The birth of the Soviet missile defense system. The end of Yuditsky

46
So, this is the beginning of the 1970s.

From the point of view of an outside observer, the work in the SVC proceeds in a regular socialist way - the research institute receives an order from one department or another for the development of a computer and executes it. At the beginning of 1972, there were three such orders at once. In 1971, the Sukhoi Design Bureau ordered a CAD supercomputer. In 1972, the GRU MO orders a supercomputer for (possibly) breaking ciphers. And finally, in the same 1972, an order is received from the Ministry of Civil aviation for the development of a message switching center (Yuryuzan project) with the installation of a sample at Pulkovo airport and subsequent serial production. The MGA was in the process of re-equipping the airports; in 1971, four French DS-4 message switching centers were purchased for their telegraph network at a cost of one million dollars. Similar CFBs were needed at every hub airport, as a result, the currency ran out, and it was decided to develop a domestic solution.



Yuditskiy deals with the first two problems himself (as an expert in modular arithmetic and supercomputers), the third partly delegates to the team of V.L.Dshkhunyan (more on this below). The result of work for Sukhoi is System IV (accepted by the customer, but the MCI was hacked to death), the result of the work for the GRU was the supercomputer 41-50 (accepted by the customer, but the MCI was hacked to death), but the work on the Yuryuzan project proceeded even more interesting.

First, here a fundamentally new class of devices was required for the SVC - not a supercomputer, but a mini-computer and not a number crusher, but a control system. Yuditsky, as we have already said, was not a fanatic, but a man of tremendous intellectual flexibility, and he simply could not fail to make a breakthrough in such a seemingly distant field from his interests. Everywhere that he touched, some new and progressive circuitry and architectural ideas flourished, and he did not disappoint in the field of mini-computers.

While the main team of the SVC was in sadness and depression due to the closure of all supercomputer developments, Yuditsky suggested starting from the opposite end - to build not the largest, but the smallest computer, and for this to do something that no one else in the USSR had ever done. Design a microprocessor!

The first in the USSR started the creation of domestic microprocessors SVC, for this purpose Yuditsky in 1973 allocated a special laboratory headed by the already mentioned Dshhunyan. The employees of the microprocessor laboratory were young even by the standards of the "youth" SVC and had a huge advantage in their audacious thinking over the dinosaurs who were engaged in cloning Western technologies. Recall that American microprocessor technologies began to actively develop just a couple of years earlier, and no one then knew where the idea of ​​single-chip integration would lead us, so Yuditsky and his employees were literally at the forefront of global technological progress at that moment.

Dshhunyan was appointed the chief designer of the Yuz-1 research and development project (microprocessor), about 15 people worked with him. After analyzing the main architectural solutions of the LSI (multiplied by the analysis of Soviet production capabilities), the then classic bit slice scheme was chosen, which we have already written about in detail. Yuditsky was a principled opponent of the naked copying of foreign samples, but naturally he could not help but investigate how the competitors were doing.

Dshhunyan recalls:

The solution was not traditional. We interpreted the task, focusing not on reproducing the American analog, but on the basis of our own ideas about what a processor should be for use in the national economic complex and in the defense industry.

Dshhunyan's team had competitors, for example, a group of on-board computer developers under the leadership of OP Gorokhov from the Leningrad Production Association "Elektroavtomatika". Their approach was, let's say, not very sound - Gorokhov did not want to develop a universal microprocessor, but simply to implement individual nodes of his computer in the form of a LSI, thereby obtaining a computer on a board consisting of several dozen unique mono-tasking microcircuits.

In addition to the complete futility of such an approach as a whole, Gorokhov's group was faced with the inhuman complexity at that time of implementing an entire computer unit in the form of a LSI, as a result, the work stalled. In the SVC itself, an alternative project was proposed by A.I. Koekin's laboratory (an 8-bit single-chip microcontroller with a reduced instruction set), but it was rejected as too primitive.

In the final version, the microprocessor kit of the K587 series looked as follows: K587IK2 - 4-bit bit slice processor, K587IK3 - 8-bit bit slice coprocessor, K587IK1 - 8-bit bus controller, K587RP1 - 8-bit RAM controller. The basic command system is its own - "Electronics NC".

Thus, the first and last time in all history In the USSR, we developed an absolutely original microprocessor, not borrowed from anyone in any way, with its own command system!

Nothing like this has been done in the country either before or since.


From left to right: 587IK2 4-bit arithmetic section of the first series of the first Soviet microprocessor, 9-volt CMOS technology, 1976, 587IK2 - a similar chip in 5-volt CMOS, 588VS2 - advanced 16-bit section, 1985 - "Integral" , 1802ВР1 - TTL version, advanced 16-bit section, 1802ВР5 - continuation of the series, parallel multiplier 16x16 bits. Photo from the collection of the author.

In general, the question of the priority of the first original domestic microprocessors (sectional) is disputed by the semi-mythical 532 series, whose history is full of lacunae and contradictions.

A set of microcircuits of this series, according to one version, was developed from the beginning of the 70s on the topic "Salyut-4" (according to some sources - "Salyut-MT4") and is the first Soviet microprocessor (not single-chip), with its own architecture and command system ... There is only one known special computer "Salyut-4" - an onboard computer for manned orbital stations, which is compatible with the ES computer according to the command system. But it is not a fact that this is the same "Salute", because the 532th series is known only in the civilian version, K532. This is rather weak for space.

As for the developers, there are also versions (perhaps not mutually exclusive).

According to the first, the circuit design stage of the development was carried out at the SVC, and the development of the topology and design - at the Research Institute TT ("Angstrem") under the leadership of Popov.

According to the second, it was one of the enterprises belonging to NPO ELAS, for example, at that time it included NIIMP, factories "Component", "Micropribor" and SEMZ. In any case, the serial production of microcircuits of this series was organized in 1974-1975 at Angstrem. The series included K532IR1 - an 8-bit register, K532IK1 - a digit comparison circuit, K532IK2 - a control device, K532IK3 - a multifunctional device, K532IE1 - an 8-bit counter.

According to B.M. Malashevich,

When the first domestic microprocessors were created, there was no special grouping in the IS designation system, so they were designated within grouping 53, this is how CMOS series 532 (NIITT, Zelenograd) and r-MOS series 536 (LKTB Svetlana, Leningrad) were born. When grouping 58 was allocated for microprocessors, previously reserved, the 532 series was renamed 587, and the 536 series was not renamed.

However, this version has serious inconsistencies with reality - neither IK4, nor IE1 are listed in the 587th series. As a result, the 532 series, as usual, is still waiting for the efforts of technoarchaeologists.

At the same time, in the designation of domestic microprocessors, the devil's leg will break - LSIs with indices 5xx were produced from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, and there was no order in their assignment. For example, K536IK is the ALU of calculators released in 1987, 582IK1 is a 4-bit bit slice, a Texas Instruments SBP0400 clone (original 1976, ripped off in 1980), and 585IK is an analogue of Intel 3001 released as early as 1991.


And then went the options transitional to the DEC command system. KM1801VM1, KM1801VM2, KM1801VM3 - copies of DEC LSI-11/03 of varying degrees of advancement, produced until the early 1990s. The developer is the same Dshhunyan. Square chip - L1839VM1, 32-bit processor, VAX-11 clone (next to the black original), produced in 2007 (!) In military design, a rather rare microcircuit. Photo from the collection of the author

It is striking that the K587 went into series (although it did not compare with the circulations of the later Intel clones), and this series was released in several versions in more than one generation. Original 9V CMOS K587 (SVTs, NII TT and Angstrem), 5V CMOS K588 (SVTs, NII TT and NPO Integral), TTL K1802 (SVTs, NII TT, NII ME and Mikron), nMOP K1883. Like Robotron U-83, these chips were produced even in the GDR!

In the future, a single-chip version of the K587 series with added on-chip peripherals (RAM / ROM / timer) was developed, in the version of the 1801BE1 microcontroller (with its own architecture "Electronics NC"). Later, at the request of the MEP, this architecture was abandoned in favor of the PDP-11 architecture and on its basis the VM801VMx, a series of Soviet 16-bit single-chip microprocessors, was implemented.

Nevertheless, it did not have a direct foreign analogue, the closest one was a single-chip DEC T-11 processor, but there was no full compatibility; T-11 has a direct clone K1807BM1. Another close analogue is LSI-11/03 (Electronics-60), but unlike it, the K1801 processors have a single-chip design. The processors were manufactured at the factories Angstrem (Zelenograd) and Exiton (Pavlovsky Posad). Later, for the production of a full range of components for the UKNTs, the production of KM1801VM2 was mastered at the Solnechnogorsk Electromechanical Plant (SEMZ) in Solnechnogorsk.


Already direct copies of PDP - multi-chip module KN1811 and its memory manager KM1811BT1, analogue of DEC304E; in composition and functions it is similar to the memory manager block of the K1801VM3 processor. Beside the originals: above - DEC F-11 processor, below - DEC J-11. Photo from the collection of the author

The machine for which it was developed was a little less fortunate, and the SVC was not at all lucky, but first things first.

In 1973, the prototype "Electronics NTs-1" was completed (still without a microprocessor, implemented on the traditional logic of small integration). The machine is accepted by the commission, including the Director General of the Scientific Center, A. V. Pivovarov, and the director of the Institute of Cybernetics of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Academician V. M. Glushkov, with extremely high marks. The chief designer was Yuditsky himself, the developers: M. M. Khokhlov, V. V. Smirnov, B. A. Mikhailov, Yu. L. Zakharov and others. The machine turned out to be quite simple against the background of all previous works - 16-bit, with a performance of 0,5-0,7 MIPS, 128 KB RAM on magnetic domains (those same bubble memory boxes) and 7 KB ROM on removable induction cards (idea taken from the System IV).

The development was carried out in the anarchic style traditional for the SVTs, which is absolutely not similar to the dull Soviet design bureaus. M. M. Khokhlov recalls:

Davlet Islamovich created the atmosphere of a creative union of like-minded people who jointly solve the task. All participants were equal, positions were forgotten, the main thing was ideas, their discussion, regardless of the person, and the definition of ways of implementation.

The machine turned out to be compact (much smaller than the SM series similar in class) and, most importantly, modular, and the concept of these modules, developed by Yuditsky, was close to the modern idea of ​​a personal computer.

In the same way, in NTs-1 it was possible to remove and insert RAM blocks, connect additional controllers, etc. Yuditsky himself jokingly called his creation "children's designer". Power consumption - 1,1 kW, characteristics are also close to modern powerful gaming PCs. As an incredible exotic, the car was optionally equipped with a terminal - in other words, a monitor for convenient operation, which could only be dreamed of in devices of this class in those years.

In a separate table there was an amazing combined UPVV - a combined device for preparation, input and output of information. It consisted of a PL-150 tape puncher, a deeply modernized FS-1501 photo card reader, a Konsul-260 electric typewriter and controllers for connecting them to the standard ES computer interface. Note that only the perforator was Soviet, everything else, due to the monstrous quality of the domestic periphery, was taken from the Czech Republic.

Reading punch cards was a special fun.

In the USSR, there were no peripheral devices comparable to "Electronics" in size, even in the project, and one should not forget about their legendary quality. As a result, we had to farm an absolutely incredible thing. The photo reader unit was removed from the Czech reader, a manual (!) Broach and connectors for connection were attached to it, and in this form they were pushed into the UPVV. This was used in a mini-computer in the mid-1970s, entering information by manually dragging a punched card one piece at a time.

It was even more difficult with printing. Printers in the current sense were just appearing all over the world, but the SVC already had an experimental working model of its inkjet printer (theme “Jeweler”, GC V.S.Butuzov). Nevertheless, no one was going to produce it in series. As a result, the problem was solved by screwing the same electric typewriter to the SUPPV.

At that time, magnetic tape drives with a width of 35 and 16 mm were used as external storage devices, of which only 16 mm corresponded to the size of a minicomputer to some extent, but even then it was racks. Such a thing would not fit into the table, it would be logical to use tape cassettes, but the quality of Soviet cassettes of that time cannot be described in censorship words at all. The SVC, in fact, had to solve the problem of re-issuing serial cassettes, making them more or less suitable out of unusable ones.

As a result, KNML was developed (GK A. G. Kokyanov) with a cassette capacity of 5 Mbit with hardware control of information.


Prototype "Electronics NC-1", demonstrated at the exhibition "Svyaz-75". In the foreground, in fact, is the computer itself in the form factor of a small table, behind it is the same table UPVV - a combined device for preparation, input and output of information. In the background is an optional 16mm ZMB-61-1 tape drive, also made in Czechia. The drive on Soviet MK-60 cassettes was characterized by simply unimaginable quality, even after all the modifications of the SVC, so in practice it was used very limitedly. In the second photo, near the serial "Electronics NTs-2", a group of leading specialists from SKB VT, who replaced the destroyed SVTs: Remnev Viktor, Kovalev Vyacheslav, Basin Yuri, Shiptyakova Lyudmila, Polozov Boris, Prokofiev Alexander, Pinaev Viktor on the day of the end of the theme "Alpha" on June 27 1977 year. Photo from SKB archives (http://www.skbvtvm.ru/)

One way or another, the problems were overcome and, without waiting for the release of the K587, the MEP issues an order to begin serial production at the Pskov Plant of Radio Components (PZRD) of the Pskov Association "Rubin". To support production at the PZRD, the SKB of Computing Equipment was formed. In 1974, serial production began, continuing (already with the modified forces of SKB VT machines) until 1989.

At the exhibition "Svyaz-75" the demonstration copy "Electronics NTs-1" made a splash. In an article about this B.M.Malashevich says:

As AI Abramov recalls: “The staff of the international exhibition“ Svyaz-75 ”was amazed at the trouble-free operation of“ Electronics NTs-1 ”from morning to evening, while the ES computers and SM computers go astray many times a day.

So the Yuryuzan project received its own control machine, and as a result, the first prototype for Pulkovo was manufactured by the forces of the SVC itself - a four-machine duplicated two-channel hardware and software complex.

Each channel consisted of a computer for interaction with telegraph channels, a computer for processing telegrams, and communication equipment with telegraph channels. CCS provided processing of 64 telegraph channels with automatic verification and correction of telegrams. The set of NTs-1 modules was replenished with a data transmission multiplexer. The complex was ready in 1975, it only remained to mount it (this happened a little later, after the complete destruction of the SVC, as a result, the prototype remained the only one, it worked successfully until 1995).

So, Yuditsky's only project was crowned with success, but a sword was already brought over the SVC.

In 1975, the microprocessor was finally ready and, using the modularity of the NTs-1, the prototype was converted into a single-board computer on a microprocessor - the first in the USSR, absolutely original and in no way inferior to similar developments in the United States. The prototype of the first is no longer a mini, but a microcomputer received the index "Electronics NTs-01" (not to be confused with "Electronics NTs-1").

The pre-production version ("Electronics NTs-02") was a little larger, occupying two boards, but still, it fit in a compact 5-kilogram case 240x420x60 mm, had a speed of 0,25 MIPS, power consumption - 15 watts. The forces of the pilot production of the SVTs itself produced 40 sets of NTs-02, after the destruction of the SVTs they were taken by Angstrem, and they were used to control the input control of the IET, robots and microcircuit splicing machines.

Note that later, thanks to the efforts of the Penza SKB VT, they prepared for the release of the version "Electronics NTs-1" on the BIS - "Electronics NTs-2" (again, do not confuse the index with the own development of the SVC on the BIS - NTs-02) and "Electronics 5E37".

And finally, none of them should be confused with "Electronics NTs-31", this is the development of NIITT in 1980, chief designer Yu. E. Chicherin, control machine of CNC machines.

In the wake of technical successes, SVC began to develop a number of compatible microcomputers - NTs-03T, NTs-04T and NTs-05T. In the course of negotiations with the developers of the on-board computer from the Leninets LNPO - R. Yu. Bagdonas and V. I. Koshechkin - the idea of ​​a parallel joint development of ground and onboard versions of the microcomputer was born. They must be identical, except for the design. The basic modules were built on the basis of the Magistral NC bus developed at the SVC (extension of the Soviet analogue of the Unibus PDP-11 with the ability, unlike the original, to connect up to 4 processors). Only the development of NTs-03T (GK D.I.


From left to right: prototype "Electronics NTs-01" and its board, prototype "Electronics NTs-02" and its board, then NTs-03T, NTs-03D, NTs-03S, NTs-04T and NTs-04U. Source - Boris Malashevich, The origin and formation of domestic microelectronics (http://it-history.ru).

In addition, work on switching centers attracted the attention of LNPO Krasnaya Zarya from the Ministry of Industry and Communications to the SVC. They were engaged in the development of the first in the USSR digital telephone communication system "Kavkaz-5", naturally, powerful computers were required for switching.

As a result, one more order fell on the extremely satisfied engineers of the SVC - a complex of computing facilities of variable composition "Svyaz-1". We worked together with the Research Institute of Electrical Devices (Research Institute ETU), the head institute of the LNPO.

The production of the KVS was planned at its own plant "Krasnaya Zarya". During the development, the solutions found in the course of designing the switching devices of System IV, NTs-1 and Yuryuzan were used in the broadest way, but the Svyaz-1 router was much more complex and powerful than anything that had been created for switching earlier.

An amazing hardware and software complex with a modular operating system was developed, multiprocessor and multitasking, also reconfigurable for the number of processors up to 30.

An original processor was also developed for the complex (GK IP Seleznev). With a corresponding set of microprograms, it was used in the KVS as a signal processor and as a switching processor. For the RAM, a special multiplexer processor (GK V.L. Glukhman) was made, which controls the exchange of data between the RAM-1 modules and the external memory of the ES computer on magnetic disks.

Each KVS processor accessed the memory subsystem (the task table) and received the current task from it. If there was no suitable task for him, and there was no master processor in the system at the moment, he assumed this role by periodically looking through the task table. As soon as a corresponding task appeared for the leading processor, he resigned from himself this role and proceeded to perform the current task.

KVS "Svyaz-1" and its software were developed, the project was accepted by the customer, the design and software documentation in the middle of 1976 was transferred to "Krasnaya Zarya" for serial production.

As a result, by the middle of 1976, the SVC was on the rise.

All current projects were successfully completed, in the spring the pilot production was transformed into the Logika plant, Electronics NTs-1 was already being produced in Pskov, the Yuryuzan prototype was mounted at Pulkovo, and the documentation for the Svyaz-1 PIC was transferred to Krasnaya Zarya. ”, The project K587 was completed and the serial production of the first Soviet microprocessors was being prepared.

The MEP became so generous that it wanted to donate the building under construction in Moscow on Sireneviy Boulevard to the SVC, organized its own pioneer camp "Albatross" for the children of its employees (whose number reached 1700). Relations were established with numerous Leningrad research institutes.

Naturally, all this could not last long.

On June 1976, XNUMX, Minister Shokin, the hero-creator of Zelenograd, the creator and defender of all domestic microelectronics, signed an order “On the transformation of the Specialized Computing Center into the Scientific Center. It had only two lines:

To transform the Specialized Computing Center and the Directorate of the Scientific Center into the Special Design Bureau (SKB) "Scientific Center".

V.S.Butuzov recalls:

In the first days of July 1976, in the middle of the day, I returned from Moscow and was immediately summoned to see DI Yuditsky. Entering the office, I saw there all the leadership of the SVC and the heads of divisions. All were depressed and silent. Looking at me, Davlet Islamovich said shortly: "We are not there." After a pause, he addressed all those present: “Everyone should be in their places and deal with the arrangement of people. You yourself will be the last to leave, when all your people are settled. "

What happened?

Why did the reorganization order turn out to be a disaster? Where, in general, did this order come from? Did the MEP treat the SVC well?

As usual, the reason was purely personal and, as always, in the USSR rests on the relationship "designer-official". The evil genius of Yuditsky was Shokin's deputy V.G. Kolesnikov. As we have already mentioned, Yuditsky was in some ways very similar to Kisunko - a young, impudent, not hiding his opinion, a zero toady, always speaking to his face what he thinks. For the Soviet bureaucrat, there was no more offensive personality, especially given the intellectual level of the party elite and, at the same time, their fabulous sense of their own greatness.

Kolesnikov, the deputy minister of the electronics industry, was a character worthy of his great colleagues - Shokin and Kalmykov. A simple locksmith of the locomotive depot of the Kastornaya station of the Moscow-Donbass railway, who peacefully served there from 1943 to 1945, following his senior colleagues, he quickly realized that the strength of the proletarian was in the party, and already in 1948 he became deputy chief designer of the Voronezh plant of radio components. There he worked comfortably for 4 years, after which he found himself in the role of a trade plenipotentiary already in the GDR, the appointment was extremely warm, then his career flooded by leaps and bounds.

After completing evening courses at the Polytechnic, he immediately became the director of the Voronezh semiconductor device plant, then the general director of the Voronezh production and technical association "Electronics", and in 1971 - the deputy minister. Along the way, as usual, he received the Lenin Prize and four orders (and later, naturally, the star of the Hero of Labor).

After the defeat of the SVTs, his career gained such acceleration that when Shokin died in 1985, Kolesnikov automatically inherited the throne of his godfather and himself became minister of the electronics industry, having also received the USSR State Prize a year earlier. Already in the years of the Russian Federation, he also became a Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and peacefully died in 2015 at the age of 90 years.

That Kisunko, that Yuditsky and Kartsev had an attitude towards such people, to put it mildly, not very positive. And, alas, they did not hide this, for which they all paid in the end.

N. M. Vorobiev:

Davlet Islamovich was very quick to think and therefore bored at various meetings in the ministry, where he had to attend. Quickly grasping the essence of the question, he often asked high-ranking executives tricky questions to which many did not find a quick answer. About such slow-witted people, he usually said: “As gray as the pants of a fireman.

V.S.Butuzov:

Davlet Islamovich did not respect developers who did not create new products, but copied foreign samples and called them “artisans”. On this issue, he constantly contradicted V.G. Kolesnikov, who was an active supporter of the reproduction of foreign samples.

Note that not only Kolesnikov, Shokin himself was a fierce supporter of complete cloning, in an orderly order forcing them to massively produce something, and only that, which had an obvious Western prototype.

N. N. Antipov:

Deputy Minister V. G. Kolesnikov was acutely jealous of D. I. Yuditsky towards the minister. Alexander Ivanovich valued Davlet Islamovich as a specialist, and when he needed to prepare any documents on computer technology, he entrusted him with this, often putting him in his private room for this. Kolesnikov, who claimed the role of a leading computer scientist in the Ministry of Economic Development, usually persistently tried to intervene, which, of course, Davlet Islamovich did not tolerate. Davlet Islamovich never went to V. G. Kolesnikov to sign documents, knowing from experience that he would be refused. He sent me or someone else depending on the nature of the document. Kolesnikov signed the document, but after a long tirade against the SVC in general and DI Yuditsky in particular.

Alas, the seemingly personal love of the master did not save the slave from reprisal, Shokin, putting Yuditsky in a separate office, without any hesitation, under an unfortunate mood, simply destroyed his center, and his career, and all his works with one stroke of the pen.

However, even with Shokin, not everything was as smooth as we remember, the old locksmith fancied himself the greatest expert in microelectronics, which the hot-tempered Yuditsky could not stand.

A. V. Pivovarov:

It should be noted that the task of his elimination was facilitated by Davlet Islamovich himself, or rather, by his complex nature. He was a father to his subordinates, but sometimes he was, to put it mildly, not respectful enough with his superiors. There were many examples of this, here is one of them.

In the spring of 1976, A.I.Shokin, V.G. Kolesnikov, A.A.Vasenkov gathered in my office. DI Yuditsky heard about the progress of work on the mini-computer. After the report, numerous questions followed, Alexander Ivanovich delved into the details, and then began to give technical "advice".

Davlet Islamovich could not stand the prolonged torture and in a rather harsh form said approximately the following: “Alexander Ivanovich, do not meddle in your own business. Your business is to provide funding, the rest I will provide ”(the same episode was similarly told by AA Vasenkov).

After a pause, the minister said: "This is where we will finish." When everyone dispersed, Alexander Ivanovich told me: "So that I don't see Yuditsky again." After that, I spoke with the minister many times, trying to soften him, explaining Yuditsky's behavior with a heavy load and his oriental character.

Alexander Ivanovich, who highly valued Davlet Islamovich as a specialist, gradually thawed out, but this episode apparently made it easier for Kolesnikov to sign an order from the minister in the summer of the same year on the creation of the SKB NC, behind which the actual liquidation of the SVC was hidden.

Naturally, one person, even a deputy minister, could not have slammed the SVC so easily by starting a reorganization of half of Zelenograd. Something else was needed that would justify the closure of the SVC before Shokin. And such was the envy and intrigues of NIITT and Angstrem, which absorbed the main potential of the Center.

The creation of microprocessors NIITT actually yawned: it completely lacked the necessary specialists in architecture and circuitry and system programmers, so at first they generously used the potential of the SVC subordinate to them, but this could not go on for a long time. It was necessary either to grow our own, which is long and expensive, or to carry out, in American terms, an “unfriendly merger,” or, in Russian terms, a “raider takeover,” using one's mighty administrative resource.

This was done, despite the fact that the main part of the SVC was completely unnecessary for NIITT: it liquidated some of the units immediately, and got rid of many later.

By this time, "Angstrem" began to release a new type of product for itself - microcalculators, mass-production equipment, the sums were spinning in the millions, awards, prizes and titles could pour like a cornucopia. But there was one small problem - for mass production, they would not have been prevented by another plant with all the infrastructure, and there was no time to create it. It is easier and faster to take a ready-made one - the Logika plant.

As a result, at one point the claims of NIITT came together - on the selected specialists of the SVC (those who are more convenient), Angstrem - on the Logika plant and the hatred of Yuditsky Kolesnikov.

The detonator of the incident was the resignation in June 1976 from the post of general director of the Scientific Center A. V. Pivovarov by age and state of health. K. A. Valiev and A. Yu. Malinin were in reserve for the post of general, but Valiev left Zelenograd, and the minister offered the post to Malinin. He agreed with the condition (and without a second thought!) - to reorganize the 2GU MEP (which then grew immensely) and to separate a separate general NPO with the joining of a number of factories and design bureaus. Shokin easily agreed, so an organizationally successful NPO NTs was created from 8 research institutes, 7 design bureaus, 9 experimental plants, 8 serial plants and 4 branches of plants.

But the SVC was literally torn to pieces in the process: some of the employees were thrown out, the plant was squeezed out in favor of Angstrem, and the transverse Yuditsky was deprived of all posts, thereby nailing down all promising developments.

On the site of the SVTs, a new SKB "Scientific Center" was formed, there was no place for Yuditsky in it, he was pushed into the NIITT by E. E. Ivanov, obviously realizing that he would not be able to endure there for a long time, which happened.

The defeat of the SVC took only a couple of weeks.

In April Shokin signs an order on the organization of the Logika plant (before the episode in A. Pivovarov's office), everything seems to be going well; Shokin signs order 8 on the transformation of the SVC and DSC into the Scientific Center, which actually liquidates the SVC and the Logika plant and removes its newly appointed leaders from their posts!

Order 336 was, surprisingly, classified. In Zelenograd, he was seen by a strictly limited circle of people, his copy was removed from the archives of the orders of the NC or never got there. And only in 2004 a copy unexpectedly surfaced among the unaccounted papers during the next reorganization of the Scientific Research Institute of the Scientific Center. Thanks to the executive director of the Scientific Center A. A. Popov, he was available to Boris Malashevich.

This secrecy gave rise to the legend that Order 336 was signed not by Shokin, who seemed to appreciate Yuditsky, but by his cunning deputy. This legend was supported by the reasoning that the minister signing orders on the creation of a new plant and appointing its leaders could not have known that at that very time another order was already being prepared, in fact turning into a farce what he signs, otherwise it the same nonsense! However, one should not underestimate the Soviet party battles, there could be something else.

This is how the participant of those events, A.A.Vasenkov (chief engineer of the NC before reorganization and chief engineer of NPO NC and SKB NC after), evaluates this legend:

Indeed, the relationship between D.I. Yuditsky and V.G. Kolesnikov was very complicated and could not but influence the decision on the fate of the SVC and Davlet Islamovich. But not in such an open, demonstrative manner. And the decision was influenced not only by the position of V.G. Kolesnikov.

Andrey Yuryevich Malinin, who was appointed the general director of NPO NTs, also set his own conditions. As regards the SVC, there were two of them.

First, the NGO should be headed by an organization with the status of the head research institute - the SVC had such a status, determined by the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Secondly, the collective of the parent organization must deal with the general strategy for the development of the NGO and ensure its implementation by the enterprises of the association. According to Andrei Yuryevich, he should not carry out instrumental development, since this will tear his strength away from the main task, and in case of failure, it will undermine the authority of the parent organization. Therefore, the main subdivisions of the SVTs did not find a place in the SKB NTs.

By the decision of A. Yu. Malinin, naturally coordinated with A. I. Shokin and V. G. Kolesnikov, they were transferred to NIITT, although this did not follow directly from the order of the minister. But the minister was persuaded.

Why NIITT?

Because they needed departments that develop microprocessors. And there were no applicants for other divisions.

The SEC was cut by two more orders No. 420 dated July 16.07.1976, 454 and No. 6.08.1976 dated August XNUMX, XNUMX.

In the preambles of these orders, the grounds for their issuance are indicated by the orders of the Minister No. 336-dsp of June 29, 1975 and No. 168-c of July 7, 1976. Please note that order 336 is stamped DSP, but at 168 it is already "Secret" , and it has not yet been discovered.

It is also interesting that only nine days separate them, and the SVC was liquidated even before the formation of the SKB NTs, it seems that someone was in a hurry, fearing that the minister, under the influence of time and Pivovarov, might soften in his attitude towards Yuditsky.

By order 454, all the supporting structures ended up in the SKB NTs, and the developers and production shops - in NIITT and Angstrem, the Logika plant was completely demolished after everything of value was taken from there.

The SVC disappeared completely.

The current plant "Logika", which produces pure gases and water for semiconductor production, as evidenced by its website, dates back to 1977, the first period of the existence of a plant with such a name has been deleted from history.

Until mid-September, D.I. With the collapse of the SVTs, the NC-1 program and systems based on it, the Yuryuzan program for the further development and the Svyaz-1 aircraft commander were destroyed. After several years of work on the CFB and switches, we had to start from scratch.

In addition, the development of the country's first RAMs on magnetic domains and ROMs on induction cards were abandoned, their production technology had not yet been brought to an industrial level, while in the West similar devices were used until the 1990s.

The groundwork for inkjet printers, improvements to compact-cassette drives, developments in the development of multilayer printed circuit boards technology, work in the field of fault tolerance of systems and a set of work in the field of information compression were destroyed - a fundamentally new direction for the USSR, which was no longer developed in it.

In addition, the ideas of developing supercomputers were forgotten in Zelenograd forever, the scientific groundwork for 5E53 and 41-50 was lost. As a result, when ITMiVT faced the need to have advanced CAD systems for designing "Electronics SS BIS", there were no computers of suitable power or design systems at hand. I had to urgently draw something from scratch, but the results were disappointing.

Yuditsky soon put the squeeze on completely, recalls V.S.Butuzov:

Deputy Minister V. G. Kolesnikov signed an order eliminating the post of D. I. Yuditsky in NIIMP too. Davlet Islamovich had no choice but to finally leave both Zelenograd and the MEP.

Yuditsky was helped by his old friend Kartsev, with whom he had an excellent relationship and with whom the MRP officials had previously unsuccessfully tried to quarrel him. And the last couple of years of his life he spent at the Research Institute of VK, the Institute of MA Kartsev. Most of the divisions of the SVC (excluding the developers of microcircuits), transferred to NIITT, received a not very affectionate reception, their topics did not correspond at all to the institute, as a result, all, except for a few microelectronics specialists, were forced to leave.

N. N. Antipov recalls:

When transferring to NIITT, I was appointed deputy. Chief engineer, but no tasks were assigned to me, despite my repeated requests. At this time "Angstrem" released one of the first microcalculators, it seems, "Elektronika B3-18". Its printed circuit board was wired manually, unprofessionally, without following the rules and regulations. Each board was manufactured separately. I organized the re-layout of the board in accordance with all technological standards, on one technological board, as far as I remember, 16 calculator boards were placed, separated after their final production. The result was shown to the director E. E. Ivanov. No reaction. I did some more initiative work. And also no reaction. I understood: they make it clear to me that Angstrem does not need my services. The readiness with which my application for transferring to another job was signed confirmed the correctness of my conclusion.

In this way, the management of Angstrem got rid of one of the largest specialists in the USSR in organizing the development and production of equipment, which went through a huge school at ZEMZ and SVTs, and they did not have their own specialists of this level.

This attitude prompted many of the remaining leading specialists to leave too, and these losses were irreparable, affecting all subsequent developments.

Many divisions were beheaded as a result of the departure of leaders, a number of divisions were reorganized or abolished. All staff were demoralized.

M. M. Khokhlov recalls:

It was hard for us then. Very hard. We didn't understand a lot. There was a feeling that some villain shot us on the fly. Confusion and vacillation began.

It was even harder for Davlet Islamovich. He went to the hospital. After leaving the hospital, he called me and asked me to tell him everything I know about sparse matrices. I began to talk about the general theory of matrix algebra, but it felt like he just needed an interlocutor. Soon he interrupted me: "What do you think to do next?" “I don’t know,” I replied, “I already had an offer several times at NIIMP, but I refused. I don't want to leave the team. And maybe everything will still be formed? " “No,” he replied, “you do not know our elite, they are capable of anything. Think and tell me. I will go to NIIMP as a deputy. director ".

It seems to me that then we all together and each separately betrayed him. We didn't have to go to NIITT then. It seemed to us that by preserving the theme, we would preserve the team. In fact, we have lost both the theme and the team.

Thus, we ourselves, by our actions, helped to break his will and finally finish it off.


In 1983, Yuditsky died suddenly of a heart attack at the age of 53. In the same year, his best friend Kartsev, a genius of a different profile, but not of a smaller scale, died, and we will tell about his fate later.
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  1. +18
    4 September 2021 05: 19
    I read this interesting article for a long time (but fluently), plunging into the past with the life of comrades, acquaintances and friends, with carriage companions, with random business travelers, until I came to this:
    As usual, the reason was purely personal and, as always, in the USSR rests on the relationship "designer-official". The evil genius of Yuditsky was Shokin's deputy V.G. Kolesnikov. As we have already mentioned, Yuditsky was in some ways very similar to Kisunko - a young, impudent, not hiding his opinion, a zero toady, always speaking to his face what he thinks. For the Soviet bureaucrat, there was no more offensive personality, especially given the intellectual level of the party elite and, at the same time, their fabulous sense of their own greatness.

    And then I realized that the phrase, expressed many decades ago: “If a person stands out against the general gray background, then the dullness will not leave him alone,” is a priori correct.
    How familiar it all is.
    The higher the pedestal that the dwarf climbed, the better you can see that he is a dwarf. © Gabriel Laub. 
    1. +3
      4 September 2021 07: 17
      Quote: ROSS 42
      For the Soviet bureaucrat, there was no more offensive personality, especially given the intellectual level of the party elite and, at the same time, their fabulous sense of their own greatness.

      If a bureaucrat did not possess knowledge of electronics, this does not mean at all that his intellectual level is below the plinth. In matters of management, intelligence, for example, Kisunko, could also be below the plinth.
      The statement that the intellectual level of the party elite was low indicates the level of intelligence of the approver.
      Quote: ROSS 42

      And then I realized that the phrase, expressed many decades ago: “If a person stands out against the general gray background, then the dullness will not leave him alone,” is a priori correct.
      But here you can not argue.
      1. 0
        4 September 2021 21: 46
        In matters of management, intelligence, for example Kisunko, could also be below the plinth.

        Quite right. I have Kisunko's memoirs, judging by a number of sayings, written in the late 80s. There he is strongly substituted in places, I will try to write a review of this book for VO.
    2. +9
      4 September 2021 08: 40
      Something reminds me of what is happening "today".
    3. 0
      11 October 2021 12: 04
      I also stumbled on the same fragment, and I will tell you that the opposite is true. Soviet electronics engineers of the 70s are arrogant arrogant snobs who considered themselves the smartest, looked down on people of manual labor and in general at everyone who did not belong to technical science, did not feel the slightest gratitude to the country that created this grandiose base, learned them and allowed to play with their expensive toys. I know this because my parents belong to this environment, and I grew up in it. Unfortunately, the official ideology of the USSR, which at that time was inherent in the cult of science, itself created new gods from these young techies. It is not surprising that they considered the achievements of Soviet electronics their own, and the country's successes in this regard - the result of their own genius. In the end, these people destroyed the USSR.
  2. +13
    4 September 2021 07: 33
    Sad, but apparently true story. My first home computer, Lviv, turned out to be dead and not working iron. On which I could not run more than one program.
    The second ZX-spectrum, in the body of a Watson calculator, with a used tape recorder and an old TV-set "banner" plowed like Papa Carlo for 25 hours a day. 48 Kb of memory and a red "Reset" button. The next from the SKB-Quorum line had its own five-inch floppy drive and already 128 KB. Then came the Pentiums.
    But childhood it always remains childhood, it has 8 shades of gray on an old black and white TV, cooler than a few million on a new LCD.
    Thank you!
    1. +7
      4 September 2021 12: 03
      Vladislav, I had to cook in this, it's about my industry. This is how the officials destroyed the Soviet microelectronics. Presumably, it was the same in other industries.
      Great sadness.
      1. +2
        4 September 2021 22: 13
        Quote: depressant
        This is how the officials destroyed the Soviet microelectronics.

        L.Ya., are you sure that this was a deliberate act of officials? Are you sure that if you were in the place of one of these officials, then you would have a real opportunity to do otherwise?
        I ask these questions not because I am defending an official, but because I have experience. When you start to delve into the ESSENCE of an official's actions, you often understand that he is right. Although at first it was thought that this was just bureaucratic lawlessness from a narrow-minded mind. True, I dealt with Soviet officials. What they are now, I do not know.
        1. +3
          4 September 2021 23: 58
          Unfortunately, here we are dealing with the essence of the bureaucracy as a whole. And it is such that any official, having got used to the workplace and finding a measure of the lack of control of his position, begins to use this position in his personal interests. These are connections, benefits and state funds that he manages and appropriates in accordance with a measure of lack of control (impudent appropriation is already in our time). When this resource is completely exhausted, the official begins to see his own position as insufficient to satisfy ambitions and personal needs, and he seeks to occupy a higher position. And if he is already on it, he will use all available means to destroy competitors with the help of loyal subordinates.
          What can change this situation? Only the fear of severe punishment up to the highest measure of social protection. Or patriotism, which seems doubtful in our time. And in the post-Stalin era of the USSR, patriotism and adherence to the ideology of communism is just ridiculous.
          Then what was the criterion "did it - did not do it" in the era of the birth of microelectronics?
          Only the ability to reproduce the best foreign samples. After all, the work of a technical product of such a level as a microprocessor is not understandable either to the state leadership or to the highest official responsible for its creation. The microcircuit does not sow, does not plow, does not fly, does not float, its work cannot be assessed visually, in tons, in kilometers traveled, in height above ground level, flight range, etc. That is, so that it was accessible to the country's leadership, which, naturally, is entirely non-specialists. But if you create a semblance of a foreign model, and the foreign countries confirm that, they say, an analogue has turned out, then a confirmed comparison criterion appears. In this case, the government's assessment of the actions of the head of the department is guaranteed to be excellent. His right to hold office seems to be confirmed, accompanied by government awards and monetary incentives. This gives the very head the opportunity to "drown" those who propose an innovative development by all available means, fighting for their sweet seat as a senior official. After all, a development that surpasses its foreign analogue excludes the criterion of comparison, and the state leadership may perceive the statement of superiority as false.
          Some other considerations can also be cited.
          But the main thing is that the creative spirit of the Stalinist era was lost, officials in microelectronics received absolute power. The competition between developers began to be reduced to zero as an obstacle and even a threat to the personal bureaucratic well-being. But within the framework of socialism, the officials seemed to be insufficiently monetized, socialism was destroyed, unable to replace it with capitalism. And now we have what we have in microelectronics.
          Do not trust the officials! None! The activities of each of them are based on hidden personal motives, and not on the state and, moreover, human interest. At the same time, they perfectly mastered the method of justifying the impossibility of realizing the goals set for them by the state. Thousands of reasons will be found. They will convince better than any gypsy woman.
          1. 0
            5 September 2021 07: 46
            Quote: depressant

            After all, the work of a technical product of such a level as a microprocessor is not understandable either to the state leadership or to the highest official responsible for its creation.

            Well, yes, everything: rocket and space technology, nuclear power, aircraft construction, chemistry, etc., etc., etc., everything was clear and the state. management and officials of all ranks, but the microprocessor, well, no way ...
            Or maybe the trouble is completely different? Maybe our "scientists" were unable to create, not that the best samples, but could not even copy?
            Today everyone understands, and the state. management too, and officials, and how are you getting on? Are the USA, Japan, China ahead in the creation of microelectronics? Or we will blame everything on the "totalitarian past" in which, well, the innovators of the electronics industry were simply crushed. Oh yes, the geneticists were still crushed ...
            Quote: depressant
            Do not trust the officials! None!

            And I don’t trust anyone in my life until I check it. Ukrainians have a saying -
            the chol will not believe until he feels it. Though I am not one of them, but I adhere to the same - until I "feel".
            That is why I am not "friends" with the written "historians" on VO.
            1. +1
              5 September 2021 08: 27
              I myself am not very friendly with the written historians on VO! )))
              But ...
              Well, yes, everything: rocket and space technology, nuclear power, aircraft construction, chemistry, etc., etc., etc., everything was clear and the state. management and officials of all ranks, but the microprocessor, well, no way ...

              Well, of course, colleague!
              The rocket took off and did not fall - is it visible? It is seen!
              Nuclear reactor gave electricity? Gave! The plane took off at point A and flew to point B? Flew!
              Chemistry gave polyethylene, which you can touch with your hands? She gave!
              Etc. etc.
              And then there comes a limit to the ability to evaluate. Has the plane set a record for handling? Well, the designers have worked on the shape of the wing and fuselage, and so on. The use of the microprocessor, its participation in improving the characteristics of the product - it is not obvious, it means self-indulgence)))
              What does a microprocessor give? What did the officials see then and see now? And, by the way, not only here - everywhere!
              And here's what: the ability to create a supercomputer that is able to assess the performance of the managing official himself and, God forbid, the government. To see and suggest ways to optimize the management apparatus by drastically reducing it.
              Oh no! Officials don't need this!
              Have you noticed that with the introduction of computer technology, the number of officials has grown due to the creation of new unnecessary institutions and posts, and the papers have not gone anywhere? The number of printed papers has only increased! The class of officials is defending itself! That does not exclude the presence of a certain number of decent people in their ranks. But do not look for those among the highest and even middle officials.
              1. 0
                5 September 2021 20: 47
                Quote: depressant

                The rocket took off and did not fall - is it visible? It is seen!
                Nuclear reactor gave electricity? Gave! The plane took off at point A and flew to point B? Flew!

                Before the rocket took off, it had to be done, like the plane.
                Was the microprocessor made? No! And there was funding for work on the topic! And the official realized that at that moment the "electronics" were not able to do it. And that's why there was no "persecution", they just removed the funding. The official realized that "it is not for the horse to feed."
                And "electronics engineers" translated their inability to create at least something sensible to "stupid and narrow-minded" officials.
                Quote: depressant

                Have you noticed that with the introduction of computer technology, the number of officials has grown due to the creation of new unnecessary institutions and posts, and the papers have not gone anywhere?

                Yes it is. But I see the problem in a slightly different way. She is in general "computer" illiteracy. People who work with a computer do not know how to use all its capabilities. This is the first thing. And the second - not all the programs necessary to facilitate the work are installed on it.
                1. +2
                  5 September 2021 22: 54
                  Well, well, colleague, we talked to you. In gratitude for the labor of reading my commentary, I always like my opponents. And in this case, it neutralized the minus put by someone.
                  But I disagree with you. Because I read all the articles of the Author on this topic and from my own practice I know how the production of microcircuits neglected the most elementary rules laid down in those. maps. Neglected in order to reduce production costs. And this was encouraged by the superiors, who did not understand the essence of microelectronic technology. This essence is in strict reproducibility, purity of the process and the impossibility of any rationalization, gag, contrary to the installation of the developer.
                  The bosses, who are ultimately ministerial officials, did not even understand this. Do you know what percentage of good output was in the 80s in the United States? More than sixty! And in our country only in rare cases 37%, and for the most part - 17%. A huge number of rejects at the stages of intermediate and final tests meant a sharp rise in the cost of suitable products, nullifying tricks that violate the requirements of technological maps. As a result, the sanctioned violation in order to reduce the cost led to an increase in the cost.
                  And how the military acceptance was tormented, selecting the guaranteed fit from ... fit!
    2. 0
      6 September 2021 09: 36
      Oh, and nifiga you had a breakthrough - from the 128kb Quorum directly to the Pentium, bypassing the legendary in one way or another 286, 386, 486 laughing
      For me, so far, not a single computer has been able to compare with the BK-0010 (HB 1801VM1) in terms of "lamp behavior for a programmer" bully
  3. +3
    4 September 2021 10: 01
    Reading this series of articles, I am more and more convinced that personality makes history. A lot, if not everything, depends on the person in power. What qualities a person endowed with power of any level possesses, such will be the results of his activities.
    1. +4
      4 September 2021 11: 27
      I am in solidarity, so there is no faith in the masses for a long time, but there is strong faith in personality.
  4. +7
    4 September 2021 11: 18
    Here is another reason why the Soviet Union lost the race to the United States - in fact, the destruction of outstanding personalities and, along with it, whole breakthrough developments.
    Although this is only a consequence of the main defect - an untenable system of power, a new Stalin did not come, and the cadres who replaced them actually led the country to collapse.
    Perhaps it's better now, is it much better? Total cut everywhere and everywhere.
  5. +4
    4 September 2021 11: 26
    > with a cassette capacity of 5 Mbit
    All the same, it is customary to indicate in bytes.

    There is also the uncoiling of microcircuits - is this a typo or some kind of technological process?

    And once again I ask the authors to concentrate and publish a book on the topic. I swear - you are extremely competent and exciting, make money and educate the masses, you can!
    1. +5
      4 September 2021 12: 05
      Welding the leads to the board.
    2. +4
      4 September 2021 12: 34
      Quote: Victor Tsenin
      And once again I ask the authors to concentrate and publish a book on the topic. I swear - you are extremely competent and exciting, make money and educate the masses, you can!

      It would be great, our children and grandchildren need it. In their stories there is something to be proud of, there are also the names of those who, due to personal selfish ambitions, incompetence, hindered the development of the country, if you look at it as a whole.
  6. +2
    4 September 2021 15: 12
    “NTs-1 could remove and insert RAM blocks, connect additional controllers, etc. Yuditsky himself jokingly called his creation“ children's designer. ”Power consumption - 1,1 kW, its characteristics are also close to modern powerful gaming PCs. " - tell me, did not understand: do you mean modern (2021) PCs ?!
    1. +3
      4 September 2021 22: 09
      What surprised you? Game, conditionally top-end hardware is gluttonous, you already know.)
      1. +1
        5 September 2021 10: 11
        No, I meant performance. Although, a little googling, he himself realized the stupidity of his first question. Obviously, this meant computers, modern NC-1. But it is not entirely correct to apply the term "gaming PC" to them.
  7. +2
    4 September 2021 15: 55
    But then there were no "effective managers" yet. It is scary to assume that they will find out in 40 years about the current "effective" ones.
  8. +7
    4 September 2021 16: 22
    One of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the lag in the scientific and technological revolution is that Suslov's pseudo-ideologues did not understand the role of an ENGINEER, SCIENTIST, DESIGNER, TECHNOLOGIST, as before, as 100 years ago, arguing that the most important thing is the ordinary worker.
    This was reflected in the 50-60-70s. and on the prestige in society, and on the salary, and led to the fact that the smart struggled to get out of the slavery of engineering and technical personnel.
    How much did an engineer, a researcher get, and how much was not even a very skilled worker?
    What will this worker do without a designer, technologist or engineer?
    So the slipping started, the smart ones stopped going to the engineers, who were made by INZHENEGRAMI
    1. 0
      5 September 2021 07: 49
      Money for engineers has nothing to do with it, where it was very necessary they were paid, and very well. The main thing is that everything really new appeared rather in spite of the system, and not thanks to it, and always struggle with the system at the expense of personal health and nerves ... the forces were not equal ...
  9. -3
    4 September 2021 17: 47
    All the rules - under the USSR, everything was ruled by bureaucrats who were somehow restrained by Stalin (as far as possible for one person).
    To get rid of the bureaucrats, it was necessary to carry out an extremely painful measure - to liquidate the USSR.
    1. +1
      4 September 2021 22: 11
      It is very wise not to improve and modernize, but to destroy to hell. Gaidar players are applauding while standing.
      1. -4
        4 September 2021 22: 35
        Beria, Khrushchev, Andropov and Gorbachev tried to "improve and modernize" - it did not work (the Soviet bureaucrats were very strong), they had to be destroyed (as in 1789 and 1917).
        1. 0
          4 September 2021 22: 41
          Well, you are right, they liquidated Beria, Khrushchev (are you serious?), Andropov from the gerontocrats, barely had time and that's it. Well, Gorbachert is a reformer, well, well) To destroy is not to build, a stupid thing is not tricky.
  10. +2
    4 September 2021 18: 08
    The officials won. As a result, they ruined the country.
  11. +1
    4 September 2021 21: 50
    while machines ES EVM and SM EVM go astray many times a day.

    Quite right. Worked for EU 1055 in the mid 80s, a rare Mr., especially compared to the French "Iris".
    1. ANB
      +1
      4 September 2021 23: 37
      ... Worked for EU 1055 in the mid 80s, a rare Mr., especially compared to the French "Iris".

      EC 1033,1045. 4 years. They chased the tail and mane. I never noticed any failures. Well, not very nimble, yes. EU 1066 is generally a fairy tale. But the DCK (brainchild of dec) is definitely rare feces. Constantly crashed and crashed. After the EU, I was shocked.
      1. +1
        5 September 2021 11: 37
        But the DCK (brainchild of dec) is definitely rare feces. Constantly crashed and crashed. After the EU, I was shocked.

        Well, I don’t know, I didn’t work at the DCK. Probably, yours were from the garbage. Compared to BESM-6, the EU was somehow not very reliable, but by the mid-80s BESM was already over.
        1. ANB
          +1
          5 September 2021 12: 36
          ... Compared to BESM-6, the EU was somehow not very reliable

          Maybe we got to different periods? In 1987 I began to get acquainted with the EU 1045. Os EU. And at 1033 svm stood. There were no problems. And the personal computers of the EU were quite reliable and were easily repaired, since the diagnostic program was included in the kit. Directly showed the coordinates of the faulty microcircuit.
          1. +1
            5 September 2021 18: 26
            Well, maybe I did the diagnostics of EC 1045, but I was talking about EC 1055, I considered there a separated two-dimensional flow using the Spalding method at Fortran77. It was in 1986-88. Disgusting car.
            1. ANB
              +1
              5 September 2021 19: 09
              ... Disgusting car.

              1055 did not see. What was wrong with her? Is this a 360/370 clone too?
              1. +1
                5 September 2021 20: 02
                I don’t know which clone of IBM. Failures were in half an hour or an hour.
                1. ANB
                  +1
                  5 September 2021 21: 19
                  What operating system was it?
                  Failure every hour is not normal. How is it expressed? The whole car was hanging up and overloaded? In the same place, ecc was provided.
                  Perhaps you were unlucky and got a defective one. We even had 1020 working steadily, and was written off as obsolete.
                  1. +1
                    6 September 2021 08: 01
                    Frankly speaking, I don't remember about the operating system. As a gas dynamics user, I was only interested in the convergence process during iterations. The car hung, rebooted, it was. And even 1010 worked steadily on processing the experiment until it was written off.
  12. +1
    4 September 2021 22: 44
    It's a shame for us, for the USSR, ... The system gave birth to a system devouring any non-standard view of breakthrough technologies in cybernetics. And, unfortunately, in other industries, often the main seats were occupied by "locksmiths of locomotive depots" with party membership cards. And besides the multiplication table, due to the paucity of mind, they could not even understand the essence of the developments of smart scientists.

    EEEE- x, that and about ... whether their computers hi
    1. ANB
      +1
      4 September 2021 23: 39
      ... that and about ... whether their computers

      Elbrus stayed.
    2. +1
      5 September 2021 11: 41
      And, unfortunately, in other industries, often the main seats were occupied by "locksmiths of locomotive depots" with party membership cards.

      And in the last 35 years, who has occupied the "main seats"? Maybe Chubais, who destroyed the unified energy system of the USSR, had great knowledge? There is a suspicion that the "locksmith of the locomotive depot" would never have thought of this.
  13. +1
    5 September 2021 15: 33
    Thanks for the series of articles. Very informative.
  14. 0
    8 September 2021 17: 21
    Pts. Good. Throughout a bunch of articles. As an educated person, I am interested in it. BUT! Vague suspicions plagued. And what about the ABM thread? Or will we reach 2021 in the line of microcircuits, and then round off?
  15. 0
    28 September 2021 21: 22
    FS-1500 \ 1501 - these were devices for reading punched tape. Cassettes MK-60 were used for sound recording, but they were not suitable for recording digital information. Then the Germans began to release tapes, so information was recorded on them without problems. Stavros was involved in the creation of the SVC .. It is unclear what kind of SM computers we are talking about. M-6000? There were different examples. Some broke every hour, others worked for weeks and months ...

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"