"Era of Gorshkov"
The "finest hour" of the Soviet fleet?
The previous part of his essay, which in parallel examines the main milestones in the development of the domestic naval fleet and railway transport, I named after Nikita Khrushchev. And he named this one in honor of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, who spent longer than anyone else at the head of the Soviet (and Russian - too) fleet.
Moreover, judging by the reaction in the comments to the previous part, the very proposal to look at the figure of Khrushchev with an open mind caused a very violent reaction from a certain category of readers. One can imagine how violent the reaction will be to approach Gorshkov's assessment critically, that is, in accordance with the rules historical science, and not apologetically, as is customary in propaganda. However, my texts are designed for sane readers, who are likely to see in them a rational kernel and an opportunity to form a more reliable idea of the past.
Formally, the "Era of Gorshkov" began in 1956 (and even earlier, since, in fact, he was the most influential person in the leadership of the fleet since June 1955, when he was entrusted with the duties of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy). Sergei Georgievich signed requirements for the development of fundamentally new surface ships that replaced torpedo-artillery ships, which flourished during the era of two world wars, and submarines. He, as the commander-in-chief of the fleet, is also responsible for his defeat during the Cuban missile crisis, as mentioned in my two previous articles.
But the main period of Gorshkov's stay at the head of the Soviet navy fell on the years when Leonid Brezhnev was at the head of the USSR. In the literature, it is customary to emphasize the warm relations that developed between these two figures and largely predetermined the heyday that our naval forces experienced during this period.
Let's try to assess the validity of this judgment.
For this, first of all, let us highlight some important features of this historical period.
According to an increasingly important point of view in the social sciences, in 1968-1975 our civilization entered a new stage of its development. Its name has not yet been fully established. In particular, they talk about the service era that has replaced the industrial one. But in any case, the dramatic changes that swept around the world during this period make it possible to speak of a change in the development paradigm.
It covers many different aspects, but we will touch on only one of them related to changing views on the future of military conflicts. It was during this period that it became clear that the mobilization model characteristic of the First and Second World Wars was becoming a thing of the past. It was required to "grope" for a new military doctrine, within the framework of which both conduct combat training and the construction of the armed forces.
In the United States, such a doctrine has become "flexible response", that is, preparation for waging wars of varying intensity and scope. The possibility of a global nuclear missile conflict between NATO and the Warsaw bloc was taken into account, although its probability was already estimated much lower than in the first years after 1945.
It was becoming more and more obvious to Washington that the politicians in the Kremlin were ordinary people, not maniacs like Hitler; and they are not at all going to step into the abyss, "taking" with them tens or even hundreds of millions of people. And if this is so, then we need to prepare for other, more real wars that can bring obvious benefits to America. This approach, of course, was extremely cynical. But, on the other hand, he only repeated the one that dominated the world for centuries: war is an integral part of human activity and it is apparently impossible to completely exclude it from the latter in principle.
It is only necessary to strive to limit it to certain limits, going beyond which threatens to cause excessive humanitarian and civilizational damage. This also applies to naval wars, which, although they are much more rare than land wars, also happen from time to time.
Unfortunately, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, for various reasons, they were unable to come to similar, completely logical conclusions. At the helm of the USSR by this moment there were people in whose lives the Second World War left an unhealed mark. As a result, the desire to prevent this from happening again absolutely dominated in their minds and exerted a direct influence on the policy being implemented. Of course, the participation of the USSR in wars and military conflicts.
In the USSR, unfortunately, they were unable to develop a similar doctrine that would meet modern requirements. Instead, the propaganda slogan "protecting world peace" increasingly determined the real military policy. This applied to both the army and the navy.
In particular, the task of preventing a new world conflict, now in a nuclear missile form, has become the main one facing the Soviet Navy. Thus, the criterion for the success of the fleet was not victories, but the lack of participation in conflicts. This very non-participation could already be interpreted as a successful activity of the fleet, the justification of all aspects of its organization.
It is clear that in such a situation, any expansion of its structures could only evoke approval, and the negative impact on the economy, to which such an expansion led, was rejected: can there be an excessive price paid for the preservation of peace?
Now let's turn to the question - how exactly did the "Gorshkov fleet" realize this task of preventing war?
This activity can be divided into two parts. The first refers to the strategic nuclear forces (in the role of which, since the 60s, nuclear submarines - carriers of ballistic nuclear missiles have been acting). Their appearance not only put on the agenda the need to put such ships on combat duty, but also put forward new requirements for anti-submarine weapons designed to search and, if necessary, destroy those from the enemy. Of course, the Soviet fleet could not help but be involved in such activities.
But, in addition, on the initiative of Gorshkov, the concept of the so-called "combat service" was formulated, according to which Soviet ships were to conduct continuous monitoring of the American ships, in order to prevent them from delivering a surprise strike. And first of all, American aircraft carriers were subject to such supervision and escort. But the justification of this task today raises certain doubts, since the very role that aircraft carriers played in the American fleet has undergone significant changes as the Cold War continued.
As mentioned in the previous part of the article, at the turn of the 40s and 50s, they were adapted for the basing of the first carrier-based aircraft - carriers of atomic bombs and were considered as part of a strike "fist" intended for a nuclear attack on the USSR. In particular, striking air defense airfields in order to prevent Soviet fighters from countering American strategic bombers' raids on cities deep in Soviet territory.
However, it should be emphasized that, according to the views of the time, the nuclear strike should have been delivered not at the very beginning of the conflict, but during its subsequent phase. And the task of suppressing air defense, the implementation of which was supposed to precede the start of nuclear bombings, was seen as too responsible and serious to count on solving it only by means of a deck aviation... Therefore, by the mid-1950s, aircraft carriers are beginning to be seen more and more as a tactical combat system, whose combat use is possible not only in a world thermonuclear conflict, but also in the course of "small" wars: to deliver strikes on the territory of countries with which the United States entered into conflict. And it is this role that they play to this day.
Unfortunately, these changes in the role assigned to aircraft carriers went unnoticed in the USSR. And within the framework of the very system of "combat service" introduced by Admiral Gorshkov, escorting American aircraft carrier strike groups has become one of the main tasks facing Soviet sailors. Some of them to this day are proud to have participated in its implementation, claiming that it was thanks to this that the world was saved.
But it is impossible to agree with this statement. Since, as already mentioned, the immediate threat of an attack on the USSR did not come from the aircraft carriers. Its carrier was nuclear submarines with nuclear ballistic missiles, and aircraft carriers solved completely different tasks, which the Soviet fleet, in fact, could not resist.
And connected with this, perhaps, the greatest flaw in the concept of "combat service", which was the basis of the activities of the Soviet Navy, headed by S. Gorshkov. It consisted in the fact that the initiative was completely surrendered to the enemy (even if in that era he was necessarily called "conditional"). Indeed: the Soviet fleet only followed the American one; pursuing their own, independent goals in such an environment was completely ruled out.
Here we can draw a certain analogy with the period of the late XIX - early XX centuries, when the “census” system operated in the Russian Imperial Navy, which was subjected to such massive criticism after the Tsushima defeat. She motivated the officers to make long voyages, but conduct exercises, combat maneuvering, improve the use of weapons within its framework, due attention was not paid. The result of such an imbalance in the combat training of the fleet was that the Second Pacific Squadron, having made an unprecedented transition from the Baltic Sea to the Far East, could not, having met the enemy, impose its will on him, eventually suffering a natural defeat.
The practical activities of the Soviet fleet in the 1970s-1980s also led to a similar "Tsushima".
However, why did she lead? She brought her to her! Indeed, it was during this period that the economy (and all other spheres of social life) of the USSR entered a stable “peak” that ended in its collapse. It is clear that the fleet by its activities contributed only to the growth of government spending, and not vice versa. And thus, the growth of the fleet (when S. Gorshkov was at its head) objectively brought the collapse of the country closer, for whose economy it was becoming an increasingly heavy burden.
Although, from the point of view of the ability of the leadership of the fleet to defend the interests of their department, this period is in fact sometimes its peak.
In this regard, an illustrative episode comes to mind. The former commander of the Long-Range Aviation V.V. Reshetnikov in his memoirs, describing the flights of his heavy air ships to reconnaissance of American aircraft carriers, makes a grumpy remark to Admiral Gorshkov, on whose initiative the "land" pilots were entrusted with this task. Here's how: now the sailors, in fact, led the representatives of another military "department".
But once upon a time, on the contrary, they themselves were under the operational subordination of the army command. So, I repeat, in this sense, thanks to the efforts of Gorshkov, the fleet certainly reached the peak of its power.
But was it good from the point of view, so to speak, of national interests?
After all, this most powerful fleet took away a huge share of resources that could be directed to the development of the national economy, which was in dire need of urgent modernization efforts. Yes, and in the ground army, as shown, for example, the same Afghan war, there were also many bottlenecks that needed to be "embroidered", in bringing it to a "modern look", as it became fashionable to say during the "Serdyukov »Military reform (I intend to touch upon it in the next, concluding part of my article).
Moreover, the land army, although rarely, nevertheless took part in real hostilities. In addition to the aforementioned Afghanistan, it was, for example, the invasion of Hungary in 1956, and also in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But still the main source of combat experience for the USSR was the conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia.
To avoid a direct confrontation with the Americans, who were practically indispensable in their participation, and did so under their "own flag," Soviet servicemen, as a rule, used the status of military advisers, which allowed them not to advertise their nationality. It is clear that for the fleet this method of "camouflage" was unacceptable, therefore, from the point of view of combat training, and from the point of view of the development of doctrinal guidelines, it found itself in the same "stagnation" as the whole country.
So it turns out that, although in some situations the Soviet fleet really played an important role in resolving certain crises in which the USSR was involved (to the greatest extent this applies to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war), but in general, being overly "carried away" by his main task - opposition to the Americans (and this opposition was largely speculative and not real, as mentioned above), he, in fact, did not prepare for other combat missions.
What kind of tasks could they be?
First of all, this refers to operations against the coast. Of course, the Soviet fleet was actively rehearsing the amphibious landings, which looked so impressive in the course of television reports. True, it should be borne in mind that these landings took place according to the canons of World War II, that is, they required the landing forces to approach directly to the coast. Our marines did not have the capabilities to carry out the over-the-horizon landing promising a lower level of losses, on which the Americans worked a lot.
But other methods of operations of the fleet against the coast were practically not taken into account. For example, this applies to the shelling of coastal targets by naval artillery. For this, there were no corrective groups capable of taking control of such a fire. But, say, the British in the Falklands War actively used this method, which became one of the components of their victory in it.
Today you can see how the history of the Gorshkov's fleet is being actively “corrected” “retroactively”; properties that he did not really possess are attributed to it (so far - gradually, almost imperceptibly to a superficial glance). So, in the hall of the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg, the exposition of which is dedicated to this period, under the showcase, which displays a model of the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev" surrounded by ships of other types, there is a plate: "Aircraft Carrier Strike Group".
But a similar term was used precisely in the American Navy, and not in the Soviet! Yes, and the point is not in formal terminology, but also in the fact that in terms of strike missions, Soviet aircraft-carrying ships could not compare with American ones, limiting themselves to covering the squadron from the air and participating in anti-submarine warfare. And as for the fulfillment of long-range air defense missions, the Yak-38 VTOL aircraft based on the "Kiev" could not claim to be combat fighters, continuing to remain, in fact, experimental machines. Therefore, the full implementation of these tasks became available only with the construction of the Tbilisi aircraft carrier and the creation of a carrier-based version of the MiG-29 fighter for it, which made it possible to carry out a full-fledged air defense of ship formations (at least in theory).
Summarizing what has been said, it should be noted that the most important conceptual flaw of the "potkovsky" fleet was the fundamental impossibility of a situation when it would have taken the initiative in opening hostilities, which was, perhaps, one of the key drawbacks of the "combat service" concept.
At the suggestion of Admiral Gorshkov, Soviet propaganda put forward the slogan: "Aircraft carriers are a weapon of aggression." Perhaps this is completely true, and not only in relation to aircraft carriers, but also to the modern "large" fleet as a whole. Although aircraft carriers, indeed, more and more claimed the leading role in it. Not least because their capabilities in operations against the coast have steadily increased compared to other types of ships. And this function: to project force on directions remote from their own territory, in fact, determined the development of this class.
As the English say:
"In the event of war, our fleet will not wait for the enemy on its shores, but will meet him at the strangers."
Led by Gorshkov, the Soviet navy also regularly appeared on foreign shores - this is so. But he could not start hostilities there on orders from Moscow, and not following the situation that was developing on the spot. And this circumstance significantly affected its real combat significance. And Moscow, given the current policy and the military doctrine subordinate to it, could not give such an order either. So the fleet is constantly increasing in size and cost, while solving one single combat mission, which is the nuclear deterrence of the United States. At the same time, the fact that the means of a strategic first strike are deployed on submarine missile carriers, and carrier-based aircraft, since the 60s, are designed to solve other problems, has passed the attention of our naval strategists.
The transformation of the prevention of a world nuclear missile conflict not only as the main task of the fleet, but also as, in fact, the only task, was fraught with a serious mistake.
Indeed, in this case, the very fact that this war did not happen automatically meant the success of the fleet. But how, through the prism of such success, can we assess the need for further development of the fleet: what forces does it need in order to continue to successfully fulfill its mission?
The absence of a clear criterion (which, by and large, can only provide real combat experience), led to the fact that the fleet of the "potential enemy" - the United States - was more and more considered as a standard in the process of such development. Which "incidentally", in addition to preparing for a global nuclear-missile conflict, was also aimed at participating in local conflicts with much weaker opponents. Well, the fleets of the colonial empires entered the stage of disintegration in the second half of the XNUMXth century.
Nevertheless, such a “retrospective” terminology well illustrates the tendency inherent in the “Gorshkov era” to “reach out” to American “colleagues” all the time, convincing the country's leadership to allocate more and more resources for the development of the fleet. From the point of view of the interests of the fleet itself, this was perhaps not bad. He grew in number, new vacancies were opened, thereby providing career opportunities for naval officers; in competition with representatives of other branches of the armed forces, their positions have strengthened in comparison with previous times.
As for the thesis that the existence of just such a powerful fleet was vital to prevent a third world war (in which some of its most fanatical fans seem to still believe), it does not stand up to serious criticism. Suffice it to recall that even after the beginning of the "decline" of this fleet, when it clearly gave up the task of containing the fleet of the United States and other NATO countries, the third world war did not come (to everyone's happiness, of course). Moreover, not a single acute international crisis that threatened to escalate into it has also happened. But the costs of creating and maintaining the naval forces were an increasingly heavy burden on the country's economy, which was already experiencing a crisis of efficiency, while the benefits associated with the real combat use of our naval power were, in fact, unattainable.
It seems to me that in our today's assessment of the "great fleet of Admiral Gorshkov" this circumstance must be taken into account.
Steel tracks of the era of "stagnation"
And now again, as in all previous "series", we turn to the topic of railway transport of the Country of Soviets.
What marked its development in the 70-80s?
As we remember, in the second half of the 50s - 60s, a real breakthrough was made in this development. In the professional environment, it is often called "traction reconstruction", meaning the replacement of outdated steam locomotives with more advanced types of locomotives - diesel locomotives and electric locomotives. But, as it was said in the previous part, electrification became the technological "foundation" of this reconstruction, which made it possible not only to launch the most productive type of locomotives on the most heavily loaded lines - electric, but also to provide electricity to numerous civil consumers at stations and along the tracks.
Although the declared figure of 40 thousand km of electrified kilometers of railways in the period 1956-1970 was not achieved (in fact, it was completed by about 2/3), it can be said that the appearance of steel lines during this period underwent radical changes. However, by the end of the 60s, the pace of electrification slowed down significantly. On the one hand, it was not always economically feasible to use electric locomotives where diesel locomotives did an excellent job. On the other hand, there was not enough free electric power. Numerous industrial enterprises continued to be built in the country, competing with the railway for access to electricity.
And here both the leadership of the Ministry of Railways and the State Planning Commission were required to find a new breakthrough technology that could form the basis of a new round of transport modernization, as was done in the early 30s and mid-50s. And this technology has already appeared. It was electronic equipment based on semiconductors: power, serving to work in supply networks, and low-current, designed for the tasks of controlling and monitoring networks and units. Its development over time has turned the most various areas of technology, including the technology of railways of foreign countries. So, on the basis of semiconductors, a new generation of electric locomotives was created, more economical and reliable, with more rational control and with better maintainability.
The introduction of semiconductor electronics on diesel locomotives made it possible to switch to a distributed traction system, when several locomotives, located not only in the head of the train, but also in the middle and in the tail, were synchronously controlled by one driver from the cab of the head. True, this option could be implemented only under the condition of a radical increase in the reliability of diesel engines in order to allow them to operate in an unattended mode. Namely: the traditional domestic problem with the reliability of power plants forced to carry out such an arrangement of diesel locomotives, which left access to them along the route.
In general, as already mentioned, all the possibilities of the progress of electronics for the modernization of railway transport were clearly underestimated. Instead, the approach of the past continued to dominate, with the emphasis on electrification and increasing the unit capacity of locomotives.
This was accompanied by quite anecdotal phenomena, one of which was the intensification of the "fight against steam locomotives." Although by this time on most main lines they were completely replaced by modern locomotives, they were still used on inactive ones. It would seem that one could come to terms with the fact that they will work for several more years in these areas until they exhaust their resource. Moreover, the path there was often weak, unable to withstand the loads from more powerful and heavy diesel locomotives. However, by this time, the rate of replacement of steam traction with a progressive one had become an important indicator by which the work of railway workers was assessed.
And thus, they were forced to constantly report that in this or that section, where steam locomotives used to work, trains are now driven by diesel locomotives. Most likely, this is precisely why the Ministry of Railways started purchasing M62 diesel locomotives.
This locomotive was developed at the Lugansk diesel locomotive plant in a smaller European size than the domestic one and with a reduced axle load, and since 1965 it has been supplied to the countries of Eastern Europe: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and some others. And since 1970, they also began to work on domestic routes.
There is a legend among railway lovers that the growth of the M62 diesel locomotive fleet on the railways adjacent to the western border of the USSR was carried out at the request of the Ministry of Defense and was part of the preparations for the war in Europe. Proceeding from the fact that these diesel locomotives, which, as already mentioned, were created for operation precisely at this test site, having limitations for this in terms of size and axle load, its supporters believe that the supply of these locomotives from 1970 for operation also to Soviet lines was intended precisely to use them for the thrust of military echelons, which in the "special period" were to rush across the border to the West. This "theory" is frankly conspiracy in nature and is simply frivolous.
But the fact that, contrary to the original intentions, the M62 continued to be produced (including in modernized, two- and even three-section versions) in Lugansk until 2001, played a role in the crisis of the Ministry of Railways.
The fact is that, despite the attractive, "okay" appearance, a comfortable cab (it was created taking into account the "one-person" system adopted on foreign railways, that is, it was distinguished by a convenient layout of controls for their use only by the driver) , from a technical point of view, at the beginning of the 70s, the locomotive already looked very archaic. First of all, this applied to a two-stroke diesel engine, which was distinguished by an increased oil consumption; and also to traction transmission of constant-direct current. That is, the generator, driven by a diesel engine, produced a direct current, which was then supplied to traction motors, which had the same collector device. This increased the size and weight of the generator because AC electric machines are more compact and easier to maintain.
Therefore, immediately after the creation of the M62, the Lugansk plant began work on a new generation of diesel locomotives with a four-stroke diesel engine, alternating-direct current transmission (in which the alternating current generated by the generator is rectified and then supplied to the traction motors), the electric drive of auxiliary machines and other improvements. And, again, at first there appeared a machine intended for export (diesel locomotive TE109), and then it was the turn of the heavy two-section TE116, which was supposed to replace the aging TE3.
This work was very difficult, the elimination of emerging problems was slow. It would seem that in such a situation all forces should be concentrated on overcoming them in order to quickly "put on the wing" a fundamentally new, more efficient locomotive. But the plant workers instead dissipate their forces and put into production another type of diesel locomotive. And this is just one example of how palliative solutions have increasingly begun to replace truly disruptive technologies, leading to dissipation of efforts and slower growth.
There was also stagnation in the development of the designs of electric locomotives and electric trains. First of all, it consisted in the continuation of the use of the so-called contact-rheostat control system, rooted in the very beginning of the twentieth century. It was distinguished by large losses of electricity and the inability to smoothly regulate the voltage on traction motors. A breakthrough role here could also be played by the widespread use of power semiconductor technology, but the lag in this area was gaining momentum ...
Another factor that reduced the efficiency of the railways was the continuation of the course for their maximum mobilization use in the event of a war, which was formed at the dawn of their existence and so brilliantly justified itself during the Second World War (this was described in detail in one of the previous parts).
Therefore, many types of rolling stock continued to be built taking into account mobilization requirements. Thus, the most common long-distance passenger carriages, reserved seats, provided for the possibility of being included in freight trains and had completely autonomous life support systems (heating and power supply). This worsened the commercial characteristics of the cars, created obstacles to improving their design. At the same time, the era of mass armies, which demanded large-scale mobilization measures, was forever a thing of the past ...
As the demand for transportation grew (which was caused, among other things, by the imperfection of the Soviet economic mechanism), rail transport satisfied them less and less. The steel pipeline crisis was expanding.
This caused growing concern in the highest leadership circles, which from time to time sternly demanded the restoration of order. True, they had a very vague idea of how to do this. One of the first to "fall under the hand" was the legendary minister Boris Beschev, who headed the industry, like S. Gorshkov, for almost 30 years: from 1948 to 1977. But, of course, it couldn't help; Beshchev's three successors, who took office before 1991, faced an ever-growing tangle of problems.
Conclusions
The two decades preceding the collapse of the USSR are a period of active action of those factors that served as prerequisites for this collapse and are well traced. At the same time, among people who, nostalgia for the Soviet period, does not allow them to recognize the regularity of its completion, it is customary to admire this period. This fully applies to the situation in the two areas we are considering: in the navy and in railway transport.
At first glance, in both regions there was an unprecedented flowering, expressed in the most extensive extensive growth in the entire history of development. More and more ships under the Soviet naval flag sailed the seas and oceans. The same applies to trains bearing the designation of the USSR Ministry of Railways: they ran more and more often, their weight and length increased. Everything seemed to be fine. As a matter of fact, patriots of both departments like to use this argument, proving that the objects of their adoration have nothing to do with the creation of a systemic crisis and the disintegration of the state caused by it; that all the problems were created by the efforts of some malefactors (agents of the West, separatists from national republics, degenerated partocrats - underline the necessary). However, in reality, both the fleet and the railways were sinking deeper into a quagmire of problems.
By the end of the "Gorshkov Era", the Soviet fleet far exceeded the requirements arising from the requirements of the necessary sufficiency for the defense of the country. Being completely sharpened for the preparation for the third world war (the prevention of which was at the same time his main task), he was completely unsuitable for use in local armed conflicts and thus transformed into a thing in itself, cumbersome, expensive and by and large useless. For the country's economy, which was losing its efficiency, it turned more and more into a burden, which it was unable to support.
On the railways, as mentioned above, a transportation crisis developed: they more and more could not cope with the requirements imposed on them. This resulted not only in a decline in economic indicators, but also in the growth of the “shadow economy”. In particular, theft on the railways (which was easier to produce, taking advantage of the confusion and low speed of delivery of goods), speculation in passenger tickets on the scarce (especially during the period of mass vacations) southern directions, grew. Well, the mechanic of the refrigerator section, in which the coveted delicacies were delivered, turned into one of the most corrupt figures.
Thus, despite the outward splendor, both the fleet and the railway transport by the end of the Soviet period were seriously ill organisms, the treatment of which turned out to be almost impossible due to the lack of a correct diagnosis.
- Valery Stolov
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