Anti-tank rifles
NEW TYPE WEAPONS
For the first time, anti-tank rifles - single-shot 13,37 mm Mauser Tankgever used the German Reichswehr in 1918, at the final stage of the First World War. This experience turned out to be rather negative, therefore, in the following years, the armies of the leading states of the world intended to defeat enemy Tanks with the help of light cannons and "universal" heavy machine guns. However, the scale of the mechanization of troops made the idea of light infantry anti-tank weapons with a range of several hundred meters more and more attractive. In the 30s, work on the PTR intensified, including in our country. By the way, the term "anti-tank rifle", apparently, is borrowed from the German Panzerbüchse - in fact, we are talking about rifled weapons.
In the 1936-1938, 15 of various PTR caliber systems from 12,7 to 25 mm were tested, until it became clear that the requirements for the anti-tank gun were initially too high. 9 November 1938 of the Red Army Artillery Directorate formulated a new task, which included the development of a 14,5-mm self-loading anti-tank gun, which could always be with units of a rifle company in any terrain and in any combat conditions. Work on the new cartridge caliber 14,5 mm began at the Scientific Test Site of small arms (NPSVO) and continued at one of the Moscow factories.
With the expectation of this ammunition, N. V. Rukavishnikov, an employee of the same test site, constructed an APP adopted on October 7 1939 of the year. And yet, by 22 on June 1941, the troops did not have serial anti-tank guns. This dramatic situation is often explained by the position of Marshal G.I. Kulik, who headed the Main Artillery Directorate before the war and declared 1940 in the spring of the ineffectiveness of light anti-tank weapons in the fight against "the newest German tanks." The opinion of the marshal probably contributed to the delay in work on the PTR (as, by the way, the removal from production of 45-mm anti-tank guns), but did not stop them. Where the technical reasons played a major role - Plant No. 2, which was commissioned to produce the first batch, in the winter of 1939-1940, the main capacities were used for the production of PPD. In addition, repeated tests of Rukavishnikov's PTR showed its high sensitivity to contamination, unmasking the position with dust raised by gases from the muzzle brake. The gun needed refinement and the 26 July 1940 of the year was decommissioned. The tests of the converted PTR were held on June 1941, and the report of the NIHTPLO on the results was dated by the 23 number - the second day of the Great Patriotic War.
MASS SAMPLES
The urgent establishment of the production of anti-tank guns in the conditions of the outbreak of war, when all the capacities of the existing enterprises of the People's Commissariat of weapons were loaded, required the solution of many organizational and technological problems. In the meantime, in July 1941, temporary measures are taken to ensure the prompt supply of the PTR army.
One of them is an attempt to urgently organize the release at the Tula Machine-Tool Plant (plant No. 66) 7,92-mm guns modeled after the captured German Pz.B.39. His armor penetration (at a distance of 300, a bullet pierced armor with a thickness of up to 23 mm) was sufficient to fight Wehrmacht light tanks. Yes, and the average tanks of the enemy, it could hit when fired into the board. Plant number 66 was to manufacture 5 thousands of such PTRs. But in September there were still problems with the work of the mechanisms of the gun. In October, the machine-tool plant was evacuated. The troops got on one data - up to 1 thousands, on the other - only 426 such MFR. In any case, 7,92-mm guns were used in the defense of Tula (several units received the Tula Worker Regiment).
At that time, they also recalled 12,7-mm single-shot rifles, similar in type to the German Mauser Tankgever, - in 30-ies they were made in small quantities in Tula for testing the 12,7-mm cartridge, and NPSVO in 1938-m offered to develop On this basis, the store PTR. Now there was a proposal to release a single-shot anti-tank gun under the 12,7-mm cartridge DShK small workshops (the initiator is the engineer V. N. Sholokhov). Semi-handmade production began in Moscow in the workshops of the Mechanical Engineering Institute. Bauman, then - in OKB-16. The simple design of the German Mauser PTR was supplemented with a muzzle brake, butt shock absorber and a folding bipod. Especially for these guns, 12,7-mm cartridges with an armor-piercing bullet were produced, which allowed penetration of armor 400 mm thick at the 20 distance.
The finishing of the 14,5-mm cartridge continued: in August, its version with a solid core BS-41 bullet was put into service. This core is often called metal-ceramic, although it is not about ceramics, but about the use of powder metallurgy. If 14,5-mm bullet B-32 at a distance of 300 m penetrated armor with a thickness of 21 mm, then BS-41 - 35 mm.
Staging for the production of Rukavishnikov PTR was still a problem. To speed up work on more technologically advanced 14,5-mm PTR, according to DF Ustinov's memoirs, Stalin at one of the T-bills meetings offered to entrust the development to one more, and for reliability - to two designers. The task in the beginning of July was received by V. A. Degtyarev and S. G. Simonov. Soon, ready for testing samples appeared - the entire 22 of the day passed from the formulation of the problem to the first test shots. The new anti-tank rifles should have fought with medium and light tanks and armored vehicles at ranges up to 500 m.
Degtyarev and his KB-2 employees at the tool factory No. 2 in Kovrov developed two options with varying degrees of automation. Already July 14 working drawings transferred to production. On July 28, the PTP of Degtyarev was reviewed at a meeting in the Small Arms Administration. 30 July to accelerate the organization of mass production Degtyarev offered to simplify one of the samples, turning it into a single-shot, because it is the power system usually gives the greatest number of problems in fine-tuning weapons. A few days later this option was submitted.
28-29 August PTR Degtyarev tested on NIPSVO. And also 6-12 of August, the joint test of Simonov’s self-loading PTR (based on his own self-loading 1938 self-loading rifle of the year) and the modified Rukavishnikov PTR were tested here. Sample Simon showed the best results.
29 August 1941, the Degtyarev single-shot rifle and Simonov the self-loading rifle were put into service under the designation PTRD and PTRS respectively. This was done even before the termination of the PTR tests (12-13 of September passed the tests for survivability, and the final ones - of September 24).
Degtyarev's rotary longitudinally sliding bolt had two lugs in the front and a straight grip in the rear. The percussion mechanism is of the shock type with a helical mainspring, the tail of the firing pin goes out behind the bolt and looks like a hook. The cocking of the firing pin was performed when the bolt was unlocked Barrel PTRD supplied active muzzle brake, absorbing up to 2 / 3 recoil energy. The tubular stock contained a shock absorber spring. The principle of the automatic unlocking of the bolt when rolling back was creatively borrowed from artillery. After the shot, the barrel with the receiver retreated backwards, the bolt handle attacked the copy profile, mounted on the butt, and turned, unlocking the bolt. After stopping the barrel, by inertia, the bolt retreated back and stood on the bolt delay, the bolt reflector pushed the gun case into the lower window of the receiver. In the forward position, the moving system was returned by a shock absorber spring. The shutter remained open, and to prepare for the next shot, it was necessary to insert a new cartridge into the upper window of the receiver, send and lock the shutter. This made it possible to increase the combat rate of fire with the coordinated work of a two-person calculation. The aiming device was moved to the left on the brackets and included the front sight and reversible rear sight at a distance of up to 600 m and above (in the MFR of the first releases, the rear sight moved in the vertical groove).
The butt had a soft pillow, a wooden support for holding the weapon with his left hand, a wooden pistol grip, an emphasis for the cheek arrow. Foldable stamped bipod and carrying handle were attached to the trunk. The accessory included two canvas bags for 20 cartridges each. The total weight of the ATGM with ammunition was about 26 kg. In combat, the gun carried one or both calculation numbers. Imagine the load on the calculation on the march and in battle.
The minimum of parts, the use of a butt tube instead of a frame, simplified the production of PTR, and this was crucial in those conditions. PTRD production began at the Kovrov plant number 2: in early October, the first batch of 50 guns was put into assembly, 28 of October created specialized production - the task for anti-tank weapons was a priority. The first batch in the 300 PDRD was made in October and sent to the 16 Army in the beginning of November by Lieutenant General K. K. Rokossovsky. Later, the plant No. 74 (Izhevskiy machine-building) was connected to the release of the TPRD. By 30 December 1941, the 17 688 PTRD was manufactured, and for the entire 1942, the 184 800. The main production of PTRD was conducted in Kovrov until November 1943, when plant number 2 ceased production. But since October 1943, the PTDD began to be assembled in Zlatoust at plant No. 385.
Self-loading PTRS had an automatic based on the removal of powder gases through the transverse hole in the wall of the barrel. The barrel bore was locked by tilting the bolt body down. Percussion mechanism - kurkovy, with a helical combat spring. A two-row magazine with a lever feeder was hinged to the receiver, fitted with a clip (bundle) with 5 cartridges with the lid opened down. The accessory included 6 clips. By the use of ammunition shutter stood on the delay. The sighting device included a fly with a fuse and a sector sight, notched from 100 to 1500 m. The PTR had a wooden butt with a soft cushion and shoulder pad, a pistol grip. Butt neck was used to hold the left hand. The barrel was supplied with a muzzle brake, a folding bipod and a carrying handle were attached to it.
Production of PTRS was simpler than Rukavishnikov's PTR (a third fewer number of parts, 60% less machine-hours), but much more complicated than the PTD. It was planned to produce PTRS in Tula, but after the evacuation of part of the production of plant No. 66 in Saratov, the manufacture of PTRS was established there, at plant No. 614 (formerly Traktorodetal). There was not enough equipment or capacity for the rapid organization of production. They found a way out in the cooperation of enterprises: the manufacture of the shop box was entrusted to the combine plant, the hammer plant was entrusted to the mechanical workshops of the local university. November 7 first PTRS successfully passed the tests, from December in Saratov began its mass production. Izhevsk Plant No. 74 also attracted to the production of PTRS; in November, it received an assignment to organize the production of a PTDD, and already 6 in November - additionally for the production of PTRS. In November, the residents of Izhevsk manufactured the 11 PTRD, and the first two PTRS were able to pass only in December. Initially, the production of parts of the PTR was distributed in the shops of the plant, then built a separate wooden huts. Used evacuated production of the Tula Arms and Podolsk mechanical plants. 36 July 1 of the plant on the basis of the plant number 1942 was selected plant number 74 (later Izhevsk Mechanical Plant), which produced including anti-tank guns of both systems, and from the middle of 622-th only PTRS.
In 1941, the entire 77 PTRP was released, in 1942, 63 308. The establishment of mass production has reduced the cost of PTRS - from the first half of 1942 to the second half of 1943, it almost halved.
Since the PTRs were taken on an urgent basis, the shortcomings of the new systems — tight extraction of the liner from the PTRD; double shots from the PTRS — had to be corrected during production. Due to the tight extraction of the sleeves, it was recommended to lubricate the cartridge chamber of the MFR before firing and every 10-12 shots. This, as well as rather sensitive recoil, reduced the real combat rate of fire compared to the stated in the manuals. The deployment of mass production in wartime still required a certain period of time - the needs of the troops began to be satisfied to a sufficient degree only from November 1942.
TTRD production was stopped in Izhevsk at plant number 622 in July, and in Kovrov at plant number 2 - in November 1943, in Zlatoust at plant No. 385 - in December 1944. PTRS were produced in Saratov at plant number 614 until June 1944 of the year, in Izhevsk at plant number 622 - until December of the same year. In total, the five plants indicated produced 471 726 PTR - 281 111 PTRD and 190 615 PTRS. The troops delivered 469 700 PTR of both systems. The peak of production - 249 642 units - falls on 1942 year, when the role of anti-tank weapons in the anti-tank defense system was the most significant. The number of 14,5-mm cartridges released in 1940-1945 is estimated at 139,8 million, the peak of production is 1942-1943 years.
BATTLE EXPERIENCE
With sufficiently high ballistic data, 14,5-mm MFR was distinguished by maneuverability and adaptability. They, of course, were not a substitute for even light anti-tank guns, but eliminated a significant gap between the "anti-tank" capabilities of infantry and artillery. Although in the 1941, the PTR had to play precisely the role of the latter - back in August 45-mm guns were withdrawn from the battalion and divisional level and transferred to form anti-tank regiments and brigades.
The first new PTR were the troops of the Western Front, defending Moscow (here, by the way, a certain amount of Rukavishnikov's PTR was used). The directive of the front commander, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov from October 26 of 1941 of the year, referring to sending an anti-tank platoon to 5, 33 and 16 of the army on 3-4, called for immediate use of this exceptional weapon. .. giving them regiments and battalions ". And in his order from December 29, Zhukov pointed out shortcomings in the use of anti-tank weapons: using their calculations as shooters, lack of interaction with groups of tank destroyers and anti-tank artillery, cases of abandonment of anti-tank weapons on the battlefield.
The most famous battle during the defense of Moscow was the battle at the Dubosekovo 16 junction in November 1941 of the 4 Company of the 2 Battalion of the 1075 Regiment of the 316 Rifle Division of Major General I.V. Panfilov. Of the 30 German tanks that participated in the attacks, 18 was shot down, but less than 20% of Red Army soldiers survived from the entire company, at the front of which the attack took place. This battle showed not only the ability of the PTR calculations (in the battalion there was the entire 4 calculation) to fight with tanks, but also the need to cover them with arrows, machine gunners and support for anti-tank and regimental artillery. Anti-tank strongholds became a form of organizing close cooperation between anti-tank artillery, anti-tank guns, tank fighters and automatic infantry weapons.
From December 1941, the company of PTR (on 27, then on 54 rifle) was introduced into the infantry regiments, and from the autumn of 1942, the platoon of PTR on 18 rifles entered the battalions. In January, the 1943-th company of the PTR was included in the composition of the motorized rifle-machine-gun battalion of the tank brigade, here the companies of the PTR will survive until March of the 1944 year. The PTR companies were also introduced into the anti-tank artillery battalions, and the PTR battalions were introduced into the anti-tank brigade battalions. Anti-tank guns, along with light machine guns, ensured the self-defense of artillery batteries from surprise attacks by the enemy.
It should be noted that the effectiveness of the combat work of the PTR calculations is evaluated differently, in the Russian literature of recent years it is common to focus on their shortcomings and assume that they had only "psychological significance" in the context of a clear lack of anti-tank artillery. However, the former Wehrmacht Lieutenant General E. Schneider wrote: "In 1941, the Russians had 14,5-mm PTR ... which caused a lot of trouble to our tanks and later light armored personnel carriers." Former Major-General F. von Mellentin noted: “It seemed that every infantryman had an anti-tank rifle or anti-tank gun. The Russians very skillfully disposed of these funds and, it seems, there was no such place where they would not be. ” In general, in a number of Germanic works on World War II and the memories of German tankers, Soviet PTR are referred to as “respectable” weapons, but due also to the courage of their calculations. The Soviet commanders, already in 1942, noted the new features of the Germans' attacks with the participation of tanks and assault guns - they sometimes stopped at 300-400 from the advanced trenches, supporting their infantry with fire from the spot. And these are the ranges from which Soviet PTRs opened fire. As you can see, the fire of anti-tank guns had not only “psychological significance”.
Having played a large role in the anti-tank defense in 1941-1942, the PTR from the middle of 1943-th - with the growth of armor protection of tanks and assault guns over 40 mm - lost their positions. If in January 1942 the number of PTRs in the troops was 8116, in January 1944 was 142 861, that is, it grew 17,6 times over two years, then in 1944 it began to decline and by the end of the war the current army had only about 40 000 PTR.
October 30 1944, Chief of Staff of the 1 of the Baltic Front, Colonel-General V.V. Kurasov reported: “The experience of using PTRs during World War II shows that they had the greatest effect in the period before July 1943, when the enemy used light and medium tanks , and the combat formations of our troops were comparatively weaker than they were saturated with anti-tank artillery. Starting in the second half of 1943, when the enemy began to use heavy tanks and self-propelled guns with powerful armor protection, the effectiveness of the MFR decreased significantly. The main role in the fight against tanks is currently entirely carried out by artillery. MWDs with good fire accuracy are now used mainly against firing points, armored vehicles and enemy armored personnel carriers. ” The subunit commanders successfully used the main advantages of the MFR - maneuverability, the ability to constantly be in the combat formations of small subunits, and the simplicity of disguise - both in 1944 and 1945. For example, when fighting in the environment, in populated areas, with the capture and consolidation of bridgeheads, when it was not possible to use artillery.
PTR was used to fight not only with tanks and armored vehicles. Armored workers often led to silence bunkers and bunkers of the enemy. Snipers used PTR instead of a sniper rifle to defeat the enemy at long distances or behind closures (attempts to install an optical sight on the PTR were unsuccessful due to too strong recoil of the weapon). Anti-tank guns were also used to fight low-flying aircraft - here the advantages were of self-loading PTRS.
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