Military Review

Battle of the steel armada

90
Battle of the steel armada
The German 88-mm FlaK 18/36/37 anti-aircraft gun from the 2nd battalion of the General Goering anti-aircraft regiment destroyed at Dubno. In the background, German soldiers examine the damaged Soviet heavy tank KV-2. A car from the Popel group (belonged to the 12th tank division of the 8th mechanized corps)


Already in the first border battles, Soviet troops showed themselves as a serious enemy, and the Germans noted this. Despite all the shortcomings in the training of soldiers and officers, equipment, unfavorable conditions for entering the war, the Red Army fought fiercely, maintaining relative order and high morale.

The defeat of the aviation of the front


An important role in the counterattacks of the mechanized corps of the Southwestern Front (SWF) was to play aviation... However, by the beginning of active operations of the front's mobile formations, the aviation of the South-Western Front had largely lost its combat effectiveness.

The commander of the air force of the South-Western Front Astakhov, in his report in August 1941, noted:

“The air force of the South-Western Front as a whole was not prepared to repel surprise raids by the enemy air force on our airfields and to get out of the attack.
On 22.6.1941/22.6.1941/22, the first enemy raids on our airfields of the front line did not inflict significant losses on our flight units, but, as a result of weak leadership from the commanders of air divisions and air regiments, the units subordinate to them in organizing an exit from the attack and repelling enemy air raids, the last repeated strikes during June 23, 24 and in the next two days inflicted significant losses on our flight units, destroying and damaging 237 aircraft at our airfields on June 68, XNUMX and XNUMX, which is XNUMX% of the material losses at our airfields as a result of air raids enemy for the entire period of the war. "

Also, during the offensive, the Germans captured a large number of front-line airfields, which led to the loss of aircraft that were damaged or were malfunctioning. The damaged and faulty aircraft simply did not have time to evacuate.

As a result, the South-Western Front Air Force had lost 24 aircraft by June 1941, 1452. Therefore, Soviet aviation was unable to effectively cover and support the attack of mechanized corps.


Fighting June 25, 1941


On the evening of June 24, 1941, the front command again made an attempt to gather all mobile formations into a fist for a counterattack on the enemy. The mechanized corps (8th, 15th and 4th) were supposed to cut the wedge of the German 1st tank group, saving the 5th Soviet army from encirclement. At the same time, the depth of the strike was reduced to 60 km, the 8th mechanized corps was supposed to reach Berestechko, the 15th - to Sokal through Radzekhov.

On June 25, the Soviet command was unable to organize a coordinated counterstrike. The 8th and 15th mechanized corps were on the march. The Germans continued their offensive. But on this day, the Nazis faced new Soviet formations, which came from the depths of the defensive orders of the front. The German 11th Panzer Division in the Dubno - Mlynov area entered into a meeting battle with units of the 36th Rifle Corps and the forward detachments of the 19th Mechanized Corps Feklenko. Having broken into the defenses of the 228th Infantry Division, which was on a wide front, the Nazis took the city of Dubno by the middle of the day on June 25. To the north, our riflemen, supported by a company of tanks (16 T-26 and T-38 vehicles) of the 40th Panzer Division of the 19th Corps, held Mlynov. True, Ivashkovsky's detachment lost almost all of its tanks during the stubborn battle.

Heavy battles for Lutsk were on the right flank.

Here the 131st motorized division of the 9th mechanized corps of K.K.Rokossovsky and units of the 1st artillery anti-tank brigade of K. S. Moskalenko defended themselves. By evening, the Germans took Lutsk. The 131st Motorized Division defended 20 km of the front and could not resist a concentrated attack.

The Soviet division had a tank regiment of 104 BT-5 and BT-7 tanks, which supported the infantry with fire from the spot. But the Germans neutralized it with strong artillery. So, the 14th Panzer Division had its own strong artillery, plus corps artillery - the 511th artillery regiment (150-mm howitzers), the 2nd division of the 60th artillery regiment (100-mm guns) without one battery, the 607th heavy division artillery (210-mm mortars) without one battery, 731st heavy artillery battalion.

Such an artillery fist literally swept away the liquid formations of the Soviet infantry and its artillery. Also skilful and methodical actions of the Luftwaffe. German artillery and aircraft were clearing the way for the tanks.

Machine gunner of the 743rd motorized rifle regiment of the 131st motorized division I.K. Yakovlev recalled the battle with the enemy:

“The shooting was already aimed at trenches, trenches, shelters, accumulations of equipment. From above, they were clearly visible by the spotter plane. What survived from the bombs was destroyed by the shells methodically and for a long time.
The regiment suffered heavy losses in people and equipment, unable to either hide or defend itself. German shells were torn at the positions of the regiment for a long time.
Meanwhile, under the roar of bombs and shells, the enemy pulled the sapper units to the river, set up a pontoon crossing, and threw tanks, guns, soldiers and mortars to the eastern bank. Weak fire from our surviving batteries and rifle and machine-gun firing of soldiers could not stop the enemy, destroy their crossing. "

Having captured Lutsk, the German command turns the tank divisions of the 3rd motorized corps (13th and 14th) to the south, to Rivne.

Obviously, this was due to the strong resistance of the enemy along the line of the strategic highway, which led to Kiev. The Nazis decided to go further south, along secondary roads.

On the same day, the situation in the direction of the main strike changed qualitatively. The Germans are pulling up the 2nd echelon divisions. Now the mobile formations of the South-Western Front were no longer opposed by individual enemy tank divisions, but by new mobile formations and infantry divisions. In the footsteps of the 11th Panzer Division, the 16th Hube Panzer Division (48th Motorized Corps) is moving forward. On the 25th, the 16th division was in the Radzekhov area. Three infantry divisions are entering the border of the Styr River.

On the front of the Soviet 6th Army, Muzychenko continued the offensive of the 49th Kübler Mountain Corps from the 17th Army. The enemy's offensive was held back by the 32nd Panzer Division of the 15th Mechanized Corps. Our tanks attacked without the support of infantry and artillery, in marshy areas, which led to heavy losses. The German infantry, who had experience in fighting in Poland and France, fought bravely, burning Soviet tanks with anti-tank guns and in close combat with cans of gasoline, to which they tied grenades, placed in the path of armored vehicles with anti-tank anti-jib mines (tellermines).


Tellermina 35 (Tellermine 35 Stahl, T Mi 35 St) - anti-tank anti-track mine of push action. Developed in Germany. Introduced into service in January 1935. The mine is installed manually on the ground. An explosion occurs when a tank track or a car wheel hits the mine pressure cover. As a result of the explosion, a vehicle wheel or two or three tracks of a caterpillar is destroyed and the roller of the tank's undercarriage is partially damaged.


Soviet heavy tank T-35, abandoned on the street of Lvov city of Grodek. This vehicle is from the 67th Panzer Regiment of the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Southwestern Front.


Soviet tank KV-2, abandoned on the street of Lvov in the city of Zolochiv as a result of a malfunction. A vehicle from the 8th Panzer Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps

June 26, 1941 attacks


At the cost of tremendous efforts and losses, already on the march, the command of the South-Western Front managed to assemble a group of mechanized corps to strike on the flanks of the German strike group. True, the offensive lines indicated in the order were already occupied by the enemy. The Nazis captured Luktsk and Dubno. As a result, flank counterattacks turned into fierce oncoming battles.

Feklenko's 19th corps fought a counter battle with the tank divisions of the 3rd and 48th motorized corps. The 43rd Panzer Division of Tsibin faced the enemy (the battle group of the 11th Panzer Division) on the outskirts of Dubno. Here the infantry and artillery of the Soviet 228th Infantry Division retreated, which eased the position of our tankers. Tsibin used the infantry and artillery of the 228th division in his attack.

In tanks and infantry, the forces were approximately equal. But the Germans had a great advantage in corps heavy artillery. At the forefront of the attack were several new types of tanks, the T-34 and KV, followed by the light T-26. The battle lasted about 4 hours and ended with the exit of Soviet tanks to the outskirts of Dubno. However, the Germans blew up the bridges, and ours could not break through to the city.

The success of the attack was achieved at the cost of the loss of both KV tanks (both burned out) and 15 T-26 tanks. Further, they planned to develop an offensive on Dubno from the southeast, along the railway, but on the night of June 27, the division retreated to Rovno.

South of Lutsk, the German 13th Panzer Division was advancing, which broke through the combat formations of the Soviet 228th Infantry and 40th Panzer Divisions. This affected the position of the 43rd Division, it was bypassed from the north, and there was a threat of a "boiler". Tsibin's division had to retreat.

Meanwhile, the second battle group of the 11th German division reached Ostrog, where it clashed with the troops of the second strategic echelon of the Red Army - part of the 109th motorized division of the 5th mechanized corps and the 57th tank division (formations of the 16th army of the Trans-Baikal Military District) ...

The first echelons with the division headquarters on June 18, 1941 disembarked at the Berdichev station. The troops of the 16th Army were sent to the Western Front, where a catastrophic situation developed. The motorized division of the 26th began a march to the Shepetovka station, where it was supposed to plunge into train echelons and go to Belarus.

However, the enemy's breakthrough to Ostrog forced to change plans. The commander of the 16th Army, Lukin, moved the division to Ostrog. The reconnaissance battalion was the first to arrive in the city and take up defensive positions. The Germans knocked him out. In the evening, the 114th Panzer Regiment of the 57th Panzer Division, equipped with T-26 tanks, went to the city. At night, the 381st motorized rifle regiment arrived, then other parts of the 109th division, which did not manage to go to Orsha, were pulled up to Ostrog. The main forces of the two regiments of the motorized division were already on their way, and it was impossible to turn them back.

On the southern flank in the Radzekhov area, units of the 15th mechanized corps of Karpezo fought defensive battles, repelling the attacks of the enemy, who tried to bypass the flanks of the 10th and 37th tank divisions. Corps Commander Carpezo was wounded during an enemy air raid.

The Germans stopped the counterattacks of our tanks with strong anti-tank artillery, meeting the Soviet vehicles with fire from guns of various calibers, including heavy howitzers put on direct fire. The corps, anti-aircraft guns of the Germans smashed and "invulnerable" KV. Also, the German Air Force played an important role, smashing the headquarters, artillery and rear parts of the corps.

In addition, by the end of the day, the corps had only 36 guns on the 15-kilometer stretch of the offensive. That is, there was practically nothing to suppress the enemy's artillery. Panzer divisions had very few riflemen to secure the occupied territory and defend their tanks from enemy infantry.

Since parts of the 15th mechanized corps were tied up in a heavy oncoming battle, the 8th mechanized corps of Ryabyshev was to play the main role in the South-Western Front's counterstrike, which lost almost half of its materiel during a 3-day 500-kilometer march. The corps was supposed to go to Berestechko.

The battle group of the 16th Panzer Division stood in the way of our troops. German intelligence warned the command of the tank division about a large accumulation of enemy forces in the direction of the attack. The Germans took up defensive positions. On the morning of the 26th, the 12th and 34th Panzer Divisions launched an offensive. By evening, our troops advanced 10-15 km, reaching the approaches to Berestechka, threatening the communications of the enemy's 38th motorized corps.

Tank losses were relatively small. But German planes knocked out all the tractors of the artillery regiment, most of the gun crews of the 12th division died. The 7th Motorized Infantry Division was unable to advance. With the support of aviation and the neighboring 15th corps, the panzer divisions of the 8th corps could develop their first success, but there was no help. Also, the front command did not throw into the battle parts of the 37th Rifle Corps that was approaching from the depths.


Heavy tank T-35, abandoned due to a malfunction on the Sasov-Zolochev road. This vehicle is from the 67th Panzer Regiment of the 34th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps.


Soviet heavy tank KV-2 produced in November-December 1940 from the 8th Panzer Division of the 4th Mechanized Corps, abandoned due to a malfunction in the technical park of the repair base of the 4th Mechanized Corps of the 6th Army of the Southwestern Front

27th of June. Stop order


On the night of June 27, the 8th mechanized corps received an order from the command of the South-Western Front to stop the offensive and retreat behind the defensive formations of the 37th rifle corps.

The 15th mechanized corps received a similar order.

The front command, after the departure of the chief of the General Staff, Zhukov, decided to abandon counterstrikes by mobile formations. It was decided to place the 31st, 36th and 37th rifle corps suitable from the depths on the line of the Stokhod, Styr rivers and the settlements of Dubno, Kremenets, Zolochev. Mechanized corps - to withdraw the rifle divisions behind the battle formations and prepare for a counteroffensive.

The decision was clearly wrong.

The Germans broke through the battle formations of our rifle divisions in the Lutsk-Dubno sector on the 25th.

The SWF command made a mistake in the direction of the enemy's main attack. It was decided that the 1st Panzer Group sought to develop an offensive in the southeast direction, towards Tarnopol. In reality, the Nazis pushed further east, in the direction of Ostrog and Shepetovka, to encompass the Soviet armies in the Lvov salient in cooperation with Schobert's 11th Army, which was concentrated in Romania.

Therefore, the Soviet command was not going to hold back the enemy east of Dubno. It was believed that the main forces of the German wedge were turning to the southeast.

Meanwhile, the Germans broke into the defenses of the 36th Rifle Corps on the river. Styr, and only the support of the mechanized corps did not allow the Soviet front to collapse completely. The 228th rifle division of the 36th corps, together with the formations of the 19th mechanized corps, retreated to the northeast, to Rovno. In the evening the Germans broke into the outskirts of Rovno. Unable to withstand artillery and air strikes, the Soviet infantry retreated. A continuous line of defense was broken, the Germans bypassed the 19th corps from the south. Komkor Feklenko decides to withdraw troops to the river. Goryn, 20 km east of Rivne.

A heavy battle was going on behind Ostrog. On the morning of June 27, two regiments of the 109th motorized division launched an offensive on Ostrog, supported by 45-mm guns from T-26 and BT tanks from the 57th and 13th Panzer Divisions. Having overcome the river Viliya on the only bridge and by swimming, our troops began a battle for the city. Already in the first hours of hostilities, the 109th division lost its commander, Krasnoretsky. The division was headed by his deputy Sidorenko. In the afternoon, the 15th Panzer Regiment of the 11th Panzer Division of the Germans approached Ostrog, and the balance of forces immediately shifted towards the enemy. The Germans drove our troops out of the city.

On June 27, the main forces of the 9th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky entered the battle. Katukov's 20th Panzer Division tried to advance in the Mlynov area. The Nazis actively counterattacked, bypassed the flanks and forced our troops to withdraw. Novikov's 35th Panzer Division held back enemy attacks all day, then withdrew. Rokossovsky took the initiative, ordered to withdraw the troops back, occupying the strategic highway Lutsk - Rovno. His weak tank divisions, with open flanks, could not stop the enemy on their own.


Soviet heavy tank KV-2, which failed with a bridge in the village of Pelcha near Dubno. The vehicle was produced in November-December 1940 from the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps of the Southwestern Front. There is a trail of hitting a high-explosive projectile on the tower


Soviet heavy tank KV-2, knocked out at Dubno. A vehicle from the Popel group (belonged to the 12th Panzer Division of the 8th Mechanized Corps). This tank was knocked out by anti-aircraft gunners of the 2nd battalion of the General Goering anti-aircraft regiment. The regiment was part of the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Corps attached to the 1st Panzer Group of Army Group South. Transferred to the 11th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht, this anti-aircraft regiment took part in a major tank battle near Brody

New counteroffensive


The "stop order" of Kirponos and Purkaev further disorganized the best mobile formations of the front.

The corps withdrawn from the battle were returned to the battle under the pressure of the Headquarters.

The 15th mechanized corps received an order to return at 10 o'clock. The 10th Division, bound by the battle, has not yet withdrawn from the battle. And the 37th Panzer Division managed to retreat and spent the day marching 180 degrees. The situation with the 8th mechanized corps was similar. The 12th Panzer Division was on the march, but the 7th Motorized Rifle and 34th Panzer Divisions did not have time to receive an order to retreat and fought in the same areas.

In the memoirs of N.K. Popel ("The tanks turned to the west"), the process of returning the 8th corps to battle is described very vividly:

“The one to whom the corps commander addressed, did not listen to the report, did not raise his hand to his temple. He walked, crushing the bushes with his polished boots, straight towards Ryabyshev. When he approached, he looked up into the wrinkled, high-cheekbone face of the corps commander and in a voice choked with rage asked:
- How much did you sell for, Judas?
Ryabyshev stood in line in front of a member of the Military Council (HH Vashugin), taken aback, could not find anything to say, and we all looked in confusion at the short, well-cut corps commissar. "

The 8th mechanized corps again launched an offensive in the direction of Dubno.

Popel's forward detachment advanced about 10 km and was stopped 10-12 km south-west of Dubno. The Soviet mobile formations found the enemy's weak spot, although the command did not know about it. The advance of units of the Soviet 12th and 34th tank divisions towards Dubno blocked the communications of the 16th and 11th enemy tank divisions. This forced the German command to move reserves to the Dubno area and suspend the offensive in the main direction. The 11th Panzer Division stopped at Ostrog, the 16th Panzer Division stopped the offensive on Kremenets, turned back and went to Berestechka.

While the Soviet mechanized corps again went on the attack in the direction of Dubno, the withdrawal of the Soviet 17th and 6th armies began in the offensive zone of the German 26th Army. Their withdrawal was covered by one of the strongest fortified areas of the Molotov line in the Rava-Russkaya area. In the fortified area in June 1941, there were 61 bunkers, armed with 8 76,2 mm, 52 45 mm caponier cannons, 181 easel and more than a hundred light machine guns. The Germans suppressed the embrasures of the pillboxes with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, then flamethrower tanks and sappers with land mines went into the attack. When some pillboxes opened fire again, anti-aircraft guns and other types of heavy weapons fired again. Some of the fortifications were suppressed by flamethrower tanks, others were blown up by land mines. Rava-Russkaya fell.


The bodies of killed German soldiers in front of the Soviet fortifications of the "Molotov Line" east of Kristinopol (now Chervonograd, Lviv region), two kilometers from the border. Photo taken in the operational sector of the German 6th Army

To be continued ...
Author:
Photos used:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/, http://waralbum.ru/
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  1. Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 04: 30
    0
    The bodies of the killed German soldiers
    Not killed, but destroyed!
    1. Bar1
      Bar1 15 September 2021 07: 58
      .
      you are reading these endless articles about the beginning of the war, and a clear and complete picture is not created that could explain what all the same happened at that time and why ours so ineptly merged the beginning of the war and squandered so much technology.
      One of the most important factors of that great defeat is this
      - The commanders of the formations and formations acted not according to the situation, but under the pressure of the Bolshevik ideology, when the Red Army "is the strongest" and the Red commanders should not defend themselves, but it is necessary to respond to the offensive with an offensive, to conduct oncoming battles.
      On the stubborn resistance of the Germans, backed up by strong artillery, it is always possible, having mobile formations, not to beat in the forehead, but to bypass the German defenses from the flank, but it seems that our commanders have forgotten about this.
      On the one hand, we are told that there was no connection, even the fronts were losing contact with Moscow, but here it seems that Moscow was firmly holding the command of the fronts and did not allow them to independently solve the problems that had arisen.
      1. Vladimir_2U
        Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 08: 26
        +12
        Quote: Bar1
        the commanders of the formations and formations acted not according to the situation, but under the pressure of the Bolshevik ideology,
        The rest can no longer be read, a person who imagines that the troops are acting under the influence of ideology and not the Charter is unlikely to be able to write something sensible about the war.
        1. Bar1
          Bar1 15 September 2021 08: 33
          .
          Quote: Vladimir_2U
          The rest can no longer be read, a person who imagines that the troops are acting under the influence of ideology and not the Charter is unlikely to be able to write something sensible about the war.


          Are you one of those who do not read, but write? There is a joke about this.



          see from 1 h 06 min.


          see from 1h 11min.
          1. Vladimir_2U
            Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 08: 36
            +11
            Quote: Bar1
            Are you one of those who do not read, but write? There is a joke about this.
            To understand that guano is guano and not jam, it is enough to smell it, it is not even necessary to touch it. I repeat:
            a person who imagines that the troops are acting under the influence of ideology and not the Charter is unlikely to be able to write something sensible about the war.
            1. Bar1
              Bar1 15 September 2021 08: 41
              .
              for an employee of a sewage convoy, under the influence of this particular profession, everything in the world is Mr., but this is only the opinion of this employee.
              1. Vladimir_2U
                Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 08: 43
                +6
                Quote: Bar1
                for an employee of a sewage convoy, under the influence of this particular profession, everything is Mr., but this is only the opinion of this employee.

                It's funny, yes, especially when you consider that you are dragging guano here indiscriminately.
                Quote: Vladimir_2U
                a person who imagines that the troops are acting under the influence of ideology and not the Charter is unlikely to be able to write something sensible about the war.
                Do you have an answer to this?
                1. Bar1
                  Bar1 15 September 2021 08: 49
                  .
                  Quote: Vladimir_2U
                  Do you have an answer to this?


                  I replied, watch the movie Battle of Moscow.
                  1. Vladimir_2U
                    Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 08: 58
                    +9
                    Quote: Bar1
                    I replied, watch the movie Battle of Moscow.

                    Is fictional cinema such an argument for you? I suppose you are studying the history of the USSR on the "Gulag Archipelago".
                    1. Bar1
                      Bar1 15 September 2021 09: 01
                      .
                      Quote: Vladimir_2U
                      Is fictional cinema such an argument for you? I suppose you are studying the history of the USSR on the "Gulag Archipelago".


                      prefer squalor over art?
                      1. Vladimir_2U
                        Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 09: 03
                        +7
                        Quote: Bar1
                        prefer squalor over art?

                        Well, if you consider military-historical, documentary and technical literature to be squalor and "The Gulag Archipelago" and other nonsense art, then yes
                      2. Bar1
                        Bar1 15 September 2021 09: 13
                        .
                        Quote: Vladimir_2U
                        Well, if you consider military-historical, documentary and technical literature to be squalor and "The Gulag Archipelago" and other nonsense art, then yes


                        what documentation and technical literature?

                        My opinion: Solzhenitsyn basically wrote the truth, but of course he exaggerated the colors, especially when he was finishing writing his "Red Wheel" in the USA - this is also an ideology.
                        Those. when you start to understand all this "history", then you understand that this is a multi-layered lie, ie. lies to lies.
                      3. Vladimir_2U
                        Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 09: 22
                        +5
                        Quote: Bar1
                        what documentation and technical literature?

                        Which you prefer feature films, and not of the highest class, and "mostly the truth" of Solzhenitsyn.

                        Quote: Vladimir_2U
                        a person who imagines that the troops are acting under the influence of ideology and not the Charter is unlikely to be able to write something sensible about the war.
                        Can you answer this in your own words? And not with references to late Soviet cinema ...
                      4. Region-25.rus
                        Region-25.rus 15 September 2021 16: 12
                        +3
                        My opinion: Solzhenitsyn mostly wrote the truth, but of course he exaggerated
                        forgot to add - "country truth" There could be no other in the USSR, right?
  2. lucul
    lucul 15 September 2021 09: 28
    +2
    you are reading these endless articles about the beginning of the war, and a clear and complete picture is not created that could explain what all the same happened at that time and why ours so ineptly merged the beginning of the war and squandered so much technology.

    Explaining:
    The shooting was already aimed at trenches, trenches, shelters, accumulations of equipment. From above, they were clearly visible by the spotter plane. What survived from the bombs was destroyed by the shells methodically and for a long time.
    The regiment suffered heavy losses in people, equipment, unable to hide or defend themselves. German shells were torn at the positions of the regiment for a long time.

    That is, the aviation adjustment of the artillery strike with the help of the FW-189 reconnaissance aircraft, it could be in the air for a very long time.

    A sort of German Bayraktar 1941.
    As soon as La-5, in 1943 (Kuban air battle), were able to clear the sky from FW-189 and the Me.109 covering it, our military successes began.
    Air superiority is the key to victory.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 15 September 2021 10: 17
      +6
      On 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, not a single "Rama" was in combat units!
      Other machines were used. The main one was Hs. 126.
  3. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 15 September 2021 17: 16
    +2
    Quote: Bar1
    One of the most important factors of that great defeat is this
    - The commanders of the formations and formations acted not according to the situation, but under the pressure of the Bolshevik ideology, when the Red Army "is the strongest" and the Red commanders should not defend themselves, but it is necessary to respond to the offensive with an offensive, to conduct oncoming battles.

    This is called active defense. Which is the only possible way to at least do something in a situation where the enemy is utterly superior in mobility.

    The reason for the defeat lies elsewhere - in the extremely weak training of personnel at all levels, up to and including ignorance of the Charter and inability to apply its provisions in practice. In addition, the situation was aggravated by the lack of discipline and subordination, when the lower commanders, instead of accurately following the order, regularly began to show bad initiative, not supported by knowledge and skills.
    Just to understand - which Red Army entered the battle with the Germans:
    The other day, uv.Malysh threw another "manual for the populace in the 41st" (tm) aka "REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION Comrade S. Timoshenko. OF THE YEAR."

    The fat begins literally from the first pages, in the "Operational preparation" section. "Over the past 4 months, the District has carried out the following measures to train senior command personnel and staffs:" (blah blah blah a two-page list of events) and the following phrase tops it all:
    "As a result of all these activities the operational training of senior officers has grown significantly and is assessed mediocre."
    Then everything is no less beautiful.
    "Infantry.
    ...
    Conclusion: the units and formations of the district, fulfilling your requirement to co-ordinate companies and battalions, are quite ready to solve simple combat missions "
    “The training of mortar units and subunits is mediocre, with the exception of the 24th OMB, which is poor. The training of the 45th and 76th regiments of artillery is mediocre.
    ...
    The conducted artillery firing and viewing exercises showed that the division’s artillery of the District was prepared to perform combat missions in the main types of combat mediocre.
    ...
    The training of the regiments of the ARGK is mediocre, with the exception of 311 popes and 318 hap RGKs, whose training is poor. "
    And so on for 70 pages. The final table of test results in parts is a classic "heartbreaking spectacle" (c) Donkey.

    There were just over three months left before the start of the war ...
    1. Bar1
      Bar1 15 September 2021 20: 02
      -7
      Quote: Alexey RA
      Which is the only possible way to at least do something in a situation where the enemy is utterly superior in mobility.


      and why is this "on the head for mobility", our tanks had a limited service life, but we did not know anything about the service life of the same T3 and T4.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 15 September 2021 20: 22
        +4
        Quote: Bar1
        and why is it "on the head for mobility", our tanks have a limited motor resource, but there was

        And with the fact that it is not weapons that are fighting, but structures. And for them, mobility is determined not by the motor resource of an individual tank, but by the speed of the convoy. Which is determined by the slowest unit.
        For the Red Army MK, the slowest unit is not the rear and other auxiliary units, but the basis of the formation's firepower - something without which it is impossible to fight at all. Namely - artillery with its ceremonial 3-5 km / h. And replacing agricultural tractors with Stalingrad tractors will not help - this tractor is not suitable even for infantry artillery.
        The STZ-5 tractor, neither in terms of its dynamic qualities, nor in the convenience of its service, nor in its reliability, meets the requirements for the divisional artillery tractor in any way and urgently requires a large number of changes covering the entire tractor structure ...

        Division artillery does not have an appropriate tractor that meets its tactical and technical data and requirements.
        © Deputy. Major Ivan Ivanov
        Quote: Bar1
        but about the service life of the same T3 and T4, we do not know anything.

        We know indirectly that requests for engine repairs and new engines have sharply increased after the Battle of Smolensk.
        The trouble is that the issues of the motor resource of equipment, the organization of the march and field repairs at the Panzerwaffe surfaced even under the Anschluss. And not in September 1939, and even against the background of the complete rearmament of the armored vehicle with a fundamentally new technology (2,5 times increase in mass, new engine, etc.).
      2. strannik1985
        strannik1985 15 September 2021 20: 24
        +3
        and why is it "on the head for mobility"

        Because by June 22, 1941 in the Red Army there were 272 thousand cars, and in the German Armed Forces ~ 600 thousand.
  4. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 15 September 2021 17: 29
    +2
    Quote: Bar1
    On the stubborn resistance of the Germans, backed up by strong artillery, it is always possible, having mobile formations, not to beat in the forehead, but to bypass the German defenses from the flank, but it seems that our commanders have forgotten about this.

    Now you have come to the correct explanation. It's not about the ideological press, but about the training of commanders. After all, an offensive with a detour to the flank is still an offensive.
    The problem is that the commanders, at best, did not know how to properly organize an offensive, and at worst, they did not know any other tactics other than to pile on them in the forehead. A typical example:
    The newly formed 19th tank brigade arrived in the area of ​​the city of Mozhaisk on October 9 and 10, 1941.
    (...)
    On October 12.10.41, 6.00, at XNUMX:XNUMX an order was received from Major General Shcherbakov to advance in the direction of Solovyovo with the half-squad and capture Gzhatsk with the other half of the brigade.
    The offensive starts at 8.00. Prior to the brigade's offensive, by dawn 12.10 the rear of the brigade arrived and the materiel began to replenish with ammunition and fuel. At 6.30 the enemy himself launched an offensive. The brigade commander ordered a counterattack, for which seven T-34 tanks advance on the forehead, and ten T-34 tanks circumvent the right flank and rear of the enemy. Approaching Zhulev, the tanks were met by Major General Dreyer, who, not knowing the order of the brigade commander to bypass tanks on the right flank and the rear of the enemy, gave the order to advance also in the forehead.
    As a result of changes in the combat course of the tanks and a frontal attack by enemy fire, 8 T-34 tanks (burned) were withdrawn from the battle.
    © Ulanov / Shein
    After all, it came to insanity: in the orders of the front level in the part dedicated to the elimination of shortcomings, it was necessary to quote almost word for word the basic provisions of the Regulations and Instructions.
    1. Bar1
      Bar1 15 September 2021 20: 15
      -1
      Quote: Alexey RA
      It's not about the ideological press, but about the training of commanders


      this was too simple an explanation, for example, more than one mechanized corps took part in the Dubna battle, so the commanders of all corps could not be wrong at the same time, someone was really not prepared, but there were also trained commanders. This means one thing, that EVERYONE carried out either erroneous or even criminal orders of the high command. It looks like it more.
      There is such a historian Martirosyan: he openly says that Timoshenko and Zhukov did not fulfill Stalin's command "Full combat readiness" on June 21-22.
      And the beginning of the gene. Headquarters Zhukov, as you know, arrived in the South-Western Front and actually removed the front command from the leadership. In fact, Zhukov and commanded the unsuccessful Dubninsky offensive.
      1. strannik1985
        strannik1985 15 September 2021 20: 17
        +1
        Such a historian eats Martirosyan

        It remains to know what "Full combat readiness" means?
        1. Bar1
          Bar1 15 September 2021 22: 27
          -3
          Quote: strannik1985
          It remains to know what "Full combat readiness" means?


          Well, why don't you know such simple things?

          https://stalinism.ru/stalin-i-armiya/esche-raz-o-boevoy-gotovnosti-i-direktive-1.html
          1. strannik1985
            strannik1985 16 September 2021 07: 21
            0
            well, why don't you know

            Do not know repeat
            Tell me, how should "combat readiness" look like for the 04/120 rifle division without the announcement of mobilization? In which readiness it is necessary to bring the mechanized corps without the call of equipment from the national economy?
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 15 September 2021 20: 39
        +2
        Quote: Bar1
        this was too simple an explanation, for example, more than one mechanized corps took part in the Dubna battle, so the commanders of all corps could not be wrong at the same time, someone was really not prepared, but there were also trained commanders.

        Ulanov / Shein has data on the training of mechanized corps in "Order in tank forces" and "First T-34. Combat use." In short, the clumsy taught the clumsy, and without having classes, training grounds and a technical base. For example, here is the situation in one of the best MK - the fourth:
        ... most of the personnel of tank divisions - the "technical" kind of troops - do not even have an incomplete secondary education, falling into the group of "3-6 grades", and the total number of holders of higher and secondary education is very noticeably lower than the total number of command personnel. That is, among the commanding staff there are quite enough of those who, at best, have grades 7–9, or even 3–6, behind their backs. Secondly, in the "old" (formed in the summer of 1940) 8th Panzer Division, the number of illiterate and illiterate is quite comparable to the number of those with complete secondary education. Needless to say, neither the first nor the second factors contribute to either speed or the success of combat training?

        Information about the provision of polygons, shooting ranges and training fields of units of the 4th mechanized corps.
        8th Panzer Division.
        He conducts combat firing in accordance with the order of KOVO No. 12 41 at the range of the 26th tank brigade, which is located 5 km north-east of Grudek-Jagiellonsky. The land for the landfill was alienated by the resolution of the Lviv Regional Executive Committee.
        It is necessary to fully assign the indicated range to the 4th mechanized corps, since it included the 32nd tank division stationed in Lviv, which does not have a shooting range and a range.
        The 8th motorized rifle regiment occupies 37 hectares for a shooting range, the land belonged to a landowner and currently the land is used by individual peasants. The shooting range is located west of Jasnisk. A petition was filed for the alienation of the land before the Lviv Regional Executive Committee.
        The 32nd Panzer Division does not have a training ground and a shooting range.
        Tanks KV and T-34, armed with large-caliber artillery, are not provided with a training ground. It is necessary to use the anti-tank director for shooting at the Lvov artillery range in the Brzezin Belka area.
        Units are missing: firing tables for 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938, tank guns L-10, L-11, manual on the materiel of 122-mm howitzers mod. 1938 and 152-mm howitzers mod. 1938, manual for the materiel of the tank gun L-10, L-11 training tower models, training tower pantographs.

        However, what to say, if 2/3 of the privates and, worst of all, 1/3 of the junior command staff of the BTV KOVO on 01.01.1941/1/3 had an education of XNUMX-XNUMX grades. And with a specialized education, I was generally seams:
        ... more than half of the platoon commanders in the tank forces graduated from "other educational institutions", in this case "courses for junior lieutenants and their peers" (1591 people out of 1642), that is, did not receive a full course of special military education; however, it was these people who had to directly organize the process of combat training in the subunits, direct this process and control the depth and quality of training
  5. Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 16 September 2021 00: 02
    +3
    Unfortunately, ideological pressure on the army took place - people still had a 37-year-old memory, when a couple of random phrases or "politically incorrect actions" could suddenly disappear. This pressure led to the fact that in a stressful environment the commanders were forced to look not only at the objectively evolving situation, but also at the issues of their personal safety and the safety of their own families. Since we were very fond of "having fun" also on the families of "enemies of the people". Accordingly, under such pressure, people often made tactically wrong decisions, being forced to show excessive conformism to the views of the existing line. Both the political-strategic (offensive war) and the pre-war line, which severely limited the ability of commanders to organize defense. A number of situations on the first day of the war show that defense successes were often achieved where the local authorities directly violated certain orders of the center, which was afraid to provoke the Germans. In particular, Kuznetsov had something similar in his memoirs, even if it concerns the Baltic Fleet Air Defense, if my memory serves me .. Where the military did not dare to go against the line and regulations, there were immediate conditions for collapse in such an environment.
  • Catfish
    Catfish 15 September 2021 09: 18
    +3
    A very significant remark. laughing The whole question is how it changes the meaning of a given phrase.
  • Vlad St
    Vlad St 16 September 2021 09: 30
    -2
    I wanted to say something smart, right?
  • north 2
    north 2 15 September 2021 05: 21
    -2
    and what did the author want to show with the article? What do destroyed Soviet tanks look like? And I prefer intact Soviet tanks frozen on pedestals ...
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 15 September 2021 08: 22
      -1
      The road to victory went through these losses
  • parusnik
    parusnik 15 September 2021 06: 13
    +5
    Samsonov, Zavyalov - a mighty tandem
  • Andrey VOV
    Andrey VOV 15 September 2021 06: 40
    +5
    Samsonov is published every day, apparently without sleep or rest .. I wonder who he copied this material from ... Not a single mention of civilizations, Protorussians and other things ..
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 15 September 2021 08: 48
      +3
      There are a lot of Samsonovs, so they have time everywhere
      1. Andrey VOV
        Andrey VOV 15 September 2021 08: 55
        +1
        Hell, I didn't think he could be cloned ... Trouble
      2. Toucan
        Toucan 15 September 2021 10: 47
        +3
        Quote: vladcub
        There are a lot of Samsonovs, so they have time everywhere

        They would also understand what they are writing about. The article contains a bunch of technical blunders. negative
  • Olgovich
    Olgovich 15 September 2021 07: 03
    -1
    incorrect assessment of the situation and inept command - the main reason for failure

    The Polish and French campaigns were no lesson.
    1. igordok
      igordok 15 September 2021 08: 37
      0
      Quote: Olgovich
      The Polish and French campaigns were no lesson.

      The lesson could only be for the members of these companies. And the Red Army was just an outside observer.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 15 September 2021 09: 20
        -2
        Quote: igordok
        Only for participants these companies. And the Red Army was only outside observer.


        Those. you refute axiom "A fool learns from his mistakes, a smart one learns from others."
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 15 September 2021 11: 58
          +3
          Olgovich, haste and self-deception played a role here.
          In the early 30s, the MK was created, and after the Spanish events, it was decided that the tank brigade was better and the corps was hastily disbanded. And then: "grab your suitcases" hastily form coypes
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 15 September 2021 17: 48
          +2
          Quote: Olgovich
          Those. you refute the axiom "A fool learns from his mistakes, a smart one learns from others."

          And what lessons the Red Army could learn from the war, about which we knew that: the enemy massively landed troops of up to 15 thousand people, the Maginot line was broken through by heavy tanks with 100-mm guns, operating as part of three heavy tank divisions, the enemy was widely used motorcyclists, of whom he had up to 60 thousand people? wink

          The most interesting thing is that the same epic with mechanized corps was just the result of a lesson in the French campaign - the data on it that the USSR had. The trouble is that the structure of the same TD was created under the influence of the pre-French OShS Panzerdivision, overloaded with tanks, and even reflected in the distorted mirror of intelligence.
          1. chenia
            chenia 15 September 2021 21: 02
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            The trouble is that the structure of the same TD was created under the influence of the pre-French OShS Panzerdivision, overloaded with tanks,


            We have cleverly built the structure of the MK. Yes, they ripped off the Germans (these are only those like Olgovich who are not in the know), but it was more consistent with the formation of the development of success (they reduced the artillery, it was supposed to be on tanks (76 mm), and if there is an MSD (MD), they reduced the anti-tank unit of the unit, it is also true , and the infantry (subunits) is less than that of the tankers, there is not enough anti-aircraft artillery, so the 14,5 and 20 mm machine guns could not be created, but air cover was supposed to be, but here the problems of both the aviation itself and the interaction.).
            But here they clearly missed the TP (four battalion, 5 tanks in platoons, (4 - heavy)) was not controllable at all, both at the unit level, as well as in subunits. The Germans have a two-battalion TP as a rule (there could be three), and a four-platoon TP, although there are also 5 tanks in platoons (this is how they recruited one and a half hundred tanks in the TP), too bad. But the tactical training of the KV among the Germans is a cut above that of other tactical commanders. And with an unstable defense (France, and we at first) rolled, and then they also got out sideways.

            Here we have lobbying, while they are giving funds (funds), we need to come up with structures and more (on one level, this is TP, on the other (puffing out) 21 more MKs to boot). We thought that they would have time to figure it out, grind, adjust, "hem", shorten. And so on.

            Did not make it.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 16 September 2021 12: 27
              +1
              Quote: chenia
              We have cleverly built the structure of the MK. Yes, they ripped off the Germans (these are only those like Olgovich who are not in the know), but it was more consistent with the formation of the development of success (they reduced the artillery, it was supposed to be on tanks (76 mm), and if there is an MSD (MD), they reduced the anti-tank unit of the unit, it is also true , and the infantry (subunits) is less than that of the tankers, there is not enough anti-aircraft artillery, so the 14,5 and 20 mm machine guns could not be created, but air cover was supposed to be, but here the problems of both the aviation itself and the interaction.).

              The ambush is that this whole structure, which is not bad in theory, worked only with experienced personnel. Especially in the regiment-division level. And the USSR did not have these personnel physically - simply because until 1940 it had no tank divisions in nature. The future divisional commanders had experience in commanding only tank brigades, which were bare tanks - without infantry (a small part of the brigades actually had regular infantry), artillery and normal rear. And the combat experience was limited exclusively to the NPP on the Finnish. And their bosses were exactly the same - so there was no one to prompt.
              Quote: chenia
              But here they clearly missed the TP (four battalion, 5 tanks in platoons, (4 - heavy)) was not controllable at all, both at the unit level, as well as in subunits). The Germans usually have a two-battalion TP (there could be three), and a four-platoon TP, although there are also 5 tanks in platoons (this is how they recruited one and a half hundred tanks in the TP), too bad.

              Together, let's say thanks to intelligence, which frightened the German TD in 580 tanks.
              And I want the same. © smile
          2. Olgovich
            Olgovich 16 September 2021 07: 55
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And what lessons could the Red Army learn from the war, about which we knew that: the enemy was massively landing troops of up to 15 thousand people,

            belay
            what are the troops?

            On May 10, Army Group A began its movement through the Ardennes and by May 12 reached the Meuse. In the forefront was Panzer group (5 armored and 3 motorized divisions) Ewald von Kleist... Moved further north Panzer Corps of Hermann Goth, consisting of two armored divisions... On May 13-14, German troops, passing through the southern part of Belgium, reached the Franco-Belgian border.

            13 May Reinhardt's Panzer Corps, which was part of the von Kleist Panzer Group and advancing north Panzer Corps Guderian, crossed the Meuse near Monterme. Thus, already on May 14, seven panzer divisions crossed the Meuse. Dinan, Monterme and Sedan had five more motorized divisions on their way. In addition, more two tank divisions (Goeppner's tank corps), withdrawn from the front of the 6th army, were to arrive in the zone of operations of the 4th army in a few days. The moment of surprise was fully used, all the difficulties of the terrain and the technical implementation of the operation were successfully overcome by the German army. etc. (with)
            1. Foul skeptic
              Foul skeptic 16 September 2021 09: 31
              -2
              belay
              what are the troops?

              Those that landed in the Netherlands.
            2. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 16 September 2021 11: 52
              0
              Quote: Olgovich
              what are the troops?

              Those that our intelligence reported.
              Colonel Matzke returned from the Belgian theater of operations in an extremely confident mood. Operations on the western front developed with such force and such speed that all enemy defense plans were overturned. Parachutists and airborne units performed especially well. Only in the vicinity of Rotterdam was a landing of 15 thousand people armed with machine guns, light weapons, anti-aircraft guns and light tanks.
              © Source report dated 3.6.40 on the statements of Colonel Matzke and Lieutenant Colonel Heigendorf about the experience of the war in Poland and in the West.
              Or do you think that the General Staff of the Red Army had a time machine and full access to the primary data and analysis of the French campaign? wink
              The leadership of the USSR, like any other country, made decisions based on information, which he had here and now... And he had the following:
              Intelligence informed the Soviet command that for the offensive the Germans deployed 90 divisions on the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourgish borders, including 15 tank and motorized ones, and 40 more divisions on the French border (and only on May 10, 1940, according to Soviet intelligence , the Germans had more than two hundred divisions). Acting under the cover of about nine thousand combat aircraft, widely using "new techniques and methods of warfare" and "new offensive weapons (heavy tanks, motorcycle units, dive bombers, airborne troops)", German troops in the shortest possible time "penetrated deep into the territory of France , reached the coast of Northern France and thus separated the Belgian grouping of allies from the main forces of France, surrounded the Belgian grouping of allies of up to 60-70 divisions, "however, losing two thousand combat aircraft and about half a million people killed and wounded. "Only in the vicinity of Rotterdam was a landing of 15 thousand people armed with machine guns, light weapons, anti-aircraft guns and light tanks." The Wehrmacht, according to Soviet intelligence, broke into the fortifications of the Maginot Line with heavy tanks armed with 100-mm cannons (however, the data on the combat weight of heavy tanks differed - according to some sources, the German T-5 and T-6 heavy tanks weighed 60 tons, other sources were limited to "only" 32 tons). At least 2-3 German tank divisions, according to the same valiant reconnaissance, had one regiment of heavy tanks in their composition, however, other sources reported the creation of two divisions from 35-ton heavy tanks. German motorcyclists, according to comrades Stirlitz, rolled across the fields and roads of Belgium and Northern France in groups of up to sixty thousand people.
              © Ulanov / Shein

              In general, after getting acquainted with the information that the pre-war USSR had about potential adversaries, many pre-war throwings become clear, which, based on today's knowledge, seem strange.
              1. Olgovich
                Olgovich 16 September 2021 14: 23
                +1
                Quote: Alexey RA
                Source report dated 3.6.40 on the statements of Colonel Matzke and Lieutenant Colonel Heigendorf about the experience of the war in Poland and in the West.
                Or do you think that the General Staff of the Red Army had a time machine and full access to the primary data and analysis of the French campaign?

                about tank wedges, about Dunkirk, they, of course, "did not know", but they knew that only "paratroopers took France, etc. yes
                1. Foul skeptic
                  Foul skeptic 16 September 2021 14: 38
                  -1
                  about tank wedges, about Dunkirk, they, of course, "did not know", but they knew that only "paratroopers took France, etc.

                  Panzerkeil is still 3 years away, so a time machine is definitely needed request
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 16 September 2021 15: 14
                    0
                    Quote: A vile skeptic
                    about tank wedges, about Dunkirk, they, of course, "did not know", but they knew that only "paratroopers took France, etc.

                    Panzerkeil is still 3 years away, so a time machine is definitely needed request

                    for sure, the tank divisions did not advance, Dunkirk is provided with paratroopers yes
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 16 September 2021 15: 35
                  +1
                  Quote: Olgovich
                  about tank wedges, about Dunkirk, they, of course, "did not know"

                  They knew about tank wedges. It was on the basis of this knowledge that large armored formations were restored, as well as the OSHS BTV was radically redesigned. But since the knowledge, as always, was incomplete and inaccurate, the result was a mechanized corps of the 1940 model.
                  And information about Dunkirk and what was happening around it, even 20 years ago, continued to be clarified. smile
                  1. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 17 September 2021 09: 03
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    then as a result we got a mechanized corps sample 1940

                    it turned out to be 1941. Which was already (on a much smaller scale) in 1939 and 1940.
                    No conclusions, respectively, have been drawn.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    And information about Dunkirk and what was happening around it, even 20 years ago, continued to be clarified.

                    about the paratroopers who surrounded Dunkirk and ensured the defeat? wink
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 17 September 2021 13: 32
                      0
                      Quote: Olgovich
                      it turned out to be 1941. Which was already (on a much smaller scale) in 1939 and 1940.
                      No conclusions, respectively, have been drawn.

                      Once again, the conclusions were made on the basis of the information that was available for 1940-1941.
                      Well, Comrade Stalin, Timoshenko and others could not get into the Internet and read, say, Chapter 4 of "Order in tank troops" with a description of the use of French armored vehicles. So I had to rely on intelligence and open sources.

                      If no conclusions were made, then we would still have separate tank brigades and motorized divisions in the BTV.
                      1. Liam
                        Liam 17 September 2021 13: 46
                        +2
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        So I had to rely on intelligence and open sources.

                        Don't oversimplify, conclusions should have been drawn from exercises / maneuvers, not intelligence or internet data.Liberation the campaign of 39 years perfectly showed that the Red Army does not know how to do it. They disbanded so that in a few months they could again form in an even more uncontrollable monstrous form. And no teachings.
                        And no need to talk about the allegedly planned for the fall of 41. No one creates 20 MK at first and only after a year and a half is experiencing on exercises. The marshals knew perfectly well what the teachings would show and pushed back these exercises as best they could, because otherwise they would have to go against those who gave birth to the new MK-Zhukov and Stalin. And they needed it after 37/38?
                      2. Alexey RA
                        Alexey RA 17 September 2021 14: 34
                        -1
                        Quote: Liam
                        Do not oversimplify. The conclusions should have been made on the basis of exercises / maneuvers, and not intelligence or Internet data. The liberation campaign of 39 perfectly showed that the Red Army cannot be in the MK. They disbanded so that in a few months they would again form in an even more uncontrollable monstrous form. And no teachings.

                        Don't oversimplify. ©
                        First, there really were the Liberation Campaign and the SFV. Based on the results of which, it was decided that the mechanized corps-level armored vehicles had a fundamentally irreparable drawback - they are cumbersome and little controllable. Therefore, there is nothing further to try - the mechanized corps should be disbanded and limited to brigades and divisions.
                        But then, as luck would have it, the French campaign happened. As a result, it suddenly turned out that tank divisions in practice can be combined into corps, and these corps can not only be used, but rather quickly run and win. And not just anyone, but the armies of the victor countries of the last World War.
                        That is, in practice it has been proven that cumbersomeness and little controllability are not a fundamental disadvantage of a large motorized mechanical connection - with proper organization, everything works. And it works in battle. And the massive use of tanks is one of the keys to victory. Therefore, it was decided to restore the mechanized corps and try to transfer to our realities the structure that worked in France - as we knew about it.
                        But they forgot about the staff again ...
                        Quote: Liam
                        And there is no need to talk about the allegedly planned for autumn 41 years. No one first creates 20 MCs and only after a year and a half tests them in exercises.

                        To experience something in the teachings, you need to have it.
                        By September 1941, in the USSR there would have been only 2-3 fully created MKs - of those that began to form in the fall of 1940. And, God forbid, that of them there was one trained and well-coordinated (coordination of divisions in MK was scheduled for August- September). The rest would have been in the process of formation for another year and a half.
                        A year for the formation of a corps-level mechanical connection of a fundamentally new OShS practically from scratch (from the brigades) is even more optimism.
                      3. Liam
                        Liam 17 September 2021 20: 20
                        +2
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Therefore, it was decided to restore the mechanized corps and try to transfer to our realities the structure that worked in France

                        And what attempts have been made to transfer to our realities? Correctly, no. They disbanded because of the impossibility of managing them and recreated them even more cumbersome after a few months and without making absolutely any attempts to somehow minimize them at least on simple exercises. It is unlikely that you will be able to explain such senseless somersaults with censorship expressions. come from only one person, to whom no one dared argue.

                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        To experience something in the teachings, you need to have it.
                        By September 1941 in the USSR there would have been only 2-3 fully created MCs - of those that began to form in the fall of 1940.

                        And who bothers to bring to mind at least 1 out of six 40 years old and break in. And instead, the new chief of the General Staff is forming 20 more, while tearing apart those 6 that were poorly formed by that time. Unger Prishibeev kept his nose to the wind and decided to please Himself in this brilliant undertaking.
                        Dilentaticism and tyranny in one word
                      4. Alexey RA
                        Alexey RA 17 September 2021 23: 27
                        0
                        Quote: Liam
                        And what attempts have been made to transfer to our realities? Correctly, no. They were disbanded due to the impossibility of controlling them and recreated even more cumbersome after a few months and without making absolutely no attempts to somehow minimize them at least on simple exercises.

                        Again. Mechanized corps of the 30s and mechanized corps mod. 40 have nothing in common except for the name.
                        The old mechanized corps were disbanded, because in 1939 the management of such structures was considered impossible - the domestic practical experience was negative, and there was no more experience.
                        In 1940, the practical possibility of controlling large motorized mechanical connections was proved. But the mechanized corps was not "recreated" in the USSR. A completely new structure was formed on the model of the one that has proven its efficiency in practice.
                        It was impossible to test this structure in practice until the fall of 1941 due to its absence in this very practice. Or do you really think that simple exercises of a regiment half filled with people and equipment with untrained personnel will give some practical results besides the obvious: people need to be taught, and the states - filled with people and equipment? We do not even have divisional personnel in the BTV - due to the absence of a divisional structure until 1940.
                        Quote: Liam
                        And who prevented to bring to mind at least 1 out of six 40 years and break in

                        9 women will not give birth to a child in a month. How are you going to bring to mind a mechanized corps in less than a year from people who have never seen more than a brigade before and for the most part have not driven a tank of more than 10 tons? Especially taking into account our beloved industry, which does not provide spare parts, motors, or even training manuals for new tanks.
                        Quote: Liam
                        And instead, the new chief of the General Staff is forming 20 more, while tearing apart those 6 that were poorly formed by that time.

                        And who exactly out of 8 MK-40s was torn to form 21 MK-41?
                      5. Liam
                        Liam 18 September 2021 07: 36
                        +1
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        Mechanized corps of the 30s and mechanized corps mod. 40 have nothing in common except for the name.
                        The old mechanized corps were disbanded, because in 1939 the management of such structures was considered impossible - the domestic practical experience was negative, and there was no more experience.

                        Both of these klrpus are huge masses of tanks, people and equipment. The first were disbanded because they could not control them. And ... they created the second, which were twice as large.
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        It was impossible to test this structure in practice until the fall of 1941 due to its absence in this very practice. Or do you really think that simple exercises of a regiment half filled with people and equipment with untrained personnel will give some practical results besides the obvious: people need to be taught, and the states - filled with people and equipment?

                        You are very new to the history of mechanized corps.
                        The mechanized corps of the 1st wave (40 years old) were fully staffed and even some exercises were carried out.
                        According to a note from the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BKP (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1/13681, by October 1940, the formation of eight mechanized corps and two separate tank divisions was basically completed. Both tank and motorized divisions are fully manned. Due to the weak supply of KV and T-34 tanks from the industry, tank divisions were equipped with BT and T-26 tanks. On October 1, 1940, there were BT and T-26 tanks:

                        • in the 1st MK - 902,

                        • in the 2nd MK - 414,

                        • in the 3st MK - 543,

                        • in the 4st MK - 781,

                        • in the 5st MK - 741,

                        • in the 6st MK - 605,

                        • in the 7st MK - 689,

                        • in the 8th MK - 765


                        <br>• in the 6th td - 292,

                        • in the 9th TD - 229

                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        And who exactly out of 8 MK-40s was torn to form 21 MK-41?

                        In order to speed up the process of forming new mechanized corps, they included already formed tank divisions from mechanized corps of the first and second waves. So, from the 4th MK, the 10th TD was transferred to the 15th MK, in its place the 32nd TD began to form. From the 8th MK to the 16th, the 15th TD was transferred, from the 9th to the 22nd MK - the 19th TD, they were replaced by the 34th and 35th TD, respectively.
                      6. Alexey RA
                        Alexey RA 21 September 2021 13: 24
                        0
                        Quote: Liam
                        Both of these klrpus are huge masses of tanks, people and equipment. The first were disbanded because they could not control them. And ... they created the second, which were twice as large.

                        Right. Because they thought that the key to solving the problems had been found - the correct OSH. And if we transfer to our realities the OSHS "like the Germans", then everything will work - after all, the Germans work, and how.
                        Quote: Liam
                        You are very new to the history of mechanized corps.
                        The mechanized corps of the 1st wave (40 years old) were fully staffed and even some exercises were carried out.
                        According to a note by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BKP (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1/13681, by October 1940, the formation of eight mechanized corps and two separate tank divisions was basically completed. Both tank and motorized divisions are fully manned.

                        And after October 1940 comes February 1941. The "old" mechanized corps is being checked. And suddenly it turns out that the "completed formation and fully equipped" 12th TD of the 8th MK:
                        when checked by the commission of the 8th mechanized corps in February, she was rated "satisfactory"

                        has a significant shortage of command personnel - 282 people, that is, 21%. In terms of positions, this shortage falls on platoon commanders - 41 people, company commanders - 25 people. There is a large shortage of junior command personnel in the division - 521 people, that is, 21,6%. There is a surplus of the Red Army personnel - 896 people. A significant shortage of middle and junior command personnel and a supernumerary of enlisted personnel create an overload for the command personnel, which greatly complicates the normal course of combat training ...

                        Most of the command personnel of these battalions have completed all kinds of short-term courses. Many of the command personnel of the 12th motorized rifle regiment stated that they had never read the combat manual of the infantry, part of the 11th and the field manual of 36. The knowledge of the command personnel of the 3rd battalion of the 24th tank regiment does not go beyond the combat regulations of the tank forces, part of the 1st. They did not read any other statutes.

                        They did not engage in single training of an infantry fighter in tank battalions, and many of the chiefs of staff consider that this is not necessary for tank units.

                        In general, tactical training in divisional units is unsatisfactory.
                        © Ulanov / Shein
                        And the formation of the MC of the "second wave" (more precisely, the third - in the second was the 9th MC) it will not work to write off all this - the check was carried out before the start of their formation.
                        In short, the note by the NGO and the NGSH is a very optimistic consolidated document, which omits all the negative points from the primary organization from the localities.
            3. Olgovich
              Olgovich 17 September 2021 15: 38
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              If no conclusions were made, then we would still have separate tank brigades and motorized divisions in the BTV.

              Once again: at made there are no conclusions the worst in the world history of a military catastrophe, like the one that was in 1941-42.

              Nothing supernova and super-secret Germans in 41 g did not use anything.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              If no conclusions were made, then we would still have separate tank brigades and motorized divisions in the BTV.

              In what way were the easily destroyed raw mechanized corps better?
              It would be better if the divisions remained.
            4. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 17 September 2021 16: 31
              0
              Quote: Olgovich
              Once again: given the conclusions made, there is no such terrible military catastrophe in world history as the one that took place in 1941-42.

              There are even worse disasters - as in 1940. With the defeat of the mobilized army and surrender in a month.
              And you can't say that France did not draw conclusions... Did it - created BTV. And not only in the form of parts of the NPP, but also independent tank formations. And what did it give her?
              Quote: Olgovich
              Nothing supernova and super-secret Germans in 41 g did not use anything.

              Warfare is simple and quite accessible to the sound mind of man. But it’s difficult to fight.
              © Clausewitz
              In 1941, the Red Army met the army, which had already skated theoretical concepts in practice in two (or even three) wars and one Anschluss. Moreover, she rolled them to the front level with the participation of different types of troops.
              Quote: Olgovich
              In what way were the easily destroyed raw mechanized corps better?
              It would be better if the divisions remained.

              So the divisions would also have to be formed from scratch.
              Understand a simple thing - until 1940 there were no independent armored formations in the Red Army. There was an imitation in the form of tank brigades, which, in their actual state, without infantry and artillery, could only perform the tasks of the NPP. And the mechanized corps, which are more dangerous for the front rear than for the enemy.
            5. Olgovich
              Olgovich 18 September 2021 08: 14
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              There are even worse disasters - as in 1940. With the defeat of the mobilized army and surrender in a month.

              do not be ridiculous, compare the losses of 1940 and losses of 1941
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And you can’t say that France didn’t draw any conclusions. Did it - created BTV. Moreover, not only in the form of parts of the NPP, but also in the form of independent tank formations. And what did it give her?

              but Stalin did not. None.
              Quote: Alexey RA
              In 1941, the Red Army met the army, which had already skated theoretical concepts in practice in two (or even three) wars and one Anschluss. Moreover, she rolled them to the front level with the participation of different types of troops.

              who prevented the Red Army from rolling back as he wants?
              Quote: Alexey RA
              So the divisions would also have to be formed from scratch.
              Understand a simple thing - until 1940 there were no independent armored formations in the Red Army. There was an imitation in the form of tank brigades, which, in their actual state, without infantry and artillery, could only perform the tasks of the NPP. And the mechanized corps, which are more dangerous for the front rear than for the enemy.

              I didn’t understand: the country's leadership had EVERYTHING (except for brains): TIME, funds, equipment, no sanctions and restrictions, i.e. what did not have the five-year Wehrmacht, but achieved success.
            6. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 21 September 2021 13: 34
              0
              Quote: Olgovich
              do not be ridiculous, compare the losses of 1940 and losses of 1941

              Losses in 1940 - the entire French army in the Metropolis, except for those who managed to evacuate.
              Quote: Olgovich
              but Stalin did not. None.

              Exactly the same as France: BTV was created in the form of parts of the NPP and independent mechanical connections. Which, based on the results of their own and others' experience, were re-formed twice.
              Refusal of NPP tanks in rifle divisions, complete scrapping of OShS BTV after the French campaign and reorganization of old NPP brigades into divisions suitable for independent action - these are not conclusions drawn?
              Quote: Olgovich

              who prevented the Red Army from rolling back as he wants?

              With whom will you order to fight? With whom did the USSR have to arrange its French campaign in order to test the actions of corps-scale armored vehicles in practice?
              The SFV is too small for this - and then, according to its results, the infantry was finally taken away from the tanks of the NPP of the rifle divisions, which it brought to an absolutely incapacitated state.
              Quote: Olgovich
              I didn't understand: the country's leadership had EVERYTHING (except for brains): TIME, funds, equipment, no sanctions and restrictions, i.e. something that the five-year-old Wehrmacht did not have, but achieved success.

              Are you talking about France or Britain now? wink
  • icant007
    icant007 16 September 2021 11: 31
    -2
    Quote: Alexey RA
    The trouble is that the structure of the same TD was created under the influence of the pre-French OShS Panzerdivision, overloaded with tanks, and even reflected in the distorted mirror of intelligence.


    It is strange that even Katukov, describing the events of the battle for Moscow, believes that the German armored division includes about 560 tanks. Moreover, it is interesting that he makes an amendment that of them there are about 180 medium tanks, which is just like the real number of tanks.

    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/katukov/02.html

    But at the same time, higher in the text, estimating the number of German tank divisions at 14 and the total number of tanks at 1700, in fact, goes to a more correct figure.

    It is clear, we must take into account the losses, and yet.

    For this purpose, Hitler by the end of September significantly strengthened the Center group, bringing it to 77 divisions, including 14 tank and 8 motorized. Approximately 1700 tanks were concentrated in three powerful compact groupings in the directions of the main attacks.


    In preparation for the march to the East, Hitler created a fairly powerful armored force. Each fully manned tank division consisted of a tank and motorized infantry brigade, a motorized artillery regiment, and an anti-tank gun division. The division had up to 566 tanks, of which 180 were medium. They had light armor and weak weapons, but they had speed and maneuverability.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 16 September 2021 12: 02
      +1
      Quote: icant007
      It is strange that even Katukov, describing the events of the battle for Moscow, believes that the German armored division includes about 560 tanks. Moreover, it is interesting that he makes an amendment that of them there are about 180 medium tanks, which is just like the real number of tanks.

      We open the "Report of the head of the GABTU KA on the organization, armament and means of combat of BT and MV KA and foreign armies", and on page 2 we see:
      Panzer division of the German army.
      The number of combat vehicles.
      Medium tanks - 170.
      Light tanks - 410.
      Total: - 580
      smile
      In the memoirs, it is just easy to find a description of the enemy not on the basis of real states and performance characteristics, but on the basis of the data available from the side who wrote the memoirs. It should also be borne in mind that at the time of writing the memoirs, some of the data "from there" could already have leaked, so that as a result, you can get a bizarre mixture of figures from the same Mueller-Hillebrand and reports from Soviet intelligence. smile
      1. icant007
        icant007 16 September 2021 12: 21
        -3
        Or maybe the consequences of editing by "specialists")

        I still believe that the real OShS of the German tank division in the first days of the war has already cleared up for us.
  • vladcub
    vladcub 15 September 2021 11: 44
    +5
    In some ways, Olgovich is right. We are late with conclusions about: Polish and French companies. But it is impossible to say that they did not draw conclusions at all: they began to form the TC and MK
  • Ashes of Claes
    Ashes of Claes 15 September 2021 15: 50
    +1
    Quote: igordok
    The lesson could only be for the members of these companies. And the Red Army was just an outside observer.

    Great. I see that on VO it is considered good form to certainly argue with Olgovich even when he writes obvious things? And to parry his thesis about "lessons" with such a clumsy argument that, they say, only direct actors should learn lessons, and correct guys learn only at the stage of pecking a roast cock - this is, you know ...
  • Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 08: 51
    +3
    Quote: Olgovich
    The Polish and French campaigns were no lesson.

    Lesson for what? The fact that reliance on fortified areas without active defense is untenable, or is it that technically well-equipped troops can only be resisted by technically well-equipped troops?
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 15 September 2021 17: 57
      +2
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      Lesson for what? The fact that reliance on fortified areas without active defense is untenable, or is it that technically well-equipped troops can only be resisted by technically well-equipped troops?

      In fact, there were a lot of lessons for us in the French campaign, especially in terms of how not to build and use armored vehicles (attempts to fight with understaffed and under-formed armored vehicles, changing orders, tearing apart tank divisions, attacking with naked tanks, etc.). In fact, all the actions of the French armored vehicles in 1940 were repeated by the Red Army in the border battle.
      But no one (except, perhaps, the Germans) had data on the real course of that war at that time. sad
      1. Vladimir_2U
        Vladimir_2U 16 September 2021 03: 11
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        (attempts to fight with understaffed and under-formed armored vehicles, changing orders, tearing apart tank divisions, attacking with naked tanks, etc.).

        It is interesting and instructive for me, but I will remind you not even of completely different start of the war for us and for the French, but the fact that the passage through the Ardennes lasted three days.
  • novel66
    novel66 15 September 2021 11: 47
    +2
    someone else's experience will never teach anyone anything
  • Undecim
    Undecim 15 September 2021 07: 52
    +13
    German 88-mm anti-aircraft gun FlaK 18/36/37 destroyed at Dubno

    It would be better if the author wrote about superethnos and the collective West.
    FlaK 18, FlaK 36, FlaK 37 are three different, albeit similar in design, anti-aircraft guns.
    anti-tank anti-bite mines (tellermins).

    Tellermine is not a designation for anti-tank, anti-tracked mines. Teller is a plate in German. That is, this is an indication of the shape of the mine.
    1. Bar1
      Bar1 15 September 2021 08: 20
      -7
      Quote: Undecim
      FlaK 18, FlaK 36, FlaK 37 are three different, albeit similar in design, anti-aircraft guns.


      these are not different weapons, but modifications of the same 88mm cannon.

      in Belarusian, a plate is also a talerka.
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 15 September 2021 08: 27
        +9
        You'd better write something about Tartary, you are a specialist there.
        The fact that FlaK 36, FlaK 37 are modifications of FlaK 18 does not negate the fact that these are different samples.
        1. Vladimir_2U
          Vladimir_2U 15 September 2021 08: 40
          -1
          Quote: Undecim
          You'd better write something about Tartary, you are a specialist there.

          Failure of the spring escalation campaign as an example of underestimating unmanned vimans? laughing
        2. Bar1
          Bar1 15 September 2021 08: 45
          -3
          your opinion on this matter is not the opinion of a techie or a professional.
          For example, the T34 had different designs and different turrets, even different engines and different guns, but it always remained the T34.
          1. Undecim
            Undecim 15 September 2021 10: 22
            +4
            your opinion on this matter is not the opinion of a techie or a professional.

            Let's turn to the professionals.



            Bar, considering that you are an outstanding expert in languages, translation, I think, will not be difficult for you.
            1. Bar1
              Bar1 15 September 2021 12: 13
              -3
              here, in general, it is a Russian-language site and all the argumentation is in Russian, so I won't translate anything from Mumbayumba, not from German. And in Russian you can find arguments, if they exist, of course.
      2. igordok
        igordok 15 September 2021 08: 41
        +5
        The FlaK 18/36/37 gun did not exist. If it was impossible to determine the brand of the gun from the remains, the article should have simply indicated - "anti-aircraft gun".
        1. Bar1
          Bar1 15 September 2021 08: 51
          -3
          8,8 cm FlaK 18/36/37 (German 8,8-cm-Flugabwehrkanone 18/36/37, literally 8,8 cm anti-aircraft gun model 18/36/37), also known as "eight-eight" (German Acht-acht) - German 88-mm anti-aircraft gun, which was in service from 1932 to 1945


          https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/88-мм_зенитная_пушка_FlaK_18/36/37
          1. Toucan
            Toucan 15 September 2021 10: 52
            +3
            Quote: Bar1
            https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/88-мм_зенитная_пушка_FlaK_18/36/37

            It is very bad form to refer to Vika as a source of information. This is usually done by those who do not own the subject of the conversation.
            1. Bar1
              Bar1 15 September 2021 12: 17
              -4
              Quote: Tucan
              It is very bad form to refer to Vika as a source of information. This is usually done by those who do not own the subject of the conversation.


              under each article from wikipedia there is a link to the source
              and bad form when the article is anonymous. well, when they read half of the article, as in your case.
              1. Toucan
                Toucan 15 September 2021 13: 52
                +4
                Quote: Bar1
                under each article from wikipedia there is a link to the source

                Maybe you should be more careful in the choice of sources, and understand at least a little what you are writing about?
        2. Undecim
          Undecim 15 September 2021 09: 45
          +5
          If it was impossible to determine the brand of the gun from the remains, the article should have simply indicated - "anti-aircraft gun".

          Under the original photo in the original source it says:
          "Destroyed at Dubno German 88-mm anti-aircraft gun. June 1941".
    2. vladcub
      vladcub 15 September 2021 08: 56
      +1
      Vic Nick, hello. You, as usual, with the necessary addition. It is difficult without such clarifications when the authors: Samsonov and Zyryanov
  • kristofer
    kristofer 15 September 2021 15: 13
    +2





    The fortifications of the "Molotov Line" east of Kristinopol (now Chervonograd, Lviv region), two kilometers from the border, look like this today
  • Ashes of Claes
    Ashes of Claes 15 September 2021 15: 28
    +3
    2nd division of the 60th artillery regiment (100 mm cannon)

    Just converting "10 cm" into millimeters?
    maybe, after all, "105-mm guns"?
  • Operator
    Operator 15 September 2021 18: 22
    +2
    While the Soviet command was guessing on the coffee grounds, trying to guess the direction of the next strike of the German tank formations and, accordingly, organize their counterstrike, all the actions of the Red Army were in full view of the German command, which received online Luftwaffe air reconnaissance data.

    Therefore, each time, Soviet tank units attacked the Germans' pre-set anti-tank barriers instead of striking German tanks, which promptly changed the direction of their attacks.

    The command of the Red Army was not completely ready for a mobile war with open flanks in June-August 1941.
  • Vlad St
    Vlad St 16 September 2021 09: 32
    +1
    Quote: Vladimir_2U
    The bodies of the killed German soldiers
    Not killed, but destroyed!

    When I wanted to say something clever, but the "patriotism" of the brain got in the way.
  • icant007
    icant007 16 September 2021 11: 10
    -2
    Katukov's 20th Panzer Division tried to advance in the Mlynov area.


    Here you need to understand that the 20th Panzer was no longer a tank. Having lost their meager 33 tanks on the 24th.