured, examined, removed, etc.
In addition to the text, a link will be posted to the official English resource, where this document is posted, so that everyone can make sure that this is not a fake.

You, having broken off, in response change your avatar to one of the attached images.

If you decide to write me another nonsense with emoticons or start trolling out of powerlessness as usual, you should not expect my answer.

Quote: Saxahorse

Stop fantasizing otherwise I will ask Gridasov to comment

Go ahead.
Is it boring to sit alone in a puddle?

[Saxahorse]

I don’t remember that you yourself, at least once admitted your mistake, even though you sometimes made monstrous lapses.

[Comrade]

Traditionally, I offer you, as a noble site troll, a prize.
I give three thousand American dollars for proving that my comments are wrong.
Give here an English archival document, which says at what distance from the surface of the water a German shell hit an English ship of the line, and if there is less than what my commentary says, run to the bank for a money order.
Go ahead, bullfighter, the prize is waiting for you!
Document in the studio! Come on, come on!

Yes, where is yours, how is it?
Lead your "Gridasov" here as soon as possible. Let him comment.

[Saxahorse]

We are not talking about the British and not about the PMA. Diving shells, in addition to being very rare, are doubtful precisely for the Japanese with their supersensitive fuses. Don't you really see the contradiction? How can a Japanese projectile, willingly exploding from touching the rigging, calmly, without exploding, pass as much as 6 meters under water?

And your usual circus with trolling and freaks is not interesting to me. You on the merits of the question please answer.

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

We're not talking about the British

That's how you started talking, what, there is nothing to cover?
Do you remember when I gave you an example with a German shell, what did you write back to me?
What

Quote: Saxahorse

most of these fantastic tales are gross mistakes and the same fantasy of eyewitnesses. Water, incompressible liquid. Of course, you can overcome 24 meters in water. Sinking quietly.

So you were sure that this could not be.
Then I offered you money so that you prove your "correctness"... You leafed through the books, realized that you were wrong, and decided to try to save your face.
Hence the phrase

Quote: Saxahorse

We are not talking about the British and not about the PMA.

Such an answer, old friend, should have been given immediately as soon as I pointed out this shell to you. And not now that you are back against the wall.

Quote: Saxahorse

How can a Japanese projectile, willingly exploding from touching the rigging, calmly, without exploding, pass as much as 6 meters under water?

Learn to match!

Quote: Saxahorse

Stop fantasizing otherwise I will ask Gridasov to comment.

Serve it here.

[Saxahorse]

Do you have a photograph of a round hole in the blade from a Japanese armor-piercing projectile? You are presenting your conjectures as facts. A broken piece of a blade is a contact with a propeller or debris (for example, a mast) or a stone at the bottom (for example, in Qingdao). You are in a hurry to pass off the most unlikely version as an indisputable fact.

[Andrey Tameev]

Andrey, I look forward to the continuation and conclusions!

[Andrey Tameev]

I would like to point out that a huge disadvantage of this and similar articles is the tertiary analysis of secondary analysis. With all due respect to Polomoshnov, who said that his hit data is the ultimate truth?
If you really want to do something new and useful, it would be interesting for everyone to see a summary table of hits on our ships. With an indication of the time, caliber of the projectile, the place of impact, damage, from whom it hit. With the addition of columns for each source that mentions a hit. With indication of primary or secondary source and how much it can be trusted. Then, when new information appears, such a table can be supplemented, finally making a reliable picture of hits on our ships. There are quite enough sources in the public domain to create such a table. Although the work, of course, is considerable ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Tameev

I would like to point out that a huge disadvantage of this and similar articles is the tertiary analysis of secondary analysis. With all due respect to Polomoshnov, who said that his hit data is the ultimate truth?

(shrug) - checked by the reports of Russian ships and by the memoirs of Kuteinikov. Better can only be done in the archive

Quote: Andrey Tameev

If you really want to do something new and useful, it would be interesting for everyone to see a summary table of hits on our ships. With an indication of the time, caliber of the projectile, the place of impact, damage, from whom it hit. With the addition of columns for each source that mentions a hit

Not a bad idea, by the way!