Nothing that the Germans in Poland, but the country is strong

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, OdVO - Odessa VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, sd - rifle division.

Let's summarize the events that took place in the winter - spring of 1941. Earlier and in the previous part it was shown that the activities carried out by the leadership of the spacecraft in 1941 to form and equip the troops were not associated with their expectation of a war in June. This follows from the timing of these activities.

For example, anti-tank artillery brigades needed to contain tank groups were not provided with transport. From the VO they sent messages to Moscow about the lack of transport, but the answers were obscure. It was not clear from them: when at least some of the brigades will become mobile. The General Staff does not expect a war and therefore does not think about the fact that hundreds of guns will become a burden if it starts.

There is a scattering of forces and means when staffing mechanized corps, fragmentation of the volume of the assigned staff and transport involved in gathering. The transportation of resources from the inner districts to the western ones was not provided. Probably, such a question was not even raised before the government.

For your information: during mobilization, 27% of the personnel (about a million people), 22% of cars (about 32) and 000% of tractors of their total need should have been sent to the five border districts. Another part of the transport was to come from the national economy from the territory of the districts.

Redeployment of the 19th Army

In May 1941, the General Staff plans to redeploy five divisions of the 19th Army from the North Caucasian Military District to KOVO. It seems that the redeployment was due to the increase in the number of German divisions on the southern flank of the KOVO. After reducing the speed of concentration of enemy forces in this area, the need to transport all the troops of the 19th Army disappeared. Therefore, only three divisions arrived from the North Caucasus instead of the planned five.

The 171st Rifle Division from Voroshivgrad will start moving after the planned date and on June 22 will be located on the territory of the Kharkov Military District. On June 28, the 22th Mountain Rifle Division is located near the city of Sochi. From the 25th Rifle Corps, one division arrived on the territory of KOVO in late May - early June. The 26th mechanized corps remains in the North Caucasus until the start of the war.

Redeployment of the 16th Army

On May 26, a directive from the General Staff about the beginning of the redeployment of the 16th Army as part of the 5th Mechanized and 32nd Rifle Corps arrives at the Trans-Baikal Military District. At the same time, two 10 rifle divisions of the Far Eastern Front staff, ready to be dispatched, do not receive a redeployment order.

At the beginning of June, the transportation of the 152nd SD from Transbaikalia begins, the number of which is less than 6 people. The second division of the 000th corps will remain at its permanent deployment points until the start of the war.

Consequently, where it was required to transfer the 16th Army, rifle divisions were not particularly needed. And in the western military units, four rifle divisions were needed in any direction, but at the same time it was required to know about the inevitable start of the war in June ...

There are memories of war veterans and indirect facts that the 16th Army and the 57th separate tank division were transferred to the Soviet-Iranian border on the territory of the Transcaucasian and Central Asian districts, respectively. Perhaps that is why the cases with the pre-war planning documents of these districts are still classified.

There were serious prerequisites for the entry of our troops into Iran. Pro-German sentiments reign in Iran, German agents are operating and saboteurs are being prepared for actions in our oil fields. There is a plant in Baku that produces about 43% of aviation gasoline in the USSR. The great length of the uncovered coast of the Caspian Sea allows the enemy to land saboteurs in almost any sparsely populated area.

At the end of May, information is received about the possible seizure of objects in the Caucasus:

On the German side, an illegal action is being prepared in the Caucasian region, as well as airborne troops in order to prevent the destruction of industrial installations in the oil regions ...

Probably, the General Staff was planning measures to ensure security on the southern borders, which could also include blocking the exit of German troops to the British oil refinery in Iran. This plant produced a large amount of aviation fuel.

Clarification of the plans of the General Staff in May 1941

In mid-May, the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin and his deputy A.M. Vasilevsky developed the following documents:

- Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies,
- Diagram of the balance of forces and
- The scheme for the deployment of the strategic forces of the USSR.

A photo of the Power Correlation Scheme on June 30.06.2021, XNUMX hit the media. In accordance with this scheme, the General Staff represented the conduct of the first operations by the German command as follows: German troops inflict a powerful blow on the left flank of the PribOVO in the direction of Orsha and Bobruisk. This blow is provided by an auxiliary blow to Siauliai.

To parry a securing strike and counterattacks on the flank of the main enemy grouping, the troops near the PribOVO should have been enough. Therefore, this grouping was not planned to be strengthened in June.

On the right flank of KOVO, the enemy strikes from a wide front to the area of ​​the city of Korosten, and then to Kiev and Mozyr. The troops of the ZAPOVO and part of the troops of the KOVO could get into the huge cauldron.

Transport of German troops to the border

There are many published RM RU, NKGB and NKVD border troops on the concentration of German divisions near the border, which arrived from 1940 to June 1941.

For example, in May 1941, three reports of RU for May 5, 15 and 31 were received. However, from June 1 to June 21, there are no such materials published.

Why?

Let's try to understand this issue. After all, one cannot judge the actions of the leaders of the country and the spacecraft, if you do not have an idea of ​​what they knew about German shipments on the eve of the war.

As of 27.5.1941/86/3, up to 22 German divisions are actually located near our border (in East Prussia, Poland, Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and in the border regions of Romania), of which 123,3 are in the stage of redeployment. By June XNUMX, XNUMX divisions are located in the same territory.

Thus, from May 28 until the start of the war, 37,3 divisions were transported to the border, of which 30,8 were motorized and tank divisions.

In accordance with the report of RU on May 31, 120-122 divisions are located near the border, including 6 divisions in the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area. In addition to these divisions, there are 11 more formations in the central part of Romania.

On the website "Electronic Exhibitions of the Ministry of Defense" in the section "The first day of the war" Reconnaissance report No. 1 of the RU was posted at 20:00 on June 22. With the help of this summary, we will determine the number of German divisions redeployed to the border in the period from 1 to 22 June.

As of June 22, near the border there are: on the North-Western Front - 29 divisions, on the West - 31, on the South-West (up to Slovakia) - 48, in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine - 13-15, in Romania (throughout the territory ) - 33–35.

The summary notes that the number of front-line reserves in the Thorn, Bromberg, Poznan area has not been established and the number of divisions that approached on June 20 and 21 is indicated.

On June 20 and 21, arrived at the border:

- on the Suvalkinsky ledge - two SS tank divisions (noted in the increase in the grouping against the North-Western Front);

- 11 infantry divisions in the southern part of Poland (against the Southwestern Front).

5 divisions arrived in Romania, and the number of the German grouping reached 33-35 formations. An interesting detail is that as of May 31, Romania had 4 tank and 6 motorized divisions, and on June 22, there were 4 tank and 11 motorized divisions. That is, the five divisions that arrived on June 20 and 21 were identified by reconnaissance as motorized.

Thus, the German command carried out disinformation measures directly on the eve of the war.

History with two tank divisions on the Suwalki ledge, it is generally tragicomic. The only mention of them was contained in the message of Arnold on May 30, which arrived at the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Military District:

Based on information obtained from two sources:
1) workers of the county administration in Mlawa, who are constantly among the German military;
2) an officer of the former Polish army who has connections with the Germans,
the Germans concentrated in the vicinity of Suwalki two selected armored divisions of the SS ..., as well as two armored divisions of the same detachments in the vicinity of Przemysl ...

The information was obtained from rumors. None of these divisions or servicemen from them saw. In RU about the SS tank divisions was unknown. Information about two SS Panzer divisions in the Przemysl area did not appear anywhere else, since the intelligence of KOVO and RU did not confirm this information. In addition, on June 22, no enemy tanks were observed in the area.

It should be noted that, in fact, there were no German tank regiments and divisions from the fall of 1940 until June 20 on the Suvalka ledge. Also, there were no SS tank divisions in the German Armed Forces at that time.

Information about the appearance of two SS Panzer Divisions was included in the ZAPOVO reconnaissance report for June 4, but the data was provided with a reservation "Require verification"... On June 6, the report was sent to RU and PribOVO, which did not confirm this information.

In the intelligence reports of the PribOVO, information about tank regiments and divisions on the Suvalkinsky ledge will be absent until the start of the war. In the RU summary for May 31, the number of tank divisions concentrated against the Western Military District did not change and remained the same as on April 26. That is, the SS Panzer Divisions were not counted.

On June 15, RU prepared a summary with data as of May 31, which also included the above information: “There are allegedly two SS armored divisions in the Suwalki region (data require verification) ...” It is specified twice (which is extremely rare in RM) that the information is not verified. The total number of armored divisions against ZAPOVO does not change again.

On the morning of June 21, a report is being prepared at ZAPOVO "On the grouping of German troops on June 20" and the text on the SS armored divisions is not included in it, since the information could not be verified. The intelligence is not to blame for this, since the Germans blocked the area, and it was impossible for our sources to get there.

On the evening of June 21, the ZAPOVO prepares a report for June 21. Since there are reports from the border about the advancement of troops to the Suvalkinsky ledge, information about the SS divisions is included in the summary: “Presumably two SS divisions”.

The report arrives at the RU in the afternoon of June 22 and is there by the way, since according to the incoming data, tank units are advancing from the Suvalka salient, which had not been found there until June 22. This is probably why the RU decided to attribute these divisions to the formations that came up on June 21.

The figure shows the intelligence reports for May 31 and June 22, as well as the calculation results obtained from them.

In June 1941, all German formations (except for one division directed to Romania) arrived in East Prussia and Poland. It turns out that if the grouping in the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area had six formations on June 19, then from June 1 to 19 only 5-7 divisions were transported to the border from the Baltic Sea to Slovakia.

If reconnaissance could assume that part of the divisions from the indicated grouping could be transferred to the border, then the number of the transported divisions would decrease. It is unlikely that RU could have thought so ...

Since the fall of 1940, two tank divisions were stationed near the border in East Prussia. In April 1941, another arrived.

Why didn't reconnaissance find the transfer of more than 27 motorized and tank divisions?

Probably because strict security measures were introduced. The tracked part of the equipment was sent by rail, and the wheeled part moved along the roads. The scouts did not seem to perceive the convoys as moving motorized and rifle regiments. It is possible that the tanks on the platforms were camouflaged. Railway stations were cordoned off when unloading tanks, passing trains were delayed, roads during the movement of tank columns and places of deployment of divisions were guarded. For penetration into these zones, the local population was threatened with execution. Even the discovered tanks were not able to tie the reconnaissance to the arriving tank divisions.

The figure shows the dependence of the average speed of concentration of German divisions to the border.

After May 15, the speed of concentration decreases and the situation on the border should not have further worried the leadership of the spacecraft.

In addition, in mid-May, the General Staff estimates the German invasion group at 180 German divisions, and such a number had not been found near the border by June 20.

The figure shows the change in the number of divisions at the border according to reconnaissance data.

It should be noted that information about a sharp increase in the number of divisions near the border of the Republic of Uzbekistan was given in the summary only after the start of the war. On the eve of the war, the leadership of the USSR, the spacecraft and the western military units did not suspect a sharp increase in troops near the border. It is possible that the leadership of the RU did not have information about this either ...

It also seems that the information about the movement of 11 infantry divisions to the KOVO border for June 20 and 21 could be a postscript ...

Thus, a slight increase in the number of German troops from June 1 to June 20 should not have bothered the leadership of the spacecraft. The KA leadership had no doubts that the RM could turn out to be disinformation.

Below will be given RM, which mentions the transport of troops to the border. However, as shown above, according to reconnaissance data, the number of enemy divisions near the border increased insignificantly.

Containment of Hitler

Earlier, the words of General P.A.Sudoplatov about the position of the SC leadership on the eve of the war were already quoted:

The leadership of the NGOs and the General Staff strove prevent creation by the enemy on our borders of a grouping that would have overwhelming superiority over spacecraft.

Achievement at least the balance of power on the border was the most important direction of the military policy of deterring Hitler from attacking Russia...

The figure below shows the number of German divisions near the border according to reconnaissance data and the number of divisions in a military unit (excluding mechanized corps of the 2nd stage of formation). The total number of our divisions includes 23 divisions of the 16th, 19th, 21st and 22nd armies that have begun redeploying, as well as 3 divisions of the 7th rifle corps of the High Command Reserve (ODVO).

It can be seen that the parity was observed and, probably, that is why the General Staff did not begin the redeployment of mechanized corps from the inner districts. The situation on the border, even on June 19–20, should not have somehow disturbed the command of the spacecraft.

In addition, before the start of the war, intelligence was unable to provide data on the concentration of German attack mobile groups. Before the start of the war, intelligence reported the presence of only one full-fledged tank division in East Prussia, two in the Warsaw area, five in southern Poland and four in Romania.

Hitler could no longer be stopped, since he was a mentally ill leader. Therefore, the position of the leadership of the AC on the issue of policy "Deterring Hitler from throwing himself on Russia" turned out to be wrong.

But we only know about this, having an afterthought ...

2 June

Message from Dora: "All German motorized units on the Soviet border are in constant readiness, despite the fact that the tension is now less than it was in late April - early May ..."

In a message from the NKVD that arrived on the same day, it is said about the concentration of two army groups against KOVO, about the appearance of pontoons and boats in the direction of Lvov and Brest. And also about the fact that fortifications are being built at night and about the data on the redeployment of German troops to Hungary and Romania.

There is no information in the messages about the indispensable start of the war. We can talk about a war of nerves.

On May 28.05.1941, 2, the commander of the Ural Military District, Lieutenant General F.A.

3 June

The Finnish government decides to provide Germany with the northern part of the territory as a springboard for a planned attack on the USSR.

The head of the RU received two messages from Ramsay:

Berlin informed Ott [German ambassador to Japan - Approx. ed.] that the German uprising against the USSR will begin in the second half of June.

Ott is 95% sure that the war will start ...

The expectation of the start of the German-Soviet war around June 15 is based solely on information that Lieutenant Colonel Scholl [German military attaché in Japan - Approx. author] brought with him from Berlin, from where he left on May 6 ...

In a conversation with Scholl, I established that the Germans are attracted by the fact big tactical mistakewhich ... was made by the USSR ...

A request was sent to Ramsay about this error. From Japan, a response was sent on July 3rd:

Lieutenant Colonel Scholl said then that the first and main blow would be inflicted by the Germans on the spacecraft by their left flank.

The Germans are fully confident that the main forces of the spacecraft will be concentrated in the opposite direction from the line, giving full opportunity for a strong strike ...

The German command was confident that the Abwehr managed to cover up the concentration of troops in the direction of the main attack in the Baltic and showed our intelligence the presence of huge forces in the south. After the outbreak of the war, they were supposed to start looking for the scapegoats of this disinformation.

It is difficult to say: could a timely answer somehow help the leadership of the spacecraft?

Probably not. They simply would not have paid attention to a timely response, as well as to the timeframes for the destruction of the spacecraft called in the Republic of Moldova for from 4 weeks to three months.

Since neither the reconnaissance nor the General Staff suspected the direction of the main attack, the head of the RU put a resolution on the message: “Tell me how long he did not give an answer to our demand for the left flank and the telegram itself. Golikov ... "

From the memorandum of the NKVD border troops:

Along the Soviet-Hungarian border ... In the Khust region (60 km from the border) - German tank and motorized units ...

Along the Soviet-Romanian border ... At st. Borshov [arrived - Approx. Auth.] 2 echelons with heavy tanks and vehicles ...

There were no German mobile units on the Soviet-Hungarian border. There were no echelons with heavy tanks at the Borsha station. They could be there if they were rolled specifically for our reconnaissance.

On June 3, a telegram from the US Ambassador to Romania was intercepted:

Field Marshal von Reichenau arrived in Romania and took command over one of German armies.

Field Marshal von List, a specialist in the conduct of "lightning" warfare, is said to be in the area where the German troops are stationed in Moldavia.

The mobilization of the Romanian army is actually completed ...

Disinformation of the German command went well. The Americans are also confident that there is more than one German army in Romania.

NKGB officer's message:

Information about 150 divisions could only be perceived as disinformation. It is said about one of the main strikes through Turkey, but at this time they are trying to block this direction by the transfer of our troops. The announcement of the Anglo-German conspiracy should have alerted Stalin.

A decision was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to supply Germany with 6 tons of copper, 000 tons of nickel, 1 tons of tin, 500 tons of molybdenum, and 500 tons of tungsten. The country's leadership showed Hitler that the USSR was fulfilling its obligations.

Around this time, according to the recollections of the commander of the 16th Army, he began to develop an operation for his troops on the territory of Iran. At the General Staff, he meets the commander of the Ural Military District, who is developing a similar operation for his troops across the Caspian Sea.

There is little information about the issues that were discussed in Stalin's cabinet. One can only guess what it was about. On June 3, together with the military, Stalin briefly stayed with N. S. Khrushchov and A. I. Shakhurin (People's Commissar aviation industry).

Probably, the leaders of the spacecraft discussed the formation of units for the fortified areas under construction.

The next day, a resolution will be issued on this issue.

4 June

The letter from the USSR Ambassador to Germany speaks only of various rumors based on misinformation:

In parallel with rumors about the proximity of a war between Germany and the Soviet Union ... rumors began to spread about a rapprochement between Germany and the USSR, either on the basis of far-reaching "concessions" from the Soviet Union to Germany, or on the basis of the "division of spheres of influence" and the USSR's voluntary refusal to intervene in European affairs ...

Turkish, American and Chinese diplomats and military attachés asked us quite seriously about the “lease of Ukraine”, and at a reception with the Chinese ambassador on May 30, the daughter of the Turkish adviser Alkend even asked: “Why did you (ie the Soviet Union) surrender the Caucasus without a fight? ! ...

The Soviet Government agrees with the proposals of the SC leadership on the formation of units for the fortified areas under construction. The formation is planned to be carried out in two stages: by July 1 and October 1. It is allowed to increase the number of peacetime spacecraft by 120 people.

5 June

British intelligence reads partly German encrypted correspondence, but does not yet know for sure whether there will be a war between Germany and the USSR or not. Churchill wrote that "Judging by the scale of German military preparations in Eastern Europe, there is apparently a more important issue at stake than an economic agreement ..."

RU has prepared a report on the Romanian army:

The call of reservists and reserve officers for training, which began on April 21, has now assumed the character of a hidden general mobilization ...

11 infantry divisions, two cavalry divisions, a mechanized brigade, two mountain rifle brigades and one separate cavalry brigade are concentrated against the USSR ...

The officers of the Romanian General Staff insist that, according to the unofficial statement of Antonescu, the war between Romania and the USSR should begin soon ...

Message from the KhVTs (G. Kegel - employee of the German Embassy in Moscow): "They believe that in the next 3 weeks they should finally resolve the current situation, that is, if the war between Germany and the USSR does not start before June 20, then it will not happen at all ..."

By June 5, the mobile cells of the rifle divisions of the 19th Army left at the points of permanent deployment were to draw up a plan for receiving horses, convoys and transport and submit applications for their transportation to new areas. Probably, the cells of the divisions of the 25th Rifle Corps should have done the same.

6 June

Marshal Zakharov wrote:

On June 6, information was received from Romania, which contained a recording of a telephone conversation: the mayor of the city of Huls asked a colleague in Iasi if he had finished the evacuation of valuables, since on June 9–12 "events must be expected."
What events were discussed, it was not established ...

The headquarters of the district immediately informed the headquarters of KOVO and the General Staff about this ...

The military council of the district asked to authorize the management of the 48th rifle corps and its 74th rifle division to transfer to the Balti area, to move the 30th mountain rifle division to the Balti direction. The General Staff agreed with these proposals, but drew attention to the covert movement of troops at night.

The developed action plan of the 16th Army on the territory of Iran was reported to Vatutin, and then to the chief of the General Staff. Further Zhukov, Vatutin and Lukin are sent to the People's Commissar of Defense. Marshal Tymoshenko got acquainted with the plan and says: "Obviously, you will have to go to the Kremlin ..."

Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin were in Stalin's office from 20:55 to 23:00. They probably reported on the transport of troops and on the developed plans for Iran.

7 June

Alta's message:

To the east, as before, 50 trains go every day. The generals are afraid of difficulties with the supply of fuel ... There is a danger that tank troops will not be able to pass further than Kiev. The troops are informed that air support will be significantly weaker than in the west.

It is a fact that the dates for the start of the campaign against Russia have been postponed after June 20, which is explained by the large material losses in Yugoslavia. None of the informed authorities have any doubts that military actions against Russia will be carried out ...

50 trains per day is the transportation of more than a division per day, but our intelligence does not confirm the concentration of troops at such a pace. The large material losses in the Balkans and the lack of fuel seem to be misinformation ...

Isn't the lack of fuel a reason for Hitler to find sources of fuel in other countries before the start of the war with the USSR?

Poznan area - the troops in this area are considered by intelligence as troops concentrated at our border. But the number of troops near the border until June 20 changes slightly.

RU message to the head of the 1st Directorate of the NKGB:

I inform you that it would be desirable to specify your data on the concentration of up to 8 German divisions in the Sokal direction ...

If we assume that the aforementioned area in the direction of Sokal means - Grubeshov, Tomashev, Bilgorai, then, according to RU, 7 divisions are concentrated here ...

The intelligence services cross-check information about each other's troops, which do not differ much from each other. Or, if the areas are specified, then the data may coincide.

S. L. Chekunov on the forum "Militera.borda.ru" wrote: “At the beginning of June, our people did not understand what was happening at all. The meeting on June 7 is considering the complication of the situation in the Middle East ... "

In Stalin's office, simultaneously with the leadership of the spacecraft, there are:

It is possible that the issue of complicating the situation in the Middle East is being discussed there. The People's Commissar of the Oil Industry IK Sedin could be present to answer the question: "How many tankers from the Caspanker Shipping Company and for how long can it be used to transport troops of the 16th Army without significant damage to the growth?"

Memories of Marshal Golovanov

Less than two weeks before the start of the war, Marshal A.E. Golovanov witnessed a conversation between the commander of the Western Military District, General D.G. Pavlov, with Stalin:

I understood that Stalin was asking counter questions.
- No, Comrade Stalin, that's not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, and my intelligence is working well. I'll check it again, but I think it's just a provocation ...

He hung up.

- The master is out of sorts. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border ...

Stalin is worried about the situation on the border and he calls the commander of the ZAPOVO. It is possible that he called not only General Pavlov. Stalin receives two copies of the reports of the RU, counts something there, leaves notes for himself. He is interested in what is observed at the border.

And what happens at the border of the WTO?

According to the RM, the number of German divisions from April 25 to June 22 increased by only three infantry divisions.

The Germans carried out large-scale disinformation, but General Pavlov was not to blame for this. In the reliability of the RM, they were confident in the RU and in the General Staff. Railway echelons and convoys are marching through Poland, but intelligence could not interpret them as an exit to the border of arriving motorized and armored divisions.

Article it was shown that when comparing the locations of the tank and motorized formations (concentrated against the ZAPOVO) as of 31.05.1941/21/XNUMX and on June XNUMX:

1) 51% of motorized and tank regiments did not change their places of deployment;

2) out of 49% of the missing regiments, three regiments (21%) never existed in the Wehrmacht and, possibly, they were portrayed by groups of servicemen from other units;

3) none of the large headquarters of the mobile forces (headquarters of the tank division (90 km to the border) and the 58th motorized division (19 km), tank brigade (56 km)) were redeployed directly to the border on June 21.

Many cavalry, artillery and infantry regiments, infantry divisions, according to intelligence, from the end of May to 21 June also did not change their locations.

General Pavlov was confident in his intelligence, which even tracked the locations of artillery batteries, infantry and sapper battalions. It's just that the German special services have outplayed our intelligence services ...

A similar situation was with the tracking of tank and motorized divisions concentrated against KOVO.

Up to 70% of such divisions concentrated in East Prussia, also stayed in their places of deployment, where they were "discovered" at the end of May 1941.

8 June

The movement of the echelons of the 16th Army begins to slow down. This was probably due to the approach of the head trains to the Arys station - the turning point of the route: to Krasnovodsk or to the European part of the country.

9 June

Parts of the Luftwaffe began to deploy near the Soviet-German border.

Received a message from the Petty Officer:

It contains information that war can be avoided, there may be a demonstration of readiness to start a war (playing on the nerves), the southern direction is again reflected, in which intelligence already reported about a powerful German-Romanian grouping.

A message came from Shanghai (from Schiller):

The Germans prepared a speech against the USSR, both militarily and economically, and was supposed to be at the end of May this year ...

If the war with England is not over before the fall, then the Germans intend to occupy Ukraine and Donbass to provide themselves with coal and iron, which will happen regardless of the proposals and concessions that we will make under the threat of conflict. If the war ends before autumn, then a deal with the USSR is possible without an armed conflict ...

Disinformation is coming in again about the possibility of avoiding war or about the occupation of part of our territory. Our government has to walk on the edge of a knife so as not to provoke Hitler.

There is a message from the NKGB. I will cite it in a more complete form, since it concerns large redeployments of troops, but this redeployment did not affect the number of German troops in Poland.

In Stalin's office, simultaneously with the leadership of the spacecraft, there are:

Historian S. L. Chekunov writes:

That is why it was the ninth who saw the light - it is not clear. However, it is absolutely certain that until the evening of June 9, the option of a war with Germany was not considered as upcoming events ...

During two evening meetings on June 9, decisions were made to start the main deployment ...

In the area of ​​June 8-9, the 16th Army is reoriented to the Oryol military district ...

In another message, S.L. Chekunov clarified that "Decisions were made late in the evening on June 9".

It is likely that after the first meeting, the RU decided to clarify all the information on Germany. A response from this wave could serve as a directive from the NKGB to clarify issues related to the preparation of a war by Germany against the USSR. The NKGB intelligence was assigned a task for the near future by definition:

- the size of the German army, the organizational structure of infantry, tank, heavy tank, motorized, mountain rifle and parachute divisions;

- productivity of factories producing weapons, gunpowder, explosives and toxic substances;

- deployment of headquarters of armies and army groups in all theaters of military operations;

- the number of divisions and corps east of the Oder River;

- data on the construction of fortified areas against the USSR and airfield hubs from the Oder River to our border, on the territory of Slovakia, Hungary and Romania;

- plans for military operations against the USSR (in any form: documentary, in statements, etc.).

A little later, military intelligence doubted the information received from rumors and from visual observation of the marks on the shoulder straps of servicemen:

The dislocation of parts of the city of Warsaw, marked on the shoulder straps and according to the conversations of local residents, raises doubts and requires careful verification ...

To be continued ...

Comments

[Olgovich]

On the eve of the war, the leadership of the USSR, the spacecraft and the western military units did not suspect a sharp increase in troops near the border.

The leadership knew about the real practical POSSIBILITY of a sharp increase in the number of enemy troops and it was with this in mind that it had to take retaliatory measures, and not blindly rely on intelligence reports, and, knowingly being late and losing, frantically take retaliatory measures.

[strannik1985]

The management knew about the real practical OPPORTUNITY

It’s getting wet on Coke, start over ...
Countermeasures are to do the same as the Germans did, to attack first (see analytical notes on the first operations of the spacecraft by Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Zhukov), without having clear signs of preparation for an attack. Could the country's leadership have done this? Technically - yes, practically they tried to avoid it with all their might.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: strannik1985

without clear signs of preparation of an attack. Could the country's leadership have done this? Technically - yes, practically they tried to avoid it with all their might.

I, too, have the same opinion.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

Countermeasures - do what the Germans did,

yes, it should carry out a RESPONSIBLE mobilization and bring the units into a COMMISSIONING (also responsive) state, placing them and structures with ACCOUNT OF "sudden" (but inevitably real) the appearance of a large number of enemy troops

Quote: strannik1985

Could is the country's leadership to agree to this? Technically, yes, we tried with all our might. to avoid.

owes was to go.

They avoided and got a CATASTROPHE on a scale unprecedented in the world before.

[smaug78]

yes, should RESPONSIBLE mobilization

and if wrong, demobilization?

[strannik1985]

yes, should hold

On September 7, 1939, they began a covert mobilization under the guise of a BUS, on September 17 they launched an offensive. So that the troops are not defeated, you need to fight for the initiative.

Have escaped

You are now judging from the couch and the post-knowledge position.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: strannik1985

On September 7, 1939, they began a covert mobilization under the guise of a BUS, on September 17 they launched an offensive.

I doubt that the analogy between the Liberation Campaign and the situation on the German-Soviet border in 1941 is correct. Directive 14650 was not a "retaliatory" mobilization. Against whom is the answer? Against 8 border guard regiments?

[strannik1985]

Doubt the analogy

This is not the analogy, the deployment is very difficult to hide, so you have to act. There is no point in just standing on the defensive, the Allies had been digging trenches for 1940 months by May 9, but what's the point?

[Doctor]

On September 7, 1939, they began a covert mobilization under the guise of a BUS, on September 17 they launched an offensive.
I doubt that the analogy between the Liberation Campaign and the situation on the German-Soviet border in 1941 is correct. Directive 14650 was not a "retaliatory" mobilization. Against whom is the answer? Against 8 border guard regiments?

This is a classic.
In the document mentioned by the author of the article:

Considerations of the General Staff of the Red Army on the strategic deployment plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union

First 2 points:
In order to ensure the implementation of the above plan, it is necessary to carry out the following measures in advance, without which it is impossible to deliver a surprise strike at the enemy both from the air and on the ground:

1. Make a hidden mobilization of troops under the guise of training fees stock;

2. Under the guise of going to camps to carry out a hidden concentration of troops closer to the western border, first of all, to concentrate all the armies of the reserve of the High Command;

This was the beginning of not only the liberation campaign, but everything else, from Finnish to Afgan.

[Sergey-1950]

You are setting out all this, knowing how everything was in reality. And the country's leadership, the spacecraft and the General Staff THEN sacredly BELIEVED in the reliability of the RM. Which turned out to be bullshit.
This is the root of all evil. Once again and slowly: the General Staff received a complete TUFTU from the RU subordinate to it. According to the RM, it turned out that the Germans did not have motorized and tank divisions near the border. And with infantry divisions, they were not capable of a rapid breakthrough deep into our territory. The General Staff did not analyze this TUFTU, but believed in it. Believing in this TUFTU, the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense assured the country's leadership of the same.
Therefore, how could the leadership prepare for an attack if, according to RM, the enemy was not ready to attack? It would be nonsense.
However, the question arises. And why did not there exist an intelligence analysis body in the General Staff or in the Ministry of Defense or in the government?
My opinion: they simply have not matured to the understanding of this need for the latter. How did they not grow up to understand so many things that had to be understood during the war.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Sergey-1950

The spacecraft and the General Staff THEN sacredly BELIEVED in the reliability of the RM. Which turned out to be bullshit.
This is the root of all evil

the root of evil is that the country's leadership, the spacecraft and the General Staff should not to believe only RM is to doom yourself in advance in case of a mistake.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

7 September 1939 began a covert mobilization under the guise of a BUS, on September 17 they launched an offensive. So that the troops are not defeated, you need to fight for the initiative.

this is not a mobilization for WWII. what mobilization is for her see the German army.

Quote: strannik1985

You are now judging from the couch and the post-knowledge position

the leadership also had an afterthought - the defeat and seizure of Poland, France, England, Belgium, the Balkans, then extend it yourself, otherwise it will take a long time.

AND? And nothing.

[strannik1985]

this is not mobilization

What we are talking about, the volume is larger, it is more difficult to hide.

the management had an afterthought

With Poland, negotiations on the "Danzig Corridor" have been going on since 1938, with the allies Germany was at war for nine months by May 1940. They already knew about the need to conquer the strategic initiative, see the notes of Shaposhnikov, Meretskov, Zhukov, the question of politics - there were no demands, tensions, the German Foreign Ministry was silent until the last.

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

What we are talking about, the volume is larger, it is more difficult to hide.

WHY .... hide?
on the contrary, everything is legal.

Quote: strannik1985

With Poland, negotiations on the "Danzig Corridor" have been going on since 1938, with the allies Germany was at war for nine months by May 1940.

someone declared war on Poland, an ultimatum on August 30? Not? And what about Yugoslavia, Belgium, etc. Ypres? Not?
And France was told that they would go in May 1940?
Again not?

And what are you talking about then?

[strannik1985]

WHAT FOR

What is legal? The Germans were at war in June 1941, at the beginning of June we had more formations in the two echelons of armies (114) than the Germans (81).

somebody

There were territorial claims to Poland, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Norway to the Reich for one tooth, Switzerland bought off. The USSR, with all its desire, cannot be attributed to a small country. What claims have appeared against the Union since the summer of 1940?

[Olgovich]

Quote: strannik1985

What is legal?

mobilization, if it has not yet reached: on the contrary, there is a mobilized fighting army, it is opposed by a non-mobilized, non-ready army.

.

Quote: strannik1985

There were territorial claims to Poland, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Norway to the Reich for one tooth, Switzerland bought off. The USSR, with all its desire, cannot be attributed to a small country. What claims have appeared against the Union since the summer of 1940?

claims for centuries have been against each other: WHERE is the ultimatum, the declaration of war? Found it? No?

And similar examples with a dozen other countries (the SAME thing has been done with Poland) - again not enough in order to, finally, at least something to figure out and undertake?

[strannik1985]

mobilization

So it should be carried out in September 1939, or rather not to carry out demobilization in the spring of 1940. Mobilization is a sign of an attack, the Germans are accelerating and we get the same thing. Do you want checkers or go?

- again not enough to finally

So it (mobility) was raised, from 35-70 days, depending on the deployment option, up to 8-15 days. We discussed it more than once - you can't just take the army and gather it near the border in the summer of 1940, in a year there will be a crowd of men in greatcoats.
Do something - to preempt, i.e. attack first, there are no other options.

[saigon]

The distance between the echelons was somehow prevented from sharing the troops.
The troops are not mobilized and are not complete by state.
There were no statutory norms for the density of troops for defense, what kind of offensives could be discussed.

[Region-25.rus]

had to go.

well after dozens of years sitting in an easy chair and not being convicted of the enormous responsibility to water Mr. .... others! Oh yes, they are "stupid scoops" - a sacred cause! Everything is in accordance with the ideological line of the party and government.

[Non-fighter]

Mobilization = declaration of war. especially in those conditions. And who would be considered an aggressor country?
I suggest - not Germany.

[Sergey-1950]

I disagree with you. Another thing is that accusations of the Germans in the aggressive intentions of the USSR would have sounded more convincing. But, on the other hand ... Do not forget that by that time the Third Reich had defeated or captured NINE countries, was at war with Great Britain and (it turns out with all its colonies). That is, the demonstration of peacefulness concerned almost only the United States.

[Non-fighter]

And + Latin America, do not forget about Argentina with its very strong pro-German sentiments.
Imagine that after 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX the world community would come to a consensus that it was the aggressive USSR that attacked peaceful Germany. Goebbels' employees ate reinforced rations knowingly. Where would the lend-lease flow go in that case?
Yes, and I also wrote that following the Finnish war, the USSR was kicked out of the League of Nations, the then UN. Alarm bell isn't it?

[Olgovich]

Quote: Not the fighter

Mobilization = declaration of war. especially in those conditions. And who would be considered an aggressor country?
I suggest - not Germany.

I suggest: Germany has mobilized back in 1939.... Then it increased in 1940 and 41. And where .... "voyna" from the USSR?

War is not mobilization, but only when Hitler 100% prepared and not a day earlier than June 22, he could not physically begin.

[zenion]

Olgovich. That the attack was supposed to be done by the Germans was expected by the whole west, for this it was created. In order for the USSR to fend off the attack, the USA took care, when the president said that the one who attacks first will be considered the aggressor, and all help will go to the defender. This meant that the USSR had no "right" to defeat the German army in which the capitalists invested money to defeat the socialist country. I had to wait and hope that the Germans were afraid to attack, even though Healer was pushed in the back with all their might - attack, another month and it will be too late. Stalin and those who were aware of all this could not let it slip, even to those who commanded the army and did everything that Stalin would not succeed in. Didn't trust anyone. In addition to the intelligence department, there were data from the communists abroad and the Cominternists. When Stalin asked about inconsistencies in the data he was told - this is disinformation.

[knn54]

The German command carried out active disinformation measures, which, albeit for a short period, still misled our intelligence.

THE MAIN "highlight" is that the timing of the attack on the USSR changed MANY TIMES. And after the fifth / sixth report on the next timing of the start of the war, Stalin stopped trusting this information. ...

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: knn54

THE MAIN "highlight" is that the timing of the attack on the USSR changed MANY TIMES. And after the fifth / sixth report on the next timing of the start of the war, Stalin stopped trusting this information. ...

There is no "zest" here - you are talking about alleged terms, the conclusion of which was made from the flow of intelligence, in most cases with the prefix des-... I don’t understand at all why to exaggerate this nonsense "Stalin believed ... Stalin did not believe ..."

)))

[knn54]

Pelel Klaas, where did you see the "chamomile"?
Stalin stopped believing:
- the famous phrase "Send your source to ...";
-Article in the newspaper "Pravda" a week before the beginning of the Second World War.
Which "relaxed", and then, for a while, simply demoralized.
And any delay is like death, as Peter the First said.
Stalin simply did not see an AVANTURIST in Hitler.
For in December 1941, when the blitzkrieg did not work out, many Nazi officers and generals began to doubt their victory.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: knn54

where did you see the "chamomile"?

Yes, I say - this is "Stalin believed ... Stalin did not believe ...".
Already some absurdity - as soon as, they say, Comrade Stalin began to be tormented by vague doubts, he took the Pact from the safe, looked at Ribbentrop's signature, said to himself: "Nat, they will not attack ..." and retired to reread Machiavelli.

[Sergey-1950]

Much more important was the absence of tank and motorized divisions and motorized corps near our borders. They were especially dangerous.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Much more important was the absence of tank and motorized divisions and motorized corps near our borders. They were especially dangerous.

Since you are such an "expert" in military affairs, like the author of the sateika, then I will ask you the simplest question, which he was afraid to answer even earlier. The question is the following - how long did it take in 1941 for a Wehrmacht tank division, located at a distance from the border with the USSR at a distance of 100, 200, 400 and 600 km, to arrive and deploy on the spot?
The second question is how long it will take for any headquarters of a tank formation and a tank group of the Wehrmacht to leave the point of permanent deployment and move for deployment in the field.
And the third question - what is important for the commanders of the Red Army covering formations - where the headquarters of the tank groups are located or where the tank regiments and divisions of the Wehrmacht are located.
If you are not afraid to answer, then let's see what kind of connoisseur of military history you are.

[tihonmarine]

Thanks to the author for a thorough analysis.

[Basil50]

Thanks to the author.
Still, it's a pity that even today they are trying to ignore why Hitler did postpone the attack on the SOVIET UNION? Why was he in such a hurry in 1941? About Yugoslavia is not worth it.
I met with the British only a mention of a bunch of attacks on the SOVIET UNION by the Nazis with the preparation of a military coup by the Germans and the murder of JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN. The British helped the Germans in this effort, and therefore began to secret their agreements. As the secret of the negotiations that were conducted through R. Hess. However, the British did not see and do not see * anything like that * in this, it is just that * interests arise and change *.

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Vasily50

The British helped the Germans strenuously in this, and therefore began to secret their agreements.

There were a lot of those in Britain who supported Hitler and Nazism, even Lloyd George was considered a politician with pro-German views and welcomed Hitler's rise to power in Germany. Through Hanfstaengl, he gave Hitler his photo with the caption "As a sign of admiration for your courage, determination and leadership." But Britain also got in the way of Hitler when Chamberlain declared war on Germany. Rommel's corps had about 130 soldiers, and how many more were in the Balkans, but in 000 Hitler considered that Britain was no longer a hindrance to him, and that's when he decided to start a war against the USSR. According to one Gauleiter who asked, “When you decided to attack the USSR (not to confuse the plan with the date of the start of the war), Hitler replied“ Exactly 1941 weeks before the attack on the USSR. ”So somewhere on May 4, 22, which means he was not afraid Britain, but what kind of carte blanche history he had is still silent.
In our literature, the role of Britain in the victory over fascism precisely on the Southern Front is insufficiently covered, and how many troops Hitler had to keep in Africa, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, which could get to the Eastern Front, and at a time when the Germans were standing near Moscow it would be perceptible if not disastrous.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: tihonmarine

There were a lot of those in Britain who supported Hitler and Nazism.

The funny thing is that Oswald Mosley's "British Union" was banned only in July 1940 (!)
At the beginning of 40, the British Nazis even tried to participate in the by-elections to Parliament. Such are the grimaces of the "strange war".

[tihonmarine]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

The funny thing is that Oswald Mosley's "British Union" was banned only in July 1940 (!)

True, it was only after Winston Churchill came to power that the BSF was outlawed. The leader of the British fascists was imprisoned in Brixton prison. William Joyce, with the advent of World War II, became Lord Ho-Ho, who hosted the "Germany Calling" radio show in an attempt to demoralize British listeners. He became the most hated man in the country and was executed for treason in 1946. The last ideas of the British fascists also died with him.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Vasily50

I met with the British only a mention of a bunch of attacks on the SOVIET UNION by the Nazis with the preparation of a military coup by the Germans and the murder of JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN.

Yes, the mountain of secrecy gives birth to conspiracy mice, as you know. The lack of reliable information stimulates the "analytical" fantasy of cryptohistorians. But what about the connection between the beginning of Barbarossa and the attempt on Stalin's life - this is generally a gem)

Quote: Vasily50

However, the British did not see and do not see * anything like that * in this, it is just that * interests arise and change *.

What's so surprising about that? England overnight from the eventual enemy of the USSR No. 1 turned into its ally - we do not see "nothing like that" in such a turn. And the civilizational community of the Reich and Britain and their joint platform of anti-Bolshevism ...

[Doctor]

As the secret of the negotiations that were conducted through R. Hess.

They never disrupted that Hess flew in with a proposal for an alliance against the USSR.
As Churchill writes in his book:

Gecca's idea of ​​the situation in Europe boiled down to the fact that the warmongers, whose sentiments were expressed by Churchill, forced England to abandon her true interests and the policy of friendship with Germany and, above all, from an alliance with her to fight Bolshevism. If only he, Rudolph, could get to the heart of England and make the king believe in how Hitler treats her, the evil forces that currently rule this ill-fated island and have brought so many unnecessary calamities on it would be swept away.

They told us this through diplomatic channels a week after the flight.
Churchill told Stalin everything in detail at a personal meeting in 1942.

[zenion]

Apparently in order not to let it slip, after he was sent home from prison, Hess was afraid that a confession would be pulled out of him by pulling out his nails from his fingers and he hanged himself. Not at the time when the Russians were on duty, but at the time when the British were guarding it. Relatives could not believe that he did it on his own. But as at that time Tagged ruled, no one asked how it happened.

[Doctor]

Apparently in order not to let it slip, after he was sent home from prison, Hess was afraid that a confession would be pulled out of him by pulling out his nails from his fingers and he hanged himself. Not at the time when the Russians were on duty, but at the time when the British were guarding it. Relatives could not believe that he did it on his own. But as at that time Tagged ruled, no one asked how it happened.

What recognition? As I say, everyone already knew why he had come.
The British did not hide the offer of an alliance with Hitler, and confirmed their refusal.

[Doctor]

Still, it's a pity that even today they are trying to ignore why Hitler did postpone the attack on the SOVIET UNION? Why was he in such a hurry in 1941? About Yugoslavia is not worth it.

He made a fundamental decision on the attack after Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, when it was not possible to agree on Finland, Bukovina and Turkey.

In December, the development of "Barbarossa" began, they were preparing for the winter, and they attacked in the summer.

[Ashes of Claes]

I also did not understand the passage about

Quote: Vasily50

try to get around

In my opinion, historians (and fiction writers masquerading as them) have come up with a bunch of hypotheses. It began with the era of "archival famine" in the 50s and 60s. Conspiracy itch, I see, and now haunts some.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

In my opinion, historians (and fiction writers masquerading as them) have come up with a bunch of hypotheses. It began with the era of "archival famine" in the 50s and 60s. Conspiracy itch, I see, and now haunts some.

I completely agree with your conclusion - too many scoundrels of Rezun's laurels are not allowed to sleep peacefully, so they carry the "truth" to the masses on the basis of their fantasies. For example, this author of the article, who writes under a pseudonym and was afraid to give his last name, because apparently there is a reason for this.
There are now many available materials that are published in small editions and belong to collectives of military authors or historians who study materials not available in the archives. I give an example of such work, which was published under the leadership of the head of the special radio communications service of the GRU General Staff, and in which many fables of modern "researchers" are refuted, including how the country's leadership did not know about preparations for a war against the USSR:



https://d.radikal.ru/d04/2109/2e/ca497012cef4.jpg

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

who study materials not available in the archives.

That is, how is it - reading inaccessible materials? Inaccessible to whom? Is this some kind of apocrypha, family legends or memoirs? Like "the time for declassification has not come yet, but take our word for it"?

Quote: ccsr

many fables of modern "researchers"

Well, those researchers you are referring to are exercising in building a structure in which the leadership of the USSR, the General Staff of the General Staff and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs would look impeccably wise. Apparently, the truth, as usual, is somewhere in between, no?))

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

That is, how is it - reading inaccessible materials? Inaccessible to whom?

Ordinary people, including military historians.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Is this some kind of apocrypha, family legends or memoirs?

These are the materials of military scientific conferences, memoirs under the stamp, stored in a number of departments of the Ministry of Defense, as well as cases that are not submitted to the general archive of the Ministry of Defense.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Like "the time for declassification has not come yet, but take our word for it"?

In 2012, the head of the IVI officially announced for the pseudo-historians that not all the materials of the Ministry of Defense on the Second World War were declassified and transferred to TsAMO. Make a conclusion yourself - at least about the originals of encryption 8 of the Directorate and the GRU General Staff.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Apparently, the truth, as usual, is somewhere in between, no?))

I do not know your boundaries for this, in order to understand where the middle is - it may turn out to be closer to fantasy than to the real truth, or vice versa.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

These are the materials of military scientific conferences

Is this a Masonic lodge or some kind of closed club? Its members make reports, relying on some esoteric tablets, inaccessible to the laity?

Quote: ccsr

memoir memoirs under the stamp, stored in a number of departments of the Ministry of Defense

Well, yes, "objective" classified (!?) Memoirs, of course. And the famous passage from Zhukov's memoirs, where Stalin at the map says that he does not believe in an attack, that the Germans will go to Persian oil, and not to the USSR - is this a denigration of Comrade Stalin, completed under the pressure of the accursed Khrushchev? Or how?

Quote: ccsr

as well as cases that are not submitted to the general archive of the Ministry of Defense.

Where do they surrender? On the home mezzanines of Lieutenant General Todorovsky from the IRI RAS?

Quote: ccsr

that not all materials of the Ministry of Defense on the Second World War have been declassified and transferred to TsAMO. Make a conclusion yourself

Not declassified - it means they are not available as a scientific and reference base. And all links to "some undisclosed documents" that suddenly appeared in someone's possession, but which cannot be quoted for a reason (see above), are not science, but, sorry, quackery.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Is this a Masonic lodge or some kind of closed club?

No, these are the usual activities in the Ministry of Defense.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Well, yes, "objective" classified (!?) Memoirs, of course.

Yes, there is one, you obviously do not know.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

And the famous passage from Zhukov's memoirs,

This is a book for the general reader, and nevertheless it was checked by the Central Committee, GlavpUR and military censorship. So your reference to it does not mean anything, especially taking into account the conjuncture of that time and Zhukov's personal desire to present himself at his best.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Where do they surrender?

They are kept in their own archives for 75 years or forever.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

And all links to "some undisclosed documents" that suddenly appeared in someone's possession, but which cannot be quoted for a reason (see above), are not science, but, sorry, quackery.

This is a very primitive conclusion, because all questions concerning, for example, undercover work may be inaccessible to any historians and persons not involved in it. But the results of such work can be indirectly reported without even referring to it. You are clearly not in the subject, otherwise you would have known that a small part of the ciphers of the pre-war time and the war was declassified by the GRU General Staff only for the 200th anniversary of Russia's military intelligence.
So your idea of ​​quackery is just evidence of your illiteracy in such matters.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

So your idea of ​​quackery is just evidence of your illiteracy in such matters.

As far as I understand, you stubbornly read yourself into a luminary, accusing everyone and everything around in illiteracy? )) I hope you have reasons for this.

Quote: ccsr

This is a very primitive conclusion, because all questions concerning, for example, undercover work may be inaccessible to any historians and persons not involved in it. But the results of such work can be indirectly reported without even referring to it.

Enchanting. I understand, it seems, where does your arrogance of an expert endowed with secret knowledge "not for everyone" come from - a source, trustworthy, spied in undisclosed documents and told especially close ones ..... Under a subscription, I suppose, go? ))

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

As far as I understand, you stubbornly read yourself into a luminary, accusing everyone and everything around in illiteracy? ))

Your reasoning convinced me of this.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Under a subscription, I suppose you go? ))

Once I walked - this is what distinguishes me from you.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

a source of trust,

I personally knew some of them - these are really people whose assessments of the initial period of the war do not coincide with those that the author of the articles carries because of his illiteracy. I recommend reading his early works, maybe then you will understand what nonsense he is talking about.
By the way, I try to cite materials from printed publications, in contrast to this author, who often takes Internet photoshop materials and passes them off as genuine.

[ccsr]

Quote: Arzt

He made a fundamental decision on the attack after Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, when it was not possible to agree on Finland, Bukovina and Turkey.

This is a controversial issue, because, according to the GRU General Staff, preparations for war against the USSR began long before this visit:



https://d.radikal.ru/d02/2109/78/cc39c0853237.jpg

[Basil50]

Reading the pseudo-historical ZASKOKS of recognized masters from history, you somehow stop believing it seems like science, to which these same masters are related.
And in England sometimes very interesting facts emerge, sometimes deadly.
The most revealing example for US with Berezovsky teaches nothing?

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Vasily50

Reading pseudo-historical ZASKOKI recognized masters from history

Like this nonsense:

Quote: Vasily50

the mention of a bunch of attacks on the SOVIET UNION by the Nazis with the preparation of a military coup by the Germans and the assassination of JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN. The British helped the Germans in this effort, and therefore began to secret their agreements.

?

Quote: Vasily50

The most revealing example for US with Berezovsky teaches nothing?

Lord, what does this have to do with it?

[boris epstein]

"Why was he in such a hurry in 1941?"
On December 31, 1938, a five-year rearmament plan began in the USSR. The latest models of tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft were developed and began to enter service. On the stocks were the battleship Sovetsky Soyuz, which was not inferior in combat power to the Bismarck, a series of cruisers, a series of destroyers of the Ognevoy type, submarines, minesweepers ... The five-year rearmament was to end in 1943. By this time, obsolete samples would have been removed from service and personnel were retrained for new equipment, railways and highways were laid in the returned territories-West Ukraine, West. In Belarus and Moldova, new communication lines were built, fortified areas were built on the new border, the radio coverage of the troops was increased. The Red Army was shuffling with the staff of mechanized corps before Zhukov. By 1943, this would have settled down. In addition, the deployment of the Red Army was still according to the plans of BM Shaposhnikov and radically changed in six months (the appointment of G.K. Zhukov to the post of Chief of the General Staff) during this time was neither theoretically nor practically impossible. Hitler knew this (he was informed that the Red Army was in an intermediate grouping , that is, she could not strike a preemptive strike on the Wehrmacht), and therefore was in a hurry, although Germany itself was not fully prepared for a war against the USSR. The calculation was precisely on the surprise of the attack and the elaboration in European wars of close interaction between the branches of the military, tank forces, aviation, and artillery.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Boris Epstein

By this time, obsolete samples would have been removed from service and personnel would have been retrained for new equipment.

Well, yes, but the Germans at this time would rest on their laurels with their pzkpfw 1-2 and 3-4 with stumps kwk 42 and kwk 24, respectively? Why does everyone who drags on the mantra "not enough 2 years for rearmament ..." believe that while the Red Army was modernizing at an accelerated pace, the Imperial Ministry of Arms would mainly be engaged in watering ficuses in its building on Victoriastrasse?

[boris epstein]

... The whole calculation was for a blitzkrieg-lightning war, two to three months and an uprising in the rear of the Red Army. Both failed. It was the meeting in battle with the T-34 and KV that forced the Germans to install a 50-mm cannon instead of a 37-mm gun on the troika, to develop and install long-barreled 75 mm cannons on the four, to strengthen the armor on triplets and fours, to develop the Panther and Tiger. , develop an 88mm tank gun. And the Ministry of Arms was mainly engaged in increasing the serial production of tanks under the blitzkrieg strategy - light and medium high-speed tanks, armored personnel carriers for motorized infantry, light and medium tractors for artillery attached to tanks. These are the ficuses they watered.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Boris Epstein

It was the meeting in battle with the T-34 and KV that forced the Germans to install a 50-mm cannon instead of a 37-mm gun on the troika.

Well, the rearmament of the "troika" by 50mm began right after France. And then Hitler demanded the replacement of 42 calories. for 60 cal. But his quite reasonable demand was ignored. They returned to this idea only after the start of the war with the USSR. The same applies to armor - they took care of the reinforcement already in 1940.

Quote: Boris Epstein

develop "Panther" and "Tiger"

Henschel began developing the heavy tank back in 1937.

Quote: Boris Epstein

develop an 88mm tank gun.

The competition for the development of TP with penetration [email protected] was announced at the beginning of 1941, before the outbreak of the war in the East. Krupp received a contract to develop TP 8.8cm in July. It has little to do with the events on the Eastern Front.

[boris epstein]

"But his quite reasonable demand was ignored. They returned to this idea only after the start of the war with the USSR."
The war with the USSR was a gamble. Accordingly, there was also an adventurous strategy. Adventurous strategy entailed adventurous tactics and adventurous technique. Therefore, with the strengthening of armor, rearmament to more powerful guns and the development of new tanks, we were in no hurry - we will have time after the defeat of the Soviets. Indeed, in Western Europe, such adventures took place with Hitler with a bang.
In addition, when the Soviet commanders figured out the tactics of the German - a strike at the joints of regiments, divisions, armies - the Germans began to arrange fire bags at the junctions, and the German generals were not able to rebuild. Think about what Canaris was hanged for? The Abwehr reported to him about Soviet developments, but he did not give reports. He was an agent of British intelligence, England at any cost had to push Germany against the USSR. After all, on June 23, 1941, Churchill said: "For the first time in the last year, I slept peacefully." And Hitler said back in 1941: "If I had known that the Soviets had so many tanks, I would not have started a war." Even Bismarck told the Germans: “Never fight with Russia.” And he worked as a diplomat in Russia for a long time and knew what he was talking about.

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: Boris Epstein

The war with the USSR was a gamble.

Undoubtedly! This, damn it, is an axiom, Boris. And not just a gamble - but an adventure.
(If, damn it, they engage in spiritualism on TV3 and accidentally summon the spirit of the Fuhrer - he will say so, I'm sure)))

Quote: Boris Epstein

Accordingly, there was also an adventurous strategy. Adventurous strategy entailed adventurous tactics and adventurous technique.

I don't quite agree. In principle, the strategy was clear - to defeat the main forces of the spacecraft, enter the Arch-Astr line and persuade the Soviets to peace, sending Stalin with the remnants of everything into an honorable exile beyond the Urals to deal with a new enemy and extract resources for the Reich. The Nazis banned gambling in 1933, and so the Fuehrer knew - the casino always wins)

[boris epstein]

The adventure was that Hitler's victories in Europe turned his head. He never understood. that there is a giveaway game. First, England and France in Munich surrendered Czechoslovakia and Austria, then Poland, Greece (with which they had agreements on military assistance, and in Greece there were British troops), Norway, Denmark, Belgium. Holland, Yugoslavia, Albania. And then England surrendered France itself. All for the sake of Hitler attacking the USSR.

[zenion]

The fact is that if before the British knew everything about the armament of the Red Army, then after the case of the spies, all foreigners were forbidden to visit the factories. And some cities were declared by the military and forbidden. Thus, Germany has ceased to receive new information about what awaits them.

[Catfish]

Finally I mastered it, a lot of information, you can't swallow it right away.
Everything is interesting and sincere gratitude to the Author.

[Undecim]

Finally mastered

Was it worth it? What "discoveries" did you see in the author's graphomania, which was not known before?

together with the military, Stalin briefly stayed with N. S. Khrushchov

He is not "Khrushchev", he is "Khrushchev".

[Catfish]

And I just didn’t read this before, so I thanked.

[AsmyppoL]

Thank you for rating Tihonmarine (Vlad), Sea Cat (Konstantin) and
Vasily50 (Dmitry)!

[Ashes of Claes]

Hitler could no longer be stopped, since he was a mentally ill leader.

With all due respect to the painstaking work of the author, but the mothball argument about Hitler's mental illness, in my opinion, is rather ridiculous.

There were serious prerequisites for the introduction of our troops into Iran

Sorry, but in May and early June 1941, the USSR had absolutely no "prerequisites for commissioning". The entry was inspired by the joint efforts of the USSR and Great Britain after the British probed the position of the USSR with respect to Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan (Eden-Maisky) and the well-known diplomatic demarches that followed. Note that no the Soviet leadership did not make statements about German activity in Iran before the German attack on the USSR. So, blue-eyed statements that after the beginning of Barbarossa, the Soviets suddenly saw the Germans in Iran and were sharply concerned about their activity are not worth a damn. After a visit to Germany in November 40, Molotov openly repeated Ribbentrop's thesis about the territorial aspirations of the USSR - to the south, south of Baku and Batum, towards the Persian Gulf.

[Charlie]

In May 1941, the General Staff plans to redeploy five divisions of the 19th Army from the North Caucasian Military District to KOVO. It seems that the redeployment was due to the increase in the number of German divisions on the southern flank of the KOVO


Neither Stalin nor the entire top leadership of the USSR believed in the likelihood of a German attack on the USSR. Therefore, the redeployment of units of the 19th Army may be associated with an increase in the number of German divisions, but in this case, not to repel a strike in which no one believed, but for something else.

[Doctor]

Therefore, the redeployment of units of the 19th Army may be associated with an increase in the number of German divisions, but in this case, not to repel a strike in which no one believed, but for something else.

And no one was going to reflect the blows. As stated in the Field Charter of the Red Army (PU-39):

If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most attacking army that has ever attacked.
We will conduct the war offensively, with the most decisive goal of completely destroying the enemy on his own territory.

Therefore, according to:

In mid-May, the head of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff N.F. Vatutin and his deputy A.M. Vasilevsky developed the following documents:
- Considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies,

Southwestern Front - eight armies, consisting of 74 rifle, 28 tank, 15 motorized and 5 cavalry divisions, and a total of 122 divisions and 91 aviation regiments, with the next tasks:

a) with a concentric strike by the armies of the right wing of the front, surround and destroy the main enemy grouping east of the r. Wisla in the Lublin area;

b) simultaneously with a blow from the front of Senyava, Przemysl, Lyutoviska, smash the enemy forces in the Krakow and Sandomierz-Kieletsk directions and capture the area of ​​Krakow, Katowice, Kielce, meaning in the future to advance from this area in the northern or northwestern direction to defeat large the forces of the northern wing of the enemy front and the capture of the territory of former Poland and East Prussia;

c) firmly defend the state border with Hungary and Romania and be ready to deliver concentric attacks against Romania from the regions of Chernivtsi and Chisinau, with the immediate goal of crushing the sowing. wing of the Romanian army and reach the border of the r. Moldova, Iasi.

https://www.1000dokumente.de/?c=dokument_ru&dokument=0024_zuk&l=ru&object=translation

[ccsr]

Quote: Charlie

Neither Stalin nor the entire top leadership of the USSR believed in the likelihood of a German attack on the USSR.

I don't know where you got this from - apparently you fell under the spell of the anonymous author of the article, who constantly lies that in the USSR the leadership did not know about Germany's preparation to attack our country. But there is a fundamental work on the activities of military intelligence on the eve of the war, where the results of all the events of that time are summed up and the lie of the illiterate author of the article is refuted:



https://b.radikal.ru/b24/2109/d0/644fa416bfaa.jpg

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

who constantly lies that in the USSR the leadership did not know about Germany's preparation to attack our country.

Hmm ... Usually, among the adherents of the genius and perspicacity of Comrade Stalin, this is followed by an untenable mantra about "delaying the beginning," "rearmament," "reorganization," and so on. Is not it? If "everyone knew everything," then how did the Wehrmacht occupy a larger territory over the summer in comparison with the results of the Western campaign?
And in vain you reproach the author of illiteracy. Why is this arrogance?

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Is not it? If "everyone knew everything," then how did the Wehrmacht occupy a larger territory over the summer in comparison with the results of the Western campaign?

If you are very interested in this, then first, study the experience of combat training of the Reichswehr, and then you will understand that several companies in Europe before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War created an army that had no equal in the world. That is why the initial stage of the war was so tragic for us. we had no combat experience both at the tactical level and at the operational level. Moreover, the quality of German weapons was higher than ours by the beginning of the war - and this fact must be taken into account.
There are a number of other reasons, including the general backwardness of our country on the eve of the war, but not all authors want to seriously study this issue - they need Rezun's "glory" more.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

And in vain you reproach the author of illiteracy. Why is this arrogance?

Read his work here and their analysis, and then you will understand that there can be no other attitude to this liar. By the way, he is blatantly lying about the 16th Army - she did not go to any border with Iran, and recently another author described in detail the course of preparation of our troops for the introduction of troops into these territories, where completely different armies are indicated - you can check it yourself.
https://topwar.ru/186337-operacija-soglasie-kak-sssr-i-anglija-zanjali-iran-v-1941-godu.html

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

First, study the experience of combat training of the Reichswehr, and then you will understand that several companies in Europe before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War created an army that had no equal in the world.

But the command of the Red Army had a consistently high opinion of the combat readiness of the army, judging by the staff games of 1941. The March game ZAPOVO is just a bravura march of some kind - from the tank park of 8 TD and 20 TB "eastern" lose in the course of the "oncoming battle" 73 (!!!) tanks - less than 1%.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

But the command of the Red Army had a consistently high opinion of the combat readiness of the army, judging by the staff games of 1941.

You are clearly not a military specialist, because at the command and staff games, the training of the highest command personnel takes place, and during them the combat training of the troops is not assessed - at least for yourself, understand this for a start.

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

The March game ZAPOVO is just a bravura march of some kind - from the tank park of 8 TD and 20 TB "eastern" lose in the course of the "oncoming battle" 73 (!!!) tanks - less than 1%.

These are all theoretical figures, not supported by anything, because in reality, even a complete withdrawal of all tanks was not carried out in order to at least estimate how many equipment would stand up during even a 100 km march.
Now I understand why people like you are easily bought by such articles by anonymous authors ...

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

You are clearly not a military specialist,

and I don’t dress like that. The discussion in the thread has an amateurish level.

Quote: ccsr

so at least for yourself understand for a start.

Leave this mentoring, please. I hope you have enough reason for your arrogance? At least you haven't demonstrated one yet, alas.

Quote: ccsr

command and staff games, the training of the highest command personnel takes place, and in the course of them the combat training of troops is not assessed

Yeah, but the belief in their own competence is growing.

[ccsr]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

Yeah, but the belief in their own competence is growing.

As I understand it, you do not even know the basics of military science, but you are already trying to assess the state of the Red Army on the eve of the war, you are undertaking to comment on its studies. However, nothing surprising, you yourself said:

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

The discussion in the thread has an amateurish level.

So what did you want to report here - can you tell us more specifically? I can't keep track of the flight of your thoughts ...

[Ashes of Claes]

Quote: ccsr

As I understand it, you don't even know the basics of military science, but you are already trying to assess the state of the Red Army on the eve of the war,

And where did you get the idea that only you are allowed? I don't understand - why are you fuming? In my opinion, everyone here, regardless of ideological preferences, demonstrates skepticism about the combat readiness of the Red Army on the eve of the war.

Quote: ccsr

So what did you want to communicate here

The author of this essay "reports", everything else is the essence of the replica.

[icant007]

Quote: ccsr

As I understand it, you don't even know the basics of military science,

It seems that now is the time when specialists are outlawed ....

[icant007]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

The discussion in the thread has an amateurish level.

Is the dilettante a godsend for a forger? Is not it? )

[icant007]

Quote: Ashes of Klaas

eh is it? If "everyone knew everything," then how did the Wehrmacht occupy a larger territory over the summer in comparison with the results of the Western campaign?

Because in addition to knowledge, you also need skill.

[Sergey-1950]

This is from envy. The author has done a great job. Honor and praise to him. But some people want to be sure to throw a lump of dirt

[icant007]

Let's summarize the events that took place in the winter - spring of 1941. Earlier and in the previous part, it was shown that the activities carried out by the leadership of the spacecraft in 1941 to form and equip the troops were not related with their expectation of war in June... This follows from the timing of these activities.

And what were they connected with?

[icant007]

And why are we talking only about the 16th and 19th armies. Why are we silent about the rest of the armies of the second strategic echelon?

In the article, information about the redeployment of the 16th and 19th armies is presented as a kind of "piecewise" decision outside the general strategic plan. Meanwhile, the formation of armies and corps was going on in virtually all internal districts.

What are you preparing for? Oh, yes, of course not by June 22, but let's say by July 22, or August 10?

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Sergey-1950

Much more important was the absence of tank and motorized divisions and motorized corps near our borders. They were especially dangerous.

Since you are such an "expert" in military affairs, like the author of the sateika, then I will ask you the simplest question, which he was afraid to answer even earlier. The question is the following - how long did it take in 1941 for a Wehrmacht tank division, located at a distance from the border with the USSR at a distance of 100, 200, 400 and 600 km, to arrive and deploy on the spot?
The second question is how long it will take for any headquarters of a tank formation and a tank group of the Wehrmacht to leave the point of permanent deployment and move for deployment in the field.
And the third question - what is important for the commanders of the Red Army covering formations - where the headquarters of the tank groups are located or where the tank regiments and divisions of the Wehrmacht are located.
If you are not afraid to answer, then let's see what kind of connoisseur of military history you are.

I'm not afraid to answer. And it's easy.
The answer to YOUR first question.
You do not want (or cannot) understand that these same motorcycle and tank divisions were ALREADY AT THE BORDER. They did not have to overcome any 200 or 600 km. Even if the TD is 100 km from the border, then in reality it could arrive at the place in one 6-10 hours. Once again and slowly: in order to go on the offensive at 6 o'clock in the morning on June 22nd, the Wehrmacht had to go HIS MOVE at 20:00 on June 21st. And then they even had time for a short nap before the attack. And it was possible to speak at 00 o'clock. But then, if there is peace here, you won't have to sleep. Krieg, Komaraden ... What did you want? It is not difficult to calculate how long it will take a division to cover 150-200 km. Day!
Troops are never brought into battle in the first minute, there is a reserve left for increasing pressure or developing an offensive. This depends on the development of events. That is, a third of the tank divisions could be driven up by the morning of June 23 and from a greater distance. 400 km using the railway.

[Sergey-1950]

The problem was that our RU: 1-DID NOT detect tank and motorized divisions near the border, which were quite enough to start the offensive. 2- "discovered" numerous, including mythical, tank divisions in France and, in general, very far away. 3- clearly overestimated the ability of our intelligence to track the movement of distant etc. to our border. Let me remind you that half of them were mythical. That is, they could not march in principle.

https://topwar.ru/163528-razvedka-pervye-tri-mesjaca-1941-goda.html
This is a link to an article by Eugene (and you read it), where he analyzes RM RU in detail. In general, Eugene is great. She wrote a huge cycle of articles about RM RU. This is a whole book and we have the opportunity to read it before the publication of this book. Thanks a lot to him. He gave answers to the damned questions that have tormented me for decades ...

So RU is not something that was somewhat mistaken in the number of tank and motorized divisions of the Wehrmacht. It did NOT SEE them. From the word at all. Rather, I saw a WHOLE ONE etc. We also saw several tank regiments and battalions. But even a tank regiment is not a division. True, in the RU, they put the discovered TP and TB into conditional tank divisions ... All the same, it turned out sheer garbage. According to the ideas of the General Staff, the Wehrmacht could not advance; it could not have achieved anything worthwhile with infantry divisions alone.

But the problem is not only that RU did not detect tank divisions (and therefore motorized corps, they simply could not be by default) ... For RU, the organization of the Wehrmacht units and formations remained a mystery. Worst of all, the organization of armored divisions and regiments. We thought that there were two or three tank battalions in a tank regiment, and three tank regiments in a tank division. That is, a tank division should have 9 tank battalions and no less than six.
But in fact, half of the Wehrmacht's tank regiments were two-battalion (144 tanks), and the other half were three-battalion (more than 200 tanks). Two armored divisions together with a motorized division - here's a motorized corps for you. In which there are four, five, or maximum six tank battalions. And it was unaware to our RU that the four or five tank battalions he discovered were the backbone of the motorized corps they had not discovered. If RU knew the structure of the tank formations of the Germans, then the tank regiments and battalions discovered by it, with a slight tension of convolutions, could be folded into almost a dozen tank divisions. And half the number of motor hulls. Drive another 4-5 tank divisions and ... ettta is a completely different threat. The Germans began the offensive with 19 tank divisions. And not all of them took part in the battles on the first day.

[Sergey-1950]

Along the way, I answered the second question: how can the control of a motorized hull or a tank group be adjusted? How, how ... you can go by train, you can go by car. Go figure them out who these captains and majors belong to. This is not a cannon or a tank. And even those can be delivered secretly. What can we say about people.
And the third question - "what is important for the commanders of the Red Army covering formations - where are the headquarters of the tank groups, or where the tank regiments and divisions of the Wehrmacht are located."
I don't understand what the question is. Both the one and the other and the third are important. The problem is the “myopia” of RU and the confidence of the General Staff that RM supplied by RU give an objective picture.

[Sergey-1950]

So, dear participants in the discussion, RM RU gave a highly distorted picture of the number and types of Wehrmacht troops near our borders. According to the RM, it turned out that the Wehrmacht was not ready to fight the USSR. Hence such complacency, which led to the defeat in the first days of the war. This complacency causes pain and anger in the reader ... possessing an afterthought. And show him the intelligence data a day or two before the attack ... what conclusion would he draw?

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

I'm not afraid to answer. And it's easy.

I answered you in detail about your writings, where I pointed out where you are personally mistaken, as well as the author of the articles. But my answer was deleted, apparently at someone's request, and therefore it makes no sense to repeat it. As a result, I will just note that you and a certain anonymous Eugene are simply amateurs in matters of intelligence, which is why your dashing conclusions are the fruit of illiteracy, and nothing more. To begin with, at least study intelligence report No. 5, which states that as of June 1, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions were already stationed at our borders, so lie less when talking about one Wehrmacht tank division allegedly discovered by our intelligence.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ccsr

ccsr (ccsr)
13 September 2021 12: 24

-2
Quote: Sergey-1950
I'm not afraid to answer. And it's easy.

I answered you in detail about your writings, where I pointed out where you are personally mistaken, as well as the author of the articles. But my answer was deleted, apparently at someone's request, and therefore it makes no sense to repeat it. As a result, I will just note that you and a certain anonymous Eugene are simply amateurs in matters of intelligence, which is why your dashing conclusions are the fruit of illiteracy, and nothing more. To begin with, at least study intelligence report No. 5, which states that as of June 1, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions were already stationed at our borders, so lie less when talking about one Wehrmacht tank division allegedly discovered by our intelligence.

Let's do it like this. You will provide this summary here, provide a MANDATORY link to it on the resource where you found it, and then we will discuss it.
Otherwise, it may turn out that I will spend my time looking for this report Nr. 5, studying it ... and then it turns out that you meant something else. I came across such tricks and magicians more than once and taught me not to rush in search of a document, which can easily turn out to be a fake. After all, you did not even indicate the year. And the RM number will not hurt

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

... You will provide this summary here, provide a MANDATORY link to it on the resource where you found it, and then we will discuss it.

Study the printed edition issued for the anniversary of the GRU General Staff under the general supervision of V.V. Kondrashov. The certainty is 100%, so look for this book, page 399:

[Sergey-1950]

And where is the intelligence report? From June 1st. I asked you to post the SUMMARY too. Take a picture of this 399 page and post it here. Be so kind. If the summary is more than one page, then, of course, take a picture of everything.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

And where is the intelligence report? From June 1st. I asked you to post the SUMMARY too. Take a picture of this 399 page and post it here.

And I posted it in the answer to you, but my answer was destroyed. I'm afraid that this time the scan will be destroyed, because it refutes your and the author's lies:

[zenion]

Still, there is no Hitler's signature and of course the seal and signature - believe what you read, burn before reading it. Hauptsturmdrachtmalführer is correct.

[zenion]

You recalled the anecdote about how a Jew entered the university. They did not want to see him there. And this bad applicant answered all the questions, they still decided to fill him up. How many Soviet citizens died in this war? Historically, he answers - 20 million. He is asked again - now, please - by name! It's scary to read, you probably decided that your counterpart decided to become a doctor of historical sciences and decided to flunk him. No wonder one man wrote - do not argue with know-it-alls, they will overwhelm you with their lies and experience. In Ukraine, as you said, it’s cheaper to bury him than to feed him.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Sergey-1950

I'm not afraid to answer. And it's easy.

I answered you in detail about your writings, where I pointed out where you are personally mistaken, as well as the author of the articles. But my answer was deleted, apparently at someone's request, and therefore it makes no sense to repeat it. As a result, I will just note that you and a certain anonymous Eugene are simply amateurs in matters of intelligence, which is why your dashing conclusions are the fruit of illiteracy, and nothing more. To begin with, at least study intelligence report No. 5, which states that as of June 1, 14 tank and 13 motorized divisions were already stationed at our borders, so lie less when talking about one Wehrmacht tank division allegedly discovered by our intelligence.

Dear, you promised me to bring RM from June 1, 41.
Once again: 1st (first) June 1941. The number in this case is not important, the main thing is the date.
What are you joking at us here? intelligence report from the 15th unit. That is, two weeks after the date assigned to you for such an expensive RM number 5.

What does the shift in the date of the beginning of the war by TWO WEEKS mean in that very June 1941? do you need to explain?
Once again and slowly: June 15, 1941 is only a week before the start of the war. There is almost no time left for taking decisive actions and (most importantly) their implementation. It's like telling you that you have a bad ECG half an hour before your heart attack.
But this intelligence report also contains gross errors, about them below. Most importantly, even here there is not a word about motorized corps, and even more so about tank groups. According to RU, they are not there. There is not! And since there are no motorized hulls, then there is nothing to worry about. Indeed, according to the profound calculations of the General Staff for an attack on the USSR, Germany will need at least 180 divisions. Actually, there are even more, more than 200. And then there are some 120 divisions ... It's not serious somehow. You can talk about your plans for the weekend and generally relax.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Once again: 1st (first) June 1941. The number in this case is not important, the main thing is the date.
What are you joking at us here? intelligence report from the 15th unit.

You, as the author of the article, do not understand nifiga in military documents, but you undertake to "educate" the professionals. June 15 is a registration date, it determines the date of publication of the bulletin No. 5, which is why only those materials that were received before June 1 were included in it. This is directly stated in the first sentence of the report - "for June 1". Everything that came out during June was supposed to be included in MONTHLY reconnaissance report No. 6, which would have been released on July 15th. But the outbreak of war changed the timing of the submission of intelligence reports - this is obvious to any professional.

Quote: Sergey-1950

What does the shift in the date of the beginning of the war by TWO WEEKS mean in that very June 1941? do you need to explain?

And the fact that all the materials in May that got into the intelligence bulletin were OBLIGED to double-check before getting into the main text of the message, and this took time, just as you don't know about editorial and publishing work - it's strange that you don't know this either, but you're already trying to me teach with deadlines.

Quote: Sergey-1950

But this intelligence report also contains gross errors, about them below. Most importantly, even here there is not a word about motorized corps, and even more so about tank groups.

This is nonsense, if only because it is not the administrative structures that can change and move on the eve of the war that are important, but the total number of formations on our border, because this is the decisive factor for our operational planning. You just do not understand this, so you are carrying nonsense after the author of the article, believing that the power of the tank forces is determined by the headquarters of the group, and not the tank divisions and their weapons.

Quote: Sergey-1950

According to RU, they are not there. There is not!

And this is a heinous lie, because in intelligence report No. 5, even the locations of several tank and motorized divisions are indicated on one of the pages on June 1:

They are also on other pages of the summary.
https://c.radikal.ru/c39/1802/4a/af4cd3c8a821.jpg

Quote: Sergey-1950

Indeed, according to the profound calculations of the General Staff for an attack on the USSR, Germany will need at least 180 divisions. Actually, there are even more, more than 200. And then there are some 120 divisions ... It's not serious somehow. You can talk about your plans for the weekend and generally relax.

In fact, the German General Staff is counting, and intelligence report No. 5 indicates that ON JUNE 1 there are already 120-122 German divisions out of all the Germans have and this was true, because the rest of the divisions arrived within three weeks before the start of the war. It is a pity that you do not understand this, although you undertake to analyze intelligence materials in which you, like the author of the article, do not understand at all.

[zenion]

Seryozha, jump wide and you will be happy. Do not touch the fixu with your tongue there the animal poison of curare together with a laxative. I wonder which one will fire first.

[AsmyppoL]

Sergey-1950, ccsr often tries to deceive users ... Hopefully they won't check it. It is he who allegedly fights for the honor of the uniform by slipping a fake ...

ccsr : “... And this is a heinous lie, because in reconnaissance report No. 5, even the locations of several tank and motorized divisions are indicated on one of the pages on 1 June... »

Everything looks solid: a summary of the Intelligence Directorate, but everything will be different if you check the locations of German tank regiments and divisions ...
In the reconnaissance cycle, all the locations of divisions, regiments and headquarters from the appendix of this summary were considered and they did not coincide with the actual locations of all units and formations of mobile troops, as well as many infantry divisions.

Consider only the question of the tank divisions that Mr. Milchakov wrote about.
On the right side of the drawing sheet given by ccsr, we find the indicated tank divisions and at the same time look at the tank regiments:
- Lancut - headquarters of the 8th Panzer Division (ref. 214 - Requires verification, since, according to the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Military District, it is noted in Warsaw), 11-1 Armored Regiment;
- Rzeszow - up to two tank regiments;
- Sendziszow - 84th Tank Regiment;
- Lezhaisk - to a tank division.

We check on the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces as of 27.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

But there are actually no German tank regiments and divisions! These are dummies that were slipped to our intelligence services.

There is a map of the deployment of German troops for June 10, 1941, i.e. ten days after the previous data. There is a note on the map: “The map was compiled according to the data of the intelligence departments of the districts as of 1.6.41. Checked in the Intelligence Directorate as of 10.6.41.»

June 10 confirmed deployment of the 8th Panzer Division in Lancut (two armored regiments). Tanks from Lezhaisk disappeared, but a tank division appeared in Uliniv (north of Lezhaisk). Probably, other sources have named another settlement.
Many tanks appeared south of Rzeszow.

[AsmyppoL]

The next map of the General Staff of the SC dated 20.06.41. And the signature of the executor is the same. And, probably, the colonel again checked the data of the districts and the Intelligence Directorate. On the map in the area under consideration, only tank divisions are indicated: two in the Rzeszow area and near Krakow.

Now let's check: were there any German tank divisions in the area in June?
Let's check again on the German maps of the operations department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces on the evening of 16, on the evening of 19 and 22 June.

in the evening 16 June in this area is the wheeled unit of the 11th Panzer Division, i.e. without tanks.
in the evening 19 June in the same place is the wheeled unit of the 11th Panzer Division.
22 June there are no tanks in this area either.

But on our map with the situation on 22 June there are tanks in the area again and there are many of them.

The German command and their special services did everything in their power so that the KOVO command and the General Staff had an opinion about the concentration of German tank forces against the summit of the Lvov salient - south-west of the place where the corps of the 1st tank group were entered.
And our reconnaissance forces controlled the locations of the fake tank regiments and divisions, which were supposed to divert the attention of the KOVO and spacecraft leadership from the true place of entry of the mobile group ...