In a month and no more, the war will end
The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, DHW - The main military council of the spacecraft, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, OdVO - Odessa VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, sd - rifle division, Ur - fortified area.
In the previous part it was shown that, according to RU, from June 1 to June 20, 5-7 German divisions arrived at the border, of which two were motorized and, probably, one was tank... However, this was not true. On June 9, unknown information was received, after which the transfer to the west of the 16th Army was started.
June 1941
Admiral, People's Commissar of the Navy, wrote about the June events N. G. Kuznetsov:
In those tense days, the deputy chief of the General Staff NF Vatutin came to see me. He said that he carefully reads our operational reports and reports them to his superiors. Vatutin promised to notify us immediately if the situation becomes critical...
Until late in the evening of June 21, Vatutin did not inform Kuznetsov that the situation was becoming critical. It seems that the NPO and the General Staff did not consider the situation dangerous until the evening of June 21.
Commander of the Leningrad Military District M. M. Popov told:
On the tenth of June, an NCO directive was received, which appointed ... a commission chaired by the commander of the LMO, entrusting it with the tasks of choosing sites for the construction of airfields based on fighter and bomber aviation along the shores of the Barents Sea ...
On the eve of the war, a completely unnecessary task for the level of the district commander, who must leave the headquarters for a month along with a member of the Military Council. But an acceptable task for him, if the war in June is not expected in the General Staff ...
10 June
The British do not yet know whether there will be a war or not. That's why Churchill will write in the diary: «[Joint Intelligence Agency - Approx. auth.] stated: "In the second half of June we will witness either a war or an agreement ..."
RU received two messages from KhVTs (G. Kegel - an employee of the German embassy in Moscow), in which there is no information about the beginning of the war in June:
A decision was made to change the destination of the 16th Army from Voronezh to the territory of KOVO.
Directive sent to the command of military communications:
From 11.06.1941/15/16, all military echelons of the XNUMX-thousandth series, transporting the XNUMXth army of the RGK to the Orlovsky VO, to be redirected to the territory of KOVO ...
On June 12, a directive will be sent to KOVO on the arrival of the 16th Army from June 15 to July 10 as part of the 57th Panzer Division, the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 32nd Rifle Corps. The army will be subordinate to the District Military Council.
Border districts
On June 10, a cipher telegram was sent to KOVO from the General Staff:
The head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that the chiefs of the UR were instructed to occupy the foreground. Report to the People's Commissar of Defense on what basis the UR KOVO units received the order to occupy the foreground. Such an action can provoke the Germans to an armed conflict. and is fraught with all sorts of consequences ... Zhukov
The answer was sent from KOVO:
It seems that the General Staff did not agree to this.
On June 11, an encrypted message was sent to KOVO:
People's Commissar of Defense ordered:
1) The front line should not be occupied by the field and UR units without special orders. Organize the security of the structures by the sentry service and patrolling.
2) Immediately cancel the orders you gave about the occupation of the UR units ...
Execution check and report to 16 June 1941.
Zhukov
1) The front line should not be occupied by the field and UR units without special orders. Organize the security of the structures by the sentry service and patrolling.
2) Immediately cancel the orders you gave about the occupation of the UR units ...
Execution check and report to 16 June 1941.
Zhukov
On June 16, the KOVO Military Council sends another encrypted message to the Chief of the General Staff: "I ask permission to employ the personnel of the Kamenets-Podolsk and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs on the reinforced concrete structures of the first line of these URs ..."
On the cipher telegram G.K. Zhukov put a resolution:
Occupation of Kamenets-Podolsk and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs is allowed. Prepare the Ostropolsk UR along the old border for the occupation also by UR units for the purpose of training and cobble together. Urgently complete the formation of the UR units for the Kiev UR, and then prepare the UR for staffing.
Zhukov, June 18
Zhukov, June 18
Only Directive No. 1 will order the occupation of all facilities on the border: "I ORDER: ... during the night on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, secretly occupy the firing points of the URs on the state border ..."
For some structures (or for many) this order was given too late ...
KOVO. N.N.Semenov (Chief of Artillery of the 26th Army):
The crossing [of the German troops] turned out to be unexpected for the units of the [Przemysl UR - Approx. Auth.], who managed to break into their bunkers, but could not influence the prevention of the crossing, since the Germans blinded them and attacked from the rear ...
A. M. Baranov (Chief of Staff of the 17th Rifle Corps): “... The prepared lines were not constantly occupied by the troops. Only the protection of structures was constantly organized. [Kamyanets-Podolsk UR - Approx. auth.]... "
Combat log of the Mogilev-Podolsk UR:
By order of the commandant of the UR 40, 50 opb [opb - a separate machine gun battalion - Approx. Auth.] occupied the cover structures on 22.06.1941/15/00 and by 23.06.1941:XNUMX XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX occupied and put into combat readiness pillboxes ...
ZAPOVO. Brest UR. A. K. Shankov (platoon commander of the 18th brigade):
Almost all of April 1941, the personnel were inseparably in bunkers ...
In early May, a new order was received, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the bunkers ... Food, cartridges and shells were returned to the company warehouse ...
By the beginning of the war, there was no food or ammunition at the firing points, except for a few boxes of cartridges in the pillbox of the guard platoon ...
In early May, a new order was received, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the bunkers ... Food, cartridges and shells were returned to the company warehouse ...
By the beginning of the war, there was no food or ammunition at the firing points, except for a few boxes of cartridges in the pillbox of the guard platoon ...
I. N. Shibakov (platoon commander of the 17th brigade):
Of the 8 firing points in this sector, the company occupied seven ... The shelling sectors have not been cleared. In the walls of the bunkers there were holes for the communication cable and sleeves. The material part, although it was installed, but not on alert, was in conservation ...
11 June
Help from the 1st Directorate of the NKGB:
They say that the British, having familiarized themselves with important information received from Hess, asked the United States whether they would enter the war at all, without specifying the exact date. The British allegedly demanded an immediate response, stating that if the US response was negative, then Britain would conclude a separate peace ...
Posted by John (from Stockholm): "The Germans transferred 10 divisions from the Balkan countries to the Soviet border ... A total of 74 German divisions near the Soviet-German border ..."
Posted by Air conditioning (from Helsinki):
Former Minister Hakzel said ... that Germany would attack the USSR in the near future, explaining this by the refusal to supply her with bread and fuel ...
The RM again receives unconfirmed information about the possibility of concluding peace between Germany and England, about an absurd reason for starting a war against the Soviet Union and unreliable information about the number of German divisions at the border.
Military Council KOVO prepared proposals, which he sent to the General Staff. On June 12, the General Staff approved only the proposal to move the 62nd and 135th Rifle Divisions of the 5th Army to the border.
Events in PribOVO on the eve of the war
Historian M. Solonin wrote about the events in PribOVO on the eve of the war:
Nothing of the kind can be found in the archival funds of the Leningrad, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts ... it is not possible to find ... And this is very strange - how within the framework of one country and one army there could be such a difference in the dates and times of bringing troops to a state of high combat readiness ...
The events that took place in the PribOVO gave the writers a reason to invent several versions: about the directives on June 18 from the General Staff to the border districts about bringing the troops to increased combat readiness, about betrayal in the leadership of the spacecraft, etc.
Historian about the directive of the General Staff of June 18 S. L. Chekunov wrote:
It has been documented that no directive from Moscow dated 18.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX on bringing the border districts to combat readiness did not have.
Events in the Baltics could be associated with a planned operation to evict an anti-Soviet and socially alien element in the amount of about 40 thousand people.
From the certificate of the KGB of the Lithuanian USSR dated 12.05.1988/XNUMX/XNUMX: "Since the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania, the first eviction of the inhabitants of the republic outside its borders was carried out on June 15-17, 1941 ..."
In the spring, information was received about the preparation of a mutiny in the Baltic States. On the territory of the PribOVO there were three corps, formed from former military personnel of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. These corps (179th, 180th, 181st, 182nd, 183rd and 184th rifle divisions) have about 30 thousand people. It is likely that the government feared the actions of these associations during the deportation operation. This is indirectly evidenced by the encryption from the PribOVO headquarters, sent at 9:35 am on June 22:
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ...
In Orany there is the 184th Rifle Division, which is not yet fully staffed by our staff and is absolutely unreliable, the 179th Rifle Division - in Sventyany, is also not staffed and unreliable. I also appreciate the 181st Gulbene ...
In Orany there is the 184th Rifle Division, which is not yet fully staffed by our staff and is absolutely unreliable, the 179th Rifle Division - in Sventyany, is also not staffed and unreliable. I also appreciate the 181st Gulbene ...
When talking about "Our lineup", then it implies the arrival of the assigned personnel from the Moscow VO. The unreliability of the national divisions is also mentioned in the encryption of June 24:
In view of the fact that, earlier than July 10, five former territorial rifle divisions cannot be brought into battle, I ask you to allocate five new rifle divisions at my disposal ...
It turns out that the leadership of the spacecraft was obliged to know about the unreliability of territorial formations before the start of the war, but did not strengthen the grouping of troops of the PribOVO?
Why?
First. They probably thought that the situation was not yet critical. Therefore, there will be time for the transportation of a reliable assigned train.
Second, according to the General Staff, only a secondary blow was expected against the troops of the district.
Nobody in the leadership of the General Staff expected that the most powerful blow of the enemy would be delivered in the Baltic states ...
S. L. Chekunov on the forum "Militera.borda.ru" commented on the events that took place in the Baltics:
On the same day, the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to the Military Council of the ZAPOVO:
To increase the combat readiness of the troops in the district, all deep rifle divisions and command and control of rifle corps with corps units should be withdrawn to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan.
1. Leave the border divisions in place, their withdrawal to the border in the areas assigned to them, if necessary, will be made on my special order.
2.The 44th rifle corps, as part of the corps management, 108, 64, 161 and 143rd rifle divisions and corps units - to withdraw to the Baranovichi area, at your discretion ...
4. The withdrawal of these troops should be completed by July 1, 1941 ...
1. Leave the border divisions in place, their withdrawal to the border in the areas assigned to them, if necessary, will be made on my special order.
2.The 44th rifle corps, as part of the corps management, 108, 64, 161 and 143rd rifle divisions and corps units - to withdraw to the Baranovichi area, at your discretion ...
4. The withdrawal of these troops should be completed by July 1, 1941 ...
From the deadline for the implementation of measures for the withdrawal of troops, it follows that at this time the beginning of the war on June 22 is not expected.
From the Combat Log of the 44th Rifle Corps:
15.06.1941/44/XNUMX XNUMX sc received the order - to go to the mobile camp ...
All parts of the hull were not fully provided with the prescribed weapons and ammunition. As a result, the events that unfolded on June 22 found corps units unprepared for engaging in battle ...
All parts of the hull were not fully provided with the prescribed weapons and ammunition. As a result, the events that unfolded on June 22 found corps units unprepared for engaging in battle ...
It is possible that at this time the question of starting the advancement of rifle corps of the 21st and 22nd armies to the places determined by the General Staff in mid-May is being discussed. Since the General Staff does not know about the true enemy groupings and their directions of strikes, the corps of these armies move forward to parry enemy attacks, which were predicted in the General Staff. Since an auxiliary strike is expected in the Baltics, the PribOVO force grouping remains unchanged.
In June, Ramsay received information from the military attaché in Japan, who departed from Berlin on May 6.05.1941, XNUMX:
The first and main blow will be inflicted by the Germans on the spacecraft by their left flank [in the Baltic States - Approx. auth.]. The Germans are completely surethat the main forces of the spacecraft will be concentrated in the opposite direction from the line, giving full opportunity for a strong blow ...
The tragic accident was that, probably, our intelligence officer was confident in the complete control of the RU situation on the border. Therefore, in early June, he wrote only about the error: "A big tactical mistake that ... was made by the USSR"... The message about the direction of the main attack will come to RU only at the beginning of July ...
On June 12, a directive is sent to ZAPOVO on the redeployment of the 63rd and 51st rifle corps from the Volga and Ural VOs, respectively:
The following will arrive on the territory of the ZAPOVO in the period from 17.06 to 2.07.1941:
51 pp. Hull consisting of: hull control with hull parts, 98, 112 and 153 sd;
63 pp. Case consisting of: case control with case parts, ... 53 and 148 sd ...
51 pp. Hull consisting of: hull control with hull parts, 98, 112 and 153 sd;
63 pp. Case consisting of: case control with case parts, ... 53 and 148 sd ...
It seems that the next day, another decision was made to transport the 167th Rifle Division from the Volga Military District, the trains from which began moving on June 14. Troop movements had to be hidden from the Germans, so as not to provoke them and to maintain balance on the border. This is how Moscow should think, not knowing Hitler's true plans ...
The KOVO Military Council has prepared Directive, which determines the procedure for handling ammunition, equipment, fuel, food and fodder.
N.N. Voronov (Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense) wrote in his memoirs:
A few days before the start of the war, I accidentally met in Moscow with the commander of the troops [ZAPOVO - Approx. author] DG Pavlov: "How are you doing?"
- The troops of the district stomp on various tactical battalion and regimental exercises, - Pavlov answered. - Everything is fine with us ...
- The troops of the district stomp on various tactical battalion and regimental exercises, - Pavlov answered. - Everything is fine with us ...
General DG Pavlov came to Moscow to participate in a meeting of the GVS of the spacecraft, which was attended by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. Below is the minutes of the meeting.
From the minutes it is clear that nothing was discussed at the meeting of the GVS that would speak of the expectation of a war in June or would inspire concern.
Therefore, the commander of the frontier district Pavlov, after communicating with the leadership of the spacecraft, could not feel anxiety, like this leadership itself. In addition, the German grouping against the ZAPOVO troops has not increased since the end of May.
It is very likely that it was Stalin who pushed the military to any actions on the evening of June 9, since the military themselves are not particularly worried, believing that the situation on the border is under control.
It is possible that at the meeting with Stalin, among others, the question of the Baltic was discussed. This is evidenced by the presence in the office of the commander of the troops and a member of the military council of PribOVO.
12 June
Posted by Arnold (from Berlin): "Aryan" ... names the dates of the probable action against us on June 15-20 ... "
Posted by Zakhara (from Berlin): "__ got a job as an interpreter in the 3rd Panzer Division ... on June 9 he left Berlin and will be located near Lublin, where the unit is located ..."
Messages from Thomas (from Bucharest):
At the Malax factories, German tanks that arrived from Greece are being repaired around the clock. A total of 200 tanks are under repair, of which 75 are to be repaired by June 15th ...
The Romanians requested the consent of the Germans to declare a general mobilization in Romania on 12 June. The Germans did not give a final decision, but expressed an opinion that this event was premature ...
The movement of German troops into Moldova is not weakening ...
The Romanians requested the consent of the Germans to declare a general mobilization in Romania on 12 June. The Germans did not give a final decision, but expressed an opinion that this event was premature ...
The movement of German troops into Moldova is not weakening ...
Message from Vadim (from London):
We received information that in early June, in a private conversation with a group of officers of the Russian section of the Finnish General Staff, the following opinions were expressed:
a) Russian-German negotiations have already begun;
b) The details of the German demands are still unknown, but there is every reason to believe that the negotiations will enter their critical stage in mid-June;
c) If an agreement is not reached, the Germans will immediately land in Finland ...
a) Russian-German negotiations have already begun;
b) The details of the German demands are still unknown, but there is every reason to believe that the negotiations will enter their critical stage in mid-June;
c) If an agreement is not reached, the Germans will immediately land in Finland ...
The message of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR: "There is talk among German soldiers that on June 14.06.1941, XNUMX, Germany supposedly should start a war with the USSR ..."
Of the five messages, two name the dates of the possible start of the war: June 14 and in the period from June 15 to 20. However, the intensity of German traffic to our border is extremely low and, probably, these messages are not given due attention in the General Staff.
From the report of the German agent "Peter":
Filippov (head of the TASS department in Berlin - editor's note): “Our ... task is to find out if Germany is negotiating peace with England and if an attempt to reach a compromise with the United States is expected in the future ...
In our embassy in Berlin, there is practically no reliable information about Germany's plans for the Soviet Union.
From diary Churchill: "There is now new evidence that Hitler decided to end the interference of the Soviets and attack ..."
On June 12, British intelligence (possibly with the help of a radio intercept service) came to the conclusion that Hitler had attacked the USSR, but they still do not know about the exact date of the start of the war.
K. N. Galitsky (commander of the 24th rifle division):
On June 12, I was summoned to the district headquarters ... Having greeted, General of the Army DG Pavlov said: “From June 13-14, it is necessary to hold a monthly training session to retrain infantrymen to become specialists of other combat arms ...
In the second half of June, apparently, large exercises of the district troops will take place, during which the 24th Rifle Division will be deployed by car ... to the Grodno region ... Keep in mind, according to the exercise plan, on the 20th of June, the 50th Rifle Division will enter the region ... ...
And in conclusion he warned: “There will be no written instructions from me and the district headquarters. Do everything according to my personal instructions. Report them to the commander of the army, General Kuznetsov. If you have any unclear questions, check with the chief of staff of the district ...
In the second half of June, apparently, large exercises of the district troops will take place, during which the 24th Rifle Division will be deployed by car ... to the Grodno region ... Keep in mind, according to the exercise plan, on the 20th of June, the 50th Rifle Division will enter the region ... ...
And in conclusion he warned: “There will be no written instructions from me and the district headquarters. Do everything according to my personal instructions. Report them to the commander of the army, General Kuznetsov. If you have any unclear questions, check with the chief of staff of the district ...
D. I. Ryabyshev (commander of the 8th mechanized corps):
About ten days before the start of the war, the head of the department, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Ya. N. Fedorenko, visited us. I asked him for permission to conduct exercises on new combat vehicles so that the driver mechanics could practice driving their tanks, but he did not allow and hinted that in the near future conditions may arise when everyone will have an abundance of practice. For this, it is necessary to save the motor resource ...
Of course, it was necessary to save the motor resource, but for the successful movement on the roads of the mechanics-drivers of new tanks, they should be taught to correctly use the entrusted materiel.
13 June
The British, having received reliable information about the attack on the USSR, decide to warn our government. The British Foreign Secretary told the Soviet ambassador:
In the past 48 hours, we have received significant information. The concentration of troops can be used for the purposes of the war of nerves. I do not know for sure, but we were obliged to come to the conclusion in the light of this huge military build-up that a conflict between Germany and Russia is possible.
The head of British intelligence was also present at the meeting, who said: “The Germans are about to attack, and this attack will take place on June 21/22 or 28/29. I would bet my money on June 22nd ... "
It seems that they decided to check this information through the TASS statement.
The Soviet embassy in Berlin still does not believe in the imminent start of the war.
From Goebbels' diary:
Together with the OKW and with the consent of the Fuehrer, I am developing my article on the invasion. The theme "Crete Island as an example" ... It should appear in the "Velkischer Beobachter" and then be confiscated. London learns about this fact 24 hours later through the US Embassy ... All this should serve to disguise actions in the East ...
[June 15] British radio stations declare that our action against Russia is just a bluff behind which we are trying to hide our preparations for the invasion of England ...
[June 15] British radio stations declare that our action against Russia is just a bluff behind which we are trying to hide our preparations for the invasion of England ...
Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.N.Vatutin prepared reference "On the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West."
Historian S. L. Chekunov wrote:
For greater accuracy with regard to plans: the concentration went in accordance with the plan, the essence of which is set out in Vatutin's notes on June 13 and 14.06.1941, 13.06.1941. Attached to the note dated 15.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX is a map dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. This was the base ...
What are the main changes in the groupings of spacecraft forces in comparison with the document dated mid-May 1941?
The situation with Iran is not entirely clear for the Soviet government and the leadership of the spacecraft. The RM was alarmed about the movement of German troops on the territory of Turkey. Therefore, after the change in plans for the redeployment of the troops of the 16th Army in the Transcaucasus and the 22nd Army in Central Asia, the troops of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian Military District are reinforced. In the districts, divisions remain, which were planned to be transferred to the west in mid-May (10 divisions - in the ZakVO and 5 - in SAVO).
The group of troops covering the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal frontiers was also increased due to the refusal to transport four divisions (including four motorized and one tank) from these regions. This was probably due to the fact that the leadership of the spacecraft did not understand what they would have to face in the near future in the west.
The author includes the RGK formations in the composition of the troops in the Western direction, which are concentrated behind the Western (ZapOVO) and South-Western (KOVO and ODVO) fronts.
The Southwestern Front includes:
- 7 rifle divisions from the Kharkov Military District;
- 6 rifle divisions from the Oryol VO;
- 7 rifle divisions from the Volga Military District (21st Army).
The end point of the route of the 117th, 148th and 154th Rifle Divisions of the 21st Army is changed to KOVO. However, three divisions continue their movement in the ZAPOVO.
According to the local historian G. Tambovtsev, the seventh division (61st rifle division) remained on the territory of the Volga district:
The 61st Rifle Division was alerted on June 22. On this day, the commanders were given several hours to say goodbye to their families. No one was allowed home for the night. The division was sent to the front as the trains arrived. Its main forces were lost on June 23 and 24 ... [The division turned out to be - Approx. auth.] on the Dnieper, in the region of Rogachev and Zhlobin [Byelorussian SSR - Approx. auth.] ...
The 22nd Army, consisting of six Ural rifle divisions, does not change its route and concentrates on the territory of the ZAPOVO. Additionally, it includes the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow District, which is located in camps in the army concentration zone. After the start of the war, due to a lack of weapons, the 21st mechanized corps had to leave about 17 personnel in the camps.
According to the memoirs of the commander of the 21st mechanized corps D. D. Lelyushenko:
On June 15, according to the plan developed by the corps headquarters, the commanders of divisions and regiments began reconnaissance in the Daugavpils direction ...
Thus, after June 13, the General Staff drew attention to the grouping of our troops in the Baltic, but they are considering the advancement of an insufficiently equipped corps. Even this preparation is somehow unhurried: on June 15, they begin reconnaissance.
The transfer of a more powerful 10th mechanized corps from the Leningrad district is not considered, probably due to the incoming RM on the possible strengthening of the grouping of German troops in Finland and earlier RM on the landing of German troops in the Baltic.
The 19th Army includes:
- five rifle divisions from the North Caucasus Military District (three have already arrived on the territory of KOVO, and the fourth will arrive by June 22. The fifth division will remain in the North Caucasus until the start of the war);
- three rifle divisions of the 25th rifle corps from the Kharkov Military District (one is already on the territory of KOVO and two will arrive by June 22);
- 25th mechanized corps from the Kharkov district. The corps will receive an order to move only on the night of June 23-24.
A directive was sent to KOVO to move deep divisions closer to the state border, since their place was to be taken by arriving formations from the inner districts.
To increase the combat readiness of the district troops, by 1.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, all deep divisions and corps administrations with corps units should be transferred closer to the state border to new camps ...
1) 31st Rifle Corps - on a march;
2) 36st Rifle Corps - on a march;
3) 55st Rifle Corps - on a march;
4) 49th Rifle Corps - by rail and march;
5) 37th Rifle Corps - on a march.
Leave the border divisions in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be carried out only by my special order ...
1) 31st Rifle Corps - on a march;
2) 36st Rifle Corps - on a march;
3) 55st Rifle Corps - on a march;
4) 49th Rifle Corps - by rail and march;
5) 37th Rifle Corps - on a march.
Leave the border divisions in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be carried out only by my special order ...
The fixed date (July 1) again indicates that the General Staff and KOVO are not yet expecting a war on June 22. Therefore, directives from the KOVO headquarters to the corps will be sent on June 15.
The corps divisions will begin moving around June 18th.
For example, the 228th Rifle Division of the 36th Rifle Corps will receive an order to perform a training march on June 16, but will act only at 18:00 on June 18. Retractable joints will carry educational equipment, sports equipment, tents and bedding with them. With the advancement of divisions due to lack of transport, about half of the artillery, transported property, and practically all of the reserves of NZ will remain in the points of permanent deployment.
The 45th rifle corps of the RGK (from near Chernigov) did not rise until the beginning of the war.
Having received carte blanche, PribOVO to bring the troops into heightened combat readiness approaches the issue of moving the division more carefully. For the transportation of property, she is provided with additional vehicles.
Telephone message of the PribOVO Military Council to the commander of the 48th rifle division:
TASS message
June 13 was prepared TASS reportwhich was somewhat soothing. The text spoke of rumors in the British press about the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany, about Germany's unswerving observance of the terms of the non-aggression pact against the USSR, about the observance by the Soviet Union of the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.
From the memoirs of a former employee of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU V. G. Tolstikova:
From Chuev's book "One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov":
The TASS report was needed as a last resort. If we had delayed the war for the summer, it would have been very difficult to start it in the fall. Until now, it was possible to postpone the war diplomatically, and when this would not succeed, no one could say in advance. And to remain silent means to provoke an attack ...
Back in May, Germany was notified of Stalin's opportunity to arrive in Berlin for negotiations. At the same time, Berlin was informed about the Soviet Union's intention to defend its interests, including striking Berlin, and about the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons etc.
In May - early June, Secretary of State Meissner told our ambassador that Hitler was preparing to take an important step towards strengthening relations with the USSR, hinting at his desire to meet with Stalin.
Therefore, the TASS report was probably required not only in order to probe Hitler's intentions for the near future, but it was another attempt to drag Hitler into peace negotiations.
S. P. Ivanov (Deputy Chief of Staff of the 13th Army):
A sigh of relief involuntarily escaped me [after the release of the TASS statement on June 14 - Approx. auth.]. I thought at that moment that our government, apparently, probed the soil from the German side and received appropriate assurances ...
14 June
Information from Berlin indicates that military preparations are continuing and the ministries are convinced that the war will start in the first half of June 1941.
Molotov handed the German ambassador a TASS statement, which appeared in the newspapers a few hours later.
In Berlin, rumors are spreading about a skirmish that allegedly occurred between Hitler and Goebbels, who fell out of favor, and about the preparation of Stalin's visit to Germany, for which red banners are being made.
In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the deadline for early release from military schools was changed from July 1 to June 15. Released 48 384 commanders who were sent to the troops.
S. L. Chekunov wrote:
The chief of staff of the ODVO, Major General M.V. Zakharov, on the basis of a telephone conversation, sent a cipher telegram to the chief of the General Staff, General G.K.
In his reply, G.K. Zhukov ordered to detach the 9th separate army department and withdraw it to the Tiraspol region by June 17-18, 1941. Leave the district office in Odessa ...
In his reply, G.K. Zhukov ordered to detach the 9th separate army department and withdraw it to the Tiraspol region by June 17-18, 1941. Leave the district office in Odessa ...
15 June
Posted by Mars (from Budapest):
Slovak said:
1. In addition to five German divisions, which were transferred 3 weeks ago from the Presov region to Poland, 9 new divisions appeared in the Presov - Vranov region on June 4, including 2 motorized mechanized divisions.
2. By June 15, the Germans will complete their strategic deployment against the USSR. It is possible that they will not oppose the USSR now, but they are preparing for this, and the officers openly speak ...
1. In addition to five German divisions, which were transferred 3 weeks ago from the Presov region to Poland, 9 new divisions appeared in the Presov - Vranov region on June 4, including 2 motorized mechanized divisions.
2. By June 15, the Germans will complete their strategic deployment against the USSR. It is possible that they will not oppose the USSR now, but they are preparing for this, and the officers openly speak ...
Churchill writes to Roosevelt: “Based on the sources at my disposal, it can be assumed that a huge German offensive against Russia is inevitable. The last movement of the air and motorized parts is complete ... "
A version was circulated through diplomatic channels that by early July Germany would clarify relations with the USSR by presenting certain requirements.
The KOVO headquarters gives the order to move the divisions of the 17th Rifle Corps. By the beginning of the war, the corps was located at the Soviet-Romanian border at the junction of Ukraine and Moldova.
N. D. Yakovlev (chief of artillery KOVO):
15.06.1941/6/6 I was engaged in combat training at a large artillery range near the city of Yavoriv, north-west of Lvov ... In the camps ... there were artillery units of the XNUMXth rifle corps of the XNUMXth army, anti-aircraft artillery battalions of the Lvov air defense region and the artillery regiment of the RGK ...
I ordered to put on duty (naturally, for "training" purposes) one division of 85-mm and a division of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns on my own responsibility. He demanded that the rest of the artillery parks be removed from the field to the edge of the forest ...
I ordered to put on duty (naturally, for "training" purposes) one division of 85-mm and a division of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns on my own responsibility. He demanded that the rest of the artillery parks be removed from the field to the edge of the forest ...
Posted by Oswald (from Helsinki):
It is precisely established: in the period 5-15 June at least two motorized divisions unloaded in the ports of Vaaza, Oulu, Kemi, following by train echelons, at a rate of 12-16 and marching to the regions of Northern Finland. Unloading in ports and transportation from final unloading areas in Rovaniemi - continues ...
The message has a resolution: “Send out vols. Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, NGO, NGSH. Golikov. 16.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX ".
In the event of a provocation or conflict, two motorized divisions can quickly reach the Alakurtti station and cut the railway to Murmansk.
In two German motorized divisions, according to RU, there are from 168 to 192 light tanks and assault guns with a 75-105 mm cannon. In addition, according to unconfirmed information from the Internet, intelligence "knew" about giving some of the motorized divisions a separate tank battalion in the amount of 133 tanks.
On June 16-17, this message from Oswald reaches the People's Commissar for Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, who give the order to counter the possible advance of German motorized divisions to the Alakurtti station.
On June 17, at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, echelons with the 1st Panzer Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps begin to move towards the Alakurtti station.
From the Journal of Combat Actions of the 1st Mechanized Corps:
17.06.1941/1/XNUMX. On the personal order of the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, Major General Nikishov, XNUMX TD was taken from the corps and sent to perform a special task, where it departed, plunging into the Berezki station (in the Pskov region) ...
For your information: The dispatched division had 8 anti-aircraft guns (26 arrived on 6 June) and 80 shells for them.
To be continued ...
Information