Nuclear mathematics: how many nuclear charges does the United States need to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces?

Source: wikipedia.org

Article Why does the US keep mine-based ICBMs? we looked at why the United States is placing a significant portion of its strategic nuclear arsenal in highly secure mines, despite the fact that they have the most powerful fleetcapable of ensuring the safety of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN).

At the end of the article, the author concluded that the United States has formed an extremely balanced and stable strategic nuclear forces (SNF). And in the American strategic nuclear forces, silo-based ICBMs are the most stable element, which the enemy can destroy only with the use of nuclear weapons.

To what extent are Russian strategic nuclear forces stable and balanced in this regard?

Russian strategic nuclear forces

Aviation the component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, like the aviation component of the American strategic nuclear forces, is a first-strike weapon.

Aircraft carriers - strategic missile-carrying missile bombers with cruise missiles (CR) with nuclear warheads (nuclear warheads) can effectively solve the problem of delivering strikes with conventional weapons. But as a means of nuclear deterrence, they are of little use - the enemy can easily destroy them with a sudden strike at airfields, shoot them down with fighters or anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) or carriers, or cruise missiles launched by them on the flight route. They can be destroyed by both nuclear and conventional weapons.

Russian strategic nuclear forces include 60 Tu-95MS (M) -type missile-carrying bombers and 17 Tu-160 (M) supersonic missile-carrying bombers capable of carrying about 500-800 missile-carrying nuclear warheads in aggregate. At the same time, according to the START-3 treaty, formally one bomber is counted as one nuclear warhead, that is, the aviation component “selects” 77 units from the permissible number of deployed charges.

Bombers-missile carriers of the Tu-95MS (M) and Tu-160 (M) types. Source: russianplanes.net

The naval component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is strategic missile cruisers (SSBNs).

Currently, it includes one Project 677BDR SSBN, four Project 677BDRM SSBNs and four Project 955 (A) SSBNs, which together can potentially carry about 1600 nuclear warheads (YABB), provided that 10 warheads are placed on one ballistic missile of submarines ( SLBM). The actual number of nuclear warheads on SLBMs is limited by the START-3 treaty.

As the project 955 (A) SSBNs are being built, which are planned to be put into service in the amount of 10-12 units, SSBNs of project 677BDR / BDRM will be gradually withdrawn from the fleet.

Thus, the potentially naval component of the RF SNF will be able to carry 1920 nuclear warheads on 192 SLBMs. At the same time, the START-3 treaty limits the total number of deployed nuclear warheads to 1550 units, and the number of carriers is limited to 700 deployed and another 100 undeployed.

SSBN project 677BDRM and 955

The Russian Strategic Forces (Strategic Missile Forces) have 320 carriers, which together carry 1181 YABB. Of these, 122 are mine-based. The core of the Strategic Missile Forces' nuclear arsenal is formed by the RS-24 Yars ICBMs of mine and mobile basing in the amount of 149 units, carrying 606 nuclear warheads. The RT-2PM / 2PM2 Topol / Topol-M ICBMs in the amount of 123 units, carrying monoblock warheads, are gradually planned to be decommissioned, replacing them with Yarsy or an ICBM that will replace it. Heavy ICBMs R-36M / R-36M2 in the amount of 46 units, carrying 460 YABB, will be gradually decommissioned, they will be replaced by ICBMs of a comparable class "Sarmat". A similar fate will befall the two remaining UR-100N UTTH ICBMs, carrying the Avangard hypersonic gliding warhead.

PGRK "Yars". Photo: press service of the Russian Defense Ministry

Are the Russian strategic nuclear forces balanced?

From the point of view of nuclear deterrence, as in the case of the American strategic nuclear forces, strategic aviation can be taken out of the brackets, since this is a first strike weapon - it is almost impossible to protect bombers from a sudden disarming strike. Conventionally, the bombers will assume about 100 nuclear warheads allowed for deployment under the START-3 treaty.

A much bigger question is a strong bias towards the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces. Unlike the arsenal of the Strategic Missile Forces, located in the depths of their territory, SSBNs on combat patrol are in international waters, where the enemy has the formal right to detect and track them. The ability of the Russian fleet to ensure the protection of SSBNs even in the so-called "bastions" is in question. While in the base, SSBNs are even more vulnerable - to destroy them, the enemy will need several dozen non-nuclear high-precision ammunition and less than five minutes of time.

Subject to the construction of 12 Project 955A SSBNs, even if three nuclear submarines are deployed on one SLBM, in total they will have 432 nuclear submarines (rounded up to 450 nuclear submarines).

As for the Strategic Missile Forces, the question first of all arises regarding heavy delivery vehicles.

On the one hand, the ability to throw 10 or even 15 nuclear submarines across the South Pole, coupled with a set of missile defense penetration means, is wonderful.

But, on the other hand, 50 Sarmat-type ICBMs with 10-15 YABB are 500-750 YABB. No matter how well the silo launchers (silos) of heavy missiles are protected, they will be target number 1 for the enemy. During a sudden disarming strike against such an important target, the United States is guaranteed to strike "with a reserve", using 3-4 nuclear ballistic missiles per one heavy ICBM in silos. Thus, they "exchange" 150-200 of their YABB for 500-750 of ours.

Not a very equal exchange, is it?

Another option is to place on heavy ICBMs hypersonic guided warheads (GUBB) of the Avangard type, three units per ICBM, that is, a total of 150 warheads.

If the RVSE retains about 300 light ICBMs, placed in silos and on mobile ground missile systems (PGRK), with three nuclear warheads on each, of the Yars type, then this is another 900 nuclear ballistic missiles. ICBMs in silos are almost guaranteed to be protected from conventional weapons, while for their destruction, it is highly likely that two enemy nuclear warheads will be required. The exchange of two enemy YABBs for 3 of ours is no longer as bad as in the case of heavy ICBMs, but still we lose in the overall standings.

The situation with the PGRK is more complicated.

When located in the basing areas, PGRKs are practically as vulnerable as SSBNs in the base - the only difference is in the greater flight distance for the enemy's nuclear warheads. PGRK can be destroyed by both nuclear and conventional weapons. The security of the PGRK on the route, based on its secrecy, is under a big question - in the foreseeable future, there will be no places on the planet that are not monitored from space 24/365.

The revolution in space has already begun - the capabilities of satellite reconnaissance will increase manifold

Summarizing the existing and potential capabilities of SB, SSBN, PGRK and ICBM in silos, in aggregate, it turns out that we can deploy about 3600 YaBB, which is twice the limits of the START-3 treaty. On the one hand, this is good, since YAB can be partially deployed, thereby providing the possibility of a sharp increase in the potential of strategic nuclear forces in the event of complications in relations. On the other hand, the stability of strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming strike is more important for us. For example, in the event of the destruction of the entire naval component of the strategic nuclear forces, it will not matter to us: deployed on it 432 YAB or 1920 YAB. Perhaps the second option is even worse.

US nuclear weapons expenditures for the destruction of the Russian strategic nuclear forces

It can be assumed that, given the importance of the task at hand, if the United States decides to launch a sudden disarming strike, it will not save money and use nuclear warheads to destroy all Russian components of strategic nuclear forces together with conventional weapons.

To defeat the Russian strategic nuclear forces, the enemy will need:

- On 12 SSBNs, of which 6 will be in the base, the enemy will spend 6–12 nuclear warheads plus torpedoes, possibly with tactical nuclear warheads. As a result, we have a loss of 432-1920 YAB; This can also include the "Poseidons" and their carriers, since as targets they do not differ at all from SSBNs.

- The enemy will spend 4–8 nuclear weapons on SB at two air bases. As a result, we have a loss of 500-800 missile launchers with nuclear warheads (this is not so critical, since under the START treaty it is still about 100 nuclear warheads).

- The enemy will spend 150-200 nuclear warheads to destroy heavy ICBMs in highly protected silos. As a result, we have a loss of 150-750 YAB.

- On 75 PGRK in the base, the enemy will spend 8-16 YaBB. As a result, we have a loss of 225 YaBB.

- On 75 PGRK on the route, the enemy will spend 75 YABB. As a result, we have a loss of 225 YaBB.

- On 150 light ICBMs in silos, the enemy will spend 300 YABB. As a result, we have a loss of 450 YaBB.

In total, for the destruction of all Russian strategic nuclear forces, the United States should spend about 500-600 nuclear warheads out of 1550 operatively deployed, plus a certain amount of high-precision weapons, of which they have a lot.

Such a number of nuclear submarines can be deployed on three or four Ohio-class SSBNs. The minimum launch range of the Trident II (D5) SLBM is 2300 kilometers or 5,5 minutes of flight time. To increase launch density, the United States may use eight SSBNs in conjunction with promising hypersonic precision missiles launched from Virginia Block V nuclear submarines, surface ships, strategic aircraft, and ground launchers. Potentially, they can be supplemented by two British Vanguard-class SSBNs with the same Trident II (D5) SLBMs.

If Russian SSBNs are tracked on combat patrol routes, they, like SSBNs stationed at the base, will be destroyed in an even shorter period of time.

Yes, it is possible that part of the ICBM will not be destroyed and will be able to launch, but for this the United States is deploying and improving the anti-missile defense system, the process of formation and prospects of which were considered in the articles:
- Sunset of the nuclear triad. Cold War missile defense and Star Wars;
- Sunset of the nuclear triad. US missile defense: the present and near future;
- Sunset of the nuclear triad. US missile defense after 2030: intercept thousands of warheads.

It can be concluded that the Russian strategic nuclear forces have a high offensive potential, which, if necessary, can be additionally strengthened, but at the same time their resistance to a sudden disarming attack by the enemy may be insufficient.

When delivering a sudden disarming strike, the United States will spend about one third of its operatively deployed nuclear warheads, which will allow them, after striking, to dictate the terms of a “disarmed” Russia, and not to fear a blow “in the back” from the PRC. Taking into account the NATO allies, primarily Great Britain, the capabilities of the United States are becoming even higher.

Often, in the comments to articles on the stability of strategic nuclear forces to a sudden disarming strike, one can see remarks like “by the time the enemy’s nuclear weapons fall, our mines will be empty”. This is true only when hitting from a maximum distance of 8-10 thousand kilometers, when the launch detects in advance missile attack warning system (early warning system) and the country's top leadership will have about 20-30 minutes to make a decision about the beginning of the end of the world. When hitting from a distance of about two to three thousand kilometers, the time for passing the entire chain of information and making a decision will be 5-10 minutes, after which it will be too late.

The "Perimeter" or "Dead Hand" system, even if it functions, will not help - it protects against the destruction of the country's top leadership, that is, from a "decapitating" strike, but not from a "disarming" strike, when there is already nothing to give the command to start.

The United States can strike from a minimum range, with a flight time of YaBB of the order of 5-10 minutes

Strategic nuclear forces resistant to a sudden disarming strike

What should be the strategic nuclear forces that are maximally resistant to a sudden disarming strike?

Two theses can be formulated:

1. Most of the carriers of nuclear weapons of the Russian strategic nuclear forces must be guaranteed to be protected from all types of conventional weapons.

2. The expenditure of enemy nuclear warheads for the destruction of carriers of nuclear weapons of the Russian strategic nuclear forces must be greater than or equal to the number of nuclear warheads of the Russian strategic nuclear forces destroyed by it.

What is fully protected from conventional weapons and is comparable to the number of spent / destroyed nuclear warheads?

The answer is light ICBMs in silos.

Based on this, the structure of promising strategic nuclear forces will look like this:

Strategic aviation will retain its position, since abandoning it precisely as carriers of nuclear weapons is unprofitable due to the terms of the START-3 treaty - for 100 nuclear submarines counted, SB can carry about 500-800 CD with nuclear warheads. In addition, during the threatened period, SB can be dispersed, which will significantly increase their survival rate. Well, do not forget about the offensive capabilities of strategic aviation, and most importantly, the possibility of effective use in non-nuclear conflicts, which will be the main one for the Security Council.

Article The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation the possibility of building missile carriers on the basis of transport aircraft and even air-based ICBMs for them was considered, but this direction clearly will not have a priority for the strategic nuclear forces. Rather, it will be useful for delivering massive attacks with conventional weapons as an element of strategic conventional forces (SCS).

Conclusions made earlier by the author in the article The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation can be slightly corrected.

PGRK must be abandoned completely.

We are not China, and we cannot build thousands of kilometers of tunnels for them, hiding them from satellites and conventional weapons. Their vulnerability in their places of basing is maximal, and in them they will spend half of the time, if not more. To create PGRK, disguised as trucks and buses, means to expose the city with civilians to the risk of the first strike. And there will be no guarantees of the secrecy of such PGRK anyway. For the same reason, there is no point in reviving the BZHRK theme.

Even PGRK disguised as trucks can be detected and destroyed, in addition, they put the risk of a nuclear attack on cities with civilians.

The big question is the need for heavy ICBMs - they are too attractive a target for the enemy, it is extremely tempting to destroy 10-15 YABB, spending 3-4 of our own. Perhaps more optimal will be the placement of three "Vanguards" instead of 10-15 "usual" YABB.

However, according to the author, hypersonic gliding warheads (GPBB) much more promising when used with a conventional warhead. At the same time, it is better to abandon the GPBB in nuclear equipment in principle, in order not to create the risk of an accidental start of a nuclear war due to similar flight paths of the GPBB in nuclear and non-nuclear equipment. In other words: either heavy ICBMs with Avangards, or abandoning heavy ICBMs in principle.

Hypersonic gliding warheads will be more useful in non-nuclear equipment

On the naval component of strategic nuclear forces it is also necessary to make adjustments - the number of SSBNs of project 955 (A) must be limited at the level of products already built and under construction, that is, eight units.

Others or build like carriers of cruise and anti-ship missiles under the conditional project 955K, or how multipurpose submarines of the conditional project 955M... Eight Project 955 (A) SSBNs are up to 1280 YaBB, much more than our Navy can now "digest".

SSBN of project 955 (A) can become the basis for SSGN of the conditional project 955K or even a multipurpose submarine of the conditional project 955M

The main stake in the Russian strategic nuclear forces should be placed on light silo-based ICBMs. For this, both ICBMs and silos must be produced in the form of high-prefabricated products.

Manufacturing silos in the form of products of high factory readiness will reduce their cost and increase the pace of construction

The number of ICBMs in silos should be at least half of the enemy's operationally deployed nuclear warheads, with the prospect of further increasing the ratio in their favor (up to a certain limit). In this case, the number of silos, if possible, should exceed the number of deployed ICBMs by 2-3 times.

The distance between silos should exclude the possibility of hitting them with one YAB. Unlike SSBN, SB, PGRK or BRZhK, we can say that silos are an exceptional long-term investment. In addition, silos require much less funds to maintain them on alert than SSBNs, SB, PGRK or BRZhK - no fuel loading / unloading, crew change, etc. are required.

Between silos, rotation of ICBMs can be carried out under the cover of smoke screens or quickly deployed shelters, to hide the true location of ICBMs in a particular silo. Also, the "empty" silos can accommodate anti-missile launchers in containers that are visually indistinguishable from ICBM containers.

To further mislead the enemy and deceive the homing heads of high-precision weapons, in addition to redundant mines, imitators of silo covers should be installed.

Approximately this is how the silos should be located - two of the three silo covers are false (imitators), the distance "a" is the distance at which the defeat of two silos is not ensured by one enemy nuclear warhead

Optimal ratio

Now the Strategic Missile Forces have 122 active silos. It is quite possible that there is still a certain amount of silos that can be restored, bringing their number to 150-200. By assembling 50 silos of high factory readiness with light ICBMs per year, we will get 650–700 silos with ICBMs in 10 years and 1150–1200 silos with ICBMs in 20 years.

Accordingly, at the initial stage, three nuclear ballistic missiles will be deployed on ICBMs, and later, as the number of ICBMs in silos increases, the number of nuclear ballistic missiles on them can be reduced to two or even to one. Thus, light ICBMs will carry about 1200 nuclear warheads, with a recoverable potential to accommodate another 650-2400 nuclear warheads.

Another 100 nuclear charges will be counted for strategic aviation. At the same time, the potential of strategic aviation will make it possible to strike about 500-800 missile launchers with nuclear warheads.

The share of SSBNs under the current START-3 treaty will remain 250 nuclear weapons. If we are talking about eight Project 955 (A) SSBNs, then when two nuclear submarines are placed on one SLBM, it will just turn out to be 256 nuclear submarines. The reentry potential of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces will amount to another 1024 nuclear warheads.

Considering that light ICBMs in silos will not be built "instantly", for some period more nuclear submarines will have to be installed on SLBMs to compensate for the outgoing heavy ICBMs, which will lead to a temporary bias towards the sea component of the strategic nuclear forces.

The above composition of promising strategic nuclear forces largely correlates with that discussed earlier in the article The evolution of the nuclear triad: generalized composition of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation in the medium term.

How objective is the stake on light ICBMs in silos?

Just the other day, it became known about the construction in the PRC of a new positioning area for ICBMs in silos. It is assumed that about 119 ICBMs will be built in silos and false silos.

"Do you want to be advanced - this square-nested" - apparently, in China they decided to apply this slogan not to potatoes, but to ICBMs in silos

The construction concept is very similar to the one that was outlined in the series of articles "Evolution of the nuclear triad" - the construction of silo-based ICBMs in the "square-nested" way.

Not that the author claimed that the Chinese "borrowed the idea" from the pages of the Military Review, but who knows? If next year they "sow" another area in this way, then the bet on light ICBMs in silos is really used by the PRC and is justified.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that China is not bound by any agreements, and its financial and production capabilities significantly exceed Russian ones, so it can build up all types of strategic nuclear forces at the same time.

Strategic Nuclear Forces Components

Strategic aviation is primarily the use of long-range conventional weapons as carriers. As an element of the nuclear triad - the delivery of nuclear strikes in limited conflicts, dispersal during a threatened period as a signal to the enemy that his plans have been revealed and that countermeasures are being prepared.

Light ICBMs in silos - they will bear the brunt of nuclear deterrence. It is not yet possible to destroy them with conventional long-range weapons. If the enemy tries to destroy them with nuclear weapons, to ensure a high probability of hitting YABB it will take more than the START-3 treaty allows. The enemy withdraws from the START-3 treaty and begins the deployment of additional warheads from warehouse storage - instead of one nuclear warhead, we are installing three on ICBMs, accelerating the production of ICBMs for "empty" mines.

The naval component of the strategic nuclear forces - as the severity of nuclear deterrence passes to light ICBMs in silos, and the number of nuclear submarines on SSBNs decreases, they will be able to leave the "bastions" and advance to the shores of a potential enemy. For this, the tactics of firing SLBMs at a minimum distance, with a short flight time, must be worked out.

The task of SSBNs is to turn the situation upside down - let the United States wonder if we are preparing to deliver a sudden disarming strike on their ICBMs in silos and strategic aviation air bases? Have we uncovered the location of their SSBNs?

The resources currently required for the protection of the "bastions" can be released and redirected to the solution of other tasks of the fleet.

After obsolescence and decommissioning of Project 955 (A) SSBNs, they should be replaced by promising multipurpose submarines capable of carrying four to six SLBMs in universal weapon bays in total with 24-60 nuclear submarines, which will solve this problem much more efficiently than massive specialized SSBNs ...

Multipurpose submarines with SLBMs are more likely to reach the minimum launch range on the territory of a potential enemy. This will force him to concentrate resources on defense, rather than preparing for an attack on Russia.

It is characteristic that the proposed concept of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is in many respects similar in structure to the American strategic nuclear forces, which the author considers the most balanced. The only differences are in the quantitative distribution of YBB carriers.

Conclusions

The proposed concept of building Russian strategic nuclear forces is logical, realistic and feasible. For the most part, it is based on already proven solutions. There is a possibility that it is already being implemented in the PRC.

Reducing the range and type of nuclear deterrent - PGRK, BZHRK, heavy ICBMs, various "Petrel", "Avangard" and "Poseidon" Silos.

To destroy the Russian SNF based on light ICBMs in silos with an acceptable, but far from XNUMX% probability, the enemy will need more nuclear warheads than he has.

There is a possibility that a massive attack on the "fields" of ICBMs in silos is impossible in principle, since the first exploding nuclear charges will damage or deflect those following. The use of anti-missile defense systems and active defense systems (KAZ) silos of the "Mozyr" type will further enhance the security of silos.

The scheme of the KAZ type "Mozyr"

Focusing on light ICBMs in silos will radically reduce the operating costs of strategic nuclear forces, since silos have an exceptionally long service life and low operating costs. Stability of storage conditions - the absence of shocks, vibrations, temperature changes and other negative factors of influence also positively affects the service life of ICBMs in silos.

A decrease in the relative share of the maritime component will make it possible to abandon the content of SSBNs in "bastions" and use them to put pressure on the enemy with the threat of a sudden disarming / decapitating strike, forcing him to spend resources on strengthening defensive capabilities, and not on preparing for an attack on the Russian Federation. It will also force a potential adversary to be more enthusiastic about concluding, adhering to and extending strategic offensive arms limitation treaties.

Comments

[Xlor]

No nuclear weapons are needed to destroy the United States. It is enough to open the borders and send more migrants from Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America there. Then there are Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab states. The import of migrants will be much cheaper than the creation of nuclear charges and their subsequent maintenance ...

[tlauicol]

Open US Borders? Business then

[Uncle lee]

Quote: Tlauicol

Business then

Wait, I'll ring the cordon guards - let them let everyone in!

[Andrey Shiryaev]

And let the kraken run

[Uncle lee]

Quote: Andrey Shiryaev

let them run

Launch Berlaga!

[dorz]

A nuclear disarming strike is too costly and risky for the Americans. Other measures have long been announced: the fragmentation of Russia into 20-50 territories; change of regime.

[Civil]

If tomorrow is war, if the enemy attacks,
If the dark force comes
As one person, the whole Soviet people
Will stand up for a free Motherland

Chorus:

On earth in heaven and sea
Our refrain is both powerful and severe:
If tomorrow is war
If the hike is tomorrow,
Be ready for the trip today!

If war tomorrow, the country will stir
From Kronstadt to Vladivostok,
The country will be stirred up, great and strong,
And we will cruelly break the enemy!

Chorus:

A plane will fly, a machine gun will be sharpened,
Mighty tanks rumble
And the battleships will go, and the infantry will go,
And dashing tachanka rush

Chorus:


We don’t want war, but we will protect ourselves-
We mount defense for a reason.
And in enemy land, we will crush the enemy
With little blood, a mighty blow!

Chorus:

Rise up the people, pack your camping trip
Drums Drums Stronger!
Musicians, go ahead! Singers, go ahead!
Come our victorious song!

[PavelM]

As one person, the whole SOVIET people
Will stand up for a free Motherland

[max702]

Quote: PavelM

As one person, the whole SOVIET people
Will stand up for a free Motherland

The Tashkent front gives a frantic standing ovation !!

[zenion]

Correctly understand all this there. One redhead said - Russia does not need factories and factories. Russia does not need weapons. We will buy everything we need abroad from the enemy. He still continues to control the invisible front and is not afraid of anywhere. He bought and will buy everything.

[max702]

Doesn't manage anymore .. Change the training manual, fire ..

[smart ass]

The fun will begin when the states of the hypersonic missile build a nuclear warhead stuck and place it on ships

[Ilya-spb]

I read the article. The author dashed off a lot ...

Again, Russia has lost in a nuclear war.

The author has one significant drawback. According to philosophy, war is a non-zero-sum game.

Therefore, the laws of arithmetic, such as "exchanged 200 nuclear weapons for 700" are not applicable.

[Vladimir61]

Quote: Ilya-spb

I read the article. The author dashed off a lot ...

When an article by a certain "Indian" or "outskirts" expert is posted on VO, then everyone here amicably and unanimously asks questions - what is he, what is the specialist, where or by whom he served or worked, how long and what are the results, etc. ... The editorial board of VO may think about the presentation of the authors, precisely from these positions, so that there are no doubts about the competence, objectivity and profile demand of the "expert".

[NIKN]

Quote: Vladimir61

so that there are no doubts about the competence, objectivity and profile demand for an "expert".

A lot of letters, not a single professional clue, an article for an article, on Zen would have worked, but there are, in my letter, limitations.

[Stepan S]

Therefore, the laws of arithmetic, such as "exchanged 200 nuclear weapons for 700" are not applicable.

Yes, the author has this bottleneck in the article. Calculate mathematically the destruction of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, taking as a basis 100% hit and destruction of targets. Even nuclear submarines in the ocean and PGRK on the march. Another would add to this that for the destruction of the army, the required number of bullets strictly corresponds to the regular strength of the army.

[Aleksandr1977]

Only one impression from the article: "Katz offers to surrender"

[zenion]

You did not understand him. He offers to kneel down and repent for the destruction of the Indians, for the slavery of blacks, for the nuclear bombing of Japan, and especially twice with his forehead on granite, for the destruction of Hitler. Also for being still alive, for misunderstanding American crap. The offer is what the Russians can redeem for this: one and a half meters of twine, for plump two, two and a half and a bar of laundry soap. Huhu they are not hoho ?! They will be interrupted and may even meet very quickly with the soul of the Fuhrer. He's spinning in a cauldron there, waiting for his creators, that is, creators.

[skif8013]

Quote: Ilya-spb

I read the article. The author dashed off a lot ...

Again, Russia has lost in a nuclear war.

The author has one significant drawback. According to philosophy, war is a non-zero-sum game.

Therefore, the laws of arithmetic, such as "exchanged 200 nuclear weapons for 700" are not applicable.

I also completely read and did not understand only one thing. While the Yankees will sink our fleet, shoot down strategists and mutuz Mother Russia, we will look at all this and poke around in our noses ?! If so, then this arithmetic is applicable here, but it is unlikely.

[alexmach]

and didn’t understand only one thing

along the way, you did not read it in full

[AML]

You are still surprised at this. It is strange that the author believes that the Russian Federation will be responsible, it seems that it should work - and we are for what

[D16]

Yeah, you forgot the mega-gun and the hyperloop

[Yorgven]

An article about nuclear war measured by parrots. Analytics, level - a shop, vodka, dominoes ... But if we spend $ 200 billion on 10000 missile defense missiles, then we can simply destroy the United States and Great Britain, repelling a retaliatory nuclear strike.

[Per se.]

Quote: Xlor

No nuclear weapons are needed to destroy the United States.

For the United States, it is just necessary, and this is more acceptable for Russia than for the United States, a nuclear strike on the territory of Russia, at least in a global performance, since our territory, first of all, for them valuable natural resources, a trophy, and the trophy should be clean.

If to the topic of the article, then just the States do not need to deliver nuclear strikes. Our "elite" are already their dependent servants, in many respects pursuing policies under their true masters. The same our (not ours) Central Bank, under the IMF and in fact under the United States, since the Americans rule at the IMF. As a result, our (not ours) Sberbank dances to the same tune.

There are "bourgeois", there are their "bad boys", and they have "fighting dogs" (peoples and armies), on which they both make money, playing off their "dogs" for profitable bets, sawing loot. So, the lords "fight", while the "slaves" have their forelocks cracking. Who will bomb already in fact their natural resources, which are already pumped and sold through all pipes? Who will bomb their children and wives, foreign banks, with their billions of dollars in foreign currency, have long trodden a path to the West?

While Russia is in capitalism, we are already under someone else's uncle, in someone else's pole of power, under someone else's rules, not invented for our good. Ratings have fallen under Yeltsin, a popular revolt has matured. They drew conclusions, it was enough to puff up the cheeks and from time to time threaten the West with a fist, essentially continuing to "optimize" Russia, its industry, most importantly, science and education in general. Nuclear war, and who needs it? With luxury yachts and expensive apartments, rest on pearl beaches, this is no substitute for a bunker. If only by an absurd, fatal mistake. In general, we can not bomb anyone, but simply threaten to undermine Russia itself, there will already be a "kirdyk" for the whole world, nuclear shit will cover the whole world

But, the fact is that you can't lie forever, the obvious is becoming more and more obvious. The Soviet reserve of strength has not yet dried up, it will not be possible to surrender to the owners quickly, and there may not be enough time for Russia to wear out to complete degradation until a new zero rating. Therefore, it is quite possible that there will be a frank demonstration of power by the West, an ultimatum to Russia (to the Russian people), under which, in the name of peace of humanism and tolerance, it will be possible to surrender the country to the "elite". This will solve the problem for both parties, the "bourgeois" - the owners, and their servants of the "bad boys" with the cherished "jam jars" and "packs of cookies" in billions of dollars in accounts.

The whole question is how the people and our military, especially the officers, will perceive this. Sad conclusions, not out of nowhere, I would not want the worst, but in capitalism we will have a "edge" for anybody, and socialism will not return without a hard time or a serious test, without renewed socialism Russia will not survive, will not remain a great country.

[Mikhalych]

While Russia is in capitalism, we are already under someone else's uncle

And who surrendered to the USSR? Visiting bourgeois or "own" native guiding and guiding, such as the mind, honor and conscience of our era? And who is in power now? So there is nothing to blame on the mirror. ... ... Moreover, I saw how the surrender of the Motherland was going on.

[Per se.]

Quote: Mikhalych

Moreover, I saw how the surrender of the Motherland was going on.

Eh, Mikhalych! There were no fools there, they knew how to dress in the sheep skins of "democracy", and socialism, it was a relatively young system, where a lot was for the first time. As a result, inevitable mistakes, and to them the ideological sabotage of the West (and not only ideological, the CIA was not shy about outright crimes). What our "affectionate Misha" got was Chernobyl (a very murky case), an explosion on a gas pipeline (two passenger trains burned down), during the latter Gorbachev had materials about the involvement of the Americans in the sabotage.

I didn't want to spoil the relationship, they hushed it up - detente, peace, friendship, chewing gum. They hoped to make peace with the mortal enemy of socialism, the antagonist, to live in peaceful coexistence, and privileges and special rations were no longer enough for the top. Alas, "Bolivar will not take out two", as it turned out, the West does not need a strong Russia, even with the Communists, even with the Democrats, because of its self-sufficiency. There is already a master of world capitalism, for the sake of this, two world wars were started. Yes, they frankly surrendered the country, party renegades, opportunists, weathercocks, such always keep their nose to the wind, and climb into the "party of power" for a career. But, having once lied and betrayed, who will believe them now. At first, we were embarrassed to say that we have capitalism, they talked about the CIS, democracy, and world peace. The miracle did not happen, the incredible became obvious.

The problem is that there is a huge potential left from the space and nuclear superpower, scientific, technical, military. The West never dreamed of what turned out to be in the granaries of the USSR, no matter how preliminary it was poured into Gorbachev's detente, unilateral concessions. For 30 years now, our newly-minted capitalists have been eating up and “optimizing” Soviet power, turning it into “Russian power”. Long-term construction, reduction, "optimization", degradation of space achievements, science in general. Profit, here and now, from the sale of raw materials, Soviet military developments. Everything for sale, everything for the profit of those who have become billionaires.

What's next? It is difficult to say, but it was necessary to go through this, to taste the "forbidden fruit", to realize what they had and have lost, to see those who first discredited socialism, and then became a traitor. It was necessary to understand that the advertising gloss of Hollywood is far from real life, and "equal opportunities" is a mockery of the possibilities of billionaires and those who live as slaves of banks in endless debt from loans. We must take the best, drawing conclusions, say goodbye to traitors, thieves and bandits. Our people can and should live happily in Russia. Probably, everything that happened, a divine program, and it will be fulfilled, in any case, I want to believe in a good and bright.

[Uncle lee]

Quote: Per se.

I want to believe in good and light.

As one Soviet pilot used to say: "We will live!"

[dmlescs]

Our people cannot get vaccinated and put on a mask on a pug. The one that for me, personally - "our people is the main thing that depressing" - kitchen warriors and avoskin children by 80%.

[skif8013]

Quote: Mikhalych

While Russia is in capitalism, we are already under someone else's uncle

And who surrendered to the USSR? Visiting bourgeois or "own" native guiding and guiding, such as the mind, honor and conscience of our era? And who is in power now? So there is nothing to blame on the mirror. ... ... Moreover, I saw how the surrender of the Motherland was going on.

That's right, what kind of people are the boyars.

[VORON538]

The families of the military live in Russia. And the USSR was not surrendered by the capitalist bourgeois, but by the most loyal communists led by Gorbachev, Boriska (who was also a communist) only pressed power in time and turned around with his Caudla! But the communist-minded population suddenly wanted Western nishtyaks and did not even resist the collapse of the state. And thousands of missiles and tanks were not needed, it was enough to wave lace panties. And for the military in the case of the time "Ch", the matter will not arise, do not hesitate, since only the military in difficult times for Russia She was saved, but this is in the case of external aggression. In the case of a repetition of the scenario of the 80s and 90s, no one can say how everything will end.

[MegaWattExpert]

The author says the case. Everything is reasoned. There would be more such articles!

[smaug78]

At school in geography, a deuce?

[Leprikon5656]

Drunk or what?

[Vladimir_2U]

Not that I’m drowning for BZHRK, but why such confidence in their low secrecy ?! The same light ICBMs will no longer require atypical heavy wagons, and even those from orbit will still be allocated.

[prapor55]

With the fact that after the Chief came to power, they were removed from the database after 2 years and a special piece was brought in for their destruction. Partners do not destroy the most dangerous in the first place.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: prapor55

With the fact that after the Chief came to power, they were removed from the database after 2 years and a special piece was brought in for their destruction.

But what to do with a complex for which there is no ICBM? The point is not even that Yuzhmash remained in Ukraine, but that the production of solid fuel for ICBMs died in Pavlograd. And to alter the rocket for new fuel ... Makeyevtsy with this on the "Bark" have suffered.

[prapor55]

The 36th division could stand on the DB until 2008, but it was destroyed first

[Shishkov]

I also generally agree with the author, but I think that BZHRK would not hurt (without fanaticism, in limited quantities). They would increase the uncertainty factor for our "partners" in any case

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Not that I am drowning for the BZHRK, but why such confidence in their low secrecy ?!

Since the movement on civilian railways is tightly controlled by the civilian automated control system. In fact, the movement of the BZHRK will be controlled not by the army, but by the Russian Railways.
It's like hoping for the secrecy of the PGRK on the Moscow Ring Road.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Alexey RA

Since the movement on civilian railways is tightly controlled by the civilian automated control system. In fact, the movement of the BZHRK will be controlled not by the army, but by the Russian Railways.

Right on all the branches, branches, dead ends and bases with railway tracks, did this ACS spread its worms? And in this ACS will be crammed all the data on the composition, or can it be stupid "military letter" or just "letter"?

Quote: Alexey RA

It's like hoping for the secrecy of the PGRK on the Moscow Ring Road.

Utter nonsense.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Right on all the branches, branches, dead ends and bases with railway tracks, did this ACS spread its worms?

ACS gives the answer to the main question - where is the BZHRK with an accuracy to the station. And "branches and dead ends" fall into the zone of destruction of nuclear warheads.

Quote: Vladimir_2U

And this ACS will be filled with all the data on the composition, or can it be stupid "military letter" or just "letter"?

Military with additional security measures. With such measures, either 12 GU MO are lucky enough to have their products, or HE.

[Puzoter]

ACS gives the answer to the main question - where is the BZHRK with an accuracy to the station.

Who does he give the answer to? Is she sending reports straight to the Pentagon?

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Alexey RA

ACS gives the answer to the main question - where is the BZHRK with an accuracy to the station. And "branches and dead ends" fall into the zone of destruction of nuclear warheads.

In central Russia, there are tens of kilometers between "stations", what can we say about Siberia and the Far East, even if we assume that the automated control system sends data directly to the Pentagon. Well, the use of nuclear weapons to defeat, likely, but far from obligatory, BZHRK on railway lines is generally a blessing for the country, re-read the article.

Quote: Alexey RA

Military with additional security measures. With such measures, either 12 GU MO are lucky enough to have their products, or HE.

And again, why should all this be reflected in the data for the ACS? And so that the freight train does not enter the ACS in the ass of a vehicle that has stopped for the launch of the BZHRK, you know what I mean?

[Puzoter]

These are the author's wet fantasies, as well as the fact that abandoning them can prevent a blow to the cities. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden confirm this.

[D16]

There will be several more carriages with attendants and guards. If there are video cameras on each pole, it will not be difficult to track such a train.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: D16

There will be several more carriages with attendants and guards. If there are video cameras on each pole, it will not be difficult to track such a train.

Do you imagine that the guards are armored cars on platforms and sailors in wooden wagons? An ordinary train, like a postal and luggage train.

[D16]

I am not imagining. In general, I have a bad idea of ​​guarding vigorous loaves on public roads. Especially the railways. NNP Soviet trains with R-23UTTH did not play ball-alik at all and stayed in the places of deployment.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: D16

In general, I have a bad idea of ​​guarding vigorous loaves on public roads.

Those. do you completely exclude the transportation of nuclear weapons by rail? Well, if someone does not imagine SOMETHING to himself, then this does not mean the impossibility of this SOMETHING.

Quote: D16

Especially the railways. NNP Soviet trains with R-23UTTH did not play ball-alik at all and stayed in the places of deployment.

Yah. Also something from the unimaginable, or what?

The first missile regiment with RT-23UTTKh went on alert in October 1987 [10], and by mid-1988 five regiments were deployed (4 in the Kostroma region and 1 in the Perm region, 15 launchers in total). The convoys were deployed at a distance of about four kilometers from each other in stationary structures, and when they entered combat duty they were dispersed ... ...Within a radius of 1500 km from the locations of the BZHRK, joint measures were taken with the Ministry of Railways to replace the worn-out railroad bed

[jonht]

As I understand it, intelligence is asleep, the missile attack warning system is also. And we also overslept when we reached the position to attack the nuclear submarine ...
There is only one thing left .... To strike first "and the whole world to dust."
The main deterrent principle that is now working is the counter-strike. And they don't wait for it when something falls on us somewhere, a massive missile launch is recorded and a response command is immediately given to start. There is enough time to free the arsenals by sending them to a meeting, in response.

[Shishkov]

It is a pity that before you write a comment, you did not read the article ...

[jonht]

Then every now and then, I read ...
Cruise missiles fly for a long time, ICBMs fly quickly, but they can also be seen further away, so there will be time to defuse our arsenals. And again, heavy missiles will be the first to leave for their intended purpose, and everything else will be in catch-up. And the main thing is the already deployed Avangard complexes, when in a place of 30 minutes the flight time will be reduced to about 15. And it's not worth making idiots out of our general staff, there are more than adequate people there. In addition, SNF exercises are held every year, and there I also work out the time for making a decision, and I think they even take into account the fash glidors that do not yet exist on the DB.
A CONTINUOUS radar field was restored along the entire perimeter of the country and reinforced with over-the-horizon stations, which are also being built around the entire perimeter. Therefore, only traitors at the control panels can not detect a mass launch, but this is from the realm of fantasy, since they will die just like all the other radars, after all, one of the first to be destroyed.

[SKS_PRO]

The author wrote just for you:
“Often in the comments to articles on the stability of strategic nuclear forces to a sudden disarming strike, one can see remarks like“ by the time the enemy’s nuclear submarine falls, our mines will be empty. ”This is true only in case of a strike from a maximum distance of 8-10 thousand kilometers, when the launch is in advance will detect a missile attack warning system (EWS) and the country's top leadership will have about 20-30 minutes to make a decision about the beginning of the end of the world. 5 minutes, after which it will be too late. "(C)

[SVD68]

Quote: SKS_PRO

The author wrote just for you:

What is written is not a fact. And in 5-10 minutes with a counter-strike from the mines, they will fit, if there is no delay in the head of the Commander-in-Chief.

[SKS_PRO]

Well, here's an example: you (can I say "you") or let me sleep sweetly at night, not even after a holiday - just after a not very difficult day and even without a beloved woman by my side ...
And then a secretary / orderly / messenger rushes in to you? / Call the phone / write to WhatsApp
"Everything is horrible, we were attacked !!!"
In this situation, in FIVE minutes, can you make a decision to destroy the world?

[Azim77]

Why put the question of making such a decision so narrowly: one person, yes / no. Taking into account the risks outlined in the article, the decision may be different for different key events. Both in terms of speed of response and the level of verification.

[alstr]

In fact, there are a number of protocols when you DO NOT NEED a decision from the top to make a decision.
And a massive launch from all directions (and it will be) is definitely such a situation.
In addition, in the event of a nuclear explosion on the territory of the units, it automatically causes the launch of ICBMs WITHOUT AN ORDER from the command.

[Vol4ara]

Quote: alstr

In fact, there are a number of protocols when you DO NOT NEED a decision from the top to make a decision.
And a massive launch from all directions (and it will be) is definitely such a situation.
In addition, in the event of a nuclear explosion on the territory of the units, it automatically causes the launch of ICBMs WITHOUT AN ORDER from the command.

Yeah, only the access keys have the high command

[alstr]

There are also certain procedures for this.
According to the classics, these are two officers who open special envelopes, where the codes are written and then both carry out the launch.

Shl, besides, how will the "dead hand" system launch missiles - did the codes die along with the leadership?

[Stepan S]

When hitting from a distance of about two to three thousand kilometers

The author believes that the advance of all strategic forces and means to our borders, in principle, no one will notice? And the author also believes that the hit will be 100% even on nuclear submarines and PGRK. Such is his mathematics. It doesn't work that way.

[lomax77]

As recently as the day before yesterday there was another message about the interception of a reconnaissance aircraft, accompanied by a pair of B-52s, in the Dolniy Vostok. Who knows what was on board the 52s? ..
They are already at our borders ...

[jonht]

What is ballistics do you know? We will assume that yes.
1. The energy of the rocket does not change, that is, there will be no less fuel in it, it will not be removed.
2. Burnout of the composition, and for amers ALL solid-fuel missiles occurs according to a pre-planned scheme and this also cannot be changed.
3. EXISTING American ICBMs do not have a flat trajectory, they do not fly like that.
4. Based on points 1 and 2, the ICBM will first go out into space (make a slide) and from there it will fall along a steep trajectory .... Yes, the flight time is reduced, but not twice - this is the first thing. Secondly, the entire salvo will be detected by the radar, and in a disarming strike, the fascists themselves were betting not on ICBMs, but on cruise missiles of which it was planned to launch at least 2-3 thousand. And to fight just with them, the MiG-31 was specially built, sharpening them to fight against low flying targets.

[smaug78]

on cruise missiles of which it was planned to launch at least 2-3 thousand. And to fight just with them, the MiG-31 was specially built, sharpening them to fight against low flying targets.

And how many MiG-31 do you need, tell me?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: jonht

What is ballistics do you know? We will assume that yes.
1. The energy of the rocket does not change, that is, there will be no less fuel in it, it will not be removed.
2. Burnout of the composition, and for amers ALL solid-fuel missiles occurs according to a pre-planned scheme and this also cannot be changed.
3. EXISTING American ICBMs do not have a flat trajectory, they do not fly like that.

https://pikabu.ru/story/pilotyi_avialaynera_a320snyali_na_video_unikalnyiy_zapusk_traydenta_iipo_nastilnoy_traektorii_6972345

http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/ru/archive/sgsr03gronlund.pdf

[KJIETyc]

Woe-xperdy, what kind of missiles will you shoot in your Star Wars from 2000 km from the Arctic Ocean?

[atakan]

Maybe he's talking about the nuclear submarine with 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles?

But they have a range of 1,5 thousand.

[D16]

And two hours of flight time. Moreover, they will cover almost the entire distance at an altitude of more than ten km. Otherwise, there won't be enough fuel. And they do not have them in a vigorous-loaf performance. AGM only.

[D16]

When hitting from a distance of about two to three thousand kilometers

Do you already have something to hit? Did I miss building a medium-range missile system? the author is just talking nonsense, sucked out of a dirty finger.

[AUL]

Here I read it - I am surprised! Both the article and the comments imply that the blow will be completely unexpected. That rolled over to the Bidon, and he, in the toilet sidyuchi, let's press on the red button! Kindergarten...
In fact, the beginning of a war (including a nuclear one) will be preceded by many events that cannot be hidden either from intelligence agents or from national surveillance equipment. This is the dispersal of the fleet, aviation and ground forces, and the preparation of industry, energy and transport for martial law, the formation of reserves of food and raw materials, and much, much more. And these events will take more than one week! So the opposite side will have plenty of time to respond, which will significantly change the scenario described. Of course, it will not be possible to completely avoid the damage, the devastation will be terrible. But the adversary will have to be quite sour. Hopefully understanding this will keep him from pursuing silly thoughts!

[Alexey RA]

Quote from AUL

In fact, the beginning of a war (including a nuclear one) will be preceded by many events that cannot be hidden either from intelligence agents or from national surveillance equipment. This is the dispersal of the fleet, aviation and ground forces, and the preparation of industry, energy and transport for martial law, the formation of reserves of food and raw materials, and much, much more.

All this has already happened - the obligatory "threatened period", obligatory requirements through diplomatic channels, and so on. But in reality, it suddenly came on 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

[AUL]

Quote: Alexey RA

But in reality, it suddenly came on 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

An unfortunate example. Both the Ministry of Defense and Stalin himself had more than enough information about the impending attack. It was just that the strategy of responding to the threat was poorly chosen.

[Alexey RA]

Quote from AUL

An unfortunate example. Both the Ministry of Defense and Stalin himself had more than enough information about the impending attack. It was just that the strategy of responding to the threat was poorly chosen.

So in this case, the information will be sufficient. But will the leadership believe in it, especially considering the same volume of disinformation as in 1941? And in general, will the leadership believe in the possibility of a global nuclear war?
Especially considering that in this case the stakes are much higher than in 1941 - the decision will determine the fate of not one country, but the world as a whole. Plus, the higher the DEFCON, the greater the cost of the error.

[Vol4ara]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote from AUL

An unfortunate example. Both the Ministry of Defense and Stalin himself had more than enough information about the impending attack. It was just that the strategy of responding to the threat was poorly chosen.

So in this case, the information will be sufficient. But will the leadership believe in it, especially considering the same volume of disinformation as in 1941? And in general, will the leadership believe in the possibility of a global nuclear war?
Especially considering that in this case the stakes are much higher than in 1941 - the decision will determine the fate of not one country, but the world as a whole. Plus, the higher the DEFCON, the greater the cost of the error.

And here it is not necessary to believe or not believe, the infa has passed - the bombers are dispersed, and the pgrk sent them to the routes

[n456]

"Vanguard complexes, when in a place of 30 minutes the flight time will be reduced to about 15 ..."

The same "Vanguard" on the other side of the planet will fly for more than 30 minutes. Slightly faster let's say "Voyevoda."

[Radio operator and engineer]

Great comment! The article is not bad, but ... with a mass launch by an attacker, our strategic nuclear forces will not sit and wait. And 5 minutes is enough. I think that it is precisely this option that is a priority in the decision-making system.

[t-12]

The simplest thing is to build 10000 missile silos. There are real rockets in 700 mines. The rest 9300 - dummy missiles.

At the same time, the enemy should not know in which missile silos and in which dummies.

[nnm]

According to recent reports, China is doing just that now.

[Russobel]

The vector is correct. I agree with you.
Shake the Aligarhs ...
Each has 50 mines.

[Avior]

This is prohibited by the contract of sv

[VORON538]

false positions are prohibited?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Avior

This is prohibited by the contract of sv

Yes, but until we get to the false ones, we can change that. The agreement will still have to be updated, with new realities.

[Avior]

The Americans also want to change it.
Include China and tactical charges

[Aleksandr123]

We ourselves would not forget where what.

[t-12]

It doesn't matter to themselves. All the same, with a retaliatory strike, real missiles will take off, and dummies will not take off.

[SVD68]

Quote: t-12

The simplest thing is to build 10000 missile silos. There are real rockets in 700 mines. The rest 9300 - dummy missiles.

At the same time, the enemy should not know in which missile silos and in which dummies.

In such conditions, the enemy will proceed from considerations that all our silos are equipped with real missiles. And it will produce 3000 missiles with 30 warheads. And since this is a lot of money, he will decide that these 3000 missiles should be used so that the money spent does not go to waste.

[t-12]

This is decided by the inspections. Once a year, the enemy randomly selects 100 missile silos and tests the missiles. On average, there should be 7 real rockets and 93 dummies. After inspection, rockets and dummies are randomly "shuffled".

Well, or another option: no inspections, and let the enemy think we have 30000 warheads. And let him rivet 30000 warheads, wasting energy and repeating the mistake of the late USSR. If the USSR limited itself to 1000 warheads (there are enough of them to contain it), and redirected its forces to a peaceful channel, to resettle communal apartments and for all kinds of consumer goods, then maybe everything would not have ended in collapse.

[Palestinian]

meaning in the article? as soon as at least one bullet of a politician fires and all this der ... o will fly into tar rats ... everyone will get ... probably even blacks in Africa ...

[rocket757]

Nuclear mathematics: how many nuclear charges does the United States need to destroy Russian strategic nuclear forces?

everyone has mathematicians / bookkeepers, and fortunately. Some politicians would have heaped up this .... oh, don't!

[Aag]

Quote: Xlor

No nuclear weapons are needed to destroy the United States. It is enough to open the borders and send more migrants from Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America there. Then there are Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab states. The import of migrants will be much cheaper than the creation of nuclear charges and their subsequent maintenance ...

...)))) ... What borders do you propose to open?
"... The importation of migrants will be much cheaper than the creation of nuclear charges ..."
How will we deliver? On the suspensions of the Tu-95s? In the mines of SSBNs? Or will we throw YARSs?)))

[kartalovkolya]

Well, sho? Again like "... Katz offers to give up?" Another vsepalschik, but in life everything is different ... Who served, he knows!

[mark1]

In Soviet times, the number of silos was strictly limited by contracts and there was no question of any "extra" hole in the ground - everything was checked. On SSBNs, by the way, too (and now the 941st stand with dismantled mine covers for satellite control). So I doubt the viability of the idea - "screwing" in the ground a lot of silos (not very cheap, besides) - will not work. On the other hand, the defense of the silos has made great progress and there is probably no need to be afraid for the fate of “Sarmat”. BZHRK and PGRK, in my opinion, have the right to life (50% of ICBMs), do not be afraid to disguise them as civilian trailers, this will not save the city.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: mark1

In Soviet times, the number of silos was strictly limited by contracts and there was no question of any "extra" hole in the ground - everything was checked. On SSBNs, by the way, too (and now the 941st stand with dismantled mine covers for satellite control).

I doubt that the United States at the talks will reasonably defend the point of view why we cannot switch to silos as the main storage method - from the point of view of a first strike on them, this is the least relaxed option - silos will not swim close to America. And if they are strongly opposed, then the more incentives to send them.

And to control the number of regions - closed in the region, we deliver 50 ICBMs with 100 nuclear warheads. And there we put them where we want, in any of the 100 silos.

Quote: mark1

So I doubt the viability of the idea - "screwing" in the earth a lot of silos (not very cheap, besides) - will not work.

The Chinese are "twisting" - both silos and the United States.

Silos will last for a long time - i.e. long-term investment. How much does the maintenance of PGRK, SSBN cost?

Quote: mark1

On the other hand, the defense of the silos has made great progress and there is probably no need to be afraid for the fate of “Sarmat”.

It is impossible to be 100% protected from a nuclear charge, no matter how much progress there is. All sorts of mephrils and adaptaniums have not yet been invented. On silos of Sarmat they will spend not 2, but 4 YaBB. And they will stand in silos from Satan.

Quote: mark1

BZHRK and PGRK, in my opinion, have the right to life (50% of ICBMs), do not be afraid to disguise them as civilian trailers, this will not save the city.

But in my opinion, no. These are just targets. Very comfortable for the enemy.

[vvvjak]

Quote: AVM

On the other hand, the stability of strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming get away

Sorry, could not resist. Such a beautiful phrase came out thanks to a typo.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: vvvjak

Quote: AVM

On the other hand, the stability of strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming get away

Sorry, could not resist. Such a beautiful phrase came out thanks to a typo.

Never mind

[vvvjak]

If you want, then let the editors correct (the phrase under the picture with satellites). But I would leave it - it turned out cool, especially for Friday, that's why I didn't fix it myself.

[mark1]

We can switch to 100% placement of ICBMs in silos, no one will forbid us, but if there is any limiting Treaty, then it also provides for control methods - how many missiles are declared in silos, show as many (please)
Any extra mine is a suspicion of a violation of the Treaty and is either subject to destruction, or stands with an open lid and is available for satellite control. It's easier for the Chinese, they don't owe anything to anyone.
It is not possible to protect silos 100% - who can argue, but 5-50% of the surviving mines make all the supposed gestures of the adversary meaningless (we will beat the cities in response). By the way, silos from "Satan" are very strong! (over 210 kgf per cm2 not modified)
On PGRK BZHRK - in order to have an opinion, you need to know the method of application (one of the options is roaming, from a protected point to a protected one, for example, a trench shelter)

[Fuse angel]

I didn't understand something. The author described hypothetical events when we will simply stand and watch as the enemy is deploying its forces near our shores, watch how missiles fly in our direction, neither reconnaissance nor early warning missile systems seem to exist. Yes, and before the start of any conflict, there is always tension, a political crisis, etc. Therefore, I see no point in the calculations that the author gives. I didn't even finish reading the article. Sorry for the time.

[tone]

How will you track their SSBN off our shores? At the Pacific Fleet, ONE boat remained suitable for such a pr971. ONE !!!

[Fuse angel]

They are being tracked even before they went to sea, weapons such as SSBNs should not be overlooked at all. And no one just sends such weapons to the enemy's shores. When the political situation aggravates, the strategic nuclear forces are always put on alert, as are the means of control and reconnaissance

[Avior]

How do they track, sorry?

[Passing]

Quote: Guardian Angel

They're being tracked before they even go out to sea.

We have SSBNs more at the berth than patrolling, and US SSBNs spend up to two-thirds of their time in the ocean. And where exactly they swim, we do not know. Simply because they have always lagged behind in terms of low noise and detection means. And even for new projects, no breakthroughs were announced.

[Aag]

Quote: Guardian Angel

They are being tracked even before they went to sea, weapons such as SSBNs should not be overlooked at all. And no one just sends such weapons to the enemy's shores. When the political situation aggravates, the strategic nuclear forces are always put on alert, as are the means of control and reconnaissance

It looks like you are not in the subject from the word "completely" ...
Well, the Ohio came out of the bases, I think, I hope, we will track it. Further, what? I can’t imagine further tracking, especially in real time ... Well, even, let (strong assumption), - we know at least the approximate location , - everything is close to our native (us) shores, but the rules, agreements are not violated (and even if they begin to be violated), what will be our actions (well, except for calls through diplomatic channels, and suddenly they do not answer ?!)? In such a situation, we have no reason to deliver the first (warning) RNU (nuclear missile strike)!
Will our SSBNs roll off the walls? I doubt that many of the little that we have will be able to do this ... Moreover, without a "tail" ...
Yes, the Strategic Missile Forces will be transferred to the highest degrees of BG ... PGRK will come out with PPD (points of permanent deployment) ... Another question WHERE? combat duty, -re ready to fire, -controlled by most of the COP (communication channels), or on the PBSP (field combat starting positions, -classified, not previously equipped to exclude unmasking, the state is periodically monitored by a limited number of persons)? ... By the way, Author , apparently, it does not take this into account, hence the "neglect" of the PGRK, which gives some flexibility in the use of strategic nuclear forces! (IMHO).
Digress ... The author correctly says, - in geopolitical terms, our strategic nuclear forces are ... not in a better (than the United States) situation. (((The coordinates of stationary targets for NATO ICBMs have long been known, introduced into the PZ (flight missions of ICBMs), order combat use has been worked out, combat orders have been systematized ...
We, in most cases of the RYAK (missile nuclear conflict), so that "they die", will have to retarget a lot of things according to the situation ...
Missile defense over our silos? ... It seems only over Moscow ... Even the missile defense system over the second (Ural) region stipulated in the ABM Treaty was abandoned ... (((

[D16]

[quote] [how will you track their SSBP off our shores [quote]
And what have they forgotten near our shores? It is much more convenient for them to shoot from the Gulf of Mexico.

[Shishkov]

The author explains specifically for you about the reaction time in the event of a strike from a nuclear submarine. And according to your logic, since there is "reconnaissance and early warning missile systems", you can generally not spend people's money and put ICBMs in open positions

[Fuse angel]

The author counts how many YABS will go to each silo, when, by the time they hit them, they should already be empty. And about PGRK in general, nonsense, the author sweeps them aside right away, arguing that in the future it is easy to track them from satellites, and this is all from a series if only

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Guardian Angel

I didn't understand something. The author described hypothetical events when we will simply stand and watch as the enemy is deploying its forces near our shores, watch as missiles fly in our direction, neither reconnaissance nor early warning system seems to exist.

Do we have ways to track US SSBNs over 2000 km from our shores? Are we at least 200 km away, will we be guaranteed to find them?

An early warning system exists, but with an attack from 2000-2500 km, the time for everything will be 5-10 minutes.

Quote: Guardian Angel

Yes, and before the start of any conflict, there is always tension, a political crisis, etc.

The meaning of a "sudden" strike is precisely that it is delivered in a planned, deliberate manner and without any crisis.

Quote: Guardian Angel

Therefore, I see no point in the calculations that the author gives. I didn't even finish reading the article. Sorry for the time.

This is the problem, they do not read carefully, but there is an opinion.

- And sho you all went crazy with your Caruso ?! I heard your Caruso - lisps, lisps ...
- Have you been to the concert ???
- No, Rabinovich sang for me on the phone.

[carstorm 11]

It doesn't work that way. Sudden Disarming Strike is months of preparation. There are hundreds of signs by which this can be tracked. And it is impossible to hide them.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: carstorm 11

It doesn't work that way. Sudden Disarming Strike is months of preparation. There are hundreds of signs by which this can be tracked. And it is impossible to hide them.

The main thing is not to know with hindsight what is possible.

[carstorm 11]

Not. This blow is the beginning of the war. These are hundreds of movements. These are thousands of people involved. Do you think what it is like the disappearance of a heap, for example, submarines from their bases, which means that you can skip a sharp change in the system? Any changes are tracked. Therefore, major exercises are warned months in advance. So that the concentration of troops is not accepted for preparation for war. 5,5 minutes, as you say, at the minimum range, provided that the troops are already in readiness enough.

[ccsr]

Quote: carstorm 11

Any changes are tracked.

The author of the article is clearly not in the subject, because he does not know that in the eighties we tracked the number of NATO battalions on exercises throughout Europe and this was noted every day in the reports. I will not reveal a big secret, but this figure was in the range of 30-40, with the exception of large-scale exercises, which were notified to us in advance. But if this figure began to grow, then there would be a certain algorithm by which other mechanisms of our intelligence were instantly turned on. And the fact that we knew where and how many carriers of nuclear weapons are in Europe and in what condition they are, I do not even mention - in the intelligence report they were taken into account to one.
Therefore, one must be very careful when reading such authors. These are mainly the fantasies of civilians who did not come close to either the attack warning systems or the strategic nuclear forces themselves. That's why they get bloopers like

1. Most of the carriers of nuclear weapons of the Russian strategic nuclear forces should be guaranteed protected from all types of conventional weapons.

I wonder what madman is preparing to attack us with conventional weapons, the author apparently does not know, but the example of Saakashvili seems to have sunk into his head ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: carstorm 11

Any changes are tracked.

The author of the article is clearly not in the subject, because he does not know that in the eighties we tracked the number of NATO battalions on exercises throughout Europe and this was noted every day in the reports. I will not reveal a big secret, but this figure was in the range of 30-40, with the exception of large-scale exercises, which were notified to us in advance. But if this figure began to grow, then there would be a certain algorithm by which other mechanisms of our intelligence were instantly turned on. And the fact that we knew where and how many carriers of nuclear weapons are in Europe and in what condition they are, I do not even mention - in the intelligence report they were taken into account to one.

What does the teaching have to do with it? How are they related to a sudden strike from under the water with SSBNs?

Quote: ccsr

Therefore, one must be very careful when reading such authors. These are mainly the fantasies of civilians who did not come close to either the attack warning systems or the strategic nuclear forces themselves. That's why they get bloopers like

1. Most of the carriers of nuclear weapons of the Russian strategic nuclear forces should be guaranteed protected from all types of conventional weapons.

Who are you? Are you sure you are not writing nonsense?

Quote: ccsr

I wonder what madman is preparing to attack us with conventional weapons, the author apparently does not know, but the example of Saakashvili seems to have sunk into his head ...

Carriers YABCH 700 pcs. And the WTO can be tens of thousands. In the short term and hypersonic.

Nobody claims that only the WTO is attacked:

In total, for the destruction of all Russian strategic nuclear forces, the United States should spend about 500-600 nuclear warheads out of 1550 operatively deployed, plus a certain amount of high-precision weapons, of which they have a lot.

It can be assumed that, given the importance of the task at hand, if the United States decides to launch a sudden disarming strike, it will not save money and use nuclear warheads to destroy all Russian components of the strategic nuclear forces together with conventional weapons.

[Operator]

WTO with conventional warheads are not considered by our opponents as a counterforce strike weapon for two reasons:
- modern silo heads withstand a direct hit of a 500-kg conventional warhead;
- even if the enemy has analogues of our Zircon-type hypersonic missile launchers, their range will not exceed 1000 km, which is not enough to defeat silos when launching missile launchers from sea and land carriers outside the borders of the Russian Federation.
The launch of hypersonic missiles from subsonic aircraft carriers in the airspace of the Russian Federation is countered by shooting down these carriers "from a slingshot" even before reaching the launch lines of the GKR.

PS Vladimir Putin unambiguously named the targets for the Russian sea-based Zircon GKR (on multipurpose nuclear submarines) with nuclear warheads with a capacity of 250 Kt and an approach time of within 10 minutes - control points on enemy territory. Translated into Russian: objects such as buildings of governments and ministries of defense in Washington, London, Berlin, Warsaw, etc. - almost all the capitals of our potential opponents. That is to say, "fire on the headquarters."

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

What does the teaching have to do with it? How are they related to a sudden strike from under the water with SSBNs?

This was one of the options for unleashing a war against the USSR, when, under the guise of exercises, the number of troops leaving the PPD and being in the field was sharply increased. After that, a nuclear strike was inflicted on us, including from nuclear submarines, and our retaliatory strike destroyed the civilian population of Europe, and at the same time the NATO military structure suffered less damage due to the dispersal of troops.

Quote: AVM

Who are you? Are you sure you are not writing nonsense?

Just by the fact that you ask such a question, it becomes clear that you simply do not understand military affairs, although you post beautiful pictures in your articles, without understanding their meaning and the real situation in the event of a nuclear war.

Quote: AVM

Carriers YABCH 700 pcs. And the WTO can be tens of thousands. In the short term and hypersonic.

Most recently, under Trump, the Americans wanted to ditch the START treaty, and I am sure that they will always strive for this, if only because of China. So you better not stutter about the WTO - you will tell these tales to naive people. But 700 carriers will be enough for us at the moment to drive the United States and China into the Stone Age, taking into account the secondary factors that appear after the use of nuclear warheads.

Quote: AVM

Total for the destruction of all Russian strategic nuclear forces of the United States

Well, where did you get such data - you give at least one source where you get these numbers. Somehow your personal fantasies didn't impress me.

[Fan-fan]

Any changes are tracked.

No wrong... Here is an excerpt from the book "History of Underwater Espionage against the USSR": "In the United States it was believed that they could destroy many Soviet submarines in their combat positions. To check this one Sunday, urgently collecting more than two dozen multipurpose submarines from the ports of the Atlantic coast of the United States , the admirals sent this armada towards the Soviet Union. All reconnaissance forces were deployed to record the Soviet reaction. There was no sign of the detection of this urgent boat exit. "

[ccsr]

Quote: Fan-Fan

No signs of finding this urgent boat exit were recorded. "

Who did not record it and when was it? Do you think that satellite reconnaissance did not detect empty berths, and the naval OSNAZ did not detect an increase in radio traffic in submarine control networks? With what joy I have to trust the foreign authors of the book, especially since it will never be possible to gather officers at American bases on Sunday, because only those who are on duty remain there. And all of them are resting so much that they can be in another country - sucks you know the order in the American army.

Quote: Fan-Fan

No, it is wrong.

Find something more serious to refute.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: carstorm 11

Not. This blow is the beginning of the war. These are hundreds of movements. These are thousands of people involved. Do you think what it is like the disappearance of a heap, for example, submarines from their bases, which means that you can skip a sharp change in the system? Any changes are tracked. Therefore, major exercises are warned months in advance. So that the concentration of troops is not accepted for preparation for war. 5,5 minutes, as you say, at the minimum range, provided that the troops are already in readiness enough.

Move what?

Nothing "abruptly" disappears. Right now, roughly 50% of their SSBNs and SSNs are on duty. It is not known where.

[carstorm 11]

On fingers. Preparation for such an operation is planning, gathering information and activating the gathering of intelligence. The activity that falls out of the system is the first sign. She will be spotted instantly. People involved in this will immediately be limited in movement and contacts. Intelligence is focused on such scenarios from the outset. 50 percent not clear where? Do you think that the rest in the sea will not be driven out to protect against retaliation? Kicked out and long before the start. All strategic objects will also begin to prepare. You have a script that just got together and chewed. It just rolled in the evening and forward) But this does not happen.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: carstorm 11

On fingers. Preparation for such an operation is planning, gathering information and activating the gathering of intelligence. The activity that falls out of the system is the first sign. She will be spotted instantly. People involved in this will immediately be limited in movement and contacts. Intelligence is focused on such scenarios from the outset. 50 percent not clear where? Do you think that the rest in the sea will not be driven out to protect against retaliation? Kicked out and long before the start. All strategic objects will also begin to prepare. You have a script that just got together and chewed. It just rolled in the evening and forward) But this does not happen.

But what if the enemy starts to simulate such activity in advance? The first time - everyone tensed, the second - too, the fifth - tenth already got used to it. And that was only part of the plan ...

[carstorm 11]

And this happens regularly) on both sides) Therefore, conclusions are made by analysts from the entire stream of explored. From various places and sources. Literally. 41 years was a very strong lesson. Now even a simple change in communication in social networks of people, for example, from the base of the PL is being analyzed. Why? What has changed and when ?! Or why their embassy suddenly changed and diplomats behave in an unusual way. Etc. etc. War does not start without preparation. Stealth is good. Petya and the wolf and all that. But it’s not children who make decisions and analyze. As well as from their side.

[Operator]

The author correctly answered you: trying to guess the moment when the enemy inflicts a preventive counterforce nuclear missile strike based on indirect signs is like guessing on coffee grounds.

Each of the two leading nuclear powers is capable of delivering such a strike right this second without any additional direct / indirect measures.

There is no need to step on a rake a second time on June 22, 1941.

[carstorm 11]

Exactly. You would think that all the intelligence services of the world have been doing this for 50 years. This is not fortune telling. This is reality. Both the states and ours know the payroll of each boat. Together with their families. Track any of their movements. Indirect signs are not fortune-telling. This is data for analysis. And no. Each side is incapable of doing this. It is because of June 22nd.

[Aag]

Quote: AVM

Quote: carstorm 11

It doesn't work that way. Sudden Disarming Strike is months of preparation. There are hundreds of signs by which this can be tracked. And it is impossible to hide them.

The main thing is not to know with hindsight what is possible.

... I can't send you a message in peacetime, but people believe that we have everything under control! Not, I agree, - it's more convenient, more comfortable ... Well, even if - we know about the concentration of "Ogay" in the areas of strike positions, - what are we going to do?
Thanks for the article! IMHO: a lot of controversial statements, conclusions ... (sorry, perhaps from ignorance of tactics, the practice of the Strategic Missile Forces, in particular ...)
But! For the dialogue "with the listeners" (commentators) - a bold, repeated plus!
Patience to you (!): It seems that the most reactionary commentators are farthest from the topic ...)))

[your1970]

Quote: Guardian Angel

Yes, and before the start of any conflict, there is always tension, a political crisis, etc.

22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, no? And now the stakes are a little higher ...

[Pushkowed]

The author did not consider the option "underwater silos".
1. They can be placed on inland waters - enemy navies will not get through there.
2. Stealth is much higher than that of traditional silos.
3. Vulnerability to conventional weapons is lower.
4. Vulnerability to nuclear weapons - either the same or even lower. (At the same time, the enemy's YABS expenditure for the destruction of one such installation will be significantly greater than for the destruction of a traditional silo: the enemy will now have to sow the water area with his YABB using the "square-nested" method, since the coordinates of the targets are known only very approximately).
5. In addition, they can be moved from place to place (this will not work with conventional silos).
6. Missile type - the same as in SSBN (unification).

This is about the Skif project, if anything ...

[tone]

What is their expiration date and how to maintain them? If it is necessary to raise to the surface, then soon all their locations will be known.

[Pushkowed]

The shelf life is limited by the RTG performance. A few years at least.
They probably need to be positively buoyant and anchored (like anchor mines) in order to stay upright.
Maintenance - should be from the ship, with being pulled out of the water to the shore, like conventional ICBMs.
But calculating the coordinates of each installation is not an easy task for the enemy.
Maintenance ships have to scurry around the area constantly, stand in one place for a long time (each time in a different place), so it is impossible to understand what they are doing there (especially if they are of a catamaran type, like the "Commune", only with a roof to protect from observation from space).

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Pushkowed

The author did not consider the option "underwater silos".
1. They can be placed on inland waters - enemy navies will not get through there.
2. Stealth is much higher than that of traditional silos.
3. Vulnerability to conventional weapons is lower.
4. Vulnerability to nuclear weapons - either the same or even lower. (At the same time, the enemy's YABS expenditure for the destruction of one such installation will be significantly greater than for the destruction of a traditional silo: the enemy will now have to sow the water area with his YABB using the "square-nested" method, since the coordinates of the targets are known only very approximately).
5. In addition, they can be moved from place to place (this will not work with conventional silos).
6. Missile type - the same as in SSBN (unification).

This is about the Skif project, if anything ...

Expensive, not mastered, yet forbidden, I do not want to litter fresh water reservoirs, Baikal, for example. Difficult to protect, mostly freeze in winter. How will they behave in case of powerful underwater nuclear explosions? Under water, you can make a sealed container, not silos.

[Pushkowed]

Expensive

It is hardly much more expensive than a conventional silo. But "high factory readiness" is absolute.

not mastered

The SLBMs have been mastered, the SSBNs have been mastered, the Skif will not get the job done. Technologically, there is nothing fundamentally new here.

not yet

This is yes. But since ours are developing, and our "potential" are probing the ground on the topic of terminating agreements, then the key word is "bye."

I don't want to litter fresh water reservoirs, Baikal, for example.

Indeed, I don’t want to. But to get enemy YABBs on their heads - this is somehow even less desirable.

Hard to guard

Underwater lighting system, forces and means of combating PDSS, patrolling ... Everything is as usual. We have experience in protecting a naval base or some cooling ponds for nuclear power plants. The same PGRKs are even more vulnerable and require more serious protection on their MBPs. And the late Soviet experience of laying nuclear bombs near the American silos says that with them "not everything is so simple" in terms of protection from saboteurs. There is no perfect guard.

mostly freeze in winter

Seasonal ice in inland waters is not like pack ice in the Arctic.

It can be pierced before the start of the hole with a special charge (on SSBNs this is worked out, but here - and the charge is needed less, and a special "anti-ice" missile / torpedo does not need to be spent if the charge is simply made to float freely).

If the ice is thin (spring / autumn), it is possible that a rocket can be launched right through it.

An alternative is icebreaker preventive maintenance during the winter, but this can be too costly.

How will they behave in case of powerful underwater nuclear explosions?

Probably similar to the rugged submarine hulls that were tested in Bikini Atoll and Novaya Zemlya. A distance of 1-2 kilometers between them already excludes the possibility of hitting two installations with one explosion. And this despite the fact that the TPK of such "underwater missiles" is smaller in size, and therefore, they can be made even stronger. Most likely they have a cylindrical shape, and this shape is very resistant to shock waves. Even in Hiroshima, the factory chimneys survived.

Several kilometers between installations in the area - and the enemy will have to spend a lot of YABB to create a "zone of continuous destruction" (because the area grows in proportion to the square of the linear distance). In any case, obviously more than YABB on the "Scythians" themselves. Perhaps even by orders of magnitude - it takes mathematics to calculate the optimal interval between installations. If the average interval is increased by 2 times, then the area of ​​the district will increase by 4 times, and 4 times more YAB will be needed to "sow" it. In addition, the interval can be quickly changed. If the enemy has only weak warheads (like the 5-kiloton W76-2), then the Scythians can be placed more compactly. If the enemy decides to use more powerful blocks (like the 475-kiloton W88), then he will be able to place a smaller number of them on missiles, and we can reset all this by simply pushing the Scythians apart.

Under water, you can make a sealed container, not silos.

Actually, this is it. The term "underwater silos" is conditional in order to more clearly define its role in the containment system.

[Shishkov]

One does not interfere. "Skif" fits perfectly into the author's logic

[2 Level Advisor]

The simplest question is which inland water bodies do not freeze for six months?

[Pushkowed]

And what does freezing have to do with it? There is the Arctic - it is [so far] in a frozen state all year round, but this does not prevent us or the Americans from conducting combat patrols of SSBNs under the ice. Ice can be broken with a floating charge, which is activated before launch - that's all.

[2 Level Advisor]

To break through the ice is no longer just a silo, but almost a submarine + communication from under the ice, the stabilization is already different, the basis of the start is different, the size is completely different + but how to look for a place thinner as the nuclear submarines do - is it already a self-propelled silo? such 10 silos - at a price more than nuclear submarines will come out noticeably - and why are they then?

[Pushkowed]

Ice on inland waters is seasonal. Lasts six months. During this time, it does not have time to reach a multi-meter thickness, let alone in the Arctic.

Attaching a float with an explosive charge to the "Skif" TPK (so that at the "start" command it separates, floats up and explodes the ice) is no more difficult than the standard silo algorithm "open the lid before launch".

And communication is needed in any case. For the "Scythians" it can be organized via submarine cables. Again, no more complicated than underground communication cables for silos.

[2 Level Advisor]

well .. let the kilometers of cables under water (which will lead to a violation of secrecy) .. why the submarines first float over the ice, and then let them in, didn’t think? and not blowing up the ice above you from under the water and provide a bunch of engineering solutions for this?

[Aag]

Quote: 2 level advisor

The simplest question is which inland water bodies do not freeze for six months?

You know, sometimes I want to advise the authors of such comments (theorists without practice, - I apologize if the author of the comment is thinking hypothetically ...,), - take a jigsaw (!), And try to do something real!
... Did you hear about a water hammer? ... Realization that silos are far from only TPK (transport launch container), TPU (transport launch device) (in some cases they do without them ...), but a bunch of BU cables ( combat control feeding ...) ../
I will not reveal the secrets, - it is in the public domain, - ... no, I will not ... Not everything is as simple as it seems! Sorry, I can not resist, - all these questions are more difficult to solve than under the USSR! ...
Kick !!! But, isn't it a fact ?! ...

[Avior]

The SNV treaty provides for mutual control over the available charges

[nnm]

I didn't understand one thesis ...
Why US mine ICBMs are a very well-protected and practically indestructible component of strategic nuclear forces, while in our country they will simply "throw 3" heads "into the mine and that's it ..." (not a quote, but the meaning is this).
It seems to me that the approach should be identical. I understand that, perhaps, we are talking about different flight times, but not so much.
And plus, upon impact from 2-3 thousand km, by what forces and means will it be applied? All the same, as I understand, these will not be the most powerful charges? And as for me, after all, the capabilities of our air defense-missile defense system have not been fully taken into account.

[cost 75]

Because the states have 450 shpu monoblock and we have 122 shpu.

[nnm]

I caught this idea of ​​the authors. But I ask about something else - what is the number of enemy charges located in 2-3 thousand km (other options can be considered separately, because the missiles will already leave the mines), what is their real flight time and the ability to overcome air defense and missile defense? And the authors declared 5 minutes .... to what point of our territory was this calculation made? Before the European one? And it seems that almost from the territory of Ukraine .. But then we must also take into account the geography of the location of our mines, and after all, not all of the "points" are located near Moscow, etc.
And further, if the strike comes from the nearest points on the mines, will the United States have enough forces and means to simultaneously suppress other components of the strategic nuclear forces? Or, during this time, mobile complexes, submarines, aircraft will come out (I don't know why the author destroyed them so easily with almost anti-aircraft fire without taking into account the missile launch range) ..

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: nnm

I caught this idea of ​​the authors. But I ask about something else - what is the number of enemy charges located in 2-3 thousand km (other options can be considered separately, because the missiles will already leave the mines), what is their real flight time and the ability to overcome air defense and missile defense? And the authors declared 5 minutes .... to what point of our territory was this calculation made? Before the European one? And it seems that almost from the territory of Ukraine .. But then we must also take into account the geography of the location of our mines, and after all, not all of the "points" are located near Moscow, etc.

A strike from an SSBN, a position from 2300 km, sort of like the Trident's minimum range (he can't shoot at close range).

Quote: nnm

And further, if the strike comes from the nearest points on the mines, will the United States have enough forces and means to simultaneously suppress other components of the strategic nuclear forces? Or, during this time, mobile complexes, submarines, aircraft will come out (I don't know why the author destroyed them so easily with almost anti-aircraft fire without taking into account the missile launch range) ..

Where will they go? Move 100 meters from the base? Can you quickly deploy PGRK and SSBNs in 5 minutes?

SSBNs will take tens of minutes at best. Aircraft for several hours, or even more.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: nnm

I didn't understand one thesis ...
Why US mine ICBMs are a very well-protected and practically indestructible component of strategic nuclear forces, while in our country they will simply "throw 3" heads "into the mine and that's it ..." (not a quote, but the meaning is this).

The security is about the same.

But if we throw 2 YABBs to destroy 1 American carrier with one YABB, then the USA can throw 2 YABBs in order to destroy 3-10 YABBs on one of our ICBMs. Who is the loser?

[nnm]

Colleague, so I ask you to reveal the very arithmetic of your calculations: the number of carriers, heads by 2-3 thousand, to what point is this distance calculated, how did you get 5 minutes, did you take into account the missile defense, the retaliatory strike of our operational complexes, then that the planes They will definitely not fly off 100 meters, but they can hit Europe and US bases not only from the beaches of California, that the same "perimeter" will work after the first strikes on the European part, launching ICBMs from Siberia, the Far East, etc.
But I read the article with interest, thanks for the work.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: nnm

Colleague, so I ask you to reveal the very arithmetic of your calculations: the number of carriers, heads by 2-3 thousand,

In total, for the destruction of all Russian strategic nuclear forces, the United States should spend about 500-600 nuclear warheads out of 1550 operatively deployed, plus a certain amount of high-precision weapons, of which they have a lot.

Such a number of nuclear submarines can be deployed on three or four Ohio-class SSBNs. The minimum launch range of the Trident II (D5) SLBM is 2300 kilometers or 5,5 minutes of flight time. To increase launch density, the United States may use eight SSBNs in conjunction with promising hypersonic precision missiles launched from Virginia Block V nuclear submarines, surface ships, strategic aircraft, and ground launchers. Potentially, they can be supplemented by two British Vanguard-class SSBNs with the same Trident II (D5) SLBMs.

Quote: nnm

to what point is this distance calculated, how did you get 5 minutes,

The point is chosen in the world ocean "from the target".

Quote: nnm

did you take into account the missile defense,

Our missile defense only covers Moscow, it will not repel a massive strike. At best, 5-10 YAB.

Quote: nnm

retaliation of our operational complexes,

Where in Europe? The US doesn't care about them. And then we will also receive from France.

Quote: nnm

the fact that the planes will definitely not fly off 100 m,

They won't fly off at all. They have 0% chances of flying up before a sudden strike. Those that will be in the air, without weapons.

Quote: nnm

and pl can hit Europe and US bases not only from the beaches of California

They are on the edge of the country, if they are in bases, the flight time before them will be tactical complexes of 1-2 minutes. Even the hatch covers will not have time to close.

Quote: nnm

that the same "perimeter" will work after the first strikes on the European part, launching ICBMs from Siberia, the Far East, etc.

And if the strikes are synchronized in such a way that the fall is simultaneously?

Quote: nnm

But I read the article with interest, thanks for the work.

Thank you!

[nnm]

Quote: AVM

And if the strikes are synchronized in such a way that the fall is simultaneously?

It does not matter. The first launch is important, which will be immediately detected and the time will start. That is, even with a synchronized strike, the flight time, and hence the time for a retaliatory strike, will be different for different objects.

[Avior]

The timing of the decision to retaliate is also important.

[Maikcg]

The important thing is that there is a protocol for making a decision. One rocket, yes, you can play for time, call, ask if your roof is leaking there or PU terrorists have seized it. One hundred missiles (for example, maybe even if 10 or 20) - they do not leave any ambiguities, they will not think about the decision to zhahnut counter-counter, in such a case there is already an order and everything will go according to a pre-approved scenario. The only thing that can stop the launch is the hope for a new incident with a false triggering of the Oka as in 1983, and that happened only because the other detection means did not confirm, and if everyone unanimously confirms the launch, turn off the lights.

[Avior]

They will be sure to recheck, especially if some sensors fix, others do not for some reason

[Shishkov]

We probably won't hit the mines. Taking into account the unconditional domination of NATO in the world ocean, we still will not be able to deliver a disarming strike - they will remain and work out their SSBNs. If it starts, we will probably hit the industrial centers.

[Disant]

We probably won't hit the mines.

this assumption was relevant twenty or thirty years ago.
more and more mechanisms are being created in the world, and the number of opportunities for strikes, including at mines, is growing.
as an example - first PПD, and after u PТRK, which in recent years in conflicts has been used against up to the individual person

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Disant

We probably won't hit the mines.

this assumption was relevant twenty or thirty years ago.
more and more mechanisms are being created in the world, and the number of opportunities for strikes, including at mines, is growing.
as an example - first PПD, and after u PТRK, which in recent years in conflicts has been used against up to the individual person

Are you going to shoot at American silos from RPGs and ATGMs ???

[Disant]

the number of various weapons capable of hitting shpu is growing.
the number of delivery vehicles for both conventional and nuclear weapons is growing.
.
also, on the other side of the war (for the sake of your unwillingness to shoot at shpu), the number of pro weapons capable of shooting down ballistic missiles is growing. and soon (in the next 10-20 years) it will happen like an avalanche - there will be no need to reach out for shpu

[Alex 1970]

If it is so easy and simple to destroy our strategic nuclear forces, then why have the states not done this so far? So, after all, the probability of a retaliatory strike is significant and everything that is written in the article is sucky. Well, why did no one think of such a simple and cheap way as trucks with containers before, huh?

[Shishkov]

The author does not say that it is easy. The author speaks of the need to minimize risks in this priority area.

[Babay Atasovich]

Of course, I'm not a strategist, but when I passed the bombing on an old simulator, loosened and worn out, I entered all the calculations and he dropped the bomb 50 km from the NP. Received credit. When asked why? received a clear answer - the question "do you know how many megatons are there? !!"
So the question is: if all this first-impact thousand-megaton pack covers the ALL nuclear potential of the Russian Federation, then what will become of our Sharik ??? It seems to me so, and a retaliatory strike will no longer be needed. ...

[Viktor Sergeev]

We once had a bomb that, when placed at a certain depth, could split the earth when it exploded. To lay such and as Putin said: why do we need the Earth if there is no Russia on it?

[shinobi]

No one had such a charge (400 mgt), the idea was only discussed. But Sakharov "Tsar Bomboy" proved that the creation of such a charge is possible. The Yankees sat down to negotiate. "Poseidon", pulled out from under the cloth by his own good idea. In the mid-70s, on the basis of the modification of the "Kit" torpedo, an apparatus was proposed for striking the US coastal infrastructure with charges of 10-12 mgt. But something did not settle between the departments and the sailors balked. The project was postponed.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Victor Sergeev

We once had a bomb that, when placed at a certain depth, could split the earth when it exploded. To lay such and as Putin said: why do we need the Earth if there is no Russia on it?

It is impossible to split the earth with existing and promising technical means.

[Pushkowed]

It is impossible to split the earth with existing and promising technical means.

Because she is liquid It is almost entirely composed of molten stone and metal. Even its collision with a planetoid the size of Mars did not split.

[Dilettante grandfather]

And if you remember the project of the rubber bomb, then - wow!

[shinobi]

"Perimitr" was designed to retaliate just in case when there is no one to command.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: shinobi

"Perimitr" was designed to retaliate just in case when there is no one to command.

And if there is already "nothing" to command? Those. when the launch vehicles and launchers were destroyed?

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

Quote: AVM

And if there is already "nothing" to command? Those. when the launch vehicles and launchers were destroyed?

and if not to whom?
give an analysis at what number of hits on the territory of the usa the country will cease to exist as a single space and only after that it is possible to talk about the rest
the events after the strike inflicted by "Katarina" shows that as the stability of the country's governance is precisely the main problem in the United States

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Vasilenko Vladimir

Quote: AVM

And if there is already "nothing" to command? Those. when the launch vehicles and launchers were destroyed?

and if not to whom?

And this is the difference between "disarming" and "decapitating" blow.

If the "Perimeter" is operational, then there is no point in applying the "decapitation" to us. But from the "disarming" "Perimeter" does not protect.

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

you again escaped the answer, how many hits of nuclear warheads are critical for the United States, this is what you need to dance from

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Vasilenko Vladimir

you again escaped the answer, how many hits of nuclear warheads are critical for the United States, this is what you need to dance from

No one has such exact information, but there is a good article by Alexander Timokhin on this issue:

Nuclear illusion. It will not work to "glaze" the enemy
https://topwar.ru/177721-jadernaja-illjuzija-zasteklit-protivnika-ne-poluchitsja.html

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

Quote: AVM

No one has such exact information,

just this is the basis, everything else from the bow

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

the article is just not any, from the same series of owl on the globe, a STUNNY physical simulation without social aspects is given

[shinobi]

To inflict unacceptable damage on 25-35 warheads (125 kt each) in the centers of life support of civil infrastructure. Not even in cities. These are three Voevoda-class ICBMs. There was never any talk of any "glazing". This is media nonsense. For the complete destruction of the United States As a state, a little more is required. Something about 40 ICBMs of a heavy class. And yes, since the 80s, warheads are not intercepted. At the moment, there are no systems capable of intercepting warheads after the disengagement procedure. That is, everything that will take off from us because of the Urals and the central Siberia will fly exactly where it should.

[shinobi]

According to the Pentagon itself, they cannot completely knock out our Strategic Missile Forces. 35-40% of the missiles remain. This is enough for the destruction of the United States. This meant only silo-based ICBMs. According to the zero data. Now this is even more difficult to do. about the time of arrival and the speed of response, these are just fairy tales, originally from the mid-70s.

[tone]

The author does not take into account one thing that CONSCIOUSLY we have a bias in favor of SSBNs, but NOTHING is done to protect and preserve them. Plo is simply absent, and all resuscitation attempts are blocked. This suggests that the development of our NSNF has long been controlled by the Partners ...

[Wedmak]

I got the impression that the author is playing with numbers, and his proposal will only lower both the security and the strike capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces. The very proposal to abandon the PGRK looks strange, while it does not reveal HOW the enemy will find the complex disguised in the taiga. If the proposal is accepted, huge funds will be spent on the construction of mines for light ICBMs and small submarines, the number of warheads will be reduced, and a massive attack / counterattack will become impossible due to the impossibility of concentrating many carriers on any area - they will be easily detected.
In the United States, most of the missiles are in submarines, their destruction will also cost them hundreds of warheads at a time.
It's the same with mines. Something the Americans are in no hurry to adopt such a "successful" concept and modernize their strategic nuclear forces along this path. Or an offer just to us?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Wedmak

I got the impression that the author is playing with numbers, and his proposal will only lower both the security and the strike capabilities of our strategic nuclear forces. The very proposal to abandon the PGRK looks strange, while it does not reveal HOW the enemy will find the complex disguised in the taiga. If the proposal is accepted, huge funds will be spent on the construction of mines for light ICBMs and small submarines, the number of warheads will be reduced, and a massive attack / counterattack will become impossible due to the impossibility of concentrating many carriers on any area - they will be easily detected.
In the United States, most of the missiles are in submarines, their destruction will also cost them hundreds of warheads at a time.
It's the same with mines. Something the Americans are in no hurry to adopt such a "successful" concept and modernize their strategic nuclear forces along this path. Or an offer just to us?

And you read both articles CAREFULLY with the links indicated in them.

1. The United States has the strongest fleet in the world, they can afford SSBNs, while our anti-submarine component is on fire, there is no SSBN. We do not guarantee the security of SSBNs.

2. Just the United States has the structure of the strategic nuclear forces that I described, only a slightly different ratio, but about this point 1

3. PGRK will be detected from the satellite. This is not a needle. And he is not alone, with security cars. And the likelihood of this will increase more and more. If you need to hit a silo, hitting a circle of 100-150 meters, then to defeat a PGRK, it is enough to get into a circle of 1-2 km. Plus, they spend more than half of the time sitting "at home" - a very convenient target.

[Wedmak]

The USA has the strongest navy in the world, they can afford SSBNs

It's not about allowing. Not all SSBNs are in the ocean, not all can imperceptibly approach 2-3 thousand km. Not all missiles will reach their target.

We do not guarantee the security of SSBNs.

American suicide bombers too. Yes, they have a large fleet, but shooting at close range is a death sentence to themselves - this is one, an immediate launch of all ICBMs towards the United States, without options - that's two. With modern means of communication, and we have them, the message about the mass launch will reach the Supreme in less than 10 minutes.

The United States has a strategic nuclear forces structure that

Somehow I did not see hundreds of light ICBMs with 2-3 Bchs there, and somehow submarines with 4-6 ICBMs on board are not observed. In general, their strategic nuclear forces are not in the best condition now.
In the ground sit monoblock Minutemans 3, which are outright old, though modernized. Now a program for a new ICBM has been deployed, let's see what they say there.
In the sea, Trident-2 D5, also not of the first freshness, but carries up to 8 warheads. Each submarine has 24 pieces. As you can see, there are no small carriers of speech. And the range is 11 thousand km. allows not to approach 2-3 thousand. There is simply no need.

PGRK will be detected from the satellite. This is not a needle. And he is not alone; he has security cars with him.

A needle, and what kind. It was not for nothing that the Americans demanded to put the PGRK on an open area during the flight of satellites in START-1, indicate the coordinates of the launches ... There was generally a lot of demand. For the record.
Satellites are not omnipotent, the column can disguise itself, move at night, under cover of clouds / fog / rain.
At home, our PGRK sit to preserve the motor resource. In the threatened period, they dissolve in the forests.

[2 Level Advisor]

Quote: Wedmak

Not all SSBNs are in the ocean, not all can imperceptibly approach 2-3 thousand km. Not all missiles will reach their target.

at such distances they can freely .. how will you catch them for 2000-3000 from the coast?

Quote: Wedmak

the message about the mass launch will reach the Supreme in less than 10 minutes.

a little more .. and suppose 10 minutes - while the decision while the team to strike goes down + another 10 minutes - just from 2-3 thousand km and the missiles will fly, and ours will not fly away yet, and when they finish the supersonic, the time will be reduced even more ..

Quote: Wedmak

And the range is 11 thousand km. allows you not to approach 2-3 thousand. There is simply no need.

it just makes sense to approach in such a way as to shorten the arrival time.

Quote: Wedmak

olonna can disguise herself, move at night, under cover of clouds / fog / rain.

If you think that the column is constantly rummaging through the forests without stopping, you are mistaken ..

total:
1.Apl and bombers standing at the base during this time will not go anywhere and even from the pier will most likely not be allowed ..
2. The silos, the part who will survive and remain in the normal state, can .. but this is a few percent
3. also with PGRK that will be in the forest and not at the base (but not all) - a few percent will be able to ..
4. in total, it will not be possible to completely knock everything out, and even taking into account the striped PRO-20-30 BGs will fall on the minke whales .. they do not need this, so what is now is enough ..

[Wedmak]

Why do you completely ignore the tense period? The Americans will not just come to our shores and will not just risk being discovered 2-3 thousand kilometers from the coast.

and when they finish the supersonic sound, the time will be reduced even more.

Did you mean hypersound? No doubt they will finish it, but so far they have only air-launched missiles in tests.
Why did you decide that the Americans are all secretive, powerful and fast, and ours are for show, feeble and slow?
I do not understand at all why the Americans, with such power, as you are now describing, at the moment have not yet hit us ?? This is a 100% win and finally the destruction of Russia hated by them !!!! Where are the submarine warheads flying in the Barents Sea? Where are the American destroyers from Sevastopol?
Apparently, nevertheless, in both general staffs there are people who know the situation and the alignment of forces much better than you, and are able to predict their actions and the actions of the enemy's forces several moves ahead. And, I am sure, your version of the modernization of the strategic nuclear forces was also worked out and apparently did not like it.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Wedmak

The USA has the strongest navy in the world, they can afford SSBNs

It's not about allowing. Not all SSBNs are in the ocean, not all can imperceptibly approach 2-3 thousand km. Not all missiles will reach their target.

I counted just based on the KOH 0,5.

Anyone can come up to 2000-2500. We can't do that.

The missiles will not reach all of them, but for this, an excess supply + WTO is taken from Virginia.

Quote: Wedmak

We do not guarantee the security of SSBNs.

American suicide bombers too.

No, most likely now they are practically invulnerable for us and for the PRC.

Quote: Wedmak

... shooting at close range is a death sentence to ourselves - this is one, an immediate launch of all ICBMs towards the United States, without options - that's two. With modern means of communication, and we have them, the message about the mass launch will reach the Supreme in less than 10 minutes.

The early warning system will detect them not immediately, but at a certain height. Time will be 5 minutes. 10 is the maximum. Are you sure everything will work out as it should? That the president is not on a jerk, or something else? The score goes on for minutes and the degree of responsibility is high.

Quote: Wedmak

The United States has a strategic nuclear forces structure that

Somehow I did not see hundreds of light ICBMs with 2-3 Bchs there, and somehow submarines with 4-6 ICBMs on board are not observed. In general, their strategic nuclear forces are not in the best condition now.

The structure is an ICBM in silos + SSBNs with SLBMs + SBs with CD.

Quote: Wedmak

In the ground sit monoblock Minutemans 3, which are outright old, though modernized. Now a program for a new ICBM has been deployed, let's see what they say there.

Excellent reliable rockets. This is not an iPhone 17, you don't need to be the newest.

Quote: Wedmak

In the sea, Trident-2 D5, also not of the first freshness, but carries up to 8 warheads. Each submarine has 24 pieces.

In terms of performance characteristics, it is not inferior to Bulava, if not superior. They have better gunpowder.

Quote: Wedmak

As you can see, there are no small speakers of any kind.

Because their big ones are practically invulnerable. ICBMs in silos "just in case", in case we or the PRC somehow, miraculously invent something, and we can destroy their SSBNs.

Quote: Wedmak

And the range is 11 thousand km. allows you not to approach 2-3 thousand. There is simply no need.

Just then, the flight time is 30 minutes, the early warning system will work and we will strike back. The range is 12-13 thousand km only for defense, and 2000-2500 for attack.

Quote: Wedmak

PGRK will be detected from the satellite. This is not a needle. And he is not alone; he has security cars with him.

A needle, and what kind. It was not for nothing that the Americans demanded to put the PGRK on an open area during the flight of satellites in START-1, indicate the coordinates of the launches ... There was generally a lot of demand. For the record.
Satellites are not omnipotent, the column can disguise itself, move at night, under cover of clouds / fog / rain.

So then START-1. Besides, why not demand if they buy? It is necessary to extrapolate the development of satellites for 5-10-15 years. We are not talking about today, but about tomorrow and the day after tomorrow.

As for the night, clouds, rain - they are not a hindrance for reconnaissance radar satellites.

Quote: Wedmak

At home, our PGRK sit to preserve the motor resource. In the threatened period, they dissolve in the forests.

There will be no threatened period on a sudden impact.

[Wedmak]

You are simply not penetrable ...

Anyone can come up to 2000-2500. We can't do that.

Why all of a sudden ... more than once they have already approached.

No, most likely now they are practically invulnerable for us and for the PRC.

Why then suddenly became vulnerable to our strategists under the ice of the Arctic or in the Pacific Ocean?

Are you sure everything will work out as it should? That the president is not on a jerk, or something else?

Well, of course, it is more important for our president to complete the case in the toilet than, having received a confirmed message about a massive nuclear strike, immediately give the command for a retaliatory launch. And only the stars-striped "paladins of good" 24/7 sneak up to our borders in the hope of seizing this moment in order to launch their missiles without interference.

if we or China somehow, we will miraculously invent something

Well yes .. our newest underwater lighting system "Harmony" accidentally turns off.

As for the night, clouds, rain - they are not a hindrance for reconnaissance radar satellites.

It depends on what waves ... for millimeter ones, the rain is quite a hindrance. But here, too, radio-absorbing coatings come into play, so ... a needle.

There will be no threatened period on a sudden impact.

Question: where did you get the idea that our tracking systems suddenly lost dozens of carriers (and before that, they were fully loaded with ammunition), missed the concentration of enemy ships off our shores (and nothing without them), missed the departure of dozens of reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft, did not launch patrol aircraft and interceptors, turned off the early warning systems, stopped sessions with reconnaissance satellites, stopped receiving reports from undercover scouts (don't you think they are not there?), took the pose of a monkey, I don't see anything, I don't hear, I don't understand, and we just sit, wait ?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Wedmak

You are simply not penetrable ...

Anyone can come up to 2000-2500. We can't do that.

Why all of a sudden ... more than once they have already approached.

We can’t be guaranteed to be unnoticed, they most likely will.

Quote: Wedmak

No, most likely now they are practically invulnerable for us and for the PRC.

Why then suddenly became vulnerable to our strategists under the ice of the Arctic or in the Pacific Ocean?

Since, according to some information, our torpedoes under the ice do not work normally. That they have 50+ modern SSNS. And how many SSNNs do we have to accompany SSBNs?

Quote: Wedmak

Are you sure everything will work out as it should? That the president is not on a jerk, or something else?

Well, of course, it is more important for our president to complete the case in the toilet than, having received a confirmed message about a massive nuclear strike, immediately give the command for a retaliatory launch. And only the stars-striped "paladins of good" 24/7 sneak up to our borders in the hope of seizing this moment in order to launch their missiles without interference.

This is exaggerated, but in any case, it's about minutes. What if it fails? And hide yourself? Will the Faberge be enough? There are a lot of questions.

The whole point of my article is that I want our country to have the opportunity to strike back, and my opponents, that we will strike a RESPONSE-COUNTER. But I'm not sure about this, and I think that relying only on this is unacceptable.

Quote: Wedmak

if we or China somehow, we will miraculously invent something

Well yes .. our newest underwater lighting system "Harmony" accidentally turns off. ...

Does it work? Over 2000 km?

Quote: Wedmak

As for the night, clouds, rain - they are not a hindrance for reconnaissance radar satellites.

It depends on what waves ... for millimeter ones, the rain is quite a hindrance. But here, too, radio-absorbing coatings come into play, so ... a needle.

And why is the mm range when there is cm-dm? The PGRK is not at all small, you cannot easily hide it. The question is, what are his chances of hiding? 100% - 50% -10%? Let's rely on luck? Will it rain, clouds will come? What if it doesn't work? And with silos it will work 100%

Quote: Wedmak

There will be no threatened period on a sudden impact.

Question: where did you get the idea that our tracking systems suddenly lost dozens of carriers (and before that, their full load of ammunition),

They always lose them when SSBNs go to sea. And they are always loaded with ammunition.

Quote: Wedmak

missed the concentration of enemy ships near our shores (and without them there is nothing), missed the departure of dozens of reconnaissance and electronic warfare aircraft,

Why do they need all of them? SSBN and SSNS only.

Quote: Wedmak

did not launch patrol planes and interceptors, turned off the early warning systems, stopped sessions with reconnaissance satellites, stopped receiving reports from undercover scouts (don’t you think they’re not there?), took the pose of a monkey, I see nothing, I don’t hear, I don’t understand, and we sit straight , we wait?

Patrol planes and interceptors will do nothing, as well as reconnaissance satellites - they do not see under water. I don't even want to talk about undercover scouts. 2-3 people in the country may know about the strike, and the rest have sealed envelopes with an action plan that will be opened already under water.

[Wedmak]

The whole point of my article is that I want our country to have the opportunity to strike back, and my opponents, that we will strike a RESPONSE-COUNTER. But I'm not sure about this, and I think that relying only on this is unacceptable.

The whole point of your article is that the United States can at any time inflict a nuclear strike on us, and we are powerless to resist this. Arguments against are not accepted. They are stronger and will win - period.
Only now ... do not apply. And they don't even try to bring their submarine cruisers closer to 2-3 thousand km. Moreover, they do not even try to speak from a position of strength, dictating their terms, as they like to do. So, sluggish attempts to say something there, focused on domestic consumption.
They chose a war in another dimension, economic, but even here it does not work out very well. They are critically dependent on the supply of our titanium, for some reason they have increased their purchases of oil from us, their nuclear industry cannot in any way overcome the dependence on the supply of our nuclear fuel. Surprise, huh? Where are the prerequisites for a sudden vigorous blow?
As for the future: the United States has just begun a new silo ICBM program, about sea silence. They have obvious problems with the latest aircraft carriers, with the F-35, with strategic aviation, too, not all is well, although they are making a new B-21. We do not know in what condition their naval ICBMs are. not so long ago there was a failure at startup, and the news comes from there very ... ambiguous.
They have a riot inside the country and every day there are shootings, there is a clear segregation of the population, which does not cause affection among ordinary citizens. They would not think about a nuclear strike on Russia now, but how not to fall apart in the near future into a dozen North American countries.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Wedmak

The whole point of my article is that I want our country to have the opportunity to strike back, and my opponents, that we will strike a RESPONSE-COUNTER. But I'm not sure about this, and I think that relying only on this is unacceptable.

The whole point of your article is that the United States can at any time inflict a nuclear strike on us, and we are powerless to resist this. Arguments against are not accepted. They are stronger and will win - period.
Only now ... do not apply. And they don't even try to bring their submarine cruisers closer to 2-3 thousand km. Moreover, they do not even try to speak from a position of strength, dictating their terms, as they like to do. So, sluggish attempts to say something there, focused on domestic consumption.

They CANNOT but WANT and plan, work in this direction.

Quote: Wedmak

They chose a war in another dimension, economic, but even here it does not work out very well. They are critically dependent on the supply of our titanium, for some reason they have increased their purchases of oil from us, their nuclear industry cannot in any way overcome the dependence on the supply of our nuclear fuel. Surprise, huh? Where are the prerequisites for a sudden vigorous blow?

There is nothing critical for them in this list. And the purpose of a sudden strike is not to destroy the entire population, it is too "loud", you can do it and then, on the sly, lowering the quality of life. The goal is to gain control, shatter into parts and get titanium, oil, uranium several times cheaper.

Quote: Wedmak

As for the future: the United States has just begun a new silo ICBM program, about sea silence. They have obvious problems with the latest aircraft carriers, with the F-35, with strategic aviation, too, not all is well, although they are making a new B-21. We do not know in what condition their naval ICBMs are. not so long ago there was a failure at startup, and the news comes from there very ... ambiguous.
They have a riot inside the country and every day there are shootings, there is a clear segregation of the population, which does not cause affection among ordinary citizens. They would not think about a nuclear strike on Russia now, but how not to fall apart in the near future into a dozen North American countries.

Everything rot, poor fellows ...

[SovAr238A]

Quote: AVM

Plus, they spend more than half of the time sitting "at home" - a very convenient target.

Not just at home, but also very often, having moved one third out of the "house", so that it would be better seen from the satellite.
This is the requirement of treaties ...

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

at what number of detonated nuclear weapons over the territory of the United States in the country irreversible processes will occur?
it is from this that we need to build on, not from the stability of the nuclear system, but from the stability of the state
if nuclear forces remain in the United States, but the government of the country collapses and chaos ensues, it will mean the defeat of the United States in the war

[Ales]

What nonsense. Satellites are destroyed even during the threatened period. On the eve of a general nuclear war, there will be no detection or guidance by satellites.

[Maikcg]

GPS and Glonass hang so high that the existing (and prospective) missile defense / air defense system does not reach there. Detection may not be, then, and guidance is easy.
And yes, dozens of satellites cannot be simply taken down and preventively shot down - this is considered a declaration of war. That is, the first sudden strike will occur while the space component is still working.

[Undecim]

You read such articles and you realize that the state is completely in vain spending taxpayers' money on the maintenance of any Military Academies of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Military Academies of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.
And it turns out that Andrei Mitrofanov alone is enough, who in several articles completely sorted out all the problems of building and using strategic nuclear forces.

[Shishkov]

By your logic, no one needs to think, and VO needs to be closed. Demagogy

[Undecim]

And today, not everyone can think. Rather, not only everyone can think, few people can do it.
According to my logic, it is very desirable to think, especially before writing.
It is not necessary to close the VO, but I would very much like the site to attract not the Damantsevs and Mitrofanovs with the Chichkin and Ivanovs, but truly competent, knowledgeable specialists to cover such issues.

[Ross xnumx]

It can be concluded that the Russian strategic nuclear forces have a high offensive potential

You can say whatever you want, only words need to be backed up with real deeds. Some "state" henchmen behave as if the RF Armed Forces are armed with halberds, bows with arrows and pikes. The world should know that behind the peace-loving proposals of the Russian Federation and its position of equality of nations there are strategic nuclear forces capable of UNINSTALLING, in a short time "erasing" contradictions insurmountable by diplomatic means. Have already warned. Stop ironing the fur.
==========
These are the opinions:

Quote: Clever man

The fun will begin when the states of the hypersonic missile build a nuclear warhead stuck and place it on ships

should not hammer the heads of users, and the foe from across the ocean should make an offer that he cannot refuse: in the current situation, when Russia is opposed by NATO countries, all carriers of hypersonic missiles from the countries of the Western Hemisphere can be destroyed as a potential threat to security and the sovereignty of our country within the range of such missiles. For it is NOT HARD to drag us one infection after another.
Approximately the same policy should be pursued with regard to the deployment of missile bases of unknown purpose in European countries.
==========
Dialogues should be understandable without translation. Living on the orders of the world government has become costly. Better than a life like that, a moral purge is better.

[Bursa]

"On the other hand, the stability of strategic nuclear forces against a sudden disarming strike is more important for us." The author of the article, sealed up, unwittingly designated a new type of military tactics of the United States)))

[Avior]

The author does not take into account one nuance - tactical nuclear weapons on high-precision carriers are ideally suited for the destruction of nuclear strategic weapons - they can be put into service in unlimited quantities.
And the Americans have big problems with this, they limit themselves in them, since they quite rightly believe that their presence increases the risk of war
Now, if they put on stream the production of some hypersonic missiles with tactical nuclear charges, this will be a serious call ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Avior

The author does not take into account one nuance - tactical nuclear weapons on high-precision carriers are ideally suited for the destruction of nuclear strategic weapons - they can be put into service in unlimited quantities.
And the Americans have big problems with this, they limit themselves in them, since they quite rightly believe that their presence increases the risk of war
Now, if they put on stream the production of some hypersonic missiles with tactical nuclear charges, this will be a serious call ...

While WTOs are subsonic missile launchers, they are too easy to detect during a mass launch, they fly too long. When hypersound appears in commercial quantities, the problem will become more serious, I agree.

[Sancho_SP]

The message is mathematically wrong.

For guaranteed destroying all means of retaliation requires not two bombs per target, but twenty-two, and even that will give a probability of level 0,99.

And even 15 warheads on US territory are already unacceptable damage.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Sancho_SP

The message is mathematically wrong.

For guaranteed destroying all means of retaliation requires not two bombs per target, but twenty-two, and even that will give a probability of level 0,99.

And even 15 warheads on US territory are already unacceptable damage.

And for 15 warheads, they are building missile defense. And why did you decide that it is unacceptable?

[Sancho_SP]

Because the benefits of any conceivable military victory over Russia will not pay off a dozen nuclear strikes on cities and nuclear power plants in the United States.

[Operator]

In addition to a ground strike on silos, there is also an air (so-called blocking) strike on ICBMs at the very beginning of their flight, which is used when the mines are densely located.

Therefore, the most rational is the hidden construction and loading of mines with missiles under the cover of radio and infrared opaque tents with an area of ​​several square kilometers, followed by masking the silhouette of the mines on the ground (increasing soil moisture, maintaining the ambient temperature in mines) to eliminate the possibility of radar and thermal detection from space.

In this case, heavy ICBMs of the "Sarmat" type with a large thrust-to-weight ratio (to reduce the OUT distance by the atmospheric section) and various combat equipment can be based in the mines: multi-unit separable units (for destroying most targets), heavy monoblocks (for destroying megacities) and light monoblocks ( for suborbital flights at a distance of up to 20 thousand km with the aim of hitting targets anywhere on Earth).

All warheads must be equipped with shells made of metamaterial with a negative angle of reflection of radio and light / thermal radiation (zero radar and thermal signature) in outer space, false targets for overloading the missile defense system when flying in the stratosphere, as well as aerodynamic planes for performing anti-aircraft maneuvers in the lower atmosphere.

Strategic bombers, nuclear submarines and PGRK with ICBMs must be scrapped. Unmanned Poseidon submersibles with a displacement of 40 tons and a warhead with a capacity of 100 Mt for the destruction of states with a coastal location of military, economic and mobilization potential should become the only addition to the heavy ICBMs of a secretive mine base: the USA, Canada, European countries, Japan, South Korea, Arab countries are allies of the United States, etc.

PS A massive surprise strike at protected silos in current conditions is firing at a distance of 3000 km with submarine multiply-charged ballistic missiles with an approach time of 15 minutes. A massive missile strike is detected in 1 minute. The time for the missiles to take off from the silo and the divergence along the trajectories to eliminate the blocking strike is 5 minutes. Therefore, 9 minutes are left to make a decision.

[Wedmak]

You should write this proposal to our Chief Commander. Otozh they cannot think of such a simple solution ... the destruction of all our strategic nuclear forces.

[Operator]

Yours - is it Biden or Benet?

[Wedmak]

Well .. here you know .. how to look. If on the way of the proposal you meet an intelligent person who understands these matters, then the author will simply be shown a spinning finger at his temple. And if not, someone will lead someone very strongly around their finger. Twice.

[Operator]

So Naftali Benet.

[DmSol]

You still take into account the failures of technology. Force majors when entering a position. And in fact, all your arithmetic will have to be multiplied by 2. And the probability that something will go wrong will exceed all possible preferences of such a blow. Our response is inevitable. And I've heard about the American missile defense system since the 80s, but it doesn't smell of anything really working there.

Quote: AVM

Quote: nnm

I didn't understand one thesis ...
Why US mine ICBMs are a very well-protected and practically indestructible component of strategic nuclear forces, while in our country they will simply "throw 3" heads "into the mine and that's it ..." (not a quote, but the meaning is this).

The security is about the same.

But if we throw 2 YABBs to destroy 1 American carrier with one YABB, then the USA can throw 2 YABBs in order to destroy 3-10 YABBs on one of our ICBMs. Who is the loser?

[Voenlet63]

Some naive calculations. Like the Russians will sit on the priest evenly and watch how they are destroyed ...))) The author is an amateur.

[Marachuh]

Some nonsense! The author considers the conventional weapons of the United States, their system is pro, but ours does not. Disguise as cars is a risk to peaceful cities ?! And that the Americans are not going to destroy them? Not going to destroy the industry? Or, according to the author, dozens or hundreds of nuclear warheads in Moscow, Ivanovo or Vilyuchinsk will not affect civilians in these and nearby areas? And the author vkurse in general that cruise missiles can be equipped with nuclear warheads, that there are mines for this case, and much more? Or does the author believe the United States needs burnt earth and radiation all over the planet? There is a much easier, safer and more efficient way! This morgenstern is the idol of youth, fagots, dom2 and sobchak on TV, tick-tok, lack of education and medicine! Wake up already and look around! We are dying out! And the remnants of the population are rapidly degrading! With whom will he fight in 30-50 years?

[Alex_Z10]

How long does it take to launch a silo-based missile on alert after receiving a command? I'm just not in the subject. I do not think that the launch of so many missiles capable of destroying ALL the mines will go unnoticed. And in general, why the United States can be the first to strike, but Russia cannot?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Alex_Z10

How long does it take to launch a silo-based missile on alert after receiving a command? I'm just not in the subject. I do not think that the launch of so many missiles capable of destroying ALL the mines will go unnoticed.

So we now have only 200 silos.

Quote: Alex_Z10

And in general, why the United States can be the first to strike, but Russia cannot?

Because we will not be able to quietly withdraw so many SSBNs to cover all the Minutemans. And we don't have the ability to locate and destroy their SSBNs because the US has the world's strongest navy. And if we hit from our territory, we will get a full response.

[Aleksandr65]

What other concern for peaceful cities - nuclear strikes are being carried out on military, industrial and economic centers, and these are stationary military facilities, dangerous industries and large cities (in the Russian Federation there are cities with more than 1 million people). The purpose of the destruction of the nation, to capture resources

[tralflot1832]

I propose to negotiate the extension of START 3, send our "thimblers": I twist, twirl, I want to guess where the rocket is. Open the lid, no rocket?

[Vasilenko Vladimir]

but at the same time, their resistance to a sudden disarming attack of the enemy may be insufficient

But what is a "sudden" strike, how many missiles are actually required for the arrival of not ONE but 150-300 missiles, in this case it is already clear on the control panel that this is not a malfunction, not an error, but a WAR, and how many missiles will be required for chaos in the United States ?!

[Kostadinov]

When hitting from a distance of about two to three thousand kilometers, the time for passing the entire chain of information and making a decision will be 5-10 minutes, after which it will be too late.

And therefore, the function of making a decision for a retaliatory strike for each missile regiment should be assigned to its commanders. This should be brought to the consciousness of the "partners" from NATO.
If they have the means for a first strike with a short flight time, the regimental commanders will strike back.

[Avior]

Never
Nobody will entrust the regiment commander to start the third world war - not that level
He simply has neither the necessary data, nor the ability to analyze.

[Maikcg]

The submarine commander can. And why is the regiment commander worse?

[Avior]

On its own initiative, can it?

[Maikcg]

In general, yes. There are conditions, not without it, but it has the opportunity.

[Avior]

Can you give a link to a sufficiently serious source that this is so? Under what conditions does the submarine commander have instructions within half an hour to make a decision to appoint a third world war?

[Maikcg]

No. You can just assume that I am yap if you like.

[AsmyppoL]

To begin with, the author has somewhat superficially approached the preparation of the topic under consideration. This is evident from his understanding of the provisions of the START III treaty.
There are two different concepts in the treaty: nuclear charges and carriers. The carriers are ballistic missiles (BR), submarine ballistic missiles (SLBM) and strategic aircraft.
A carrier plane cannot be equated with a nuclear warhead.

BR and SLBM are carriers that can carry several combat units. The carrier aircraft transports several cruise missiles with nuclear warheads to the launch point, which then fly along their trajectories. In fact, this is the same carrier as the BR, which uses cruise missiles to separate warheads.

Several warheads and cruise missiles can be deployed on base stations and aircraft. The only difference is power.
The combat units of ballistic missiles and SLBMs are counted as charges for strategic weapons and are included in START III, while charges for cruise missiles and American nuclear bombs are tactical nuclear weapons, which are not covered by the treaty and are currently not limited in number.


The next point that I would like to note. Suddenly the rockets don't fly. This is a horror story for amateurs and for provoking the civilian masses, if necessary.

The American president cannot unexpectedly give a command for a massive nuclear strike. The states are ruled not by the president, but by those who allow him to be. Without their consent, preparation for the strike cannot begin. If the president gets out of control, he will be destroyed by the Americans themselves, who are watching him in the interests of the elite. And the president knows it ...

This does not mean that the world elite is not planning a nuclear war. They are considering ... In the media there is information that the optimal number of people on Earth should be about 500 million. The main thing for them is to bring the sacrificial rams under the retaliation. Who can we have? For example, Europe tending to aggression, including the Poles and the Balts. It has long been estimated that in the event of war, at best, up to 1% of the population will remain alive. But not for long - the radiation will also kill them ... Therefore, the Americans are pushing them to formidable squealing, hoping that other countries will be unleashed for the war and will not fly to them ...
A lot will arrive. Whoever started the war, but will answer with a scythe ...

There are multiple signs by which our intelligence will establish the fact of the beginning of preparations for a nuclear strike.
For example, the unexpected departure of all members of the elite to different places in the world, where they quite accidentally have shelters.
But many will be pulled with them, who will need them for a long time after the blow.
It is likely that our intelligence will find out about the planning of an attack on our country even before the arrival of such an instruction to their president.

If we put forward the amateurish assumption that preparations for a massive nuclear strike on Russia will not be revealed at this level, then there are many other signs. The most elementary signs are discussed at the end of the article.
https://topwar.ru/117412-bystryy-globalnyy-udar-chast-4.html

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: AsmyppoL

To begin with, the author has somewhat superficially approached the preparation of the topic under consideration. This is evident from his understanding of the provisions of the START III treaty.
There are two different concepts in the treaty: nuclear charges and carriers. The carriers are ballistic missiles (BR), submarine ballistic missiles (SLBM) and strategic aircraft.
A carrier plane cannot be equated with a nuclear warhead.

Nevertheless, one carrier aircraft is counted as one nuclear warhead.

"For calculation in the total maximum number of warheads, each deployed and non-deployed heavy bomber is counted as one unit by the accounting rules."

Quote: AsmyppoL

The next point that I would like to note. Suddenly the rockets don't fly. This is a horror story for amateurs and for provoking the civilian masses, if necessary.

The American president cannot unexpectedly give a command for a massive nuclear strike. The states are ruled not by the president, but by those who allow him to be. Without their consent, preparation for the strike cannot begin. If the president gets out of control, he will be destroyed by the Americans themselves, who are watching him in the interests of the elite. And the president knows it ...

And who spoke about the US President? Do you know who runs it? How many are there? What are their plans?

Me not. Therefore, I evaluate only the technical capability, not intentions and desires.

Quote: AsmyppoL

There are multiple signs by which our intelligence will establish the fact of the beginning of preparations for a nuclear strike.
For example, the unexpected departure of all members of the elite to different places in the world, where they quite accidentally have shelters.
But many will be pulled with them, who will need them for a long time after the blow.
It is likely that our intelligence will find out about the planning of an attack on our country even before the arrival of such an instruction to their president.

The main word here is "Probably". And if there are elites over elites? And what if they get caught up in the "lower" elites? And if there are no “upper” elites in the United States at all?

[AsmyppoL]

Can't you read about the contract?

The treaty limits the total number of deployed nuclear warheads to 1550 for both sides.
It's about warheads


The number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles, deployed submarine ballistic missiles and deployed strategic missile-carrying bombers for Russia and the United States will not exceed 700 units.
It's about carriers

Show me where you found the carrier plane in nuclear weapons ??

When I read the answer about the Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, I realized: such nonsense of the author can not be read ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

There are multiple signs by which our intelligence will establish the fact of the beginning of preparations for a nuclear strike.

And how then to understand your lies that on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, our intelligence slept through the attack, because the Germans changed their buttonholes and shoulder straps in some parts of the Wehrmacht?
Or do you think that then there were no military intelligence professionals and no one could assess the enemy?

Quote: AsmyppoL

If you put forward an amateurish assumption,

So I don’t understand you yourself an amateur, or a malicious liar when the question concerns the pre-war period of 1941.

[AsmyppoL]

You have already been explained twice, but it does not reach ... I'll try one last time ...
There were professionals at the time. They worked conscientiously and did not spare their lives ...
But our intelligence agencies faced such massive disinformation that confirmation from many different sources did not help to restore the true picture. They most often supplemented the misinformation that had been received earlier ...
As a result, the command of the border districts did not know about the presence of
concentrated large mobile strike groups. They did not know about the places of the attacks of these groups and could not take at least some measures to block them ...

Examples of this:
- intelligence reports from PribOVO for June 18 and 21, 1941, a document on the distribution of German troops at 18-00 on June 21 (in the document, all tank and motorized units and formations are smeared along the entire border), maps of the PribOVO headquarters with the situation on June 22, which indicate and divisions deep in East Prussia;
- Reconnaissance report of ZAPOVO dated June 21, in which tank divisions are evenly distributed along the border. But they are not on the Suvalka ledge. They are also absent in the diary of the chief of staff of the 3rd army, which was supposed to defend this direction. Map of the headquarters of the Western Military District, which shows the situation for June 21 (but it was prepared after the start of the war);
- reconnaissance of the KOVO headquarters from June 20, in which there is no grouping of the 1st tank group. Memories of an officer of the 5th Army's operative department, in which he speaks of not finding all the divisions of the 1st Panzer Group, recollections of the Chief of the KOVO Operations Department that the main blow was awaited in the Krakow-Lviv direction, and not at the places of attacks of the motorized corps of the Panzer group. Maps of the KOVO headquarters with the situation showing that the places of detection of tank and motorized divisions are located far from the directions of attacks of the corps of the tank group;
- all of the above is confirmed by the intelligence report of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate for June 22, the operational reports of the General Staff for June 22 and 23 ...
It so happened that intelligence confirmed the OKH order to the Abwehr in September 1940 to prepare misinformation about the concentration of the main Wehrmacht troops in southern Poland and to the south. By June 1941, the mythical grouping of German troops in Romania, numbering about 28 divisions, was added, and on June 22 it grew to 33-35 German divisions ...

As early as 3-4 years ago, the American special services prepared a package of information about the misinformation by our intelligence services of the leadership of the country and the army before June 22. This package of information (along with many others) is planned to be thrown into the network during a period of exacerbation of the situation (in a threatened period).
The package contains a logical chain: the inept work of our intelligence (this is not my opinion; mine is set out in the first paragraph) - the defeat of the border armies - betrayal in intelligence management and the betrayal of the high command staff of the spacecraft - finding the country on the brink of destruction - the same inept work of intelligence in the threatened period (after all, it is weaker than that of the USSR) - the betrayal of the generals and the majority of the country's leadership (they have deposits, children, houses, dachas, etc., etc. abroad) - to bring the masses to disobedience rallies on pain of death ... Remove the existing government and put your henchmen in place.
And they themselves are afraid of death ...

After all, this topic is related to what I wrote about. There are statements against the authorities.
There is even a saying similar to what the Americans are planning:
[i] "All this has already happened - the obligatory" threatened period ", obligatory requirements through diplomatic channels, etc. But in reality, suddenly came 22.06.41 ...
So in this case, the information will be sufficient. But will the leadership believe in it, especially considering the same volume of disinformation as in 1941? And in general, will the leadership believe in the possibility of a global nuclear war? Especially considering that in this case the stakes are much higher than in 1941 - the decision will determine the fate of not one country, but the world as a whole ... [i] "

The marshals hid their mistakes and came up with a beautiful story ... Why hide the true state of affairs, if our probable enemy uses it in the most convenient case? ..

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

There were professionals at the time.

Everything is clear, the rest of your verbiage is not interesting for me to read. Well at least it was admitted, but you will remain a liar on the issue of intelligence in the pre-war period.

Quote: AsmyppoL

As early as 3-4 years ago, the American special services prepared a package of information about the misinformation by our intelligence services of the leadership of the country and the army before June 22.

Well, finally, they revealed their "sources of information", I understood for a long time for whom you work together with a certain Victoria, which is why you are carefully hiding under pseudonyms.

Quote: AsmyppoL

After all, this topic is related to what I wrote about.

This is due to your lies, because there is no truth about the pre-war estimates of intelligence and indicates the completion of the order.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The marshals hid their mistakes and came up with a beautiful story ...

And you came up with just a vile lie, so as not to expose someone's memoirs, but to show everyone what fools were in command of the Red Army.
But your lies have been exposed repeatedly, so lie further in the spirit of how the 16th Army went to fight in Iran - this is evidence of an understanding of how things were on the eve of the war.

[DmSol]

Right like this, all 300 warheads will fly to our heads at the same time? This is from the field of computer games.

[Knell wardenheart]

I can’t agree with some of them.
1) We have a sufficiently developed missile defense system and the basing areas along the flight paths are therefore very unequal. Distances to silos from some convenient points can be much greater than some "ideal" ones, which will undoubtedly affect the "cost" of such an adventure in American calculations.
2) PGRK is not an ideal solution, but it allows the development and use of an array of trompe l'oeil, which can be modified decommissioned heavy equipment. At least in the medium term, this solution may be quite viable.
3) We will not economically export the array of highly protected silos, more budget options may not be sufficiently protected against hypersonic conventional units, which the Americans may well equip old missiles with. The placement of an array of false silos within the unsatisfactory secrecy of our current system (at least through the availability of an array of indirect data) seems to me doubtful.
4) The solutions you mentioned have a pronounced bias towards defensive containment, this reduces our ability (if necessary, which may arise) to effectively use nuclear weapons first, in case of revealing signs of the enemy's preparation. This is not good, because the predictability of our actions increases, and this is the ideal environment for the enemy to hope for a "good plan."

However, on the whole, I agree with you - in the foreseeable future, our nuclear missile immunity may stop working.

[Max PV]

As for me, it is necessary first of all to change the decision-making system to deliver a retaliatory nuclear strike. In particular, to organize a system for the automatic use of nuclear weapons in the event of a disarming strike. It is not so difficult to implement it, based on two statements:
1) It is impossible to organize an absolutely simultaneous strike against absolutely all carriers of nuclear weapons and their locations. At least a couple of minutes of "backlash" will be.
2) The impact of a nuclear explosion is not instantaneous, and, from the point of view of information transfer, a rather slow process.
Such a system can be based on a network of sensors that respond to EMP, light radiation and penetrating radiation located near silos, the basing sites of the GRK, SSBN and strategic aviation bases, transmitting a short code packet to the network before its own destruction by a shock wave, in the event of a nuclear explosion. When one or two signals pass, the information goes to the command post of the Strategic Missile Forces, with more than a dozen, directly to the state leadership, and when a certain percentage of the means of delivering a nuclear strike is destroyed, the command for a general launch should be given automatically.
Next, you need to understand what the minimum funds are needed to guarantee the United States inflicted irreparable damage.
It is easy to estimate, based on the number of coastal megalopolises and large cities with a population of more than two million people (16), based on the need to destroy each with at least two nuclear charges. And there are four or six megacities such as New York and Los Angeles, leaving a few more missiles each for Washington and several nuclear power plants. In total, you need to deliver 40-50 warheads that have reached their targets. Taking into account the possibility of intercepting some missiles by missile defense systems, the minimum retaliatory strike should include 120-150 warheads.
Expecting that 36 warheads will reach targets in cities, and another 7-8 will hit 3-4 nuclear power plants, the following losses can be expected: 3-4 million deaths on the first day, 10-15 million injured and irradiated, half of which will die in the next month, from 50 to 100 million refugees and homeless, absolute disruption of work and partial destruction of the largest ports and associated transport infrastructure, as a result of the almost complete cessation of foreign trade and the possibility of delivery of goods, radioactive contamination of at least 10% of the US territory , to a level not lower than the Chernobyl level, both due to nuclear explosions and due to the destruction of a nuclear power plant, with much worse consequences than in the same Chernobol (there, almost all radioactive materials remained inside the block and sarcophagus, here they will be scattered by a nuclear explosion) ... All this, with some probability, can lead to economic collapse, epidemics and hunger. As for me, if in any case we are able to do something similar, no one in the United States will go for a disarming strike.

[Maikcg]

It's stupidity to shoot at cities just to kill the population. Nuclear power plants, petrochemicals, dams. And the little people there without microwaves, clean water and a toilet in million people will die themselves, without any radiation. This is even a plus, since the civil defense structures will have to spend energy on their maintenance and order, than if they all just burned out in an atomic explosion.

[ccsr]

Author:
Andrey Mitrofanov

The aviation component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, like the aviation component of the American strategic nuclear forces, is a first-strike weapon.

The author makes a systematic error in assessing the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces, which is why all his arguments with an abundance of pictures and tables must be taken very carefully, because he does not have basic military knowledge in his head, and this leads to such confusion.
By definition, aviation cannot be a weapon of the FIRST nuclear strike due to its low tonnage and a long time for its use. Moreover, the very takeoff of any strategic bomber is monitored, which means that the Americans will take measures both to escort it and to destroy everything that it releases. I'm not talking about the fact that American electronic warfare systems can seriously interfere with the control systems of such aircraft, but they worked out such a possibility back in Soviet times.
That is why the weapon of the First Nuclear Strike can only be the mine missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces, which can practically simultaneously release all available ammunition, and at the same time the enemy will not be able to open either their preparation for launch, or the control signal itself for launch, and this is our most important and a decisive trump card in delivering a preemptive strike on the territory of the United States or China.
The author also has other controversial statements, but I believe that he still has a poor idea of ​​the scenario of a future war, since he believes that

Strategic missile-carrying bombers with cruise missiles (CR) with nuclear warheads (YBU) can effectively solve the problem of delivering strikes with conventional weapons.

What other conventional weapons can be used against the United States and China, the author hardly knows himself.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: ccsr

Author:
Andrey Mitrofanov

The aviation component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, like the aviation component of the American strategic nuclear forces, is a first-strike weapon.

The author makes a systematic error in assessing the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces, which is why all his arguments with an abundance of pictures and tables must be taken very carefully, because he does not have basic military knowledge in his head, and this leads to such confusion.
By definition, aviation cannot be a weapon of the FIRST nuclear strike due to its low tonnage and a long time in its use.

You have a lot of basic knowledge in your head. You shouldn't pass off your point of view as an absolute truth.

Quote: ccsr

Moreover, the very takeoff of any strategic bomber is tracked

So the PGRK, which is barely crawling, they will not track, but the plane is easy? However, PMSM will be monitored by both SB and PGRK.

Quote: ccsr

which means that the Americans will take measures both to accompany him and to destroy everything that he releases.

And where did I write that the first strike on the United States?

Quote: ccsr

That is why the weapon of the First Nuclear Strike can only be the mine missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces, which can practically simultaneously release all available ammunition, and at the same time the enemy will not be able to open either their preparation for launch, or the control signal itself for launch, and this is our most important and a decisive trump card in delivering a preemptive strike on the territory of the United States or China.

There is no such possibility, I cannot say about the PRC's early warning system, but I think it is developing rapidly.

And in the United States, an early warning system in orbit will detect the launching ICBMs when leaving the mines and all their Minutemans will fly in response. After that, they will evaluate the results of the strike and finish off what was left with the SSBN.

Quote: ccsr

What other conventional weapons can be used against the United States and China, the author hardly knows himself.

Do not attribute to me what I did not write - the targets for conventional strikes are countries like Turkey or Japan.

[ccsr]

Quote: AVM

You have a lot of basic knowledge in your head.

Of course, a lot - I devoted my life to military affairs, and did not shy away from command training.

Quote: AVM

So the PGRK, which they barely crawls, they will not track,

Who told you such nonsense? They also monitor the state of each mobile complex.

Quote: AVM

and the plane is easy?

All aircraft carriers of nuclear weapons capable of reaching our territory with refueling have been tracked piece by piece since Soviet times - you are simply not in the subject.

Quote: AVM

And where did I write that the first strike on the United States?

I say that you don’t know military science, so you throw dubious theses:

The aviation component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, as well as the aviation component of the American strategic nuclear forces - this is the first strike weapon.

I enlighten you personally that the aviation component of our strategic nuclear forces will never be a first strike weapon, for the reasons I have outlined above. Unmasking signs deprive us of surprise - that you can hopefully understand?

Quote: AVM

And in the United States, an early warning system in orbit will detect the launching ICBMs when leaving the mines and all their Minutemans will fly in response.

Naturally, they will fly, but it is precisely the element of surprise that gives us the opportunity to inflict more damage on the enemy, which is why the first blow will be delivered by the Strategic Missile Forces, and only then the command will follow patrol missile carriers sea ​​and air based on the use of standard equipment.

Quote: AVM

Do not attribute to me what I did not write - the targets for conventional strikes are countries like Turkey or Japan.

You wrote nonsense, because these two countries are allies of the United States, and only an illiterate person cannot ignore this. Are you going to fight with the United States with conventional weapons? Well, well, go for a "strategist" specializing in Internet wars ...

[evgen1221]

How many? The answer is a few, who will slaughter their own cash cow, and when the mice began to rebel against cheese (I'm talking about our oligarchs and super-efficient broodmates). And when it comes to the Yao war, the states will need about a dozen or so missiles (with real and false bb) to fire up our few large cities, which will total minus 70% of the population, while the nuclear forces will kill them with simple torpedoes at the exit or at the bases themselves (the exit of our boats in fact, it is almost not covered, there is only one sieve (according to many comments and articles on this site).

[Stepan S]

Comment from the category "how I hate all of us."

[Alanart]

Why strike at the United States through the South (!) Pole?
Is the author adequate?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Alanart

Why strike at the United States through the South (!) Pole?
Is the author adequate?

Read about the deployment of US missile defense, what is CHORB. And in general, it was not me, it was Putin who said.

[BAI]

An exemplary amateurish approach to a critical issue. I had a duty to this issue. There is the General Staff, there are military Central Research Institute, there are mathematical models. There is, in the end, the GRU GSh providing the initial data. Everything has been calculated and calculated for a long time. Based on the results, missile defense and industrial orders for the corresponding funds are built. The author flashed his erudition, but it is not recommended to apply his inventions in practice. Although, if the CIA pecks, the flag is in their hands. There will be good misinformation.
The article should be in the "Opinions" section.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: BAI

An exemplary amateurish approach to a critical issue. I had a duty to this issue. There is the General Staff, there are military Central Research Institute, there are mathematical models. There is, in the end, the GRU GSh providing the initial data. Everything has been calculated and calculated for a long time. Based on the results, missile defense and industrial orders for the corresponding funds are built. The author flashed his erudition, but it is not recommended to apply his inventions in practice. Although, if the CIA pecks, the flag is in their hands. There will be good misinformation.
The article should be in the "Opinions" section.

So state your competent opinion with conclusions (without disclosing classified information)? And so, your phrase sounds like "The giraffe is big, he knows better."

And there is no need to tell me tales about "military Central Research Institute, there are mathematical models." I can only imagine too well how military orders are divided, and how not what the country needs, but according to the principle "who has a furrier paw" can go into service.

[Ales]

Ram-ram

[BAI]

So state your competent opinion with conclusions (without disclosing classified information)?

If you do not disclose classified information, then I will not be any different from you. And then people will not notice the difference between us. Therefore, I would rather not say anything. Silence, as you know, is gold, everything is better than writing fabulous articles.

[ccsr]

Quote: BAI

The article should be in the "Opinions" section.

I agree with your conclusion. But the article should be sent to the created special section "Alternative Opinions" or even simpler - "Near Science Fiction".

[Romario_Argo]

we have an early warning system, therefore there will be a counter strike
all not deployed media will go away
on our 160 silos (KAZ) x 4 = 640 BB with a result of 50/50 x 8 = 1280 BB - 100%
on our 150 PGRK x 5 = 750 BB with a result of 30/70 x 10 US recognize = 1500 BB - 100%
This is without taking into account the nuclear submarine - the S-500 is on the way, it makes no sense to intercept the carcasses - the S-400 umbrella, Su-35/30
= 2780 BB
+ you still need to leave about 1000 BB for China
= 3780 BB
Home the cities will not have enough nuclear warheads
calculations under the article are not correct

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Romario_Argo

we have an early warning system, therefore there will be a counter strike
all not deployed media will go away
on our 160 silos (KAZ) x 4 = 640 BB with a result of 50/50 x 8 = 1280 BB - 100%
on our 150 PGRK x 5 = 750 BB with a result of 30/70 x 10 US recognize = 1500 BB - 100%
This is without taking into account the nuclear submarine - the S-500 is on the way, it makes no sense to intercept the carcasses - the S-400 umbrella, Su-35/30
= 2780 BB
+ you still need to leave about 1000 BB for China
= 3780 BB
Home the cities will not have enough nuclear warheads
calculations under the article are not correct

The fact that you do not take into account the probabilities at all, but consider the S-500s that ICBMs cannot do anything, and are trying to cover up the Su-35 and S-400 SB, says a lot about your calculations.

What "150 PGRK x 5 = 750" - if there are either 1 or 3 nuclear warheads?

Are you even aware of START-3?

I'm already tired of writing about the early warning system, read it carefully.

[Romario_Argo]

S-500 that ICBMs can't do anything

I'll tell you more,
Bullseye upon entering the atmosphere slow down (!)
altitude - speed - type of damage
100 km - 7,7 km / s - S-500 PR 77N6N1 / A-135 PR 53T6M
70 km - 5,5 km / s - S-500 PR 77N6N1 / A-135 PR 53T6 (without М)
40 km - 3,5 km / s - S-400 SAM 40N6
20 km - 2 km / sec - S-300V4 SAM 9M82 / S-400 SAM 48N6
10 km - 1 km / sec - MiG-31 R-33
and with the START-3 treaty you can paste over your toilet
You know how in the USA the change of BC is made in Ohio and how to track it ...

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Romario_Argo

S-500 that ICBMs can't do anything

I'll tell you more,
Bullseye upon entering the atmosphere slow down (!)
altitude - speed - type of damage
100 km - 7,7 km / s - S-500 PR 77N6N1
70 km - 5,5 km / s - S-500 PR 77N6N1
40 km - 3,5 km / sec - S-400 SAM 40N6; 48N6
20 km - 2 km / sec - S-300V4 SAM 9M82
10 km - 1 km / sec - MiG-31 R-33
and with the START-3 treaty you can paste over your toilet
You know how in the USA the change of BC is made in Ohio and how to track it ...

Really. Slow down. The Americans are stupid - YABB is intercepting on the border of space. And it is enough to wait until they fly closer.

At 50 meters, you can shoot down from a berdank.

[Romario_Argo]

At 50 meters, you can shoot down from a berdank.

agree... only they refused to develop berdanks, they do not have sane air defense systems
Patriot - 2 km / sec - 20 km
THAAD - 2,8 km / sec. - 30 km - by linear BB

[Operator]

Learn materiel: BB ICBMs, when approaching the surface of the Earth, have a hypersonic speed of 3 to 4 km / s and fly in a plasma cloud - see the photo in the title of the article.

[Romario_Argo]

I'm already tired of writing about SPRN, read carefully

Regarding the early warning system, as well as the MKRTs, I'm already tired of writing

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Romario_Argo

https://topwar.ru/180699-mkrc-liana-v-processe-razvertyvanija.html

What does Liana have to do with the early warning system? She is against surface ships, no more.

[Romario_Argo]

no, you and I have the same problem but different views

[Romario_Argo]

SPRN and adoption counter strike decisions will take the maximum 1 minute across the Frunzenskaya embankment
all scenarios are spelled out and decisions on them have already been made - the rest is for the operational duty officer and backup officers (so as not to pass up)

[Siegfried]

Why did you so easily completely exclude the possibility of the USA destroying our mines in a conventional way in the near future? After all, it is obvious that the replacement of cruise missiles with hypersonic ones is coming. This means that US naval carriers in 5-7 years will be capable of producing thousands of volleys of hypersonic missiles for 2-5, or maybe more, that is, kilometers. It is possible that the calculation of the Russian Federation on the possibility of a rapid dispersal of nuclear weapons carriers is more attractive, because even a sudden strike will not be just from the bay ... for such a decision there must be prerequisites. The Russian Federation will have time to prepare, to disperse mobile launchers throughout the country, etc. DEFCON 1.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Siegfried

Why did you so easily completely exclude the possibility of the USA destroying our mines in a conventional way in the near future? After all, it is obvious that the replacement of cruise missiles with hypersonic ones is coming. This means that US naval carriers in 5-7 years will be capable of producing thousands of volleys of hypersonic missiles for 2-5, or maybe more, that is, kilometers.

Because they will not hit silos without YABCH with an acceptable probability.

Quote: Siegfried

It is possible that the calculation of the Russian Federation on the possibility of rapid dispersal of nuclear weapons carriers is more attractive, because even a sudden strike will not be just from a bunch of flounders ... for such a decision there must be prerequisites. The Russian Federation will have time to prepare, to disperse mobile launchers throughout the country, etc. DEFCON 1.

This is the problem, all my opponents are sure that we will "know". And I'm not sure about that. At one time, even the beginning of WWII was missed, although everything was more than obvious. And now everything can develop with great speed and there will be no time for dispersal. It's simple:

The enemy is confident and has the ability to deliver a surprise disarming strike from close range - we only have a chance to retaliate.

The enemy has no confidence in delivering a sudden disarming strike from close range - there will be no strike.

[Stepan S]

- On 75 PGRK on the route, the enemy will spend 75 YABB. As a result, we have a loss of 225 YaBB.

I especially like this author's mathematics. 100% efficiency, can this really be at least in theory?

- The enemy will spend 150-200 nuclear warheads to destroy heavy ICBMs in highly protected silos. As a result, we have a loss of 150-750 YAB.

Heavy ICBMs are located in the very depths of the country, at least about 10 minutes of flight time, all missiles can be launched in time. The rocket is ready for launch in just over a minute. It is quite possible to keep within even from the position of "the commander-in-chief is in the toilet".
And if all these missiles are launched, it is possible that the enemy will no longer need anything else. And if one nuclear submarine survives, or has time to shoot from the pier? And there will certainly be many such "ifs" that no one can calculate in advance.
And what, again, "if" we know in advance about the preparation of the strike and be the first to deliver it? Why not? At this time, it will be a very unexpected surprise for the START-3 partners.
This concludes my fantasies at this stage. For the enemy has been destroyed. Just like the author has destroyed us.

[kloss]

The author is not aware that the Americans are planning three warheads of two types at silos ...
But how confidently expertly answers questions

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: kloss

The author is not aware that the Americans are planning three warheads of two types at silos ...
But how confidently expertly answers questions

What are you talking about?

If they triple the number of Yabb on the new rocket, then they will either exit SNV-3 or refuse SSBN. PMSM the first is more likely.

[Kostadinov]

Quote: t-12

The simplest thing is to build 10000 missile silos. There are real rockets in 700 mines. The rest 9300 - dummy missiles.

At the same time, the enemy should not know in which missile silos and in which dummies.

1. In addition, make "blind" mines. The last 20-30 meters will be opened before launch.
2. Place rockets in thousands of kilometers in tunnels from thousands of real and fake outputs.
3. Protect all mines with active defense.
And much more that you can think of.

[Basarev]

That is exactly as I said. Air and ocean are lost for Russia forever, there is only land left, but it will not have time to react. Many questions immediately arise: are the pre-doomed air and sea components of the strategic nuclear forces needed? Are strategic nuclear forces needed at all, if, taking into account the facts presented by the author, the ground component can also be considered lost?

[Alexander X]

The number of "nuclear trains" and "nuclear trucks" should be 1% (conditionally) of their mass-dimensional simulators. And let these "dummies" roll across the vastness of our Motherland. In this case, it will be almost impossible to track real launchers.
But the author sweeps aside these options on far-fetched reasons. IMHO.

[Ales]

The author is right in this matter. At one time I had to see columns with nuclear warheads near Semipalatinsk. There in front of a cane on the road two KraZA and URala, blocking the road. This is a cover for the column, no matter what God forbid someone hit a car with a warhead. The column is covered from behind by the same pair. Add another launcher, a vehicle with a guard, a radio station or command vehicle, a backup vehicle. A not frail column is obtained, which will block both stripes in one direction and will creep at a low speed. And if and how do you suggest several dozen of these columns? And along their route there are still parts of the cover, what to arrive at the place within half an hour? And everyone still has three shifts in stock and everyone has to pay combat.
Therefore, there is no such option. Only in the book of Koretsky. A similar reason put an end to the BZHRK. According to the new security requirements, they should have a cover echelon in the front and behind. And three letter-type secret trains follow the route, and only a drunken uncle Vasya will not know the dates and routes of the three letter-type trains. And firefighters of railway firefighting trains at junction stations on the eve of the passage of this trinity will be on their ears.
Maalo what will happen

[alstr]

Oh, come on - that's not much. At one time, at the department, we made calculations for the march of the S-300 division (i.e. with a full set of launchers and supporting equipment). So, the convoy of the full S-300 division consisted of about 100 vehicles.

[Ales]

Of course you are right - a little.
But we are talking about disguised launchers of light ICBMs for trailers.
Which should get lost on the roads of the country.
After all, the situation with the accident of a loaded head start in the launcher can lead to a fire with an explosion and radioactive contamination of the area. Therefore, cover is needed so that no one passes by.
So we will get a secret invisible rocket launcher in a column, behind which a traffic jam has been ripped off for several tens of kilometers ... Does our government need it?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Alexander X

The number of "nuclear trains" and "nuclear trucks" should be 1% (conditionally) of their mass-dimensional simulators. And let these "dummies" roll across the vastness of our Motherland. In this case, it will be almost impossible to track real launchers.
But the author sweeps aside these options on far-fetched reasons. IMHO.

Can you imagine how much it will cost? The whole country will live in barracks and eat grass.

[Ales]

For the article I would give a three with a huge minus.
One can see the complete incompetence of the author in this matter.
It can be seen that many questions will be a revelation for him in the future.
At the beginning of the deployment of troops and strategic forces, including satellite groups, the American and ours will be destroyed. Also like satellites of third countries. Therefore, the detection of dispersed forces will be practically impossible.

According to American estimates, at the beginning of the 2000s, two warheads were assigned for ground detonation of Mk21 and one Mk5 to defeat silos with ICBMs.
THREE NUCLEAR AMMUNITION for each silo.

At the points of permanent deployment of mobile complexes of ICBMs, the targets are structures for self-propelled launchers, control and communication centers (command and control and ZKP) and other stationary objects. The location of the dispersed SPGs at the moment of impact is unknown and their defeat is considered almost impossible. However, even in this case, for each point of permanent deployment, two Mk4A warheads are assigned for ground detonation, which makes it possible to destroy non-dispersed SPUs, as well as administrative and technical buildings and structures.

Tracking of mobile complexes is carried out by enemy reconnaissance and sabotage groups. And then, according to the task at hand: destruction or guidance. But any saboteur runs slower than equipment))))

The author is not in the house that in peacetime the number of nuclear weapons on an American surface ship or on a multipurpose submarine is strictly limited.
It's about level 2-4 ammo! It is necessary to order the president to increase the ammunition, but on the same day everyone will know about it.
In addition, the American system for providing nuclear weapons to naval bases cannot provide the delivery of nuclear weapons in full ammunition to several ships or boats for several days. They do not have special transport for these transportations, and the officers of the calculation cannot exceed the permissible working time during the day.
Apparently, the author does not know what particularly dangerous work is. And how to translate ordinary transport into a special one for transportation is the highest mathematics for him.
Although, he knows how to count. But counting does not mean that it is worth writing an article.
The author is also not aware of the dispersal of aviation. But he easily brings panic and destroys everything in our country.
There is no mention of PLO aviation and that this one is also unknown to the author.
And even in Soviet times, these aircraft were looking for American boats far from our shores. There have been many articles about this. And how they lost buoys worth more than 900 thousand dollars over the English Channel.
The author does not know what strategic aviation is for, for example, in Russia.
There are many more questions that the author is not familiar with.

[Ales]

Poseidon does not fall under the Treaty.
The existing START-3 Treaty does not contain this type of delivery vehicles.
The new Treaty, into which the Americans want to drag tactical nuclear weapons and China will not succeed. China does not need this in the next decade. In addition, the Americans and I have different views on the number of tactical nuclear weapons.
A new agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States alone is also not signed due to the Russian Federation's demands to take into account the nuclear potential of Britain and France, as well as the deployment of American missile defense systems.

[ccsr]

Quote from rudolf

It would be beneficial for Russia to include Poseidon in the START Treaty.

This will be a big mistake, because the product is not yet in service. But Poseidon can become a subject of bargaining for us, and we will win.

Quote from rudolf

If this product is nevertheless adopted, which is highly doubtful, there will not be so many of them.

It is possible that the whole idea with Poseidon was just played out in order to get concessions from the Americans on strategic offensive arms and other treaties, and the product itself will not be created further than the design documentation. They have a fear of this complex, knowing the density of America's population off the coast.

Quote from rudolf

But the non-inclusion of Poseidon in START will entail much more serious consequences. We will actually destroy the agreement with the Americans on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on NK and submarines with our own hands,

This is an exaggeration, because they themselves will take away any agreement, which they have demonstrated to us more than once, if they see that it does not give them anything, but, on the contrary, unties their hands.

[Aag]

Quote: nnm

I didn't understand one thesis ...
Why US mine ICBMs are a very well-protected and practically indestructible component of strategic nuclear forces, while in our country they will simply "throw 3" heads "into the mine and that's it ..." (not a quote, but the meaning is this).
It seems to me that the approach should be identical. I understand that, perhaps, we are talking about different flight times, but not so much.
And plus, upon impact from 2-3 thousand km, by what forces and means will it be applied? All the same, as I understand, these will not be the most powerful charges? And as for me, after all, the capabilities of our air defense-missile defense system have not been fully taken into account.

Sorry, I'm trying to answer you for the third time - communication, even in peacetime .... (I perfectly understand the difference between "civil" and "military" communication ... Although, I'm not sure anymore ...
... Answering your question:
- because the United States, (conceptually, technically, organizationally), is ready to start a RYAK (nuclear missile conflict) - this is how we were taught ... first. We do not have this in the Doctrine. If only, as the President said, the question of the existence of the Russian Federation arises ...

[acetophenone]

The article is not of particular interest because the author does not investigate the issue, and sets out the results of the study, but has a preconceived opinion, and only suitable facts and arguments are attracted to it. And the unsuitable ones are stupidly ignored. And he reacts nervously when his problems are pointed out to him. In science, this is called "quackery". And as in journalism - I don't know, maybe someone will tell you.

[TatarinSSSR]

I didn't even understand - all the American warheads at once, in one minute, land on our mines, on the strategists of nuclear submarines in the oceans, on airfields, on warehouses with nuclear weapons, on command posts? Just like that - and in one second everyone reached their goals and exploded at once? Mister author, this is fantastic. And if launches (not to detect hundreds of launches towards Russia in our time is not realistic) from the enemy's submarine will still be noticed and immediately reported to the General Staff, the Americans will not burst their eggs from fear for their cities? I propose to the author to cool down and not to catch up with horror.

[alstr]

Well considering that American boats never gave full. Maximum 4 pieces.
As well as the terrible difficulty of performing this task (we read about the operation Begemot-1 and Begemot-2), the probability of launching the entire ICBM ammunition load from a significant number of submarines without preliminary preparation and training is negligible.
Therefore, the reasoning about how to deliver a nuclear strike on ALL carriers of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation (and this can only be done with the help of submarines and from at least 4 different regions) without preparation about which they would not know is a fiction.

PS And again, for information. The release of 16 missiles in Operation Begemot 2 took 2 and a half minutes. At the same time, American boats release ammunition more slowly than ours (in terms of pace). That is, given that there are 24 missiles on Ohio, the release of a full ammunition load is at least 4 minutes.

[dementor873]

The population of New York is 8 people, the metropolitan area is 405 million (837 estimate).
The power of the bomb is approximately equal to the power of all 1 Bulava-M blocks. Orange shows the affected area with 100% 3rd degree burns, essentially the person is dead. The lines indicate the boundaries of the city, followed by the agglomeration. How to hit another country, while not giving a damn about your own population. There were such pogroms there because of one killed black man.

[looker-on]

Quote: Mikhalych

And who surrendered to the USSR? Visiting bourgeoisie or “our” native leadership and direction, such as the mind, honor and conscience of our era? And who is in power now?

Don't you know? The same people + their children are now grandchildren somewhere

[bzbo]

In general, thanks to the author) Partners of mobile systems are afraid)))

[AsmyppoL]

It’s good that people abroad, deciding whether or not to start a third world war, think more realistically than the author of this article. They have already realized for themselves that unacceptable damage will be caused to the states, the EU and the locations of their shelters.

Therefore, their views have changed somewhat. They also want to destroy our country and the People's Republic of China. They are ready to give up EU countries and their territory for destruction.

Why?
Because in the coming years or decade, the United States is expected to leave the superpower forever. This is due to the inevitable eruption of a supervolcano, after which the material well-being of this country will collapse. This means that almost the entire world should be dragged into oblivion, and we ourselves should gain a foothold in some countries with relatively developed economies. After the war, the population of these countries will be reduced to the level of the inhabitants of the colonies... They are already making plans to reduce the population on our planet to 500 million or lower.

Therefore, the industrial potential of all other countries in the world must be brought to a level significantly lower than those countries where some of the Americans should settle. Therefore, we see bacchanalia in the Middle East and the north of the African continent. After all, about 20 years ago these countries were offered $10 billion over 10 years to accommodate residential zones for 10 million Americans, but they refused. Why would they let an American wolfdog into a sheep shed?

What keeps them from going to war is the knowledge of new plans by our leadership and the threat of their destruction in peaceful oases... Why start a nuclear war if they and their relatives will burn in it?...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Because in the coming years or decade, the United States is expected to leave the superpower forever. This is due to the inevitable eruption of a supervolcano, after which the material well-being of this country will collapse.

So you also turned out to be Vanga. What intelligence told you that the supervolcano is bound to wake up? Tell us about your visions, if this does not happen...

Quote: AsmyppoL

Therefore, the industrial potential of all other countries in the world must be brought to a level significantly lower than those countries where some of the Americans should settle.

With the current level of emigrant flows, they cannot even cope with the Mexicans on their territory, which means this cannot be solved even where, according to your fantasies, they should go. How will they suddenly be able to create some kind of Eldorado for themselves, where there will be no those who should serve them?

Quote: AsmyppoL

After all, about 20 years ago these countries were offered $10 billion over 10 years to accommodate residential zones for 10 million Americans, but they refused.

Please provide a source for this information, as... I already realized that Ostap suffered, and you lied...

Quote: AsmyppoL

What keeps them from going to war is the knowledge of new plans by our leadership and the threat of their destruction in peaceful oases...

Are you interested in whether Shoigu or Gerasimov personally told you this, or are you lying as usual?

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why start a nuclear war if they and their families will burn in it?...

This factor became known after the 1972 meeting. It's a pity that this only just dawned on you. But you continue in this direction and will become an honored artist of artistic whistling.

[your1970]

Quote: AsmyppoL

After all, these countries were offered $20 billion over 10 years about 10 years ago to accommodate residential zones for 10 million Americans

One buck per American?!!! By a hundred bucks a year????!!!! I bought a couple of them at that price

[polk26l]

Ravings of a madman ! Directly according to the commandments of Peter 1! "so that everyone's stupidity is visible!" Write unreasonable ones - “Military Review” will tolerate everything! A verbose and multi-digit article that intimidates readers with terrible prospects, like others like it, were written by amateurs who absolutely do not understand the essence of modern war! And thank God! that there are fewer of them! And for the common people - a sedative! Live calmly and cheerfully! "Be fruitful and multiply!" The Red Army is the strongest!!! "

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

Author - before your eyes is one area of ​​7-8 positional protected areas of the PGRK, each with 9 hangars - guess which one of them contains the PGRK? Or in any of the other areas? The regions are several tens of kilometers apart.
How many airborne carriers of conventional weapons would be required to hit one PGRK division with 100% probability?
In the absence of reconnaissance satellites, the position changes - that is, the data becomes outdated during the flight time, not to mention the carriers - during the flight time of the most conventional weapons.

Implying that the most protected silo-based weapon is an amateur and is ABSOLUTELY wrong!

Would you say saboteurs? -
On oil pipelines, they manage to detect underground connections - with a length of communications of thousands of kilometers - and to carry out counter-sabotage measures along the routes of the PGRK - well, this is the professional responsibility of you know who.
The author has very little understanding of the issue he is discussing.

[Peaceful SEO]

Oh, these experts... you should cut and destroy everything in favor of one thing. If it were so easy to destroy the Russian Federation, we would not have been commenting on topvar long ago, but, at best, would have hunted for radioactive gophers somewhere away from the ruins of cities
Е

[Victor Dergachev]

Dear Andrey! Thanks for the article - I learned a lot of interesting things. But the analytics are lame - not everything is so simple. I advise you to read and study the military doctrine of Russia - it was not written by stupid people. Do not consider our General Staff and the leadership of the country to be a bunch of narrow-minded people. For example, Russia’s actions upon detection of a missile launch (not just one accidental one, of course). So - 1. Don station determines the launch of dozens of ICBMs on the territory of the United States and at its bases. (detection range 8 km.) 000. Confirmation of the launch from the satellite constellation. The approach time of the adversary missiles is 2-20 minutes. 30. Report to the President and the General Staff and transmission of the order to our launch complexes (this is 3 minutes). Launch of our ICBMs in 10-10 minutes. (I managed to finish my coffee during the exercises). Let me remind you that the Strategic Missile Forces are on constant alert. Everyone has arrived. Option two is the launch of more than 15 cruise missiles. (what if they are filled with nuclear weapons) - see above. For information, their launch is detected from a distance of 20-500 km. It’s not very visible how they fly, but the launch itself is easily determined (satellites and radars help us, and this is not counting spies - the launch from ships is visible, and the planes are visible on takeoff - I saw them take off from a base in Okinawa on the screen in Vladivostok. ) If there are many of them - a request to the General Staff and again our answer. Whether this is right or not, we will sort it out later, if there is anyone. US generals are not fools either (politicians are a different matter). If it were as you write, then we would have arrived long ago! And also - I smiled about the civilian population - give an example when this stopped someone (Vietnam, Korea, Syria, Iraq for example)

[Valery Vl.]

Well, yes, but we will sit and wait until all of the above comes to us, so that ours does not fly to them. From their start to our time it will not be so short, we will have time. And even today it is unlikely that it will be possible to start a war suddenly. First there was the WORD.

[Ignatius of Torquemada]

Dear Andrey Mitrofanov, I read your article very carefully, one and a half times (the second time selectively). I read it and thought, what kind of pepper is this, an expert on all the weapons and military potentials in the world. In addition, the network talks about you as a person who graduated from one of the technical colleges, received a good specialty, and worked somewhere in the military-technical field. You see, Andrey, this is extremely little for you to be called even just an expert in weapons, strategy and tactics of combat operations, an expert in the structural, block and planning components of the armed forces of various countries, including Russia. Extremely, extremely little. You actually don’t even have the ability to objectively consider issues, what an expert you are. I personally have the impression that you work for money in writing such articles and not at all for rubles. Of course, for modern youth (20-30 years old) you wrote a very important and responsible work. But essentially (I’m not afraid to say), this is hidden anti-Russian propaganda. Your article is full of such brown marks; I’ll just mention a few in the form of counter questions to your text. Why are our missiles in silos very vulnerable, but American ones are not? Are our planes at their bases very vulnerable, but American ones are not? Our ships are very vulnerable, but American ones are not? Why can all our strategic nuclear forces be destroyed very quickly and with conventional weapons, but American ones cannot? And in general, the entire article is devoted to a detailed analysis of how everything is bad with us and why, with the hint that this cannot be corrected! You are a kindly misplaced Cossack, by the standards of the 37th, I ask you to please come to the wall and turn your back!

[ivpe211]

eeeee[b][/b]

[Altmann]

The article is tedious, you are only interested in Russia-USA. But what about small states that are not interested in self-destruction? Do you think you will destroy the culture of Ancient Rome and Greece? Think better and raise awareness about the possibilities for peace in Europe and around the world. This is a terrible article, but when do we all understand who the enemy is???

[Gorgonzola]

Dear Mr. Mitrofanov!
Paragraph 1. Your analysis collapses on just one fact, which you cannot ignore: the US use of 500-600 nuclear warheads to ensure the destruction of the entire Russian nuclear arsenal will inevitably lead to the onset of a nuclear winter on the WHOLE planet (even if we assume that Russia will not be able to use any one of its own ICBMs.) And modern YaZ are no longer the same Little Boys and Fat Men dropped on Japanese cities in 45. So, the USA and Russia will never use nuclear weapons against each other, because they know that after this no one on Earth will survive.
Point 2. Russia will detect a massive launch of US nuclear weapons almost instantly, and during the flight time of US missiles, regardless of the carriers (which is at least 10-20 minutes), Russia (spitting on START-3) will have time to launch a similar or larger number of its carriers towards the USA . And this is also at least 500-600 nuclear weapons, if not 1000-1500. Even if we assume that the vaunted US missile defense system will destroy 90% of nuclear warheads flying towards them, 50-150 nuclear warheads will wipe the United States off the face of the earth.
CONCLUSION: Let's live together, Mr. Mitrofanov!)) Because if this happens, neither the Americans, nor the Russians, nor anyone on this Planet will survive.

[Knell wardenheart]

Good article, generally correct conclusions. One problem is that we now have absolutely incomparable economic, industrial, scientific and technical capabilities with the US+ allies. This means that to our conditional A they can say not only B but also C. The economy allows them to draw out 2 responses to our actions - defensive and offensive. That is what they are doing, on the one hand, improving their triad, on the other, investing in missile defense. Considering the general trend towards the gradual collapse or de facto non-operation of international security treaties, there are no guarantees that the United States will not at some point gracefully withdraw from the treaty prohibiting the militarization of outer space - and by that time will not have a fully developed set of tools for carrying it out extremely quickly . Be it the revival of the Diamond Pebbles in some form or unmanned shuttles with nuclear or kinetic weapons on board. They have preparations for both. “Cheating” the casus beli that allows them to withdraw from such an agreement is not a problem for them; they have long since learned how to carry out such actions. After this, we, in turn, will have to thoroughly shake up our economy, forget about something and create something in a hurry.

All this makes me think that with a linear approach in the “shell-armor” style, we will not ensure our safety in the future - our security is clearly tied to the growth of our economic and industrial power, and scientific and technological power - so that we have the opportunity respond as quickly or proactively as possible to changes in the approach of our “sworn friends”, quickly deploy a mass production response. At the moment, Russia has practically no allies, relatively speaking, no one will itch if they decide to do away with us (let’s say) - in turn, if someone decides to do away with the USA, then there are much more interested people to prevent this, since many countries DEPEND on the US security architecture . And this, coupled with industrial power and a strong armed forces, is the main guarantee of the security of the United States itself. We should build a similar architecture and play for the long haul.

[Svarog_11]

1) The author writes that silos do not make sense because there is no time to make a decision to strike, even on the map he draws 2300 km from the submarine.
What is being done:
a) The North Pole is ours! They have officially given it away - we are setting up military bases on the islands and, accordingly, protection from US submarines. Patrolling of our Arctic by our boats.
b) The Sarmatians will greatly reduce the time from the order to the missile launch.
2) The author seems to forget about Russian missile defense systems; can we really intercept so little?
3) Can anyone say why at least 50% of SSBNs and ground-based systems will be destroyed and that is exactly how many are at the bases, why are those on routes not taken into account?