Military Review

The beginning of the submarine war in the Baltic

37
Small submarine type "Malyutka" XII series
The small submarine M-35 is of the same type as the M-94, which was lost in the early days of the war. Submarines of the "Malyutka" type suffered especially tangible losses in the submarine war in the Baltic


The submarine war in the Baltic Sea began from the very first days of Hitler's invasion of the USSR. Even before the start of the war, several German submarines took up their initial positions on the approaches to the Soviet naval bases and at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. Their tasks were to block the actions of Soviet surface and submarine forces in designated areas by laying minefields on the approaches to bases and in gorges, as well as torpedo attacks on Soviet ships and vessels. The mines delivered by German submarines were mainly equipped with magnetic fuses, which turned out to be a very unexpected problem for the Soviet side, since the Baltic Fleet did not have a sufficient number of magnetic trawls. The torpedo attacks did not bring any particular success to the Germans, but two of them ended tragically for the Soviet ships.

At the beginning of the war, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had 65 submarines in its composition, but only 47 of them were ready to fight. The rest were under repair or in reserve. The submarines were divided into three brigades, of which the 1st and 2nd were part of the submarine detachment, and the 3rd remained training. The first brigade, under the command of Captain 1st Rank Nikolai Egypko, was based initially in the Baltic ports - in Liepaja, Ventspils and Ust-Dvinsk, and then in the area of ​​the Moonsund Islands with the main base in Triigi (Triga) Bay in the north of Saaremaa. The ships of the 1st brigade were to operate in the area south of parallel 56 ° 55 ', passing along the southern tip of the island of Gotland - Sundre Hoburgen. To the north of this line was the area of ​​operations of the 2nd brigade (captain of the second rank Alexander Oryol), based in Tallinn and Paldiski.

The ships of both brigades had the task of attacking warships and convoys of enemy ships in their areas of operation and transmitting reports on all movements fleet enemy. The fight against caravans was, of course, possible on the German routes of communication, which passed mainly off the eastern coast of Sweden, in the area of ​​the Aland Islands and in the waters of the southern Baltic between Memel and Kiel. Later, already during the war, the Germans organized new routes of communication along the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea, from Liepaja to Riga, and eventually extended to Tallinn and Helsinki. The tasks of destroying enemy ships, primarily battleships and cruisers, could be performed in their basing areas or off the Soviet coast, for example, during shelling of ports or ground forces. Therefore, the Soviet command deployed part of the submarine forces on German communications, and part in the ports of the Baltic States, mainly in Liepaja and Ventspils.

Underwater horseshoe Shch-307
Submarine Shch-307, which opened an account for enemy ships sunk in the Baltic Sea

On the whole, the deployment of the submarine forces went well. During the first two days of the war, Soviet submarines took up combat positions along the Soviet coast, and by June 25 along the coast of Sweden, in the area of ​​Bornholm Island and on the waters of the Danzig Bay. In addition, after Finland joined the war, two submarines from Kronstadt took up positions in the central part of the Gulf of Finland. In deploying these forces, the main danger came from mines placed by German ships and aircraft on the eve of the invasion. Already on June 23 in the Irbensky Strait, mines blew up M-80... This was the first loss of the submarine fleet and a serious alarm signal of mine danger, but it did not introduce any hindrances in the course of the deployment of the submarine forces.

Soviet submarines as a whole quickly took up their combat positions and began to carry out combat service, but they had to wait for a long time for success. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, the very first days of the war clearly showed that the choice of combat positions was far from being made in the best way. Off the coast of the Baltic, where the appearance of German battleships and cruisers was expected, the sea was empty. No large surface units appeared on these waters, but the depths were teeming with German submarines and the mines they placed. True, relatively small submarine forces were deployed in the coastal zone, but nevertheless they weakened the grouping operating on communications. There were too few forces left to conduct effective operations in the south of the Baltic, and the western Baltic was, in general, outside the zone of operations of the Soviet fleet. True, due to the relatively shallow depth, these waters were not very suitable for conducting submarine warfare, but sending at least some forces to the area between Bornholm, the island of Rügen and southern Sweden was possible and expedient, since most of the German sea routes were concentrated there. ...

Medium submarine
Medium submarine of the type C-11, lost in the Soel Strait

In addition, the first days of the war revealed many significant shortcomings in the organization of the submarine fleet and its operations. First of all, the submarines patrolling their combat sectors did not have sufficient information about the movements of the German caravans. The submarines themselves had to organize reconnaissance, relying on chance and often missing either convenient positions for an attack, or the very possibility of an attack. Although aerial reconnaissance was organized in the skies over the Baltic Sea, it was limited to coastal zones. And the Soviet scouts did not fly into the areas through which the German communications passed.

Special aerial reconnaissance in the interests of the submarine forces was generally absent as such, which negatively affected the results of their use against enemy shipping. Communication with the ships on the high seas worked absolutely badly. There were very few units equipped with equipment for receiving and transmitting radio signals in a submerged position. Radio messages, often containing important data on the movements of the German fleet, usually had to be transmitted at night, on the surface, while the batteries were being charged. But even at night, messages did not always reach their destination, since they were transmitted at a precisely defined time, and submarines could not always surface at that time.

Tactic


Further, from the first days of the war, shortcomings in the tactics of conducting submarine warfare appeared, which did not contribute to high performance. The submarines were assigned sectors, strictly limited by geographic coordinates, in which they had to stay awaiting the appearance of German ships. This was a purely passive tactic, inapplicable for waging a war on communications, which involves searching for enemy caravans and following them for a long time to choose a convenient position for an attack. Also vicious was the practice of using only single torpedoes for an attack - which followed from a misunderstanding of saving expensive weapons with its low probability of hitting the target. In addition, ships or ships did not always sink after a single torpedo, and repeating an attack was usually difficult or impossible due to the presence of escort ships.

Underwater minelayers
Underwater minelayers "Kalev" and "Lembit" were included in the Baltic Fleet when Estonia became part of the USSR

Most of the organizational and tactical mistakes and shortcomings manifested themselves in the very first weeks of the war. The commanders of submarines returning from missions talked and wrote about them, often proposing solutions to problems. Thanks to this, many shortcomings were eliminated already in July; the rest of the problems were solved as they were understood and the necessary information and funds were collected.

In July, the patrol system was changed and more forces were allocated for operations on enemy communications. Air reconnaissance was gradually improving in the interests of the submarine forces. The organization of communication with ships at sea has changed - now at night radio messages were transmitted repeatedly at regular intervals. The fleet demanded more communications. All these decisions were needed and were gradually implemented, but not only they influenced the effectiveness of the actions of Soviet submarines. There were also factors independent of the will of the Soviet command.

In the first weeks of the war, Soviet submarines did not have great opportunities to sink any significant number of ships or ships due to the fact that the German command had previously limited navigation on the most important Baltic routes, which, undoubtedly, was dictated by fears of the Soviet submarine forces. On the one hand, thanks to this, the German fleet did not suffer significant losses, but, on the other hand, the German economy suffered losses. The economic losses resulting from the reduction in freight traffic are difficult to calculate, but it seems that they should have been significant, insofar as before the war Sweden supplied Germany by sea up to 2 million tons of iron ore a month. So, paradoxically, by its very existence alone, the Soviet submarine fleet achieved significant success in the form of limiting these supplies.

Submarine "L-3"
Submarine L-3, the most productive in 1941.

But to restrict, of course, does not mean to completely interrupt. The German command could not afford this, but, using the experience of the battle for the Atlantic Ocean, from the first days of the attack on the USSR, organized a system of convoys in the Baltic. In the southern and eastern waters of the Baltic Sea, caravans were formed, mostly small, consisting of 2-3 ships, but with strong escorts. As a rule, a caravan escort consisted of 4–5 ships of different types, and ships with valuable cargo could be accompanied by 8–9 ships. And this despite the fact that in Atlantic convoys the proportions between the number of escort ships and transport ships were exactly opposite, because there one escort ship accounted for an average of 8 transport ships.

In the Baltic Sea, the Germans provided the caravans with not only very strong escort, but also cover from the air and from the coast. In addition, they made full use of the opportunity to conduct caravans in small coastal areas inaccessible to submarines. The Germans tried to pass the most dangerous sections of the route at night, the probability of detection by submarines was the lowest; off the coast of Sweden, the Germans repeatedly violated Swedish territorial waters, thus avoiding attacks from Soviet submarines. All this also negatively affected the effectiveness of the Soviet submarine forces.

It is worth mentioning another factor especially characteristic of Soviet submariners - their courage, self-sacrifice, discipline, skill and crew rallying. These qualities of Soviet sailors helped them force minefields, attack in difficult conditions, and often escape in critical situations. Alas, this was the downside of the lack of combat experience in most commanders and rank-and-file personnel. Experience had to be gained in the course of hostilities and often paid the highest price for it.

Cruising submarine
Cruising submarine K-3, capable of operating on long-range enemy communications

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Author:
Photos used:
http://prooruzhie.com/voennaya-tehnika/korabli-podvodnye-lodki/1115-vmf-sssr-podvodnye-lodki-malyutki.html, http://музеймаринеско.рф/istoriya-sozdaniya-i-boevoj-put-podvodnoj-lodki-shh-307-dizel-elektricheskaya-torpednaya-lodka-vremen-velikoj-otechestvennoj-vojny/nggallery/thumbnails, http://www.navy.su/navysub191745/c-9bis/index-photo.htm, http://музеймаринеско.рф/eksponaty-muzeya-dnevniki-komissara-l-3-dolmatova/, http://www.sovboat.ru/photo/k3_1.jpg
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  1. Xlor
    Xlor 3 June 2021 04: 26
    +10
    If minefields did not allow our submarines to enter the Baltic, then the fight against German convoys that transported iron ore and bearings from Sweden could be continued by aviation. But, alas, we didn't have one ...
    1. tihonmarine
      tihonmarine 3 June 2021 09: 10
      +6
      Quote: Xlor
      If minefields did not allow our submarines to enter the Baltic, then the fight against German convoys that transported iron ore and bearings from Sweden could be continued by aviation. But, alas, we didn't have one ...

      Torpedo aviation was in its infancy, as was the torpedo for torpedo bombers, there were no dive bombers (SB is not a dive bomber). And the fight against horizontal bombing of ships is not effective, plus fighter cover could not be carried out along the entire route.
      1. Niko
        Niko 3 June 2021 16: 31
        +3
        Topmast bombing has been used in the Mediterranean since 1941, so initiative and desire were needed.
        1. tihonmarine
          tihonmarine 3 June 2021 17: 33
          +5
          Quote: Niko
          Topmast bombing has been used in the Mediterranean since 1941, so initiative and desire were needed.

          The Germans were also not very good with naval aviation. After Goering crushed the Naval Aviation under the Luftwaffe, the naval pilots did not go over to his penates. Development was also delayed with a torpedo for aviation. In the end, only for the war at sea could only 26th and 30th Geshwader, armed with Non-111 and J-88, as bombers and torpedo bombers, their crews were trained in Italy.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 4 June 2021 10: 55
            +3
            Quote: tihonmarine
            The Germans were also not very good with naval aviation. After Goering crushed the Naval Aviation under the Luftwaffe, the naval pilots did not go over to his penates.

            Both sides were good there. Goering gave the naval reconnaissance squadrons, but was forced to take them back after it turned out that the fleet wanted aviation, but did not understand anything about it. In particular, the naval began to set tasks for pilots without taking into account the weather - for example, demanding a departure from an airfield closed to zero by fog.
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 June 2021 10: 52
        +5
        Quote: tihonmarine
        Torpedo aviation was in its infancy, as was the torpedo for torpedo bombers.

        The torpedo aircraft was just there. And there were torpedoes.
        The problem was different: with the beginning of the war, the Navy's air forces were used mostly over land, replacing the knocked out conventional air forces. And it cost the naval pilots very dearly.
        Black day of the KBF mine and torpedo aviation - June 30, 1941. Then, after raids on the crossings on the Western Dvina (without fighter cover), 21 vehicles remained in the regiment. And then the work at sea went on sporadically, and basically the regiment was used in the interests of the NWF and SZN. However, this is not surprising - after all, the KBF was directly subordinate to the army team from the SZN (not promptly, but directly).
    2. NF68
      NF68 4 June 2021 16: 08
      +1
      Quote: Xlor
      If minefields did not allow our submarines to enter the Baltic, then the fight against German convoys that transported iron ore and bearings from Sweden could be continued by aviation. But, alas, we didn't have one ...


      The Germans took into account the lessons of WWI when the Russian minefields created big problems for the German fleet. Therefore, the Germans and so quickly hurried in advance by setting up their mines.
  2. Richard
    Richard 3 June 2021 04: 38
    +11
    At the beginning of the war, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet had 65 submarines in its composition, but only 47 of them were ready to fight.

    Error. On June 22, 1941, the submarines of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet numbered not 65, but 69 units
    The submarines were divided into three brigades, of which the 1st and 2nd were part of the submarine detachment, and the 3rd remained a training

    Again, not exactly. Not the 3rd training brigade, but a training division with a scuba diving training squad
    Links:
    -Baltic Fleet in June 1941 (statistical collection) Appendix 4.2.
    -Baltic Fleet // Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945: encyclopedia / ed. M. M. Kozlova. - M.: Soviet Encyclopedia, 1985
    -Baltic Fleet in the Great Patriotic War // A - Bureau of Military Commissars / [under total. ed. A. A. Grechko]. - M.: Military publishing house of the USSR Defense Ministry, 1976. - (Soviet military encyclopedia: [in 8 volumes]; 1976-1980, vol. 1)
    1. SERGE ANT
      SERGE ANT 3 June 2021 05: 10
      +13
      You know, Dmitry, the data in various sources (which I read) differ - from 65 to 71 ..
      1. Richard
        Richard 3 June 2021 07: 11
        +9
        Submarines of the Baltic Fleet on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX
        1st submarine brigade
        (captain 1st rank Egypko Nikolay Pavlovich)
        1 Division (captain 3rd rank Tripolsky, Alexander Vladimirovich):
        1.С-1 (captain 3rd rank Morskoy Ivan Tikhonovich) (blown up in Libau during the retreat)
        2.C-3 (Lieutenant-Commander Nikolai Alexandrovich Kostromichev)
        3.C-4 (Lieutenant Commander Dmitry Sergeevich Abrosimov)
        4.С-5 (captain 3rd rank Bashchenko Alexander Arkadievich)
        5.C-6 (Lieutenant-Commander Vasily Fedorovich Kulbakin)
        6.С-7 (captain 3rd rank Lisin, Sergei Prokofievich)
        7.С-8 (captain 3rd rank Boyko Mikhail Semenovich (put on trial after 25.06.1941/55/XNUMX, after him was appointed Lieutenant Commander Ilya Yakovlevich Brown (commanding submarine L-XNUMX))
        8.S-9 (Lieutenant-Commander Sergei Anatolyevich Rogachevsky)
        The floating base of the 1st division of the 1st brigade "Smolny"
        2 Division (captain 3rd rank Chervinsky Vladimir Alexandrovich)
        9.S-10 (captain 3rd rank Boris Konstantinovich Bakunin)
        10.C-101 3rd rank captain Vekke Viktor Kuzmich)
        11.C-102 (Lieutenant-Commander Boris Ivanov)
        The floating base of the 2nd division of the 1st brigade "Irtysh"
        3 Division (Captain 3rd Rank Anatoly Kuzmich Averochkin):
        12.L-3 (captain 3rd rank Petr Denisovich Grishchenko)
        13. "Kalev" (Lieutenant-Commander Boris Alekseevich Nyrov)
        14. "Lembit" (Lieutenant-Commander Vladimir Antonovich Poleshchuk)
        15. "Ronis" (Lieutenant-Commander Madisson Alexander Ivanovich) (blown up in Libau during the retreat)
        16. "Spidola" (senior lieutenant Boytsov Vyacheslav Ivanovich) (blown up in Libau during the retreat)
        4 Division (Lieutenant-Commander Stepan Ionovich Matveev)
        M-71 (Lieutenant-Commander Lev Nikolaevich Kostylev) (blown up in Libau during the retreat)
        17.M-77 (senior lieutenant Khlyupin Nikolay Alekseevich)
        18.M-78 (senior lieutenant Shevchenko Dmitry Leontievich)
        19.M-79 (senior lieutenant Avtomonov Ivan Vasilievich)
        20.M-80 (Lieutenant-Commander Fedor Alexandrovich Mochalov) (blown up in Libau during the retreat)
        21.M-81 (Lieutenant-Commander Fyodor Antonovich Zubkov)
        22.M-83 (senior lieutenant Shalaev Pavel Mikhailovich) (blown up in Libau during the retreat)
        2st submarine brigade
        (captain 2nd rank Orel Alexander Evstafievich)
        6 Division (captain 2nd rank Fedotov Mikhail Vasilievich):
        23.Shch-309 (captain 3rd rank Kabo Isaak Solomonovich)
        24.Shch-310 (Lieutenant Commander Dmitry Klimentyevich Yaroshevich)
        25. Shch-311 (Lieutenant-Commander Fyodor Grigorievich Vershinin)
        7 Division (captain 3rd rank Egorov Vladimir Alekseevich):
        26.Shch-317 (captain 3rd rank Andronov Alexey Gerasimovich)
        27. Shch-318 (Lieutenant-Commander Vladimir Konstantinovich Afanasyev)
        28. Shch-319 (Lieutenant-Commander Agashin Nikolay Sidorovich)
        29. Shch-320 (Lieutenant Commander Vishnevsky Ivan Makarovich)
        30.SCH-322 (Lieutenant-Commander Ermilov Viktor Andreevich)
        31.Shch-323 (Lieutenant Commander Fedor Ivanovich Ivantsov)
        32.Shch-324 (Lieutenant-Commander Georgy Ioramovich Tarkhnishvili)
        8 Division (captain 3rd rank Yunakov Yevgeny Gavrilovich):
        33.M-90 (senior lieutenant Tatarinov Ivan Mikhailovich)
        34.M-94 (senior lieutenant Dyakov Nikolay Vasilievich)
        35.M-95 (senior lieutenant Fedorov Leonid Petrovich)
        36.M-96 (Lieutenant Commander Marinesko, Alexander Ivanovich)
        37.M-97 (Lieutenant Commander Dyakov Nikolay Vasilievich)
        38.M-98 (Lieutenant Commander Ivan Ivanovich Bezzubikov)
        39.M-99 (senior lieutenant Popov Boris Mikhailovich)
        40.M-102 (senior lieutenant Gladilin Petr Vasilievich)
        41.M-103 (Lieutenant-Commander Vadim Dmitrievich Nechkin)
        The floating bases "Oka" (Type "Kama"), "Polyarnaya Zvezda", "Amur".
        scuba training squad
        (Rear Admiral Zaostrovtsev, Alexey Timofeevich)
        9 Division (Lieutenant-Commander Nikolai Konstantinovich Mokhov):
        42.M-72 (senior lieutenant Kulygin Nikolay Nikolaevich) (on 22.06.1941 under repair)
        43.M-73 (senior lieutenant Kalanin Viktor Petrovich) (on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX under repair)
        44.M-74 (senior lieutenant Sazonov Dmitry Mikhailovich) (on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX under repair)
        45.M-75 (senior lieutenant Tarasov Pavel Stepanovich) (on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX under repair)
        46.M-76 (Lieutenant Zhavoronkov Georgy Alexandrovich) (on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX under repair)
        13th division:
        47.SCH-303 (captain 3rd rank Ivan Vasilievich Travkin)
        48. Shch-304 (captain 3rd rank Afanasiev Yakov Pavlovich)
        49.K-3 (captain 3rd rank Malofeev Kuzma Ivanovich)
        50.K-21 (Lieutenant Commander Zhukov V.N.) (from 8.06.1941 makes the transition to the Northern Fleet through the White Sea-Baltic Canal)
        51.K-22 (captain 2nd rank Viktor Kotelnikov)
        14th division:
        52.K-23 (captain 3rd rank Potapov Leonid Stepanovich)
        53.L-1 "Leninets" (captain 3rd rank Mogilevsky Sergei Sergeevich)
        54. L-2 "Stalinets" (Lieutenant-Commander Alexander Petrovich Chebanov)
        55.S-11 (Lieutenant-Commander Anatoly Mikhailovich Sereda) (included in the KBF 30.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX)
        56.S-12 (Lieutenant-Commander Vasily Adrianovich Turaev) (included in the KBF on 30.08.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX)
        57.S-13 (senior lieutenant Malanchenko Petr Petrovich) (11.07.1941 began the transition to the Baltic Sea along the Mariinsky water system, was included in the KBF on 30.08.1941)
        separate training submarine division (captain 2nd rank Eichbaum Nikolay Eduardovich):
        58.P-1 "Pravda" (Lieutenant Loginov Ivan Andreevich)
        59.P-2 "Zvezda" (Lieutenant-Commander Ivan Petrovich Popov)
        60.P-3 "Iskra" (Lieutenant Commander Alexey Nikolaevich Panteleev)
        61. M-401 (serial number С.135), an experimental boat with a single engine of the ED-KhPI type (Lieutenant-Commander Aleksey Sergeevich Tumanov) did not enter service during the Second World War
        62. Shch-301 (Lieutenant-Commander Ivan Vasilievich Grachev)
        63. Shch-302 (Lieutenant-Commander Vadim Dmitrievich Nechkin)
        64.Shch-305 (senior lieutenant, VRID Konstantin Sergeevich Kochetkov)
        65.Shch-306 (senior lieutenant Smolyar Nikolay Ivanovich)
        66. Shch-307 (Lieutenant-Commander Nikolay Ivanovich Petrov)
        67.B-2 (Lieutenant-Commander Bykhovsky Israel Adolfovich)
        68.L-55 (senior lieutenant Brown Ilya Yakovlevich)
        69. Experienced boat "REDO" (Lieutenant-Commander Nikolay Kartashev)
        TOTAL: 69 PL
        Link: "Baltic Fleet in June 1941" (KBF statistical collection) Appendix 4.2.
        1. SERGE ANT
          SERGE ANT 3 June 2021 07: 48
          +12
          Well, if we count on this source, then minus K - 21 (from 8.06.1941/11/30.07.1941 makes the transition to the Northern Fleet through the White Sea-Baltic Canal), and C - 12 (included in the KBF 30.08.1941/13/30.08.1941), 65 (included in the KBF 22/1941/XNUMX), XNUMX (included in the KBF XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX - the same, incidentally, the only submarine of the "C" series, which survived until the Victory in the Baltic and sunk under the command of Marinesco "Wilhelm Gustloff" and "General Steuben"), then you get XNUMX on June XNUMX, XNUMX.
        2. Captain45
          Captain45 3 June 2021 09: 59
          +8
          Quote: Richard
          3rd division (captain 3rd rank Anatoly Kuzmich Averochkin):
          12.L-3 (captain 3rd rank Petr Denisovich Grishchenko)

          Captain 1st Rank P.D. Grishchenko later he wrote the book "Fight Under Water" about his service as commander of the submarine L-3.
          1. Richard
            Richard 3 June 2021 10: 29
            +8
            Such a book did not come across.
            My brother in St. Petersburg has a book by Pyotr Denisovich "Combat activity of submarines of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Baltic Sea in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." with the author's dedication to the brother of our great-grandmother, Rear Admiral of the KBF.
            EMNIP, P. D. Grishchenko was the only submarine commander in the Baltic with an academic education and repeatedly pointed out to the command of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet about the operational and tactically illiterate use of the fleet's submarines in the difficult circumstances. When Stalin became aware of this in a roundabout way, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command personally forbade the fleet commander, Vice Admiral (later Admiral) V.F. 1943 for the post of chief of the anti-submarine defense of the fleet - and this despite the fact that both the Germans and the Finns at that time did not plan to enter their submarines into the Gulf of Finland.
            In 1947, having received unequivocal hints from his superiors about the impossibility of further promotion, he was forced to transfer to teaching and research work at the Naval Academy, where he defended his thesis for the degree of candidate of naval sciences on the topic “Analysis of the use of submarines in the Great Patriotic War "
            1. Captain45
              Captain45 3 June 2021 22: 54
              +2
              Quote: Richard
              Such a book did not come across.

              I downloaded it either on the "Military Literature" site or on "LitMir" in the "Military Memoirs" section, I don't remember exactly, I did not save the site address. What on one, what on another site in the section "Memoirs" come across interesting books and completely free, I recommend hi
              1. Richard
                Richard 3 June 2021 23: 36
                +2
                Thank you, Yuri. I will definitely find
  3. SERGE ANT
    SERGE ANT 3 June 2021 04: 40
    +11
    The first combat success in the Baltic was achieved by the submarine "S-11" (commander Lieutenant-Commander A. M. Sereda, on board the battalion commander Captain 3rd Rank I. N. Tuzov), which on July 19, 1941 torpedoed and sank in the Palanga region enemy network breaker No. 11. The success of the Baltic submarine was the sinking of the German submarine U-307 by the submarine Shch-144 (commander - NI Petrov) in August 1941.
    On August 10, in the same area, the S-4 submarine (commander Lieutenant-Commander D. S. Abrosimov) sank the enemy tanker Kaya (3223 brt). While in position in the Libava area, the submarine found an enemy transport and tanker heading 170 ° guarded by three minesweepers and two boats. "C-4" lay on the course of attack. The state of the sea was favorable: wave 4-5 points, visibility 40-50 cab. Having approached the tanker up to 6 cabs, the submarine commander fired two torpedoes. At the moment of the salvo, the boat floated up to a depth of 3 m. Fearing detection, the commander ordered a quick dive and increased speed. The boat hit the ground on the move and froze at a depth of 22 m. Soon depth charges began to explode. Explosions with some interruptions were heard at about 12 o'clock. By midnight the bombing stopped, and the submarine commander, after waiting a little, decided to surface to the surface. There was no enemy near. Fencing signs were displayed at the bow and stern of the boat. The designated spot was surrounded by a large oil slick. The enemy, apparently, decided that the boat was destroyed and left. "S-4", starting with diesel engines, left the dangerous area. In July 1941, "L-3" set out for a mine laying in the area of ​​the Danzig Bay. This time, the commander was given the opportunity to carry out a mine setting, taking into account the data of his own observation. Upon arrival in the area "L-3" for two days, conducted reconnaissance of the area. On July 19, at 8 a.m., two enemy minesweepers were spotted. For more than an hour, Grishchenko watched them and concluded that the enemy ships were carrying out control trawling. As soon as the minesweepers left, "L-3" set a minefield on the swept fairway, and then stepped aside. At about 7 pm, when the boat was 7 miles from the mine-laying area, a strong explosion was heard in the compartments. A column of black smoke was visible through the periscope in the direction of the planted mines. An hour after the explosion, depth charges were heard in the same direction: the enemy decided that a Soviet submarine was operating in the fairway area.
    The second L-3 campaign confirmed the expediency of giving submarine commanders initiative in choosing places for laying mines. In October-November, L-3 mines blew up enemy transports Henny (764 brt), Pollux (3161 brt), Egerau (1142 brt) and trawler Gunther.
    In August 1941, the submarine "Lembit" (commander Lieutenant-Commander VA Poleshchuk) went on a cruise, which was supposed to lay mines in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. Arriving in the designated area, the commander made reconnaissance to the west of about. Bornholm and, using the right granted to him, placed mines on the identified routes of movement of enemy transports. Five mine cans were displayed with an interval of 8-12 cabs, four mines in each can. The mines set by the submarine blew up three ships: a transport with 9 thousand tons of iron ore, a training ship "Deutschland" and a sea rail ferry "Starke". The command highly appreciated the combat campaign of the Lembit submarine.
    In August 1941, the submarine "Kalev" (commander Lieutenant-Commander BA Nyrov) staged ten mines with three banks in the Ovishi-Uzhava area. The production was successful. On September 26, the German floating base "Mosel" (8408 brt) was blown up here, and in November - a transport (2111 brt). The transport "Espirit", which received a hole in the explosion of a mine, threw itself on the coast.
    1. SERGE ANT
      SERGE ANT 3 June 2021 04: 42
      +11
      On September 20, 1941, the submarine Shch-320 (commander - IM Vishnevsky) left, which established the possibility of a breakthrough into the open Baltic through the Gulf of Finland and, operating in the Danzig Bay, sank the enemy transport. Of the other boats, only Shch-323 (commander F.I. Ivantsov) managed to get through to the area of ​​hostilities. "Shch-322" and "S-8" were killed by mines in the Gulf of Finland. Following the results of the cruise, the command of the Shch-323 fleet counted the sinking of three enemy ships. On January 17, 1942, the boat was awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Battle, becoming the first Red Banner submarine in the Baltic Sea in the Great Patriotic War.
      The commander of "Shch-323" F.I. Ivantsov on the deck of his ship. In total, in June-December 1941, submarines of the Baltic Fleet completed 79 cruises against enemy communications, sinking 6 transport ships and one floating base. During the first year of the war, the Baltic Fleet lost 27 submarines, six of them were blown up by the crews while leaving the naval bases, two were sunk by enemy aircraft and artillery in Kronstadt and Leningrad.
      1. SERGE ANT
        SERGE ANT 3 June 2021 04: 49
        +13
        Most of the organizational and tactical mistakes and shortcomings manifested themselves in the very first weeks of the war.
        Everything was ... On the afternoon of July 9, the S-6 series IX-bis submarine arrived in Kihelkona Bay, where she was waiting for an escort to go to Tallinn. The submarine commander, considering himself safe, allowed the personnel to swim. At 15.23:88 the boat was attacked by a Ju-250 aircraft. Two 100-kg bombs fell 3m from the submarine. The plane made three passes and fired at the boat with machine-gun fire. As a result of the shelling, 4 people were killed, 3 people were seriously wounded, including the boat commander, 16.17 people were lightly wounded, including a military commissar. Reflecting the attack with artillery fire, the submarine left the bay and sank at XNUMX. The divisional navigator, senior lieutenant A.I. Ilyin, who was on board, took command of the boat.
        In the afternoon of July 10, during the transition, Trigi (carried out jointly with the S-5 in the SKA escort) was attacked by an enemy plane that dropped 2 bombs. After the attack, she plunged and fell behind the detachment. In the evening, in a submerged position, it was discovered and attacked by our SKA. On the night of July 11, after surfacing, it was fired upon by a coastal battery from Cape Pangenuk. In the afternoon I was met by our SKA and escorted to Trigi, where I arrived on the night of July 12. Moved to Tallinn on 12 July.
    2. Undecim
      Undecim 3 June 2021 12: 37
      +1
      The first combat success in the Baltic was achieved by the submarine "S-11" (commander Lieutenant Commander A. M. Sereda, on board the battalion commander Captain 3rd Rank I. N. Tuzov), which on July 19, 1941 torpedoed and sank in the Palanga region enemy net breaker # 11.

      The information is not true.
      http://www.sovboat.ru/ship/s11.php3
      https://flot.com/blog/historyofNVMU/2374.php?print=Y
      There were no such ships as the network breaker in the German fleet at all.
      1. Paul Neumann
        4 June 2021 11: 23
        +3
        The first combat success in the Baltic was achieved by the submarine S-11 (commander Lieutenant-Commander A.M. Sereda), which on July 19, 1941 torpedoed and sank the enemy network breaker No. 11 in the Palanga region. (V.N.Boyko, Tragedies of the Baltic submarine)

        On July 19, 1941 "S-11" under the command of Lieutenant-Commander A. M. Sereda torpedoed and sank a fascist network breaker in the Palanga region. (G.M.Egorov, fairways of the naval service)

        Later it will become known that on July 19, the S-11 submarine opened a combat account of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet submariners: it sank the net breaker No. 11 with a displacement of about 5000 tons with enemy troops. (G.M. Obushenkov, With my participation)

        Operating in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, on July 11, 19, in the Palanga region, "S-1941" sank a German auxiliary vessel - net breaker No. 11 ("KT-11") with a displacement of about 5 tons, which transported enemy troops. (S. A. Gurov, In the footsteps of the Baltic submarine)

        you shouldn't be more Catholic than the Pope.
        1. Undecim
          Undecim 4 June 2021 11: 49
          -2
          If you still find in the "Kriegsmarine" the "network breaker" you specified with the corresponding confirmation in German sources about his sinking on the specified date, I immediately recognize the sanctity of the Roman pontiff.
          1. Paul Neumann
            4 June 2021 13: 54
            +4
            sperrbrecher-11 was part of 1. sperrbrecherflotille under the command of captain third rank christian schmidt-prestin. German sources do not confirm her loss - sometimes they deny her loss, but more often they are silent about her fate. sometimes confused with sperrbrecher-ii, which sank in skagerrak. it is possible to find information that sperrbrecher-11 served in the German demining administration after the war, but there is no information confirming that this is the same vessel. you can find information, chro sperrbrecher-11 was used as a transport.
            in short, no one confirms success with -11. It is believed that the first confirmed success in the Baltic was the sinking of the u-144 by the u-307 submarine on August 9, 1941.
            and the pope's official title is “His Holiness,” whether you admit it or not.
            1. Undecim
              Undecim 4 June 2021 15: 00
              0
              in short, no one confirms the success s-11

              Key phrase of your comment. That is, it is not even clear what kind of ship we are talking about in general, not to mention its sinking. I wish you creative success.
              It is always pleasant to deal with a person who knows how to admit his mistakes.
              And local hamsters have already left traces of their vital activity in the form of minuses.
              1. Paul Neumann
                13 June 2021 22: 56
                0
                just reading people saw what was written in the article in Russian in white: "Submarine Shch-307, which opened an account for enemy ships sunk in the Baltic Sea."
                and thinking people also know that a la guerra come a la guerra - torpedoed, but did not watch the sinking. or couldn't wait. or heard an explosion, and decided that he had sunk, but in fact the ship hobbled to the port. or ochibas with target identification and therefore the torpedo report does not fight with the post-war data. or the German sources have incorrect data (gross pirates don't lie? ha ha!). or, to be honest, maybe the submariner lied. let it be for you - the whole crew lied. this is hard to believe, but correct me if I missed another opportunity.
                therefore, it is important to confirm every sunk ship (downed aircraft). because in wartime it matters - both military and financial. until then, success is considered unconfirmed. 30 years later, veterans write their memoirs and skip the word "unconfirmed", because it is not pedagogical, unpatriotic and not bold. and 70 more later, some young amateur on the Internet will start poking with a mouse at some forgotten, undocumented and clumsily translated scribble with a cry "veterans and historians are lying all!
                1. Undecim
                  Undecim 13 June 2021 23: 02
                  0
                  What did you want to say with your comment?
                  You have cited an unconfirmed historical fact.
                  The first combat success in the Baltic was achieved by the submarine "S-11" (commander Lieutenant Commander A. M. Sereda, on board the battalion commander Captain 3rd Rank I. N. Tuzov), which on July 19, 1941 torpedoed and sank in the Palanga region enemy net breaker # 11.

                  I pointed out that you have cited a historical fact that has not been confirmed by any document.
                  What are you trying to prove to me? What unconfirmed facts of high patriotic motives can be used?
  4. Olgovich
    Olgovich 3 June 2021 07: 05
    +4
    the first thing that comes to mind when mentioning the actions of submarines in the Baltic are not isolated tragedies when they broke through barriers in the Gulf of Finland ...
  5. smaug78
    smaug78 3 June 2021 08: 45
    -1
    it seems that they should have been significant, insofar as before the war Sweden supplied Germany by sea up to 2 million tons of iron ore a month. So, paradoxically, by its very existence alone, the Soviet submarine fleet achieved significant success in the form of limiting these supplies.
    The author, here they do not believe the thoughts on the fence. Only numbers ... So the article is a two ...
    1. Niko
      Niko 3 June 2021 12: 45
      -2
      In 1941, more ore was supplied from Sweden to Germany than in 1940. The author is fantasizing.
      1. Paul Neumann
        4 June 2021 11: 26
        +2
        for those who read the texts diagonally: rch is about July / August 1941. to a real submarine war when the time comes. while on the way, pardon mon canadien, Tallinn crossing.
        1. Niko
          Niko 4 June 2021 16: 01
          -2
          "It seems they were significant ...." The most accurate information, why did not you take the pseudonym "The Brothers Grimm"? Or something like that? And you can put as many minuses as you want with your "genosses". Below in the commentary there is a table of supplies laughing
  6. Undecim
    Undecim 3 June 2021 11: 51
    +3
    The economic losses resulting from the reduction in freight traffic are difficult to calculate, but it seems that they should have been significant, insofar as before the war Sweden supplied Germany by sea up to 2 million tons of iron ore a month. So, paradoxically, by its very existence alone, the Soviet submarine fleet achieved significant success in the form of limiting these supplies.

    The fleet did not achieve any success in limiting the supply of iron ore from Sweden to Germany by sea.
    On the contrary, shipments of ore by sea in 1941 increased against the previous year.
  7. Niko
    Niko 3 June 2021 12: 55
    +2
    "The waters of the Baltic were KISHELI by the submarines of the Germans" GORGEOUS .... By the beginning of the war, the Germans used 5 (FIVE) submarines in the Baltic against the USSR. But using the term KISHELA is not entirely fair .... Author, read something before writing heroic epics.
    1. Paul Neumann
      4 June 2021 11: 29
      +2
      "by German submarines And the mines they placed" - one small letter for an illiterate person, but a huge difference for a person reading.
      1. Niko
        Niko 4 June 2021 15: 58
        0
        Because of such "scholars" like you, a huge part of the youth laughs at the Second World War, thinking that these are fairy tales. Because after checking the "facts" from your writings in a minute on Google, they think that since you have to lie about the war in order to show heroism, then it (heroism) did not exist
        1. Paul Neumann
          13 June 2021 23: 00
          -1
          no, it’s just young people weaned to read and think, and taught to find fault with everything domestic and believe any scribble and film-making from our enemies.
  8. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 4 June 2021 17: 26
    +3
    The submarine war in the Baltic Sea began from the very first days of Hitler's invasion of the USSR. Even before the start of the war, several German submarines took up their initial positions on the approaches to the Soviet naval bases and at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland.

    Mauno Jokipii wrote that along with German submarines, Finnish submarines worked in the central sector of the Gulf of Finland - immediately from 22.06.41, even before Finland entered the war.
    On day X, the Finns, in addition to barrage mining in the waters of the Åland archipelago, planned to lay mines from submarines off the Estonian coast: a) even before the onset of day X, from three submarines at the entrance to Tallinn Bay and b) with an interval of three days - two barriers to east, on the highway leading to Kronstadt. Between these minefields, there were passages for torpedo attacks by Finnish submarines. Finnish submarines were to conduct their operations east of 25 degrees east longitude. The western sector remained free for the German naval forces.
    The order received by the Finnish submarines formulated the tasks of both mining the waters at a minimum distance from the enemy shore (it was impossible to accomplish this task unnoticed by other means), and the offensive tactics of torpedo strikes were defined. The order for its execution to the submarine commanders was given by the captain of the third rank (later the commander of the submarine fleet of Finland) Arto Kivikuru. It was given orally, on the maps delivered from the headquarters of the naval forces, only the areas of action were outlined. It was impossible to even write about the secret mission in the ship's logbook.

    All documentation on the minefields set was drawn up only on June 26, 1941, that is, with the beginning of the war. During the second submarine raid on 23-24 June, two minefields were placed west of Suursaari Island.

    Minefields set up on the night of June 22, 1941 by three Finnish submarines off the Estonian coast in the waters of Mohni, Kalgrund and Kunda, and also on June 23-24 in the Suursaari, Ruskeri and Länsiviri area. Although the Germans did not directly demand this kind of direct support, the Finns, who at the Kiel talks on June 6 refused to allow German submarines to enter the eastern Gulf of Finland, nevertheless wanted to demonstrate that they were fulfilling their expectations within the brotherhood of arms.

    If they began to assert that the General Staff did not know anything about the secret naval operations of those days, this statement could, at best, only concern the first raid, but not the second, which was confirmed in the documents of the General Staff, which gave the “go-ahead” to carry it out.
    © Jokipii Mauno. Finland is on the road to war.
  9. nemoXX
    nemoXX 6 June 2021 15: 26
    0
    Red propaganda claimed that Hitler "was well prepared for the war", having 2 submarines for all ocean theaters by the beginning of the 57nd MV, of which only 17 could operate in the Atlantic. Taking into account the transitions "there and back", at the beginning of the war in the Atlantic operated 2-3 submarines. The USSR, having 65 submarines in the Baltic alone, more than 200 submarines in total + dozens under construction - "was not ready for war"! Therefore, the only task set to him after the start of the "unexpected Great Patriotic War" - to interrupt the delivery of iron ore from Sweden to Germany - failed miserably. Until March 45, when the British did not bomb and torpedo the German Baltic convoys, Germany imported Swedish ore without interference from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. An interesting nuance is the fact that in 41 Soviet submariners sometimes reported about the sinking of "German transports with ore", which was not confirmed after the war on the basis of German documents. It turned out that owls. Submarines were drowned ... neutral Swedes. Hiding these facts with bogus orders to patrol in completely different places. That is why, the relatively recent discovery of a S-8 sunk somewhere near Bornholm, far from the place where she allegedly patrolled (according to the papers), caused a small sensation: "how, they say, did she end up there?" But not only S-8 fought against the Swedes.