Military Review

In a month and no more, the war will end

64

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, DHW - The main military council of the spacecraft, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, OdVO - Odessa VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, sd - rifle division, Ur - fortified area.


In the previous part it was shown that, according to RU, from June 1 to June 20, 5-7 German divisions arrived at the border, of which two were motorized and, probably, one was tank... However, this was not true. On June 9, unknown information was received, after which the transfer to the west of the 16th Army was started.

June 1941


Admiral, People's Commissar of the Navy, wrote about the June events N. G. Kuznetsov:

In those tense days, the deputy chief of the General Staff NF Vatutin came to see me. He said that he carefully reads our operational reports and reports them to his superiors. Vatutin promised to notify us immediately if the situation becomes critical...

Until late in the evening of June 21, Vatutin did not inform Kuznetsov that the situation was becoming critical. It seems that the NPO and the General Staff did not consider the situation dangerous until the evening of June 21.

Commander of the Leningrad Military District M. M. Popov told:

On the tenth of June, an NCO directive was received, which appointed ... a commission chaired by the commander of the LMO, entrusting it with the tasks of choosing sites for the construction of airfields based on fighter and bomber aviation along the shores of the Barents Sea ...

On the eve of the war, a completely unnecessary task for the level of the district commander, who must leave the headquarters for a month along with a member of the Military Council. But an acceptable task for him, if the war in June is not expected in the General Staff ...

10 June


The British do not yet know whether there will be a war or not. That's why Churchill will write in the diary: «[Joint Intelligence Agency - Approx. auth.] stated: "In the second half of June we will witness either a war or an agreement ..."

RU received two messages from KhVTs (G. Kegel - an employee of the German embassy in Moscow), in which there is no information about the beginning of the war in June:

In a month and no more, the war will end

A decision was made to change the destination of the 16th Army from Voronezh to the territory of KOVO.

Directive sent to the command of military communications:

From 11.06.1941/15/16, all military echelons of the XNUMX-thousandth series, transporting the XNUMXth army of the RGK to the Orlovsky VO, to be redirected to the territory of KOVO ...

On June 12, a directive will be sent to KOVO on the arrival of the 16th Army from June 15 to July 10 as part of the 57th Panzer Division, the 5th Mechanized Corps and the 32nd Rifle Corps. The army will be subordinate to the District Military Council.

Border districts


On June 10, a cipher telegram was sent to KOVO from the General Staff:

The head of the border troops of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that the chiefs of the UR were instructed to occupy the foreground. Report to the People's Commissar of Defense on what basis the UR KOVO units received the order to occupy the foreground. Such an action can provoke the Germans to an armed conflict. and is fraught with all sorts of consequences ... Zhukov

The answer was sent from KOVO:


It seems that the General Staff did not agree to this.

On June 11, an encrypted message was sent to KOVO:

People's Commissar of Defense ordered:

1) The front line should not be occupied by the field and UR units without special orders. Organize the security of the structures by the sentry service and patrolling.

2) Immediately cancel the orders you gave about the occupation of the UR units ...

Execution check and report to 16 June 1941.

Zhukov

On June 16, the KOVO Military Council sends another encrypted message to the Chief of the General Staff: "I ask permission to employ the personnel of the Kamenets-Podolsk and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs on the reinforced concrete structures of the first line of these URs ..."

On the cipher telegram G.K. Zhukov put a resolution:

Occupation of Kamenets-Podolsk and Mogilev-Yampolsky URs is allowed. Prepare the Ostropolsk UR along the old border for the occupation also by UR units for the purpose of training and cobble together. Urgently complete the formation of the UR units for the Kiev UR, and then prepare the UR for staffing.
Zhukov, June 18

Only Directive No. 1 will order the occupation of all facilities on the border: "I ORDER: ... during the night on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, secretly occupy the firing points of the URs on the state border ..."

For some structures (or for many) this order was given too late ...

KOVO. N.N.Semenov (Chief of Artillery of the 26th Army):

The crossing [of the German troops] turned out to be unexpected for the units of the [Przemysl UR - Approx. Auth.], who managed to break into their bunkers, but could not influence the prevention of the crossing, since the Germans blinded them and attacked from the rear ...

A. M. Baranov (Chief of Staff of the 17th Rifle Corps): “... The prepared lines were not constantly occupied by the troops. Only the protection of structures was constantly organized. [Kamyanets-Podolsk UR - Approx. auth.]... "

Combat log of the Mogilev-Podolsk UR:

By order of the commandant of the UR 40, 50 opb [opb - a separate machine gun battalion - Approx. Auth.] occupied the cover structures on 22.06.1941/15/00 and by 23.06.1941:XNUMX XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX occupied and put into combat readiness pillboxes ...

ZAPOVO. Brest UR. A. K. Shankov (platoon commander of the 18th brigade):

Almost all of April 1941, the personnel were inseparably in bunkers ...
In early May, a new order was received, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the bunkers ... Food, cartridges and shells were returned to the company warehouse ...
By the beginning of the war, there was no food or ammunition at the firing points, except for a few boxes of cartridges in the pillbox of the guard platoon ...

I. N. Shibakov (platoon commander of the 17th brigade):

Of the 8 firing points in this sector, the company occupied seven ... The shelling sectors have not been cleared. In the walls of the bunkers there were holes for the communication cable and sleeves. The material part, although it was installed, but not on alert, was in conservation ...

11 June


Help from the 1st Directorate of the NKGB:

They say that the British, having familiarized themselves with important information received from Hess, asked the United States whether they would enter the war at all, without specifying the exact date. The British allegedly demanded an immediate response, stating that if the US response was negative, then Britain would conclude a separate peace ...


Posted by John (from Stockholm): "The Germans transferred 10 divisions from the Balkan countries to the Soviet border ... A total of 74 German divisions near the Soviet-German border ..."

Posted by Air conditioning (from Helsinki):

Former Minister Hakzel said ... that Germany would attack the USSR in the near future, explaining this by the refusal to supply her with bread and fuel ...

The RM again receives unconfirmed information about the possibility of concluding peace between Germany and England, about an absurd reason for starting a war against the Soviet Union and unreliable information about the number of German divisions at the border.

Military Council KOVO prepared proposals, which he sent to the General Staff. On June 12, the General Staff approved only the proposal to move the 62nd and 135th Rifle Divisions of the 5th Army to the border.

Events in PribOVO on the eve of the war


Historian M. Solonin wrote about the events in PribOVO on the eve of the war:

Nothing of the kind can be found in the archival funds of the Leningrad, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts ... it is not possible to find ... And this is very strange - how within the framework of one country and one army there could be such a difference in the dates and times of bringing troops to a state of high combat readiness ...

The events that took place in the PribOVO gave the writers a reason to invent several versions: about the directives on June 18 from the General Staff to the border districts about bringing the troops to increased combat readiness, about betrayal in the leadership of the spacecraft, etc.

Historian about the directive of the General Staff of June 18 S. L. Chekunov wrote:

It has been documented that no directive from Moscow dated 18.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX on bringing the border districts to combat readiness did not have.

Events in the Baltics could be associated with a planned operation to evict an anti-Soviet and socially alien element in the amount of about 40 thousand people.

From the certificate of the KGB of the Lithuanian USSR dated 12.05.1988/XNUMX/XNUMX: "Since the restoration of Soviet power in Lithuania, the first eviction of the inhabitants of the republic outside its borders was carried out on June 15-17, 1941 ..."

In the spring, information was received about the preparation of a mutiny in the Baltic States. On the territory of the PribOVO there were three corps, formed from former military personnel of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. These corps (179th, 180th, 181st, 182nd, 183rd and 184th rifle divisions) have about 30 thousand people. It is likely that the government feared the actions of these associations during the deportation operation. This is indirectly evidenced by the encryption from the PribOVO headquarters, sent at 9:35 am on June 22:

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ...
In Orany there is the 184th Rifle Division, which is not yet fully staffed by our staff and is absolutely unreliable, the 179th Rifle Division - in Sventyany, is also not staffed and unreliable. I also appreciate the 181st Gulbene ...

When talking about "Our lineup", then it implies the arrival of the assigned personnel from the Moscow VO. The unreliability of the national divisions is also mentioned in the encryption of June 24:

In view of the fact that, earlier than July 10, five former territorial rifle divisions cannot be brought into battle, I ask you to allocate five new rifle divisions at my disposal ...

It turns out that the leadership of the spacecraft was obliged to know about the unreliability of territorial formations before the start of the war, but did not strengthen the grouping of troops of the PribOVO?

Why?

First. They probably thought that the situation was not yet critical. Therefore, there will be time for the transportation of a reliable assigned train.

Second, according to the General Staff, only a secondary blow was expected against the troops of the district.

Nobody in the leadership of the General Staff expected that the most powerful blow of the enemy would be delivered in the Baltic states ...

S. L. Chekunov on the forum "Militera.borda.ru" commented on the events that took place in the Baltics:


On the same day, the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was sent to the Military Council of the ZAPOVO:

To increase the combat readiness of the troops in the district, all deep rifle divisions and command and control of rifle corps with corps units should be withdrawn to the camp in the areas provided for them by the cover plan.
1. Leave the border divisions in place, their withdrawal to the border in the areas assigned to them, if necessary, will be made on my special order.
2.The 44th rifle corps, as part of the corps management, 108, 64, 161 and 143rd rifle divisions and corps units - to withdraw to the Baranovichi area, at your discretion ...
4. The withdrawal of these troops should be completed by July 1, 1941 ...

From the deadline for the implementation of measures for the withdrawal of troops, it follows that at this time the beginning of the war on June 22 is not expected.

From the Combat Log of the 44th Rifle Corps:

15.06.1941/44/XNUMX XNUMX sc received the order - to go to the mobile camp ...
All parts of the hull were not fully provided with the prescribed weapons and ammunition. As a result, the events that unfolded on June 22 found corps units unprepared for engaging in battle ...

It is possible that at this time the question of starting the advancement of rifle corps of the 21st and 22nd armies to the places determined by the General Staff in mid-May is being discussed. Since the General Staff does not know about the true enemy groupings and their directions of strikes, the corps of these armies move forward to parry enemy attacks, which were predicted in the General Staff. Since an auxiliary strike is expected in the Baltics, the PribOVO force grouping remains unchanged.


In June, Ramsay received information from the military attaché in Japan, who departed from Berlin on May 6.05.1941, XNUMX:

The first and main blow will be inflicted by the Germans on the spacecraft by their left flank [in the Baltic States - Approx. auth.]. The Germans are completely surethat the main forces of the spacecraft will be concentrated in the opposite direction from the line, giving full opportunity for a strong blow ...

The tragic accident was that, probably, our intelligence officer was confident in the complete control of the RU situation on the border. Therefore, in early June, he wrote only about the error: "A big tactical mistake that ... was made by the USSR"... The message about the direction of the main attack will come to RU only at the beginning of July ...

On June 12, a directive is sent to ZAPOVO on the redeployment of the 63rd and 51st rifle corps from the Volga and Ural VOs, respectively:

The following will arrive on the territory of the ZAPOVO in the period from 17.06 to 2.07.1941:
51 pp. Hull consisting of: hull control with hull parts, 98, 112 and 153 sd;
63 pp. Case consisting of: case control with case parts, ... 53 and 148 sd ...

It seems that the next day, another decision was made to transport the 167th Rifle Division from the Volga Military District, the trains from which began moving on June 14. Troop movements had to be hidden from the Germans, so as not to provoke them and to maintain balance on the border. This is how Moscow should think, not knowing Hitler's true plans ...

The KOVO Military Council has prepared Directive, which determines the procedure for handling ammunition, equipment, fuel, food and fodder.

N.N. Voronov (Head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense) wrote in his memoirs:

A few days before the start of the war, I accidentally met in Moscow with the commander of the troops [ZAPOVO - Approx. author] DG Pavlov: "How are you doing?"
- The troops of the district stomp on various tactical battalion and regimental exercises, - Pavlov answered. - Everything is fine with us ...

General DG Pavlov came to Moscow to participate in a meeting of the GVS of the spacecraft, which was attended by the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff. Below is the minutes of the meeting.


From the minutes it is clear that nothing was discussed at the meeting of the GVS that would speak of the expectation of a war in June or would inspire concern.

Therefore, the commander of the frontier district Pavlov, after communicating with the leadership of the spacecraft, could not feel anxiety, like this leadership itself. In addition, the German grouping against the ZAPOVO troops has not increased since the end of May.

It is very likely that it was Stalin who pushed the military to any actions on the evening of June 9, since the military themselves are not particularly worried, believing that the situation on the border is under control.

It is possible that at the meeting with Stalin, among others, the question of the Baltic was discussed. This is evidenced by the presence in the office of the commander of the troops and a member of the military council of PribOVO.


12 June


Posted by Arnold (from Berlin): "Aryan" ... names the dates of the probable action against us on June 15-20 ... "

Posted by Zakhara (from Berlin): "__ got a job as an interpreter in the 3rd Panzer Division ... on June 9 he left Berlin and will be located near Lublin, where the unit is located ..."

Messages from Thomas (from Bucharest):

At the Malax factories, German tanks that arrived from Greece are being repaired around the clock. A total of 200 tanks are under repair, of which 75 are to be repaired by June 15th ...
The Romanians requested the consent of the Germans to declare a general mobilization in Romania on 12 June. The Germans did not give a final decision, but expressed an opinion that this event was premature ...
The movement of German troops into Moldova is not weakening ...

Message from Vadim (from London):

We received information that in early June, in a private conversation with a group of officers of the Russian section of the Finnish General Staff, the following opinions were expressed:
a) Russian-German negotiations have already begun;
b) The details of the German demands are still unknown, but there is every reason to believe that the negotiations will enter their critical stage in mid-June;
c) If an agreement is not reached, the Germans will immediately land in Finland ...

The message of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR: "There is talk among German soldiers that on June 14.06.1941, XNUMX, Germany supposedly should start a war with the USSR ..."

Of the five messages, two name the dates of the possible start of the war: June 14 and in the period from June 15 to 20. However, the intensity of German traffic to our border is extremely low and, probably, these messages are not given due attention in the General Staff.

From the report of the German agent "Peter":

Filippov (head of the TASS department in Berlin - editor's note): “Our ... task is to find out if Germany is negotiating peace with England and if an attempt to reach a compromise with the United States is expected in the future ...

In our embassy in Berlin, there is practically no reliable information about Germany's plans for the Soviet Union.

From diary Churchill: "There is now new evidence that Hitler decided to end the interference of the Soviets and attack ..."

On June 12, British intelligence (possibly with the help of a radio intercept service) came to the conclusion that Hitler had attacked the USSR, but they still do not know about the exact date of the start of the war.

K. N. Galitsky (commander of the 24th rifle division):

On June 12, I was summoned to the district headquarters ... Having greeted, General of the Army DG Pavlov said: “From June 13-14, it is necessary to hold a monthly training session to retrain infantrymen to become specialists of other combat arms ...
In the second half of June, apparently, large exercises of the district troops will take place, during which the 24th Rifle Division will be deployed by car ... to the Grodno region ... Keep in mind, according to the exercise plan, on the 20th of June, the 50th Rifle Division will enter the region ... ...
And in conclusion he warned: “There will be no written instructions from me and the district headquarters. Do everything according to my personal instructions. Report them to the commander of the army, General Kuznetsov. If you have any unclear questions, check with the chief of staff of the district ...

D. I. Ryabyshev (commander of the 8th mechanized corps):

About ten days before the start of the war, the head of the department, Lieutenant General of Tank Forces Ya. N. Fedorenko, visited us. I asked him for permission to conduct exercises on new combat vehicles so that the driver mechanics could practice driving their tanks, but he did not allow and hinted that in the near future conditions may arise when everyone will have an abundance of practice. For this, it is necessary to save the motor resource ...

Of course, it was necessary to save the motor resource, but for the successful movement on the roads of the mechanics-drivers of new tanks, they should be taught to correctly use the entrusted materiel.

13 June


The British, having received reliable information about the attack on the USSR, decide to warn our government. The British Foreign Secretary told the Soviet ambassador:

In the past 48 hours, we have received significant information. The concentration of troops can be used for the purposes of the war of nerves. I do not know for sure, but we were obliged to come to the conclusion in the light of this huge military build-up that a conflict between Germany and Russia is possible.

The head of British intelligence was also present at the meeting, who said: “The Germans are about to attack, and this attack will take place on June 21/22 or 28/29. I would bet my money on June 22nd ... "

It seems that they decided to check this information through the TASS statement.


The Soviet embassy in Berlin still does not believe in the imminent start of the war.

From Goebbels' diary:

Together with the OKW and with the consent of the Fuehrer, I am developing my article on the invasion. The theme "Crete Island as an example" ... It should appear in the "Velkischer Beobachter" and then be confiscated. London learns about this fact 24 hours later through the US Embassy ... All this should serve to disguise actions in the East ...
[June 15] British radio stations declare that our action against Russia is just a bluff behind which we are trying to hide our preparations for the invasion of England ...

Deputy Chief of the General Staff F.N.Vatutin prepared reference "On the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war in the West."

Historian S. L. Chekunov wrote:

For greater accuracy with regard to plans: the concentration went in accordance with the plan, the essence of which is set out in Vatutin's notes on June 13 and 14.06.1941, 13.06.1941. Attached to the note dated 15.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX is a map dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX. This was the base ...

What are the main changes in the groupings of spacecraft forces in comparison with the document dated mid-May 1941?

The situation with Iran is not entirely clear for the Soviet government and the leadership of the spacecraft. The RM was alarmed about the movement of German troops on the territory of Turkey. Therefore, after the change in plans for the redeployment of the troops of the 16th Army in the Transcaucasus and the 22nd Army in Central Asia, the troops of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian Military District are reinforced. In the districts, divisions remain, which were planned to be transferred to the west in mid-May (10 divisions - in the ZakVO and 5 - in SAVO).

The group of troops covering the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal frontiers was also increased due to the refusal to transport four divisions (including four motorized and one tank) from these regions. This was probably due to the fact that the leadership of the spacecraft did not understand what they would have to face in the near future in the west.

The author includes the RGK formations in the composition of the troops in the Western direction, which are concentrated behind the Western (ZapOVO) and South-Western (KOVO and ODVO) fronts.


The Southwestern Front includes:

- 7 rifle divisions from the Kharkov Military District;
- 6 rifle divisions from the Oryol VO;
- 7 rifle divisions from the Volga Military District (21st Army).

The end point of the route of the 117th, 148th and 154th Rifle Divisions of the 21st Army is changed to KOVO. However, three divisions continue their movement in the ZAPOVO.

According to the local historian G. Tambovtsev, the seventh division (61st rifle division) remained on the territory of the Volga district:

The 61st Rifle Division was alerted on June 22. On this day, the commanders were given several hours to say goodbye to their families. No one was allowed home for the night. The division was sent to the front as the trains arrived. Its main forces were lost on June 23 and 24 ... [The division turned out to be - Approx. auth.] on the Dnieper, in the region of Rogachev and Zhlobin [Byelorussian SSR - Approx. auth.] ...

The 22nd Army, consisting of six Ural rifle divisions, does not change its route and concentrates on the territory of the ZAPOVO. Additionally, it includes the 21st mechanized corps from the Moscow District, which is located in camps in the army concentration zone. After the start of the war, due to a lack of weapons, the 21st mechanized corps had to leave about 17 personnel in the camps.

According to the memoirs of the commander of the 21st mechanized corps D. D. Lelyushenko:

On June 15, according to the plan developed by the corps headquarters, the commanders of divisions and regiments began reconnaissance in the Daugavpils direction ...

Thus, after June 13, the General Staff drew attention to the grouping of our troops in the Baltic, but they are considering the advancement of an insufficiently equipped corps. Even this preparation is somehow unhurried: on June 15, they begin reconnaissance.

The transfer of a more powerful 10th mechanized corps from the Leningrad district is not considered, probably due to the incoming RM on the possible strengthening of the grouping of German troops in Finland and earlier RM on the landing of German troops in the Baltic.

The 19th Army includes:

- five rifle divisions from the North Caucasus Military District (three have already arrived on the territory of KOVO, and the fourth will arrive by June 22. The fifth division will remain in the North Caucasus until the start of the war);
- three rifle divisions of the 25th rifle corps from the Kharkov Military District (one is already on the territory of KOVO and two will arrive by June 22);
- 25th mechanized corps from the Kharkov district. The corps will receive an order to move only on the night of June 23-24.

A directive was sent to KOVO to move deep divisions closer to the state border, since their place was to be taken by arriving formations from the inner districts.

To increase the combat readiness of the district troops, by 1.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, all deep divisions and corps administrations with corps units should be transferred closer to the state border to new camps ...
1) 31st Rifle Corps - on a march;
2) 36st Rifle Corps - on a march;
3) 55st Rifle Corps - on a march;
4) 49th Rifle Corps - by rail and march;
5) 37th Rifle Corps - on a march.
Leave the border divisions in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be carried out only by my special order ...

The fixed date (July 1) again indicates that the General Staff and KOVO are not yet expecting a war on June 22. Therefore, directives from the KOVO headquarters to the corps will be sent on June 15.

The corps divisions will begin moving around June 18th.

For example, the 228th Rifle Division of the 36th Rifle Corps will receive an order to perform a training march on June 16, but will act only at 18:00 on June 18. Retractable joints will carry educational equipment, sports equipment, tents and bedding with them. With the advancement of divisions due to lack of transport, about half of the artillery, transported property, and practically all of the reserves of NZ will remain in the points of permanent deployment.

The 45th rifle corps of the RGK (from near Chernigov) did not rise until the beginning of the war.

Having received carte blanche, PribOVO to bring the troops into heightened combat readiness approaches the issue of moving the division more carefully. For the transportation of property, she is provided with additional vehicles.

Telephone message of the PribOVO Military Council to the commander of the 48th rifle division:


TASS message


June 13 was prepared TASS reportwhich was somewhat soothing. The text spoke of rumors in the British press about the proximity of the war between the USSR and Germany, about Germany's unswerving observance of the terms of the non-aggression pact against the USSR, about the observance by the Soviet Union of the terms of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

From the memoirs of a former employee of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU V. G. Tolstikova:


From Chuev's book "One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov":

The TASS report was needed as a last resort. If we had delayed the war for the summer, it would have been very difficult to start it in the fall. Until now, it was possible to postpone the war diplomatically, and when this would not succeed, no one could say in advance. And to remain silent means to provoke an attack ...

Back in May, Germany was notified of Stalin's opportunity to arrive in Berlin for negotiations. At the same time, Berlin was informed about the Soviet Union's intention to defend its interests, including striking Berlin, and about the possible use of chemical and bacteriological weapons etc.

In May - early June, Secretary of State Meissner told our ambassador that Hitler was preparing to take an important step towards strengthening relations with the USSR, hinting at his desire to meet with Stalin.

Therefore, the TASS report was probably required not only in order to probe Hitler's intentions for the near future, but it was another attempt to drag Hitler into peace negotiations.

S. P. Ivanov (Deputy Chief of Staff of the 13th Army):

A sigh of relief involuntarily escaped me [after the release of the TASS statement on June 14 - Approx. auth.]. I thought at that moment that our government, apparently, probed the soil from the German side and received appropriate assurances ...

14 June


Information from Berlin indicates that military preparations are continuing and the ministries are convinced that the war will start in the first half of June 1941.

Molotov handed the German ambassador a TASS statement, which appeared in the newspapers a few hours later.

In Berlin, rumors are spreading about a skirmish that allegedly occurred between Hitler and Goebbels, who fell out of favor, and about the preparation of Stalin's visit to Germany, for which red banners are being made.

In accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, the deadline for early release from military schools was changed from July 1 to June 15. Released 48 384 commanders who were sent to the troops.

S. L. Chekunov wrote:

The chief of staff of the ODVO, Major General M.V. Zakharov, on the basis of a telephone conversation, sent a cipher telegram to the chief of the General Staff, General G.K.
In his reply, G.K. Zhukov ordered to detach the 9th separate army department and withdraw it to the Tiraspol region by June 17-18, 1941. Leave the district office in Odessa ...

15 June


Posted by Mars (from Budapest):

Slovak said:
1. In addition to five German divisions, which were transferred 3 weeks ago from the Presov region to Poland, 9 new divisions appeared in the Presov - Vranov region on June 4, including 2 motorized mechanized divisions.
2. By June 15, the Germans will complete their strategic deployment against the USSR. It is possible that they will not oppose the USSR now, but they are preparing for this, and the officers openly speak ...

Churchill writes to Roosevelt: “Based on the sources at my disposal, it can be assumed that a huge German offensive against Russia is inevitable. The last movement of the air and motorized parts is complete ... "

A version was circulated through diplomatic channels that by early July Germany would clarify relations with the USSR by presenting certain requirements.

The KOVO headquarters gives the order to move the divisions of the 17th Rifle Corps. By the beginning of the war, the corps was located at the Soviet-Romanian border at the junction of Ukraine and Moldova.

N. D. Yakovlev (chief of artillery KOVO):

15.06.1941/6/6 I was engaged in combat training at a large artillery range near the city of Yavoriv, ​​north-west of Lvov ... In the camps ... there were artillery units of the XNUMXth rifle corps of the XNUMXth army, anti-aircraft artillery battalions of the Lvov air defense region and the artillery regiment of the RGK ...
I ordered to put on duty (naturally, for "training" purposes) one division of 85-mm and a division of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns on my own responsibility. He demanded that the rest of the artillery parks be removed from the field to the edge of the forest ...

Posted by Oswald (from Helsinki):

It is precisely established: in the period 5-15 June at least two motorized divisions unloaded in the ports of Vaaza, Oulu, Kemi, following by train echelons, at a rate of 12-16 and marching to the regions of Northern Finland. Unloading in ports and transportation from final unloading areas in Rovaniemi - continues ...

The message has a resolution: “Send out vols. Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, NGO, NGSH. Golikov. 16.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX ".

In the event of a provocation or conflict, two motorized divisions can quickly reach the Alakurtti station and cut the railway to Murmansk.


In two German motorized divisions, according to RU, there are from 168 to 192 light tanks and assault guns with a 75-105 mm cannon. In addition, according to unconfirmed information from the Internet, intelligence "knew" about giving some of the motorized divisions a separate tank battalion in the amount of 133 tanks.

On June 16-17, this message from Oswald reaches the People's Commissar for Defense and the Chief of the General Staff, who give the order to counter the possible advance of German motorized divisions to the Alakurtti station.

On June 17, at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, echelons with the 1st Panzer Division of the 1st Mechanized Corps begin to move towards the Alakurtti station.

From the Journal of Combat Actions of the 1st Mechanized Corps:

17.06.1941/1/XNUMX. On the personal order of the Chief of Staff of the Leningrad Military District, Major General Nikishov, XNUMX TD was taken from the corps and sent to perform a special task, where it departed, plunging into the Berezki station (in the Pskov region) ...

For your information: The dispatched division had 8 anti-aircraft guns (26 arrived on 6 June) and 80 shells for them.

To be continued ...
Author:
64 comments
Ad

Subscribe to our Telegram channel, daily additional materials that do not get on the site: https://t.me/topwar_ru

Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. polpot
    polpot 16 September 2021 18: 12
    +21
    Thank you, I read it with interest, we look forward to continuing.
  2. motorized rifle
    motorized rifle 16 September 2021 18: 17
    -5
    [/ quote] Historian M. Solonin wrote about the events / quote]
    . [/ quote] In addition, according to unconfirmed information from the Internet, intelligence "knew" about giving some motorized divisions a separate tank battalion in the amount of 133 tanks [/ quote]

    FSE! Drain the water!
    1. tihonmarine
      tihonmarine 16 September 2021 18: 29
      0
      Quote: motorized infantryman
      ] Historian M. Solonin wrote about the events in

      You can't trust corned beef.
      1. Alex_1973
        Alex_1973 16 September 2021 23: 04
        -3
        tihonmarine (Vlad)
        You can't trust corned beef.
        It's not even about Corned beef, the main message is this:
        according to unconfirmed information from the Internet
        , this is really a pearl ...!
      2. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk 16 September 2021 23: 05
        +1
        Quote: tihonmarine
        Quote: motorized infantryman
        ] Historian M. Solonin wrote about the events in

        You can't trust corned beef.

        In no case.
      3. lelik613
        lelik613 18 September 2021 17: 25
        0
        Ja, ja, natürlich! Isteric s? Olonin das grosse Seifenblase ...
    2. Catfish
      Catfish 17 September 2021 05: 27
      +3
      [quote] ... a separate tank battalion in the amount of 133 tanks [/ quote] [/ quote]
      "The first staff of a separate wartime tank battalion was accepted in the same September 1941. According to this state, the battalion was supposed to have three tank companies (one company of medium and two companies of light tanks). The staff was supposed to have 130 people and 29 tanks." (C)
      There were options from 29 to 36 tanks in retaliation, but 133 tanks, even for fantasy, is too much.

      I served in a separate tank regiment, and in 1967 it had three three-company battalions, 10 T-54 tanks in a company plus a battalion commander's vehicle, in total - 93 vehicles plus a regiment's tank, plus three PT-76s in reconnaissance. So count it. And this is a regiment!

      So "let the one who carries this nonsense drain the water. laughing
      1. icant007
        icant007 17 September 2021 09: 21
        -5
        Quote: Sea Cat
        I served in a separate tank regiment, and in 1967 it had three three-company battalions, 10 T-54 tanks in a company plus a battalion commander's vehicle, in total - 93 vehicles plus a regiment's tank, plus three PT-76s in reconnaissance. So count it. And this is a regiment!


        The number of combat vehicles in subunits and, accordingly, in units and formations has been reduced since the beginning of the war and up to the present time.

        And at the beginning of the war, both us and the Germans, the tank battalions in the state were very inflated. The Germans have 70 tanks on average, we have plus or minus 50.
        From this angle, the number 133 no longer seems fantastic. Although very doubtful.
    3. ccsr
      ccsr 18 September 2021 15: 05
      .
      Quote: motorized infantryman
      .In addition, according to unconfirmed information from the Internet, intelligence "knew" about giving some motorized divisions a separate tank battalion in the amount of 133 tanks

      FSE! Drain the water!

      I hope you now understand what kind of "researcher" a certain anonymous "Alexei Ivanov" is, if he takes as a basis the "intelligence materials" invented by him about 133 tanks in the battalion. But the funny thing is that local "experts on military history" believe in this nonsense, and do not even require the author to document his lies. As they say, there is nowhere to swim further ...
      1. zenion
        zenion 4 November 2021 11: 11
        0
        I read Solonin and much of what he wrote about the beginning of the war coincides with what my wife's grandfather and other front-line soldiers who survived told me. Of course, neither the grandfather nor the other front-line soldiers had complete information about the whole country, but if you read or listen to stories from different places, you can imagine a picture. The same thing that happened to my wife's grandfather literally coincides with what my cousin said, who was traveling to the Baltic States, where their regiment of heavy tanks was sent. They were taken to one place, the tanks to another, and everything for the tanks in the third, and at four o'clock the war began. Here is such a coincidence in Ukraine and the Baltic states. A huge mess in the country in which the great officials were to blame, but Stalin was made guilty.
  3. boni592807
    boni592807 16 September 2021 18: 41
    +7
    History teaches that IT is not taught. watching modern reruns in real life ...
  4. Sasha from Uralmash
    Sasha from Uralmash 16 September 2021 19: 08
    +6
    Everyone knew, everyone was preparing, but it happened, what happened! Do not step on the same rake!
  5. Operator
    Operator 16 September 2021 19: 18
    .
    On June 21, 1941, the military attaché of the Soviet embassy in Berlin - he is also the chief resident of the General Staff of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Germany - sent a radio message that the next morning Germany would attack the USSR.

    Beria personally reported the radio coded message to Stalin with a recommendation to immediately recall and shoot the military attaché for disinformation. Lavrenty Pavlovich was famous for his ability to always correctly understand the political attitudes of his boss.
    1. parusnik
      parusnik 16 September 2021 20: 28
      +11
      In the early morning of June 22, 1941, the Soviet military attaché in Berlin, Major General V. I. Tupikov, ordered the cipher officer to send a radiogram to Moscow, this was his last message to Moscow from Berlin. on the morning of June 24, it was completely blocked by the German police. With the mediation of the Swedish Embassy, ​​an agreement was reached on the export of all Soviet citizens on several trains to the area of ​​the Bulgarian-Turkish border for exchange for German diplomats who arrived from Moscow. The special train departed from Berlin on July 1 and only ten days later arrived at the appointed place. After a thorough examination of the documents, the staff of the Soviet embassy moved one by one to neutral Turkish territory. Upon his return to the USSR, Major General Tupikov was placed at the disposal of the NCO Personnel Directorate and was appointed Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front (July - September 1941). He took office on July 29, 1941, at a time when the troops of the Southwestern Front fought heavy defensive battles against superior enemy forces in the Right-Bank Ukraine. On September 20-21, 1941, when leaving the encirclement in the Shumeikovo tract (grove) not far from the Dryukovshchina farm (according to other sources, near the Ovdievka farm), Lokhvitsky district, Poltava region in battle, front commander M.P. Kirponos and front chief of staff V. I. Tupikov died from enemy fire, and the unconscious and wounded officers (including Major General M. I. Potapov) were taken prisoner.
    2. Krasnoyarsk
      Krasnoyarsk 16 September 2021 23: 08
      +10
      Quote: Operator

      Beria personally reported the radio coded message to Stalin with a recommendation to immediately recall and shoot the military attaché for disinformation.

      Have you heard it personally? laughing
      1. Operator
        Operator 17 September 2021 00: 12
        .
        Vladimir Ivanovich Vinokurov - Professor of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Center for Military-Diplomatic Analysis and Assessment, Doctor of Historical Sciences:
        "On June 21, the day before the start of the war, Beria wrote to Stalin in his report:" I again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who continues to bombard me with "disinformation" about Hitler's alleged attack on the USSR. that this attack will begin tomorrow. The same was radioed by Major General Tupikov, the military attaché in Berlin ... He claims that three groups of the Wehrmacht armies will attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, citing Berlin agents "
        https://nvo.ng.ru/spforces/2021-06-24/1_1146_aggression.html

        PS D. biles who graze in the comments on VO will tear their own ...... bully
        1. Krasnoyarsk
          Krasnoyarsk 17 September 2021 09: 10
          +9
          Quote: Operator
          PS D. biles who graze in the comments on VO will tear their own ......

          Judging by your minuses, they did break it ... wassat
        2. Tamer
          Tamer 17 September 2021 09: 50
          +16
          Quote: Operator
          June 21, the day before the start of the war, Beria in the report to Stalin

          None of the "operators" of this "note" presented it as they did not ask laughing
    3. Tamer
      Tamer 17 September 2021 10: 53
      +12
      On June 21, 1941, the military attaché of the Soviet embassy in Berlin - he is also the chief resident of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces in Germany, sent a radio message that the next morning Germany would attack the USSR

      According to P.I. Ivashutin, on June 21, a message about the attack on June 22 was sent by the military attaché in France, General Susloparov:
      "On the report of the military attaché in France, General Susloparov, dated June 21, 1941, that, according to reliable data, the attack was scheduled for June 22, 1941, there is Stalin's resolution:
      "This information is an English provocation. Find out who the author of this provocation is, and punish him" (Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. 1990. No. 5. P.57)
      There is also Beria's report of 21.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, which you indicate below, referring to the article of V.I. Vinokurov, is given more complete:
      “I again insist on the recall and punishment of our ambassador in Berlin, Dekanozov, who is still bombarding me with 'disinformation' about Hitler’s allegedly preparing an attack on the USSR. He announced that this attack would begin tomorrow. Major General V.I. Tupikov, military attaché in Berlin. This stupid general claims that three groups of the Wehrmacht armies will attack Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, citing Berlin agents. " wink
  6. ccsr
    ccsr 16 September 2021 20: 44
    .
    Author:
    Alexey Ivanov
    In the previous section, it was shown that, according to RU, from June 1 to June 20, 5-7 German divisions arrived at the border, of which two were motorized and, probably, one was a tank division. However, this was not true.

    This is a heinous lie, because according to intelligence report No. 5, as early as June 1, 1941, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions were concentrated on the border with the USSR. The author has no idea what came later to our border, because he did not see a single daily report of the RS GSh until June 21 and wonders on the coffee grounds.
    On June 9, unknown information was received, after which the transfer to the west of the 16th Army was started.

    This primitive lie was refuted by Major General I.P. Makara in the article "From the experience of planning the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war with Germany and direct preparation for repelling aggression" (Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal No. 6, 2006, p. 3-9):
    “In April - May 1941, the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff began with the consent of the government to covertly mobilize military reserves under the guise of large training camps. The goal was to strengthen military units and formations in 14 military districts. In total, over 802 thousand enlisted personnel were called up for training camps before the war, which amounted to 24 percent. its total number according to the mobilization plan MP-41. This event allowed to strengthen half of all rifle divisions, intended mainly for operations in the west. At the same time, the units and formations of other arms and branches of the Armed Forces were replenished.
    A very important decision was made to move the troops of the second strategic echelon - the reserve armies of the High Command. The formation of this echelon in the Western theater of operations began on May 13, 1941, when, with the permission of I.V. Stalin's General Staff issued orders for the advancement of the four armies formed in the internal districts: The 22nd - from the Ural Military District to the Velikiye Luki region, the 21st - from the Volga Military District to the Gomel region, the 19th - from the North Caucasian Military District to the Belaya Tserkov area and the 16th - from the Trans-Baikal Military District to the Proskurov region. The 25th Rifle Corps from the Kharkiv Military District, which was subordinated to the 19th Army, also moved westward. ”
    The city of Proskurov, it has been Khmelnitsky since 1954, and Shepetovka is a city, a district center that is part of the Khmelnitsky region of modern ...

    Those. no information was needed on June 9, because the decision to redeploy the 16th Army was made at the General Staff on May 13, 1941.
    This is how this would-be researcher deceives the gullible public, slipping his conjectures as irrefutable facts.
    1. smaug78
      smaug78 16 September 2021 21: 15
      +11
      This is a heinous lie, because according to intelligence report No. 5
      Link will be?
      And then
      Reconnaissance report No. 5 (in the West) RU GSh KA 15.06.1941/30/1: “... b) in the Warsaw direction (against the West) 1 divisions, incl. ... 6 md, 4 td and 1 tp (8 td in total), XNUMX cd and XNUMX kn; ... "
      In total, there were 5 TD and MD in front of the entire ZAPOVO (including two conventional tank divisions consisting of four tank regiments in bulk; headquarters were not found).
      ...
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 17 September 2021 11: 56
        .
        Quote: smaug78
        Link will be?

        Isn't the summary enough for you? It was even used by the author of the article, but the conclusions of this pseudo-researcher are simply wild.
        I have already provided scans of pages where a fairly detailed view of this summary is given. What, bring it again?
        Quote: smaug78
        And then

        And what "and then"? Or do you think that the Germans were obliged to transfer all divisions at the same time, and not to regiments and separate battalions to the place of future deployment?



        Quote: north 2
        Why on the pages of VO history is not reviewed by such recognized historians as Zhukov, Fursov or Spitsyn, but reviewed by those who refer to Solonin ...

        I agree with your conclusions and the assessment of the writings on VO - here is just obscurantism in relation to historically confirmed facts and documents, but by a "historian", for example. they call a certain Chekunov, who has neither historical nor military education, and started his business by offering to scan TsAMO documents for money.
        So the appearance of such pseudo-researchers as the author of the article is quite natural. True, their motives may be different, but the goal is the same - to discredit our history, which they do by publishing such near-historical nonsense.
        1. smaug78
          smaug78 17 September 2021 19: 25
          +9
          And then the head. the warehouse, as usual, galloped over and carried nonsense ...
          Head warehouse
          This is a heinous lie, because according to intelligence report No. 5, as early as June 1, 1941, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions were concentrated on the border with the USSR.
          .
          Intelligence report number 5
          Reconnaissance report No. 5 (in the West) RU GSh KA 15.06.1941/30/1: “... b) in the Warsaw direction (against the West) 1 divisions, incl. ... 6 md, 4 td and 1 tp (8 td in total), XNUMX cd and XNUMX kn; ... "
          In total, there were 5 TD and MD in front of the entire ZAPOVO (including two conventional tank divisions consisting of four tank regiments in bulk; headquarters were not found).
          ... Storyteller, how did you get more connections for an earlier number than in the summary for a later one? Did you drink your brain completely?
          Ingenious skipping
          And what "and then"? Or do you think that the Germans were obliged to transfer all divisions at the same time, and not to regiments and separate battalions to the place of future deployment?
          ... Funny, you were not taught at school - chtol? is there before and what is after? laughing
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 17 September 2021 19: 43
            .
            Quote: smaug78
            Funny, you were not taught at school - chtol? is there before and what is after?

            What is the question, "expert" of military reports? Can you correctly formulate, or did you still not understand what the monthly summary of the General Staff of the General Staff is and why does it indicate the total number of tank and motorized divisions?
            Quote: smaug78
            In total, there were 5 TD and MD in front of the entire ZAPOVO (including two conventional tank divisions consisting of four tank regiments in bulk; headquarters were not found).

            Why are you misinterpreting bulletin # 5, which clearly states that there was "one tank and six tank regiments (four tank divisions in total)" - are you lying deliberately to please the author of the article? And about the headquarters in paragraph "b", to which you refer, there is not a word - there are no words "headquarters not found." Are you a professional forger or do you believe in all the lies spread by liars like "Eugene"?
            1. smaug78
              smaug78 17 September 2021 19: 59
              +8
              Head warehouse, don't wiggle your tail ... bring your summary, then pid..with, yes links laughing PS In the dates, the clown is completely confused laughing
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 17 September 2021 20: 38
                .
                Quote: smaug78
                Bring your summary, then pid..with, yes links

                I have brought them several times, but people like you do not understand anything about them, that is why they do not hesitate to lie.
                Study the first sheet again, and ask the liar Evgeny for all the others - I laid it all out a long time ago, and he used my scans to distort it:
                https://d.radikal.ru/d04/1802/72/b1982646d840.jpg
                https://d.radikal.ru/d04/1802/72/b1982646d840.jpg

                https://d.radikal.ru/d04/1802/72/b1982646d840.jpg
                I hope you will no longer lie about the Warsaw direction that "the headquarters have not been found" - or were you few in childhood whipped for lies?
                Quote: smaug78
                PS In the dates, the clown is completely confused

                What dates, name them a liar.
                1. smaug78
                  smaug78 17 September 2021 20: 57
                  +12
                  This is a heinous lie, because according to intelligence report No. 5, as early as June 1, 1941, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions were concentrated on the border with the USSR.

                  Reconnaissance report No. 5 (in the West) RU GSh KA 15.06.1941/30/1: “... b) in the Warsaw direction (against the West) 1 divisions, incl. ... 6 md, 4 td and 1 tp (8 td in total), XNUMX cd and XNUMX kn; ... "
                  In total, there were 5 TD and MD in front of the entire ZAPOVO (including two conventional tank divisions consisting of four tank regiments in bulk; headquarters were not found).
                  Head warehouse, you are an ordinary lying, cowardly pid..r. You are not enough on the militia piz ... whether. I decided to piz.t here ...
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 17 September 2021 21: 26
                    .
                    Quote: smaug78
                    Head warehouse, you are an ordinary lying, cowardly pid..r.

                    I realized that your lie was exposed and you began to grumble saliva as usual. But I have nothing to do with it, since you do not know how to understand the summaries.
                    Quote: smaug78
                    It's not enough for you on the militia piz ... whether. I decided to piz.t here ...

                    Yes, you better refute the summary, and not remember about the dead militia, where different Chekunovs told about one telegraph apparatus at the General Staff's communications center ...
  7. north 2
    north 2 17 September 2021 06: 15
    .
    I recently heard the speeches of one blogger, so he already flew very high in the clouds and reported with ambition that bloggers in Russia are stronger than acting and recognized academic historians and even leaders of state. But when their creations were completely historical education that did not have Solonin and Rezun, bloggers did not exist yet, but it was precisely on the attractiveness of striking the recognized works of recognized academic historians that Rezun and Solonin began to publicly and openly poke their concepts of falsification of history to us, and this has already reached up to hundreds of falsifiers who are now simply raging on the Internet and calling themselves historians. But how can you make an audit of history if 99% of them were not allowed even into the state. archives and archives of the Second World War? How much time did Suvorov and Rezun spend in the archives, as, by the way, and the author of this article, Ivanov? Therefore, their works and articles are either generalized synopses from someone's memoirs or a primitive cryptohistory with elements of historical revenge. Why on the pages of VO history is not reviewed by such recognized historians as Zhukov, Fursov or Spitsyn, but reviewed by those who refer to Solonin ...
  8. icant007
    icant007 17 September 2021 17: 34
    .
    I.N.Shibakov (platoon commander of the 17th brigade):

    Of the 8 firing points in this sector, the company occupied seven ... The shelling sectors have not been cleared. In the walls of the bunkers there were holes for the communication cable and sleeves. The material part, although it was installed, but not on alert, was in conservation ...


    It would seem, what conclusion should be drawn from this. Impossible to fight?
    This group fought until June 30. I wonder what and how if everything was so bad.

    http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/sb_bug_v_ogne/10.html
    1. lelik613
      lelik613 18 September 2021 17: 41
      -1
      On the moral and strong-willed I believe.
      1. icant007
        icant007 19 September 2021 07: 28
        .
        Quote: lelik613
        On the moral and strong-willed I believe.


        With this commentary, I wanted to show that the author, citing the testimonies of the participants in the battles, often shows what is beneficial to his point of view, that is, one negative.
        1. lelik613
          lelik613 19 September 2021 15: 19
          -1
          However, it is not harmful to add that the walls of even non-ready pillboxes are stronger than combat-ready trenches.
  9. Altmann
    Altmann 17 September 2021 20: 12
    +12
    It was a tumultuous time, I think who knew he was afraid and therefore he was calm. You know, after such a long time, we are all smart to find where to attack or defend. But I am sure that during the month of the worm, each of you (us) would not know what to do. But the fact is that both Stalin and the General Staff failed, which cost the lives of millions of people. It is a fact.
  10. AsmyppoL
    19 September 2021 15: 31
    +13
    Quote: icant007
    Quote: lelik613
    On the moral and strong-willed I believe.


    With this commentary, I wanted to show that the author, citing the testimonies of the participants in the battles, often shows what is beneficial to his point of view, that is, one negative.


    With this comment, you, as usual, are deliberately trying to throw mud at the author. I am glad that your knowledge was only enough for a minor episode of the article ...

    The main thing in the given fragment is the conservation of weapons of bunkers and uncleared sectors of fire. This takes much longer than delivering some of the ammunition.

    In addition, it can be seen from your comment that you read the original text of the memoirs of a war veteran. Therefore, I write that you deliberately distorted the meaning of the memory in your comments.
    And there it says: "On the first day, battles were fought with separate enemy reconnaissance groups, which often advanced outside the shelling sector of our points ... "

    Therefore, the pillbox garrisons could deliver ammunition from the company depot on the first day of the war.
    For provocation - put a minus
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 19 September 2021 19: 09
      .
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      With this comment, you, as usual, are deliberately trying to throw mud at the author. I am glad that your knowledge was only enough for a minor episode of the article ...

      A serious blow to all sorts of crooks from history was dealt by an article published in Izvestia, where the historian S. Kudryashov dwelt in detail on new historical documents that became available to a wide range of readers, and where it is indicated that there was no surprise, and your fantasies about intelligence are just a custom lie :
      “The Russian Historical Society (RIO), during its meeting in Moscow, published unique documents of the General Staff of the Red Army during the spring of 1941, which refute the myths that the Soviet Union intended to attack Nazi Germany, and prove that the USSR was preparing to respond to the invasion of the Wehrmacht. This was reported by RIA Novosti.
      We are talking about the "Scheme for the deployment of strategic forces of the USSR" and "Scheme of the balance of forces", which were submitted with the permission of the General Staff at the request of the chairman of the RIO, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin.
      According to Sergei Kudryashov, a researcher at the German Historical Institute in Moscow, the "diagram of the balance of forces" is a unique document that has been presented openly for the first time. It shows that the Soviet General Staff knew that the Nazis were preparing to strike with three army groups.
      “If you compare the Power Ratio Chart with the Barbarossa Plan map, you will see that they are very close. This suggests that the professional level of our General Staff was very high, its senior officers were correctly aware of the situation and worked efficiently, "- the story of Kudryashov.
      According to him, by mid-May 1941, the military-political leadership of the USSR believed that if Hitler's Germany intended to strike the USSR in the north and west, then the Wehrmacht would hardly withstand a powerful blow from the Red Army in the south.
      "Let me emphasize: we are not talking about the plans of the USSR attack on Germany," said Kudryashov.
      The historian added that the "Deployment Scheme" assumes a scenario in which Germany invaded the territory of the Soviet Union and the war is already underway, and the Red Army in this situation is taking retaliatory actions.
      “We are talking about a limited military operation in the initial period of the war. Yes, the theater of military operations is large, but there are no arrows stretched out to Europe to conquer it, "added Kudryashov."

      (https://www.gazeta.ru/army/news/2021/06/30/16179236.shtml , https://iz.ru/1186564/2021-06-30/v-moskve-pokazali-oprovergaiushchie-populiarnyi-mif-o-voine-dokumenty )
      All this confirms the main theses of O. Koznikin's works, which people like you and other Chekunovs and Zaretskys made fun of.
      I think now they will all have to shut up their tongues in a certain place, or refute the materials that have appeared ...
      1. AsmyppoL
        19 September 2021 19: 33
        +12
        Before writing any nonsense, it would be worth familiarizing yourself with one of the schemes. In accordance with the scheme of the balance of forces, the SC LEADERSHIP WASN'T EXPECTED AGAINST THE TROOPS A MAIN ATTACK OF THE GERMAN TROOPS.
        Assumptions of the General Staff about the strikes of the German troops were completely far from the Blanc of Barbarossa. Therefore, these documents have not been previously published and have not been published until now ...
        But the photo hit the internet and was reviewed a month ago in an article.
        Finally, after a month, something reached you ...

        And you don't have enough knowledge to refute my intelligence reports ...
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 19 September 2021 20: 21
          .
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Assumptions of the General Staff about the strikes of the German troops were completely far from the Blanc of Barbarossa. Therefore, these documents have not been previously published and have not been published until now ...
          But the photo hit the internet and was reviewed a month ago in an article.
          Finally, after a month, something reached you ...

          You can’t refute this heinous lie, because you didn’t see the true "Power Correlation Scheme" before the dissemination of your articles about intelligence on this forum, which is why you got stuck with your verbiage.
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          And you don't have enough knowledge to refute my intelligence reports ...

          And you don't have them at all - just a set of wild fantasies, like the radio messages with reports three days later in the General Staff Department. Well, there was so much other rubbish from you here, including lies about the capabilities of our radio intelligence, that I see no reason to return to this again. But on occasion I will deal with your pearls, just like those that Chekunov distributed on the milleter, and then made excuses.
          1. AsmyppoL
            19 September 2021 20: 37
            +9
            For the most inattentive user, I inform you that the Diagram of the balance of forces is available in all three last parts of the article.
            IN ALL THREE LAST ...
            If you read this text twenty times, it will probably come ...

            The scheme is based on a reconnaissance report dated May 15, 1941, which is available online.
            RMs are completely false and untrue.
            The main directions shown in the diagram are described in Considerations. And in Kozinkin's waste paper there is nothing but stupidity, which does not even come close to reflecting the materials mentioned above ...
            But you do not have enough knowledge to understand the elementary ...
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 19 September 2021 21: 02
              .
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              For the most inattentive user, I inform you that the Diagram of the balance of forces is available in all three last parts of the article.

              Lying as always, because even this article does not have this scheme:

              Moreover, this diagram is not an original topographic map, but the basis for its compilation was the materials and maps of the RU GSh, which I laid out long before you saw all this in Izvestia. So you are once again caught in a lie. But this is not the point, but the fact that the professional historian S. Kudryashov documented that intelligence supplied our General Staff with reliable information, which coincided with the plans of the Germans.
              Moreover, another historian O. Vishlev confirms that the Germans had information that their plans were known to the command of the spacecraft:
              Back in 2001, the historian O. Vishlev showed that German intelligence in May 41 reported to Berlin that the Russians knew for sure about the operational plans of the Wehrmacht:
              “Indeed, these intelligence reports contain a lot of information, the reliability of which is beyond doubt. So, among reports on military issues, it was true that the General Staff of the Red Army considered it possible for Germany to strike the USSR in three directions: from East Prussia to Leningrad, from the Warsaw region - through Brest, Minsk and Smolensk to Moscow and from the Lublin region and from the territory of Romania - to Kiev.

              So another historian refutes your primitive lie regarding the actions of Soviet military intelligence on the eve of the war. Moreover, these people, like O. Kozinkin, unlike you, do not hide their names and surnames, and do not hide behind network nicknames. Feel the difference and then you will understand who is spreading lies anonymously ...

              Quote: AsmyppoL
              But you do not have enough knowledge to understand the elementary ...

              Of course, not everyone can understand your lies about the 16th Army, as well as about 133 tanks in the battalion. Where did you come up with this nonsense, especially since you do not give references to this lie, which means it was invented by you.
              1. AsmyppoL
                20 September 2021 06: 53
                +9
                I made fun ...
                This is a post-war map that has been featured in a number of newspaper articles due to the lack of originals ...
                1. ccsr
                  ccsr 20 September 2021 11: 33
                  .
                  Quote: AsmyppoL
                  This is a post-war map that has been featured in a number of newspaper articles due to the lack of originals ...

                  Again, an attempt to dodge, after you were caught in a lie - this scheme was created on the basis of open authentic materials of the Soviet General Staff, as stated by the historian S. Kudryashov:
                  According to Sergei Kudryashov, a researcher at the German Historical Institute in Moscow, The "power balance chart" is a unique document that has been presented openly for the first time. It shows that the Soviet General Staff knew that the Nazis were preparing to strike with three army groups.
                  “If you compare the Power Ratio Chart with the Barbarossa Plan map, you will see that they are very close. This suggests that the professional level of our General Staff was very high, its senior officers were correctly aware of the situation and worked efficiently, "- the story of Kudryashov.

                  Naturally, a genuine map could not fit in a newspaper article, but the diagram matches it exactly. So don't lie that you might have seen her while writing your semi-literate articles about intelligence.
                  Why did you lie about 133 tanks in a German tank battalion, allegedly on the basis of intelligence data - where is the evidence of this, do not evade questions as usual, otherwise it is sickening to watch you wriggle.
                  1. AsmyppoL
                    25 September 2021 15: 33
                    +7
                    The Russian Historical Society, during its meeting in Moscow, published the unique documents of the General Staff of the Spacecraft from the spring of 1941 ... This is reported by RIA Novosti.

                    We are talking about the "Scheme for the deployment of strategic forces of the USSR" and "Scheme of the balance of forces", which were presented with the permission of the General Staff at the request of the chairman of the RIO, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service Sergei Naryshkin.

                    According to Sergei Kudryashov, a researcher at the German Historical Institute in Moscow, the "diagram of the balance of forces" is a unique document that first presented openly ...





                    Keywords in the above interview: "The diagram of the balance of forces" и "Diagram of the deployment of the strategic forces of the USSR" и "first".

                    Any person versed in military affairs understood that this card cannot be:

                    - The diagram of the balance of forces, since only the armies of the parties are indicated, not the concentrated forces. In addition, neither reconnaissance nor the General Staff of the spacecraft knew about the places of concentration of German tank groups, marked on the map;

                    - The scheme for the deployment of the strategic forces of the USSR, tk. reserve armies are not shown.

                    A person interested in history, before writing his opinion, would look for something related to this map on the Internet. A self-confident person who does not have the proper military knowledge simply posted his opinion, throwing mud at a more knowledgeable person ...

                    On December 18, 2020, RIA Novosti published the indicated map in the article “The Barbarossa Plan”.
                    https://ria.ru/20201218/voyna-1589489081.html?chat_room_id=1589489081

                    The material was prepared on the basis of open sources. Therefore, this map cannot be published for the first time!

                    Publishing a new article about the Scheme placed in the foyer in RIA Novosti they simply took the existing drawing without caring about its content.

                    This map came to RIA Novosti from the article “Why Hitler's Plan Barborossa Failed”, published as early as July 20, 2020 with reference to RIA Novosti.
                    https://kursdnya.ru/2020/07/21/prezhde-nemcy-ne-vstrechali-takogo-soprotivleniya-pochemu-provalilsya-gitlerovskij-plan-barbarossa/

                    A photograph of the Power Correlation Scheme exhibited in the foyer was presented several times in previous articles by the author.



                    You should read more and search for materials before passing off your thoughts as truth ...
                    1. ccsr
                      ccsr 25 September 2021 19: 46
                      -9
                      Quote: AsmyppoL
                      Any person versed in military affairs understood that this card cannot be:

                      - The diagram of the balance of forces, since only the armies of the parties are indicated, not the concentrated forces.

                      Lying as always, because in the 2008 edition "Military intelligence informs. Documents of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. January 1939-June 1941" on p. 568 Golikov's report is given, but the map is not shown, so you could not see it. And if you could, then give the publication where it is placed, otherwise it will once again confirm your falsity. But the declassified "Scheme of Possible Actions against the USSR", which was attached to this report, was published later, and I, unlike you, can give the data where it is published. But you hardly saw her, so you were again caught cheating.
                      For the general public, this scheme was indeed unknown, as reported in Izvestia. If this is not the case, then give the edition where the diagram was previously published, since you "read more" and know everything.
                      Quote: AsmyppoL
                      In addition, neither reconnaissance nor the General Staff of the spacecraft knew about the places of concentration of German tank groups, marked on the map;

                      Complete nonsense, if only because you have not brought a single June intelligence report to assert that it was not indicated in them. So your lie has long been exposed, because all your home-grown conclusions are based only on data as of June 1, and do not take into account that German troops were deployed to the border for three more weeks and our intelligence recorded this. Here are the reports that started arriving back in April:

                      Quote: AsmyppoL
                      A photograph of the Power Correlation Scheme exhibited in the foyer was presented several times in previous articles by the author.

                      Lies, because these were only the last couple of articles, tk. you never published this before the publication of the Izvestia article.
                      Quote: AsmyppoL
                      This map came to RIA Novosti from the article “Why Hitler's Plan Barborossa Failed”, published as early as July 20, 2020 with reference to RIA Novosti.

                      Nonsense, because this scheme was made on the basis of a declassified map of the GRU General Staff, which was first published for the 200th anniversary of military intelligence in one of the limited editions. But you just didn’t know this, so you’re lying about July 20, 2020, although it’s already known that the map-based scheme was published much earlier.
                      1. AsmyppoL
                        26 September 2021 08: 30
                        +7
                        I will answer for the last time ccsr, who does not have the necessary military knowledge and, in view of this, is simply juggling facts. Caught by the hand in the deception, he again tries to "cheat" the readers who are watching the skirmish in this part.

                        ccsr"Lying as always, because in the 2008 edition "Military intelligence informs. Documents of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army. January 1939-June 1941" on p. 568 Golikov's report is given, but the map is not shown, so you could not see it. And if you could, then give the publication where it is placed, otherwise it will once again confirm your falsity. But the declassified "Scheme of Possible Actions against the USSR", which was attached to this report, was published later, and I, unlike you, can give the data where it is published. But you hardly saw her, so you were again caught cheating."

                        The report of the Head of the Intelligence Directorate and the "Scheme of possible options for action against the USSR" were considered on July 27.07.2021, XNUMX, in the sixth part.

                        https://topwar.ru/185262-mirnaja-vesna-pered-vojnoj.html

                        It is also shown why this scheme and the report itself could not somehow help the General Staff in planning countermeasures. Again ccsr is caught cheating and misleading forum readers.
                      2. AsmyppoL
                        26 September 2021 08: 44
                        +5
                        Quote: AsmyppoL: "In addition, neither the reconnaissance nor the General Staff of the spacecraft knew about the places of concentration of German tank groups, marked on the map ..."
                        ccsr"Complete nonsense, if only because you have not brought a single June intelligence report to assert that it was not indicated in them. So your lie has long been exposed, because all your home-grown conclusions are based only on data as of June 1, and do not take into account that German troops were deployed to the border for three more weeks and our intelligence recorded this. Here are the reports that started arriving back in April ..."

                        Again, a false statement. Reconnaissance report # 5 for the West, dated June 15, has been reviewed multiple times in an article on reconnaissance. This summary includes "Dislocation of German units of formations ..."
                        All places of deployment of tank battalions, infantry, motorized and tank regiments, infantry, motorized and tank divisions are mapped by the author on the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces. And this was not done by anyone before the author ...
                        From the presented diagram, it was clear that the intelligence had completely inaccurate intelligence information about the deployment of the German group. Anyone can be convinced of this if he ties the deployment of units and formations of German troops to their actual location.

                        Also, it can be seen that ccsr does not understand military documentation. The head of the Intelligence Directorate wrote that before the start of the war, only FIVE summaries... ссsr cites a link to "Special message of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border with the USSR" from
                        04.04.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX For him, that intelligence, that the special message is all the same. Well, a person does not understand military science ...
                      3. AsmyppoL
                        26 September 2021 08: 59
                        +4
                        If intelligence reports of the Republic of Georgia General Staff for the peaceful period of June 1941 are hidden from us, it turned out that it was possible to restore the vision of the Republic of Uzbekistan on the transportation of German troops and their groupings when comparing Intelligence reports No. 5 of June 15 (as of May 31) and No. 1 for 22.06.41/9/XNUMX This work was carried out in the cycle of exploration and the XNUMXth part of this article.

                        https://topwar.ru/186514-nichego-chto-nemcy-v-polshe-no-silna-strana.html

                        It turns out, according to the RU General Staff, only one infantry division arrived in Northern Poland (against the troops of the Western Military District) from June 1 to June 19 (inclusive). In Southern Poland - 1 ... 2 infantry divisions ... Absolutely false information that came from intelligence ...

                        Tank groupings in the places of deployment of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th tank groups do not pass either through the RM of the reconnaissance department of the PribOVO headquarters on June 18 and 21, or along the RM of the reconnaissance department of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO on June 21 (as of June 20) , nor in the intelligence report of the Russian General Staff for June 22. They are not on the maps of the ZAPOVO headquarters with the grouping of German troops as of June 21. These groupings are absent on the maps of the PribOVO and KOVO headquarters.
                        But a huge mechanized German grouping of fifteen (!) Tank and motorized divisions exists in Romania, where it has never been. But this grouping corresponds to the instructions of the German command to the Abwehr to create a false picture for the Soviet command about the presence of the main German forces in the south of the General Government and to the south ...

                        Let me clarify that the author examined in three cycles ALL published materials from the intelligence services of the General Staff, the NKGB and the border troops of the NKVD. All published ...
                        There is one more attempt to deceive readers with ccsr ...
                      4. AsmyppoL
                        26 September 2021 09: 04
                        +3
                        And the last thing. ccsr was caught by the hand while trying to pass off a post-war card as a supposedly pre-war one ...
                        It did not even occur to him (he is far from military knowledge) that the indicated main directions of German strikes, given in the Diagram of the balance of forces, are also given in the test document "Considerations ..." dated mid-May 1941.
                        Some provocative statements by ccsr and a complete forgery without providing any true facts ...

                        I would just skip the comments of such a person in the future ...
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. icant007
      icant007 20 September 2021 06: 47
      .
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      For provocation - put a minus


      Provocations are all your articles.
      I watch a whole codela of minusators caught up here.
      So you are afraid.
      Well be afraid, be afraid ...
      1. AsmyppoL
        20 September 2021 06: 56
        +7
        So the information about the ammunition was specially distorted?
        Don't you laugh hysterically anymore?
        Three years ago, you threatened to deny my intelligence data? Is there nothing? Didn't find anything in hundreds of numbers data ???
        1. icant007
          icant007 20 September 2021 08: 56
          .
          And where does the numbers? I never argued about numbers.

          I said that the entire body of intelligence obtained by June 22 provided our command with the necessary information.
          And everything else is already a question of the adopted model of actions, the general level of preparation and unpreparedness for war.
  11. icant007
    icant007 20 September 2021 08: 23
    -7
    The commander of the Leningrad Military District M.M. Popov said:

    On the tenth of June, an NCO directive was received, which appointed ... a commission chaired by the commander of the LMO, entrusting it with the tasks of selecting sites for the construction of airfields for basing fighter and bomber aircraft along the shores of the Barents Sea ...

    On the eve of the war, a completely unnecessary task for the level of the district commander, who must leave the headquarters for a month along with a member of the Military Council.



    Am I correct in understanding that the district commander was not present until June 22?
    1. AsmyppoL
      25 September 2021 06: 52
      +4
      There is a document according to which from 19 to the morning of June 22, the commander of the Leningrad Military District was not in Leningrad
      1. icant007
        icant007 25 September 2021 07: 05
        .
        Excuse me, of course, but the absence of the district commander in Leningrad from June 19 to 22 is not a crime.
        Vaughn Kirponos was also not on the property and 22 and 21
        1. AsmyppoL
          25 September 2021 07: 26
          +5
          Doing provocation again?
          You asked a question and I answered it.
          And then write that the absence of a district commander is not a crime.
          Did I write that this is a crime? Why attribute your thoughts to another person ??
          The article simply states that the commander of the district was sent for a month on a secondary business trip. did not expect the outbreak of war in June.
          Later, when the war began, by order from above, the car with the commander was uncoupled from the train and, out of turn, was sent to Leningrad.
          1. icant007
            icant007 27 September 2021 06: 35
            -1
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Later, when the war began, by order from above, the car with the commander was uncoupled from the train and, out of turn, was sent to Leningrad.


            Where is it written?
        2. ccsr
          ccsr 25 September 2021 20: 09
          -8
          Quote: icant007
          Excuse me, of course, but the absence of the district commander in Leningrad from June 19 to 22 is not a crime.

          As you noticed, this falsifier of history makes a stuffing about the commander of the LMO, and on the basis of this fact, makes a false conclusion that they were not preparing for war. Any military professional knows perfectly well that a commander can be on vacation, on a business trip, absent due to illness or being treated, or participate in events held by the People's Commissariat of Defense, where he must be present. But in any case, the district is commanded by its first deputy, or the chief of staff of the district or another deputy - depending on who is appointed by the district commander, i.e. it is not an ownerless artel, as it seems to the author of the false articles.
          When you caught him fraudulently, he immediately came up with a version of a "secondary business trip", although it is already obvious that the district commander leaves the district only on the personal order of the NGO or the NGSH. But this deceitful author of AsmyppoL (Aleksey Ivanov) does not give either the purpose of the trip or the duration of the commander's stay in it, i.e. uses his thimble techniques to mislead the gullible public.
          It's good that you caught this verbiage in a lie, I think that those who understand military affairs immediately see that he is simply lying, as it was, for example, with the 16th Army, and allegedly some June intelligence messages, after which they began to transfer it.
  12. icant007
    icant007 20 September 2021 08: 39
    .
    A. M. Baranov (Chief of Staff of the 17th Rifle Corps): “... The prepared lines were not constantly occupied by the troops. Only the protection of structures was constantly organized [Kamenets-Podolsk URa - Approx. auth.] ... "



    Ok, we read further the author's source:

    Due to such circumstances, the Corps Commander, upon returning from the district command and staff exercises (early June), urged to withdraw at least 50% of the divisions to their defensive zones with ammunition and the necessary engineering equipment. The permission was given from above, but I do not remember, by the Commander of the Army or the District. The Corps Commander spoke personally.
    With this permission, it seems, two battalions with regimental and divisional artillery and with special units were withdrawn from each regiment. The corps artillery was withdrawn by 75-80%
    The units were located in the depths of their defenses, areas, and parts of the 164th rifle division in the forests of the south-west. Khotin.
    In these areas, the subunits were housed in tents, conducted exercises according to the plan, improved their defense areas, strongholds, anti-tank obstacles in engineering respect, erected barriers and carried their protection. The troops were constantly on alert to occupy their areas.


    The corps formations entered into battle with the Nazi, Romanian and Hungarian troops in the following conditions:
    1) When within the boundaries of divisional strips and regimental sectors there were units of divisions in the composition of 50 to 70% with almost full artillery.
    Corps artillery regiments (as far as I remember, each without one division) were in the area of ​​their positions, from which they provided Hertz, Chernivtsi and Hertz, and Khotyn directions.


    Doesn't it seem to the reader that if we continue to quote Comrade Baranov, then the final meaning will be different from that imposed by the author?
    1. AsmyppoL
      25 September 2021 07: 13
      +11
      It seems that without "sensations" denigrating the author of the article, you can no longer live. At the same time, you still do not have the proper knowledge. Possessing superficial knowledge, you try to find cons, but somehow you do it badly ... It turns out not a refutation, but a simple provocation. Therefore, I put a minus again ...

      First. The article deals only with the fortifications of the URs. To what to attribute the actions of field troops to fill URs?
      Second. The article is mainly limited to the events of the date of June 15th. Why lead to events that have not yet been discussed in the article? To give weight to your words?
      Third. In the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 17th Rifle Corps, not everything is clear, but you do not know that ...

      In accordance with the Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of 13.06.1941, the deep divisions were ordered to be transferred closer to the state border to new camps. It also mentions the only division of the 17th rifle corps - 164th rifle division:
      1) one joint venture - in Dunaevtsy, 20 km north. Hertz;
      2) one joint venture - to the Larga area;
      3) the rest of the units - to the Khotin area ... "
      There are no other published data on the withdrawal of divisions or units of the 17th brigade. Only the words of the chief of staff of the corps remain.

      At the same time, the historian S.L. Chekunov wrote about the 17th Rifle Corps: "Nobody part 17 ck in the UR according to the PP (cover plans) did not output ...
      We are talking about 164 divisions and goes. The directive says: take to the camp at a new parking lot. Here are 164 SD and withdrawn ... All documents on withdrawal are available, starting from the directive of the General Staff. There is also a district order, which is dated .... June 15th.
      The order to the commander of the 17th rifle corps was handed over to the representative of the corps headquarters at 16.00. To the representative of the 164th Rifle Division, Senior Lieutenant Shimansky, the redeployment order was handed over at 15.55 on 15.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.


      S.L. Chekunov was asked a question: "And where is the Journal of Combat Actions of the 17th Sc Denm?"
      The answer was given: "We will not go anywhere, we will write it down as a document written in hindsight about non-existent events".

      The railway was conducted at the headquarters of the corps and the chief of staff looked through it. it is possible that with his submission, records of non-existent events were made. Many years later, in his answers to Pokrovsky, he could, either on purpose or because of the effect of false memory, introduce inaccuracies in his answers ...
      1. icant007
        icant007 27 September 2021 06: 48
        -6
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        At the same time, the historian S.L. Chekunov wrote about the 17th Rifle Corps:


        Chekunov is of course an infallible authority. What is he referring to?
        And in his collection of Pokrovsky, he does not make any comments.

        but you don't know that ...


        But you apparently own the sacred truth.

        Still, a person with different names and a bunch of profiles.


        Quote: AsmyppoL
        The railway was conducted at the headquarters of the corps and the chief of staff looked through it. it is possible that with his submission, records of non-existent events were made. Many years later, in his answers to Pokrovsky, he could, either on purpose or because of the effect of false memory, introduce inaccuracies in his answers ...


        Is this your idea? Original.

        If the chief of staff is telling a lie, then perhaps Alexei Ivanov can also tell a lie.



        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Second. The article is mainly limited to the events of the date of June 15th. Why lead to events that have not yet been discussed in the article? To give weight to your words?


        I look at the situation as a whole in dynamics, and you pull individual dates out of context and are pleased to make the discovery of America.

        Quote: AsmyppoL
        First. The article deals only with the fortifications of the URs. To what to attribute the actions of field troops to fill URs?


        But I did not understand this passage at all. So what?
        You have something, only it is not a question.
  13. icant007
    icant007 20 September 2021 11: 30
    .
    We go further.

    Combat log of the Mogilev-Podolsk UR:

    By order of the commandant of the UR 40, 50 opb [opb - a separate machine gun battalion - Approx. Auth.] occupied the cover structures on 22.06.1941/15/00 and by 23.06.1941:XNUMX XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX occupied and put into combat readiness pillboxes ...


    Assessing the readiness of the fortified areas, the author sculpts and compares the fortified areas located directly on the border and URs on the old border.
    In this case, the Mogilev fortified area is located about 50 km from the border, as well as Kamenets-Podolsk.

    And there is nothing unusual about bringing these secondary areas on alert by 15.00:23 on June XNUMXrd.
  14. Mykola Kovach
    Mykola Kovach 19 October 2021 17: 57
    -2
    Bastard Zhukov screwed up here too! Worse than Vlasov.
  15. Ol willy
    Ol willy 9 November 2021 17: 52
    +1
    Ironically, the Poles were in a similar state at the beginning of the war. The Poles wanted to begin mobilization already in the middle of the summer of 1939 and to take up defensive positions by the end of August; however, well-wishers from London recommended “don't - don't provoke”. The Poles trusted and, as a result, the mobilization was never fully carried out since the Germans were already in Warsaw ...

    However, the Poles were smart enough to remove aircraft from the airfields already explored by the enemy, as a result of which the losses of the Polish Air Force on the ground were extremely low.
  16. tank64rus
    tank64rus 17 November 2021 16: 49
    +1
    We will never know the whole truth about the beginning of the war. No wonder, on the orders of Khrushchev, the special commission has been shoveling through all the archives for five years. As a result, Stalin directed the war on a globe and one rifle for three. Now part of the truth has come out and this already makes us think hard about the beginning of the war. There was betrayal and heroism and panic and endurance to the last. The article is interesting and the author has worked through a large amount of material.