Peaceful spring before the war

The following abbreviations are used in the article: ArchVO - Arkhangelsk Military District, IN - military district, gsd - mountain rifle division, GSh - General base, ZabVO - Transbaikal Military District, ZakVO - Transcaucasian VO, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, Lvo - Leningrad VO, MVO - Moscow VO, NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, OdVO - Odessa VO, ORVO - Oryol Military District, HALT - Privolzhsky VO, Pribovo - Baltic special VO, PTABR - anti-tank artillery brigade, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, RU - intelligence department of the General Staff, SAVO - Central Asian VO, sd - rifle division, SibVO - Siberian VO, SCWO - North Caucasian VO, SNK - Council of People's Commissars, Urvo - Ural VO, HVO - Kharkov VO.

In the first parts, it was said that the two countries began to prepare for a war in Europe, including against the USSR, after the end of the First World War. Therefore, our country could not avoid participation in a future war. The only question was: how many countries will participate in the war with the USSR?

The government of the Soviet Union managed to postpone the start of the war. During this time, Poland and France dropped out of our opponents in the planned war. England was left alone on the edge of the abyss and no longer thought of a war with the Soviet Union. The intelligence services of England, Germany, Poland, France, the USSR and the United States at different times were unable to provide the necessary reliable RM, which led to negative consequences for these countries.

Hitler decided to begin preparations for war with the Soviet Union. He believed that this war would be much tougher than the war with "civilized" France and England. After the victory in this war, the fate of the Poles, Czechs, Balts and the inhabitants of the USSR was unenviable. From 50 to 85% of the population of these peoples were planned to be destroyed or resettled, which was akin to death. In a future war, the Soviet army and the people had to defend their right to life ...

In the previous part it was shown that the leadership of the spacecraft understood how the Germans would fight, but for some reason they could not use their knowledge on the eve of the war.

In December 1940, the spacecraft had 9 mechanized corps. After the appointment of GK Zhukov to the post of chief of the General Staff, the planned number of formed mechanized corps was increased from 10-11 to 21: 10 corps of the 1st stage and 11 - of the 2nd.

Mobilization plan and mechanized corps

On February 12, 1941, in Stalin's office, a draft document with proposals from NGOs on mobilization deployment, known as MP-41, was considered. Later, the document will include clarifications on changing the deployment scheme, the number of wartime, on the formation and disbandment of large formations and formations, on the change of states, etc.

In accordance with this document, the spacecraft will have 314 divisions. In addition to these formations, the spacecraft had brigades, regiments and other units that are not considered in the article.

The presented document is the proposals of the spacecraft leadership for wartime, which, perhaps, will come only in 1942. This follows from the amount of technology considered in the document. For example, tanks:

... Establish the staffing of weapons and military equipment during general mobilization:

... tanks:
heavy (KB and T-35 tanks) - 3907;
medium (T-34 and T-28) - 12843 ...

Such a number of tanks could not enter the troops in 1941. In May 1941, the mechanized corps of the 2nd stage were not planned at all to participate in the war with Germany. The chief of the Main Armored Directorate Ya.N. Fedorenko spoke about this to D. D. Lyulyushenko. Now it becomes clear that there are more personnel in the mechanized corps of the 2nd stage - after all, he was trained and prepared for the receipt of equipment in 1942.

On March 8, Stalin approved the list of command personnel of the new mechanized corps.

1940 NPO memo and 1941 planning

Submitted on October 5, 1940 to Stalin and Molotov a note "On the basics of strategic deployment for 1940 and 1941" contained two options for the deployment of spacecraft troops. The note was overloaded with assumptions and data on the number of troops for the Northern or Southern options, and also did not contain any conclusions. The note did not contain the main thing: which variant of the NKO and the General Staff was considered the most probable and how the deployment of troops in the West should be carried out. Naturally, such a document needed to be redone. New variant document presented on the website "Electronic Exhibitions of Moscow Region".

In the memoirs of the military it is said that Stalin chose the deployment of troops according to the Southern option. It is impossible to establish whether this is so, but it is unlikely that Stalin himself chose the option. After all, it is known that on many issues, before making a decision, he was interested in the opinion of specialists. It is possible that the leaders of the KA expressed their opinion, with which Stalin agreed ...

In 1938, there was a similar situation when the head of the General Staff B.M.Shaposhnikov prepared a note People's Commissar for Defense K. E. Voroshilov, which said:

At this time it is difficult to say where the deployment of the main forces of the German and Polish armies will take place - to the north of Polesie or to the south of it ...

Intelligence service made by our probable opponents of concentration traffic will determinewhere their main forces will be deployed, and therefore, starting from the 10th day of mobilization, we can also change variant of our deployment of the main forces, taking it to the north or south of woodland.

Therefore, it is proposed to have two options for strategic deployment - to the north or south of the woodland ...

It is difficult to say why there was no similar conclusion in the prepared note in the fall of 1940.

Historian S. L. Chekunov on the forum of the site "Militera" noted:

The political decision (in the common people "directive of the Government") on military planning, on the basis of which the General Staff carried out planning in 1941, exists "with the signature of Stalin" ...

Organizational measures in the spring of 1941 were carried out on the basis of an addendum to the development plan, which was formalized by the "resolution of the Council of People's Commissars" of 12.02.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX ...

The February-March version, this is the general standard planning, carried out in the development of the October instructions of Stalin ...

For the February-March document, there is a whole bunch of working materials (maps, calculations, applications, etc.) ... There are calendar plans, notes on working out the operational plan. Combat strengths were not worked out, options for transfer were not worked out, etc.

Vatutin made preliminary calculations “on his knees” at the beginning of June ...

General Staff on strategic deployment

The leadership of the country and the spacecraft knew that a war with Nazi Germany was inevitable, but how the German generals would fight and when the war would start was unknown.

Some publications indicate that since December 1940, the leadership of the USSR was aware of Hitler's plans for a war with our country. It is clear that the leadership of the spacecraft in this case should have known about these plans. It looks like this is an attempt at falsification stories with the aim of withdrawing reconnaissance from under the blow. But the intelligence agencies were not to blame for the fact that they faced massive disinformation at all levels, including Hitler, Goering and Goebbels. RMs have been rechecked, but they have been confirmed by misinformation coming from a variety of other sources.

March 11 GSh prepared document "On the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the west and east." The doc says that "Documentary data on the operational plans of potential adversaries, both in the west and in the east, does not have... »

The document notes that Germany has up to 260 divisions, of which 200 (77%) will be directed against our borders. The number of troops allied to Germany is not considered in the article.

To conduct operations in the west (excluding the Finnish Front), the General Staff proposes to allocate: 158 rifle, 27 motorized, 53 tank and 7 cavalry divisions (78% of the total number of SC divisions). It is interesting that, in the opinion of the General Staff, in percentage terms, the number of divisions of the USSR and Germany concentrated on the border to the total number of formations turns out to be comparable.

It can be seen that the General Staff provides for the use in operations of all motorized and tank divisions available in the spacecraft, some of which will not be equipped with equipment in 1941. Therefore, the presented combat plan is the possible actions of the spacecraft in 1942 or later, when the mechanized corps of the 1st and 2nd stages will be largely equipped with equipment.

For operations against Japan, a fairly large Soviet grouping is intended in the amount of 37 divisions: 23 rifle, 6 motorized and motorized, 7 tank and one cavalry division from the Far Eastern Front, the ZabVO and the Siberian Military District.

There are inaccuracies in the considered copy of the document:

- the spacecraft should have 60 tank divisions, and in accordance with the document under consideration, there are 61;
- there should be 32 motorized and motorized rifle divisions, and in accordance with the document there are 33;
- the number of cavalry divisions located in the territory outside the western districts is 6, not 9.

In which grouping of troops there are inaccuracies in the part of the above divisions, it is difficult to say, since the numbers are mentioned (or used) twice and therefore cannot be misprints.

1941 training camp

On March 8, the Protocol of the Decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) included the question "On the conduct of training camps for military-liable reserves in 1941 ...". These training camps are considered to be Large training camps (hidden mobilization) associated with the preparation of the spacecraft for war in the spring and summer of 1941.

From 1939 until the beginning of the war, the two older ages of the enlistment staff were removed from the register. In the territories annexed to the USSR in 1939-1940 there was an untrained enrollment staff. Since 1938, categories of the population that had previously undergone military service or training in reserve (article by A. Yu. Bezugolny "Features of the call for military service of representatives of the peoples of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War"). Some categories of people who had previously been impaired in their rights began to appeal. The untrained enlistment staff needed to be trained. According to plans in 1940, it was planned to attract 1,6 million people to training camps, but the Soviet-Finnish war changed these plans.

In the book “Stalin's Lost Chance. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Europe: 1939-1941 " M. I. Meltyukhov wrote that the total number of liable military reserves on July 1, 1940 was 11 people, of which 902 (873%) were not trained. The introduction of troops into the territory of Poland and the war with Finland led to the fact that the dismissal of servicemen from the ranks of the spacecraft was delayed and a large number of assigned personnel were called up. By the end of the war with Finland, there were 4 thousand people in the spacecraft, of which 010 thousand were assigned personnel.

The number of enrolls planned to be attracted to the training camp in 1940 (1,6 million people), and the presence of 1,59 million in the ranks of the KA in March 1940, significantly exceeded the number of people who were attracted to the training camp in 1941. In 1940, no one cared about Germany's opinion on the matter. If they were waiting for the war in the spring-summer of 1941, they could easily have called for up to a million people for training, or by an additional decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to double this number ...

S. L. Chekunov wrote: “As of 1.1.41, according to the General Staff (excluding the Baltic States), there were 3 untrained conscripts, of which the bulk was in the border districts ...

The General Staff did not give instructions on the exact timing of the training camp in the rifle divisions. The decision on the timing of the collection was made in the districts. [As an example, S. L. Chekunov at the forum cited an excerpt from the document - approx. auth.]:

“I approve the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Timoshenko March 28, 1941. The plan for conducting training sessions of the assigned composition of military formations, units and rear bodies of spacecraft in 1941 ...

4. Training fees to conduct:

a) in all SDs in one queue from June 1 to October 15 ...

The exact timing of the charges for the formations is set by the military councils of the districts ... "

In the figure below, it can be seen that the rifle divisions stationed in the LMO and in the western VOs consisted of 28% of the scribes from the entire composition involved in training. How many of them were untrained is unknown. But there should have been a lot of them.

By June 22, 805 people had been drafted, with a limit of 264 appointees permitted by the Government. Consequently, 975 people were left to go through training camps in the second peaceful half of the year. If the command of the spacecraft was expecting a war in June 870, then untrained personnel would not be involved in the training camp. They would attract trained people and most of them were drafted into the divisions of the western military units.

S. L. Chekunov:

Of course, the postponement of the training camp and their increase in early May increased the combat and mobilization readiness of the Red Army. However, this has nothing to do with “hidden mobilization”, even “under the guise of training camps” ...

We return to one of the postulates that need to be guided: about what the war will be like before 22.6.41 in the USSR did not know... The country's leadership did not proceed from the "History of the Second World War" ...

Issuing 1941 training camps for Large training camps or covert mobilization is another attempt at falsifying history, just like saying that "Intelligence provided everything ..."

Intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated 11.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX and its consequences

March 11 prepared by intelligence report RU, in which it is noted:

on 1.03.41 Germany had 20700 aircraft ..., of which: combat - 10980, naval - 350, others - 9370 ...
The German Air Force consisted of 5 air fleets (8 aviation corps) and two separate aviation corps ... One of them is located in Italy, the other - in Romania and Bulgaria ...

The summary shows the distribution of German Air Force combat aircraft in various territories:

It can be seen from the figure that the number of combat aircraft near our border from the fall of 1940 to March 1.03.1941, 1 did not change. As of March 6,4, XNUMX% of the total number of aircraft were near our border.

Before the start of the war, intelligence did not report the presence of any aviation corps headquarters or any air headquarters near our border. fleet... The lion's share of German aviation was relocated to border airfields on the eve of the war, and the data on this did not have time to enter the RU, the General Staff and the headquarters of the districts. The memoirs say that on the evening of June 21, the commander of the ZAPOVO learned about the increase in the number of German aviation at one (or several) airfields. In this case, as a disciplined campaigner, he would definitely report this to the People's Commissar of Defense ...

March 15 out Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and SNK "On the production of KV tanks for 1941", which defines the production of heavy tanks at the Kirov and Chelyabinsk Tractor Plants. The leaders of the spacecraft are currently satisfied with the booking and armament of heavy tanks.

In the intelligence report of 11.03.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, there is information about the construction in Germany of three new models of heavy tanks. It seems that the information about the development of heavy tanks in Germany greatly concerned the leadership of the spacecraft and the government. Or (which is more likely) the leadership of the KA worried about the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the SNK.

In March 1941, Marshal Kulik arrived at artillery plant number 92, assigning chief designer V.G. Grabin the task of developing a new weapon for the KV tank.

V.G. Grabin some time after Kulik's departure, Stalin called:

I want to consult with you. It is believed that a heavy tank is armed with a low-power cannon that does not meet the tasks of a heavy tank. Currently, the issue of rearming it is being considered: instead of the 76-mm cannon, it is proposed to put a powerful 107-mm ...

On May 14, the first shot was fired from the 107-mm ZIS-6 cannon, and serial production was to begin on July 1. The armor-piercing shell of this gun had armor penetration of the order of 160-175 mm and could pierce through any tank in the Wehrmacht.

April 7 in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and SNK the issue of strengthening the armor of the KV-1, KV-2, KV-3 tanks and the design of more powerful KV-4 and KV-5 tanks with a ZIS-6 cannon is being considered.

It was decided to install additional armor screens 1-2 mm thick on the most vulnerable spots of the KV-25 and KV-30 tanks. The frontal armor of the KV-3 tank should have been increased to 115–125 mm and the ZIS-6 cannon installed.

Tasks were issued for the design and manufacture of the tank:

- KV-4 with armor of 125–130 mm with armor of the most vulnerable spots of 140–150 mm;

- KV-5 with 170 mm frontal armor and 150 mm side armor.

Since no war was expected in the near future, the terms were set sparing:

- by 15.05.41 to complete the development of drawings and technology for shielding;

- from 1.06.41, the production of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks should be carried out with a screen;

- KV-1 and KV-2 tanks located in military units should be screened in place, starting screening on July 1 and ending by January 1.01.1942, XNUMX.

It was not so easy to expand the production of shielded hulls and towers, and only on June 19 the final protocol according to the KV shielding scheme.

The production of shielded hulls and towers was launched in the second decade of June. From the report of the military representative Dmitrusenko (21.06.41): “The shielding of the KV-1 hulls and towers has begun. Accepted 18 buildings and 12 shielded towers ... "

In early June, RMs arrive, which lead to a discussion of the issue of moving armies from the internal districts and to serious concerns about German heavy tanks. On June 9, the NKGB intelligence transmits to its agents an NCO request, which, among other things, requires to learn about the organizational and staff structure of the German heavy so on. The request noted:

it is especially important to identify by tanks: the maximum thickness and resistance of the armor; types of tanks with maximum weight and armament and the number of tanks weighing 45 tons and more ...

13 June People's Commissar of Defense signs a note to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and to the Government "On the insufficient armament capacity of the new KV and T-34 tanks, as well as other samples of promising tanks that are in design." Work on the creation of heavy tanks with powerful armor and weapons will be phased out after the start of the war, when it becomes clear that the Germans do not have heavy tanks like ours.

Strengthening the armor of the T-34

In the period from April 1 to April 21, 1941, two hulls and two towers were fired upon. T-34... It turned out that the armor of the hull and turret, with the exception of the upper frontal plate of the hull, can be penetrated by 45-mm shells at a distance of 600 meters and closer.

7 May the Resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars "On the production of T-34 tanks in 1941" It dealt with the future production of the A-43 and A-44 tanks. Clause 10 of the decree concerned the shielding of T-34 tanks:

To oblige ... to test two prototypes of the T-34 tank with additional shielding of the turret and the frontal hull plate with armor thickness of 13-15 mm.

To provide shielding of 1941 pieces in 500. T-34 tanks located in military units by sending special brigades with material and tools to the field;

... STZ and Plant No. 183 have been producing shielded tanks according to the approved model since August 1941.

The Mariupol plant to supply the plant No. 183 in accordance with the production of shielded tanks, armor parts, starting from July 1941 ...

In May, the first experiments on firing screens were carried out. It turned out that after their installation, the through-penetration limit of the projectile increased by 40-55 m / s. The documentation for the screens was ready by mid-June 1941. In July, two tanks received shielding and were tested.

Work related to the shielding of the T-34 tanks available in parts could, at best, be completed by the beginning of 1942.

Communication problems

General N. Gapich, the former head of the spacecraft communications department, in the article “Some thoughts on management and communicationWrote:

On March 15, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense "On the distribution of duties between the deputies of the People's Commissar of Defense" is issued:

In addition to managing the activities of the General Staff of the SC, I entrust to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the SC, General of the Army, G.K.

Under the direct subordination of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, have:

a) GSA;
b) Management of fuel supply to the spacecraft;
c) Spacecraft Communications Directorate;
d) Main Directorate of Air Defense of Spacecraft;
e) General Staff Academy ...

General Gapich's immediate superior G.K. Zhukov wrote:

Major General N.I. Gapich, the chief of communications troops of the spacecraft, reported to us about the lack of modern communications equipment and the lack of sufficient mobilization and emergency reserves of communications equipment ...

Consequently, the chief of the General Staff knew about the communication problems, but could not defend this issue in the spring of 1941.

Gen. N. Gapich:

Later, at the beginning of 1941 [6.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX - approx. ed.], when JV Stalin became the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, the NPO again presented to the Council of People's Commissars, already to Stalin, a draft resolution on the development of the communications industry.

But this time the decision remained the same ...

It seems that the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect communication problems in a future war. After all, they were able to push the production of gliders six days before the start of the war: "To support the airborne units of the NKO, the following number of gliders is needed in 41-42 years ... In total, for 1941 - 2000 pieces ..."

Head of communications PribOVO General P. M. Kurochkin, describing the pre-war method of combat training of staffs and command personnel of the communications troops of the army and district levels of command, pointed out one of the reasons that led to the loss of command and control in the first days of the war:

Combat actions of the German army against the USSR

March 20 prepared Report head of RU "Statements, organizational measures and options for military operations of the German army against the USSR." The report states:

The report draws conclusions:

1. Based on all the above statements and possible options for action in the spring of this year, I believe that the most possible date for the commencement of actions against the USSR will be the moment after the victory over England or after the conclusion of an honorable world for Germany.

2. Rumors and documents that speak of the inevitability of a war against the USSR in the spring of this year should be regarded as disinformation coming from British and even, perhaps, German intelligence ...

The report does not contain the RU's opinion on the most likely course of action. Everything is dumped to a heap before the management, which must make a decision.

In some publications, the authors choose option 3 as the most likely. It is concluded that, knowing about the most likely option, Stalin was obliged to make the right decision. It's easier for these authors, because they know the history of the Great Patriotic War ...

The figure shows a diagram for the report of the head of the RU. Does this scheme give an idea of ​​how the German generals will fight? The opinion of the author does not give.

It should be noted that the presence of such associations as an army group was not detected by our intelligence against the troops of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO until the beginning of the war. Although the headquarters of Army Group B (later the headquarters of Army Group Center) had been at the border since the fall of 1940. The headquarters of Army Groups "North" and "South" were also not found by our reconnaissance, although from the end of April 1941 they were also at the border. According to intelligence, there were only a few field armies near the border. Therefore, according to the presented scheme, it is generally not clear whether the strike will be delivered by reinforced armies, or the strike will be delivered only after the concentration of army groups in different directions and the redeployment of large mobile groupings.

In the North, an army group (or a reinforced army) is attacking Leningrad. How many mobile groupings are there, where will they be concentrated before striking, the total number of this grouping of this army group before the attack, how will military operations be conducted against the troops concentrated on the border? All this is unknown.

For the Central Group - the same questions as for the North. The arrow of the strike of the enemy grouping includes the entire border of the ZAPOVO. It is precisely such RMs that will be at the district headquarters on June 21: all tank and motorized formations that reconnaissance discovered are distributed along the entire border in the district's area of ​​responsibility. On the borders of the district (Suvalkinsky ledge and the area of ​​the city of Brest), large tank groupings (even at least one tank division each) were not found by reconnaissance.

In the material of the intelligence department of the PribOVO headquarters, prepared at 18:00 on June 21, all tanks, armored personnel carriers, cannons and infantry battalions are equally distributed over different sections of the border. There is no information on the directions of the strikes of the mobile groupings. There is only a grouping of mobile troops in the area of ​​the city of Tilsit.

In the South, all blows converge at Kiev. Again, it is not known: how many mobile groups will the enemy have, where are they concentrated, the total number of this army group before the attack? One of the blows comes from the side of the top of the Lviv ledge. The same information will be at the KOVO headquarters on June 21: a significant part of the tank and motorized formations are allegedly located at the top of the Lvov ledge.

According to the recollections of the former chief of the KOVO operations department I. Kh. Baghramyan, on the eve of the war, the main enemy's attack in the direction of Krakow - Lvov, that is, at the top of the Lvov ledge, will be expected at the district headquarters. Where there were no mobile German formations, but the German command imitated them.

After 36 days (25.04.41/XNUMX/XNUMX), the military attaché in Germany, General V. I. Tupikov prepared a note addressed to the head of the RU, which does not speak of Germany's unequivocal plans to attack the USSR.

Events that could happen in the near future (regarding Sweden and Finland) did not happen.

IV Tupikov spoke about the possibility of an event that could postpone the war.

Numerous RMs about the movement of German divisions across the territory of Turkey and about the plans of the German command to start military operations in the Middle East and on the North African coast - look like an event that could postpone the start of the war?

Or the numerous RMs about the conditions and an ultimatum from Germany - isn't this a reason to start negotiations with the Hitlerite leadership, somewhat postpone the start of the war and prepare the army for its start? ..

After May 15, the General Staff prepared a document "On the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies." While preparing the document, there is still no certainty about the plans for the deployment of the German army:

Most likely, the main forces of the German army ... will be deployed to the south of ..., Brest, Demblin to strike in the direction of Kovel, Rovno, Kiev. This blow is likely to be followed by a blow... At the same time, we must expect a blow in the north from East Prussia to Vilno, Vitebsk and Riga ...

The document uses the phrase “Most likely", In another crossed out phrase -"apparently”, It emphasizes that during the development of the document it was not known exactly how the military operations would unfold. Therefore, the claim that in the spring of 1941 intelligence revealed the main provisions of the Barbarossa plan is an attempt to falsify our history.

New formations in the spacecraft

In May 1940, the Republic of Moldova received information on the use of heavy tanks by the Germans. In the fall of 1940, messages similar to those sent in June probably also arrived (intelligence report no. 4):

About German heavy tanks
On the western front, the Germans use heavy 60-ton and 35-ton tanks ("T5-6"), armed with a cannon of up to 100 mm caliber. Two tank divisions were created from 35-ton tanks (the data needs to be clarified) ...

In November 1940, the formation of 20 machine-gun and artillery brigades began, "With powerful cannon and machine-gun armament, designed to fight and counter enemy tank and mechanized troops".
According to the staff, the brigade had 17 T-26 tanks, 19 armored vehicles, 30 45-mm anti-tank guns, 42 76-mm divisional guns, 12 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 36 76-mm or 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.

On 12.2.41, a new mobilization plan was approved, after which the People's Commissar of Defense issued an order to disband redundant cavalry divisions and 20 machine-gun and artillery brigades.

11.01.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX from the Council of Defense under the Council of People's Commissars (it is most likely that we are talking about the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars) a letter comes about the formation of artillery brigades of the RGK. The heads of the Main Artillery Directorate sent answer to this question:

1) To exclude from the composition of the Artillery anti-tank brigade RGK 45-mm cannon mod. 1937, replacing them with 57-mm guns mod. 1941 of the year. Before the start of the gross production of a new 57-mm anti-tank gun, we consider it expedient to introduce into the brigade 37-mm anti-tank anti-aircraft guns mod. 1940 of the year.

2) Reduce the number of 76-mm divisional guns. To be allowed to equip brigades with 76-mm guns mod. 1939 as having less weight.

3) Due to the low mobility of the 76-mm anti-aircraft gun mod. 1931 and an insufficient number of 76-mm armor-piercing ammunition, we consider it expedient to replace them with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns mod. 1939 on a four-wheeled gun carriage with better mobility and a proven armor-piercing round.

4) To oblige the People's Commissariat of Ammunition to provide the program of equipping the artillery anti-tank brigades of the RGK with the necessary amount of armor-piercing ammunition.

23 April out Decree The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On new formations as part of the spacecraft", which spoke about the formation "10 PTABR RGK" and about the formation "5 airborne corps".

The incoming RM repeatedly spoke about the presence in Germany of parachute divisions - 4-5 and airborne divisions - 4-5. This is probably why the spacecraft decided to form 5 airborne corps in order to keep up with the potential enemy. Only on the part of the Germans - it was disinformation ...

Obviously, the presence of heavy tanks on the part of the enemy pushed the SC leadership to the introduction of 107-mm M-60 cannons into the PTABR. Since the M-60 guns were received in insufficient volume, when staffing the brigades, they were replaced with 85-mm anti-aircraft guns.

The 85mm and 107mm cannons were clearly intended against heavily armored tanks. These guns, for various reasons (large mass and dimensions, spaced aiming elements) were not quite suitable for using them as anti-tank guns.
By the beginning of the war, PTABR were not provided with vehicles, which were supposed to arrive during 1941:

State Planning Committee of the USSR to provide for the allocation of NPOs during 1941, in excess of the plan, to ensure the measures specified by this Resolution - 8225 trucks (of which 5000 ZIS-5 vehicles), 960 STZ-5 tractors and 420 Stalinets tractors.

From KOVO 17.05.41/XNUMX/XNUMX sent telegram People's Commissar for Defense:

For the emerging PTABRs, 600 ST-2 tractors, 300 STZ-5 tractors are required, for the artillery units of the formed motorized mechanized, tank and rifle divisions, 503 ST-2 tractors and 792 STZ-5 tractors are required.
The guns are coming in, there is nothing to carry. I ask for orders to accelerate the expulsion of the vehicle fleet of the formed parts ...

By June 18, 75 ST-2 tractors and 188 STZ-5 tractors were shipped to KOVO for PTABRs, of which 50 ST-2 and 120 STZ-5 were sent to the 1st brigade. 25 ST-2 and 68 STZ-5 (165 units required) were sent to the 2nd brigade.

The other three KOVO brigades did not receive tractors.

By June 18, 18 tractors were shipped for two PTABR PribOVO.

On June 7, three PTABR ZAPOVO are half-manned with guns. Until July 1, they promised to deliver 72 more 76-mm guns and 60 - 85-mm guns. At the same time, the 6th brigade had only 4 tractors, the 8th brigade had 7 tractors, and the 7th brigade had none at all.

The figure shows the locations of PTABR PribOVO and ZAPOVO. The figure additionally shows (approximate) directions of attacks of the German motorized corps and the directions of attacks expected in the General Staff as of 15.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.

PTABRs ZAPOVO, having no transport, and disappeared in the crucible of war far from the places of advancement of the enemy strike groups. General Pavlov is not to blame for this, since the places of deployment were determined in the General Staff.

It should be noted that all PTABRs are far from the direction of the 2nd Panzer Group's strike in the area of ​​the city of Brest, which was not discovered by reconnaissance until June 24. This direction did not cause concern in the General Staff before the start of the war.

The figure below shows the locations of PTABR KOVO.

If the NKO and the General Staff knew about the directions of the enemy's motorized corps strikes and the timing of the start of the war, then the PTABRs could at least be brought to positions by means of transport allocated from other units ...

But that was unknown ...

To be continued ...

Comments

[polpot]

Thank you, I read it with interest, I look forward to continuing.

[tihonmarine]

Good article, I look forward to continuing, with respect.

[antivirus]

.iinedap mechudub irp ytiltsdop ujedan tuad-motop ymolos and anes aquotogaz ote-sokones
haymaking is harvesting hay and then straw. can be spread ahead of time, if you know where.
they didn’t even know the gl - didn’t have time to react, even knowing where we were going to fall.
"4 years mother without a son .." then another 40 years without sons until his death ...

Sergei Gavrilovich Semenov, 1931, d. Maksimovo, Staritsky district of the Kalinin region: “We were under the German for a month and a half, but nearby, near Rzhev 1,5 g, they didn’t count us as people. They could easily kill us” At 10, the child understood instinctively, everyday communication, glances and beat, drove out of the hut.

[agoran]

Interesting article.
In the early 70s, he worked as a schoolboy in Utilsyrye in the summer. There were many books to-rye removed from libraries, as not appropriate.
So, there were many memoirs of participants in the war without censorship.
One of the books described the results of the check of the Western Military District, I don't know how it was before, but like our GMMO (General Inspection of the Ministry of Defense).
The conclusions were disappointing.
S-you were standing in the parking lot not refueled, without BC.
The tanks were in pits without ammo.
It was not a short distance to the warehouses with the BC.
L / s was poorly trained.
And these are not all the conclusions.

[ccsr]

Quote: agoran

There were many books to-rye removed from libraries, as not appropriate.

Well, no need to fantasize, because during the inventory of libraries, books that have become unusable due to frequent use by readers are constantly discarded. They were destroyed according to the act, and new ones were bought in exchange - such was the order in the USSR, and your conjectures "as not appropriate" have nothing to do with reality.

Quote: agoran

The conclusions were disappointing.

So no one hid it - there is a report at the reception of the Tymoshenko People's Commissariat of Defense, there are the results of the Finnish one, there are other reports, all this has long been open and one can understand that the authorities knew about it. But the country could not allocate more for the needs of the army, and even a number of mistakes were made with the equipment under Tukhachevsky, so they ended up on June 22 without the necessary reserves, with equipment of outdated models. And some paid propagandists like AsmyppoL (Aleksey Ivanov) speculate on this, selectively snatching out the negative, and not explaining why this happened, and even distorting the meaning of the documents of those years. For example, he writes:

After May 15, the General Staff prepared a document "On the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies."

Firstly, it is just a draft, not signed by anyone or reported to Stalin, so the "document" is just AsmyppoL's lies.
Secondly, it was not Zhukov who developed it, but his deputy, so that such a GUIDING document did not exist at the General Staff.
All the work of this would-be researcher AsmyppoL (Aleksey Ivanov) is based on such juggling.

[smaug78]

Historian S. L. Chekunov at the forum of the site "Militera"

True, on the forum of the Militera website, Chekunov was not considered a historian, but was constantly driven to face the table for lying, inability to work with sources, etc. And then there it is like - "historian" ...

[ccsr]

Quote: smaug78

True, on the forum of the Militera website, Chekunov was not considered a historian, but they constantly drove a face about a table for lying, inability to work with sources, etc. And here it’s like a “historian” ...

"Historian" Chekunov is a rather enchanting person who began his journey into history by offering to make copies in the Podolsk archive for 2000 rubles, and he decided to do business on this. But the matter did not go well, and he retrained as a "historian" by posting some archival documents from TsAMO with his comments, which often cannot be called fantastic. In order not to be unfounded, I quote some of his "speeches" from the militia, where he was repeatedly exposed for ignorance in military knowledge:
Sergei st writes:

Not at all. During the war, couriers were only in the NKVD system.
In the period 1924-195x (I do not remember exactly what year) feldsvyaz was ONLY in the OGPU-NKVD-MVD
Correspondence of the division commander was conducted either through military mail or through the "institute" of couriers. Feldsvyaz in the NKO-MO system did not exist until the mid-50s. Learn materiel.
It was about FELDSVYAZ. There was no such thing in the RKKA-KA-SA at the time of the NGO. So stop twisting ...

http://militera.borda.ru/?1-3-0-00001332-000-200-0-1301511521
Then he studied the question a little and another statement follows, refuting his lie:
Sergei st writes:

I admit my mistake. There were couriers in the NCO system. But they did not exist in the FPS, but in different divisions. For example, by order of the NCO No. 0281-1941, the Feldjeger Communications Group was created under the General Staff's Cipher Department. In addition, by order of the NCO No. 322-1941, couriers were introduced to the POSTAL SERVICE of the NCO Chancellery. There was no dedicated service.

At first, for a long time, he was pushing the draft of the Directive w / n as the original original of the encryption, which was given to him at TsAMO:
Sergei st writes:

In addition, lamer, all the documents of the 8th department of the General Staff for the war a long time ago (back in the 50s) were handed over to the general archive. At the moment, this is the fund of the 48th TsAMO

http://militera.b.qip.ru/?1-3-0-00001332-000-80-0
As it turned out, not all of them, because in 2007 the official representative of the archival service of the Ministry of Defense said that the encryptions had not yet been declassified. This is the level of "historical" work with Chekunov's archival documents.
Then the question touched on the work of the cipher officers of the Russian General Staff on the eve and during the war, and it turned out that Chekunov did not know what they were at all:
Sergei st writes:

Radio operators ransomware in RU - it's cool. Here in front of me lies the office building of the RU 1940. I do not observe radio operators-encryptors at point-blank range
Nothing more to say? THERE WERE NO ENCRYPTION RADISTS

http://militera.b.qip.ru/?1-3-0-00001332-000-80-0
I will not even refute this heresy with documents, but anyone who reads M. Boltunov's book about the special radio communications service will find out that radio operators-encryptors have always been part of agent groups in both strategic and operational intelligence.
In general, Chekunov is an ardent anti-Stalinist, and all his "creativity" directed at discrediting the activities of the leader of the peoples:
Sergei st writes:

Generally under his leadership, the state was on the verge of defeat, so you know.

Sergei st writes:

So what kind of respite did Stalin get? .... Hitler DIDN'T COME TO WAR WITH THE USSR UNTIL 1941. THERE IS NO MERIT OF STALIN HERE.

Unfortunately, the author of the article AsmyppoL (Alexei Ivanov) is essentially the same anti-Stalinist and anti-Soviet, which is why they constantly carry the idea that everyone in our state and the People's Commissariat of Defense were fools, could not reveal Hitler's plans, and therefore they are all to blame for tragedy on June 22.
I have never met a more disgusting and outright meanness among the local authors, and this makes me think that the anonymous author is deliberately fulfilling the order, apparently he was well paid for it.

[Doctor]

I did not understand what the author wanted to say. That the USSR was not preparing for a war with Germany? And therefore, by June 41, he called for 800 thousand fees with the allowed limit under a million?
Somehow unconvincing.

[icant007]

Quote: Arzt

I did not understand what the author wanted to say.

The author tried to say that intelligence in particular and the military command in general are mugs. And an attempt to present something else is "falsification of our history")))

Here is the main idea of ​​all his articles)

[Sergey-1950]

The main idea of ​​the article is that the high command of the KrA did not expect a war in the summer of 1941. This belief was based on the RM provided by the RC General Staff. They involuntarily instilled this conviction into Stalin as well. Otherwise, they would have to declare that they themselves do not trust their own subordinates. But, unfortunately, unfortunately. Neither the leadership of the NGO, nor the General Staff thought about the option that the RM is disinformation. Or it may contain many inaccuracies and white spots. And then the war can start much earlier. In this case, plans for mobilization and deployment were to be worked out for two or three scenarios. But no one thought about it ...

[Doctor]

The main idea of ​​the article is that the high command of the KrA did not expect a war in the summer of 1941. This belief was based on the RM provided by the RC General Staff. They involuntarily instilled this conviction into Stalin as well.

This idea was instilled in us at school. Suddenly, without a declaration of war ...
The author is trying to revive her. But he constantly contradicts himself.

If they were waiting for the war in the spring-summer of 1941, they could easily call up to a million people for training.

And right there:

By June 22, 805 people had been drafted, with a limit of 264 appointees permitted by the Government.

[icant007]

Quote: Sergey-1950

The main idea of ​​the article is that the high command of the KrA did not expect a war in the summer of 1941.

Never tell this nonsense about an unexpected war to anyone else.

[Konnick]

Never tell this nonsense about an unexpected war to anyone else.

This justification was invented by the generals to accuse Stalin and to justify themselves.
I always quote a fact that I know:

The day before the start of the war, Major General N. Dedayev gave the order to withdraw the 67th division, which he commanded, from the barracks and to take up defensive positions around Libava. Thus, the first wave of fascist bombers bombed the empty barracks of the garrison, in contrast to the same Brest fortress.
There were orders that the majority were afraid to comply with because of fear of being accused of committing a provocation.

[Sergey-1950]

I would advise you to carefully read the commentary, and then write.
The fact of the matter is that the explanation of the suddenness of the attack did not explain anything to the person who had studied the issue in the slightest degree. I began to study the topic of the initial period of the Second World War when the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov appeared. Then the memoirs were just beginning to come out. Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Baghramyan, Meretskov and ... "History of the Great Patriotic War" 1962. editions. Almost all available sources ...
On the one hand, we were preparing. On the other hand, they were caught by surprise. At the same time, at that time I had no doubt that the intelligence was reporting everything accurately. This was the axiom stated by Zhukov, Vasilesky and others.
But gradually the thought arose that something was not being said ... For some reason, the problems caused by the suddenness lasted for a long time.
After ten years of reading, rereading, comparing facts from various sources, it became clear to me that the defeats at the beginning of the war had systemic reasons. Yes, the Red Army, suffering losses, weakened the Wehrmach, yes, the sacrifices were not in vain. But the systemic vices of the Red Army did not allow its enormous potential to be realized.
This is a completely wild hobby for mechanized corps. As a result, the mechanized corps were exterminated like dinosaurs, and the rifle divisions were deprived of tank support. Connection. Giving completely unrealistic orders. Lack of understanding of the need for interaction between the combat arms. Even the artillery escort of the infantry had to be taught in 1942 ...
Worse, for the same reasons, much the same thing happened again in 1942.

[icant007]

I would advise you to carefully read the commentary, and then write.

So don't confuse surprise and unwillingness. The fact that the mess was full is a no brainer.
But the war was not unexpected.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Yes, the Red Army, suffering losses, weakened the Wehrmach, yes, the sacrifices were not in vain.

Nobody ever argued with this - it was during 1941 and the first half of 1942 that the most trained personnel of the Wehrmacht were knocked out, which was qualitatively higher than our military personnel.

Quote: Sergey-1950

But the systemic vices of the Red Army did not allow its enormous potential to be realized.

Generally speaking, it is not so much a matter of "systemic flaws" as of the state's inability at that time to provide the army with everything it needs. From this it is necessary first of all to make a start, and then move on to the chaos in the army. You are aware that the People's Commissariat of Defense did not even have their own communication system, they had to rent communication lines from the NKS, there were no cable lines and all wire communication was on poles. This already allowed the Germans to deprive many parts of control in the first hours of the war, but this is not a mess, but the country's inability to build cable communication lines in the pre-war period due to a banal shortage of copper.

Quote: Sergey-1950

This is a completely wild hobby for mechanized corps.

Firstly, the idea of ​​mechanized corps arose in the early thirties, i.e. there was no "hobby" before the war, but there was a theory of motorized warfare, and the corps fit into it.
Secondly, the German tank groups and our tank armies at the end of the war just showed that the very idea of ​​mechanized corps is not so vicious. The viciousness was that their structure was not worked out in the exercises, and even the staffing was completely useless. But again, all this is related to the country's capabilities, and not to mistakes in justifying their creation.

Quote: Sergey-1950

Worse, for the same reasons, much the same thing happened again in 1942.

By the way, since you are already talking about 1942 and about our blunders, then you should not forget that in May of this year, the German commanders for the first time began to shout that the arriving reserves entirely consisted of poorly trained personnel. It turns out that it was not only us, but also the Germans who had to teach in the war.
So there are many different approaches to assessing the events of the initial period of the war, and they have broken spears on this more than once, but still we need to really understand and assess the military potential of Germany and the USSR and not blame everything on a mess in our Armed Forces.

[Sergey-1950]

[/ quote] Actually, the point is not so much in "systemic flaws" as in the absence of the state's ability at that time to provide the army with everything it needs. From this it is necessary first of all to make a start, and then move on to the chaos in the army. You know that the People's Commissariat of Defense did not even have their own communication system, they had to rent communication lines from the NKS, there were no cable lines and all wire communication was on poles. This already allowed the Germans in the first hours of the war to deprive many parts of control, but this is not a mess, but the country's inability to build cable communication lines in the pre-war period due to a banal shortage of copper. [Quote]
Let me argue with you.
The link example is a very good reason for this. It has long been known that before the maneuvers were carried out THREE WEEKS before them, a wire connection was being prepared. And even with all that, a civilian connection was used. The army simply did not have the skills to conduct combat operations in conditions of a collapse of wire communications. Now, if only the corps were run-in in conditions of the wire communication being out of order, and then they continued to engage in eyewash wherever they went ... Then at least in the Main Directorate of Communications there would be clarity of what was happening with communications in the troops at the beginning of the war. But the fact of the matter is that future communication problems with the start of the war remained a mystery to everyone from battalion commanders to the General Staff. And the lack of funds has nothing to do with it. If the problem is visible, then they look for solutions. And few of the GUS suggested it, but no one wanted to listen to them.
The second is one. Mechanized Corps. Yes, indeed, the idea of ​​creating tank hordes was born in the heads of Tukhachevsky and, apparently, many more. The origins of this idea, apparently, must be sought among the world's equestrian revolutionaries. But it is not important. Another thing is more important: who and how determined the number of tanks and mechanized corps for the future "liberation campaign"?
Tukhachevsky wanted to have 50-100 thousand tanks. Complete nonsense, because before the war the country approached the production of 100 thousand TRACTORS a year. But if we transfer the entire tractor industry to the production of only tanks, albeit exceptionally light ones, then even then they would be released 4-5 times less. The tank is not a tractor. But the fact is that tractors were also needed anyway. And for the people's economy and for the same army. We needed artillery tractors, which, too, could not produce a sufficient number. but a tractor is both simpler and cheaper than a tank.
Second or two. After the demolition of the old leadership of the NKO, tank appetites became more modest - at the turn of 1940-1941, the need for the number of mechanized corps was determined by nine. And suddenly, like a devil from a snuff-box, tsyfir 29 was born. Three times more. Who gave birth to this nonsense? On what basis? The question is open. It is not even discussed.
Indirectly, this points to G.K. Since these 29 MKs arose immediately with his arrival.
In my unenlightened opinion, if we had stayed with nine MKs, there would be more sense from them.
It's like diluting one liter of wine with two liters of water. Receive three liters of burda.
The second is three. For the formation of these MKs, all the infantry support tanks were taken. And what is infantry without the support of tanks can be easily seen from memoirs (Popel "In a tough time", Shatilov "On the land of Ukraine", Baghramyan- "This is how the war began" - battles for the elimination of the Okuninovsky bridgehead of the Germans, and many others)
But the most damning thing is that before the war the mechanized corps was not checked on the march. Yes, at least a tank division. But as soon as the war began, and on the very first day, flaws began to creep out, which could be easily identified and eliminated before the war. A simple example: it turns out that if a mechanical unit or a unit march for more than one day, then the drivers of cars, tanks and tractors begin to fall asleep. accidents, the materiel is out of order ...
These are the irresponsible ones! And surely they were all members of the Komsomol!
And the Germans had a co-driver for each truck. And in the crew of the tank there is at least one replacement mechanic drive. What, it was impossible to find out before the war?
Three. Anti-aircraft cover. T-that tears ...
Even the future Marshal of Victory believed that the BACK could cover 160 sq. Km, i.e. minimum etc. on the march. But it turned out that only FIVE sq. Km. The mistake is small. Only 32 times ... A trifle.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

And the lack of funds has nothing to do with it.

Well, if you are aware of the communication system from the battalion to the General Staff, then you probably should have known about its staffing with equipment in the troops - I will not repeat myself, but this sometimes amounted to 30-40% of the staff. What can we talk about if, with equipment below 80% staffing, any unit, including the liaison one, is considered non-ready in peacetime?

Quote: Sergey-1950

The army simply did not have the skills to conduct combat operations in conditions of a collapse of wire communications.

We did not have enough field wire for tactical actions, and the first long-distance communications equipment appeared only in 1942, i.e. we didn’t even have anything to compensate for the loss of the NLN wire connection. It's better not to remember about radio communication - poor training was noted even from Khalkin-Gol and to Finnish. But again, what is primary here, taking into account the fact that the units were not equipped with equipment, and there was simply nothing to teach people, and there were not enough signalmen themselves in the troops. It was from here that the legs of the loss of command and control of troops grew. I do not see the malicious intent of our commanders here - it did not depend on them.

Quote: Sergey-1950

Tukhachevsky wanted to have 50-100 thousand tanks.

Stalin believed that this was just Tukhachevsky's nonsense, which is why his ideas were not taken seriously.

Quote: Sergey-1950

And suddenly, like a devil from a snuff-box, tsyfir 29 was born. Three times more. Who gave birth to this nonsense? On what basis? The question is open.

Are you aware that the weapons program, adopted at the beginning of 1941, providing for the creation of 30 mechanized corps, was calculated until 1946, and in peacetime?
So first you need to understand the weapons program itself and the country's tank building capabilities, and only then ask about this figure, calling it nonsense. For me, taking into account the available tank fleet in 1941, and the annual production of 3-4 thousand tanks per year, the creation of 30 mechanized corps is not an impossible task.

Quote: Sergey-1950

For the formation of these MKs, all the infantry support tanks were taken.

This was due to the fact that at that time we could not with the first echelon of defense restrain the offensive strike of the Germans, which is why it was decided to create more highly mobile mechanized corps in order to quickly transfer them to the most dangerous areas of the gust. What in this idea is contrary to military science, if our cavalry has been used as a reserve during mass battles since ancient times?

Quote: Sergey-1950

But the most damning thing is that before the war the mechanized corps was not checked on the march.

This is a serious mistake, I agree, but with a strict limitation of the cost of fuel and the service life of equipment, knowing that it can fail for a long time during the march, the question of the correctness of this position is also not obvious.

Quote: Sergey-1950

A simple example: it turns out that if a mechanical unit or a unit march for more than one day, then the drivers of cars, tanks and tractors begin to fall asleep. accidents, the materiel is out of order ...

So this will happen now, which is why training marches of 500 km are limited. And it's better not to talk about the situation at that time. And nevertheless, the headquarters of KOVO successfully carried out a car march, which began on the eve of the war.

Quote: Sergey-1950

A trifle.

You know, I still wonder how they fought at the beginning of the war and managed to win, because I know what the Soviet Army was like before the collapse of the USSR and therefore I look at various "little things" from my experience of military service. In general, we were a poor country on the eve of the war, compared to Germany, and this was the main factor in their initial successes. It is good that our army did not flinch at that difficult time, and this already somehow puts various blunders into the background.

[Sergey-1950]

Dear ccsr, we are talking somehow in parallel. No offense, I'm talking about a lot of problems that could at least be discerned without waiting for the war and. And you tell me about the lack of this and that.
Well, there was a lack of, say, 50% or 60% of the means of communication. Yes, at least 90%. It’s not harmful to find out what it’s like to fight with a real deficit. Or do you want to say that you need to find out when the means (in this case, communications) are complete?
This is absurd. And if the funds BEFORE THE WAR are not included? Well, there will be only 70-80%. What, too, wait-wait? In addition, in the course of the database, part of the communication means (and much more) will be lost. Perhaps the same 30% will remain. So God himself orders to check how it is possible to keep the database in this case. The enemy will not wait for you to replenish to the norm.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

No offense, I'm talking about a lot of problems that could at least be discerned without waiting for the war and. And you tell me about the lack of this and that.

Well, we saw them before the war, asked the country's leadership to speed up the re-equipment of the army, but what's the point of it, if the country, for example, did not produce trunk communication cables at all, and I’m not even talking about field ones. Do you know or not, but we did not even produce the required number of radio tubes then, so we had to buy American ones for serial equipment - could the military have solved this problem?

Quote: Sergey-1950

It’s not harmful to find out what it’s like to fight with a real deficit.

Are you sure that without this you can fight against a well-armed enemy? The Germans proved to us that miracles do not happen, and if the tank has a small motor resource, it will fail on the march, without even entering the battle. This is where the losses began.

Quote: Sergey-1950

The enemy will not wait for you to replenish to the norm.

Of course it will not, but the country's leadership is not magicians to get out of the sleeve everything the army needs. Have you forgotten how we paid for the purchases of weapons in Great Britain for gold in the early years of the war? Are the military leaders to blame for this, too?

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Sergey-1950
No offense, I'm talking about a lot of problems that could at least be discerned without waiting for the war and. And you tell me about the lack of this and that.

Well, we saw them before the war, asked the country's leadership to speed up the re-equipment of the army, but what's the point of it, if the country, for example, did not produce trunk communication cables at all, and I’m not even talking about field ones. Do you know or not, but we did not even produce the required number of radio tubes then, so we had to buy American ones for serial equipment - could the military have solved this problem?

The military could not solve the problem of the lack of cables and radio tubes. But they COULD AND HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO carry out exercises without preliminary THREE-WEEK PREPARATION of the educational theater. This is blatant eyewash and self-deception.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

The military could not solve the problem of the lack of cables and radio tubes.

It is already good that you understand this, in contrast to the author of the article.

Quote: Sergey-1950

But they COULD AND HAVE BEEN OBLIGED TO carry out exercises without preliminary THREE-WEEK PREPARATION of the educational theater.

Who told you that the exercises were not carried out at all? You have apparently forgotten that for the equipment of a new theater of operations on the western borders after 1939, the spacecraft engineering service took 5-7 years - reports on this issue are available on the network.

Quote: Sergey-1950

This is blatant eyewash and self-deception.

I agree only partly, because there was such a thing, but to say that everything was built on this in the spacecraft is simply ridiculous - the first weeks of the battles have already shown the Germans what they did not expect to face. One exit of the Boldin group is in itself an incredible fact for the world military history of the 20th century. This is, of course, lyrics, but I still adhere to the idea that we were simply much weaker in 1941 than the Germans.

[Sergey-1950]

(continuation).
And the following happened. Not only did most of the formations not have a set of communications equipment (transport, anti-aircraft artillery, support tanks in rifle formations ...), they also had no idea what problems would arise when it started.
Second. The spacecraft also had well-assembled connections. For example, 4th, 8th and 6th mechanized corps. It gave them a lot. In a connection equipped with 100% vehicles, drivers will still fall asleep at the wheel in a day and make accidents. That sharply reduced the speed of the column. And what is the use of this completeness?
But back to the connection. Not just to the means of communication, but to communication as a system.
Poor functioning of communications as a system, when and if the situation changed rapidly and new decisions had to be made within a few hours, led to a collapse of command and control. The formations fought in isolation. In most cases, this led to defeat or defeat and retreat. There are very few exceptions to successful actions of fronts, armies, or at least corps at the beginning of the war (actions of the 5th Army, and even then not from the first day, the Investigative Committee of General Petrovsky in Mogileven is 100%), there are more examples of successful actions of divisions and regiments. But the successful actions of even the corps could not greatly influence the situation on the front line of defense.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

And what is the use of this completeness?

Generally, manning is assessed not only by technology, but also by personnel, weapons and rear reserves.

Quote: Sergey-1950

Poor functioning of communications as a system, when and if the situation changed quickly and new decisions had to be made within a few hours, led to a collapse of command and control.

This is all theory, and now tell us if there are not enough regular radio operators in the regiment-division-corps link, then how are you going to manage tens of thousands of servicemen on the march, stretching for many tens of kilometers.

Quote: Sergey-1950

But the successful actions of even the corps could not greatly influence the situation on the front line of defense.

The whole war is a series of successful actions ranging from tactical to operational at the army level. It was this that decided the outcome of the war, and not what the General Staff could have planned, although it was in the strategic plan that we began to outplay the Germans only after we were able to put the Germans in our position in 1943.

[AsmyppoL]

You are absolutely right.
If such exercises were held at least in 1939-40, these unacceptable problems would be revealed. They would have been voiced before the leadership of the KA, who, having realized them, would have brought the essence of the problem to Stalin and the Council of People's Commissars. But the leadership of the army at that time was interested in the number of tanks, guns and aircraft, and not in the problems of control or and the interaction of units and formations.

Therefore, as Gapich writes, in 1938-1939, a number of enterprises producing communications equipment switched to the production of more needed products: they began to participate in the production of military equipment.
Gapich submitted a note in 1940, but the leadership of the spacecraft, not understanding the problem, could not clearly explain the need for communication. In the note, he clearly explained what needs to be done to increase the production of communications equipment and, in particular, cable.
And there can be no excuse for G.K. Zhukov that he became chief of the General Staff only in January 1941. He was the commander of KOVO and was obliged to delve into this problem in the district ... This problem in the spring of 1941 was not announced to the command of the districts.

As a result, as Gapich writes, the formations left the points of deployment and did not reach the areas where operational communications were deployed.
"Operation of radio stations during the period of concentration and deployment not foreseen, so as not to reveal the deployment of troops to the enemy. "
Therefore, on the first day, a loss of control was carried out. And the first two days did not affect the loss of border battles.

Here is what Bagramyan writes: about the 41st Panzer Division of the 22nd Mechanized Corps: “There was an obvious discrepancy with it; east, apparently to Kovel, where, according to the plan, the entire 22 mechanized corps was to be concentrated. Neither the commander nor the corps commander had any contact with the division by the end of the day [June 22] ... "A whole mechanized corps was lost in ZAPOVO.

There was a lot that could be done. For example, to buy communications and thousands of kilometers of cable in Germany. And they bought the cruiser "Lutsev" ... They could have taken part of the communications equipment from the inner districts. It did not even occur to the General Staff to deploy the communications units and units of the border districts before the war ...
But Zhukov was Gapich's immediate superior and did nothing ... Although he did, he submitted a plan for the deployment of a huge number of formations, formations, the equipping of which left the means of communication, and so extremely small ...

[Sergey-1950]

Alexey, it looks like we think similarly.
Before the war, colossal work was really done in the country. Samples of new technology alone are worth what. But not enough attention was paid to mastering technology and acquiring combat skills.
Worse than that. The troops were not trained in many necessary things. Leading a retreat - the word "retreat" was taboo. And as a derivative, the troops had no idea what to do in an encirclement or in a threat of encirclement. The command staff consists not only of thinking and decisive people.
Most follow the prescribed methods. If you do not work with them in advance, then the average officer may get confused or act not in the best way. And the delivery of impracticable orders ... And how did they know that, for example, the 6th MK would have to abandon all the artillery in the camp, since there were no tractors for it. And, as Baghramyan writes, "then we understood ...". We realized that the order could be given. But it will be impossible to fulfill it. Or the mechanized corps that fulfilled the order upon arrival at the deployment point will not be at all the mechanized corps, which it should be according to all calculations.
The apotheosis or the beginning of this fashion was the directive number 2 on the transition to the "decisive" offensive on June 23rd.
Zhukov was then ashamed of this directive. In "Memories ..." he tried to dissociate himself from her authorship. But something is hard to believe in his innocence.
The directive did not take into account EVERYTHING that must be taken into account when issuing such an order. Neither intelligence, nor an assessment of the state of our troops ... nothing is provided. What for?

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Sergey-1950

The directive did not take into account EVERYTHING that must be taken into account when issuing such an order. Neither intelligence, nor an assessment of the state of our troops ... nothing is provided. What for

The answer to such questions was given by A. Isaev in one of his books - even knowing (after the fact!) The detailed situation, tell us how must was to do?
And advice about the cable and about the cruiser, with reference to the "useless" Zhukov, in favor of the poor. Ask at your leisure - who and when became the People's Commissar of Communications, and in what condition the People's Commissariat of Communications was in the pre-war years.
Everyone sees himself as a Napoleon, after 80 years ...

[AsmyppoL]

I already know that.
We managed to unearth a lot of things that others did not see.
And your rudeness does not bother me at all.
Some readers asked me to express my opinion and I am presenting it.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I already know it

Wow...

Quote: AsmyppoL

And your rudeness does not bother me at all

That's even how ... Finally, the post was addressed to another person. Getting into other people's discussions is bad manners. All the more so for those who think they are literate.

[AsmyppoL]

Try to find another person's statement about the cruiser ... This is what I say ...
They asked me through a personal note and I expressed my opinion: if anyone else is interested in this ...
Judging by the pluses, someone liked it ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

The apotheosis or the beginning of this fashion was the directive number 2 on the transition to the "decisive" offensive on June 23rd.

I'm just wondering if you yourself read it to tell tales about the "decisive offensive"?

"TO MILITARY COUNCILS LVO, PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO, ODVO
Copy: TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF THE NAVY
On June 22, 1941, at 04:XNUMX in the morning, German aviation, without any reason, raided and bombarded our airfields and cities along the western border.
At the same time, German troops opened artillery fire in different places and crossed our border.
In connection with an unheard-of insolent attack from Germany on the Soviet Union
p r and a z v and y:
1. Troops by all means and means to attack the enemy forces and destroy them in the areas where they violated the Soviet border.
Henceforth, until further notice, ground troops will not cross the border.
2. By reconnaissance and combat aviation to establish the places of concentration of enemy aviation and the grouping of his ground forces.
Destroy aircraft at enemy airfields and bomb the main groupings of enemy ground forces with powerful blows from bomber and assault aviation.
To deliver air strikes to a depth of German territory up to 100-150 km.
Bomb Königsberg and Memel.
Do not air raids on the territory of Finland and Romania until special instructions.
Tymoshenko
Malenkov,
Zhukov
22.6.41 y., 7.15 "

https://nvo.ng.ru/history/1999-11-12/5-directive.html
Even from the text it follows that we are not talking about any offensive by fronts or armies at all, and even aviation tasks are limited in the radius of destruction and in the territory of other allies of Germany.
Maybe it’s enough to misinterpret history to please someone’s interests, and to carefully study the documents of those years yourself?

[Sergey-1950]

1. Troops by all means and means attack the enemy forces and destroy them in the areas where they violated the Soviet border.
Henceforth, until further notice, ground troops will not cross the border.

Something I don’t understand anymore about what we are arguing. What do you think to attack the enemy with all your might is not a decisive offensive? Then we must first agree on the terminology, otherwise further discussion will turn into a dispute about nothing. You, it seems to me, are already ready to transfer to my personality.
But I will return to the essence, and not to the form, to which you are happy to try to move out. So, my main thought: a few hours after the start of the war (I don't remember the exact hour, but somewhere at noon), the leadership decided to throw down the adversary with a rr-decisive and mighty blow. Forgetting all the basic commandments: first, kill the water, and then get into the water. That is, find out what forces and where the adversary is advancing, try to understand his goals, after that take a look at what you yourself have and then set reasonable tasks for your squads.
None of this happened.
Here is what Sandalov, a staff member of the 4th Army of the Western Front, writes in his memoirs:

And at about 16 pm I was summoned to the reserve command post of the army, in the area of ​​the Dam (20 kilometers north-east of Kobrin). The chief of staff of the district, General Klimovskikh, finally managed to contact this point via the wires of the People's Commissariat of Communications. Together with me, the army commander and a member of the Military Council went to the negotiations. In their presence, I briefly reported on the situation by telegraph and received the following instructions from General Klimovskikh:

“The district headquarters turned into the headquarters of the Western Front. A general mobilization has been announced. Transfer the army to wartime states. The troops of the neighboring army at 10 o'clock fought on the border. Since then, there has been no connection with them. The front commander orders the 4th Army: with a counterattack, mainly by the forces of the Oborin corps, to defeat the enemy in the Brest region and reach the border. To help you from the zone of the neighboring army, from the Belsk-Gainovka line, the mechanized corps of General Akhlyustin will act in the direction of Brest.

[Sergey-1950]

So, the 4th army received the task of defeating the enemy with its two corps - rifle and mechanized (and this is 75-80 percent of the forces of this army).
I draw your attention again: at four o'clock in the afternoon On June 22nd, the 4th GOT a directive / order / polite-request (not in the name of the essence) for a suicidal offensive. You can read the details yourself.
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/sandalov1/index.html, стр. 115

[Sergey-1950]

Bagramyan writes about the same thing. Chief of the operational department of the headquarters of the South-Western Front.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

I draw your attention once again: at four o'clock on June 22nd, the 4th received a directive / order / polite request (not in the title) for a suicidal offensive.

Once again I draw your attention to your ignorance in military affairs - any offensive is planned in advance, taking into account the forces and means available, indicating the goals and objectives of such an offensive. Where did you see all this in the directive number 2 which you are waving and the essence of which you do not understand at all.

Quote: Sergey-1950

June 22nd 4th RECEIVED a directive / order / polite-request (not in the title)

This is where your misunderstanding of this directive grows, because for you everything is one, whether it's an order, a request, or a directive. What then can I talk to you about if you do not know that a return to initial positions does not mean at all that an offensive was planned at that period. How to plan it, even if there was not even a general picture on all fronts by this time?

Quote: Sergey-1950

You can read the details yourself.

You still don’t understand these details - why should I discuss with you what you don’t understand.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

Something I don’t understand anymore about what we are arguing. What do you think to attack the enemy with all your might is not a decisive offensive?

Of course not - it is necessary to prepare an offensive even during a war, and it takes time.

Quote: Sergey-1950

So, my main thought: a few hours after the start of the war (I don't remember the exact hour, but somewhere at noon), the leadership decided to throw down the adversary with a rr-decisive and mighty blow.

These are just your fantasies, because there was no plan for a "decisive offensive". You can study the cover plans for a start. Or did you find it somewhere else? By the way, the Directive is not an order, it has a different status in the army regulations.

Quote: Sergey-1950

Klimovskikh the following instructions:

“The district headquarters turned into the headquarters of the Western Front. General mobilization has been announced. Transfer the army to wartime states. The troops of the neighboring army at 10 o'clock fought on the border. Since then, there has been no connection with them. The front commander orders the 4th Army: counterstrike, mainly by the forces of the Oborin corps, defeat the enemy in the Brest region and reach the border. To help you from the zone of the neighboring army, from the Belsk-Gainovka line, the mechanized corps of General Akhlyustin will act in the direction of Brest.

In fact, we are talking only about a counterattack in order to return to their original positions, repelling them from the enemy, and not about conducting an offensive. Can't you understand this from the text you quoted? I wonder where you studied and studied military science, or in general.

[ccsr]

Quote: Arzt

I did not understand what the author wanted to say. That the USSR was not preparing for a war with Germany? And therefore, by June 41, he called for 800 thousand fees with the allowed limit under a million?
Somehow unconvincing.

Moreover, this illiterate "researcher" is modestly silent about the fact that two deployed armies arrived in KOVO, and the entire reserve of the Civil Code included several armies, and Marshal M.V. Zakharov writes about this:

In this way, to the second strategic echelon, which was the reserve of the High Command, included the 16th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 24th and 28th armies; and they included 58 rifle, 13 tank and 6 motorized rifle divisions.
The advance of the 19th and 16th armies to the Kiev direction shows that the main forces of the Red Army were concentrated south of Polesie, according to the certificate "On the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the west", compiled by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin eight days before the start of the war, that is, June 13, 1941.

So the lie of the author of the article that they allegedly mobilized little for training camps is devoid of common sense - this difference was blocked by the newly arriving armies, which were much better prepared than the scribes. This is how this figure distorts not only our history, but also denigrates the leadership of the country and the army at that time.

[cavl]

What is this nonsense about better trained armies from the inner districts?
In divisions from the inner districts, only a third of the rifle companies are manned. The rest of the composition is attributed. It takes 25 days to harmonize the personnel of the division according to the pre-war standards.
And in the arriving divisions from the North Caucasus, there are still many untrained people who hardly know how to shoot and prepare a grenade for a throw.
You will also quote from the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky that all 802000 called up for the collection departed to the west.

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

What is this nonsense about better trained armies from the inner districts?

There is no nonsense - at least against the background of the appointees, they already had well-coordinated units, were staffed with personnel and equipment, albeit incompletely. Yes, and combat training in these units was carried out for more than three weeks.

Quote: cavl

And in the arriving divisions from the North Caucasus, there are still many untrained people who hardly know how to shoot and prepare a grenade for a throw.

Did you yourself study the composition of the divisions that were part of the 19th Army? For example:

The 127th Rifle Division was formed by the directive of the NKO of the USSR No. 0/1/104596 of July 8, 1940 in the Kharkov Military District on the basis of the 23rd Rifle Division that had departed to the Baltic States. Major General T. G. Korneev was appointed commander of the division. Parts of the division were stationed in the cities of Kharkov, Chuguev and Bohodukhiv.
In mid-August 1940, the staffing of the division with personnel and military equipment was completed. From September 20, 1940, the division took part in demonstrative tactical exercises, where it was praised by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense for its high skills. The cadets of the regimental school and artillerymen of the 535th rifle regiment especially distinguished themselves.

Then look for yourself, and do not forget that replenishment does not mean that a division was not combat-ready before, if it did not have 100% of its personnel.

Quote: cavl

You will also quote from the memoirs of Marshal Vasilevsky that all 802000 called up for the collection departed to the west.

Why I need this, I do not understand, but your tales about a third of the command staff without a decree of categories looks at the level of similar memoirs.

[Alex 1970]

As I already wrote about the huge number of abbreviations, and so here is the link, take a look before writing. After all, you can end up with your Newspeak like this. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Su7trrJZQI

[AsmyppoL]

Yes, okay, Alexey. Three-quarters of the abbreviations are a primer for people interested in the events of the war: the General Staff, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Red Army and the abbreviated names of military districts ... There are only three or four abbreviations that are less common ...

[Sergey-1950]

Interesting article. Thanks to the author and other authors for unearthing the topic of the pre-war period and the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.
This period was completely distorted by our memoirists and academic publications on the Second World War. Reading the memoirs and even cross-reading them did not give an answer to the sacramental questions "Why? How could this have happened in June-July 1941. And why a remnant of the same army was able to chase the Germans near Rostov, Tikhvin and near Moscow? After horrific disasters." The reference to "surprise and treachery" made me dumbfounded and aroused first rage and then a bitter smile for the twentieth time. And finally, the publication of classified documents and the work of enthusiasts gave the answer to these damn questions. Thank you very much for your work.

[AsmyppoL]

Thank you very much for the good words Sergey-1950, Agoran, Polpot, Tihonmarine!

[Non-fighter]

PTABRs by means of transport separated from other units, at least could be brought to positions ...

Who will give them cars? What pocket will they get it out of?
Let me remind you that the transport that was listed in the army BEFORE mobilization ran in the national economy.

[Konnick]

Plans ... plans. But it turned out differently, it's not arrows to draw. Our generals underestimated the influence of aviation on the course of hostilities, although the Spanish Civil War showed its growing role. When our pilots left Spain, the Francoists immediately seized air supremacy and the defeat began in the battle on the Ebro River.

Our airfields became the primary targets of the German aviation. Having deprived us of fighter aviation, the Luftwaffe seized air supremacy, and what is it, any movement of troops became a problem, movement on the railways was blocked, aviation reconnaissance clearly monitored the location of our units, bomber aviation blocked supplies and smashed headquarters, and ground attack aircraft closely interacted with tank wedges. Therefore, no matter how brilliant our generals were, all plans collapsed due to a lack of aviation cover.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Arzt

I did not understand what the author wanted to say. That the USSR was not preparing for a war with Germany? And therefore, by June 41, he called for 800 thousand fees with the allowed limit under a million?
Somehow unconvincing.

111 550 apprentices were called for training camps in PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and OdVO.
4 conscripts were drafted into the rifle divisions of the state 100/1900 (staff 10291 + 1100 = 12191 people)
4 conscripts were drafted into the rifle divisions of the state 120/6000 (staff 5864 + 6000 = 11864 people)
Those. they wanted to have about 12000 men in the rifle divisions.

Mountain rifle divisions (6 in the KOVO and one in the ODVO) were contained in 4/140 staff in the amount of 8829 people. 1100 people were called to the training camp in KOVO.

If they were waiting for war and wanted to increase 103 divisions of the western border districts to 12000 people, then another 255053 attorneys would have to be attracted to the training camp. This was not done. Determination of the volume of those called up for collection was given to the districts and about 350 thousand were called up in the internal districts. The time of arrival according to the summons for the gathering of the assigned personnel was estimated at 1-3 days.
If they were expecting war, then as many personnel as possible should have been raised in the western border districts, and in the inner ones it could have been raised before sending ...
Before the deployment of the divisions of the border western districts, up to the wartime level, it was additionally required to transfer from the inner districts about a million enrolled personnel and tens of thousands of vehicles and horses ...

In addition, in ZAPOVO, PribOVO and OdVO there were somewhere 25-30% of untrained people who were also called up for training camps. They needed to be taught basic skills. In Soviet times, a little less than a month was allotted to the course of a young fighter before taking the oath. So untrained conscripts, if they were waiting for the war on June 22, had to be called up immediately after the May holidays, to conduct a KMB and begin to coordinate with the rest of the composition arriving at the training camp.
It was possible to defend in the Government to increase the number of people recruited for the BUS (hidden mobilization) 1,6 million, as in the previous year. If the leadership of the spacecraft were sure of this, but they were not at all sure of this ...
That's the only thing I wanted to say ...

[AsmyppoL]

And when I indicated the number of 255053 people for the training camp, one must not forget about one more point.
Usually conscription for military service in the Red Army was made in the fall (after the end of the harvest). In 1941, in the spring, a large number of young conscripts were called up (I can't look for this question on the Internet now). Even taking into account this draft, the shortage in the divisions was large. And before bringing them up to 12000 staff, on average, it was required to arrive at the training camp 111550 and 255053 people of the assigned staff

[Doctor]

And when I indicated the number of 255053 people for the training camp, one must not forget about one more point.
Usually conscription for military service in the Red Army was made in the fall (after the end of the harvest). In 1941, in the spring, a large number of young conscripts were called up (I cannot search for this question on the Internet now).

And what does this mean? About the fact that they did not expect a war?

You yourself write:

By June 22, 805 people had been drafted, with a limit of 264 appointees permitted by the Government.

Is it common practice to call for a million dollars every year?

Further, it is also unconvincing:

If the command of the spacecraft was expecting a war in June 1941, then untrained personnel would not be involved in the training camp. They would attract trained people and most of them were drafted into the divisions of the western military units.

Do you know why it is unconvincing? Because before the Finnish it was exactly the same. Moreover, not only the untrained were called up, but often they did not even say that they were being drafted into the army. As, for example, in Kharkov under the guise of a trip to ski competitions.
This is generally a common practice for the USSR, right up to Chechnya.

[Sergey-1950]

Quote: Arzt

... before Finnish it was exactly the same. Moreover, not only the untrained were called up, but often they did not even say that they were being drafted into the army. As, for example, in Kharkov under the guise of a trip to ski competitions.
This is generally a common practice for the USSR, right up to Chechnya.

Yes you are right. Tyrants, damn it ... My grandfather was dragged to the Russian-Japanese 1904. I went to see hockey, I think Spartak and CSKA, and his there ... and another half of the stadium. My grandmother went crazy until he called her on her mobile. But this is only two months later. Cell phones were immediately taken away from everyone ... the satraps ...

[AsmyppoL]

Unconvincing, so unconvincing ...
But your argument that the Finnish war was also akin to the "because" argument.
It was different in the Finnish war. At first, the LVO wanted to cope quickly and raised the enrollment structure of only its district. There is no inter-district traffic here.
When it did not work out quickly, but it turned out longer and without light, they began to transfer regiments (aviation) and divisions from many parts of our country. At the same time, the enrollment structure was raised in the Western Districts (that's how much I was not looking for it).
But it was raised with the consent of the Government and the Politburo. As the figures say, they were raised by 1,59 million people. But they raised the composition already assigned to the divisions, where there were much less untrained people. Because in 1939, for example, from Central Asia, they began to call in six times more people. But in 1939, the people were already assigned to the raised divisions ...

By the end of the summer of 1940, the spacecraft was practically reduced to its original composition. They plan to collect in 1941 and again come to the number of 1,6 million enrolls for the collection. But the situation has changed. In the western border districts, half of the units are located on the newly annexed lands and the assigned composition is partly local, i.e. untrained.
They said in the Government that they have filed a lot and need to be reduced to less than a million, and the military have also been reduced. In January, they do not expect a war in the summer.
New mechanized corps are formed in the spring, and some of them are again in new territories, where the composition is mostly untrained. Do they know about this in the General Staff's mob control? Of course they know - this work is their bread ...
Now it is allowed to call in more than 975 thousand registered personnel, raised just over 800 thousand, and more than 2/3 of them are far from the border. Is this the expectation of war? When do divisions need to move to the border for two weeks? And the divisions of the internal districts must also mobilize - there are very few transport of them. And without transport, 50-60% of the artillery must be left at the points of permanent deployment. And if the mobilization is carried out according to the plan, an additional week or two are needed ...
So what is the point of calling in attorneys in the division of the internal districts if you know that a war is about to begin? And the divisions should still lift the assigned transport? During this time, the assignees will arrive. After all, they have a standard of 1-3 days before arriving at the unit.

In my opinion, if a war is expected, then the entire enlistment staff must be driven to the western districts, tk. when mobilization is announced, trains with redeployed units, assigned personnel from internal districts, and assigned vehicles will go there anyway. And the smearing of the lifted composition, in my opinion, is just raising it for study, eh. not expecting a war ...

[Doctor]

It was different in the Finnish war. At first, the LVO wanted to cope quickly and raised the enrollment structure of only its district. There is no inter-district traffic here.
When it did not work out quickly, but it turned out longer and without light, they began to transfer regiments (aviation) and divisions from many parts of our country. At the same time, the enrollment structure was raised in the Western Districts (that's how much I was not looking for it).

Like: "You don't understand, this is different."
The same thing.
You are proceeding from the idealistic premises of modern times - trained, experienced, selected warriors must fight.
But this is not the case. Even now. And even more so in those years.
Historical experience says that the untrained are easily and unobtrusively sent to war.
This is now being discussed in the next branch: a resuscitation physician is needed in the DRG, or the usual doctor will be enough.
In the case of a large-scale batch of the WWII type, everything will be as usual - men to the front, women in the field, children to the machine.

[Doctor]

So what is the point of calling in attorneys in the division of the internal districts if you know that a war is about to begin? And the divisions should still lift the assigned transport? During this time, the assignees will arrive. After all, they have a standard of 1-3 days before arriving at the unit.

In my opinion, if a war is expected, then the entire enlistment staff must be driven to the western districts, tk. when mobilization is announced, trains with redeployed units, assigned personnel from internal districts, and assigned vehicles will go there anyway. And the smearing of the lifted composition, in my opinion, is just raising it for study, eh. not expecting a war ...

First, to drive the entire enrollment into the border districts is to provoke Hitler. He and what was there was enough:

German Declaration on the Declaration of War on the USSR (1941)
Summarizing the above, the imperial government declares that the Soviet government, contrary to its obligations:
1) ...
2) ...
3) concentrated on the German border all their troops in full combat readiness. Thus, the Soviet government violated the treaties with Germany and intends to attack Germany from the rear, while it is fighting for its existence ...

Secondly, it is wrong strategically (if you are going to defend ). With a sudden attack by the enemy, they will be surrounded (which is what happened).

Thirdly, are you going to fight only in the first echelon? They call everywhere, including to the internal districts, to build up forces.

And if you look at what was not reinforced, but THROUGHOUT to the western borders, then there can be no question of any unwillingness.

From 13 to 22 May, the General Staff ordered 3 armies to start moving to the western borders of the 22nd, 21st and 16th armies ...
On May 13, cadets from military schools were released ahead of schedule ...
By the directive of the Chief of the General Staff, the western border districts were ordered from June 12 to June 15 to secretly withdraw divisions located in the depths, closer to the state border ...
From June 14 to June 19, the command of the border districts received instructions by June 22-23 to withdraw the front (army) directorates to the field points ...

[Sergey-1950]

[quote = Arzt] [quote]
First, to drive the entire enrollment into the border districts means to provoke Hitler. [/ i] [/ quote]
The fact of the matter is that until the very beginning of the war there was no complete clarity of what was going on. Is the Wehrmacht deploying to attack? Or is it a red herring in the war with England? But a real build-up of forces is taking place, they are moving forward in the border and even bringing artillery to fire, putting shells on the ground, pontoon parks on the banks of rivers ...
In the eyes of those who stood at the border, this meant the beginning of the war from minute to minute .... But the General Staff, NGOs had RM, according to which GERMANY DIDN'T HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES AT OUR BORDERS for a major war.
Showing the preparation of troops for the DB is one thing, but having enough strength for a real war is quite another. According to RU intelligence, the Germans did not have the strength to do something serious. There is excellent material on this issue on this site.
https://topwar.ru/160519-a-dolozhila-li-razvedka-tochno.html
Thanks to Eugene for the huge and painstaking work.

The point is that we have an afterthought. And then and there, our leadership had to decide on the basis of THE KNOWLEDGE HAVE THEM. This knowledge was based primarily on the RM RU GSh and the conviction of the GSh and NCOs in the reliability of RM.
But to our great regret, the intelligence contained glaring holes, which played a fatal role in the essentially inadequate response of our leadership to changes in the situation on the eve of the war and in the first days of the war.

[Doctor]

The fact of the matter is that until the very beginning of the war there was no complete clarity of what was going on.

It `s naturally.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey-1950

... But the General Staff, NPOs had RM, according to which GERMANY DIDN'T HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES AT OUR BORDERS for a major war.

This is where such an enchanting conclusion comes from, if all intelligence reports in June 1941 indicated the arrival of more and more Wehrmacht units to our border? Even according to report No. 5, you can calculate how many units of the Wehrmacht have already been partially or completely redeployed to our border, but do you think that this was not enough for an attack? On the first page of the summary it is indicated that on June 1, 120-122 Wehrmacht divisions were deployed near our borders, not counting their allies. And that was not enough? Well, well, you probably do not know that for another three weeks the Germans drove the troops to the border.

Quote: Sergey-1950

According to RU intelligence, the Germans did not have the strength to do something serious.

Lies, you, like the author of the articles, cannot even figure out the summaries, so you fantasize about this.

Quote: Sergey-1950

But to our great regret, the intelligence contained glaring holes, which played a fatal role in the essentially inadequate response of our leadership to changes in the situation on the eve of the war and in the first days of the war.

This is another heinous lie in the spirit of the article's author, and not supported by anything. On what basis then did the Directive w / n June 21, indicating the exact date of the attack - June 22-23, appeared? Well, if the leadership did not know the exact date, how could they then give it to the troops and the navy - they didn’t think about it by chance?

[Sergey-1950]

"" First, to drive the entire enrollment into the border districts means to provoke Hitler. ""


The fact of the matter is that until the very beginning of the war there was no complete clarity of what was going on. Is the Wehrmacht deploying to attack? Or is it a red herring in the war with England? But a real build-up of forces is taking place, they are moving forward in the border and even bringing artillery to fire, putting shells on the ground, pontoon parks on the banks of rivers ...
In the eyes of those who stood at the border, this meant the beginning of the war from minute to minute .... But the General Staff, NGOs had RM, according to which GERMANY DIDN'T HAVE SUFFICIENT FORCES AT OUR BORDERS for a major war.
Showing the preparation of troops for the DB is one thing, but having enough strength for a real war is quite another. According to RU intelligence, the Germans did not have the strength to do something serious. There is excellent material on this issue on this site.
https://topwar.ru/160519-a-dolozhila-li-razvedka-tochno.html
Thanks to Eugene for the huge and painstaking work.

The point is that we have an afterthought. And then and there, our leadership had to decide on the basis of THE KNOWLEDGE HAVE THEM. This knowledge was based primarily on the RM RU GSh and the conviction of the GSh and NCOs in the reliability of RM.
But to our great regret, the intelligence contained glaring holes, which played a fatal role in the essentially inadequate response of our leadership to changes in the situation on the eve of the war and in the first days of the war.

[Sergey-1950]

(continuation).
Here's something else to consider. When discussing the themes of the war of the Third Reich against the Soviet Union, the participants in the discussion often, even most often, do not take into account the international situation on the eve of the war and the international situation of our country. Stalin and the leadership as a whole had a priority goal of preventing a war with the combined forces of the fascist alliance and the Anglo-Saxons. The socio-economic basis for creating such an alliance. For those who have forgotten, I will remind you that the share of the USSR in the world military-economic potential of the planet was 14%. For comparison: Germany-14,4%, England-10,2%, USA -... 42%. Only these three participants, having united, did not give our country any chances not only of winning the war, but even of some kind of analogue of the Brest Peace.
In 1984, a very good book on this topic was published - V. Sevostyanov "Before the Great Test".
Therefore, Stalin behaved extremely cautiously. Overcautious .... But there is an explanation for this.

[AsmyppoL]

First of all, the leadership of the spacecraft did not even allow the possibility of encircling large groups of spacecraft forces. If you have any other data, I will read it with interest. I'm talking about the encirclement of large groups of our troops.

Further, a year before the war, there were about 800000 appointees in the Western districts, including those from the inner districts. And no one was afraid to provoke about twenty German infantry divisions with our armada.

The question is different. Beginning on June 23, echelons with hundreds of thousands of appointees went to the border. For example, about 200 thousand of the enrolled personnel did not arrive at the ZAPOVO. Therefore, in the warehouses for this personnel, they were unclaimed and the enemy got about 300000 rifles, it is not known how many of the 24000 assault rifles, several tens of thousands of light and heavy machine guns, about 4400 artillery pieces, about 350 tanks. This is what the enemy got because of the non-arrival of the assigned personnel and transport.
We are not talking about the property abandoned by mechanized corps and rifle divisions on the marches.
Since June 30, dozens of echelons with enrolled personnel for the Western Military District began to be returned to the ARVO, where there was no equipment, no weapons, or uniforms for them.
And to recruit the divisions of the OrVO, HVO, their appointees went and also without weapons.
And after the departed armies from the inner districts, they were already assigned to them in the places where these armies were to be deployed. And the armies began to be transferred to another place. And for mobplanes, some of them were to be concentrated at the border. Echelons from separate internal districts with enrolled personnel went there.

The deep hulls of course went to the border, but they had no transport. Therefore, about 50-60 percent of the artillery remained in the permanent deployment points. The mobilization scheme was violated.
Since the armies of the internal districts did not go to fight, but to the camps, the manning of the echelons took place in a random manner.
For example, in the ZhBD of the 16th Army it is said that the echelons entered the battle from the wheels, and the ammunition was in other echelons. And with the beginning of the war, they all got mixed up and they were sent to different stations. Before shipment, the equipment did not go through either repair or routine maintenance. As a result, a huge number of tanks of the 5th mechanized corps were out of order.

Due to the violation of the mobplan, for example, the rifle corps being transferred to Minsk, had either 206 or 209 shells of the same caliber. There was no pomegranate at all. Yes, they received something from the warehouses of the Minsk UR, but these warehouses do not have 122-mm and 152-mm shells, there are no mortar mines, tk. this is not in service with the Urovsk units. The stock of grenades is not designed for a whole hull. 76 mm shells are not intended for divisional guns of the same caliber ...

The corps, which were marching on foot, left most of the artillery. She was supposed to come after the mobilization of transport. But people did not go to war, they went to the camps. If they knew about the war, they would have removed more weapons from their warehouses ...
About the release of commanders. There were also graduations in June and it is said about graduation from some schools back in April ...
The problem was different ...

[Doctor]

The problem was different ...

That's right, you perfectly describe the preparation of the USSR for the war with Germany.
She's very impressive.

So what's the problem?

[AsmyppoL]

Above, I have not noted one more point.
At the present time, I do not know the degree of staffing of armies moving out of the Ural and Volga districts.
They partially called up the assigned personnel, but they, as divisions of the 4/120 state, did not have enough transport. So, did they take the entire artillery park across the state or left part of it in the districts ... There is no information about this.
Why did you do this? The army leadership did not expect a war. Something unexpected happened on the 9th or on the night of June 10th. Since the question of mobilization could not go, they did as they did.
Why couldn't we talk about mobilization? The military fell on Stalin.
My opinion is this: the military had only one plan to deploy the entire colossus at once. It was not envisaged by the plans of the military for the complete deployment of part of the troops with the mobilization of transport from the national economy.
If you believe Budyonny's diary, then on June 21, they announced that we would defeat the enemy at the border. They did not understand how they would be smashed. And when they called the districts around 23-00 on June 21, they did not say anything about the content of the directive.
But before that you should wait two months ...

[AsmyppoL]

I beg your pardon, we are talking about the fact that the military did not have plans to deploy only divisions of the 1st and 2nd echelons of covering armies (or in separate districts) with the mobilization of transport from the national economy

[Sergey-1950]

As you study the issue, more and more attention is riveted on the deployment plan. I must say that his lack of development ... surprises. And that's to put it mildly.
But the plan is papers, a lot of papers. The mobilization plan is part of the mobilization process itself. Success or failure depends on how the mobilization goes. It is impossible to foresee everything in advance, in the plans. It is necessary to have and be able to react not according to plan, since it is impossible to foresee everything.
But at the same time, the plan should have provided for the need to transfer armies to another front (albeit in the form of an algorithm). And what happened in practice?
We all know about the transfer of the 16th and 19th armies, recently arrived at the South-Western Front, to the Western Front. According to the descriptions in the textbooks, they threw it bravo and successfully. In fact ... read the book of Lieutenant General Tolkonyuk "Wounds heal slowly." There is about the epic of the 16th army. When you read this, you involuntarily come to the thought that it would be better to leave her in Ukraine. And so, two combat-ready armies were withdrawn from the South-Western Front, and it is not clear what arrived at the Western Front. In terms of aggregate strength, the 16th Army did not reach the rifle corps. Because of the mess and the mess.

[AsmyppoL]

You're right. The cover plans (COPs) were crude. At the forum, Sergei Chekunov (I am not even familiar with him in absentia) wrote on the forum:

The history of the May Directives [directives for the development of software] is very simple: this is not a new cover plan.
The decision to issue such directives was taken while Comrade Meretskov was in command of the General Staff after analyzing the district cover plans presented. After reading the "burda" that was sent by the districts, Comrade Vatutin went to complain "that the districts are making up fables" and came up with a summary: it is necessary to give directives that would regulate the development of the software.
With the arrival of Zhukov, this work intensified, but [could] do it only by the beginning of May ...

No one knew that the enemy would suddenly and too quickly break through into our depths of territory. The domination of their aviation in the air, lack of communication, distorted information and so on - so on - so on ...
The 16th Army was most likely driven for an operation in Iran. see the article
https://topwar.ru/172586-1941-sosredotochenie-otdelnyh-armij-k-juzhnoj-gosgranice.html

PS Today I put another part for moderation, but I wanted to keep it for another week, so that later there would be no big break.
This is for you and others who put stars ...

[Alexander Lysenko]

What air supremacy ?? Read corned beef.

[Alexander Lysenko]

The first three paragraphs and the understanding that this is nonsense