Units of a new type and new equipment. Prospects for the development of the Airborne Forces

The airborne forces of Russia have a high combat potential, and it is planned to increase it. To solve such problems, a set of various measures has been proposed and implemented. It provides for noticeable changes in the organizational and staff structure of the troops with the creation of units of a new type. In addition, it is necessary to continue the current rearmament processes, as well as introduce new products and samples into them.

State and prospects

Currently, under the control of the command of the Airborne Forces, two airborne assault (three-regiment composition) and two airborne (with two regiments each) divisions, three separate airborne assault brigades, as well as units of special purpose, support, etc. are serving. Also, the troops have several educational institutions of their own.

In recent years, several programs and projects have been successfully completed aimed at restoring and building up the combat capability of the Airborne Forces. As a result of such events, the landing troops actually became the backbone of the Russian rapid reaction forces. In the foreseeable and distant future, such a potential of the Airborne Forces should grow.

The modernization of the Airborne Forces is carried out as part of a long-term program covering various areas. The current update processes were launched several years ago and so far have only yielded limited results. At the same time, certain decisions are regularly made that directly affect the further development of the troops. The next steps of this kind have taken place in the recent past and are expected in the near future.

According to the results of all the transformations and reforms, the Airborne Forces should become a highly mobile branch of the armed forces, capable of starting to perform assigned tasks in the specified area in the shortest possible time. It is planned to preserve all the basic capabilities already available to the troops, as well as to ensure the development of new tactics and skills.

Units of a new look

Back in 2017, there were reports in the domestic media about the imminent creation of units of a new type, designed to expand the capabilities of the Airborne Forces. One of the battalions of the 31st Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (Ulyanovsk) was re-equipped and re-equipped in accordance with new ideas. He underwent the necessary training, after which he took part in the Vostok-2018 exercises and in a number of other events. The maneuvers showed the advantages of the updated battalion, and also identified the weak points of the concept.

The unit of the new type differs significantly from the airborne assault and paratroopers provided for by the current structure of the Airborne Forces. Such a battalion is deprived of armored personnel carriers and airborne combat vehicles. At the same time, its number is increasing and its firepower is increasing: due to large-caliber machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, anti-tank complexes, etc.

The airmobile unit must work in conjunction with the army aviation... It is the helicopters that are responsible for the rapid transfer of the assault force to a given area, and must also support it from the air. It is proposed to create airmobile medical units.

In the course of exercises in recent years, an experimental "new type" battalion from the 31st brigade has shown itself well and confirmed the need for widespread introduction of new ideas. As is now known, a similar decision has been made and plans have been drawn up for real steps in this direction.

At the end of last year, the commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Andrei Serdyukov, said that airborne assault formations of a new type would be created as part of the troops. A little later it became known that airmobile battalions would appear in all airborne assault regiments and brigades. The necessary transformations will be completed by the beginning of next year.

Helicopter landing

The appearance of the "new type" units has been determined taking into account the new method of use. Depending on the assigned tasks and other factors, they will be able to arrive at the battle site on their ground vehicles or helicopters. In the latter case, new organizational issues arise, on the successful solution of which new capabilities of the Airborne Forces depend.

Back in 2019, it was reported that the airborne troops may have their own aviation units. Domestic media wrote about the possible formation of a helicopter brigade, the task of which will be precisely the transfer of airmobile battalions. In addition, the possibility of joint work with army aviation was considered, incl. with the transfer of helicopter squadrons under the control of the Airborne Forces.

Until now, the issue of creating airborne units of the Airborne Forces has not been fully resolved. The helicopter brigade has not yet been created, and army aviation from the Aerospace Forces continues to carry the paratroopers. Whether such a system will be retained is unclear. The appearance of its own aviation in the Airborne Forces will give obvious advantages, however, the current approach is in line with the tasks set. This has been repeatedly confirmed in recent exercises.

Rearmament issues

The supply of military, automotive and special equipment to the Airborne Forces continues, as well as various weapons. So, last year, approx. 300 modern armored vehicles of various types, as well as over 100 vehicles. Due to this, the share of modern technology is gradually increasing, which has a positive effect on combat effectiveness.

More samples are expected. In the near future, the procedures related to the adoption of the Typhoon-VDV armored vehicles should be completed. An unknown amount of such equipment will be ordered to re-equip new airmobile connections. It was reported that, first of all, armored vehicles with a combat module equipped with a 30-mm cannon will be purchased. Then the troops will get self-propelled anti-tank systems at the same base.

Also in the near future it is expected to start production and deliveries of promising self-propelled anti-tank guns "Sprut-SDM1". This technique has already been tested and received a recommendation for adoption. The main features of these self-propelled guns allow for mass production and full-scale rearmament.

Particular attention is paid to the means of landing. Mass deliveries of new D-10 and Arbalet-2 parachute systems have begun. Several new systems for dropping equipment and cargo have been accepted for supply or are being prepared for this. In parallel, a number of samples of the next generation are being developed with various new capabilities.

In the process of development

The development and re-equipment of the armed forces in general and the airborne forces in particular must be continuous and planned. The results of this approach, used in recent years, can be seen already now, and in the future, the positive consequences of the current measures and decisions will appear.

To date, the optimal shape of the Airborne Forces in terms of numbers, equipment and combat capabilities has been determined. Now the army and the defense industry are jointly implementing such plans. At the same time, noticeable changes are being made to the troop development program, such as units of a "new type" with their own characteristic requirements.

It should be expected that the current plans to improve the organizational and staff structure of the airborne troops will be successfully implemented. Also, there is hardly any reason to doubt the prospects of the current rearmament programs. As a result, in the short or medium term, the Airborne Forces will receive new capabilities and become a more powerful and flexible tool in the armed forces.

Comments

[andrewkor]

Airmobile troops, are they following the example of the Americans in Vietnam?
Rocked for a long time, more than 40 years. Even in Ukraine, they quickly penetrated!

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: andrewkor

Even in Ukraine, they quickly penetrated!

VnaU has implemented a lot of things, especially in commercials and presentations, even almost entered NATO, in wet dreams.

[Civil]

I never understood this bias towards the Airborne Forces.

[Old tanker]

And they need to be created in the ground forces, not in the Airborne Forces.

[Lara Croft]

Quote: Old Tanker

And they need to be created in the ground forces, not in the Airborne Forces.

Definitely. As an airmobile reserve for the commanders of the OA and / or USC (VO) ....
Yes, and at remote military bases of the Russian Federation abroad, they would be useful, for example: a company (battalion) ...

[S. Smirnov]

Quote: Lara Croft

Quote: Old Tanker
And they need to be created in the ground forces, not in the Airborne Forces.

Definitely. As an airmobile reserve for the commanders of the OA and / or USC (VO).

Then it is more logical to have them both in the ground forces and in the airborne forces.

[dauria]

And they need to be created in the ground forces, not in the Airborne Forces.

So the army aviation was at the ground. Subordinate to the army headquarters. Including bombers with attack aircraft. At the level of a motorized rifle division, there is a separate helicopter squadron under the operational subordination of the division commander. Usually mixed. Half 24 and 8. There were no airborne forces nearby. And they parachuted ordinary "red-runners". It was competent - it was a real infantry with real support of all means of the division under operational control. Where did it all go?

[Eug]

I have two comrades - a classmate and a "one-rider" a year older - were "red-runners

[Eug]

Yesterday I cut off something, without finishing, I continue - "red-runners" with landing emblems in their buttonholes, when asked about the place of service, both answered - DShB.

[ccsr]

Quote: dauria

So the army aviation was at the ground. Subordinate at the level of the army headquarters. Including bombers with attack aircraft.

The ground troops in the districts had an army aviation department, and as far as I understand, it was it that set the tasks, i.e. there was double subordination for the armies, as was the case with the 16th VA in the GSVG. She did not obey the command of the army aviation of the group headquarters, and she was led by the General Staff of the Air Force, as far as I remember, although something may have been forgotten.

Quote: dauria

At the level of a motorized rifle division, there is a separate helicopter squadron under the operational subordination of the division commander.

These squadrons were not on the staff of the division, and the operational subordination, unfortunately, does not provide the coherence that would be available if the division commander was responsible for it as a regular unit. For good reason, it is generally necessary to introduce helicopter regiments into the composition of ground divisions, and then many problems of training and interaction will be removed.

Quote: dauria

Where did it all go?

Now it is difficult to understand where everything is going, since the question arose of creating its own aviation in the Airborne Forces, and in general how the fate of the airborne troops themselves in the future will be decided, because much has changed in the army, including its number in the first place.

[dauria]

These squadrons were not on the staff of the division, and the operational subordination, unfortunately, does not provide the coherence that would be available if the division commander was responsible for it as a regular unit.

And thank God that only operational ... One devil is that they have anxiety, and we must, as if we lacked our own. Yes, and they tried to spread their order on us .. It's funny - you see, they need to see the shoulder straps. And what are the shoulder straps in a jumpsuit or jacket? And about the division's staff - this is too scattering of forces turns out. The division's tasks are too small in a real massacre, not like those of the army or the front (districts in peacetime). More often, a massive use of aviation is needed.
By the way, GKChPist Yazov was a divisional commander in that MSD in Dauria, to which our OVE was attached ... I did not find it, but the old people remembered good ... I was sensible.

[ccsr]

Quote: dauria

And what about the division's staff - it turns out to be too scattering of forces. The division's tasks are too small in a real massacre, not like those of the army or the front (districts in peacetime).

American experience just says that the introduction of attack and auxiliary helicopters into the divisions, on the contrary, increased the combat power of the formation. Well, how do you imagine a tank division without helicopter cover on the march? And in battle, attack helicopters can generally decide the outcome of a clash, even with less participation of armored vehicles and, accordingly, with less losses. I am not even talking about the speed of troop transfer and maneuvering.

Quote: dauria

Yes, and they tried to spread their order on us .. It's funny - you see, they need to see the shoulder straps.

I understand that, due to their mentality, helicopter pilots will always be against it, and I understand that. But we must look to the future and see that the number of divisions has been drastically reduced, which means that the power of the formation must be increased, and primarily through operational-tactical nuclear weapons and attack helicopters. We simply have no other alternative, given the size of our territory.

Quote: dauria

By the way, GKChPist Yazov was the division commander in that MSD in Dauria, to which our OVE was attached

I know too well how the assigned unit differs from the regular one - I served in the army for more than one year, and I know this problem. That is why I think it is time to change the very structure of divisions, and combined-arms commanders need to learn to understand what helicopters are and how to lead them in battles or during operations. This will benefit our army.

[dauria]

American experience just says that the introduction of attack and auxiliary helicopters into the divisions, on the contrary, increased the combat power of the formation.

I agree only in local conflicts of low intensity. There, a division is a force. Yes, and performs something like a police-occupation function to keep the neighborhood.
But we have forgotten something about the war in the European theater of operations. Or God forbid the Chinese. There is a division, but what is there - the combined arms army will be an instrument for a week. Not at all independent, but according to the general concept, not even of a front, but of a group of fronts .. And even in the Soviet Union we didn’t have enough helicopters, you won’t be spoiled for scattering. And now there is no need to speak.
Yes, and from the experience of leadership of aviation in the same Patriotic War, on the contrary, from the very 41st they realized that it was necessary to re-subordinate aviation, take command of it from the infantry, even at the front level, to larger ones. Although, their dog knows what kind of war our big-headed bosses are preparing for. Look, they are directly praying to the Airborne Forces ...

[ccsr]

Quote: dauria

I agree only in local conflicts of low intensity. There, a division is a force. Yes, and performs something like a police-occupation function to keep the neighborhood.

Yes, the fact of the matter is that after Syria, it turns out that this is exactly what awaits us in the future.

Quote: dauria

But we have forgotten something about the war in the European theater of operations. Or God forbid the Chinese. There is a division, but what is there - the combined arms army will be an instrument for a week.

Everything will end faster - some will survive, but most are unlikely. So there will be no one to command, and they won't even remember about front-line operations.

Quote: dauria

Look, they are directly praying to the Airborne Forces ...

We have a president and top military leadership in the person of the Minister of Defense, civilians - so they are bought for show, and those who understand something in military affairs, unfortunately, do not influence their worldview. That is why some "reforms" are surprising among professionals.

[Nubia2]

You can simply give the airborne units to the ground forces.
Howl the truth will be a lot.

[Momotomba]

I never understood why it was impossible to take the Omsb, remove all armor from it, add a squadron of flying aircraft to the squadron and call it all a separate airmobile battalion ... Develop the appropriate tactics of use, of course.

[Old tanker]

It was once planned that way. For this, and the "flying BMP" Mi-24 was created. But something did not grow together.

[Momotomba]

As usual, we embody a good idea in our way, like a monkey ...
But it may be correct that experiments are being carried out on the Airborne Forces ... The expediency of throwing them on the enemy's heads from aircraft is highly questionable. And the hand does not rise to make ordinary motorized riflemen out of them.

[Vladimir_2U]

procedures related to the adoption of armored vehicles "Typhoon-VDV". An unknown amount of such equipment will be ordered to re-equip new airmobile connections.

I definitely do not understand the need for such a technique for the Airborne Forces, the cross-country ability, which means the mobility, is fundamentally lower than the tracked one. Protection also raises doubts in comparison with low-silhouette BMD-BTR-D. Can someone explain.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

As they say now, easy! The legendary GAZ-66 was in many respects worse than the Typhoon-VDV. The 66th was inferior both in terms of security and as a tractor. And the protection just raises doubts about the BMD, that's where the weak hull, armor and low protection against explosions. The advantages of the modern BMD-4 include high firepower, but not protection.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

As they say now, easy! The legendary GAZ-66 was in many respects worse than the Typhoon-VDV. The 66th was inferior both in terms of security and as a tractor.

Those. in your opinion typhoon is a replacement for shishige? Well, let's say, let it be a heavily armed truck with dubious cross-country ability and carrying capacity, but why would it serve as a replacement for BMD? Now, in terms of cross-country ability, which means the mobility of the BMD is a cut above a two-axle overweight machine with a huge silhouette, no corners of armor and a window half the forehead.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

By no means is it a replacement for the BMD, a good and armored tractor, first of all, like a multipurpose vehicle. And even in this capacity, his armor and resistance to explosions are higher.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

a good and armored tractor, first of all, like a multipurpose vehicle.

Although yes, modern trends to book everything and everything, and trucks, including the Airborne Forces, also did not pass by, I agree. but about the passability is still debatable, the weight of the shishiga and the typhoon are incomparable.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Shishiga is a defective tractor, it could not cope with the D-30 howitzer, and no matter what its cross-country ability. The Typhoon will handle it like an artillery tractor without question, no matter how much you want to challenge it. And patrolling and escorting are still assigned to the Airborne Forces, and it is better to do this under armor than without it.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

And patrolling and escorting are still assigned to the Airborne Forces, and it is better to do this under armor than without it.

In general, "Typhoon" shows that the Airborne Forces make a plug in all the holes. However, the T-72 is also an indicator.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Take a look at your leisure, unfortunately I can't give you a link, a semi-documentary film about the war on the part of Afghan dushmans. There is a very tragic, but memorable footage of the attack on a convoy, where two of our servicemen leave the GAZ-66 and surrender. After viewing, there will be fewer questions about the need to book a car. It is unlikely that they would have surrendered so easily, sitting in an armored Typhoon. And if there was also a combat module in the Typhoon, then, having lost mobility, they would have crumbled the entire spiritual ambush into cabbage.
This, of course, is more of a general comment and wish, but there should not be technology similar to the GAZ-66, especially in the Airborne Forces, everything is under armor, and it does not matter if it is an artillery tractor or an escort vehicle.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

This, of course, is more of a general comment and wish, but there should not be technology similar to the GAZ-66, especially in the Airborne Forces, everything is under armor, and it does not matter if it is an artillery tractor or an escort vehicle.

In general, I agree that it is better with armor than without armor, but what about, for example, quadras and buggies, buses and just trucks, a field kitchen, for example? So there is a place for conventional shishige in the army. But specifically the two-axle Typhoon, both as a truck and as a tractor, is doubtful, it has a maximum place on the dirt road.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Specifically, the two-axle Typhoon for landing, the Mi-26 helicopter and for escorting, so that half-blind four-axle armored personnel carriers do not drive, do not chew the motor resource.

[psiho117]

It turns out interestingly: we, in the end, are moving towards the idea of ​​the Airmobile Troops, wanting to get an expeditionary force at the exit, like the US Mareen Corp.
At the same time, the Americans, on the contrary, are reforming their marinade into the classic marines.

How funny everything spun

[Old tanker]

Airmobile troops are good at low intensity conflicts. In a conflict with an equal enemy, the possibility of their use is sharply reduced due to the saturation of the sides with air defense systems. So a transfer by helicopters is possible only on its own territory as a mobile reserve for "patching holes" or rapidly building up efforts.

[ammunition]

Quote: Old Tankman

In a conflict with an equal enemy, the possibility of their use is sharply reduced due to the saturation of the parties with air defense systems.

And not only. About 6 years ago, a similar question was already raised at VO -
https://topwar.ru/85594-kak-perevooruzhit-vdv-.html

[Boris55]

Quote: Old Tankman

So a transfer by helicopters is possible only on its territory as a mobile reserve

The facts contradict your conclusions.

[Old tanker]

What are the facts? Have you ever carried out a calculation of forces and means to provide tactical airborne assault with helicopters? Can you at least name the conditions for holding it?

[chenia]

Quote: Old Tankman

Airmobile troops are good at low intensity conflicts

And this is 99% of conflicts. I don’t remember anything (66 years old, and I was not in the Second World War)) when we participated in a global conflict. But Prague, Kabul, Pristina. Naturally, in a serious conflict, the Airborne Forces must be turned into motorized riflemen (which, in essence, is supposed to be).

[Boris55]

Quote: chenia

Airborne forces must be turned into motorized riflemen

You've heard the expression: "Winged infantry"? So, no one should be turned into anyone. "The paratrooper is only five minutes an eagle, and the rest is a motorized rifleman."

[chenia]

Quote: Boris55

You've heard the expression: "Winged infantry"?

This is what I heard, But the armament of the Airborne Forces is not the armament of the non-winged infantry. And wingless infantry is more powerful than winged infantry. The task of the Airborne Forces (and this is in a serious conflict) will fall on the head of the enemy (and here's how it will turn out), which has a guard outpost, and not an echeloned defense, brazenly chopping up half-asleep and awkward enemy soldiers with shoulder blades. And then hold the area until the main forces approach.
Let's be honest, this rarely works with a strong opponent.

[Boris55]

Quote: chenia

armament of the airborne forces, this is not the armament of non-winged infantry

Everyone has their own stars. The Airborne Forces is primarily a headquarters reserve that solves specific tasks and, first of all, the elimination of command centers behind enemy lines, disorganization of enemy troops and their supply services, destruction of both material and manpower behind enemy lines.

Quote: chenia

Let's be honest, this rarely works with a strong opponent.

In Syria, 60 Kaolitian countries led by the United States could not cope with ISIS, and we, together with the Syrians, could easily. There was no Airborne Forces, there were MTR and VKS of Russia.
Once again, everyone has their own tasks.

ps
There is no need to repeat the "feat" of the Poles when they attacked our tanks on horseback with sabers.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Boris55

There is no need to repeat the "feat" of the Poles when they attacked our tanks on horseback with sabers.

Whose is "your"? With white Balkankreuz?

[psiho117]

Quote: Boris55

In Syria, 60 countries of the coalition led by the USA could not cope with ISIS

Let's just say - they didn't really want to cope with it - NATO members don't care about Syria and ISIS, but for the Americans, terrorists are a lovingly nurtured tool that they don't want to part with until the very end.

"feat" of the Poles when they attacked our tanks on horseback with sabers

This is a myth, it was not like that.
They cut the little people with sabers, and the tanks were shot through the viewing slots, they put grenades into the barrel, chassis and open hatches.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Boris55

The Airborne Forces is primarily a headquarters reserve that solves specific tasks and, first of all, the elimination of command centers behind enemy lines, disorganization of enemy troops and their supply services, destruction of both material and manpower behind enemy lines.

Yeah ... and the Airborne Forces have been preparing for these tasks for 70 years. And the situation requiring their solution never comes.
And at the same time, the Airborne Forces are constantly being used as highly mobile elite infantry - to reinforce conventional motorized riflemen. And at the same time, landing just as regularly suffers from a lack of firepower and protection. And she also regularly receives reinforcements from the very motorized riflemen, whom she theoretically should have strengthened, but in fact - weakened. .
The classic use of the Airborne Forces in a more or less serious conflict is Afghanistan. Remember how it ended for 345 pdp? That's right - already in 1982, the regiment began to be transferred to states and military equipment close to the army, transferring paratroopers to conventional armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles and dramatically increasing artillery.

[Normal]

Quote: Boris55

The Airborne Forces is primarily a headquarters reserve that solves specific tasks and, first of all, the elimination of command centers behind enemy lines, disorganization of enemy troops and their supply services, destruction of both material and manpower behind enemy lines.

Clear. Have read.
"I, too, once had a chance to study the regulations, and there it is also not written anywhere that we are 10 vehicles, and so a tank battalion attacked head-on."
From the movie "In war as in war"
And now to the harsh truth of life.
Describe where and when in real airborne databases the airborne forces carried out these statutory tasks given by you.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Somehow you think very stereotypically, weren't these tasks the Airborne Forces solved when the troops entered Afghanistan in 1979? It was there, during the assault on Amin's palace, that the task of eliminating the control center was solved, completely behind enemy lines, like almost all the other tasks listed. Or you need one of the European capitals to be convincing and a war on a scale no less than World War II.

[garri-lin]

With a parity of forces, it will work with any opponent. The rear is always weak. And stretched out. A correct raid on the rear can leave the enemy without supplies and reserves. Or it will force to expose the front for neutralization.

[Normal]

Quote: Boris55

You've heard the expression: "Winged infantry"?

As usual Boris55 heard something, but does not know where that "ringing" is
Where did you serve? What do you understand in the Airborne Forces?

[Old tanker]

The fact is that our Airborne Forces are the reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. That is, they are designed to be transported over long distances. How to transfer helicopters to them? Waste their resource and precious time? In my opinion, it is more expedient to create airmobile brigades not in the structure of the Airborne Forces, but in the districts. In those areas where their use is most likely. And tie their place of deployment, as close as possible to the bases of army aviation.

[chenia]

Quote: Old Tankman

not in the structure of the Airborne Forces, but in the districts.

It was like this until the 90s. DShBr (DShB) subordinate to the districts, then reassigned the Airborne Forces. Yes, DShBr should operate in the tactical or nearby operational zone.

Quote: Boris55

there were

Quote: Boris55

Russian Aerospace Forces.

And the Iranians, they were cannon fodder.

Quote: Boris55

Everyone has their own stars. Airborne forces

Yes, I do not mind, and in theory they can work in the strategic rear of the enemy.
And in practice, and with a strong opponent?
But in critical, conflicting, but before the shot and decisive actions, they are very much needed.
I have already said a hundred times, the task is to occupy the clearing. And whose meadow is the picnic. And then diplomats will throw notes at each other. And it will be. And no one does not want a global conflict.

[Old tanker]

This was the case until the mid-10s. And then the airborne monster swallowed these district rabbits.

[OgnennyiKotik]

Quote: Old Tankman

In a conflict with an equal enemy, the possibility of their use is sharply reduced due to the saturation of the parties with air defense systems.

Air defense is not critical for helicopters. They fly at a height of a couple of tens of meters, at this height they can only be shot down at close range. The landing takes place at a distance from the front.
Fighters with AWACS are dangerous, but without gaining air superiority, combat operations are impossible.

[Old tanker]

Yes Yes. Tell this to the Afghan helicopter pilots.
The DShK and MANPADS were enough for them there. Even without Shilok and Tungusok, Strel-10 and their analogues.
For the front line, we still have to fly over. What is needed for this I can tell in a personal. If interesting. It's too long.
Well, at the expense of AWACS, they will light up the flight of the mass of helicopters from their height. And they will organize a meeting

[Per se.]

Quote: Old Tankman

due to the saturation of the sides with air defense

An "equal adversary" is not a monolithic bloc, it has weak points, its own geographic environment. It is unlikely that anyone will carry out a semblance of the capture of Crete by the Germans, without suppressing air defense.
With our Russian expanses, if it presses down, we may have to land on our own territory, just because otherwise there will be no time to transfer forces.

We desperately need the Airborne Forces, moreover, it would be possible to create on their basis a general command of all airborne units and special forces. In this, to unite the Marines with the Airborne Forces, where they have been mastering scuba gear and operations on the water surface for a long time, and the Marines are parachuting. Then, amphibious ships will be added to the military transport aviation, and the paratroopers themselves will become a force capable of quickly solving a much wider range of tasks in modern warfare, even more mobile than the wars of the past.

All the talk about the uselessness of the Airborne Forces, at best from misunderstanding, at worst, is ideological sabotage for the benefit of our sworn "partners" who have lagged far behind us in amphibious technology, training, tactics and strategy of such troops.

[Old tanker]

And no one talks about the uselessness of the Airborne Forces. Talk about how to use them in a modern war with an equal enemy.

[Per se.]

Sergei, who is to be understood as an "equal opponent"? Those who are not like the Afghan mujahideen and have all kinds of troops? Anyway, no one will be parachuting on the dome of the US Capitol.
To paraphrase, an equal enemy has a specific country and army ("name and surname"). The Airborne Forces already have different equipment for different tasks, parachute landing is only one of the methods of mobility. In addition, there is no escape from the competent interaction of all types of troops, including armored ones. Tanks were, and, presumably, will remain the main striking force of the ground forces, in a big war, in the defense of Russia. The Airborne Forces and the Marine Corps alone cannot win such serious wars.

[Old tanker]

An equal adversary is an adversary who has regular Armed Forces with a systematized organizational and staff structure. Units of all combat arms of which are staffed with modern military and military equipment, and have trained personnel and well-coordinated units.
A couple of names for example.
NATO, Japanese Armed Forces. And that's just the neighbors.

[Per se.]

Quote: Old Tankman

And that's just the neighbors.

This is not just about our neighbors, but in general, about airmobile connections, which are good not only in low-intensity conflicts. Leaving aside Vietnam, helicopter and airborne operations were actively used by the United States in their aggression against Iraq (where the army was far from weak).

So, for example, to increase the efforts of the airmobile brigade of the 101st Airborne Division, in the morning of February 28 (10 km west of Nasiriyah), an airborne assault force was parachuted with a force of up to two parachute battalions (about 1200 people) from the 82nd airborne
The landing was carried out in two stages: at the first stage, personnel were dropped, at the second, equipment and heavy weapons. The task of the landing was to capture the Al-Nasiriyah-Baghdad-Basra junction and by holding it to prevent the enemy from retreating on the road to Baghdad, and the approach of his reserves in the direction of Basra.
In the course of hostilities, combat helicopters based in the airborne brigade of the 101st airborne division were actively used.
Independent combat operations by air and airborne assault forces were conducted for about a day. This is just one episode.

Why, I say everything, it is impossible to unequivocally exclude the importance and necessity of landing, both by parachute landing and by airborne landing.
Which one will be in demand will depend on the circumstances. We have the best airborne forces, and they must at least be preserved, improved even better, as well as all our armed forces, including tank formations.

[ccsr]

Quote: Old Tankman

Airmobile troops are good at low intensity conflicts.

And we do not foresee others - either such conflicts, or the whole world in dust.

Quote: Old Tankman

In a conflict with an equal enemy, the possibility of their use is sharply reduced due to the saturation of the parties with air defense systems.

This is why the aerospace forces are needed, which in low-intensity conflicts will suppress all enemy air defenses so that helicopters can transfer airborne assault units.

Quote: Old Tankman

So a transfer by helicopters is possible only on its own territory as a mobile reserve for "patching holes" or quickly building up efforts.

I do not agree with this conclusion - the order of two helicopter carriers clearly indicates that the General Staff plans to use airmobile connections outside our territory, and it is precisely the helicopters that are being relied on.
As for the views of the author of the article:

Until now, the issue of creating airborne units of the Airborne Forces has not been fully resolved. The helicopter brigade has not yet been created, and army aviation from the Aerospace Forces continues to carry the paratroopers. Whether such a system will be retained is unclear. The appearance of its own aviation in the Airborne Forces will give obvious advantages, however, the current approach is in line with the tasks set. This has been repeatedly confirmed in recent exercises.

I fully agree that helicopter units should be part of the airborne divisions as separate regiments, and this is the future. I believe that the commander of an airmobile formation must be fully responsible for the condition and combat readiness of the helicopter units - there will be more order, and it will not otmazhitsya, blaming the failure of the task on the helicopter pilots, tk. he will be responsible for everything.
As for the helicopter brigade, I have doubts - as far as I know, the regimental structure of helicopter units is the most optimal for us, and if the author proves the advantages of the helicopter brigade, then his proposal can be discussed.

[Old tanker]

And we do not foresee others - either such conflicts, or the whole world in dust.

Unfortunately, this is far from the case.
And the doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons by us in a non-nuclear conflict says that only if there is a threat of the existence of the state and the people. So until the enemy takes Moscow, we will not unleash the nuclear apocalypse.
We will not incinerate Japan together with the entire globe for the attack on the Kuril Islands. You have to fight with the usual means.

[ccsr]

Quote: Old Tankman

So until the enemy takes Moscow, we will not unleash the nuclear apocalypse.

Let's unleash, even as - any massive takeoff of US strategic bombers can already be a reason for our strategic nuclear forces to strike their territory.

Quote: Old Tankman

We will not incinerate Japan together with the entire globe for the attack on the Kuril Islands.

They will not attack - they have little guts for this.

Quote: Old Tankman

You have to fight with the usual means.

With the Americans? I do not believe.

[Lara Croft]

Quote: psiho117

It turns out interestingly: we, in the end, are moving towards the idea of ​​the Airmobile Troops, wanting to get an expeditionary force at the exit, like the US Mareen Corp.

Rather, an analogue of the American 101st Airborne Forces and the British 16th Airborne Forces.
For example, the standard AA Armor of the 101st Airborne Assault Division is capable of transferring 3 out of 9 aircrafts at a time in one flight ...
Senior comrades believe that the existing DShD / DShBr. The RF Airborne Forces are overloaded with equipment ... the development of a new Concept for the use of the Airborne Forces (new look) is apparently still on the way ... the main thing in the process of reforming the Airborne Forces is not to lose combat readiness ...
For example, the 31st DShBr. (Ulyanovsk) is the "fire brigade" of the CSTO countries in the Central Asian direction, will not its combat effectiveness be reduced by the experiments carried out on its basis to create airmobile units?

[OgnennyiKotik]

Not really. The Airborne Forces repeat the US Light Brigades. They have the most of them in the army: 13 brigades. Only vehicles (MRAP, SUVs, trucks, helicopters) are armed with equipment, a "light" tank in the future. There are no fundamental differences between infantry and airborne brigades.

11 tank brigades in the Army and 5 in the National Guard;
7 striker brigades in the Army and 2 in the National Guard;
5 light (infantry, 13 total) brigades in the Army and 20 in the National Guard.
5 airborne brigades;
3 airborne assault brigades.

[ccsr]

Quote: psiho117

It turns out interestingly: we, in the end, are moving towards the idea of ​​the Airmobile Troops, wanting to get an expeditionary force at the exit, like the US Mareen Corp.

Since we are building two helicopter carriers, and perhaps more will be ordered, then we are indeed following the American path.

Quote: psiho117

At the same time, the Americans, on the contrary, are reforming their marinade into the classic marines.

It is unlikely that our capabilities can be compared with the claims of the Americans for the whole world, and therefore we cannot fully focus on them, but we can take something from them.

Quote: psiho117

How funny everything spun

I think that the current strategists have a different look at the future of the fleet, hence such decisions, when instead of aircraft carriers they began to build helicopter carriers. How well thought out will be seen from the future "Syria".

[Sebastian]

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a36005513/us-marine-corps-historic-reinvention/

[hagen]

What is the article about? About nothing ... No new staff, no equipment. Moreover, there is not even an approximate vision of tasks and standards. Perhaps the article is intended for housewives. Hmmm ....

[Normal]

No technology, no mobility. Of course, the concept of BMD, as a parachute-dropped floating fire support vehicle, which is at the same time an armored personnel carrier for a squad, has not found wide application in reality, but this does not mean that it is necessary to make pure infantry from the Airborne Forces, without means of transportation. Armored vehicles? Well, I don’t know ... We don’t have classic MRAPs. Typhoon? May be. But for now, exactly what "can", and how this technique will show itself
in real databases it is not clear yet.
Airmobility? Do we have what to provide for it? Mi-8? The car is good, but it is 55 years old at lunchtime! The Mi-8 is huge, heavy, and noisy. There is no other massive helicopter.
In general, there are questions, but answers ...

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

In real combat, the GAZ-66 showed itself somehow not very well, so the Typhoon is a very good replacement for it.

[garri-lin]

You like to compare two completely different cars from two fundamentally different eras. They are related only by biaxiality.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

As they said before - a rotten excuse. Already by the beginning of the 80s, a 260 hp KAMAZ engine was available, which went to the BTR-80, armored glass was also known, which means that the creation of a car similar to the Typhoon was possible already in those years. But bulletproof vests were hung on the doors.

[garri-lin]

The typhoon, in the place where it is shoved, is not needed today. Erzats armored car. His destiny is PMCs and the rear, not the battlefield. And in 80, a car like the Typhoon was not created for a very simple reason. There was an armored personnel carrier 80.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

And what, the BTR-80 was hauling the D-30 howitzer? That is, you are, so to speak, an adherent of the disarmament of the Airborne Forces in terms of eliminating artillery. There are no self-propelled howitzers, and you also want to get rid of the towed artillery. We will continue to move on tilt trucks. A good strategy, with such experts you don't need enemies.

[garri-lin]

You are an adherent of razorozheniye advocating for admission to the troops of openly non-military equipment. The ideal tractor for the D 30 is the Ural. Actually, he was regular. And the BTR 80 did not refer to a tractor of guns, but to the vision in the USSR of what is now called an armored car.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Well, yes, of course, the tented Ural is the ultimate dream. Few of them burnt along the roads were left in Afghanistan, do you want to see a repetition by all means?

[garri-lin]

In that situation, the Typhoons would have stood in the same way. Less but would be worth. I'll tell you a secret. A properly organized ambush of the "Column bottom" type always achieves results. The possibilities are known. The goals are known. The rest is a matter of technology. Which is what Afghan demonstrated.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

So nice to see casualties even from small arms in defenseless trucks?
Are you talking about technology?

[garri-lin]

Is the Typhoon so heavily armored? 7,62 × 54 BB and 12,7 for the Typhoon, that for the Urals, that for Shishiga, that for the armored personnel carrier, will be equally effective. 5,45 here yes. The difference is joking. Only weapons are selected based on the protection of the target. With a machine gun, they will not climb onto a tank, but they will revolt what that tank can do. And the weapon that can strike the Typhoon is not rare. So he's a common target.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Really, it turns out that we have Typhoon without armor and better without armor under the tent? Where are the thoughts about vulnerability from 7,62, already more like an obsession?

[garri-lin]

5 class of protection. They say. Only it is not clear whether it is in the basic configuration or in the reinforced one. Because sometimes they say grade 3. Class 5 armor piercing 7,62 × 54 does not hold. In fact, the armor of the Typhoon is slightly better than that of the armored personnel carrier. The windows are huge. Equivalent weight. The axles are half as many. Replacing the sewn with soap. You can make a note to yourself for the future. Should the Typhoon fight, how to start whining about insufficient armor protection and questionable maneuverability. The shell, by the way, after minor modifications as a tractor for the D 30, is quite relevant.

[Normal]

Quote: Normal

GAZ-66 is an off-road truck.
Typhoon is an armored car.
Different eras, concepts of application and therefore functions.

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

The functions are exactly the same. Tractors for D-30 and carriers for artillery crew, one weak and without armor, the other powerful and armored.

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

And what, the BTR-80 was hauling the D-30 howitzer?

Did GA-66 carry the D-30?
It's not in vain that I asked about the 105th Fergana, you thought in the subject.
You are in vain comparing Gas-66 and Typhoon Airborne Forces. The Typhoon is not proposed to replace Shishige, but as a replacement for the BMD in the new airborne formation. Even if the Typhoon pulls the D-30, this is not its main function, but only one of its intended capabilities. In fact, the D-30 will carry (if it is at all in service with the airborne forces of the new formation) not the Typhoon, but the good old Ural.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Ural is not airborne, this is for your information and is not armored. Check out in the open press how the Caucasus-2020 exercise took place, where MI-26 delivered Typhoons with personnel, and MI-8 D-30 howitzers on an external sling. Which speaks about the use of Typhoon precisely as an artillery tractor.
And where does the information about the replacement of BMD with Typhoons come from? More like a fiction.
And where does such a passion for the use of unarmored vehicles come from, weren't the losses in the Afghan war of 11 thousand cars impressed enough?

[Normal]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

Ural is not dismantled, this is for your information

Thanks for the information. I, who served in the 104th Airborne Division, did not even know about it. How can I not guess about the "landing method" of landing.

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

And where does the information about the replacement of BMD with Typhoons come from?

Probably from here

The unit of the new type differs significantly from the airborne assault and paratroopers provided for by the current structure of the Airborne Forces. Such a battalion loses armored personnel carriers and airborne combat vehicles ..................................
It was reported that, first of all, armored vehicles with a combat module equipped with a 30-mm cannon will be purchased. Then the troops will get self-propelled anti-tank systems at the same base.

You see, we are discussing the article here, and not "concepts" are measured

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

MI-26 can only transport the Urals on an external sling, this is also a note.
And we are not talking about a complete rejection of BMD, but only about some units on armored vehicles. Although I admit I missed this point in the article.

[Normal]

Sergey Aleksandrovich.
ZakVo or TurkVo?

GAZ-66 is an off-road truck.
Typhoon is an armored car.
Different eras, concepts of application and therefore functions.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

TurkVO.
The functions are exactly the same. Tractors for the D-30 and carriers for the artillery crew, one weak and without armor, the other powerful and armored.

[Normal]

Quote: Sergey Alexandrovich

TurkVO.

Is it the 105th Fergana?

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

Didn't have a relationship. As I understand it, it was long before that.

[Sergey Aleksandrovich]

I did not know that the answer would be used as a provocation, henceforth I will be more careful with those who like to transport personnel in tilt trucks without armor.

[forcecom]

I risk making a big mistake, but in my opinion in the USSR Armed Forces there was a division of "snake and hedgehog" there were DShD and SDA as part of the Airborne Forces, which were deployed with the entire fleet of BMDs from "their" ILs that were part of the Airborne Forces and were DShBr (in principle, the same paratroopers), but part of the ground forces and subordinate to the commander of the districts. Just these DShBr were "lightened" due to the fact that only one battalion in their composition was planted on the BMD, the rest were transferred by trucks and the main method of landing these brigades was helicopter. Thus, the Airborne Forces solved operational strategic tasks in the theater of operations, and the "airborne troops" of the districts either engaged in tactical landings in close conjunction with the rest of the units, or played the role of a "fire brigade."
Experts, correct me if I am greatly mistaken.

[ccsr]

Quote: Forcecom

and there were DShBr (in principle, the same paratroopers), but part of the ground forces and subordinate to the commander of the districts.

There were also separate airborne assault battalions in each army, i.e. in the GSVG, for example, one more brigade was recruited, tk. there were five armies. There was also an SPN brigade, but it was subordinate to the chief of intelligence, i.e. went under a different category, as security.
Indeed, these brigades did not obey the command of the Airborne Forces and were more mobile due to the lack of many types of heavy equipment and weapons of the Airborne Forces, which made it possible to use them faster, without waiting for the arrival of the Airborne Forces units to this theater.
I believe that the need has long been ripe to move from too much centralization of the Airborne Forces, which has been preserved since Soviet times, and transfer all their formations directly to the districts, leaving the command of the Airborne Forces only to control, study, develop documents and manuals in order to bring these units as close as possible to those theaters on which they are planned to be used.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

There were also separate airborne assault battalions in each army

So they and for this link were created - "air echelon". But taking into account the organization of the BP. with certain specifics and provision of equipment for the landing, let them be in the Airborne Forces. And if necessary, you can reassign. It's like two artillery regiments in a division before the war. And not one, but the other, scattered by divisions on rifle regiments. Then it was difficult to organize a real BP in subunits (for artillerymen) in units of a different kind of troops.

[Eug]

As for me, airborne assault (airmobile) brigades as part of armies are the very thing. Everything else, "deeper" than army tasks - special forces. On the coastal areas - "Marine" DShB. As part of the border detachments - DShMG. Typhoon (the one that the Airborne Forces) is for the mobile companies of the military police. Something like this...

[Bogalex]

Also in the near future it is expected to start production and deliveries of promising self-propelled anti-tank guns "Sprut-SDM1". This technique has already been tested and received a recommendation for adoption.

Why do you think so?

[Dimax-nemo]

Everything is much easier to explain. We do not have the number of transport aircraft to carry as many as 5 airborne divisions with standard armored vehicles. BMD-1 and -2 will soon go on pins and needles, their deadlines have already expired. The BMD-4 is one and a half times heavier, at least, and it will not be possible to quickly equip all the airborne forces with them. This is where the helicopter landing without armor (the Mi-26 is almost a piece commodity, and no replacement is foreseen yet), which actually landed in the course of local conflicts, to put it mildly, more often than parachute ones.

[ccsr]

Quote: Dimax-Nemo

This is where the helicopter landings without armor (the Mi-26 are almost a piece commodity, and no replacement is foreseen yet), which actually landed in the course of local conflicts, to put it mildly, more often than parachute ones.

Indeed, it is mobility that has become the main reason that it will be necessary to abandon heavy equipment for the Airborne Forces, and their actions will increasingly resemble the actions of the district level DShBr.
Moreover, modern reconnaissance means, including UAVs, will allow the enemy to instantly reveal the location of heavy equipment and destroy it in their rear, which means that the meaning of its dropping is lost. That is why light weapons, including wearable ATGMs, recoilless guns, mortars and air defense systems in the future, will become the main type of weaponry for airborne units, if only because it will be easier for them to camouflage and such means are easier to transfer for reinforcement.

[Dimax-nemo]

I'm only afraid that when such a landing party meets with ordinary motorized infantry on wheeled armor, it will have a hard time. It's not so easy to outplay them due to their mobility, if they are not mountains, forests or swamps.

[ccsr]

Quote: Dimax-Nemo

I'm only afraid that when such a landing party meets with ordinary motorized infantry on wheeled armor, it will have a hard time.

The fact is that ground battles like the Great Patriotic War are no longer foreseen in our country, but the scenario of Syrian conflicts will apparently prevail in the future. So there is no point in making the landing force heavy with heavy equipment, especially if the enemy does not have line troops, and their actions are more reminiscent of partisan sorties.

[Dimax-nemo]

In addition to Syria and men in slippers, there were also Donbass and Karabakh, where MBT and other armored vehicles were quite used.

[ccsr]

Quote: Dimax-Nemo

and Karabakh, where MBT and other armored vehicles were quite used.

You probably missed the video of how the Turkish drones in service with Azerbaijan destroyed the Armenian armored vehicles - look, something can become clearer for you.

[Dimax-nemo]

And what, after that NATO began to remove tanks from service? The Armenians had such air defense and such electronic warfare that it became possible. And on flat terrain, and not in the mountains, everything could have been different in general.

[Igor Vorobyov]

The top photo at the parade of the USSR Airborne Forces

[Per se.]

Quote: Igor Vorobiev

at the parade of the USSR Airborne Forces

Look at the photo more closely, in the USSR the Airborne Forces did not wear blue tunics, this appeared after the Union, like the guard of honor company, the musicians did not have a "red breast", two-headed eagles on the flags of buglers.