Woe from wit. On the methods of concentrating artillery fire on one target in the Russo-Japanese War

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Article "On various methods of fire control of the Russian fleet on the eve of Tsushima" compared the methods of artillery fire adopted by the Pacific Squadron (author - Myakishev), the Vladivostok cruiser detachment (Grevenits) and the 2nd Pacific squadron (Bersenev, with amendments by Z.P. Rozhdestvensky). But this topic is very large, so in the previous material it was possible to cover only the issues of zeroing and fire to kill during individual shooting, when one ship is firing at the target. The same article is devoted to the concentration of fire on one target by a detachment of warships.

As seen concentrated fire on the Pacific Squadron


The technique of conducting squadron fire on one target is prescribed by Myakishev very simply and clearly. According to his instructions, in this case, the lead ship should perform the sighting, by default - the flagship, since the flagship usually goes ahead. Then the targeting ship should be shown the distance (in one number) to the ships of the squadron following it, and then give a full side salvo.

As a result of these actions, our other ships, following the lead, received the distance from it to the target, and in addition, the result of the fall of a volley carried out for a given distance. Myakishev believed that by taking advantage of all this, the gunners of other ships would be able to calculate the necessary adjustments to the sight for their ships, which would ensure the effective defeat of the enemy.

At the same time, Myakishev fully admitted that “something could go wrong,” and therefore demanded to fire volleys to kill. From his point of view, the gunners were able to distinguish the fall of their own volley from the fall of the volleys of other ships and, thanks to this, adjust the sight and rear sight.

The sequence of actions described above, according to Myakishev, should have been used at a distance of 25–40 cables. If, for some reason, the distance at which the fire will be opened is less than 25 cables, then the shooting should be carried out without zeroing, according to the readings of the rangefinder. At the same time, the salvo fire was replaced by a fugitive one. Well, and shooting at a distance of over 40 cables Myakishev did not consider at all.

As seen concentrated fire in the Vladivostok cruiser detachment


According to Grevenitz, everything turned out to be more complicated and interesting. He distinguished three "kinds" of detachment shooting.

Woe from wit. On the methods of concentrating artillery fire on one target in the Russo-Japanese War

We will postpone the first of them until better times, since now, dear reader, we are talking about the concentration of fire, and not about its dispersal. And regarding the concentration of fire, Grevenitz made two significant reservations.

First, Grevenitz saw no reason to focus the fire of a large squadron on a single ship. From his point of view, no battleship, no matter how well protected, will not be able to withstand the impact of three or four ships equivalent to it.

Accordingly, Grevenitz proposed to form several detachments of the indicated size as part of the squadron. Such detachments were supposed to maneuver "according to previously received instructions", which implies the possibility of separate maneuvering, if such, again, was prescribed in advance. Each such detachment must choose a target for concentrated fire independently, however, the detachment can be given priority targets in advance - say, the most powerful enemy ships.

According to Grevenitz, the concentration of squadron fire on several enemy ships will not only quickly disable the most powerful and dangerous enemy combat units, but also minimize the losses of your own squadron from enemy fire. Here he quite rightly noted that the ship's accuracy "sags" when it is under enemy fire, and that the general concentration of fire on a single target will lead to the fact that other enemy ships will be able to smash our squadron "in range" conditions.

Without a doubt, the division of the squadron into detachments and the concentration of fire on several enemy ships at once favorably distinguishes the work of Grevenitz from the work of Myakishev.

Interestingly, Grevenitz believed that the "squadron leader" should not be on the ship of the line at all, but that he should raise his flag and be on a fast and well-armored cruiser in order to be able to observe the battle from the side. The idea was that in this case, the flagship, being at a distance, would not suffer from the concentration of enemy fire and, if necessary, could approach any part of the squadron without breaking its formation. Accordingly, the admiral will be better informed and will be able to more effectively control both maneuvering and artillery fire of his ships.

There was certainly a grain of rationality in these theses of Grevenitz, but the problem was the open weakness of the means of communication of those times. The radio was hardly reliable enough, and the antenna could easily be disabled, and the flag signals could simply be overlooked or misunderstood. In addition, it takes a certain amount of time to give an order with a signal - it needs to be dialed, raised, etc. At the same time, the admiral leading the squadron could control it by simple changes in the course of the flagship, even with completely downed halyards and destroyed radio.

In general, I am inclined to assess this idea of ​​Grevenitz as theoretically correct, but premature, not provided with the technical capabilities of the era of the Russo-Japanese War.

But back to the squad shooting technique.



She, according to Grevenitz, should have been as follows. At a distance of 30-60 cables, the squadron battle should have begun with zeroing. In this case, the flagship of the squadron (hereinafter referred to as the flagship) first indicates with the flag the number of the ship at which the squadron will fire. However, the rest of the ships of the detachment are allowed to open fire on it only when this flag is lowered. The flagship, without lowering the flag, starts zeroing in and conducts it as described in the previous article - in volleys, but not using the “fork” principle. Apparently, Myakishev did not propose to use either "forks" or volleys, limiting himself to zeroing in from a single gun, that is, in this matter, the Grevenitz technique also had an advantage over the one that was available on the 1st Pacific squadron.

But Grevenitz had other significant differences as well.

Myakishev suggested transferring only the distance to the enemy from the flagship to the other ships of the squadron. Grevenitz, on the other hand, demanded that the rear sight be transmitted along with the distance - according to his observations, in most combat situations, the horizontal aiming angle corrections for the flagship's guns were quite suitable for two or three ships following it. In my opinion, this idea of ​​Grevenitz is very reasonable.

According to Myakishev, the flagship was supposed to give the distance to the enemy only after the zeroing was completed, and according to Grevenits - whenever the flagship's fire controller was giving corrections to his guns. For this purpose, on each ship of the squadron, two hand semaphores were to be constantly in service (not counting the spare), with the help of which it was necessary to inform the next ship in the ranks about the distance and rear sight given by the flagship artilleryman - the fire control.

Accordingly, from other ships they could observe, so to speak, "history»Zeroing in the flagship and adjusting the guns, giving them the latest amendments. Then, when the flagship took aim and lowered the flag, thereby giving permission to open fire to the rest of the squadron ships, they could engage in battle with minimal delay.


Personally, this order seems somewhat far-fetched to me.

The desire to make it possible for each ship to see changes in the zeroing parameters is a good thing, but what about the inevitable time lag?

The shooting ship can show the current distance and the correction to the rear sight in time. But while they see him on the next one, while they rebel, while these readings are noticed on the next ship in the ranks, it may turn out that the shooting ship will already fire a salvo at the new installations, and the end ship of the detachment will receive information about the amendments of the previous or even earlier salvo.

And finally, fire to kill. Myakishev, as already mentioned above, with concentrated fire at long distances, by which he understood 30-40 cables, relied on volley fire. Grevenitz was sure that during the concentrated fire of several ships on one target, it would be impossible to distinguish the fall of the shells of his ship from the shots of other ships of the detachment. Alas, it is not clear whether this judgment of Grevenitz applied to volley fire or not.

Myakishev did not deny the usefulness of rapid fire, but believed that when firing at long distances, by which he understood 30-40 cables, volley fire to kill would distinguish the shooter from the fall of his own volleys from others firing at the same target. For Grevenitz, volley fire was not at all taboo - he directly recommended zeroing in with volleys of 3-4 guns, citing the fact that at distances of 50-60 cables a single burst might not be noticed. And Grevenitz did not at all suggest returning to zeroing from one gun at distances of less than 50 cables. However, unlike Myakishev, Grevenitz in no case recommended firing to kill with volleys. After zeroing in, he had to switch to rapid fire, at least from a distance of 50-60 cables.

Why?

With individual shooting, Grevenitz considered it possible to adjust the sight and rear sight according to the results of quick fire. To do this, it was necessary to observe a certain "midpoint of the shells hit." Apparently, it was about the fact that during rapid fire, bursts of shells falling into the water, as well as hits, if any, would still form a kind of ellipse, the midpoint of which could be determined by visual observation.

It is possible that in some circumstances this method worked, but it was not optimal, which later led to the transition to salvo firing. And it is quite possible to assert that when firing at least two ships at one target with rapid fire, it will be practically impossible to determine the "midpoint of shell hit" for each of them.

But, I repeat, firing volleys for Grevenitz was not forbidden, so it remains unclear: either he simply did not guess before the volley fire to kill, or thought that even salvo firing would not make it possible to adjust the sight and rear sight with concentrated fire of the detachment one by one goals.

As for detachment fire at medium distances, Grevenitz understood it in exactly the same way as Myakishev - shooting according to the data of the rangefinder without any zeroing. The only difference was that Myakishev considered it possible to shoot like this at a distance of 25 cables or less, and Grevenitz - no further than 30 cables.

As seen concentrated fire on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron


It must be said that Bersenev's work practically does not consider the issues of concentrating fire on one enemy ship. All control of such fire, according to Bersenev, comes down to only two remarks:

1. In all cases, fire must be concentrated on the enemy's lead ship. Exceptions - if such has no combat value, or if the squadrons disperse on counter courses at a distance of less than 10 cables.

2. When firing at the lead enemy, each ship in the formation, making a shot, informs the “aiming” of the next matelot so that the latter can use the results of the shot as a zeroing. At the same time, "The signaling method is announced by a special order for the squadron," and what should be transmitted (distance, rear sight) is unclear.

Thus, if Myakishev and Grevenits gave the technique of squadron (detachment) firing, then Bersenev has nothing of the kind.

Nevertheless, one should not think that the 2nd Pacific was not at all preparing to conduct concentrated fire on the enemy. In order to understand this, it is necessary to look at the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky and the actual shooting in Madagascar.

To begin with, I will quote a fragment of Order No. 29, issued by Z.P. Rozhdestvensky on January 10, 1905:

“The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. This number should focus, if possible, the fire of the entire squad. If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the enemy's lead or flagship. The signal can also target a weak ship in order to more easily achieve a result and create confusion. So, for example, when approaching by head-on and after concentrating fire on the head one may indicate the number to which the action of the entire artillery of the first (head) squadron of the squadron should be directed, while the second detachment will continue to operate on the originally chosen target. "

It is quite obvious that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky introduced detachment fire on the 2nd Pacific Squadron: from the text of his order it follows that in those cases when the flagship shows the number of the enemy ship with a signal, then the squadron should concentrate fire on the indicated target, and not a squadron as a whole. The squadron was trained in the "detachment" method of conducting concentrated fire in Madagascar.

Thus, the senior artilleryman of the Sisoy the Great, Lieutenant Malechkin, testified:

"Before the start of firing, usually the lead ships of their detachments (Suvorov, Oslyabya and others) determined the distances either by sighting, or with instruments and showed their matelots this distance - with a signal, and then each one acted independently."

In this respect, the control of artillery fire, according to Rozhestvensky, corresponds to the proposals of Grevenitz and is more progressive than that of Myakishev. But there is an extremely important moment in which the commander of the 2nd Pacific Squadron "bypassed" both Myakishev and Grevenitsa, namely, shooting "whenever possible."

This phrase is used by ZP Rozhestvensky whenever he writes about concentrated shooting: "On this number, if possible, the fire of the entire detachment should be concentrated ... Following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy."

Both Myakishev and Grevenitz ordered to conduct concentrated fire at the designated target, so to speak, "at any cost" - their methods did not provide for the transfer of fire from a separate ship of the detachment to another enemy ship on their own initiative.

But order number 29 gave such an opportunity. According to its letter, it turned out that if any ship of the detachment, for any reason, could not conduct effective concentrated fire at the designated target, then he was not obliged to do this. From the testimony given to the Investigative Commission, it can be seen that the ship commanders used the opportunity given to them.

So, for example, the battleship "Eagle", unable to conduct effective fire on "Mikasa", transferred it to the closest armored cruiser. This is also indicated by the analysis of hits on Japanese ships in the outset of the Tsushima battle. If in the first 10 minutes the hits were recorded only at Mikasa (6 shells), then in the next ten minutes out of 20 hits, 13 were hit by Mikasa, and 7 - by five other Japanese ships.

However, if ZP Rozhestvensky, within the framework of the organization of concentrated shooting, divided the main forces of his squadron into two detachments, then he should have been given simple and understandable instructions on the choice of targets for each detachment. He gave them, but the tactics of fire fighting, chosen by the Russian commander, turned out to be very original.

The fire control of the 1st armored detachment raises no questions. ZP Rozhestvensky could indicate the target for the concentrated fire of four battleships of the "Borodino" class at any time, while the "Suvorov" retained the ability to give signals. Another thing is the 2nd armored detachment, headed by "Oslyabey". Oddly enough, but, according to the letter of order number 29, the admiral in command of this detachment had no right to independently choose a target for concentrated shooting. Such an opportunity was simply not foreseen. Accordingly, the target for the 2nd detachment was to be indicated only by the commander of the 2nd Pacific squadron.

But, reading and re-reading Order No. 29 dated 10.01.1905/1/2, we will not see there a way in which ZP Rozhestvensky could have done this. According to the text of the order, he could designate a target either for the XNUMXst armored detachment, raising a signal with the number of the enemy ship in the ranks, or for the entire squadron, for which he had to open fire on it from the flagship Suvorov without raising any signal. There is simply no way to assign a separate target to the XNUMXnd squad.

Of course, reasoning theoretically and wanting to assign different targets to the two squads, one could first order the squadron's fire to focus on one target, which the admiral will designate for the 2nd squad, and then transfer the fire of the 1st squadron to another target, raising the appropriate signal. But this will cause a significant delay in zeroing in on the target designated for the 1st detachment, which is unacceptable in battle.

Moreover. If you think about it, then the opportunity to assign a target to the entire squadron was only at the outset of the battle or at the moment of its resumption after a break. After all, only then the target on which the Suvorov opened fire, without raising a signal, could be seen and understood by the rest of the ships of the squadron. And in the course of the battle, when all the ships are fighting - try to figure out to whom the Suvorov's fire was transferred there, and who would monitor it?

The conclusion is paradoxical - having split the squadron into 2 detachments, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky provided for the indication of the target only for one of them - the 1st armored one.

Why did this happen?

There are two options here. Perhaps I am mistaken, and the authority to select the target was nevertheless delegated to the commander of the 2nd armored detachment, but this was done by some other order or circular that is unknown to me. But something else is also possible.

It should be understood that the orders of Zinovy ​​Petrovich did not cancel Bersenev's instructions, but supplemented it. Thus, if some situation was not described by Rozhestvensky's order, then the ships of the squadron should have acted in accordance with Bersenev's technique, which required the concentration of fire on the lead ship of the enemy formation. But given the fact that the Japanese had an advantage in speed, it was to be expected that they would "press" on the head Russian battleships. It is unlikely that the Oslyabya and the ships following it could effectively hit the Mikasa: then the ships of the 2nd armored detachment would have had no choice but to scatter fire on the enemy ships closest to them.

It can be assumed that ZP Rozhestvensky did not believe in the effectiveness of the concentrated fire of the 2nd armored detachment, in which two of the four ships were armed with outdated artillery.


Perhaps he saw the need for such concentration only in cases where:

1) in the outset of the battle H. Togo will be substituted so much that the fire of the entire squadron at one ship will be justified;

2) during the battle "Mikasa" will be in a position convenient for concentrating the fire of the 2nd armored detachment on it.

Both options seemed tactically unlikely.

Thus, it turns out that, according to order No. 29 of 10.01.1905/1/2, concentrated fire should have been conducted by the XNUMXst armored detachment, while the XNUMXnd dispersed fire on the Japanese ships nearest to it, disturbing them and interfering with the aiming shooting at the leading Russian ships. This tactic made sense.

In the outset of the Tsushima battle, the following happened.

If ZP Rozhestvensky wanted to concentrate the fire of the entire squadron on Mikas, then, in accordance with his own order No. 29 of 10.01.1905/1/XNUMX, he would have to open fire on Mikas without raising any signal. He raised such a signal, thereby ordering only the XNUMXst armored detachment to shoot at the Japanese flagship and allowing the rest of the Russian ships to shoot at Mikasa only if they were quite sure of the effectiveness of their fire.

I would like to note that ZP Rozhdestvensky's description of the choice of targets leaves much to be desired.

All the same could have been written down much easier and more clearly. But when evaluating certain guiding documents, one should take into account the existence of a fundamental difference between the order and the methodology.

The methodology should cover, if possible, all scenarios. It should explain how to act in the bulk of combat situations and what to be guided by in the event of an abnormal situation not described in the methodology.

An order is often drawn up to concretize a particular issue: if, say, a squadron has an established understanding of the rules for conducting a fire fight, then the order is not at all obliged to describe these rules in full. It is enough to indicate only the changes that the issuing order wishes to make to the existing order.

For the rest, the methods of concentrated shooting adopted by the 2nd Pacific Squadron are very close to those proposed by Myakishev and Grevenitz.

Zeroing should begin if the distance to the enemy exceeds 30 cables. The lead ship of the detachment was supposed to shoot. He should have shown the distance and corrections for the rest of the ships to the rear, that is, along the horizontal aiming angle, as Grevenitz recommended. And according to Myakishev, only the distance should have been shown.

But ZP Rozhestvensky, like Myakishev, believed that it was necessary to provide these data not with every change of sight and rear sight, but only when the lead ship was aimed. Data should be transmitted not only with a semaphore, as recommended by Grevenitz, but also with a flag signal. Each ship of the detachment, having noticed the data transmitted to it, must rehearse them, showing the next matelot behind it.

As for the sighting, the best results would probably be given by a salvo sighting with cast-iron shells, carried out by the "fork" method. Myakishev suggested shooting with cast-iron shells, Grevenitz with cast-iron shells and volleys, ZP Rozhdestvensky with a fork.

As you can see, none of them guessed right.

The fire to kill at Grevenitsa and Rozhdestvensky should have been fired with rapid fire, at Myakishev - in volleys, because the latter seemed to be able to distinguish between the fall of their shells when the fire was concentrated on one target.

Why - like?

In fact, the analysis of the effectiveness of various methods of zeroing and shooting to kill with concentrated shooting at one target "pulls" for a full article, which I plan to write later. And now, with the permission of the dear reader, I will answer another question.

Why does the article begin with the words "woe from wits"?


There are two fundamentally different ways of conducting concentrated fire - with and without centralized control.

In the first case, the shooting of several ships is controlled by one artillery officer, and this is how the Russian Imperial Navy tried to shoot.

According to Myakishev, Grevenits, Bersenev, Rozhestvensky, the fire control of the flagship carried out the zeroing, determined the corrections, and then broadcast them to the other ships of the squadron or detachment. Strictly speaking, this, of course, is not a complete cycle of fire control, because here it turned out, rather, control of the zeroing: after receiving the distances and correcting to the rear sight, each ship had to fire to kill on its own.

Probably, we can say that full control, when both the sighting and the fire to kill the whole compound are directed by one person, was implemented after the Russo-Japanese War on the ships of the Black Sea fleet.

I cannot say for sure that, unfortunately, I do not have the shooting techniques that guided the Black Sea Fleet on the eve of the First World War.

But, in any case, the Russian Imperial Navy, both before and during the Russo-Japanese War, and later, tried to master and put into practice precisely the centralized control of concentrated fire.

The second variant of concentrated fire was the firing of several ships at one target without any centralized control. That is, each ship fired completely independently: he himself determined the parameters of the target, he carried out the zeroing, he himself controlled the effectiveness of the fire to kill without any regard for the other ships firing at the same target. Judging by the information I have, this is how the Japanese fired.

Which of these methods is better?

On paper, of course, centralized control of concentrated fire had clear advantages.

Alas, in practice it has completely failed to justify itself.

Let us recall the history of the same Black Sea Fleet, where the centralized fire control of the pre-dreadnought battleships was brought, I am not afraid of these words, to unimaginable perfection.

Tsushima's lessons were learned. They did not skimp on combat training - the Dotsushima Russian Imperial Navy could not even dream of spending training shells for firing Black Sea battleships. The statement that after Tsushima one battleship per year began to spend as much shells on shooting practice as before Tsushima - the entire squadron in which he was listed may be an exaggeration, but not so large.

And there is no doubt that the individual Black Sea battleships fired better than any ships of our fleet during the Russo-Japanese War. Various methods of centralized fire control were tried, and during the exercises the Black Sea squadron confidently hit the target with a second or third salvo, even for more than 100 cables.

However, in two real combat episodes, when our superbly trained battleships clashed with the Goeben, they failed miserably in concentrated fire with centralized control. At the same time, when the battleships fired individually, they achieved good results. In the battle at Cape Sarych, "Evstafiy", "waving his hand" at centralization, with the first salvo managed to hit the "Goeben", which, alas, became the only one for the whole battle.


But there is a feeling that only the constant change of course allowed the battlecruiser to avoid other hits.

At the Bosphorus, our two battleships - "Eustathius" and "John Chrysostom", concentratedly fired at the "Goeben" without much result, having spent 21-mm shells in 133 minutes and having achieved one reliable hit. Let's take into account that the battle began at a distance of 305 cables, then the distance was reduced to 90 cables, after which "Goeben" retreated. But the Panteleimon approaching the battlefield, firing individually, slammed a 73-mm projectile into the German-Turkish flagship from the second salvo from a distance of about 305 cables.

If we look at the practice of other fleets, we will see that in the same First World War, firing volleys, possessing incomparably more advanced rangefinders and fire control devices, no fleet sought to conduct concentrated fire on one target.

Under Coronel, the Scharnhorst fired at Good Hope, and the Gneisenau at Monmouth, and the British responded in exactly the same way. Under the Falklands, the Battlecruisers Sturdy also distributed their fire on the German armored cruisers. In Jutland, the battlecruisers Hipper and Beatty, who fought fiercely, strove for individual cruiser versus cruiser fire, without trying to focus the entire squadron's fire on one target, and so on.

In fact, in the main naval battles of the First World War, concentrated fire, with rare exceptions, was conducted either by mistake or by force, when for some reason it was not possible to distribute the fire to other enemy ships.

Thus, in my opinion, the problem was not that the methodology of centralized control of concentrated fire, which was used by the 2nd Pacific Squadron, had certain shortcomings. In my opinion, the very idea of ​​a centralized fire control of a ship formation for those years turned out to be flawed. In theory, it promised many advantages, but at the same time it turned out to be completely unrealizable even with the technologies of the First World War, not to mention the Russian-Japanese one.

The Japanese did it easier. Each of their ships determined for themselves who to shoot at: of course, they tried to hit first of all the flagship or the leading ship. Thus, the concentration of fire on one target was achieved. If, at the same time, some ship ceased to see its own falls and could not correct the shooting, it, without asking anyone, chose another target for itself. By doing so, the Japanese achieved a good hit rate.

So why do I still write "woe from wits" in relation to Russian shooting techniques?

The answer is very simple.

The Russian Empire began to create a steam fleet much earlier than the Japanese and had much more traditions and maritime practice. Long before the Russo-Japanese War, Russian sailors tried centralized fire control of one ship, when firing was carried out under the direction of a senior artillery officer, and were convinced of the advantages that such an organization provided. The next, completely natural step was an attempt to centralize the control of the firing of several ships. This step was absolutely logical, but at the same time it was erroneous, since it was impossible to implement such control on the existing technical base.

In my opinion, the Japanese, having embarked on the development of modern warships much later than our compatriots, simply did not grow to such nuances by the Russo-Japanese War. They even reached the centralization of fire control of one ship only during the war itself, and everywhere they spread this practice closer to Tsushima.

I believe that it was precisely the "late start" and the lag in the theory of fire control that prevented the Japanese from making such a promising, but at the same time erroneous, attempt to centralize the control of concentrated fire.

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  1. +11
    2 August 2021 06: 02
    Dear Andrew,
    Thanks for the helpful article!
    Frankly, your humble servant did not have a chance to get into such a "jungle", so I read it with great interest.

    quote] In the battle at Cape Sarych "Evstafiy", "waving his hand" at centralization, the first salvo achieved hitting the "Goeben" [/ quote]




    [Quote] At the Bosphorus, our two battleships - "Eustathius" and "John Chrysostom" concentratedly fired at "Goeben" without much result [/ quote]

    In 23 minutes of the battle, Eustathius managed to fire 60 shots from 12 '' (due to damage to the obturator of the cushion of the right gun, the nose turret fired only 25 shells) and 32 shots from 8 '' guns, John Chrysostom - 75 and four, respectively.
    "Panteleimon", firing only the main caliber, used up 16 shells, another 13 12 "shells were sent to the enemy by the" Three Saints ". Thus, our ships of the line issued 164 12 '' and 36 8 '' shells, while achieving two hits with shells of the main caliber.
    The firing accuracy was 0,6%.
    "Goeben" shot worse, using up 126 11 '' shells, the battlecruiser did not achieve a single hit.
    In the photo: Russian battleships under fire.
    1. +6
      2 August 2021 08: 25
      If I remember correctly, Goeben had all the hits.
      1. +6
        2 August 2021 08: 47
        Goeben achieved hits in the battle at Cape Sarych, but the Bosphorus did not have them
      2. +4
        2 August 2021 09: 14
        If I remember correctly, Goeben still had hits.
        At Cape Sarych, he hit Eustathius 5 times from 11 inches.
        1. +5
          2 August 2021 11: 31
          Quote: Pushkowed
          At Cape Sarych, he hit Eustathius 5 times from 11 inches.

          True, but Comrade is talking about the Bosphorus.
    2. +6
      2 August 2021 15: 21
      Valentine, good afternoon!
      Recently posted an interesting article on the results of the British shooting in 1905.
      https://alex-cat-1975.livejournal.com/36625.html
      1. +3
        3 August 2021 03: 17
        Hello. Alexei !
        Thanks for the information, I have no such information. There are the results of the final training caliber shooting of the Grand Fleet for 1911 and, it seems, for 1912.
        It will be interesting to compare the results of firing the same battleships with an interval of six years.
      2. 0
        3 August 2021 05: 46
        Dear Alexey, I have reviewed the material you recommended.
        Amused.
        Here is alex_cat_1975 writes:

        from a distance of 6000 yards 11 shots 12 inches (305) - horrible 10


        The following is the output:

        Six months have passed since Tsushima. How did the Japanese shoot at Tsushima (if you don't immediately look at the result)? Well, probably the same way. The school is one.

        It turns out that since the battleship King Edward VII achieved ninety percent accuracy when firing from main battery guns, it means that the Japanese in the Battle of Tsushima from 12 '' guns inevitably hit Russian ships more than four hundred times.

        Yes, with the title of the opus alex_cat_1975 is clearly overdone. Writes
        Target bombardment by the British fleet

        and he himself told about the shooting of a single
        battleship King Edward VII
        .
        This whole alex_cat_1975
        laughing
      3. +1
        3 August 2021 19: 42
        Hello, Alexey!

        "Dug" abstract interest for the sake of how the quality of fire of the main-caliber guns of the battleship "King Edward VII" changed over the years?
        The information at our disposal allows us to conclude that not everything was safe there, and sometimes the ship could not do without a forced "storming" after the failed firing.
        "King Edward VII" in 1911, according to the results of general naval firing, received 53,5 points. For comparison, the battleship "Formidable", which then took first place in the Grand Fleet, had 331,7 points.
        The battleship's command strained, and the following year they managed to get 283 points.

        In 1905, out of eleven 12 '' shells fired from King Edward VII, the target was hit ten.

        Over time, more shells were fired for the final shooting practice: it was 11, it was 13. In 1911, out of thirteen shells fired, the target was hit six, the next year, the shooting results worsened, out of thirteen shells, the target was hit only four.
        Four gunners took part in the exercise.
        Thus, it can be stated that the level of firing of battleships in the English fleet did not differ in stability, accuracy fluctuated greatly from year to year, ups alternated with falls, and dispassionate statistics are a witness to this.

        Pictured: Battleship King Edward VII during shooting practice in 1907.
        1. +1
          3 August 2021 21: 37
          Valentine, have the shooting conditions changed? Shield size, distance, etc.
          1. 0
            4 August 2021 00: 56
            Hello, Alexey!
            Shooting for credits, based on the results of an annual combat training, during which they could not help but know in what conditions they would have to take the exam.
            A certain cape was used as a target. There are no other details.
        2. 0
          4 August 2021 12: 06
          Thus, it can be stated that the level of firing of battleships in the English fleet did not differ in stability, accuracy fluctuated greatly from year to year, ups alternated with falls

          It is not clear whether they are "valid" shells after zeroing or without it (30kab according to Russian instructions already demanded ... yes, besides the distance, it also eats other factors - temperature, quality of gunpowder ... And the reasons for the inconsistency:
          1. "Human" factor? - art changed. officer, gunners ...
          2. Weather. The picture in 1907 shows smooth surfaces, no waves (except for their own. However, everyone shoots in the same conditions (in some year), and the result is different ...
    3. +1
      2 August 2021 22: 24
      In the presented photo, where - in Goeben?
      1. +6
        3 August 2021 02: 31
        Quote: Aviator_
        In the presented photo, where - in Goeben?

        Yes, a 12 '' shell from Eustathius did it.
        Another photo from this hit.
  2. 0
    2 August 2021 08: 14
    Ay, yes Andrey! +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    1. +3
      2 August 2021 08: 47
      Thank you, dear Vyacheslav!
      1. -3
        2 August 2021 08: 53
        Recently found your 2012 comment. Clever. Here's how! What are you ... "good veteran" IN.
      2. +2
        2 August 2021 09: 34
        Looking through books on the theory of artillery firing even in the twenties and thirties, one comes to the conclusion that the hits during Tsushima were accidental.

        This is from the well-known book by Goncharov "Course of Naval Tactics".
        1. +6
          2 August 2021 09: 55
          It is unlikely that Goncharov was aware of the shooting technique used by the Japanese. Even the British, who had observers on Japanese ships, did not fully understand it.
          1. -1
            2 August 2021 10: 13
            It is unlikely that Goncharov was aware of the shooting technique used by the Japanese.

            Indeed, where in 1932 the head of the Naval Weapons Department of the Naval Academy and the professor could have known the technique of shooting the Japanese in Tsushima.
            1. +8
              2 August 2021 10: 39
              And where is the position?
              Did he have access to secret Japanese archives ???
              Even now, when materials from these archives have been posted, there are still questions about the Japanese shooting method in Tsushima.
              1. +1
                2 August 2021 10: 40
                Who has questions? Have you talked to experts?
                1. +8
                  2 August 2021 11: 21
                  Questions from those interested in this topic. Yes, I communicated with some specialists, those who are on the Tsushima forums.
                  And in fact, now there is no literature in which this technique would be described.
                2. +5
                  2 August 2021 11: 26
                  Dear Undecim, in this matter I, perhaps, still support Alexey.
                  The whole question is that Goncharov could only know about the techniques of Japanese shooting in Tsushima from official Japanese history, the printed works of British observers, and the testimonies of Russian eyewitnesses. And Japanese internal documents, which could tell about all this, became available relatively recently.
                  Quote: Undecim
                  Who has questions? Have you talked to experts?

                  The problem is that most of the specialists leaned on the decryption of the Japanese archives. The Japanese post archives in Japanese, enthusiasts translate them into Russian, often using auto-translation with all that it implies. I am already silent about the fact that historians who try to do this are hardly pros in artillery ...
                  1. +2
                    2 August 2021 11: 34
                    Dear Andrew!
                    Do you think that Japanese internal documents could contain some secret methods of fire control that a professional naval artilleryman and professor, thirty years later, could not comprehend on the basis of publicly available information?
                    What secret methods of fire control, beyond understanding, can be developed with a rangefinder and binoculars from the fire control devices?
                    Or did the Japanese have an MSA that we don't know about?
                    1. +4
                      2 August 2021 11: 42
                      Quote: Undecim
                      Do you think that Japanese internal documents could contain some secret methods of fire control that a professional naval artilleryman and professor, thirty years later, could not comprehend on the basis of publicly available information?

                      So it's not a secret here. For example, it is completely unclear whether the Japanese fired to kill with rapid fire, or with volleys. Or, for example, what were they guided by, carrying out zeroing sometimes from one gun, sometimes - in volleys. Etc.
                      If we take the Grevenitz technique (sighting in volleys to make it easier to see, without a fork) and the Rules of Artillery Firing of 1927, where the sighting in volleys was carried out with a fork, and the defeat was diagnosed by missing hits, then the second is fundamentally more effective, and you cannot distinguish them by eye.
                      1. +3
                        2 August 2021 11: 55
                        Unfortunately, I have never and nowhere come across specialized literature on this issue. But I don’t think that among the professionals - the naval gunners of the leading maritime states, this issue was not understood and analyzed, especially taking into account the progress in the material part and was not taken into account in the training of specialists. Obviously, such publications simply did not make it to the public.
                        As for me, the main question in relation to Tsushima is not even what kind of system was with the existing technical base at that time, but who, as a system he had, mastered in practice and was able to apply it in real combat.
                      2. +7
                        2 August 2021 12: 29
                        Quote: Undecim
                        Unfortunately, I have never and nowhere come across specialized literature on this issue. But I don’t think that among the professionals - the naval gunners of the leading maritime states, this issue was not understood and analyzed, especially taking into account the progress in the material part and was not taken into account in the training of specialists. Obviously, such publications simply did not make it to the public.

                        A fragment from a secret British report on the Tsushima forums was uploaded by Kronma. If interested - write, I'll look for a link in the evening.
                        The British wrote complete nonsense there. And then what to say about the rest, who did not even have observers on the Japanese ships?
                      3. +1
                        2 August 2021 13: 19
                        Thanks, I have it.
                      4. +2
                        2 August 2021 15: 11
                        And you do not have the MGSH officers' work "On Shooting and Fire Control in the Japanese Navy." 1906 g.
                        It would be interesting to compare our views with Japanese documents.
                      5. +2
                        2 August 2021 16: 51
                        And you do not have the MGSH officers' work "On Shooting and Fire Control in the Japanese Navy." 1906 g.
                        I do not have it, but you can request it from the Russian State Archive of Naval Aviation, the second volume of the collection "The Works of Messrs. MGSH Officers".
                      6. +2
                        2 August 2021 22: 26
                        If you have experience of online ordering at RGAVMF - please share. You can in a personal.
  3. +6
    2 August 2021 10: 07
    Andrei, good afternoon!
    Thank you very much for the interesting article.

    On the issue of transmitting a signal to select a target in battle.
    Organizationally, the addressee was indicated by raising the callsign of the detachment (ship, entire squadron) to whom the signal was intended. The absence of a call sign meant an order to the entire squadron.

    Logically, Oslyabya and Suvorov opened fire on Mikasa. And, therefore, their detachments also had to shoot at Mikasa. "Nikolai 1" opened fire 10-15 minutes after the start of the battle, due to the fact that the distance was too great. Yes, and he did not shoot at Mikasa, although there are references to the shooting of some BBOs at Mikasa.

    By the practice of concentrating fire. By the time 2TOE went on the campaign, there was already experience in combat in the ZhM, which showed difficulties in observing the fall of shells when the fire of several ships was concentrated on one target. Why was this experience ignored? What is your opinion?
    1. +2
      2 August 2021 11: 21
      Greetings, Alex!
      On the topic of getting to Peresvet I will answer in the evening. Shall we continue in that thread, or would you prefer to move the discussion here?
      Quote: rytik32
      Logically "Oslyabya" and "Suvorov" opened fire on "Mikasa". And, therefore, their detachments also had to shoot at Mikasa.

      The fact of the matter is that no. Logically, Suvorov raised signal 1, at which the 1st armored vehicle was supposed to shoot at Mikasa, and the 2nd could only do it "as far as possible." The order did not provide for the duty of the ships of the 2nd armored to shoot at the target "Oslyabi"
      Quote: rytik32
      By the practice of concentrating fire. By the time 2TOE went on the campaign, there was already experience in combat in the ZhM, which showed difficulties in observing the fall of shells when the fire of several ships was concentrated on one target. Why was this experience ignored?

      Was there? As a matter of fact, the introduction of "detachment" concentrated shooting is already a realization of such an experience.
      1. +4
        2 August 2021 13: 45
        On the topic of getting to Peresvet I will answer in the evening. Shall we continue in that thread, or would you prefer to move the discussion here?

        Better here
        The order did not provide for the duty of the ships of the 2nd armored to shoot at the target "Oslyabi"

        What about
        If there is no signal, then following the flagship, the fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy


        As a matter of fact, the introduction of "detachment" concentrated shooting is already a realization of such an experience.

        4 ships is a lot, it still requires special measures to separate the fire.
        1. +1
          2 August 2021 17: 41
          Quote: rytik32
          Better here

          Very well. Then I quote from there
          Quote: rytik32
          Yes.
          Its thickness is not directly indicated, but "by eye" is about two times less. This is what we should start from when evaluating the size of the hole.

          The whole point is that in this case, the size of the hole indicates a 6-inch projectile, well, maybe 203 mm, but not 305 mm. On the other hand, we know that 2 shells hit the waterline of Peresvet, the caliber of which was determined to be 6-10 inches, both in the 178 mm section of the armor belt (the copper plating was damaged - this is directly indicated in the description). Another hit (copper and wood plating were torn apart) was under the 17th gun.
          The hole in the photo you brought may be from one of these shells. At the same time, one more or less reliable photo of the 305-mm hit we are discussing is

          Unfortunately, the photo was not taken right after the battle.

          Accordingly, the size of the hole cannot be estimated. But the place of hit does not coincide with the photo you gave.
          Quote: rytik32
          What about
          If there is no signal, then, following the flagship,

          I agree with you that such an interpretation is possible. But - extremely unlikely. In the context
          The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. The fire of the whole squad should be focused on this number, if possible.
          If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy.

          nevertheless, we are talking about the flagship of the squadron, not the detachment. Besides, I think that someone would have mentioned, in the testimony, that "they shot where they ordered from Oslyabi."
          Quote: rytik32
          4 ships is a lot, it still requires special measures to separate the fire.

          I agree that there are many. But Grevenitz, even after the RYAV, recommended firing detachments of 3-4 ships.
          Taking into account the fact that Rozhestvensky's detachments had one and a half times fewer ships, in comparison with 1TOE, which experienced such problems, and taking into account the fact that Rozhdestvensky made a special reservation "if possible" for the detachment's ships, I think this was more than enough. And he had no time to come up with some completely new method of distributing fire.
          1. +1
            2 August 2021 22: 12
            The whole point is that in this case, the size of the hole indicates a 6-inch projectile, well, maybe 203-mm, but not 305-mm.
            This is already a question for the "appraisers"
            On the other hand, we know that 2 shells hit the waterline of Peresvet, the caliber of which was determined to be 6-10 inches, both in the 178 mm section of the armor belt (the copper plating was damaged - this is directly indicated in the description). Another hit (copper and wood plating were torn apart) was under the 17th gun.
            The hole in the photo you brought may be from one of these shells.

            These shells did not lead to a hole, and in the photo there is an obvious hole.
            still we are talking about the flagship of the squadron

            Strange then the logic of the order. One-by-one control does not work out.
            But Grevenitz, even after the RYAV, recommended firing detachments of 3-4 ships.

            Grevinits recommended the first ship to shoot at the first, the second at the second, etc. complete separation as in PMA.
            1. 0
              3 August 2021 11: 17
              Quote: rytik32
              This is already a question for the "appraisers"

              Alexey, the question is still for you. Several shells hit Peresvet at the waterline level, at least three of them were outside the 102 mm upper belt. Two of them were rated as 152mm, one as 305mm. In the photo, the damage is very similar to the hit of a 152-mm projectile. You claim that it is 305 mm. At the same time, the reasoning you have
              Quote: rytik32
              These shells did not lead to a hole, and in the photo there is an obvious hole.

              Why do you think you didn’t bring it? The descriptions of all the hits are very lonely and hardly complete. Sorry, but with the same success we can say that this hit is not from a 305-mm projectile on the grounds that the description of the latter does not contain information about damage to the copper and wood plating (for other hits, they are present).
              But let's even say that this hit is from a 305 mm. What does this prove? A number of other hits are known in which a single heavy projectile gave significantly larger holes (Poltava, Oryol, Diana, etc.). On the last one, a 254-mm shell left a hole 5,4 m long and 1,8 m high.
              Quote: rytik32
              Strange then the logic of the order. One-by-one control does not work out.

              So it is - control only for 1st squad
              Quote: rytik32
              Grevinits recommended the first ship to shoot at the first, the second at the second, etc. complete separation as in PMA.

              Why not? See paragraphs 25, 28, and 29 for descriptions of squad and focus shooting.
              1. +2
                3 August 2021 13: 05
                Why do you think you didn’t bring it?

                The holes are marked on Cherkasov's diagram with a different symbol than hits in the belt without breaking through.
                The holes that caused the flooding are also indicated separately.
                So far, the following discrepancies are evident:
                1. On Cherkasov's diagram there is no hole in the 2nd compartment of the living deck, but in his description there is.
                2. There are no traces of a hole in the general photo, into which the "cart will pass".
                3. According to the photo, there is a hole above the main belt at the tip (where there is no upper belt). It is not comparable with Cherkasov's scheme.

                So for now, questions are about the schemes (for holes in the bow, the overhead lines of the three schemes do not even have two converging) and, possibly, to the descriptions. From the available array of information, I first of all trust photographs.

                A number of other hits are known, in which a single heavy projectile gave significantly larger holes (Poltava, Oryol, Diana, etc.). On the last one, a 254-mm shell left a hole 5,4 m long and 1,8 m high.

                Andrey, why are you all bending a stick in one direction? The Japanese attributed the hole 3'8 "x2'5" to the "Eagle" to a 12 "projectile.

                1. 0
                  3 August 2021 17: 29
                  Quote: rytik32
                  The holes are marked on Cherkasov's diagram with a different symbol than hits in the belt without breaking through.

                  Not understood. So that kind of confirms what I said, doesn't it? Although, as for me, there are different symbols symbolizing different calibers.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  So far, the following discrepancies are evident:
                  1. On Cherkasov's diagram there is no hole in the 2nd compartment of the living deck, but in his description there is.

                  Which speaks about the low reliability of the schemes.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  2. There are no traces of a hole in the general photo, into which the "cart will pass".

                  So there are no general photos where the bow of the ship would be clearly visible. So this is not surprising.
                  Quote: rytik32
                  3. According to the photo, there is a hole above the main belt at the tip (where there is no upper belt). It is not comparable with Cherkasov's scheme.

                  Just with the scheme - it is quite comparable

                  As many as 4 possible candidates
                  Quote: rytik32
                  Andrey, why are you all bending a stick in one direction? The Japanese attributed the hole 3'8 "x2'5" to the "Eagle" to a 12 "projectile.

                  For one simple reason. I fully admit that the holes from the 12-inch in some cases were less than the "cart will pass". But there is more than enough evidence when heavy shells left just such, very large holes. Therefore, I see no reason to consider a large hole as a consequence of several shells hitting the same place.
                  1. +2
                    3 August 2021 17: 50
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Although, as for me, there are different symbols symbolizing different calibers.

                    The holes are painted black. This is clearly visible.
                    So there are no general photos where the bow of the ship would be clearly visible.

                    Aren't you surprised that a lot of holes in "Peresvet" were filmed, but a hole the size of a cart was not filmed?
                    But there is more than enough evidence when heavy shells left just such, very large holes.

                    I agree with this, but this is about other ships.
                    1. 0
                      4 August 2021 16: 53
                      Quote: rytik32
                      The holes are painted black. This is clearly visible.

                      The fact of the matter is that no. One of the four holes into which I "poked" with red arrows in the diagram above is exactly the one through which the office and others like them flooded. But none is painted black.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Aren't you surprised that a lot of holes in "Peresvet" were filmed, but a hole the size of a cart was not filmed?

                      Dear Alexey, the vast majority of schemes show large holes in the bow, outside the armor belt. And there is no photo of them. Personally, my opinion is that the photographer took photos of those holes that he could photograph, and, as I understand it, he photographed standing on the woods, so he chose where it was more convenient. And he clearly did not intend to collect a full-fledged photo album of damage.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I agree with this, but this is about other ships.

                      Why is that? In the photo you have given below, they are very impressive.
                      1. +1
                        4 August 2021 21: 57
                        One of the four holes into which I "poked" with red arrows in the diagram above is exactly the one through which the office and others like them flooded.

                        To begin with, I would like to know where this office is ... do you have drawings and diagrams of "Peresvet"?
                        In the photo you have given below, they are very impressive.

                        The boundaries of the first breach are roughly clear. And the dimensions "by eye" are 1,5x2 meters. And the place is just about where the Oslyabe got there. And exactly between two holes in Cherkasov's diagram :)
                        But I will ask you to circle the boundaries of the 2nd hole in two photographs. I can’t see it at all.
                      2. 0
                        5 August 2021 16: 59
                        Quote: rytik32
                        To begin with, I would like to know where this office is ... do you have drawings and diagrams of "Peresvet"?

                        So they are on yours too :) Krestyaninov

                        The joke is that both offices are not on the residential, but on the battery deck, that is, the hole was sufficient to also affect the battery deck. This is one of the reasons why I strongly doubt that the photo you cited is from the same 305 mm
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The boundaries of the first breach are roughly clear. And the dimensions "by eye" are 1,5x2 meters.

                        I cannot agree. Substituting a growth figure to the hole

                        We get the length and width at least the height of a person, but taking into account the fact that the battleship is facing us, the hole is wider in width than in the photo (hole at an angle)
                        This is not to mention the fact that, in my opinion, there is a human figure in the hole, and it is smaller than the size of the hole.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        But I will ask you to circle the boundaries of the 2nd hole in two photos.

                        It can be seen disgustingly, circled in a red line. But I'm not sure myself
                      3. +1
                        5 August 2021 17: 00
                        The photo is very small, I'll try to zoom in
                      4. +2
                        5 August 2021 18: 02
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        So they are on yours too :) Krestyaninov

                        This is the drawing "Oslyabi"
                        We get the length and width at least the height of a person

                        In height, the hole ends at shoulder level and the person bent down a little, i.e. no more than 1,5 m.
                      5. 0
                        6 August 2021 18: 07
                        Quote: rytik32
                        This is the drawing "Oslyabi"

                        Well, Peresvet seems to be of the same type, isn't it?
                        Quote: rytik32
                        In height, the hole ends at shoulder level and the person bent down a little, i.e. no more than 1,5 m.

                        It would be if he was standing on the lower edge of the hole, which I am not at all sure about.
                      6. +1
                        6 August 2021 18: 41
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Well, Peresvet seems to be of the same type, isn't it?

                        Nuances are possible
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        It would be if he was standing on the lower edge of the hole, which I am not at all sure about.


                        I marked the level of the lower edge of the hole.
                        The angle of inclination of the upper edge of the hole and the window next to it coincides with
                      7. +2
                        6 August 2021 22: 37
                        Excellent! I have long wanted to understand the place of this hole in the second photo! Thanks.
                      8. 0
                        8 August 2021 11: 49
                        Absolutely disagree.
              2. 0
                4 August 2021 22: 03
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Why not? See paragraphs 25, 28, and 29 for descriptions of squad and focus shooting.

                1. 0
                  5 August 2021 17: 02
                  Alexey, I told you in which paragraphs of Grevenitz are descriptions of concentrated detachment shooting at one target. No. 25,28, 29. Why are you copying and pasting paragraph 26

                  Dedicated to, as its name suggests, dispersed shooting? :)))
                  1. +1
                    5 August 2021 21: 05
                    So on Grevinitsa the detachment could well conduct dispersed fire. Moreover, it is he who goes under No. 1.
                    1. 0
                      6 August 2021 18: 05
                      Quote: rytik32
                      So on Grevinitsa, the detachment could well conduct dispersed fire

                      And we are discussing focused. In fact, the conversation began with a discussion of the division of the Grevenitz detachment.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Moreover, it is he who goes under No. 1.

                      Really? :)))
                      1. +1
                        6 August 2021 19: 04
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And we are discussing focused. In fact, the conversation began with a discussion of the division of the Grevenitz detachment.

                        Do you understand my point that Grevenitz did not at all consider concentrated fire to be mandatory in squadron combat?
                      2. 0
                        8 August 2021 11: 47
                        I didn’t consider it obligatory, I simply gave it priority, pointing out some special cases in which dispersed fire had an advantage.
                      3. 0
                        8 August 2021 12: 25
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        just prioritized it,

                        He did not give priority to concentrated fire, but simply pointed out the pros and cons of each method.
                      4. 0
                        12 August 2021 10: 28
                        Quote: rytik32
                        He did not give priority to concentrated fire

                        Well, yes, he just called it one of the basic principles of the art battle.
                      5. 0
                        12 August 2021 13: 11
                        Yes, one of two main ones: lumped or distributed.
                        The Grevinitsa instruction is the most recent chronologically. And distributed fire has already appeared in it - the main method for PMA. Clear progress. Those. the evolution turns out like this:
                        1. The emergence of rapid-fire guns SK - the transition to rapid fire. The rate of fire rules.
                        2. There were questions about the adjustment.
                        a) 2TOE - we hit the rangefinder. The main thing is the pace. By the way, this strongly overlaps with the works of Alekseev.
                        b) The Japanese. The main thing is accuracy, we hit with volleys with adjustments. The rate of fire dropped.
                        c) The British. Made "Dreadnought". Many main battery guns, increased rate of fire. SK is not needed. We hit with volleys with adjustments. We tried to concentrate fire up to PMA.

                        And Grevenitz's proposal looks quite modern against this background.
          2. +1
            3 August 2021 22: 29
            By the way, you have a nice photo.
            and I will add one more, which clearly shows the place and size of the hole in the 1st compartment
            1. 0
              4 August 2021 16: 53
              Thank you!
    2. +3
      2 August 2021 11: 23
      Quote: rytik32
      Why was this experience ignored?


      Dear Alexey, I hope that the distinguished author will answer your question. I will expose a scan for you, after reading it I think you will draw your own conclusions:
  4. +2
    2 August 2021 10: 49
    Long before the Russo-Japanese War, Russian sailors tried centralized fire control of one ship, when firing was carried out under the direction of a senior artillery officer, and were convinced of the advantages that such an organization provided.

    Dear Andrey, all this is true up to a certain point, and, more true, when it comes to a more accurate center rangefinder and guns of the same caliber. Artillery of different caliber already complicates such shooting, even guns of the same type, but in towers or casemates, required correction during salvo firing. What can we say about the adjustment of fire by several ships.

    Great stupidity in Tsushima, the initial setting of firing at Mikasa. Our column stretched out, had a lower speed, many ships actually did not see the target, if at all they could reach it with their fire from the tail of the wake formation. On the contrary, the Japanese won in large part precisely because of the focusing of fire on the flagship. So, one by one, all our new battleships were knocked out. This required the coverage of the column head, which the Japanese did by placing a "stick over the T".


    If, in the battles of the First Pacific Squadron, our ships simply left under such fire from the Japanese lapels in the opposite direction of coverage, the general course dominated under Tsushima, and the general directive led to the pogrom.

    British Admiral Rodney (George Bridges Rodney) used tactics from the Evolution of Fleets by John Clerk to defeat the French at the Isles of All Saints.
    Rozhdestvensky missed his chance, when the Japanese fleet turned around, he did not go to rapprochement. At the same time, the bet on Russian lightweight armor-piercing shells and the layout features of new battleships, with the possibility of strong fire along the course of the ship, could be justified. But, it would already be an "alternative history".
    1. +4
      2 August 2021 11: 31
      Quote: Per se.
      Great stupidity in Tsushima, the initial setting of firing at Mikasa.

      Which was received only by the 1st armored squad
      Quote: Per se.
      On the contrary, the Japanese won in large part precisely because of the focusing of fire on the flagship.

      They initially focused on 2 Russian flagships, but at the same time Borodino and Alexander quickly came under fire. The Russian squadron, during the first 20 minutes, achieved hits on 6 Japanese ships, which does not fit at all with concentrated fire on one target.
      Quote: Per se.
      This required the coverage of the column head, which the Japanese did by placing the "stick over the T".

      They still did not put her
      Quote: Per se.
      If, in the battles of the First Pacific Squadron, our ships simply left under such fire from the Japanese lapels in the opposite direction of coverage, the general course dominated under Tsushima, and the general directive led to the pogrom.

      There was no such thing at all :))) Our ships did not go "nailed" to the course of NO23 at all and maneuvered quite significantly. The same Rozhdestvensky turned 4 rumba when the danger of the stick over T became clear, and Alexander's throw under the stern to the 1st detachment of Togo?
      Yours faithfully, hi
      1. +2
        2 August 2021 12: 03
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        There was no such thing at all :)))
        The battle in the Yellow Sea (August 10, 1904), the fire was opened at 12:20 by the Japanese from a maximum distance of 80 cables. Japanese ships tried to cover the head of the Russian squadron.

        After opening fire, the Japanese squadron turned to the right, and our ships turned to the left. This was, in any case, in the initial phase of the battle, when there was active maneuvering, the Japanese tried to cover the head of the Russian squadron, and ours tried to evade, and pass the main forces of the Japanese into the open sea. Unfortunately, the breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok then also failed, but there was no pogrom, as in Tsushima.
        1. +1
          2 August 2021 14: 28
          About the Second Squadron, the above turned out to be off topic, although the goals were similar - a breakthrough to Vladivostok. What was the maneuvering, only that they were not "nailed" to the course of NO23, otherwise, as they say, the Japanese did what they wanted, and ours maneuvered as best they could. At the same time, the Japanese were allowed to cover the head of our squadron, and, in fact, like in a shooting range, shoot all our new battleships that led the column like flagships. Further, the pogrom, the organized squadron, as a real force was no longer there, finished off the lonely and the remnants. The main shame is the descent of the Andreevsky flags, the surrender of the remaining detachment with the wounded Rozhdestvensky.
          1. +6
            2 August 2021 17: 54
            Quote: Per se.
            After opening fire, the Japanese squadron turned to the right, and our ships turned to the left.

            It was the same in Tsushima. When the Japanese twisted their noose, the Russian squadron for some time followed the same course in order to make it possible to realize its artillery advantage. But when the Japanese finished the maneuver, and walked from left to right, across the course of the Russian squadron, going into the head, ours turned right
            Quote: Per se.
            Unfortunately, the breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok then also failed, but there was no pogrom, as in Tsushima.

            The extremely unsuccessful maneuvering of Togo in the first phase of the battle and later resumption, moreover, in an extremely unfortunate position for the Japanese (they were catching up, walking along the formation), saved the 1TOE from the defeat. Nevertheless, having entered the clinch in the 1nd phase, the Japanese knocked out the flagship (Tsarevich) in a little over an hour and inflicted heavy damage on Peresvet, which is very similar to the damage in Tsushima.
            Quote: Per se.
            At the same time, the Japanese were allowed to cover the head of our squadron, and, in fact, like in a shooting range, shoot all our new battleships

            yes it was not. Nobody covered our heads. After Rozhdestvensky's lapel, the battle went on in parallel columns, while the Japanese, due to the high speed, pulled ahead. Suvorov was knocked out, but Togo's EBRs went too far, which is why Alexander tried to pass under their stern. The Japanese were forced to turn away from our squadron, and during this maneuver they did a good job.
            1. +2
              2 August 2021 22: 13
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              yes it was not. No one covered our heads


              Very clear
              1. +2
                3 August 2021 11: 21
                Quote: rytik32
                Very clear

                And no coverage, which is typical.
                In fact, there are schemes there - a carriage and a small cart, what looks like the truth there is incomprehensible. If you take an analysis, it turns out that when the Japanese came forward and tried to cover the head of the Russian column, Alexander made an attempt to pass under their stern.
                1. +4
                  3 August 2021 11: 28
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  In fact, there are schemes there - a carriage and a small cart, what looks like the truth there is not clear

                  Take the diagram from the report of the commander of "Mikasa". Very adequate. There are, of course, remarks, but small ones. The most valuable thing in it is that for 4 points the distance and heading angle are indicated for "Suvorov"
                  1. +2
                    3 August 2021 11: 42
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Take the diagram from the report of the commander of "Mikasa".

                    Alexey, you say that there was coverage, you should spread it. I don't have it, in Japanese archival documents I can hardly distinguish a maneuvering scheme from poems about sakura :)
                    1. +3
                      3 August 2021 11: 49

                      Coverage at 2:47 and 2:51
                      Full and in good resolution https://disk.yandex.ru/d/rJ8Nucd1ASIEVQ
                      1. 0
                        3 August 2021 17: 10
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Coverage at 2:47 and 2:51

                        Well, let's take a look. It shows the Japanese diagram - I see. Now we put on it what we know about the maneuvering of Russian ships

                        At 14.43 (14.25 our time) Suvorov takes 4 rumba to the right. The line follows him.
                        At 14.44 Suvorov loses control and turns him back. Alexander follows him, but then realizes that he is not controlled, and returns to the original course (moreover, it is unclear which one. Either the one that the squadron went to 14.43, or the one that Suvorov gave at 14.43:XNUMX). Then, seeing that while he was maneuvering back and forth, the Japanese were coming out at the head of our column, and the distance had increased, he turned to pass under their stern.
                        If Suvorov had not turned 4 rumba and everything went on as it went, the Japanese would have gone out to reach. But Suvorov turned away. If at Alexander they immediately realized that Suvorov is not controlled and would have gone the same way, perhaps coverage would have also come out. But Alexander dashed behind Suvorov, which led to a gap in the distance, which allowed him to try to pass under the stern at Togo in the future.
                      2. +1
                        3 August 2021 17: 53
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        At 14.43 (14.25 our time) Suvorov takes 4 rumba to the right

                        According to the Japanese scheme, this happened a little later.
                        What is the source of your time?
                      3. 0
                        4 August 2021 16: 45
                        Quote: rytik32
                        What is the source of your time?

                        According to our officialdom + testimony of Clier-de Colong
                      4. +1
                        4 August 2021 22: 22
                        If Suvorov had not turned 4 rumba and everything went on as it went, the Japanese would have gone out to reach.

                        So coverage by that time was already.
                        Here is the data on the targets of the Japanese ships from Nawalmanual's article:

                        Mikasa: 14.40 - 5 700 m (head)
                        "Shikishima": 14.40 - 6 m (head?)
                        Fuji: 14.38 - 4 m (second); 600 - 14.40 4 m (head)
                        "Asahi": 14.36 - 4 m (head?); 600 - 14.41 m (second)
                        "Kasuga": 14.34 - 4 m (head?); 300 - the second ship; 14.40 - 14.45 4 m;
                        "Nissin": n / a;
                        Izumo: 14.40 - second ship; 14.43 - 4 m (head?);
                        Azuma: n / a
                        "Tokiwa": 14.35 - 4 m; 700 - 14.40 4 m (second); 300 - 14.41 m (second?)
                        "Yakumo": 14.38 - 4 m (ship of the "Borodino" type); 500 - 14.40 4 m; 500 - 14.43 m (second);
                        "Iwate": 14.35 - 5 m (head); 100 - 14.37 m (head?); 5 - 000 m (head?); 14.42 - 4 300 m (third)

                        Almost the entire fleet is on 2 targets: Suvorov and Alexander!
                        And the result is: Suvorov is knocked out of action, Alexander is badly damaged.
                      5. 0
                        5 August 2021 17: 03
                        Alexey, welcome! Explain, please, how from the figures you cited did you see the coverage of the Russian column? The figures directly refute you. Mikasa is farther from Suvorov than Fuji, which is quite consistent with absolutely all known battle schemes - the 1st detachment of Togo was to the left in front of the Russian and was on a course close to parallel. With coverage, the distance from Suvorov to Mikasa and to Fuji would be approximately equal, or - and here is a whole kilometer, which is just very similar to the length of the 4 Japanese EBR line.
                        Concentration of fire is not evidence of coverage. At the beginning of the battle, our 1st armored one was firing at Mikasa, so he enveloped the Japanese column?
                      6. 0
                        5 August 2021 21: 33
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        The 1st detachment of Togo was to the left and in front of the Russian and was on a course close to parallel.

                        Not quite parallel.
                        Mikasa course (Japanese time)
                        2:35W
                        2:43 SO67
                        2:47 SO51
                        this is pure coverage

                        There was still coverage at the very beginning of the battle from which "Suvorov" left at about 14:00 rus 14:18 yap turning to the right.
                      7. 0
                        6 August 2021 17: 36
                        Quote: rytik32
                        this is pure coverage

                        Coverage, Aleksey, is a maneuver of forces to reach the flank (flanks) or to the rear of the battle formation of enemy ship groupings. What you list for coverage does not draw from the word "at all"
                      8. +1
                        6 August 2021 19: 10
                        Reach is not a thing in itself. The purpose of coverage is to place your ships in more favorable conditions of fire than enemy ships.
                        Here is a diagram for clarity.

                        Our end ships almost fell out of action due to distance and angle. And the Japanese concentrated the fire of their entire fleet on the lead ones.
                2. +2
                  3 August 2021 12: 00
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  And no coverage, which is typical.
                  Andrey, if the word "coverage" is not made absolute, then it is obvious that, firstly, the Japanese had a higher speed. This allowed their main forces to overtake our flagship. Secondly, it also allowed to focus the fire, and, in fact, to put the notorious "stick over T".

                  Probably, a good administrator would have come out of Rozhestvensky, some kind of head of the base, but he turned out to be a mediocre naval commander, although he could effectively throw binoculars into the water.
                  Below is the diagram, where the Oslyabya and our flagship, Prince Suvorov, were already finished, the battleship Emperor Alexander III was shot in "coverage".

                  The diagram shows the coverage of the head of our column.
                  1. 0
                    3 August 2021 17: 10
                    Quote: Per se.
                    The diagram shows the coverage of the head of our column.

                    See the diagram above. And yes, the "coverage" in your diagram was not due to the Japanese, but because of our decision to pass under the stern of the 1st detachment
                    1. +2
                      4 August 2021 06: 43
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And yes, the "coverage" in your diagram was not due to the Japanese, but because of our decision to pass under the stern of the 1st detachment
                      Okay, so be it. Further.
                      If at Alexander they immediately realized that Suvorov is not controlled and would have gone the same course, perhaps coverage would have also come out.
                      How to deal with this? It turns out, "Alexander" jumped aside for the uncontrollable "Suvorov", got coverage. I would have gone the same way. At the same time, the Japanese did everything to cover the head of our column, and in this they were helped by the high speed of the squadron move. They did it, our fleet was defeated. Everything else, "the rustle of nuts", there is no point in arguing.

                      Most importantly, what conclusions should be drawn to the present, what should history teach us? To begin with, having more progressive technical solutions, our innovations gave way to even older ones, but proven and reliable, which was used by the Japanese. For example, our electric turret drives, the 152 mm gun turrets themselves, which were inferior in rate of fire to casemates, in general, were technically "raw" in many respects. Evil irony, where it was necessary not to rush, to show wisdom, we boldly introduced new, but not yet sufficiently tested, and even "raw". Where, on the contrary, is conservatism, if not dogma. In fact, the squadron was sent with blanks into battle, instead of full-fledged shells. When did we have HE shells for 75 mm (76) and 120 mm guns?

                      And now, speaking of "miracle weapons", one must remember about reasonable compromises, between the time-tested and the new, otherwise, you can get a new "Tsushima", both at sea and on land.

                      Thank you for your attention and in general for the article.
                      1. 0
                        4 August 2021 17: 01
                        Quote: Per se.
                        How to deal with this? It turns out, "Alexander" jumped aside for the uncontrollable "Suvorov", got coverage. I would have gone the same way.

                        No problem :)))) The thing is that a minute before the failure of the steering, Suvorov changed the course by 4 points to the right. This is a classic way of getting out of the reach of a faster formation, it turns out, as it were, movement along a small circle, while the enemy is walking along a large one. That is, if Suvorov had not been knocked out of the line, there could have been no coverage.
                        The problem is that when Suvorov was turning, or immediately after turning, the steering wheel was broken and he rolled to the right. At Alexander, they realized that Suvorov was not controlled, but did not understand that the beginning of Suvorov's maneuver (turning by 4 rumba) was deliberate. Therefore, Alexander returned to the course that Suvorov was following to the lapel and which, yes, if he followed them further, it led to the coverage of the Russian "head".
                        However, while Alexander was turning back and forth, time passed, the Japanese, who did not expect this, moved too far away, and Alexander saw a good opportunity to pass under their stern.
                        Quote: Per se.
                        When did we have HE shells for 75 mm (76) and 120 mm guns?

                        So we didn't even have land mines for 152-mm guns, and for 305-mm they were equipped with smokeless powder.
                        Quote: Per se.
                        Thank you for your attention and in general for the article.

                        Always happy ! drinks
  5. +4
    2 August 2021 10: 52
    Andrey Nikolaevich, good afternoon!
    Thank you for the article. Interesting as always. Plus I put it. We look forward to continuing.
    If at the same time some ship ceased to see its own falls and could not correct the shooting, it, without asking anyone, chose another target for itself.

    Our "Eagle" also acted in the 1st detachment, when it became impossible to shoot at "Mikasa", without asking anyone he transferred fire to the nearest ship "Iwate".
    1. +2
      2 August 2021 17: 43
      Greetings, Andrey!
      Quote: Kayuk
      Our "Eagle" also operated in the 1st detachment.

      Quite right, that's why I gave it in the article as an example.
  6. +3
    2 August 2021 13: 39
    Another break in the template. The Russians used more advanced shooting methods and performed worse than the Japanese, using outdated ones. It doesn't fit in my head.
    1. +4
      2 August 2021 15: 10
      The Russians used more advanced shooting methods and performed worse than the Japanese, using outdated ones. It doesn't fit in my head.

      The Japanese did not use outdated, but rather established methods. Of course it sounds crazy, but I agree with the author. On our ships there was a lot of progressive (medium-caliber gun turrets with large firing angles and electrified drives (with reserve handwheels), electrical artillery fire control devices, proposed at one time by S.O. Makarov and produced by the domestic plant of N.K. Geisler, who gave the guns (by commands from the conning tower} instructions on the direction of fire, the distance to the enemy and the type of shells to be fired, the placement of power plants in the engine room, and the dressing room - under the protection of armor, electric drives of auxiliary mechanisms, etc. . and even X-rays on "Aurora" and 7 more ships), to which the world's fleets came about 15-20 years later. building.
      Therefore, the conclusion in the article can be attributed not only to shooting control:
      This step was absolutely logical, but at the same time it was erroneous, since it was impossible to implement such control on the existing technical base.
    2. +2
      3 August 2021 10: 01
      In the history of the art of war, this happened regularly. For example, the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. The Protestant army of Christian of Anhalt-Bernburg, using the most progressive at that time linear tactics, already tested on the battlefield in the Netherlands, was utterly defeated by the rapidly aging thirds of Buckois.
  7. +2
    2 August 2021 14: 42
    about communication
    I got the impression that Ratier was not used in the (Russian) fleet then?
    signaling by floodlights - maximum of the simplest evolutions "raise the beam up"?
    1. Fat
      +3
      2 August 2021 15: 38
      hi New?
      Lieutenant A.K. Nebolsin Patrol and reconnaissance service in the fleet. Extract from lectures. - Sevastopol: 1903.

      ... Experiments of daytime negotiations with a battle lantern give better results (about 18 miles), but this method requires: a) a lot of time, b) does not allow the vessel to circulate during signals, c) more than two vessels cannot participate in the signal " ...
      ..We should stop our attention on a simple, extremely militarily advanced lantern "La Ratier", through which you can speak for 2 or more miles secretly from the enemy.
    2. +2
      2 August 2021 15: 50
      Quote: lodochnik2000
      did you get the impression that Ratier was not used in the (Russian) fleet at that time?

      Apparently, yes.
      There were Tabulevich's signal lights - white and red. The first one conveyed a dot, the second a dash. A special combustible powder was used to increase the intensity of the light.
      Also, 13 ships of the squadron had mechanical semaphores.
  8. +4
    2 August 2021 15: 54
    Grevenitz, on the other hand, demanded that the rear sight be transmitted along with the distance.

    and when did you come up with the divisions on the tower?
  9. +9
    2 August 2021 18: 01
    I envy you, Andrei, with white envy. smile
    Comments to articles are exceptionally sensible, in essence, like the articles themselves. Although there are not many of them, the quality is impressive. During my rebellious youth, I was carried away by the topic of floating iron with the passing throwing of heavy suitcases at each other, but then information on this issue (sea battles of the first half of the twentieth century) was catastrophically little, alas ... Varyag bookstore on Bolshoi Morskoy in St. Petersburg was completely incapable of my interest, not just to satisfy, but to somehow support, and among my acquaintances I failed to captivate anyone with this topic in order to somehow exchange information. At the age of fourteen I knew who Rozhdestvensky, Stark, Vitgeft, Enquist, Togo, Kamimura, Uriu were ... There was such a book series of the publishing house "Shipbuilding" - "Wonderful ships". smile
    Eh, I would then have your articles ... And life could have gone in a completely different zigzag - there were always enough naval educational institutions in Leningrad ... smile
    I hope that your articles are read not only by those who comment on them, but also by young intelligent guys of that age when you still do not know what you want to do in the future. And it's okay if you "steal" one or the other of them from the aviation or the Airborne Forces with your materials (with a holiday, by the way, all those involved), all the more, it will be great if you lure them away from advertising, sales or jurisprudence or finance - this good we have so much ...
    In general, thanks for the material. And all the participants in the discussion for their comments. hi
    1. +1
      4 August 2021 20: 19
      Greetings, dear Michael! hi drinks
      Thank you for your kind words. Come back, I just posted the following article for moderation :)
  10. 0
    2 August 2021 23: 59
    Again, I got the enviable role of that very Baba Yaga from the wild forest. That was always against. laughing There is nowhere to go, a bucket of tar is available, you will have to attach it for its intended purpose. bully

    Looking at the article, it is immediately clear that our friend from Chelyabinsk did not understand the essence of the claims to the previous article. The firing techniques that Andrey pulled from the description of the dreadnought control system are completely unsuitable for battleships. At short and medium distances, all these forks and zeroing need an armadillo like a hare a stoplight! If you have only 1-2 degrees UVN on the enemy, so you take yes directly to the enemy and shoot! Tracking the fall of the shells, of course. Why are there any other dances with a tambourine? And let me remind you that the battleship's capabilities for fine aiming are also very limited, because naval guns do not have levels or gyroscopes, and the 1st TOE does not even have optical sights yet.

    That is why the meaning of zeroing for battleships is reduced exclusively and only to checking the distance indicated by the rangefinder. Or even with the eyes of a commander. Therefore, one burst, from the undershoot recommended by Myakishev, is enough behind the eyes at small and medium distances of 10-30 kb. Are you convinced that the rangefinder is not lying? You can go to rapid fire.

    At long distances for battleships of 50-70 kbl. zeroing would certainly not hurt. However, here the battleships run up against the extremely low rate of fire of the main caliber. This Sevastopoli knew how to make a volley in 30 seconds. The battleships of the RYAV times are five times slower, what kind of fork can there be if the enemy has time to go to hell in a few minutes. Therefore, here, too, they were limited only to specifying the distance with the help of a medium caliber. The completely different ballistics of the guns did not bother, there is still nothing to choose from. It is curious that they thought about the choice of the rear sight only at these distances, 50-70 kbl. Before that, it was enough to aim at the enemy's bow, the projectile had time to fly. And then tips began to appear how much to throw on the move to hit.

    The conclusion is simple, the instructions of Myakishev, Grevenitsa and Bersenev quite correctly described the method of firing battleships based on the real technical capabilities of the ships of that time. They just had to be done carefully!

    Of particular interest is the author's regular references to the method of shooting the Japanese. I would very much like to understand what sources the author relies on? There are no works that study this topic in detail and are considered generally accepted today. Fragments of material found in other sources often contradict the author's descriptions. One gets the impression that all the references and references to the methods of shooting the Japanese are simply taken from the ceiling by the author.

    Well, the last part of the article (count half of it), devoted to the interpretation of Rozhdestvensky's orders, evokes the usual deep skepticism. We have known for a long time about Andrey's sincere, and alas, unrequited love for ZPR. Rozhestvensky, in turn, was very fond of orders. The admiral published them continuously and completely haphazardly. No temporal or even logical sequence can be found in them. That's what struck in the head at the moment, then immediately into the order and clothe. There is no point in looking for logic and common sense in one of them literally by letter. Rozhestvensky himself, by May, had firmly forgotten what he had ordered there in January. No final documents based on these orders, summarizing this verbose and even graphomaniac collection of papers with numbers, have not appeared. The transformation of these pieces of paper into a real guide to action never happened. And there was no point in devoting half an article to fortune telling on the coffee grounds. You can be sure. None of the battleship commanders, just like us, had any idea what Rozhestvensky actually wanted to say with one of these orders. Forget generally. wink
    1. +3
      3 August 2021 05: 19
      Quote: Saxahorse
      There is nowhere to go, a bucket of tar is available, you will have to attach it for its intended purpose.
      Looking at the article, it is immediately clear that our friend from Chelyabinsk did not understand the essence of the claims to the previous article.


      Nice. By all appearances, you are in the subject, like a fish in water.
      So why run after Andrey with buckets of bile and tar, sit down yes write an article !

      Quote: Saxahorse
      here the battleships run into the extremely low rate of fire of the main caliber. This Sevastopoli knew how to make a volley in 30 seconds. The battleships of the YAV times are five times slower.


      There is no need to generalize, dear colleague, not everything is so simple.
      In England on "Mikasa", for example, during the tests of main battery guns, the following results were obtained.
      Each 12 '' bow cannon sequentially fired three shell, one of them spent on everything about everything one hundred forty-three seconds, which gives on average forty eight seconds on one shot.
      And that includes delays. So, the problem with the shutter caused a delay of twenty-five seconds, in addition, the fog periodically hid the targets, and this also took time from the gunners.
      Now according to the results of the shooting.
      The first shell fired from one of the 12 '' bow guns threw a shield into the air, the second gave a flight of 10-20 yards, the third gave a flight of 20 yards and dodged ten yards to the left.
      Other guns also showed satisfactory results.

      And now let's remember that this battleship fired one hundred twenty-four 12 '' shells during the Tsushima battle. This is the maximum, it is likely that Mikasa fired on Nebogatov's detachment the next day, so from these 124 you need to subtract a certain number of shells fired on May 15, 1905.
      1. -1
        3 August 2021 23: 06
        Quote: Comrade
        So than running after Andrey with buckets of bile and tar, sit down and write an article!

        What for? The fame and popularity of the writer has never been attracted. There is no feeling that it will turn out well, so I'm not trying. Just to the best of my ability, I try to reduce the amount of noodles that go to poor readers in an interesting topic for me RYAV.

        But you should not exaggerate your own importance. For the most part I don’t even read the articles of the same Andrey on the topic of economics, dreadnoughts or the modern fleet. But attempts to turn it inside out and redraw the entire history of the RYV are certainly straining. Alternative history is a place on the alternative history site!

        Quote: Comrade
        Each 12 '' bow gun sequentially fired three shells, one of them spent one hundred and forty-three seconds on everything, which gives an average of forty-eight seconds per shot.

        When they write about circus tricks, they mean such demonstrative results. Moreover, you know the reason. The Japanese stored part of the ammunition in the tower and used manual labor for loading. The result is good but short-lived.

        Quote: Comrade
        And now let's remember that this battleship fired one hundred twenty-four 12 '' shells during the Tsushima battle. This is maximum,

        But this is already an estimate of the real rate of fire in battle. Here we see that there were 4 rounds for 31 barrels, which in about 4 hours of real combat gives us a practical rate of fire - one volley in 8 minutes. Agree, it is difficult to imagine a "fork" at such a rate of fire of the main battery.
    2. +1
      3 August 2021 11: 38
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Looking at the article, it is immediately clear that our friend from Chelyabinsk did not understand the essence of the claims to the previous article. Shooting techniques pulled by Andrey from the description of the dreadnought control system

      Saksakhors, you are not even able to understand that the data I have taken not from the mythical "descriptions of the dreadnought control systems", but from the "Rules of the artillery service No. 3 Fire control on naval targets" which were part of the Charter of the artillery service on the ships of the RKKF, and were distributed to ALL ships RKKF, and not only on dreadnoughts. That is, the patrolmen were shooting at them :) Accordingly, your
      Quote: Saxahorse
      Why are there any other dances with a tambourine?

      comes from an exceptional misunderstanding of the subject of discussion. Well, that's natural for you.
      Quote: Saxahorse
      That is why the meaning of zeroing for battleships is reduced exclusively and only to checking the distance indicated by the rangefinder. Or even with the eyes of a commander. Therefore, one burst, from the undershoot recommended by Myakishev, is enough behind the eyes at small and medium distances of 10-30 kb.

      Enough for you. But for some reason the Eagle is not enough for the gunners.
      About 2½ hrs. from the conning tower it was given: to begin zeroing at the Japanese cruiser on _ | _, similar to our "Aurora". It was an Iwate class I armored cruiser. Nobody fired at him and the fall of our shells was perfectly visible. The first shot for 30 cables - undershot, the second - 35 flights, the third - 32 hits under the conning tower, which gave a large brown-yellow column of smoke during the explosion. Distance 32 cables and rear sight 32 (8) were transferred by me to all the plutongs of my group and rapid fire was opened on the cruiser
      1. +2
        3 August 2021 23: 42
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        and extended to ALL ships of the RKKF, and by no means only to dreadnoughts. That is, the patrolmen were shooting at them :)

        Will it not be difficult to name you specifically the year? It is interesting to compare the equipment of these "patrol boats" and ships of the RYAV times. How do you imagine the execution of the "fork" by means of a mechanical sight, a la Mosin rifle, at a target of 4-5 km. When the front sight covers most of this target. On the sight there are thousandth divisions, but with what accuracy will you catch the "horizon" with such an sight?

        The first shot for 30 cables - undershoot, the second - 35 flights, the third - 32 hits under the conning tower, which gave a large brown-yellow column of smoke during the explosion. Distance 32 cables and rear sight 32 (8) were transferred by me to all the plutongs of my group and rapid fire was opened on the cruiser

        What beauty! And the fountains are on a silver platter, and the zeroing step is strictly according to the instructions, and a beautiful yellow column of smoke! Immediately evident, pyroxylin exploded! laughing

        And the Russian officers are liars! And their shells do not explode on the water, you know! And there are no splashes during flights! And hitting the enemy is completely imperceptible because pyroxylin is the most smokeless of all explosives! They all had to first find out from Andrey how everything really should look.

        The description given by you looks frankly popular and implausible. If everything were so simple and beautiful, everyone would shoot like that. And the question why Iwate got so few hits would not have arisen either.
        1. +3
          4 August 2021 00: 29
          Quote: Saxahorse
          And the question why Iwate got so few hits would not have arisen either.

          Incidentally, this hitting the wheelhouse does not match the Japanese damage data on either the Iwata or the Izumo.
        2. +2
          4 August 2021 17: 16
          What I always liked about you, Saksahors, is your ability to shout joyfully, verbosely and fervently to the entire Internet: "I do not read articles that I undertake to criticize!"
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Wouldn't it be difficult to name the year specifically?

          We open the article about which you wrote
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Our friend from Chelyabinsk did not understand the essence of the claims to the previous article.

          And read
          The Rules of Artillery Service, published in 1927,

          to remind, what ships were then included in our "invincible and legendary"?
          Quote: Saxahorse
          What beauty! And the fountains are on a silver platter, and the zeroing step is strictly according to the instructions, and a beautiful yellow column of smoke! Immediately evident, pyroxylin exploded!

          If you, Saksakhors, instead of gleefully and verbosely snide on the topic of seeming incongruity, still read what you undertake to refute, then you would know that "Eagle" used cast-iron shells for zeroing. Which, as everyone knows except you, was equipped with "instant" fuses, and black powder instead of pyroxylin.
          Quote: Saxahorse
          And the question why Iwate got so few hits would not have arisen either.

          Saksakhors, do you know something about hitting Iwata? :)))) Come on :)))))
          In fact, the official Meiji reports 17 hits on this cruiser. Sources known to us indicate the time for only 7 hits. So from the "Eagle" he could well snatch a good
          1. +2
            4 August 2021 22: 56
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            In fact, the official Meiji reports 17 hits on this cruiser. Sources known to us indicate the time for only 7 hits. So from the "Eagle" he could well snatch a good

            As usual, you didn’t even notice that the shooting of the Eagle, so beautifully presented by you, ended in a mess. Iwate - 17 hits (of which 2x305 mm, 3x203 mm, 2x152 mm, 1x120 mm, 5x75 mm) (15 wounded). It is easy to see that the only thing that can be attributed with some interference to the Eagle as a result of zeroing in is these - 2x152-mm. So where did "all the plutongs" burn with a quick fire !? Such a small number of hits indicates that the distance to the target, 32 (8), was determined incorrectly. Guess what is the problem there?

            You yourself gave a clear example that zeroing in is not at all a guarantee of accurate shooting. At small and medium distances, zeroing did not give a clear advantage over shooting at a rangefinder. And its meaning is only in checking the readings of the rangefinder and consisted.
            1. +3
              5 August 2021 17: 05
              Quote: Saxahorse
              As usual, you didn't even notice

              As usual, you, Saksakhors, get out of one puddle just to find another right there :)
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Iwate - 17 hits (of which 2x305 mm, 3x203 mm, 2x152 mm, 1x120 mm, 5x75 mm) (15 wounded). It is easy to see that the only thing that can be attributed with some interference to the Eagle as a result of zeroing in is these - 2x152-mm.

              It is easy to see that out of 17 hits, 2 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 5 = 13 were identified, and 4 were not. That is, the possible number of shells that "Iwate" received from "Eagle" is not "at most two", as you imagine, but may well reach 6 plus a certain number of those 5 75-mm shells that he received according to your list
              Congratulations, you once again failed in 4 steps of arithmetic hi
              1. 0
                5 August 2021 23: 43
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                It is easy to see that out of 17 hits, 2 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 5 = 13 were identified, and 4 were not.

                There and these 2x152 were described as presumably 120 mm. But I did not begin to upset you at all. Hits in the stern are suggestive of BBO, however. Well, the fact that they did not shoot from 75 mm cannons at 30 kbl then, it seems, even you should know. :)

                If there are more detailed arguments in the descriptions you have, let's link, see and clarify. I do not mind dealing with Iwate in detail. In the meantime, the description of the sighting given by you immediately raises doubts with its deliberate picture quality.
                1. +1
                  6 August 2021 17: 31
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  there and these 2x152 were described as presumably 120 mm

                  Where exactly"?:))))
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  Well, the fact that they did not shoot from 75 mm cannons at 30 kbl then, it seems, even you should know. :)

                  You should have known that the Tokiwa received a 75-mm shell at 14.02 local time. And the bulk manual is generally sure that 75 mm shells hit Mikasa in the outset of the battle. But you certainly don't know.
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  I do not mind dealing with Iwate in detail.

                  Understand :) Who's in the way? :)
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  In the meantime, the description of the zeroing given by you immediately raises doubts.

                  Saksakhors, I congratulate, you and not only in arithmetic, you also failed in logic. Let me remind you that you stated that zeroing is not needed for 30 cables :)))))
                  1. 0
                    6 August 2021 22: 26
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Saksakhors, I congratulate, you and not only in arithmetic, you also failed in logic.

                    You fool me and I'm naive about you going. laughing

                    And what does Iwate have to do with it, you are our "expert" !? Eagle after Mikasa transferred fire to Izumo. Izumo, in the first phase of the battle, had one single hit with a 152 mm projectile, the first and the last, at about 14:27. The second was in half an hour and already with a 12 "round. Also by the way with Iwate, the first at 14:23 - 12", the second was 203 mm, the third was 120 mm. Hits 152 mm, in the first phase of the battle were not. Those same 4 unidentified hits are described as 3 "or less, that is, most likely fragments. And even they were at 15 o'clock and later.

                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    You should have known that the Tokiwa received a 75-mm shell at 14.02 local time.

                    Let me quote a specialist here. Warrant Officer Tumanov, by the way from Eagle tongue
                    writes:
                    The dials in the battery showed more than 30 cables and therefore at the beginning of the battle my guns had to be silent. The hits on the battleship began from the very beginning of the battle; from the shaking of the ship when large shells hit the armor from the lintel of the battery, a cloud of the finest dust *) descended from almost all the beams *), so that it was almost dark in the battery, as at night. The same dust very soon powdered the optical sights and I ordered to switch to ordinary ones. After 10 minutes the distance decreased to 30 cables and I opened fire with steel shells. The places where my shells fell was completely invisible, in view of the darkness, the small caliber of my guns and the mass of splashes near the enemy ships. In view of this circumstance and the urgent orders of Admiral Rozhestvensky to take care of the shells, I stopped firing as soon as the distance was over 30 cables


                    In total, we have returned to the starting point. As I wrote to you, the result of the sighting was a complete zilch. One single hit, first and last. You can read my opinion on the benefits of such a zeroing above.
  11. +1
    3 August 2021 08: 43
    I read the series of articles with interest, but it is simply impossible not to ask the question:
    So, HOW did the Japanese shoot at all these objective technical and theoretical problems of that time? :) the result is, as they say, repeatedly over the course of the roar.

    How did they solve the question "to distinguish their bursts from neighboring ones" so tormenting for everyone and clearly relevant with such a mass of fire on the lead ship as in Tsushima? How did you correct it then?

    How did those Japanese ships shoot, who objectively could not shoot at our lead ship?
    1. +2
      3 August 2021 09: 58
      Quote: Dmitry Surzhikov
      How did they solve the question "to distinguish their bursts from neighboring ones" so tormenting for everyone and clearly relevant with such a mass of fire on the lead ship as in Tsushima? How did you correct it then?

      Read my article https://topwar.ru/183235-cusima-faktory-tochnosti-japonskoj-artillerii.html
      1. +1
        3 August 2021 19: 07
        So I read the whole cycle, but in your article there is no about how they distinguished the volleys of many of their ships at the head Russian ones (after all, they all fired with volleys from the text and all of them had noticeable smoke when exploding into the water, while at the same time, a dense Fire). It is not very clear why this problem did not affect when adjusting the group fire.

        Well, how did the Japanese indicate the target (or planned before the battle) to the ships "from the middle" of the Japanese formation if they could not shoot at the head?
        1. +1
          3 August 2021 20: 46
          Well, how did the Japanese indicate the target (or planned before the battle) to the ships "from the middle" of the Japanese formation if they could not shoot at the head?

          The article says that each Japanese ship independently determined the target. Moreover, on May 15, Kassuga was the first to open fire, even earlier than Mikasa. So no one indicated the target to the Japanese ships.
          but in your article there is no about how they distinguished the volleys of many of their ships at the head Russian ones (after all, they all fired with volleys from the text and all of them had noticeable smoke when exploding against the water, while dense fire was fired at our heads).

          Two techniques were used:
          1. The time was counted by a stopwatch.
          2. We watched the flight of the projectile into the tube.
          Well, there are large intervals between volleys, at least 20 seconds.
          When too many ships fired at one target, the fire was transferred to other, more convenient ones.
        2. 0
          4 August 2021 10: 08
          But I will explain this point in the next article. She's almost ready
    2. +2
      3 August 2021 11: 39
      Quote: Dmitry Surzhikov
      So, HOW then, with all these objective technical and theoretical problems of that time, did the Japanese shoot? :)

      So I explained :)))) But at the end of the cycle I will definitely make a vault, so that the answer to Alexei's article
      Quote: rytik32
      https://topwar.ru/183235-cusima-faktory-tochnosti-japonskoj-artillerii.html

      was not smeared on many articles
  12. +1
    3 August 2021 09: 42
    music inspired (tm)
    remembered the story of L. Sobolev "The first listener"
    there is a "rivet" moment about "splash discrimination"
    -----------------------------------
    ... To do this, he assigned the exact intervals of the volleys of each caliber and assigned separate spotters for each caliber. Stopwatches were fired on the first salvo, and all the firing was fired in volleys a minute later with a phase shift of twenty seconds. Thus, the shells fell every twenty seconds, and in the interval of a minute between the volleys of each caliber, the adjustment by phone was in time ...
    ------------------------------------
    as a result of NNP, this method has taken root very well on land
    and for ships, as already mentioned, the pitching factor.
    stabilization was needed or at least mercury contactors ...
  13. -2
    4 August 2021 00: 56
    As far as I remember. The Japanese "shimoza" exploded immediately after breaking through the side. Burned out everyone. Our shells didn't detonate. The problem was with the fuses. They pierced through without an explosion. And the Japanese had a still greater angle of elevation of the trunks. What do I remember.
  14. 0
    4 August 2021 09: 07
    But while they see him on the next one, while they rebel, while these readings are noticed on the next ship in the ranks, it may turn out that the shooting ship will already fire a salvo at the new installations, and the end ship of the detachment will receive information about the amendments of the previous or even earlier salvo.

    Andrey forgets that in order for all ships to simultaneously receive flagship flag signals, there were rehearsal ships sailing outside the main column and being visible from all matelots.
    The cruiser "Pearl" in the Tsushima battle played the role of a rehearsal ship (transmitting flags of the admiral's commands to the detachment walking behind).
    1. 0
      4 August 2021 10: 06
      Andrei does not forget :)))) Andrei examines the Grevenitz methodology, which did not provide for the presence or use of rehearsal vessels hi
      1. +4
        4 August 2021 10: 16
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Andrey examines the Grevenitz technique, which did not provide for the presence or use of rehearsal vessels


        Hello dear Andrey - my compliments :)

        Such rehearsal ships appeared a long time ago and their use has become a tradition - even with Ushakov's squadron, they were used in the Russian fleet.
        So if the author did not indicate this in his work, only because this method of transmitting orders to the entire wake column had become so accustomed that its application was considered an unconditional rule for controlling the squadron.
        1. 0
          4 August 2021 17: 19
          Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
          Hello dear Andrey - my compliments :)

          Mutually, Dmitry Vladimirovich! hi I answered from the phone, so briefly.
          Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
          So if the author did not indicate this in his work, only because this method of transmitting orders to the entire wake column had become so accustomed that its application was considered an unconditional rule for controlling the squadron.

          The fact of the matter is that Grevenitz, in his methodology, "painted" the squadron into separate units, and in order to use rehearsal ships, they should have been mentioned in the methodology - what they say are needed by the number of units, assigned to each of them, etc. etc. But, alas, nothing like that. So - I agree that your thought is interesting, but I don't think that this was what Grevenitz meant.
      2. 0
        4 August 2021 13: 19
        ..the Grevenitz method, which did not provide for the presence or use of rehearsal vessels

        Hmm, not really. After all
        Grevenitz believed that the "squadron leader" should not be on the ship of the line at all, but that he should raise his flag and be on a fast and well-armored cruiser in order to be able to observe the battle from the side.

        Ie according to Grevenitz "squadron chief" was himself on a high-speed "rehearsal ship")) This idea should be recognized as very correct, and considerations of imperfect means of communication are untenable. After all, it was the ships of the line that were deprived of masts and halyards for signals, and not at all a cruiser "located to the side". And "turn as I do" - both in ZhM, and in Tsushima they turned ...))
        1. 0
          4 August 2021 18: 35
          Quote: anzar
          That is, according to Grevenitz, the "squadron leader" himself was on a high-speed "rehearsal ship"))

          Which, of course, it would not have been difficult to "rebel" the instructions of several flagships to the rest of the ships of several detachments of ships wassat
    2. +1
      4 August 2021 23: 19
      Quote: Dmitry Vladimirovich
      The cruiser "Pearl" in the Tsushima battle played the role of a rehearsal ship (transmitting flags of the admiral's commands to the detachment walking behind).

      The cruiser Pearl in the Tsushima battle in the sweat of his brow defended the transports. Emerald and possibly Almaz worked as a repetitive vessel. And all three should have been, in accordance with the number of detachments.

      Tellingly, all three commanders were firmly convinced that they were following the flagship's order. And all three were right, because Rozhestvensky managed to issue all kinds of orders, but he did not bother himself with specifying which of them cancels what and what changes. However, we see the same chaos in other orders and instructions of the ZPR.
      1. +2
        4 August 2021 23: 48
        At the beginning of the battle, Pearl was a rehearsal vessel for the 1st Division. But as soon as "Suvorov" was out of order, "Pearl" forgot about it and scrambled through the line. And then he nailed to Enquist. Send the order to transfer command to Nebogatov? Remove the admiral? Yes you! They shoot there!
        1. +3
          5 August 2021 17: 07
          Quote: rytik32
          But as soon as "Suvorov" was out of order, "Pearl" forgot about it and scrambled through the line.

          At the beginning of the battle, the Russian squadron fought on the left side, the Zhemchug and Izumrud were on the starboard, performing the duties of rehearsal ships, and in addition, they were supposed to cover the main forces from mine attacks and provide assistance to the knocked out ships. As described in the previous article, "Pearl" was doing exactly this, but, mistakenly assuming that the Japanese were moving to the right side of the squadron, cut through its formation in order to be on the left flank and thus landed right between the fighting columns. Then he, as it were, "went down" to the end ships of the Russian squadron, and again crossed over to its right side. However, not wanting to interfere with the salvo of the coastal defense battleship, "General-Admiral Apraksin" slowed down, which made the auxiliary cruiser "Ural", which by that time had almost lost controllability, made a bulk on the "Pearl", and in the "Ural" itself it was believed that " crushed ”“ Emerald ”. After that, the "Pearl" tried to move forward, but saw the damaged battleship, and approached it, believing that it was the flagship "Prince Suvorov", although in fact it was "Alexander III". At this time, Russian destroyers marched past the Zhemchug, on one of which flag officer Z.P. Rozhdestvensky Clapier-de-Colong, hence the assumption arose that both the entire headquarters and the admiral were also on the destroyer. Japanese battleships approached "Alexander III", and the commander of "Pearl" P.P. Levitsky, having no chance to provide support to the battleship (the only mine vehicle that the cruiser could use in conditions of excitement was damaged during a collision with the Ural), of course, retreated. "Zhemchug" followed the destroyers, believing that the admiral would like to switch to the cruiser out of the fire zone, but this did not happen, and later, at about 16.00, "Pearl" joined the cruising detachment of Rear Admiral O.A. Enquista, taking part in the protection of transports from the attack of Japanese cruisers
  15. -13
    4 August 2021 15: 18
    Dear Andrey, you are clearly confusing something due to the lack of centralization of fire among the Japanese (however, perhaps I did not fully understand something - the article is not finished). Eyewitnesses of the battles unanimously describe the sighting and fire of the Japanese as centralized, calling it a "jet": the fire of several ships focuses at one point on the undershoots, and then moves towards the ship until there is a cover (unfortunately there are no materials - you need to look (not my profile - I just read out of curiosity and remembered the technique (very peculiar))).
    It seems to me that the Japanese, at the command of a senior art officer, focused the fire of several ships at some point (preferably, that it was closer to the enemy), and then, by changing the distance, "brought" focus to the target. After covering, they kept the target at the desired distance.
    1. +2
      4 August 2021 17: 22
      Quote: Astor-27
      Dear Andrey, you are clearly confusing something due to the lack of centralization of fire among the Japanese

      No, I do not confuse
      Quote: Astor-27
      Eyewitnesses of the fighting unanimously describe the sighting and fire of the Japanese as centralized, calling it a "jet":

      Alas, nowhere in the Japanese data does it say anything like that. And the "jet" was quite obtained due to the intense fire of several ships on one target, and even in battle it would not even be dreamed of.
      1. -10
        4 August 2021 19: 02
        It is quite possible .... From the principle, I will find the sources and throw them off to you. And I will read the second part of the article with pleasure. wink
        1. +1
          4 August 2021 20: 15
          Quote: Astor-27
          From the principle, I will find the sources and throw them off to you

          I have come across descriptions of this "jet", I just can't figure out where :))) A very good source is K. Abo's secret lecture, which he read to British naval officers. In Tsushima, Abo was Mikasa's senior artillery officer, so he knew what he was talking about.
          With regard to fleet fire control, no specific preparations have been made to focus fire on a specific ship.
          But the rules were in effect:
          - aim at the nearest ship in the ranks;
          - if the distance is not very different, prefer the lead and end ships in the ranks;
          - aim at the ship that does the most damage.
          All of our ships, acting independently, have used these principles.
          1. -13
            4 August 2021 20: 54
            My dear fellow, what are you talking about? Well, to whom, and you need to take Japanese statements on faith critically: you are a person, in everything, immersed in the topic. You have probably read the works of Okumiya and Fuchida (Fuchida) about 2 MB. If they are there ... let's just say - not completely frank (and they both went on trial - it was much easier to extract the truth from them than from the lecturer), then what to expect from the lecturer? Truth? By the nature of my past activity, I studied the Chinese language (and in connection with the peculiarities of the forthcoming work, and the psychology of the Chinese). And next to them the Japanese students studied. So, both the Japanese and the Chinese are united by one thing - they consider the Europeans to be barbarians (if this is how the Chinese word "pinyin" can be translated), while the word "stupid" is used as an adjective. Yeah, so they will tell the truth to these "stupid northern barbarians". Hold your pocket wider...
            1. +1
              5 August 2021 17: 08
              Quote: Astor-27
              My dear fellow, what are you talking about? Well, to whom, and you need to take Japanese statements on faith critically

              Well, first of all, Abo was not a lecturer, he was a commander and a Japanese attaché who, as a matter of courtesy, delivered the said lecture. Secondly, the British were allies of Japan at that time. Third, and most importantly, the British had their own observers on Japanese ships throughout the war, and these observers were regular and qualified British naval officers. Agree, it would be rather difficult to hide from them some new "jet" method of firing. And it would be just foolish to try to make a secret from what the British already knew. And the Japanese weren't stupid.
          2. +4
            4 August 2021 21: 38
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I came across descriptions of this "jet", I just can't figure out where :)))

            This is R. Melnikov's version about the jet.
            In fact, it was long ago refuted by at least data on the consumption of shells in the Japanese fleet.
            1. +2
              4 August 2021 21: 56
              Quote: rytik32
              This is R. Melnikov's version about the jet.
              In fact, it was long ago refuted by at least data on the consumption of shells in the Japanese fleet.

              In general, this is a caricature that was released in Japan after the Battle of Tsushima, in which Admiral Togo pours shells from a hose at the Russian squadron.

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