Talent will hit targets that no one else can hit
and genius is in goals that no one sees.
Arthur Schopenhauer
and genius is in goals that no one sees.
Arthur Schopenhauer

One of the most widespread propaganda myths in Russia today is the story of the Stalinist persecution of cybernetics.
The phrase "cybernetics is the venal wench of imperialism" is often quoted, sometimes attributed to Stalin or Zhdanov (however, some believe that Lysenko called genetics a venal wench).
With regard to cybernetics, this is not entirely true, or not at all true.
We will not discuss cybernetics in general. Consider only history the development of its military applications in our Fatherland.
But the history of ideas is always the history of people.
Everyone knows S.P. Korolev as the creator of the Soviet space industry. But other military scientific directions also had their founding fathers and brilliant leaders.
The history of science cannot be limited to the development of ideas - it should equally concern living people with their characteristics, talents, dependence on social conditions, country and era.
S. I. Vavilov
S. I. Vavilov
Father of military electronics
Axel Ivanovich Berg - a remarkable Soviet scientist, public and statesman, Hero of Socialist Labor, admiral-engineer, academician.
Several books and countless articles have already been written about the life and work of the academician. Previous article about A.I.Berg on VO can serve as a prelude to the one presented.
The versatility of his activities and the abundance of traces left by him in domestic science and technology are striking.
The largest scientist, a brilliant organizer of science and technology, a prominent statesman and military leader AI Berg made an enormous contribution to the development of domestic radio electronics and cybernetics.
From May 1927 of the year Chairman of the Radio Communication and Radio Navigation Section of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Red Army Navy. As a teacher at VMIU, he created a radio laboratory at the school and was engaged in scientific research in the field of radio in it.
In 1932 year the laboratory was transformed into a research institute, and Berg was appointed its head.
In 1932-1937 years. - Head of the Scientific Research Marine Institute of Communications and Telemechanics - NIMIST. (In the future, the Scientific Research Marine Institute of Communications and Telemechanics NIMIST, the 34th Scientific Research Institute of Communications of the Navy, and now this scientific unit is part of the Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Navy "Naval Academy named after Admiral Fleet Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsova ").
In 1932 year the laboratory was transformed into a research institute, and Berg was appointed its head.
In 1932-1937 years. - Head of the Scientific Research Marine Institute of Communications and Telemechanics - NIMIST. (In the future, the Scientific Research Marine Institute of Communications and Telemechanics NIMIST, the 34th Scientific Research Institute of Communications of the Navy, and now this scientific unit is part of the Military Educational and Scientific Center of the Navy "Naval Academy named after Admiral Fleet Soviet Union N. G. Kuznetsova ").

Exhibition complex "Lenexpo". Administrative building. The building was built in the 1910s for the Experimental aviation station - the first military unit of naval aviation in Russia, created in 1912. In 1934, the territory and the building were transferred to the Scientific Research Institute of Maritime Communications, which was formed in 1932, and later to the Scientific Research Marine Institute of Communications and Telemechanics (NIMIST).
Passion around cybernetics
At the time of its appearance, cybernetics was not at least in the least developed and formalized direction. Rather, it was a complex of ideas and approaches related to the most diverse areas of knowledge: from purely technical (fast execution of calculations) to philosophical ("can a machine think").
Electronic computers already existed and were beginning to be used to solve applied problems, but no one particularly remembered cybernetics. And not because it was forbidden.
Soviet computer specialists did not yet see any connection between "abstract cybernetics" and the development of electronic computing technology, which at that time was already proceeding at a rapid pace.
Soviet computer specialists did not yet see any connection between "abstract cybernetics" and the development of electronic computing technology, which at that time was already proceeding at a rapid pace.
The term "cybernetics" began to be used more often in a narrower sense, meaning by this mainly the analogies that exist between machines and living organisms, and the philosophical questions that arise in connection with the social consequences of automation.
Today the term "cybernetics" is almost withdrawn from scientific use. In Russian it was replaced by the word "informatics", in English - Computer Science. This happened in connection with the change of scientific generations and as a result of the rapid development of computers and related information technologies.
The advocates of cybernetics were mainly "pure" mathematicians, philologists and philosophers, then science fiction writers joined them.
The party could not stand aside, and it was with these ideas that artificial intelligence would change the world that it argued through the controlled ideological apparatus.
The nature of the dispute was not at all technical. None of the disputants denied that computing technology needed to be developed. They argued about the nature of thinking - about whether it is possible to model human consciousness by means of mathematics.
In order to resolve this issue, it was necessary at least to understand what a person is and what thinking is. Realize that the cause and structure of human thinking must be sought not only in the brain, but also in the nature of social relations.
It is clear that the apologists of the Marxist-Leninist theory could not allow the “cybernetics” to interfere in the privatized area of their political institutions.
Academician Berg's merit was that he turned the largely utopian "cybernetic" ideas of Norbert Wiener into specific scientific areas and technical projects, including those that determined the development trends of computer technology, control mechanisms, combat information and control systems and combat control systems of the Navy THE USSR.
Moreover, he managed, thanks to his deep knowledge and charisma, to convince the highest military-political leadership of the country and Stalin personally in the need to develop these scientific areas.
But at the same time, he also did not escape prison, which was a typical point in the biography of many Soviet scientists and designers.

Berg after being released from prison, 1940
The beginning of the scientific path
In the 1920s, fundamental transformations were outlined in radio engineering: damped oscillations began to be replaced by non-damped ones, interest in short waves increased, which marked the beginning of the development of more and more new ranges of electromagnetic oscillations.
In those years, instead of spark, arc and machine radio transmitters, instead of radio receivers with crystal detectors, technical means were created using electronic tubes. For several decades, until semiconductors were invented, replacing vacuum tubes, vacuum technology remained the basis of scientific and technological progress.
In the 20s and 30s Berg completed a series of studies on electronic generators of radio frequencies, radio reception, theory and calculation of operating modes of electronic tubes in various conditions, on frequency stabilization, signal amplification and generator control.
Axel Ivanovich put forward and proposed solutions to a number of fundamentally new problems (for example, grid detection, anode and grid modulation), which were of great importance for the development of radio engineering, and in some cases outstripped the results of scientists from other countries.
He was especially involved in the theory and methods of calculating lamp generators. The efficiency, simplicity and accuracy of Berg's calculation method, applicable to all practical modes of operation of oscillator, modulator and amplifier tubes, provided the development of methods of engineering calculations in radio engineering.
Many of these studies did not lose their significance after the transition of radio engineering to semiconductors, since the principles of signal processing in vacuum tubes and semiconductors have much in common.
The ideologist of communications in the Navy
At the end of the year 1926 The People's Commissar for Military Affairs appointed a special commission to work out a policy in the field of arming the fleet with radio-technical means. And Berg is appointed as its chairman.
The task of this commission was modest - to check what radio equipment is on the ships; calculate what is missing and give a recommendation for additional equipment.
Like no one else, Berg knew that the fleet was equipped with outdated radio stations and that there was no general program for arming the fleet with communications equipment. Each ship designer, each chief of communications of a fleet or flotilla acted according to his own understanding.
And there was no understanding: at that time, at a high level, radio engineering was just being born, radio specialists could be counted on one hand.
Berg, becoming in 1927 at the head of the rearmament of the navy by means of communication, put forward the idea of supplying the entire fleet with completely new radio equipment. "Throw out the old, install a new one."
In May, the 1927 he headed the communications section of the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Red Army Naval Forces.
In 1928 year largely on Berg's initiative, the RKKA Naval Communications Research Test Range was organized, which in 1932, as a result of the merger with the communications section of the RKKA Navy Scientific and Technical Committee, was transformed into the RKKA Naval Scientific Research Institute of Communications and Telemechanics.
Berg was appointed the head of this institute, and here his fruitful work began on the creation of new technical means of communication, hydroacoustics and telemechanics for the navy.
Axel Ivanovich put forward the idea of radically re-equipping the fleet with radio equipment, formulated the requirements for it, defended the ideas of specialization and standardization. Under the leadership and with direct participation of Berg, two large radio weapons systems were developed and implemented.
One of them - "Blockade" (1927-1932) marked the transition from spark radio engineering (telegraph communication using damped oscillations) to tube transmitters and receivers, which made it possible to carry out more reliable telegraph, as well as radiotelephone communication with sustained oscillations in the medium wave range.
Another system - "Blockade-2" (1934-1939) it worked already in the short-wave range and made it possible to build more stable radio lines, which created the preconditions for the transition to automatic transmission and reception methods.
"Blockade-2" entered service with the fleet before the start of the Great Patriotic War, and, as Admiral of the Fleet I.S. appointment ".
The first integrated communication system of the fleet was the "Blockade-1" complex, which the plant named after. Kozitsky released in 1927-1934. It includes 9 types of HF and SV transmitters, HF and VHF radio stations, 4 types of radio receivers.
Provided for the gradation of sets of equipment for individual characteristics and purpose for all classes of ships and coastal facilities.
Provided for the gradation of sets of equipment for individual characteristics and purpose for all classes of ships and coastal facilities.
New requirements of the fleet associated with the development of new maritime theaters (HF band instead of SV, increased stability, etc.) were implemented in the communication system "Blockada-2" developed jointly with NIMIS, scientifically substantiated by A. I. Berg. From 1937 to the beginning of the war, the plant produced 7 types of transmitters, 5 types of receivers and an HF radio station that were part of it.
Hydroacoustics.
Berg was engaged in the development of the first hydroacoustic instruments for surface and submarine fleets and published articles on this topic in the magazine "Marine Collection". Under his leadership, a domestic hydroacoustic technique was created at the institute.
Radio navigation.
His services are also great in the development of ship radio navigation. During the years of Berg's voyage, the navigator used directional radio transmission (amplitude radio beacons) and directional radio reception (auditory radio direction finders) at medium waves. Berg investigated the deviation of a ship's radio direction finder and participated in the creation of direction finders, which still serve as a simple and reliable means of determining the position of a ship at sea.
Radar.
The first experiments on radar in our country were also carried out under the leadership of Berg back in 1936.
Axel Ivanovich successfully combined the important administrative and scientific-organizational work of the head of the institute with extensive personal theoretical and experimental work.
Many contemporaries recalled that a small laboratory was equipped in his office behind a partition. A wall model with a multi-stage radio transmitter circuit and stands for testing electronic tubes were deployed here. When Berg had a new idea, he could immediately turn to laboratory facilities.
Creation of a new industry - radio electronics.
The first complex document in the history of the USSR that defined the role of electronic weapons and laid the foundation for the radio electronics industry was the decree of the State Defense Committee (GKOK) of July 4, 1943 "On Radar".
Axel Ivanovich Berg recalls how, having got to Stalin (after two and a half years in prison), he spent three hours explaining the idea of radar to the leader.
We must pay tribute to the intuition of Joseph Vissarionovich! Not everyone is able to understand the essence and significance of new technologies within a few hours. The result of this very communication was the GKOK Decree No. 3683ss, which became the basis for the creation of a new industry.
STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE
RESOLUTION No. GKO-3683ss
July 4, 1943. Moscow. Kremlin
About radar
Considering the extremely important importance of radar for enhancing the combat effectiveness of the Red Army and the Navy, The State Defense Committee decides:
1. Create a Radar Council under the State Defense Committee.
2. To assign the following tasks to the Radar Council under the GFCS:
a) preparation of drafts of military-technical assignments of the GKOK for designers on the armament system by means of radar of the Red Army and the Navy;
b) the all-round development of the radar industry and technology, ensuring the creation of new radar facilities and improving the existing types of radars, as well as ensuring the serial production of high-quality radars by the industry;
c) involvement of the largest scientific, design and engineering-technical forces in the radar business, capable of moving forward radar equipment;
d) systematization and generalization of all the achievements of science and technology in the field of radar, both in the USSR and abroad, through the use of scientific and technical literature and all sources of information ...
RESOLUTION No. GKO-3683ss
July 4, 1943. Moscow. Kremlin
About radar
Considering the extremely important importance of radar for enhancing the combat effectiveness of the Red Army and the Navy, The State Defense Committee decides:
1. Create a Radar Council under the State Defense Committee.
2. To assign the following tasks to the Radar Council under the GFCS:
a) preparation of drafts of military-technical assignments of the GKOK for designers on the armament system by means of radar of the Red Army and the Navy;
b) the all-round development of the radar industry and technology, ensuring the creation of new radar facilities and improving the existing types of radars, as well as ensuring the serial production of high-quality radars by the industry;
c) involvement of the largest scientific, design and engineering-technical forces in the radar business, capable of moving forward radar equipment;
d) systematization and generalization of all the achievements of science and technology in the field of radar, both in the USSR and abroad, through the use of scientific and technical literature and all sources of information ...
Noting "the exceptional importance of radar for increasing the combat capability of the Red Army and the Navy," the decree set tasks in the field of science, industry, mobilization of qualified specialists, training, supply, concentration of all radar work in a specially created headquarters.
The emergence of the radio industry
In 1943, Berg was appointed Deputy Minister of the Electrical Industry and was given the task of developing radar. Now it was required in a short time to ensure the development of science, technology and production in the field of ultrahigh radio frequencies.
Axel Ivanovich proposed to organize a powerful scientific and technical base of the electrovacuum industry in the system of the Ministry of Electrotechnical Industry, to involve the Ministry of Aviation, Shipbuilding and Armaments in the work on radar, to establish a coordinating body - Council on Radar under the government of the country.
Berg worked as deputy chairman of this council (headed by G.M. Malenkov) until 1947.
He was actively involved in the production of radar technology, the creation of new research and design organizations, as well as training. The chairmanship of G.M. Malenkov emphasized the state importance of the problem.
But since Malenkov did not understand anything about electrical engineering and was terrified of Stalin, Axel Ivanovich had to resolve issues directly with the "leader of the peoples", bypassing his immediate boss.
In 1947, Berg became the head of the large Research Institute of Radar and Military Radio Electronics.
In June, the 1953 he was summoned to the Minister of Defense of the USSR N. A. Bulganin, where he reported on the state of affairs with radar and was ordered to prepare a report with proposals for reorganizing the case.
The end of this visit was unexpected for Axel Ivanovich, but to some extent and natural (outstanding scientists at that time were often appointed to high administrative positions with an appropriate degree of responsibility): on September 18, 1953, Berg was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR. He directly supervised the development of radar technology in all branches of the armed forces.
In organizing new sectoral institutions, Berg recognized the importance of development and fundamental science. In 1953, he initiated the creation of the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1953-1954 he was the director of this institute and the chairman of its academic council.
Berg held almost a dozen responsible posts, but successfully coped with all his duties, thanks to his enormous capacity for work. However, the overload made itself felt: in 1956 he became seriously ill. This forced him in 1957 to ask for release from leading work in the Ministry of Defense, and in 1960 to resign due to illness from the cadres of the Soviet army to retire with the right to wear a military uniform.
His civilian period was equally productive.
Berg became the organizer of the Scientific and Technical Society of Radio Engineering, Electronics and Telecommunications. A. Popov and the first chairman of its central board (1945-1950), and later - an honorary member of the board.
His important undertaking in this direction was the organization of the publication of the popular series of books and brochures "Mass Radio Library" (MRL), which began to appear in 1946. Axel Ivanovich was the managing editor of this series for five years (until issue 194).
He helped shape the editorial policy, which he himself formulated in the following words:
“We provide the latest scientific and technical information, written in the best traditions of popular science literature.
We try to give an idea of the subject from a physical point of view, select authors from the forefront of the problem that the book is devoted to, that is, authors who are directly involved in this issue, and strive to give in each book, in addition to cognitive, and practical material: diagrams and calculated ratios.
We try to maintain the level of presentation in the MRB in such a way that our books are understandable to readers with secondary education. "
We try to give an idea of the subject from a physical point of view, select authors from the forefront of the problem that the book is devoted to, that is, authors who are directly involved in this issue, and strive to give in each book, in addition to cognitive, and practical material: diagrams and calculated ratios.
We try to maintain the level of presentation in the MRB in such a way that our books are understandable to readers with secondary education. "
In 1954, on the initiative of Berg, the editorial board of the MRB was created, in which he himself entered, but even under the collective management, his role as the scientific director of the publication did not change.
Sequential numbering of issues exceeded 1200, and the total circulation of publications is estimated at tens of millions of copies. Berg was also involved in the direct organization of radio clubs, schools of radio electronics through DOSAAF.
A. I. Berg was the chairman of the board of the AS Popov All-Union Scientific and Engineering Society of Radio Engineering and Radio Communication, a member of the editorial board of the popular science magazine "Radio", a member of the editorial board of the magazine "Electricity". In 1962-1965 he was the editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia "Industrial Automation and Industrial Electronics".
Education.
A well-educated creative person Aksel Ivanovich showed himself as a champion of the development in our country of education in the field of radio engineering, and later - radio electronics, computer technology and cybernetics.
He played a significant role in the organization of radio engineering faculties, faculties of applied mathematics and cybernetics in the universities of our country. It was he who came up with the idea of introducing methods and means of programmed teaching and, in general, teaching, as close as possible to practice.
Father of Russian Cybernetics
Academician Berg initiated the creation of the Scientific Council on the complex problem "Cybernetics" under the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1959-1979).
Over the years, Russian cybernetics has gone through a difficult path of formation and development. The basic ideas and principles of cybernetics have influenced all areas of knowledge. And it's not just about the computerization and mathematization of knowledge.
The very approach to the object under study has changed: with cybernetics came new approaches - systemic, informational and probabilistic-statistical.
This work was headed and coordinated by Academician Berg for twenty years. He made not only a significant, but a fundamental contribution to the formation in the USSR of bionics, technical cybernetics (with all its "military" applications), structural linguistics, and artificial intelligence.
The topic "Berg and Cybernetics" (informatics, computer technology) is even more extensive than "Berg and Radioelectronics".
"Cybernetics is a science that has great prospects and looks far ahead."
A. I. Berg
A. I. Berg
It is customary to associate the birth of cybernetics with the publication date (in 1948) by Norbert Wiener of his famous book Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in an Animal and a Machine.
In this work, for the first time, the ways of creating a general theory of control were shown and the foundations of methods for considering problems of control and communication for various systems from a unified point of view were laid. The founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, defined it as the science of control and communication in mechanisms, organisms and societies.
In 1948, Academician Lavrentyev, director of the Institute of Mathematics and vice-president of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, wrote a letter to Stalin about the need to accelerate research in the field of computer technology and about the prospects for using computers. On June 29, 1948, JV Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, signed a decree, in accordance with which the Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Engineering was created.
In 1948, the Patent Bureau of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for the introduction of advanced technology in the national economy registered the invention of B.I.Rameev and I.S.Bruk of a digital electronic computer (certificate number 10475 with priority December 4, 1948).

Resolution on the establishment of the Institute of Precision Mechanics and Computer Science
Projects of this scale, as it was accepted, were entrusted to several organizations at once. Therefore, MESM and the BESM that soon followed it were not the only ones. In 1952, the M-1 and M-2 machines, created in the team of I. S. Brook, began to operate, in 1953 the first copy of the Strela computer appeared, and in 1954 the production of the Ural family of machines began.
Thus, the work was carried out in the USSR, and the results were demanded by industry and science. At the same time, obtaining information from abroad was extremely difficult, since in the USA (as well as in the USSR) work on the creation of computers was carried out in the interests of the military-industrial complex and nuclear energy in an atmosphere of strict secrecy.
Nevertheless, for two decades, the USSR practically did not lag behind the United States. And this parity existed largely thanks to one person - academician A. I. Berg.
As for the lag of the USSR behind the USA in the development of computer technology, which is often blamed on the notorious "pogrom of cybernetics", it basically began to take shape in later years and was largely caused by a general technological lag.
Since the end of the 50s, A. Berg's sphere of scientific interests has focused on all aspects of cybernetics.
“Third life” - this is how the book “Axel Berg - a man of the twentieth century” called “the cybernetic period of the academician's activity, which largely determined the formation of a new complex scientific direction.
“The natural course of events (along with the development of radio, which in the 20s and 30s proved to be a brilliant means of communication, and in the early 40s, during the Patriotic War, as a first-class weapon, and by the end of the 40s it gave a sudden exit - the creation of electronic computers) by the 50s I came to cybernetics ”, - wrote Axel Ivanovich in his memoirs.
At this time, publications appeared in the Soviet press in which cybernetics was characterized as an idealistic bourgeois "pseudoscience".
Such a view objectively retarded the development of cybernetic ideas, the development and application of computer technology in our country.
However, practical tasks and, above all, the task of strengthening the country's defense capability required not an end to work in the field of cybernetics, but the expansion and intensification of this research. It was necessary to overcome the wall of misunderstanding, inertia and mistrust, to break down the ideological barrier.
However, practical tasks and, above all, the task of strengthening the country's defense capability required not an end to work in the field of cybernetics, but the expansion and intensification of this research. It was necessary to overcome the wall of misunderstanding, inertia and mistrust, to break down the ideological barrier.
And in the person of Admiral Berg, who in 1953-1957 held the post of Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR for radio electronics, cybernetics found a person who provided the conditions for its formation and flourishing.
For A. I. Berg, cybernetics meant a new stage in his life. In the early 50s, the important role of cybernetics in the development of scientific and technological progress became obvious to him.
Possessing fundamental knowledge in almost all exact sciences, authority and knowledge of Soviet bureaucratic mechanisms, Axel Ivanovich sought to implement his ideas and plans.
“I can’t give up, I’m not accustomed, I want to live and gain recognition of my innocence”;
"He who does not dare to form his own opinion is a coward, who does not want to be a lazy person, who cannot be a fool."
"He who does not dare to form his own opinion is a coward, who does not want to be a lazy person, who cannot be a fool."
In the late 50s, when he no longer held official posts, but focused on scientific research, on April 10, 1959, A.I. Berg made a report at a meeting of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where he clearly formulates the main thing:
"The task of cybernetics is to increase the efficiency of human activity in all cases when he needs to exercise control."
And he ends his report with the words:
"If the Scientific Council on Cybernetics of the USSR Academy of Sciences is created, it will consider this its main task."
The Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences approved the report.
The Cybernetics Council was created. Academician A.I.Berg was approved as the head of the Council, and Doctor of Physics and Mathematics as his deputy. n. A. A. Lyapunov. For 20 years, the Berg Council has been a nationwide research center for cybernetics and its applications.

Council structure. A. I. Berg's note
The main structural divisions of the Council were the sections coordinating research in certain major areas.
Major scientists of various profiles have gathered around Berg. They were V. V. Parin (biology and medicine), V. S. Nemchinov (economics), N. G. Bruevich (reliability), V. I. Siforov (information theory), N. I. Zhinkin, B. F Lomov (psychology), M. A. Gavrilov, Ya.Z. Tsypkin (technical cybernetics), V. V. Ivanov (linguistics), B. S. Sotskov, V. M. Akhutin (bionics), A. G. Spirkin (philosophy) and many others.
At the turn of the 50s – 60s, several concepts of cybernetics were formed in the USSR, coinciding in the main provisions, but differing in content and emphasis.
So, AA Lyapunov, a mathematician with broad theoretical and applied interests, came to cybernetics from the problems of descriptive set theory, and in his cybernetic developments he focused on programming (the foundations of the theory of which he laid down) and information comprehension of life processes.
Berg was an engineer, and cybernetics was for him a direct continuation of what he dealt with as one of the founders of domestic radio electronics. From the very beginning of the development of cybernetic research in our country, AI Berg understood the term "cybernetics" very broadly.
He defined cybernetics as the science of optimal control of complex dynamical systems based on mathematics, logic and computers. In problems of cybernetics, the role of optimization was emphasized.
In philosophical understanding of cybernetics AI Berg believed that the concept of "information" is as fundamental for modern science as "matter", "field" and "energy".
He put forward the idea that a comparative study of concepts such as "physical entropy" and "entropy in information theory" should be carried out.
It follows from the comparison (as A.I. Berg believed) anti-entropic essence of cybernetics and the interpretation of control as an objective process aimed at eliminating chaos.
Institutes of cybernetics were created in the republics, new laboratories in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, countless conferences, seminars and symposia were held. And all this under the leadership or with the direct participation of A. I. Berg.

A. I. Berg, 1963
In accordance with the concept of A.I.Berg, the most important cybernetic directions were divided into theoretical and applied ones.
First associated with the development of a common theoretical basis for cybernetics, second - with applications of cybernetics in various fields, taking into account their specific features.
Main theoretical directions: mathematical problems of cybernetics; information theory; technical cybernetics (theory of control processes in technical systems); reliability theory; the theory of sign systems, which studies the construction of natural and artificial languages; bionics; mathematical theory of experiment; philosophical problems of cybernetics.
As it is clear from the 1967 report, more than 800 people were involved in the work of the Scientific Council on Cybernetics and its sections on a voluntary basis, including 14 academicians, 30 corresponding members, about 200 doctors and over 350 candidates of sciences. On the staff of the Council, there were only 26 people, including 15 researchers. A truly unique scientific organism was created!
Many scientific directions of a cybernetic nature owe their development to the creative and organizational energy of A.I. Berg, namely: the theory of sign systems, information theory, bionics, mathematical theory of experiment, theory of reliability, programmed teaching.
A.I.Berg owns the most general interpretation of cybernetics, in fact, embracing what is now called informatics.
He always proceeded from the fact that the development of its mathematical methods plays a decisive role for modern cybernetics. "The progress of science in all its varieties is largely determined by its mathematization."
Berg formulated and implemented applications of cybernetic theory in various fields: economics, energy, transport, chemistry and metallurgy, wildlife, medicine, psychology, law, and military affairs.
Academician A. I. Berg was one of the first in the Soviet Union to understand the importance of the problem of developing control systems for technical means for the exploration and development of the ocean.
On his initiative, in 1976 within the framework of the Scientific Council, a commission "Theory and Methods of Controlling Systems for Research and Development of the World Ocean" was organized.

A. I. Berg in the office
The publishing activity of the Council for Cybernetics, which took place with the closest and decisive participation of Axel Ivanovich, was also of great importance. He writes books on cybernetics himself, edits many publications, and warmly supports talented authors.
Elena Vladimirovna Markova, who worked for many years with A.I. Berg in the Council on Cybernetics, writes:
“Axel Ivanovich was a true“ helmsman ”of cybernetics, he confidently guided his huge ship - the Council on Cybernetics - towards a single goal: the creation of national cybernetics. He felt confident.
All of his previous work (communications, radio, electronics, automation) prepared him for a new role.
He mastered the mathematical apparatus, foreign languages, breadth of knowledge, so he easily perceived new cybernetic ideas.
Engineering experience, love of knowledge and talent of an organizer allowed him to create in the Council a whole range of applied areas of cybernetics, which was the main distinguishing feature of Berg's cybernetics. "
All of his previous work (communications, radio, electronics, automation) prepared him for a new role.
He mastered the mathematical apparatus, foreign languages, breadth of knowledge, so he easily perceived new cybernetic ideas.
Engineering experience, love of knowledge and talent of an organizer allowed him to create in the Council a whole range of applied areas of cybernetics, which was the main distinguishing feature of Berg's cybernetics. "
Military Cybernetics
By the end of the 50s, the defense industries and organizations of the country's Ministry of Defense showed interest in the use of computers for solving information processing and control problems in military systems.
The tasks were significantly different in nature from those that had become traditional by that time - computational ones. Difficulties in the use and disadvantages of universal computers when using them in military systems for solving control problems in real time were revealed. As a result, a specific area of computer technology for military systems has been actively developed.
This vector almost simultaneously began to form in several problem-oriented areas for land, aviation, naval, missile and other systems in defense industries and enterprises. For further development, the requirements of customers from various fields of application turned out to be essential.
Thus, the first work on the creation of means for automating the control process of a submarine and a surface ship was carried out in the 50s at the Research Institute of the Navy with the direct participation of Academicians A.I.Berg and B.V. Gnedenko.
Then, in the interests of increasing the efficiency of control, separate electronic means of control automation began to be installed on warships, but this did not give significant results, since they were not a single system, had low reliability and operational efficiency.
To address these issues, science and industry continued research and work, the results of which made it possible to significantly increase the efficiency of shipborne radio-electronic equipment.
This system was the prototype for future BIUS.
Combat information and control system (CIUS) is a complex of electronic computing equipment and other technical means on a warship, designed for the automated development of recommendations for weapon control and maneuvering in order to make the most efficient use of combat and technical capabilities.
The next stage was the development of ACS.
Force ACS is a set of hardware and software tools that ensure the adoption of decisions on force control in accordance with the assigned task and information from the situation lighting system, as well as the transmission of combat control signals to subordinate and interacting forces.
In the mid-60s, the cooperation of industrial enterprises with military-scientific support from the Naval Research Institute created a prototype of the first in the Navy "ACS by the forces of the fleet" (AS-4 system).
This system was introduced in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, as well as in the General Staff of the Navy and provided automated collection, processing, storage of operational information on the composition of its forces, enemy forces and the state of the environment.
The commissioning of the AS-4 system to a large extent made it possible to intensify and facilitate the management activities of the operators and the command of the Navy.
There was a period when, from the denial of the need to computerize the control processes and systems of the Navy, the scientific organizations of the Navy and, naturally, industry began to lobby for universal automation, including in the force control system.
This trend is already running out, although some of its carriers are still in business.
The rest understood:
Full automation of the control processes of the forces of the fleet is impossible.
A person (commander, commander, operator) acts as an obligatory and main link of control, performing, according to his official purpose, those control functions that cannot be formalized, algorithmized and performed by a computer.
Therefore, the concept of ACS of the Navy, both then and now, is in a sense an abstraction. There is no single universal ACS for the Navy. There are many autonomous systems and means of automating individual processes for controlling the forces and assets of the Navy.
A person (commander, commander, operator) acts as an obligatory and main link of control, performing, according to his official purpose, those control functions that cannot be formalized, algorithmized and performed by a computer.
Therefore, the concept of ACS of the Navy, both then and now, is in a sense an abstraction. There is no single universal ACS for the Navy. There are many autonomous systems and means of automating individual processes for controlling the forces and assets of the Navy.
Historically, these subsystems and complexes were developed and implemented independently of each other, without a single concept of automation of the naval command and control processes. And they did not dock with each other very well.
There were organizational and technological reasons for this process.
• Tough interagency barriers and restrictions on secrecy led to the fact that the exchange of information on the development of specialized, mobile computers between specialists from different industries and enterprises in the country was sharply limited.
• The absence of a developed centralized industry of electronic components for computers in the 50s – 70s was the reason for their development, often by the same enterprises that created the computer architecture and control systems as a whole. As a result, the element base was often semi-handicraft and of various types, did not differ in high quality and technological level.
• The need for many enterprises of the defense industries to develop systems in a full cycle, starting with the creation of the computer element base and further all computer technology and software, not only led to a multitude of parallel, non-standardized developments, but also significantly increased the duration and cost of projects.
• The appearance at the end of the 50s of a fundamentally new type of product - software, in which the intellectual essence of control methods and processes was concentrated, as well as a significant proportion of the factors that determine the quality and efficiency of military systems, were underestimated either by the industry or by the customer.. Unlike tangible hardware, neither one nor the other wanted to pay for algorithms and programs.
• Lack of proven technology, relatively low qualifications and remuneration of most programmers did not stimulate productivity gains, high quality of programming results and systems in general.
• The development of production technology and the element base of military computers did not keep pace with the growth of requirements for their resources in terms of memory and performance, necessary for the implementation of all new requirements and tasks.
• When creating requirements for military mobile computers, a detailed analysis of algorithms and programs to be implemented was necessary. In addition to the necessary ones, in an effort to algorithmize fundamentally non-formalized decision-making processes by commanders of different levels, in equipment and systems, along with the necessary ones, clearly redundant functions were also included.
As a result, by the mid-70s, a very wide range (about 300) types of military mobile computers had been formed, differing in architecture and command structures, focused on the features of functional tasks, as well as in design, depending on the areas of application.
They were distinguished by the almost complete absence of any auxiliary and peripheral equipment that was not required for the direct solution of direct functional tasks of a specific control system.
This was the beginning. Even if not cloudless, but necessary for further development.