The Cold War, the great achievements and catastrophic miscalculations of the Soviet Union are still some of the most burning topics, exciting inquisitive minds who are trying to find the truth in the affairs of bygone days.
However, are they really gone, given that we still continue to reap the bitter fruits of the old failures of the Soviets - and will we reap for many, many years to come? ..
In the current environment of analysts and Orientalists, it is extremely fashionable to argue that Russia can once again become a great ideological force on a global scale, competing with both Western neo-Trotskyism and Islamic expansion - and this reasoning perfectly intersects with the topic of our conversation today. This is a difficult topic, very little-known, but extremely important - it concerns one of the pillars on which the international power and reputation of the USSR stood.
Namely: the pillar of the world revolution and the promotion of the idea of communism, which made it possible to spread Moscow's influence even in countries that were completely unfriendly to us.
Flag of the Communist Party of Britain. Photo source: ukip.org
Of course, it is impossible to consider the collapse of the international communist movement in the format of just one article - even a brief description of all the processes of this catastrophe would take, perhaps, the volume of a fairly solid novel. We will try to draw some important conclusions from the analysis of the events of 1956 - those during which the Communist Party of Britain was de facto destroyed without a fight.
Why did the Soviets need international support?
Before we move on to the immediate topic of our conversation, I would like to dwell on such an important point as the expediency of supporting any friendly forces in other countries - and, in particular, in unfriendly countries (which Great Britain was in relation to the USSR).
I propose to consider this issue, again, using the example of Britain itself in the words of the famous classic in the world of military-political strategy Edward Nicolae Luttwak:
“The real reason for British supremacy at sea was the success of its foreign policy in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. by interfering in continental affairs with the aim of countering one of the great powers or a coalition of powers that were on the verge of gaining dominance in continental Europe, the British did not allow an end to the strife. This forced the continental powers to have large land armies, which, in turn, deprived them of the means to create equally large fleets. Superior naval power was the result of a successful strategy, not its cause.
British policy priorities were active diplomacy and the ability to subsidize obedient but poor allies, and not the desire to maintain a high combat readiness of the Royal fleet.
The fact that British supremacy at sea coexisted with the invariably modest funding of the Royal Navy is a clear reflection of the logic of strategy. Conversely, Britain would be in complete contradiction with this paradoxical logic if it sought to achieve dominance solely by building more and more frigates. Britain's European adversaries would have had their hands free to respond to the British naval focus, and they would have begun building their own frigates instead of diverting their resources to waging land wars with each other. Contemporaries who sharply criticized the inadequate allocation of funds for the Royal Navy, including admirals who bitterly complained that the British gold needed by their ships was distributed to foreigners, were guided by common sense, but not by strategic considerations.
Ironically, by the time Mahan's book was published, the British government had abandoned its decades-old policy. Instead of arming Germany's continental adversaries, especially the much-needed Russians, in order to maintain the balance of power on the continent, large funds were allocated to the Royal Navy in order to maintain naval power in a direct competition for building warships with Imperial Germany. Both common sense and public opinion were satisfied. But Mahan gained such resounding fame in Britain not as the author of a guide to the conduct of smart policies, but rather as a propagandist of the policy already formulated: the National Defense Act, which established the "parity" of the British fleet with the two fleets of the strongest continental powers taken together. was adopted in 1889, even before Mahan's first "mind-influencing" book was published.
In the end, both naval power, and the accumulated capital of naval superiority, and a lot of shed blood - all this was brought to the altar in the battles of the First World War. Britain for the first time found itself seriously involved in a land war in Europe, which, most likely, it would have been possible to avoid altogetherif so many resources had not been spent on the naval forces. Whatever we choose to consider as the main reason for all these consequences: a straightforward and inflexible public opinion, which turned British leaders away from following the policies of their predecessors (who financed the railways and arsenals of Tsarist Russia instead of building more battleships), or the lack of strategic clarity of these leaders - in any case, there is little doubt that the agony and decline of Britain was greatly accelerated by policies that reflected Mahan's delusions. "
British policy priorities were active diplomacy and the ability to subsidize obedient but poor allies, and not the desire to maintain a high combat readiness of the Royal fleet.
The fact that British supremacy at sea coexisted with the invariably modest funding of the Royal Navy is a clear reflection of the logic of strategy. Conversely, Britain would be in complete contradiction with this paradoxical logic if it sought to achieve dominance solely by building more and more frigates. Britain's European adversaries would have had their hands free to respond to the British naval focus, and they would have begun building their own frigates instead of diverting their resources to waging land wars with each other. Contemporaries who sharply criticized the inadequate allocation of funds for the Royal Navy, including admirals who bitterly complained that the British gold needed by their ships was distributed to foreigners, were guided by common sense, but not by strategic considerations.
Ironically, by the time Mahan's book was published, the British government had abandoned its decades-old policy. Instead of arming Germany's continental adversaries, especially the much-needed Russians, in order to maintain the balance of power on the continent, large funds were allocated to the Royal Navy in order to maintain naval power in a direct competition for building warships with Imperial Germany. Both common sense and public opinion were satisfied. But Mahan gained such resounding fame in Britain not as the author of a guide to the conduct of smart policies, but rather as a propagandist of the policy already formulated: the National Defense Act, which established the "parity" of the British fleet with the two fleets of the strongest continental powers taken together. was adopted in 1889, even before Mahan's first "mind-influencing" book was published.
In the end, both naval power, and the accumulated capital of naval superiority, and a lot of shed blood - all this was brought to the altar in the battles of the First World War. Britain for the first time found itself seriously involved in a land war in Europe, which, most likely, it would have been possible to avoid altogetherif so many resources had not been spent on the naval forces. Whatever we choose to consider as the main reason for all these consequences: a straightforward and inflexible public opinion, which turned British leaders away from following the policies of their predecessors (who financed the railways and arsenals of Tsarist Russia instead of building more battleships), or the lack of strategic clarity of these leaders - in any case, there is little doubt that the agony and decline of Britain was greatly accelerated by policies that reflected Mahan's delusions. "
The meaning of politics, as one of the forms of war, is invariably simple and was formulated centuries ago in ancient Rome - divide and rule. As we can see from the above quote from Luttwak, Britain successfully applied this principle, becoming the greatest empire in the world. The USSR, no less successfully, applied this strategy for its own purposes, using an extensive network of communist and anti-colonial movements, which at other times threatened to completely break the established influence of Europe and the United States, and even pushed the NATO bloc to destruction from within.
Of course, we could ask a question in the spirit of "what if? ..", but, as they say, story does not know the subjunctive mood - she exists to learn from previously made mistakes.
Great pogrom of the British Communist Party
1956 became, without exaggeration, an absolutely turning point in the history of relations between the USSR and other countries and movements of the socialist camp. The Hungarian events, the Suez crisis, the imminent collapse of the British Empire, the report on the "Stalin personality cult" - all this mixed in a monstrous cocktail that dealt an irreparable blow to the communist parties around the world. It is necessary to consider the events of those days in a comprehensive manner - otherwise the picture will be incomprehensible and biased.
So let's go to November 1956.
On King Street, nervous excitement reigns. An emergency meeting of the Executive Committee of the British Communist Party is gathering - the main agenda was the urgent development of a new strategy of behavior in connection with the Hungarian events. CPB delegates are fiercely discussing the forthcoming issue of the Daily Worker, which will focus on the main agenda: counter-revolution in Budapest, fascists eager for power, and the need to rally communists in front of the looming face of the third world war.
Through an intersection from King Street in Trafalgar Square, demonstrators clashed with the police, chanting "law, not war!" A day earlier, French and British air forces bombed Cairo, and a day later, commandos would land in Port Said. The Suez crisis is in full swing, and the geography of its hostilities is very extensive, ranging from the shattered windows of the Foreign Office in Whitehall to the legendary Egyptian pyramids.
The British Empire prepares to die, but refuses to die without a fight. London continues to desperately cling to the largest and most status piece of its heritage - complete control over the Suez Canal, recently nationalized by the Egyptians.
In three months, pressure from the UN, the United States and the USSR will still force France and Britain to withdraw their troops - but now the events are in full swing, and the communist community of England is also involved in them, who are simultaneously passionate about the Soviet invasion of Hungary.
Here we get to know the first nail in the coffin lid of the international network of pro-Soviet Communist Parties: despite the fact that the social bloc is shaken by events of a completely epochal proportion, Moscow does not provide any intelligible information about what is happening. It is only known that Soviet troops are storming Budapest: tank parts, and some quarters are demolished by artillery.
Hungary is a complete mess and confusion. The more liberal government of Imre Nagy, which came to power, sometimes negotiates with the USSR, then loses control over the situation. Two weeks earlier, it seemed that Soviet troops were already leaving the country, and Nagy took power, relying on factory committees and workers' councils - but negotiations in the center of Budapest are thwarted. Nagy is not in control of anything - reprisals begin in the country against military and party leaders loyal to the old regime. The country is literally torn apart by passion and overabundance weapons: lynching becomes a reality, as well as shooting at the raging crowd. The Soviet loyalists do not at all look like victims: they seize arms depots and dig in under the cover of military garrisons.
One of the most serious mistakes of the USSR was the distorted coverage of events in Hungary. The Central Committee was more interested in eliminating the consequences of the uprising, but not its causes. Photo source: myhungary.net
Today the Hungarian delegates are meeting with a commission from Moscow, and tomorrow all radio stations are broadcasting news about the fact that the troops of the Warsaw Pact are marching on Budapest, and there will be no more negotiations.
British communists (and not only them) were seriously puzzled by what was happening. The whole old line of party agitation was completely inappropriate for the events of November 1956. “The imperialist aggression of France and Britain” suddenly ceased to be the main topic of the day - both party members and ordinary Englishmen were increasingly interested in another question - what about Budapest?
The first sign of a split among the pro-Soviet communists happened a few months earlier. The CPB members were perplexed by the June events in Poznan, Poland, which had been shaken by the first general strike in the history of socialist Poland. The workers destroyed the building of the city party committee and took the city prison by storm. To suppress the riot, Warsaw used a regular army. Rumors spread actively that the Polish communists were unable to cope with food supplies, which was the reason for the strike.
In short, the situation was completely ambiguous - the authorities of the socialist republic with crude violence suppressed the discontent of the starving workers. How to react to this?
The Warsaw Pact bloc itself also hesitated. In February of the same 1956, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev read a report in Moscow "on the personality cult of Stalin." Suddenly, communists all over the planet learned that even Soviet Russia could be wrong, and high-ranking party members not only fought for world peace, but also hunted intrigue and fought for personal influence, which caused truly ideological people to suffer.
These events are best characterized by a wonderful quote from the British Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm:
"The British working class and its party vanguard were in a state of permanent nervous breakdown, close to total hysteria."
In short, the pro-Soviet political forces were in a real knockout - if in the old years the USSR was seen by the Western communists as a “paradise of the working class”, then in 1956 the situation changed radically, which was shortsightedly ignored by Moscow.
The Communist Party of Britain honestly fulfilled its duty and for some time was even able to stop the processes of ideological split in its ranks thanks to consolidation around the leaders of the movement. CPB Secretary General John Gollan, with the support of the main party ideologist Rajani Palmi Dutta, expressed the official position of the party around which he tried to gather his associates:
“The imperialists are striving to take revenge for the defeat in World War II. If the rebels in Hungary win, they will not spare any of the communists. Nagy does not control the country. He assured us otherwise, but in the end we see photographs of disfigured party members executed right on the street. Hungary will become a dagger aimed at the heart of Soviet Eastern Europe, followed by NATO forces. "
But the crisis had already made itself felt - it was inevitable. Palmi Dutt later recalled that it all began with a report by Khrushchev in 1956:
“It was impossible to hide him. What once looked like the glare of the sun has turned into a storm. Nobody wanted to discuss workers' rights or iron smelting anymore. Everyone asked: I had a friend in Moscow before - so it turns out that Stalin killed him? "
Monty Johnstone, head of the British Komsomol (Communist Youth League), also touches on this topic in his memoirs. The summer and autumn of 1956 shocked communists all over the world, but the Soviet Central Committee stubbornly rejected all attempts to discuss what was happening, insisting that the events in Moscow and Poznan had already ended, and there was no need to discuss them further. But the Politburo could not hide from the problems so easily - everyone was too much worried about the "Moscow report" and the events in Budapest.
The main question literally hung in the air - why do communists kill communists?
By the way, in 1942 MI-5 installed wiretapping equipment on King Street and closely monitored the situation. The observations were reflected in the report "On Two Dons" (this name was chosen for a reason - thus the British secret services compared the general secretary and ideologist of the CPB John Gollan and Palmy Dutt with mafia bosses), which reveals very interesting details of private conversations of high-ranking members of the British Communist Party.
So, Pollit attacks Khrushchev with fierce criticism for the fact that he made a report "on the cult of Stalin's personality", without allowing anyone to prepare and without informing the international communist movement in any way. On that fateful day of February, the "main Russian communist" (yes, this was the title Nikita Sergeevich once bore) detonated an information bomb, the effect of which turned out to be more terrible than an atomic war. Worse, Khrushchev did not give any opportunity for an adequate reaction to the ideologists of pro-Soviet parties around the world - and if in Europe the communists, in the end, simply turned their backs on the USSR, then in the person of China, Moscow got a sworn enemy.
The general misunderstanding was reflected in the latest issue of the Daily Worker on November 5, 1956. Below you can see an excerpt from this issue:
“The Hungarian events mean a crisis in the world labor movement. We must urgently find answers to important questions: how are we different from Moscow, and how will workers' democracy work in England? The aggression of British imperialism is monstrous: we are climbing into Egypt for profits, but after the "Moscow report", the events in Poland and Hungary, we must understand what is wrong in the world communist movement. "
Dorothy Thompson (managing editor of the Daily Worker) wrote in her diary about total impotence:
“We knew about the success of labor. We knew how the Red Army liberated Europe. We knew that the capitalist press belittles the successes of the Soviet economy and frightens the layman with the economic crisis and Soviet tanks. But now we have no answers. We knew that socialism lay ahead. Yes, we knew that either socialism or barbarism awaited us. But we did not understand how to move from the events in Hungary and Poland to the post-capitalist world and how to tell the British worker about it. Why is the Red Army acting like British commandos in Egypt? "
Subsequently, Dorothy Thompson left the British Communist Party before the end of the year.
One of the central causes of the ideological crisis was, in fact, the figure of Imre Nagy himself. In 1955, Khrushchev desperately tried to save him from the clutches of Janos Kador, of whose atrocities the Central Committee was more than aware. But already in 1956, Khrushchev himself declared Nagy a "counter-revolutionary". Photo source: sensusnovus.ru
Naturally, the CPB could not sit idly by. Secretary General John Gollan sent party journalists to Budapest - the latter were supposed to confirm the official position of Moscow and collect evidence testifying to the "fascist rebellion in Hungary." Reports fell on King Street like a tub of water - yes, atrocities really reigned on the streets, officials were lynched without trial, but the reason for this was not communism, but bureaucracy and poverty.
Suddenly, the situation in Budapest turned out to be even more complicated than any expectations and much more complicated than any instructions from Moscow. The unexpected arrest of Hungarian ministers made the situation even more confusing.
In short, even looking at the events with their own eyes, the British communists could not come to an understanding of the situation - and was it possible, given the passive behavior of the Moscow Politburo?
It was not clear how to describe the prerequisites for the uprising and how to explain them to the workers? Hungarians decided to tear to pieces the communists? No, it wasn't like that. Communists attacked the Hungarians? No, this version also has nothing to do with the truth. Perhaps the negotiation process would bear fruit? But why then did it all end with Soviet tanks?
If the Manchester workers did not obey the decrees of the revolution, could we force them to obey by firing squad?
- from a private letter from John Ross Campbell, British communist activist and editorial chief of the Daily Worker.
The international communist movement was experiencing a terrible ideological crisis. The theoretical reasoning of the Marxists instantly turned out to be powerless in the face of practice ...
Moscow, meanwhile, was bursting with a stream of telegrams - everyone was especially worried about the fate of the leaders of the Hungarian workers' collectives (which is not surprising, given that the communists of Europe were consolidated precisely among the working class). Moscow was indifferent and silent - its only reaction was either silence or stereotyped dry phrases about the successes of world socialist construction.
The line of no return was passed - the shock and misunderstanding passed. The Politburo left the Communist Parties of the entire world alone with a distinct sense of betrayal.
In the blink of an eye, the USSR became a source of counter-revolution and imperialism for its own followers. Marxist circles were everywhere replaced by newborn and previously unknown Trotskyist organizations, which, unlike Moscow, could provide answers to the previously pro-Soviet youth of Europe.
At the same moment, the British Empire collapsed: Anthony Eden resigned, the Anglo-French troops left Egypt in disgrace. The revolution in Britain still did not happen, and Moscow remained arrogantly silent about the questions of the working people.
Nineteen journalists left the Daily Worker, and the mouthpiece of pro-Soviet ideas in Britain fell silent. The Communist Party was disintegrating and dying before our eyes. Not only did its structure break down, but personal ties also collapsed. Here is what Allison MacLod, one of the oldest leaders of the CPB, wrote about this:
“Even marriages break up. Thompson does not speak to Kettle. Cornforth promised to remain in the party, but on the day of the execution Nadia sent a check for a thousand pounds and a party card by registered mail. Miriam Palmi Dutt left her husband ... ".
British communists (as well as everyone else) tried to understand - what would happen if a revolution happened in England itself? Will the CPB be able to come to an agreement with Moscow, or will Soviet tanks rumble through the streets of London, as happened in Budapest? Will the Soviet Politburo give at least some power and freedom of choice to the British communists, or will it crush any expression of the will of the British workers?
Due to the silence of Moscow, what is happening in Hungary gave rise to completely fantastic versions of what is happening.
Some timidly expressed their thoughts out loud that the "Trotskyist Khrushchev" had decided to drown the Polish and Hungarian "Stalinist workers" in blood. On the contrary, others said that the "Stalinist Khrushchev" was fighting against the "democrat Nagy" who wanted to return Leninism. Others reasonably objected to them - what kind of Khrushchev was a Stalinist, if he was the one who read the report?
Perhaps it was Nagy who was a Stalinist? But no, he was against Stalin. Then, probably, the fascists really raised their heads in Budapest?
Why, then, did the Soviet Union first withdraw its troops and then attacked Budapest? Is Nagy or Khrushchev to blame for this?
No one really understood anything.
By the end of 1956, the CPB had lost more than 9 members (this was a real disaster, given that its total number was only 000 thousand - it must be admitted that England did not reach the almost two million Italian Communist Party). The Scottish miners' union and the British firemen's union left the party in full force. Even the most fierce supporters of the Soviet world left - Max Morris, who back in November desperately defended Moscow's position, tore up his party card and quarreled with Palmy Dutt.
The best of all what was happening was described by the direct participants in the events. For example, here is what the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm left in his diaries:
“I, an old British Marxist, feel like a fool. I have always had an umbilical cord connecting me with Moscow, with the revolution, with the homeland of all workers. It was inconceivable for me to break off relations with the cradle of the revolution - and I remain in the party. But I do it out of habit. I don’t know whom I betray more: myself, the idea, or the Soviet Union ”.
Henry Bowett, British Communist Party member:
“Now I knew that my brother, who left for the Soviet Union in the 30s and was shot in Moscow, was not an MI5 spy. Now I know - he, like me, is a communist. I do not regret that I joined the party - but now I should leave it. I am a communist - but the party is not communist. "
Arthur Merron, head of the internal committee on party democracy of the CPB:
“I am examining letters from activists. The Soviet Union was unconditionally right in stopping the counter-revolution in Hungary. But Khrushchev's speech about Stalin ... my deputy said that she would no longer go to meetings, that we are all counter-revolutionaries ... She is leaving the party. I think that the situation can still be corrected - but I do not know how ... ".
At the end of the year, the leadership of the party also changed - the tension of the Hungarian crisis broke many prominent CPB figures (such as Harry Pollita, who died of a stroke a few years later). The previously mentioned head of the editorial board of the Daily Worker, John Ross Campbell, became the man in charge of contacts with Moscow. He tried to establish contacts with the Soviet Politburo and resolve the ideological difficulties that arose in the movement, having received an answer to the main question: is it possible to repeat events similar to Budapest in 1956?
Moscow by that time began to remotely realize the consequences of its actions in Hungary (and especially the consequences of its uncertain position): the Soviet leadership began to desperately convince the European communists that what happened in Budapest was a tragic exception that will never happen again.
But the process could no longer be stopped: the communists of the whole world gradually began to divide into those who advocated cooperation with the USSR, and those who wanted independence from "Soviet imperialism."
The last nail in the coffin of the British Communist Party (and, alas, many others) was the events of 1968 in Czechoslovakia. Twelve years later, it turns out that the USSR did not keep its promises - and the final collapse of the pro-Soviet movements could no longer be stopped.
John Campbell will write a letter to Moscow filled with anger over the events in Prague: why did the Union promise the countries of Eastern Europe freedom of self-government, provided there was no repression and the threat of withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and again unleashed its military power against fellow socialists?
The Soviet Union was unanswered - probably, even in Moscow itself, they did not know the answer to this question.
The European Communist Parties literally disappeared before our very eyes, losing control over the trade union movement. Their members spilled over into neo-Trotskyist and European socialist movements until Moscow finally lost at least some leverage on public opinion and political circles in Europe.
As an afterword
Now it is difficult to imagine a situation in which Moscow possessed not only hearts and minds, but also had an organized lobby in countries that we now consider absolutely inaccessible not only to the influence of Russia, but also, perhaps, to any constructive dialogue with our country.
Unfortunately, to this day we underestimate the capabilities of the notorious “soft power”, this supposedly “newfangled” instrument, which was once perfectly mastered by the USSR.
Of course, now the problems of a particular British Communist Party look alien, distant and incomprehensible to us - we can hardly realize the tragedy of the events of 1956 and 1968, because to this day we do not understand the consequences of the collapse of the pro-Soviet communist movements. And the consequences are quite simple - in the end, the once pro-Soviet forces came to power in Europe, which, after a series of crises, were reformatted into Eurosocialists and neo-Trotskyists.
Forces that now take a deeply anti-Soviet and anti-Russian position.
The forces that the Soviet Union once nurtured with its own hands.