Project 20386: "fun fun - hard hangover"
The failure of the scam with the project allegedly "promising corvette and ship of the ocean zone" 20386 is obvious. Its accomplices are looking for how to evade responsibility (for deliberately undermining the combat capability of the Navy, including the failure to ensure the combat stability of the NSNF). This must not be allowed - the guilty must answer.
The other day in the media there was a wave of publications about the stealth corvette 20386 and how unobtrusive it will be. And, as luck would have it, immediately after this wave, it was published statement by the head of the USC A. L. Rakhmanov that "Mercury" instead of entering service can be completed as an experimental ship or vessel.
If, within the framework of our understanding, modern technologies are applied on the corvette, then, in fact, its construction may drag on until these technologies are developed ...
And if we take into account that the ship itself can become an experimental vessel, then it will never [become part of the Navy]. It will plow the sea and develop new technologies ...
If it is a real test vessel, it will be put into operation as a test vessel.
And if we take into account that the ship itself can become an experimental vessel, then it will never [become part of the Navy]. It will plow the sea and develop new technologies ...
If it is a real test vessel, it will be put into operation as a test vessel.
Well, the consequences of this scam are slowly but surely becoming apparent.
This project has been written about several times.
For example, on October 28, 2016, an article by A. Timokhin “Worse than a crime. Construction of the corvettes project 20386 - error "... Or on March 20, 2019 A. Timokhin, M. Klimov “Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam ».
However, the current situation on this project harshly raises the question of the need to return to this scam again and again.
"Shipwreck of Admiral Chirkov"
I emphasize that the lobbyists of 20386 not only do not have any sane technical arguments, but their actions (since 20386) contradict their own statements and admissions of what the Russian Navy needs, for example:
August 22, 2018, RIA News... Russian frigates of type 22350 and corvettes of project type 20380 should be built in large series, in general, the Russian Navy should have at least 18 frigates, corvettes - 36, said on Wednesday the chief adviser to the President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), former commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov.
And this is declared by the person who is the "dad" not only of the scam from 20386, but also of even more stupid and senseless "modular" patrol ships of Project 22160.
February 12, 2014, FLOT.com. Command of the Naval fleet Russia abandoned the concept of a corvette for the protection of water areas (OVR). Instead, it is planned to create patrol ships. The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, stated this in a blitz interview to the Central Naval Portal. The main command does not see any prospects in the creation of ships previously designated as the "OVR Corvette". One of the main tasks of the OVR is to ensure the protection and defense of the naval forces in the areas of naval bases and in the adjacent territories. This task is now performed by coastal surveillance equipment, stationary sonar stations and coastal missile and artillery troops armed with anti-ship missiles of various ranges, as well as anti-submarine and strike Aviation... Having abandoned the corvette, the Navy turned to the idea of creating patrol ships - less armed, but with greater autonomy and versatility, capable, among other things, of going on long voyages.
There were no stationary GASs with the required characteristics declared by Chirkov both then and now. The anti-submarine and strike aviation of the Navy was defeated and in fact lost its combat capability against any serious enemy (more on this in one of the next articles). In general, "everyone knows everything." Including the fact that there were persons who, at that time, “lobbied for certain issues” ...
In fact, Chirkov's statement (about "18 frigates and 36 corvettes") is his own "receipt" of the actual fiasco of all his ideas, shipbuilding plans (except for project 22800, which was actually saved by the executors). However, the "shipwreck of Admiral Chirkov" (a catastrophic disruption in shipbuilding in GOZ-2020) does not prevent him from feeling good in the chair of the chief adviser to the USC president.
The genesis of the project 20380 itself is not the topic of the article, although further it is worth returning to it in more detail: the project, with a certain modernization, can still show itself from its best side. It's about his so-called "development". And if the installation of the UKSK for long-range anti-ship missiles, KR and PLUR on the 20385 project can be understood and welcomed, then the epic with the corvette's radar is clearly worthy of the pen of Agatha Christie.
More on this - “Thundering and others. Will our fleet receive effective ships of the near zone ".
The Americans, with their "Pentagon Wars" (see picture), would be envious.
But it turned out even more "fun" with the alleged "development" of 20380, but in fact with a completely new project 20386, "increased" in displacement and price almost to the level of a frigate (with an extremely dubious concept and low combat capabilities). Quote:
January 3, 2015, AN. The fact of the passage of the TTZ at 20386 is known, when Mr. Zakharov, on behalf of Almaz, brought the TTZ to the Central Research Institute of VK, signed with the head and then immediately with the Commander-in-Chief. Naturally, no one from the institute read anything inside. Then. Read later and [deleted - obscene expression].
Project 20386 and its chief designer I. G. Zakharov This is about the events of the beginning of 2013 I. G. Zakharov, chief designer of project 20386 (and concurrently (in 2012–2014) vice president of USC).
IG Zakharov agrees with V. V. Chirkov TTZ for a new corvette of project 20386 (and bypassing the Navy specialists, it is obvious that the head of the Central Research Institute of VK at the time Zakharov came to him already had the command: "sign").
A piquant moment in this whole situation - at the same time, the commander of the Baltic Fleet reports to V.V. Chirkov about the complete incapacity of the corvettes of project 20380 (Zakharov's brainchild in the position of chief of the 1st Central Research Institute of VK).
Once again about "Zaslon"
In 2010, the developer of the "promising" "super-RLK" with AFAR of the Navy was appointed an organization that had previously developed the most difficult thing - this is ... airfield air conditioners. It immediately receives a generous stream of funding (the abundance of which, to put it mildly, is unparalleled for such developments). At the same time, the really leading AFAR firms in the country - NIIP im. Tikhomirov and "Fazatron" (although the latter at that time had an air target already really shot down from under AFAR).
In the subsequent period of time JSC "Zaslon" made active attempts to enter the subject of aviation radars, but all these attempts ended in fiasco. There is not a single really operating airborne radar with AFAR "Zaslon" (in fact, there is nothing surprising, "on the rake" problems with AFAR (especially thermodynamic), as they say, "bumped" and incomparably much more experienced NIIP and "Fazatron").
At the same time, the persons from the "Zaslon" actively presented others for their developments, for example, the TsNPO "Leninets" (I emphasize, the TsNPO "Leninets" and JSC "Zaslon" (in the past, the STC "Plant Leninets") are completely different organizations and, unlike "Zaslona", TsNPO "Leninets" really has vast experience and authority in matters of radar and aviation systems). Who actually made the radar for the same Tu planes of the latest modifications - you should look at the annual reports of the Leninets Scientific and Production Association. And the role of the "Barrier" here, figuratively speaking, is a wrapper for sweets, which were made by completely different people and organizations.
Despite the repeated postponement of the delivery date of the "Thundering" corvette (project 20385), the MF-RLK actually failed tests at the end of 2020. Although the targets were actually shot down (the 9M96 missiles, which worked there excellently), the conditions for firing were such that the MF-RLK could not be turned on at all (the errors were reliably covered by the deployment of active missile homing heads). We were actually preparing to fire at the console (simulated) target (with the parameters of target missiles).
Immunity of the MF-RLK "Zaslon" against a real threat from the air. And these are exactly the facts! (screen from the video of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation)Let me emphasize that the author considers the appearance of such details and details of the shooting and combat training of the Navy and the RF Armed Forces in the public domain incorrect. Moreover, a number of persons from the "professional community" asked him that "it is impossible to write in such detail in public." It is logical, but these details were given in the official video of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - DIMK), and all these numbers and details were visible and obvious to any specialist (including a foreign one) and, accordingly, were carefully studied by them.
The author wrote a report addressed to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation about, to put it mildly, the strange actions of DIMK, including the question of the presence of real leaks in the materials of DIMK. The answer (from the acting head of DIMK) was in the style of "all is well beautiful marquise":
Everything has been agreed by the specialized specialists of the RF Ministry of Defense
There are also good reasons to believe that in fact the firing at the RM-120 target missile of the Pacific corvette Aldar Tsydenzhapov (artillery from under the MF-RLK) was actually failed.
And the reasons for this failure are quite visible: in the Ministry of Defense video from "Thundering" - a powerful illumination of the center of the screen by the operation of the MF-RLK itself (with a radius of about 3 km) not only excludes the possibility of firing AK-630M (from under the MF-RLK), but also puts very serious questions, because of what such a flare is formed and how this reason influenced the firing accuracy of the medium-caliber AK-190 ...
Actually, it is understandable why the PM15 was "pulled up" for a hundred meters for the "Thundering" (and why they were so afraid to shoot at really low-flying targets).
For specialists (real specialists in the work on NLC and their defeat) everything is clear. That is, the technical problem is at the level of a normal technical meeting, followed by the necessary improvements.
However, the real problems of the MF-RLC are not so much in technology, but in another - in the leadership and its attitude to business.
Obviously, this problem "got out" far not during the shooting of the "Thundering", but immediately (... years ago). It is known that back in 2017, the MF-radar was tested on the shore, at a special stand. Taking this factor into account, bringing the problem not just to the ship, but also to its Gosy, is not just shame and disgrace. This is the complete confidence of the top management of Zaslon that “nothing needs to be done”, because due to PR, lies (allegedly “knocked down” target of “Aldar”) and administrative pressure, in any case and in any form, they will “push” the Ministry of Finance -RLK to the fleet.
As a matter of fact, watch the "news from DIMK" after the shooting of the "Thundering" and, as they say, enjoy. "Facts on the face" ...
I have a simple question for the officers of the Navy (and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, for example, the Office of Military Representations): how is your officer's honor and just conscience combined with all these supposedly successful tests?
Especially - to the officers who were preparing the RM15 for the Gosov "Thundering" and set the altitude of its flight altitude almost ten times higher than the real anti-ship missiles.
However, with MF-RLK everything turned out to be much more fun, but more on that below.
Insanity of "container modularity"
On this topic, the author has repeatedly written:
"Modules will not save patrolmen";
"What modules do our ships need".
In short: modularity for ships provides both significant opportunities, primarily in terms of modernizing ships, and imposes serious restrictions. For example, in the United States, the modular approach had both a major success (modernization of the Ticonderoga missile launcher and the Spruence EM) and a catastrophic failure on the LCS ships.
However, the main thing for the Russian Navy was the possibility of effective modernization of the ships of the combat strength. And it was technically quite realistic - the installation of small-sized modules of new systems and complexes.
Instead, we started packing "everything and everything" into 20 and 40-foot containers. The fact that they did not climb on the ships "sawing" these topics did not interest, because they expected even more cutting on "promising special modular ships."
The whole insanity of "modular approaches" in the Russian Navy is especially clearly visible in the example of "modular GAS".
The "original dimensions" "BUGAS" Vignette "(" Minotaur ") are close to those of the western BUGAS. Moreover, in the special literature of the late 2000s, data on work on the "compact Minotaur" (which could be massively installed on ships and small displacement vessels) were given. However, we “buried” all this and tried to “forget firmly”, because the “sawmill whistled” over “modular ships” and “special container modules for them” (I emphasize - obviously such that they could not be put on ships of combat strength and carried out their modernization).
The result of this violence against common sense and engineering personnel is clear:
As the initial data, a section of one of the variants of the export corvette "Tiger" and materials about the "modules" from an article in the "Marine Bulletin" were taken.
As a matter of fact, after such a “creative result” of “containment” it is not at all surprising that the developers of the “modular” 20386 preferred not the “innovative modular-container” BGAS, but the usual one.
And now for comparison: the Western approach to "modular BUGAS".
These are precisely compact stations suitable for installation on small ships and vessels (up to large boats and BEC).
And once again it is worth citing a photo that raises serious questions about the competence and suitability of a number of Navy chiefs (including the head of the Navy's PLB (anti-submarine warfare) service).
This is an Egyptian "big hunter" of Chinese construction (type "Hainan", in fact - project 122 of the USSR, which began to develop at the end of the Great Patriotic War). But with a modern low-frequency BUGAS.
This is what the correct "modular principle" is.
Note, technically and tactically correct, but having a very serious "organizational disadvantage" - a relatively low cost. That is, it is difficult to get a "big cut" on it. Accordingly, the "sheep" of the Navy simply must be shorn both on the huge 40-foot BUGAS and special innovative modular ships on them (and the "compact Minotaur" is buried).
Navy combat readiness?
What is such "combat readiness"?
After all, parades became the main point of "combat training" (in quotation marks).
Once again about comparing 20386 with other serial ships
So, the project 20385 corvette, smaller in displacement and cheaper, had: a helicopter, a UKSK for 8 missiles ("Caliber", "Onyx", in the future "Zircon") and 16 air defense missile systems "Redut". Yes, it lost in maximum speed (while having a much cheaper diesel power plant) and very insignificantly in seaworthiness.
By the way, in connection with the use of turbines for 20386, and did anyone consider the gas turbine 20385?
The much more expensive and large 20386 initially had: 8 Uranium anti-ship missiles (that is, I was not able to use the PLUR and KR - as well as the long-range Turquoise, Onyx and Zircon anti-ship missiles) and the same 16 UVP for Reduta ". 4 "Caliber" in a frankly weak container launcher could only be delivered instead of a helicopter. As the saying goes, "Repin's painting - they sailed."
Even against the background of a very small and formally weak patrol ship of Project 22160 (displacement half as much), Project 20386 looks extremely doubtful: either a 1-foot container or a helicopter. At the same time, at 40, two 22160-foot containers stood up together with a helicopter.
"Thrown" into the water hull "Daring Mercury" project 20386
Comparison with the frigate of project 22350 for 20386 is generally meaningless.
And not only because formally in terms of armament 22350 conceals 20386 as a "bull sheep", but also because as of today the MF-RLK is actually "furniture" (with all the deadlines for completing the ROC long ago disrupted). For it is incapable of solving the tasks for its intended purpose, and the lobbyists of Zaslon, with a “complete lack of conscience,” declare the need to continue generous budget funding in order to “teach” “Zaslon” to shoot down at least something (from questions: what about the state contract , on which a lot of money has already been spent, but the output is only "furniture", these lobbyists are strenuously dodging).
At the same time, the cost of the corvette, which had already “soared” up after the installation of the MF-radar “Zaslon” (project 20385) on it, continued its “vertical take-off” on project 20386, practically catching up with the frigate of project 22350 (which had an order of magnitude greater combat effectiveness than the strange "over-the-top-underfregat" of the project 20386). Moreover, the project 20386 "crosses the road" to the frigate of the project 22350 in the narrowest point of our surface shipbuilding - gearbox production. And here the question already arises: is this stupidity or deliberate sabotage?
And here it is worth quoting once again one of the founders of the 20386 project:
August 22, 2018, RIA Novosti. "In general, the Russian Navy should have at least 18 frigates and 36 corvettes,"
- said on Wednesday the chief adviser to the president of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), former commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov.
The most important thing in all this brothel (chaos) is that, finally, having more or less brought a very decent frigate of Project 22350, the organizers and accomplices of the scam from 20386 started to actually replace it in the series (under the "cover" of an "advertising banner" with tsiferkoy 22350M) on the deliberately "drunk" and poor combat characteristics of the project 20386.
Just the glaring shortcomings of the project 20386 caused a "logical" desire of the persons participating in this scam to "eliminate" them (and, of course, under the pretext of this, continue "tasty development of large budget funds" for "themselves beloved"). As a result of this process, in December 2019 in Sevastopol, a "promising ship of the oceanic zone based on project 20386" was presented to the President. More - A. Timokhin “Is alteration of the project 20386 planned?”.
Launchers, yes, they added. UKSK appeared. As for the statement to the president (which the whole country could see on TV at this screening) by Mr. Evmenov about allegedly 32 UVPs for the "Caliber" (including in the nose from the gun mount), then there are two options: either the current Navy Civil Code is not able to distinguish UKSK "Kalibrov" from the UVP ZUR "Redut", or, excuse me, there was a direct and public deception of the first person of the state.
Speaking of deception, it is worth remembering the "juicy details" "Re-bookings" of "Daring Mercury" - a very interesting question: was the President reported on them? Or has the relevant information for the “first person” been “edited correctly” once again?
After all these design and technical (and financial) manipulations, the real price tag of 20386 exceeded that of 22350 (which still significantly exceeds this "nedoproject").
What does the fleet need?
Taking into account that one of the main tasks of the corvette is anti-submarine defense (ASW), the key for the corvette is not just equipping it with effective means of search, but the creation of an effective grouping of forces that really ensures the solution of tasks for the intended purpose (including ASW) in the near the maritime zone (and local areas of the far and ocean, if necessary).
Taking into account, as a rule, the zonal structure of the acoustic field (the presence of zones of "shadow" and "illumination"), the problem in most cases cannot be effectively solved by one powerful hydroacoustic complex (GAC) on a single carrier - a group of ships optimally distributed in the area is required, carriers of the SAC. At the same time, with the transition to such a "network" principle of PLO operation, the requirements (and cost) to the SAC and SAS of individual carriers can be significantly reduced (and their optimization should be carried out at the level of not the carrier, but the grouping of forces in the theater of operations). Moreover, the optimization problem (maximum efficiency at the lowest resource cost) requires a reasonable limitation of the characteristics and cost of individual units to ensure the creation of the necessary grouping.
In this regard, inflating the cost of a separate ship is not only ineffective, it practically excludes any effective solution of the PLO problem. This approach is only suitable for parades, in a real war it will end in defeat.
The issue of mass (and effective - as an element of the grouping of forces in the theater of operations) of the naval corvette is one of the key issues in the navy today. All the technical possibilities for this ("cubes" of complexes and systems) are there. We have all the technical capabilities for the mass construction of efficient ships in the near sea zone. And all acute problems have purely organizational reasons (calling things by their proper names - "snake ball" of intrigues and "interests" of the so-called "respected persons").
Do developers understand this?
I. G. Zakharov, chief designer 20386 (in his own book on corvettes):
The need to create and maintain small corvettes in the fleet is a result of the growth in cost and the increase in the capabilities of multipurpose corvettes.
... The size of the naval personnel of the Navy may be reduced by more than 60% ... The current situation can only be reversed by focusing efforts on solving more clearly defined priority tasks, one of which is the creation of a lower-class corvette and, therefore, less cost. Due to these ships, it will be possible to maintain the required number of surface ships in the fleet.
... The size of the naval personnel of the Navy may be reduced by more than 60% ... The current situation can only be reversed by focusing efforts on solving more clearly defined priority tasks, one of which is the creation of a lower-class corvette and, therefore, less cost. Due to these ships, it will be possible to maintain the required number of surface ships in the fleet.
That is, he understands everything, but does the exact opposite.
Does the Navy understand this?
Two ex-Navy Main Commands are very well settled in the USC. So to speak - "set an example." And this example is well accepted. As it is perceived that even very experienced specialists can have very serious problems with employment "in their specialty" in the defense industry if they show principles of principle (but if "grease on time", then everything will be "ok": both the position and the salary, and more than in service).
As a result of all this, we have in the fleet: a crowd of absolutely worn-out "invalids" (on crutches with an inoperative turbine) of the IPC project 1124M, which have practically completely lost their combat significance (only as targets for the enemy), a small series and have not been brought to a normally combat-ready state of corvettes 20380 and modelki and a large financial cut on the project 20386.
Everything is "normal".
The so-called "respected people" are satisfied, the "sheep" (Navy) is once again shorn. Well, the fact that in the event of a real war the ships of the Navy will drown like kittens - so completely different people (and not those so-called "respected" people) will be responsible for this. And this should be remembered by those who are now responsible for the business and the result and to whom the so-called “respected” again show the “carrot” (or “envelope”) - with the “prospect” of a “soft chair” in their circle.
"Doubtful sauce" "stealth"
As noted earlier, the supporters of 20386 lack any adequate technical arguments. There are only “adjectives”: “modular”, “innovative” and the like about “the introduction of new approaches in ship architecture” (the latter is an integral part of the topic on which budget funds were actively “sawed”). The last "splash" of PR in 20386 was associated with allegedly stealth: "the first stealth ship of the Navy" - the media buzzed at once at once.
Let's disassemble this crafty bogey (in fact, an attempt to close, filling with the sauce of "stealth", all the indecency of the project 20386).
The best answer to the thesis about the "stealth ship" is the fate of the US Navy Sea Shadow, an experimental stealth vessel, which had a really extremely low level of visibility (not only of the hull, but also of wave formation on the water surface), a huge amount of research and special training with it, and in as a result - destroyed.
At the same time, the US Navy did not in any way abandon stealth. The question is its size and place in the complex of combat characteristics of ships. Stealth technologies were massively introduced on serial ships (and previously built ships of the US Navy) with a significant decrease, including in their radar signature.
Similar work was carried out in the Soviet Navy as well. For example, a close examination of the photographs of the superstructures of the BOD project 1155 still shows the presence of the surviving remnants of the special coating ("matting"). Another thing is that it worked in combination with a special paint.
And the key issue of "limited stealth" for ships was that the solution of a number of basic tasks by them is simply incompatible with stealth (for example, air defense and anti-aircraft defense tasks).
Is there a "tactical niche" for really "very stealthy ships" in naval warfare?
Yes there is.
But rather narrow: for example, the solution of shock missions (missile boats (RCA) of the Sköld type of the Norwegian Navy).
For the Russian Navy, such a project has a well-grounded meaning, and the potential of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau is quite possible to realize it, if not for one "but": such a "small sea stealth" definitely requires inclined launchers ("anathematized" in our Navy) ...
Beginning of the End
Let us recall once again what the head of the USC A. Rakhmanov said - the ship can be completed as an experimental one, and the time of its construction will depend on the development of "modern technologies", well, or in a simple way: the date of delivery is unknown when, it may not enter the combat strength.
Project 20386: "fun fun - hard hangover."As they say, "facts on the face" ...
And here it is interesting to look at the reaction on one of the special forums, especially among people "in the subject" and previously seen in active lobbying 20386 (link):
Curious # 11.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX. Transferring "Mercury" to the category of OS is a tricky "desire" of the USC, such as an excuse for failing to meet all the deadlines for this order. There is a rumor that some of the contractors cannot even name a specific date for the completion of their development work on the corvette systems, and an experienced bureaucrat Rakhmanov wants to jump off and evade responsibility. And the Navy, as they say, does not care at all.
DM # 12.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX. ... the idea of an experimental vessel is not Rakhmanov's. Customers have been pushing it for more than a year. Rakhmanov only voiced.
brazil # 11.06.2021/20386/20386. This is an acknowledgment of the failure of the project 20380. Corvettes 5 wanted a dozen units and stopped new orders 20380 (5). Now there will be a pause in the admission of corvettes 20386 (22350) instead of 20386 to the Navy. In addition, 22350 will also get, because the supply of 27 equipment affects the supply for new orders XNUMX. Only R&D enthusiasts remained in the black: modularity, electric propulsion, etc. Experimental vessel for XNUMX billion The money was mastered and left without ships (sabotage of clean water) ...
WWWW # 11.06.2021. Two former commander-in-chief of the Navy are now working at the USC. The raftsmen do not think about the fleet, but about the future sinecure in the USC, so they agree to ffffffseeeeee !!!
WWWW (lobbyist 20386 with NIO of the Navy) # 11.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX ... troubles with the integration of REV are now not into a smart mast, but into an ingenious superstructure.
DM # 12.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX. ... the idea of an experimental vessel is not Rakhmanov's. Customers have been pushing it for more than a year. Rakhmanov only voiced.
brazil # 11.06.2021/20386/20386. This is an acknowledgment of the failure of the project 20380. Corvettes 5 wanted a dozen units and stopped new orders 20380 (5). Now there will be a pause in the admission of corvettes 20386 (22350) instead of 20386 to the Navy. In addition, 22350 will also get, because the supply of 27 equipment affects the supply for new orders XNUMX. Only R&D enthusiasts remained in the black: modularity, electric propulsion, etc. Experimental vessel for XNUMX billion The money was mastered and left without ships (sabotage of clean water) ...
WWWW # 11.06.2021. Two former commander-in-chief of the Navy are now working at the USC. The raftsmen do not think about the fleet, but about the future sinecure in the USC, so they agree to ffffffseeeeee !!!
WWWW (lobbyist 20386 with NIO of the Navy) # 11.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX ... troubles with the integration of REV are now not into a smart mast, but into an ingenious superstructure.
Translating into normal Russian the “fig leaf” of “the integration of REV into a brilliant superstructure” (it was said with obvious “irony through clenched teeth”), we again come to “Zaslon” with its “innovative wunderwaffe” - IBMK MF-RLK.
And now for the latest serial 20380 (5).
Hulls of the corvettes "Strict" and "Mercury" at the Northern Shipyard (Curious, http://www.balancer.ru)Quote (link):
Bashkirhan # 11.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX Curious posted a photo of "Mercury" on the next branch, so its neighbor on the left is "Strict". When the "Strict" is at least put in the boathouse and the composite superstructure, which was delivered to the shipyard long ago, is installed on the hull, then you can start to rejoice.
Igor_FarEast # 11.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX Sadness is sad. With "Mercury" it is understandable, but why "Strict" with "Zealous" are fumbling? Especially Zealous. Almost ready. Long ago. ASZ "Aldara" has already passed and almost finished "Sharp". They have the same components.
WWWW # 11.06.2021. Are you sure? Now they are strange with REV (Zaslonovskaya mast). There seems to be as many ships as there are variants of this miracle!
Igor_FarEast # 11.06.2021/XNUMX/XNUMX Sadness is sad. With "Mercury" it is understandable, but why "Strict" with "Zealous" are fumbling? Especially Zealous. Almost ready. Long ago. ASZ "Aldara" has already passed and almost finished "Sharp". They have the same components.
WWWW # 11.06.2021. Are you sure? Now they are strange with REV (Zaslonovskaya mast). There seems to be as many ships as there are variants of this miracle!
It turns out "fun" (in quotes) - in fact, we have not only failures with 20386, state tests of "Thundering" and "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" (for more details - Leaky umbrella of the fleet. Technical analysis of the "Thundering" firing), but also just the ability to mass-produce this "miracle-Yudo" MF-RLK, to put it mildly - "under a very serious question" ...
And there can be only one conclusion from all this: this time the perpetrators (for deliberately undermining the combat capability of the Russian Navy and Armed Forces, including the failure to ensure the combat stability of the NSNF) must answer, and in full. At least posts.
Unfortunately, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation does not contain an article about deliberate sabotage and actions to undermine the country's defense capability, there is only "negligence". However, this is not "negligence"! What has been going on with us on the subject of corvettes since the mid-2000s is precisely the deliberate action to "use" huge budgetary funds by undermining the country's defense capability.
The specialists perfectly understood everything, reported to the management (that is, they knew everything perfectly) and even wrote on public resources:
AN 16.11.2006 (i.e. fifteen years ago):
Criticism of project 20380 ... nobody cares, but how, in fact, these, no doubt, excellent missiles will fly in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from "Fourke" ... So to speak, according to the "fire and forget" scheme. About what!! About the goal? Or about a rocket? .. The developers of the air defense missile system diligently bypass all sharp corners, such as: how will your missile defense system see the target in case of target designation errors in the region of 1 degree? The answer is to see, ... and so on.
Criticism of project 20380 ... nobody cares, but how, in fact, these, no doubt, excellent missiles will fly in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from "Fourke" ... So to speak, according to the "fire and forget" scheme. About what!! About the goal? Or about a rocket? .. The developers of the air defense missile system diligently bypass all sharp corners, such as: how will your missile defense system see the target in case of target designation errors in the region of 1 degree? The answer is to see, ... and so on.
Well, the last "cherry on the cake."
As it was officially announced, the construction of new corvettes was an order of the President of the Russian Federation. Despite the conclusion of state contracts on them (to report - to the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation), their laying has not been made so far (due to the "pitfalls" and "mines" of the project, which the author and A. Timokhin wrote about, and first of all - the Ministry of Finance -RLK "Zaslon").
In fact, we have a clear, obvious and public sabotage of the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation and issues of the country's defense capability. And here the question already arises - does the “vertical of power” generally work in our country? Where are those who are obliged to "watch"? Or are they "shoelaces considering"? While all this is going on (and heading for a new Tsushima)?
What they are now trying to do with 20386 with his transfer to an experimental vessel is a direct attempt by the accomplices of everything that happened to him - to evade responsibility.
There is a state contract for the creation of the ship, and if you please show the result.
No result (in the form of a warship capable of actually solving tasks as intended)? And what was the money spent on?
But, it turns out, the specialists knew all the viciousness of this project and scam at once, and they reported?
Then, excuse me, there are very specific questions to very specific officials. In the plane of the "relevant code". And they are obliged to bear the corresponding responsibility. There are, excuse me, structures that are obliged to “keep vigil” (and simply “objectively report to the top”, including to the “first person” about the real situation).
As for the "Daring Mercury" - the fleet has a critical situation with the ship's personnel. Accordingly, “to forgive sins” and write off “on the mouse” a potential warship would be a mistake worse than a crime.
Now the key problem of "Mercury" is the MF-RLC "Zaslon".
Accordingly, the solution is technically very simple, but organizationally - excruciatingly difficult (you must show adherence to the so-called "respected people"): throw the MF-RLK "Zaslon" off the ship (with replacement for serial and actually working REV).
After all the forgeries and failures of the "tests" of the "Barrier" on the "Thundering" and "Aldar Tsydenzhapov", there is every reason for this.
Yes, the 20386 series is not needed (because it crosses the road of the 22350 series, and it is the project 22350 frigate that needs to be forced as much as possible in the series). But with the replacement of the MF-RLK with actually working REV - "Mercury" will be in the ranks of the Navy. And he will find a job.
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