Actual technologies of Victory: to see the path as a whole, not content with individual steps
An amazing analysis of the still fashionable genre "historical revelations "leads to observations of a much more relevant and even economically applied nature. So from the excursion into the history of the Soviet defense industry, lessons follow that may be useful in the methods of New Industrialization.
Doctor of Historical Sciences Aleksei Sergeyevich Stepanov on page 369 of his book “Development of the Soviet aviation in the pre-war period, "writes:" ... The atmosphere of suspicion in the light of the ongoing political purges created serious prerequisites for the decline in the credibility of the command staff in the eyes of subordinates and a sharp weakening of discipline, which often manifested itself in drunkenness, moral corruption and a sharp increase in accident rate. I leave it to my readers to decide whether, and if they can, how - in one head - even a pilot, even a historian - to combine fear of purges with a sharp weakening of discipline.
In the same place on pages 369 – 370 he, referring to pages 308 – 310 and 312 – 313 of the book of Sergey Vladimirovich Abrosov “Air war in Spain. The chronicle of air battles "writes:" The author of the monograph on the air war in Spain, S. Abros, came to a sad conclusion: the Red Army Air Force, with some exceptions in December 1936 and the first months of 1937, did not properly study the experience of Soviet pilots in combat operations . By the end of spring 1937, the little that was done had practically ceased. He believes that this can be partially explained by the repressions that have begun, but he makes an important reservation: “But not all the military were subjected to persecution by the state security organs, and it would be wrong to reduce all the troubles only to this reason. For example, the brigade commander Smushkevich Yakov Vladimirovich in the summer of 1937, upon arrival from Spain, is appointed deputy head of the Red Army air force. Despite the high position held for a number of years, Ya.V. Smushkevich for some reason paid unacceptably little attention to the war, for participation in which he was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. ” Among the proposals that were ignored were such as painting objects on military airfields in camouflage colors, the need to change the structure of a three-aircraft fighter link to a “pair” of fighters, the need to have fighter-level flight orders in height. The author does not indicate the reasons for the inactivity of the Soviet leadership. Later, the same situation developed with the study of the experience of the war in China. ” Again, I believe that readers will be able to decide to what extent it was precisely repression that prevented all of these innovations - especially given that during the war years, when there were significantly more reasons for fear and suspicion, all this was put into practice.
But perhaps the most interesting material for self-reflection was found on the pages of 266 – 275. There, it was first reported: a brigade engineer — later Lieutenant-General of Aviation — Ivan Fedorovich Petrov, returning from Germany in June 1940 (where he headed the commission for studying German aviation, purchasing production equipment and samples of flight technology), reported to the country's leadership that German aircraft production is three times higher than the Soviet. Stepanov quotes Petrov’s article “I fulfilled the task of Stalin” (“Motherland”, 1992, # XXUMX, pages 5 – 32): “At one of the meetings in the Kremlin, before I went to Germany, I was given a personal task: Germans should show us the entire aviation industry. When inspecting try to determine their industrial potential. In case of war with Germany, it is very important for us to know now how much they will be able to produce combat aircraft per day. ” ... After examining 219 aviation points in Germany - most of the German aircraft factories, especially new ones - I came to the conclusion that Germany is capable of producing combat aircraft up to 70 – 80 per day. I made the first report on the calculations I carried out at the MAP board [Stepanov rightly notes: this is a mistake in the text - at that time there were not ministries, but people's commissariats, including the People's Commissariat of the aviation industry], held under the leadership of A.Shakhurin [ Alexey Ivanovich Shakhurin in 1940 – 1946 was the people's commissar of the aviation industry]. The figure I mentioned was so inconsistent with the ideas of the potential power of the German aviation industry that existed among the leaders of our aviation industry that my message was greeted with irritation, if not hostile. After such a reaction, I naturally felt very bad. Shakhurin closed the board meeting, phoned Malenkov. He said that we immediately went to him. When we entered the office, Malenkov asked me a single question: “How much do you think the Germans will be able to produce combat aircraft per day?” - “By our count - 70 – 80 aircraft per day,” I replied. He didn’t talk to me anymore, because he knew that I was fulfilling Stalin’s personal task. He immediately called him, and Stalin asked us to come to him. The reaction of Malenkov, who was in charge of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) for the aviation industry, and Shakhurin was quite clear: at that time our industry produced only 26 aircraft per day, including training ones ... In addition to me, these materials were signed by mechanical engineer V.K. Mikhin, an employee of our trade mission in Germany, and S.P. Suprun [Stepan Pavlovich Suprun is one of the most prominent test test pilots in those years].
Meanwhile, as Stepanov rightly points out, the German aviation industry in 1940 produced an average of all 28 aircraft per day, and the Soviet aircraft 28.95. True, a year earlier - in 1939 - the German aviation industry gave 23 aircraft daily, and the Soviet - 28.39. That is, during the year Soviet production almost did not grow, while German production increased by more than a fifth. Nevertheless, the data, called Petrov, was still very far away.
The position hasn't changed much in 1941. Even the capture of Germany in the middle of 1940 by France, with its highly developed aviation industry, which, according to Soviet calculations, is able to give about a quarter of the German one, Germany itself almost did not use. Until the end of 1941, the French and Czech (in March, 1939 Slovakia declared independence, and the Czech Republic became a protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia) enterprises produced more than 2000 aircraft for Germany — about 4 per day.
True, with the beginning of the war against the USSR, the Germans suffered such losses, which they did not expect even after very heavy losses for themselves in the campaign against France, in the Battle for England, in the Mediterranean battles. They had to unleash their own production, and order additional aircraft and engines in the same France and the Czech Republic. But still, even at the peak, they did not reach the figures stated by Petrov.
Meanwhile, the report Petrova made a strong impact on the Soviet aviation industry. Stepanov expounds in detail the emergency measures inevitable with a catastrophic lag from a potential adversary. Aircraft builders received enormous resources. Obviously, at the expense of other industries, there were no free labor and idle enterprises in the country at that time: we made up for the catastrophic lagging behind other developed countries, evident in World War I and intensified by the devastation of the Civil War. Difficulties began not only where whole factories were taken from. Firebase conversion always generates disruptions in production. Yes, and technological chains in aviation include many enterprises, so the shuffling turned into a noticeable drop in production even in the already existing part of the aviation industry.
So, Stepanov criticizes the report of Petrov - and, most importantly, the reaction of the government to him - seriously and seemingly fair.
True, just a year later - after 1941.06.22 - it turned out: to cover the needs of the front, even the performance already achieved as a result of all the fire measures taken on the basis of the Petrov report is not enough. It was necessary, however, after the evacuation, which deserves some enthusiasm, to seek additional reserves and again to increase production.
In my opinion, if, according to the report of Petrov, an emergency did not start, at the beginning of the war, one would have to simultaneously overcome the difficulties of evacuation and the same difficulties of rapidly building up the aviation industry that had to pass during the pre-war year. His mistake turned to good.
But it’s even more interesting to understand: where did the mistake come from? Is it really a brigadier engineer (after re-certification in the same 1940 - Major General), who managed to work before Germany not only as a test pilot, but also as deputy chief of the Air Force Research Institute, and almost immediately upon arrival he was appointed chief Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute (for the sake of order, I will cite his subsequent posts: in 1941 - deputy commander of the Air Force of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army; in 1942-1947 - head of the Research Institute of Civil Air wow fleet; in 1947-1951 - head of the Flight Research Institute; in 1952–1963 - rector of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology), could he succumb to panic or simply incorrectly assess the capabilities of all two and a half hundred German enterprises associated with aviation?
I suppose it’s just a good acquaintance of Petrov with the Soviet aviation industry of the same era.
The USSR, creating many branches of its industry almost from scratch, focused primarily on the most advanced technologies of that time. In particular, the conveyor production, which first emerged, as far as can be judged, in the Venetian Arsenal (where warships were assembled from parts supplied from buildings around the canal, where they sailed), but brought to perfection in the automotive industry of the United States of America (not for nothing, when during the Second World War it was necessary to build maritime transport faster than the Germans managed to sink it, designing and organizing the production of the “Liberty” series ships commissioned designers and technologists from car factories).
Technologies were sharpened under the conveyor. For example, the famous Izhmash, back in 1936, began experiments on cutting armory barrels not with a traditional scraper on a long holder - a trellis, but by pushing a profiled hard mandrel through the barrel - a mandrel. Director of Izhmash in 1939-1941 - later Deputy Minister of Defense Industry, Chairman of the State Planning Committee and the Supreme Council of the National Economy - Vladimir Nikolaevich Novikov noted: only such a gigantic enterprise could afford to spend fifty thousand blanks on experiments. But by the beginning of the war, Izhmash was producing trunks on an assembly line. Moreover, during the war years - not only for themselves, but also for all other factories and workshops that have long been producing weapons or have just been involved in this complex business. And its own Izhmash conveyor even produced assembled three-rulers. According to Novikov's recollections, Marshal Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov - at that time no longer people's commissar of defense, but a representative of the headquarters of the supreme commander-in-chief - at the sight of a continuous stream of rifles was indignant: they say, what did you show me with pre-prepared products? Novikov suggested that the marshal wait until the supply for the show runs out. An hour later, Voroshilov, convinced of the impossibility of creating such a groundwork only for a publicity stunt, left the assembly line reassured and since then praised the Izhevsk residents more than once.
By the way, the shpaler production is considered to be more accurate than the mandrel: the internal stresses in the metal, deformed by the pressure of the mandrel, gradually distort the shape of the bore. But Izhevsk people managed to select trunks from the conveyor flow, their accuracy was enough even for sniper rifles. Now the mandrel is gradually giving way to rotational forging: the blows of small hammers spinning around the barrel are gradually pressed against the long mandrel of the desired shape inserted inside. It is less productive than the mandrel, but incomparably faster than the trellis. Translation of Kalashnikov machines from the 7.62 mm caliber to the 5.45 mm in the 1974 would have been impossible without rotary machines (they were bought in Austria): such a thin mandrel is too weak. But the barrels of special precision are still cut with a spoiler: the heat treatment modes needed to completely relieve stress caused by pressure (or even pulling through the barrel of a multi-blade tool, for a single pass of the scraper many thin layers of metal and giving an exact profile) are so complicated that the output of the barrels for sniper or sport shooting is unacceptably small.
In addition, the country was overwhelmed with enthusiasm. People felt that they were building and protecting their own future. Therefore, tried from the heart. Roman Valentin Petrovich Kataev “Time, forward!” Is only a weak reflection of the then mass labor rush. Productivity often exceeded even the most ridiculous calculations of the followers of Frederick Winslow Franklin Taylor - faithful ally of Henry William Ford and the founder of the scientific organization of labor. And, if necessary, they easily switched to overtime: in particular, with the beginning of the war almost the entire industry began to work in two shifts of twelve hours (the lunch break hour and eleven working hours). Petrov is likely to take into account this opportunity to build industry capacity.
The Germans were traditionally proud of the art of their masters and accordingly built production around their golden hands. The conveyor was used very reluctantly. And the regime of the day was as gentle as possible: even the second shift was introduced extremely reluctantly. Not only for the sake of maintaining the working capacity of craftsmen who are able, according to a German joke from the time of the war, to fasten even to the surviving plate with a serial number tank all the rest. The Germans fought the war for the sake of living space and enrichment - and that was to show the workers that their efforts were already paying off.
Therefore, the powerful German machine-tool equipment was used in one shift - and even not for full performance, because without a conveyor it is more difficult to organize its loading. Therefore, the workers themselves were not worried about the quantity, but only about the quality of their products.
True, quality is really useful. For example, fighter lagg-3 - creation Shlomy Aizikovich Lavochkina, Vladimir Petrovich Gorbunova and Mikhail Ivanovich Gudkov - was fairly peretyazhelon in connection with tselnoderevyannaya (of delta wood - plywood, impregnated with a thermosetting phenol-formaldehyde resin) structure and struggle to increase survivability during combat damages. But the carefully polished surface provided him with a speed even slightly higher than that of the main competitor - Yak-1 Alexander Sergeevich Yakovlev. And when Lavochkin replaced Vladimir Yakovlevich Klimov’s M-105 liquid-cooled motor (with the development of M-100, a licensed copy of the French Hispano-Suiza using Arkady Shvetsov’s AH-82 air-cooling motor, he was a distant descendant of the American Wright R-1820 Cyclone), he had a 4 recognized as the most effective fighter of his era, optimal for winning air supremacy. The share of the Yak-5 that appeared at the same time remained mainly due to a significantly smaller mass and a shorter acceleration time resulting from it — tracking bomber and Il-3 attack aircraft Sergei Vladimirovich Ilyushin: with sharp maneuvers on a limited space, the average — taking into account all accelerations and decelerations — speed Yak-2 was much higher than the enemy fighters.
By the way, the high injectivity of the Yak-3 was achieved at a rather expensive price - a decrease in the safety factor. In itself, it is generally reasonable. English material resistance specialist James Edward Gordon, who worked for many years at the Farnborough British Aviation Research and Testing Center (where one of the world's largest air shows is held) in the book Constructions, or why things do not break, wrote: “During the war, British aircraft designers were supplied before the need for a reasonable compromise between strength and other qualities of the aircraft. The loss of the bombers from the actions of the German air defense was very large, about one of the 20 aircraft did not return from each combat departure (Each "tour of duty" for the bomber pilot consisted of 30 sorties. Their service was therefore extremely dangerous. The losses in bombing aircraft were comparable to the losses among the crews of German submarines, which were very high). On the contrary, the loss of airplanes due to the destruction of the structure was insignificant - much less than one aircraft from 10 thousand. The aircraft’s power structure weighs about a third of its total weight, and it would probably be reasonable to reduce it further in exchange for other equipment giving additional advantages to the aircraft. In this case, the number of accidents would increase slightly, but the weight saved in this way would increase the number and size of the guns or the thickness of the armor, which would lead to a significant overall reduction in losses. But the aviators did not even want to hear about it. They preferred a greater risk of being shot down by a much lower risk of an accident for technical reasons. ”
Yakovlev created a car at the lower limit of the possible. But due to a production defect that was inevitable during mass production and low-skilled personnel (women and teenagers stood at the Soviet machine tools because men were torn from the rear to the front), the strength of serial copies was often lower than permissible. According to some estimates, up to a quarter of the Yak-3 losses in flight are not caused by the enemy’s impact, but by the spontaneous destruction of the structure.
Therefore - and for many other similar reasons - after the war, the people's commissar of the aviation industry Shahurin, the commander of the air force responsible for the military acceptance of finished products, the main air marshal (which corresponds to the Marshal of the Soviet Union) Alexander Novikov and several other high-ranking military and production workers were convicted 5 – 7 years in prison. Designers — even Yakovlev with his struggle for lightness at all costs — would not be brought to justice: in the absence of a production marriage, their work would have been flawless. True, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria immediately after the death of Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili rehabilitated all the defendants of the “aviation business”: as a member of the State Defense Committee, he supervised, among other things, almost all of the defense industry, so much better than Dzhugashvili imagined the real difficulties of the then production. But in any case, this story proves the need to comply with a sufficiently high level of product quality.
And yet no quality can overcome clear quantitative superiority. For example, airplanes need the same speed first of all to impose a battle on the enemy in conditions that are favorable for themselves and inconvenient for them. But when on any maneuver you come across one of the numerous opponents - the conditions inevitably turn out to be beneficial for them.
Our military leaders have known this since time immemorial. Alexander Vasilyevich Suvorov said “Fighting not with number, but with skill” - but his own skill consisted primarily in maneuver in order to oppose the enemy with a greater number at the right time and in the right place (for example, under Rymnik, he has seven thousand Russian and eighteen thousand Austrian soldiers , defeated a hundred thousand Turks due to the fact that they were stationed in four fortified camps and each of them came under such a powerful blow that it collapsed before reinforcements from other camps arrived. And not only we knew it. Napoleon Karlovich Bonaparte said: "God is on the side of the big battalions."
The Germans initially put on the highest art of a few - but well-trained - fighters, on the unsurpassed power of a few - but well-designed and made - copies of weapons. That is why they did not think about how to squeeze out of their factories everything possible, how to achieve the productivity foreseen by engineer Petrov.
Our post-war weapons, too, were not always the best in all respects. So, the legendary Mikhail Kalashnikov assault rifle, even after all the modifications, is noticeably inferior in accuracy to fire to the earlier machine gun of Georgy Semenovich Shpagin, not to mention the later automatic rifle of Eugene Morrison Stoner. But immeasurably more reliable. A heap fire is needed only by a well-trained arrow: for a beginner, a narrow sheaf of bullets will fly past the target, so that a noticeable spread of fire will compensate for his mistakes. That is, here it is not the pursuit of quality that is chosen, but the bet on the suppression of the enemy by quantity. As experience shows, it is quite successful: in most clashes, mass armies armed with different variations on the AK theme overcome relatively few professionals who are able to fully utilize the capabilities of M-16.
Mass is needed not only on the battlefield. China has now overcome almost the rest of the world with the abundance and cheapness of its products - even despite its rather low (and at first - disastrous) quality. Yes, and Soviet products often deserved criticism (although even the worst examples of the notorious late Soviet sausage "from toilet paper" are much better than most of the modern filling of counters). But it was enough to - according to the favorite formula of the Soviet propagandists, based on the well-known phrase from the Sermon on the Mount Yeshua Davidov, "So do not worry about tomorrow, because tomorrow will take care of itself: it is enough for every day of its care" (© Good News Matthew, chapter 6, verse 34) - to be confident in the future.
I suppose, and now we need first of all not to rename the well-known applied chemistry in nanotechnology, but to revive mass production, albeit not ideal samples. Especially given the fact that all sorts of overhead costs are decomposed into a larger number of copies, so that products that are unprofitable for piece production are beneficial if their price is reduced and, accordingly, increased output. Felix Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky, being the chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy of the USSR, forcibly lowered the selling prices of most factories - and they suddenly stopped needing subsidies. Moreover, even if we now invest money directly in subsidizing domestic consumers (only in the form of targeted checks for specific purchases: China recently burned out that the money thrown into the people without address immediately turned into a bubble in the housing market prices), this money is very Soon they will return the income of the revived industry.
There are, of course, many other ways to revive domestic production. But there is a common link in them - the need to rely on our own experience, and not just thoughtlessly reproduce someone else's recipes. Including the recipes of those who, like the Germans during the war, care about the effectiveness of each individual step, and not the entire path as a whole.
Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.