"Innovative insanity" of patrol ships of project 22160
The situation calls for raising the issue of patrol ships again, especially since there is a risk of resuming their construction. The quote below has been repeatedly quoted in publications about corvettes and patrol ships of the Navy, but it (more precisely, its extremely severe consequences for the country's defense) is worth repeating it over and over again:
Command of the Naval fleet Russia abandoned the concept of a corvette for the protection of water areas (OVR). Instead, it is planned to create patrol ships. The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, stated this in a blitz interview to the Central Naval Portal.
The main command does not see any prospects in the creation of ships previously designated as the "OVR Corvette". One of the main tasks of the OVR is to ensure the protection and defense of the naval forces in the areas of naval bases and in the adjacent territories. This task is now performed by coastal surveillance equipment, stationary sonar stations and coastal missile and artillery troops armed with anti-ship missiles of various ranges, as well as anti-submarine and strike Aviation.
Having abandoned the corvette, the Navy turned to the idea of creating patrol ships - less armed, but with greater autonomy and versatility, capable, among other things, of going on long voyages.
This news immediately caused extreme bewilderment and harsh criticism - both from specialists and the interested public. For example, A. Timokhin's article - “Suitcases without handles. Navy buys a series of useless ships "(2018 g.):
In such conditions, it would really be possible to ensure the protection of water areas near naval bases only and exclusively by ships with good capabilities to combat submarines. And they, at least, could be produced (it is possible now), and if you use the reserve correctly, then these will be good ships, really capable of providing at least an anti-aircraft missile defense and allowing the main forces of the fleet at the beginning of a military conflict to leave the bases without being torpedoes shot with impunity from submarines.
And then about the new "innovative patrol ships":
It will also be useful here to recall the then (2014) statements of the chief designer of the project and some persons presented as "experts":
As it became known to the newspaper "Business Online", Zelenodolsk plant them. Gorky will build not 6 patrol ships (PC) of Project 22160, as previously assumed, but at least 12.
Experts note that this fact indicates a change in the consciousness of the country's leadership - it began to understand that the Navy, as a state instrument, can help in solving political tasks of a strategic scale. Experts believe that Project 22160 can become one of the important components of the revived Mediterranean squadron.
Alexey Naumov, Chief PC Designer, told Business Online something about the project and the progress of its implementation. According to him, “the terms of design and construction are very tight, even at the present time. To keep within them, we work hard. This indicates a high demand for the project. It is very great. "
According to the chief designer of the PK, the date of laying of 11 serial ships will be known by the end of the year.
Now "experts" - D. Glukhov (St. Petersburg):
We will not cite a whole series of enthusiastic "popular" publications in the well-known media not only because of their extremely low technical and tactical level, but also because of direct deception of readers.
In short, these ships, in the opinion of lobbyists and "popular media" - "Britain in awe" (both "old" and "new" - overseas).
As a result, however, the order for the PC project 22160 was reduced to 6 units, the fleet had already received almost all the ships of the series, but thought hard - what can you do with these "doves of peace" (for in fact, this project with due the level of efficiency is not able to decide - even anti-piracy).
At the same time, the lobbyists of this project had several "advertising topics" for these "underships" - "like universal Swiss knives", "ship for hybrid wars", "ship for special operations and special forces", "stealth", etc. ...
The "insider-lobbyist" is literally quoted (I emphasize, a person who actually has access to information, but broadcasts it on various resources, to put it mildly, "extremely selectively", and in the interests of the most dubious projects for the "development of state budgetary funds") from one of the special forums:
A comment: a Swiss knife is a pretty good all-round "field" tool, even a "poor" one, but more or less well made. As will be shown below, the 22160 project simply does not have anything that would have been done at any effective and decent level, in fact - a "Swiss knife", but made by a dude somewhere in the garage by extremely low-skilled "specialists".
Very interestingly, this "insider lobbyist" writes about the OVR corvettes (which were "killed" by Project 22160 submarines, but an attempt to squeeze them into the 22160 hull "suddenly arose" and was presented publicly at the Naval Show this year):
We will not have them in the foreseeable future, since the concept of coastal observation in the near zone has prevailed, and in it ships of the IPC type are not really needed. All claims, questions and suggestions go to the headquarters, and not even to the main one, but to the general one.
Comment: this is another lie. Neither the main headquarters of the Navy, nor the general had anything to do with this.
This actually sabotage with mercenary motives to replace the OVR ship group with some "coastal surveillance systems" was a consequence of the actions of a well-known lobbyist in recent years who enjoyed "special relations" with some VIPs. Moreover, it should be noted that "coastal surveillance equipment" with the required efficiency not only did not exist then (2014), but does not exist even today, and what was proposed by the Navy had not only low efficiency, but also near-zero combat stability - the enemy could easily and naturally "turn off" them at any moment he wanted, both in wartime and in peacetime.
Note. At present, this lobbyist was miserably expelled from the topic of the defense industry complex, but the consequences of his actions are still hanging around the neck of not only the Navy, but also of all the Armed Forces (in terms of the absolute insecurity of the deployment of a naval strategic grouping in anti-submarine warfare ).
A comment: another lie. And this time it's double. The first is that the border guards managed to "taste" all the "delights" of "innovative contours" on the project 22460 (predecessors of 22160), and the last point here was the Crimean incident with the "Defender". And the second is that the project 22160 is not any "stealth" (despite some attempts of the developer to "portray" this).
It is worth noting here the very high cost of the sub-ships of the project 22160, in fact, at the level of the MRK of the Buyan-M project (despite the much more powerful armament of the latter). And one of the reasons for this is unreasonably high prices for a number of components and systems (the optimality of the appearance and composition of which for small displacement ships raises serious questions from specialists). Further, the "insider-lobbyist" specifically about the automatic communications complex (ACS):
Found - passed - washed away (if possible, of course). And the KUG (MA, DBK) will strike. What, someone forbids doing this?
A comment: the word "washed away" about an undership with a speed of less than 22 knots looks pretty funny, if it were not for the lives of people (and the problems that were thwarted) in wartime. Here it is appropriate to recall the American LCS, where for such tasks the speed was set more than twice that of the 22160 project, and the real (and not fake, like 22160) stealth.
As for the "powerful AKS", this is a special case of one of the acute diseases of our shipbuilding, when the "specialized specialists" of the Navy allegedly "justify" for ships (this is especially acute for small ships) extremely expensive complexes with dubious equipment and appearance, but which very beneficial for "their" (specific) defense industry enterprises. At the same time, they categorically try not to allow “aliens” to this “clearing”, who often have special complexes with much greater efficiency (and confirmed in real combat conditions) and much less cost. The situation is such that a number of (publicly and officially declared, for example, the use of UAVs in service with the RF Armed Forces to solve the tasks of the Navy) positive progress in the Navy in this direction took place only thanks to the hard pressure of the higher organizations of the Ministry of Defense.
Speaking about the problem of corvettes and patrol ships of the Navy, it is worth noting insider of the above lobbyist:
A comment: another lie.
For nothing prevented (technically) the completion of the corvettes in the shortest possible time for actually working and serial (normally mass-produced) samples of radio-electronic means, with which there would be no problems with the effectiveness of the same Redut air defense system. Instead, the Navy got into a scam with a "gold" at the cost of a "tower" (IBMK "Zaslon"), which not only does not provide the specified requirements (see articles Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing и “Thundering and others. Will the fleet get effective ships in the near-field? "), but also has extremely serious problems with serial production ("the hulls are without working masts").
The most interesting thing is that in the version of the "reinforced" 22160 (presented at IMDS-2021), the armament department of the Northern PKB worked at "101%" - because there was just such a composition of radio equipment that was fully provided for the tasks of the corvettes of the Navy: the radar "Positive -M "with serial (!) Antennas of radio correction (!) SAM, that is, it solves the most important problem of this SAM.
The question arises - what (and most importantly - who) prevents from putting such a really working and serial kit on the corvettes 20380 (5)?
"Innovative-modular mirage"
The promises about "magic modules" and container "Calibers" turned out to be fairy tales, which had already been discussed in detail on the pages of "Military Review" earlier - article "Patrolling modules will not save".
Yes, there is information that the PCs still fired the "Caliber" from their "modular launchers" the non-standard lifting launcher has been used for testing Calibers since the mid-2000s and, moreover, a video of the launch from it (from the helicopter pad of the Project 1155 BOD) was shown at IMDS-2009.
Now let's listen to the insider:
At the same time, you need to understand that there are no problems to launch (in a calm sea) "Caliber" with a non-standard "folding" launcher (even from a patrolman, even from a barge), but the modular-container "Calibers" have a very serious (in fact, unsolvable) problem of forming full-fledged rocket salvos. However, according to our propaganda, we deliberately “do not knock down” each “Caliber” and hits “a whites in the eye”, and, accordingly, “everything is fine” (only there are more and more reasons to add “beautiful marquise”).
Fans of the project were looking forward to and are still waiting for the use of the AUV on the project ("XXI century", "innovations"). They did not wait, even despite the fact that the AUVs used even small PDRKs or very small RIB boats, but for the PC they somehow “didn’t grow together” (despite the presence of an “innovative crane-beam” in the stern).
I'll sprinkle "salt on the AUV on the PC".
According to the author, one of the key reasons for not using existing AUVs (including small ones) from these PCs is that the Navy really does not want to risk as a result and simply lose a very expensive AUV. And it should be noted not only the problems with positioning (which they hoped to "fix" by installing adjustable pitch propellers on the PC of the "new series") and lifting from the water at the built PCs (therefore, it is simply ridiculous to compare a powerful crane on American LCS ships and a frankly childish and weak similar design on project 22160), but also with side boats (used to support work with AUV). But more on that below.
UAVs announced on this "innovative ship of hybrid and special wars"? And even "painted"?
Forgive me, but the presence of a "kennel" (a hangar this deck box does not dare to call the tongue) for UAVs is not a condition for their effective use. Specifically for the project 22160 in view of serious problems with pitching (lack of dampers), which is acute even for ordinary Ka-27s. How often potential unmanned helicopters will start to fight on it is a separate conversation.
Searching for submarines?
Let's listen to the "insider lobbyist" again:
At the same time, there is a serial BUGAS, and the "innovation-container" BUGAS is disfigured into a 40-foot "monster" with which it cannot be put anywhere, except for the PC of project 22160 (even on the "modular" project 20386 instead of the "innovative container" BUGAS, according to obvious technical and layout advantages applied "classics").
"Insider lobbyist" ( link):
Realizing that project 22160 turns out to be very sour and weak with literally all the tasks, its supporters and lobbyists switched to rhetoric like “we have such devices, but we will not tell you about them”, while with the air of “especially dedicated”, in the most delightful expressions are declared about project 22160 as a "sea taxi for special forces", about its supposedly "super-electronic warfare", "magic" "super-reconnaissance containers", which are little green men ", then the layman (and with them the critical and objective specialists) can only accept" sessions of positive emotions "from the" popular "media (and other resources).
However, the reality is here as well - like everything in this project.
I will not give the photo itself, RIA Novosti requires payment and permission to publish for this, the resource itself published "advertising" (sale) images of project 22160, including the main command post (GKP), with posted documentation on the capabilities of the ship's radio electronic means. The published data raise very bad questions not only about the allegedly declared "super-electronic warfare", but also simply, as possible, simply reliably observe the environment of the general detection radar, because it has a significant "blind sector" in the stern.
Briefly on the supposedly "miraculous" intelligence and "special capabilities" of the project.
The funny thing is that the statements (or notorious lobbyists, or non-specialists who heard about this "in great secret" from the "sons-in-law") were extremely harshly and soberly rejected on public resources by those who actually performed tasks on the RZK (reconnaissance ships) of the Navy ( including in the position of their commanders). And the logic here was simple, at the level of a school physics course - the project 22160 did not have any serious antennas for the high-quality performance of electronic intelligence tasks.
And here again it is worth quoting the above-mentioned "lobbyist-insider", link:
And now a little bit of logic and common sense.
First. As propaganda tells us, our "little green men" are "the greenest men in the world," and the "corresponding unit of the General Staff" is, in general, the most super-intelligence (together with "colleagues from the SVR"). And then it suddenly turns out that the real situation with marine reconnaissance in our country is so bad that even miserable and wretched "ersatz opportunities" in this part of project 22160 in the General Staff are perceived with a "storm of delight"!
Second. The reasons for this really "bad" situation are clear from the statement - there are simply no ships to solve tasks, respectively, in this situation any "trough" for at least some execution (rather, "designation of a solution") of tasks is perceived with a "storm of delight."
The third. Extremely serious "flaws" are obvious, as in the very concept of marine reconnaissance - the basic project for this, RZK project 18280 turned out to be extremely expensive and with scanty serial production and, moreover, "suffer from mechanical problems."
Fourth. The choice for the subsequent serial construction of the RZK on the basis of the small tanker project speaks of the systemic crisis of the naval reconnaissance of the Navy and the difficulties with a qualitative analysis of the existing problems and the definition of really effective ways to solve them (but this is already a subject for a separate conversation).
Another opinion ( link):
- If possible, ask your son-in-law about the helicopter. Whether and, if so, how was it used.
- I asked ... I didn't have my own, there, to the very top of the head, the cargo was everywhere, where possible, for delivery ... But ... a helicopter flew in from 11356, sat down, took the objects to Tartus, and the ship went straight to Novorossiysk, nowhere entering with a load.
"Taxi for special forces"?
And our special forces fight only in "beach conditions" - God forbid "no disturbance of the sea"?
For the descent and reception of the DShL formally on the project 22160 has a limitation of 2 (two) points, and the helicopter is actually not excitement, due to the lack of roll stabilizers).
Not to mention the real statistics of assault and sabotage groups during the Great Patriotic War, there almost most of them were carried out beyond the boundaries of the possibility of using the DSL (and with very dubious possibilities of using a project 22160 helicopter from the PC).
"The Moment of Truth"
And then the Crimean incident happened (for more details - article on "VO" "A very dangerous provocation: analysis of the actions of the destroyer" Defender "off the coast of Crimea"), where "innovative ships of the XXI century" from the Northern PKB showed themselves "in all their glory" (in quotes). And if the PSKR BOKHR of project 22460 still somehow tried to compete with the provocateur "Defender", which accelerated to 30 nodal speed, then the ship of direct tracking from the Navy - the newest PC of the project 22160 "Defender" practically did not notice. It should be noted that in the officialdom of the Ministry of Defense (Department of Information Work and Mass Communications, DIMK) there were a lot of "victorious reports" about "successful tracking" of the ships of "so-called partners", only on July 23, 2021 it turned out that these tracks were " successful "until the moment when the enemy resolved it.
Despite all the "victorious reports" (in the "specific style" of the head of the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation), who actually went to "erase" what is clear, including the fact of the removal of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet (with his appointment with a to another position) immediately after the Crimean incident. At the same time, DIMK itself “stamped splints” (not related to reality) about “innovative ships XXI” of project 22160, with a speed of supposedly “30 knots” (in quotes), and continued to do so.
Yes, the actual speed of the project 22160 is less than 22 knots for the tasks of the Navy, it looks frankly poor. A helicopter could help here (more precisely, the possibility of its effective use in conditions of developed waves) and a good interceptor boat (for example, in the case of the Defender, a series of pro-sabotage grenades dropped into the water from such a boat in front of the Defender's bow could be very effective. " to reason with the unreasonable "), but with this the project 22160 is also" liquid ", so tales about the non-existent speed of the project 22160 continue, for example, the photo (about 2015) shows the process of" deceiving "according to the project 22160 (the speed of allegedly" 27 nodes ") Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission.
Immediately after the Crimean incident, the Naval Salon took place, where a version of Project 22160 with "enhanced armament" was publicly shown (for more details, see the article by A. Timokhin "The scam is restarted: a new version of the" patrol ship "22160 is shown").
As the saying goes, “Repin’s painting“ sailed ”... Actually, they came to what they were leaving (in 2014) - the OVR corvette, but already on the basis of hull 22160.
However, the main problem of the project 22160 lies precisely in this “innovative” building.
The main flaw is project 22160 as a "hydrodynamic freak"
According to the statements of its developers (at the round table on the problem of sea piracy at the Army-2017 forum), the idea of creating such a ship belonged to the ex-Commander-in-Chief of the Navy V.V. Chirkov and consisted in "the minimum displacement for unlimited seaworthiness (1 tons)" to ensure low operating costs.
To “minimize displacement” with the alleged “increase in seaworthiness”, “innovative contours” of the “modified deep V” type and a number of other “creative” hydrodynamic features of the project such as a hull fracture (“redan”) in the bow were used, about the strongest slamming of which experts warned from the moment the first information on the project 22160 appeared.
As a result, it turned out that even "innovations of the XXI century" are not able to abolish physics. For real modes of movement and displacement, the "innovative contours" of project 22160 turned out to be not just "not optimal", its developers and customers "suddenly" "made a discovery" for themselves that ships with normal round bilge contours, with a similar power plant with almost twice the displacement have a close full speed (specifically - projects 22160 and 20385 (the latter - when working "half power")).
Moreover, it is very interesting to compare the "promising and innovative" project 22160 with the not very successful cruiser of our fleet "Boyarin" (1902, died at the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War).
On sea trials, the cruiser, with a displacement of about 3 tons, the power of the machines - 200 liters. with., developed a speed of 11 knots - that is, with a displacement of almost two times greater and less power of the installation, he developed a speed significantly higher than that of the "innovative ship of the XXI century" project 160.
It should be noted that initially the Boyarin project was rated extremely low, it was imposed on our fleet through the “administrative resource” of the ruling dynasty, but the project underwent a very significant revision by Russian shipbuilding engineers (including the future academician A. N. Krylov), the result is a pretty good ship, with a relatively high speed and good seaworthiness.
It's a good question, how would Academician A. N. Krylov assess the “hydrodynamic perfection” (in quotation marks, or rather, ugliness) of Project 22160 today?
Alexey Nikolaevich was not only an outstanding shipbuilder, but also a person capable of very harsh and sharp statements, including on the rostrum of the State Duma, and in his memoirs, for example:
- Admire what control does. Cast steel machine frames for "Andrey" were rejected. Read the act: “According to the terms of the order, it is required that the ultimate resistance of the material was from 45 to 48 kg / sq. mm with an elongation of 16 to 18%, and since when testing the slats, from 50 to 53 kg was obtained with an elongation of 19 to 21%, so that both numbers lie outside the prescribed limits, the frames cannot be accepted and are subject to rejection. "
- Yes, you brought me the act from the factory or from the 11th verst (psychiatric hospital)?
Returning to project 22160, we emphasize once again - without the "innovative hydrodynamic ugliness" of the developer, with "classic contours" and the same speed, the ship could have almost twice the displacement, which made it possible to:
- placement of the second helicopter;
- placement of the power plant in two compartments in accordance with the requirements of the Navy (and not in one, as on the 22160 project);
- placement of an increased stock of removable payload (for which, in exact accordance with Archimedes, the required volume of the hull submerged in water is needed), and with the possibility of installing it in the most optimal place - in the middle part of the ship (on the "original" project 22160 to compensate for the accepted at the stern of the cargo (containers), it was necessary to introduce additional special trimmed tanks with water ballast in the bow and stern parts of the ship, which "ate" the displacement);
- placement of effective interceptor boats with SPU, ensuring their use in conditions of developed waves;
- installation of a rolling damper;
- finally, the fact that the correct larger body simply shakes less.
In other words, the normal engineering approach made it possible to actually get a completely effective (multi) functional ship - the "Swiss knife", but this technical capability (on a serial installation) was "killed" by the "innovative hydrodynamic itch" of the developer (and a set of problems for the customer - starting from banal incompetence and ending with an unwillingness to objectively report and deal with the fantasies of VIPs).
Taking into account the problems with power plants in our shipbuilding, it would be appropriate to give another example of ships of the Russo-Japanese War: Japanese advice note "Chihaya" (1901): displacement - 1 tons, speed - 464 knots at a capacity of 21 liters. with. That is, one DRRA-6 unit (or, which is much more interesting - 000DRA-6000, with a shaft generator extremely useful for patrol moves) of the Kolomna plant for a ship has a displacement of about 1 tons, with normal contours, it provides a speed of about 6000 knots, and in a single-shaft version ship (plus an auxiliary-reserve retractable column with an electric motor), the production capabilities of the Kolomna plant, expressed in potential ships, are actually doubled.
Hey, General Staff (including its Main Directorate), so you need (reconnaissance) ships?
At the same time, 1,5 thousand tons of displacement provide (subject to the removal of excessive requirements) the placement of both a helicopter and a good high-speed and seaworthy boat, capable of guaranteeing speed tracking of reconnaissance objects. Of course, we are not talking about ordering the "analogue of Chihaya" now, there are much more interesting and effective options. This example is given as one of the options for a reasonable approach to shipbuilding, an example of the fact that even at the existing power plant capacities, we could have much more ships and better in quality.
As for the comparison of the speed characteristics of the PC of the project 22160 with the western "patrolmen", the supporters and lobbyists of 22160 usually select for this formally the most "convenient" competitors for them, for example, the English River. Formally - because supposedly the "advantage" of 22160 is only in terms of "tabular characteristics", but if possible, it is realistic to solve problems in conditions of developed waves (use onboard boats as a patrol ship and provide takeoff and landing of a helicopter) River, of course, significantly surpasses the PC of the project 22160.
Yes, many western patrol ships use a hull shape that is not optimal in hydrodynamics, primarily for seaworthiness, but here they still outperform 22160, and most importantly, they do not have such a strict limitation on the range and the possibility of serial production of power plants. The latter factor forces us to be very careful about inefficient power consumption, and this is not only fuel and financial efficiency, first of all it is the ability to have (with similar production capabilities of power plants) almost twice as many ships with "hydrodynamic freaks" of Project 22160.
Patrol mission and project 22160
The above-mentioned round table at the Army-2017 forum turned out to be an extremely interesting and instructive event for many participants. Formally, it began with a "report" by representatives of the Navy on the success in the implementation of anti-piracy tasks with the final "highlight of the program" of the report and presentation of Project 22160 from its chief designer.
In reality, it turned out differently, and the first "sharp dissonance" of the "popular tone" of the official reports was the speech of the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In a polite but very harsh manner the main question was posed to the Navy and the Ministry of Defense - a fundamental change in the "threat model": instead of hungry Somali pirates with rusty Chinese machine guns, the emergence of a real threat of professionally trained "sea terrorists". The threat, to which the Navy was not ready, from the word - absolutely.
Some information about how the mentioned threat evolved can be found in the material of A. Timokhin "On modern pirates and mercenaries".
The subsequent discussion was quite stormy (as a result, the speech of the chief designer of project 22160 was under "massive fire" criticism of the participants of the "round table"), with the participation of the author of the article. With me (by chance) there were materials on various special means of Western fleets, relevant against a serious terrorist threat, and what we absolutely do not have, all this was received with great interest and the organizers' request to issue a short message in the reporting materials of the round table ".
As a matter of fact, practically nothing fundamentally “new” was discovered there, even without a sharp increase in the terrorist threat. After the successful, but "on the brink" operation to free the tanker "Moscow University" in 2010, the requirements for the ship performing anti-piracy and anti-terrorist missions became obvious. These issues, among other things, were discussed by specialists in the special press.
However, all this turned out to be "forgotten" at the moment of the formation of the intent of the project 22160.
According to the literal statement of the chief designer at the round table:
A comment: as it was shown above, when using "classical contours" with the same power plant, the same speed and range could be obtained on a ship with a lot (1,5–2 times) large displacement and capabilities.
To which the reaction of those who were discussing was: “it was according to the old dollar” (and a more economical western power plant). Moreover, the declared cost of operating a PC looks unjustifiably overestimated against the background of expensive (including in operation) corvettes and frigates - it turned out to be not cheap to operate a PC, and the point here, perhaps, is all in the same “innovative” “hydrodynamic ugliness”.
A comment: why?! In combination with the fact that under the bridge there is a "potential good fire" in the form of a helicopter and the placement of the main power plant in one compartment (contrary to the requirements of the Navy). Obviously, the naval commanders, who "played with soldiers" when developing the concept of this ship, "allowed" opponents for themselves only in the form of beggars with rusty machine guns. The fact that they might suddenly have (and are massively used in reality) the same RPG-7, they apparently did not know. One hit from RPG-7 to the area of the engine room and that's it ...
At the same time, the firing sector is the only one with any effective weapons ship - gun mount AK-176MA is limited in the stern, which is covered ... only by a couple of machine guns on a manual machine! Under these conditions, "booking a bridge not to be hit by a shooter from 50 m", to put it mildly, gives off a mockery of common sense.
The essence of all this is that even when solving "seemingly simple" anti-piracy tasks (not to mention actions against well-trained terrorists), the required level of characteristics and combat capabilities of the ship, its weapons, aircraft and boats is needed. If only because not to disrupt the anti-terrorist operation (and not to ruin people - including civilians).
The patrol ships of Project 22160 are not able to reliably solve these problems, because in the case of a strong and intelligent enemy (for example, a group of well-trained pirates (terrorists) on high-speed boats with machine guns, grenade launchers and MANPADS or a banal seizure of a civilian ship by a group of well-trained terrorists) there is a chance for the success of the PC project 22160 is practically nonexistent. His level will not be enough even for an introductory type of capture of "Moscow University" even by averagely trained pirates. Not to mention something more serious.
At least two helicopters are needed (one lands, the other covers) and at least two efficient (high-speed, seaworthy, with good carrying capacity) side boats.
From the author's article "Patrolling modules will not save":
However, 22160 is in trouble with side boats.
Here it is necessary to understand that in order to effectively solve problems, you need not just a boat with good characteristics, you need a complex: "ship - SPU (launching device) - boat". The most common design of a storm SPU for a boat in the world provides for the presence of two locks during descent and ascent - a central one that takes the weight of the boat and a bow (release device), the purpose of which is to fix the diametrical plane of the boat close to parallel to the diametrical plane of the ship during descent and ascent.
Here's how it works for the British:
And these are the Norwegians (patrol ship KV Nordkapp):
Australians:
And an example of how it is not necessary, it is impossible to do (and how it was done on our project 22160, where the descent and ascent of the RIB on the move is obviously not provided, and on the foot it is significantly limited in excitement):
Specifically, on the 22160 project, there is a SPU formally, but in the most primitive and cheap version, which does not provide safe use on the move and with developed excitement.
Here it is worth recalling, to put it mildly, very low performance characteristics of the BL-860 boats LCMI 361462.001 supplied to the Navy (and a number of other organizations), in more detail - "Boat scam".
The fact that today, under the guise of a product adopted for service, a completely different product is supplied, moreover, in fact, without an RKD (what is, can be considered as such only with considerable imagination), this is already from the category "in the navy, and this does not happen."
In contrast to this, on the new ships of the BOKHR (large PSKR of the "Ocean" type and the new "Svetlyaks"), the correct SPUs are installed for use in sea-going high-speed boats in waves.
I emphasize once again - the boat and the SPU on board the ship are a single complex, in this case, the mass of the SPU is roughly 1,5 times the mass of the boat. A vivid example of this in the BOKHR - initially, large boats of the SK-860 type were installed on the old PSKR, but on the old davits (with significant restrictions on waves). As a result, on new ships, even such large ones as "Oceans" of project 22100, they went to accommodate a smaller boat, but with an SPU, ensuring its use in conditions of developed waves.
A large boat requires a very heavy onboard SPU, as a result of which stern slips are used on a number of Navy and SOBR ships. Taking into account the pitching of the ship, the solution is not ideal, but in many cases the only possible solution to ensure the use of a heavy boat in waves. At the same time, taking into account the significant vertical vibrations of the ship's transom, the depth of the slip and the availability of the necessary margin to the ship's structures along the height of the slip from above become very important.
Examples of such "correct" slipways on western ships:
One of the classic examples of the "correct patrol ship" is the new US Coast Guard ships of the Legend type, see A. Timokhin's article “When people think with their heads. An example of a proper ocean patrol ship ".
Project 22160 has a slip, but, like everything in this project, it is in a "decorative" form. The main thing is that the categorical desire to shove in the "modular containers" at any cost led to a scanty slip height, which was aggravated by a gross design mistake - instead of using "swing gates" him below). At the same time, as follows from the initial advertising materials for the project, it was planned to install a "classic" large seagoing boat-RIB.
However, "especially creative" (but high-ranking) naval "representatives of the customer" showed the "initiative", and instead of the "classic RIB" there appeared an "armored turret" - an assault boat (DSL).
Note: the developer of the DShL - "Trident" has nothing to do with the idea of the "turtle", it is precisely "the fantasies of some VIPs from the Navy". Moreover, Trident has done a great job to make the result as successful as possible, but… taking into account the initial flaw in the original idea of the DSL. The main thing is the extremely low real seaworthiness - the "vertical clearance" "clamped" by the inadequate requirements of the customer, respectively - low deadrise (and seaworthiness) and the height of the landing compartment. That is, for river conditions, this boat is very good, and can go well for export (for example, for the Amazon or the Mekong), but at sea it has extremely strict restrictions.
The problem here is significant shock loads at speed on the hull of low dead-lift, respectively, and on the crew. At the same time, the extremely clamped vertical dimension of the boat does not provide the necessary headroom for the effective operation of the damping means.
And these are not "little things", but a very serious problem.
An example from the US Navy - both the shock loads of the boat, and the statistics of the consequences for their crews.
And I emphasize once again that the problem really exists, and not only in the US Navy (whence these figures for a private (!) Episode, and already removed from the public in the US). Representatives of the "special operating bodies" have already turned to the author for materials on the subject, because "a problem has arisen," which is not surprising. Despite the publicity of the popular media, our "little green men", of course, do not have "unparalleled" titanium shock-resistant spines, exoskeletons, the body structure is approximately the same for all "homosapiens", regardless of their state ownership. Likewise, there is no "national physics", science is international by definition.
And there is a physical (technical) problem, which we intensively “sweep under the skirting board”, trying not to notice. Special forces officers are the "golden fund" of our Armed Forces, and their state of health is not just their "private matter" but one of the factors in solving special tasks of the RF Armed Forces.
This is where the problem of testing our boats arises. In fact, seaworthy tests the way they should be carried out (with the registration of shock loads and measuring the stresses in the bonds) are simply not carried out here!
Insider:
Let me emphasize that everything mentioned above was known to specialists even before the scam with project 22160 began.
Accordingly, a simple question: why it was impossible not to engage in "cutting out tonsils from the other end", and immediately do (both on the part of the customer and the developer) according to the mind and normally?
Why are these delightful "rake races" necessary, and not just for generous budget funding, but for budgeting, selected, among other things, from the real acute problems and needs of the country's defense?
Even if the question is to “just feed” the Severnoye PKB with funding, what prevented him from giving him justified and necessary work for the Navy?
Why was it necessary to make the notorious "cripples and freaks"?
Has the Navy finally "reached" and realized the need for OVR corvettes?
TsMKB "Almaz" does not want to admit mistakes and make a massive and cheap "mobilization" version of the project 20385 corvette for mass serial construction?
Well, let the Severnoye PKB be the developer, but the ship should have a normal hull, without any "hydrodynamic innovative deformities" of project 22160!
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