On the comparison of aircraft of "different generations" of the Second World War

Today, the countries with the most powerful and well-armed air forces are trying to saturate the fleet of these same air forces with a new generation of aircraft. So far, only three countries in the world have independently developed and started production of generation 5 fighters. These are the USA, China and the Russian Federation. At the same time, dozens of Chinese J-20s continue to fly on Russian-made engines.

The presence of the new generation aircraft provides a hefty air superiority in the case of using their basic functions. Today, the number of Generation 5 fighters is led by the United States, with the total number of F-22s and F-35s in the hundreds.

And what about the superiority of more modern fighters over less modern ones during the Second World War? Although the official division into generations did not yet "legally" exist, it was de facto. After all, there were aircraft during the war years that were developed in the mid-thirties, and there were those that were created during the war.

In the video on the SkyArtist channel, a variant with the Soviet I-16 and Yak-1 against the Messerschmitt Bf.109 is considered. So, the Yak-1 made its first flight in 1940, and the Messer three years earlier.

Boris Yulin argues about the comparison of aircraft of "different generations" that were operated during the war years:

Comments

[serguei france]

Comrade Yulin, I agree with your reasoning, but a logical question arises: how our pilots on aircraft of the old generation destroyed before November 1941 as many enemy aircraft as the Luftwaffe had on June 22, 1941. By the way, the greatest losses of the Germans in aviation were in 1941. Erns Udet committed suicide in November 1941, seeing his losses and the fact that it was not possible to destroy the Soviet aviation. That is, our pilots inflicted enormous damage on German aviation even on outdated aircraft. Please reveal this aspect.

[swzero]

The yak-1 has very little chance against the bf-109f. Oddly enough, the Ishaks of the last series have more of them. The donkey is stronger than the Yak on the vertical, both horizontally, and in the roll and in dynamics (and the cannon donkey is also in the armament). The yak had only a high maximum speed, but for example near the ground, and taking into account the acceleration characteristics, the difference in real speed was small. Actually, in 42, the pilots demanded to restore the release of seagulls and donkeys for this reason - on donkeys and seagulls the pilots had more to survive against the Fredericks and Gustavs, than on new coffins like Yak-1 and Lagg-3 and Mig-3, especially against the background of the fact that their build quality in '42 dropped dramatically and already not high performance characteristics, they became quite sad. The I-41 could improve the situation with materiel in 42-180. But young efficient aviation managers cut off his oxygen. I will also note that the main problem of our fighter aviation was still not performance characteristics, but the lack of normal radio communications and normal VNOS service. The lack of the ability to interact in battle, build up forces, direct aircraft to the target - this reduces efficiency much more than performance characteristics. As a result, ours not only flew on coffins, but also numerically inferior often in local air combat.

[Doctor]

The yak-1 has very little chance against the bf-109f. Oddly enough, the Ishaks of the last series have more of them. The donkey is stronger than the Yak on the vertical, both horizontally, and in the roll and in dynamics (and the cannon donkey is also in the armament). The yak had only a high maximum speed, but for example near the ground, and taking into account the acceleration characteristics, the difference in real speed was small. Actually, in 42, the pilots demanded to restore the release of seagulls and donkeys for this reason - on donkeys and seagulls the pilots had more to survive against Fredericks and Gustavs, than on new coffins like Yak-1 and Lagg-3 and Mig-3, especially against the background of the fact that their build quality in '42 fell significantly below the plinth, and without that high performance characteristics, they became quite sad. The I-41 could improve the situation with materiel in 42-180. But young efficient aviation managers cut off his oxygen. I will also note that the main problem of our fighter aviation was still not performance characteristics, but the absence of normal radio communications and normal VNOS service. The lack of the ability to interact in battle, build up forces, direct aircraft to the target - this reduces the effectiveness much more than performance characteristics. As a result, ours not only flew on coffins, but also numerically inferior often in local air combat.

Air Force organization and tactics are key.
For example, the "North" army group was supported by 670 aircraft, and in the NWF 1150.
With a twofold superiority, it was quite possible to neutralize the superiority in performance characteristics.

[swzero]

Tactics stupidly rests on normal radio communication and VNOS (including radar). Flying in pairs in dispersed orders without normal communication is not possible. The allocation of hunters and air clearing groups is also. So they flew on patrols and direct escort, giving the initiative to the enemy and not being able to build up strength in battle. Pokryshkin's new tactics became possible only due to the presence of excellent radio stations on the aerocobra. When in the same place, on the Kuban in the spring of 43, Savitsky, in his corps flying on yaks, tried to use them, nothing really came of it. Those. the key step between the planes of the 30s and 40s was not in LTTH, but in the appearance of normal communication, and later radar, which made it possible to radically change the tactics of use. The same miserable harrikeins, which IMHO according to LTTH were much worse than donkeys, thanks to communications and radar, showed themselves quite well in the battle for Britain. Even though the Germans did not have a radar on the outer front until 43, the surveillance and radio interception service was very well developed - for each radio station on the plane, there were several radio stations on the ground. We could only dream of this at the beginning of the war due to the lack of materiel - both the quality and the number of radio stations were completely insufficient.

[serguei france]

And your reflections have a great reason, especially since the I-16 was produced in 1942, and they flew even longer. Without communication, it was already difficult to fight in that war, an indisputable fact.

[swzero]

The I-16 was not produced in 42. The evacuated plant N458 at the beginning of 42 assembled 83 UTI-4 units in a tank. These were the last serial I-16s. In parts, they fought for themselves and in 43 year. For example, in 4 Guiap KBF. And they fought quite well. Judging by the memoirs of Golubev, they managed to solve the problems with radio communication by this time, which had a positive effect on efficiency.

[serguei france]

"And they fought quite well." ...

[swzero]

Well, according to the recollections of the pilots, donkeys of late types with emils could quite normally butt - if not on an equal footing, then with good chances of success. Against Frederick, of course, everything is much worse - only to meet in the forehead, to catch at the exit from the attack with a set is much more difficult. But again, it all depends on the situation. For example, when escorting attack aircraft in 41-43, our fighters (even new ones) could do the most they could to turn head-on at the attacking Frederick / Gustav, or build a defensive circle over the silts (if the silts are also in a circle). Actually, for these purposes, a donkey and even a seagull were better suited than yaks and even more so laggi. Firstly, the star defended the pilot in frontal attacks, and secondly, the maneuverability and power-to-weight ratio are higher - it is easier to fend off enemy attacks and return to duty. In a battle between fighters, again not being able to echelon the battle formations and greatly yielding in vertical maneuver, it all came down to a defensive circle / swarm (the Germans met such a description) and meeting the attackers head-on. Those. here again donkeys and seagulls did not look better. But as for the interception of strike vehicles, then yes, for example, against the ju-88 and bf-110, bf-109e (in 41, the emil was already used mainly as a fighter-bomber / attack aircraft), gulls and donkeys sometimes had problems with in order to catch up - here the new aircraft had the advantage. The Stuky and Henkeli donkeys were quite catching up. You can read on the topic of Golodnikov's interview in "I fought in a fighter", the memoirs of Golubev from 4th Guyap and, for example, Rechkalov (although he fought on a seagull).

[swzero]

Well, Archipenko also has memoirs about how he fought on a seagull.

[serguei france]

June 22: Except for our destroyed planes at the airfields, the Germans claim that they shot down 322 of our planes in air battles and antiaircraft guns. "'However, amid chaos, confusion and outright bungling, Soviet pilots managed to meet the enemy with dignity. According to some reports, in air battles that unfolded from the Baltic to the Black Sea, they shot down 244 enemy aircraft in a day." if this is true, then everything was not so bad.

[swzero]

I think if it were not for the disabled vehicles at the airfields (I’m not even talking about the morning of June 22, but about the systematic attacks of the Germans throughout the day and in the following days), the Germans would have laid down most of their aviation in June. But alas - again, everything rests against the materiel - we did not have anti-aircraft guns in the required quantities to cover the airfields. If our airfields were covered by the Ministry of Defense, as the German Germans left half of the shock troops there on 22 June. Well, again, they did not have time to deploy a normal network of airfields before the war (due to the lack of construction equipment and vehicles, including the lack of technologies for building pre-fabricated airfields), which is why the planes were not even able to take out from under the blow.

[swzero]

As for the losses, there are, for example, interesting memoirs of V. Dirikh from the KG-51 "Edelweiss" flying the newest Ju-88s. On June 22, his squadron lost 15 full crews as a whole, and for example, only its 3rd group - 14 aircraft irretrievably (shot down or written off due to damage) - or 50% of the number:

In the evening, after the last plane landed at 20.23, the squadron commander, Oberst Lieutenant Schulz-Hein, at his headquarters in Polyanka Castle, in Krosno, summed up a disappointing result.

Sixteen flight personnel (15 full crews) were killed or missing; in group III alone, due to damage, 14 aircraft were unserviceable or crashed and were completely destroyed - loss of 50%. In other groups, the situation was a little more comforting. ...

By the way, the official German data does not recognize the loss of such a quantity of ju88. This is by the way about the reliability of the official German losses. But it is worth noting - part of the losses are due to our own new cluster fragmentation bombs, which were very dangerous for German aircraft, but at the same time were very effective in strikes against airfields

[Baron pardus]

The main problem of our aviation, not only fighter, but in general were:
a) Lack of normal motors. In 601 there was nothing comparable to what the Germans had (DB1250), the British (Merlin), and the Amerukans (40ls Alison on the P-1941). Hispano Sewiz Klimova was repeatedly raped in 1100 HP. For radial motors - the same - lagging. When we launched the GREAT ASH82 engine, corsairs were already making in the USA, from Pratt & Vitney 2800 to 2380hp.
b) Lack of ALUMINUM. That is, the planes were either heavier or less durable than necessary. Note that even in Japan, ZERO was made from Aluminum.
c) The absence of 100 and higher octane gasoline (and where to get it if the chemical industry in the USSR had to be created from ZERO. Before the Revolution there was nothing at all).
d) Weapon problems. And if the BS was brought to mind, making it one of the best 12.7mm of the war, then there were problems with ShVAK (low-power projectile), and with VYa there were problems (heavy and kicked).
e) Lack of production culture. And where does it come from if before the Revolution, Russia made its planes almost on its knees (there were no own engines from the word at all).
f) Lack of a culture of exploitation. "The surfaces have never been polished, the cab is open and the oil flaps are in an intermediate position." - Drabkin. "We learned about internal sealing only after looking at the downed enemy aircraft."

If you have a wooden aircraft with an 1100 HP engine (Yak-1), and the enemy has a duralumin aircraft with a 1300 HP engine (Me-109F), then problems are guaranteed to you, even before we begin to analyze the quality of aviation sights (who has a collimator , and who just has a cross on the cockpit). Before we start analyzing the wing mechanization level on Messer. And even before we start comparing the weight of the salvo, the radio, and the banal quality of the cockpit glass.

If the enemy has a high service culture, then his aircraft will not lose the performance characteristics they have suffered in the design bureau. And where to take the culture of service if in 1914 LITERACY was 27%, in Germany in the same 1914 literacy was 99%, and in the USA in 1910 it was 92%. Thanks to Tsarism. Well, it is impossible to completely eliminate such a lag in 19 years of Soviet power. By the way, my grandfather said that in the USSR in 1939, those who completed the 6th year were considered more or less educated. In the same United States, children of small-town farmers who had completed 6 years of age were viewed as ignorant.

[Siberian54]

A lot of comments appeared on the articles about the Second World War in the style of how they are so illiterate, with their hands growing out of their ass, and suddenly they defeated the white and bushy nats and the thought that this is a wild accident is hammered in with a quiet glan ... Apparently another zigzag of a hybrid war ..