Military Review

"Plavnik" / "Komsomolets" - a mistake or a breakthrough into the XNUMXst century?

41

On August 4, 1985, the Soviet nuclear submarine (nuclear submarine) K-278 under the command of Captain 1st Rank Yu. A. Zelensky (senior on board the commander of the 1st flotilla Submarine Vice-Admiral E. D. Chernov) made a record deep-sea dive to a depth of 1027 meters, staying there for 51 minutes. Not a single combat submarine has since reached such a depth (the usual maximum depths of most nuclear-powered submarines are two times less, and non-nuclear submarines are three times less).


Upon ascent, at a working depth of 800 meters, an actual check of the operation of the torpedo-missile complex (TRK) was carried out by firing torpedo tubes (TA) with torpedo shells.

"Plavnik" / "Komsomolets" - a mistake or a breakthrough into the XNUMXst century?

In addition to the crew and Chernov, the chief designer of the project, Yu. N. Kormilitsin, the first deputy chief designer, D. A. Romanov, the responsible delivery officer V. M. Chuvakin, and the commissioning engineer L. P. Leonov, were on board.

1. Why do we need a depth of a kilometer?


However, the question arises: what was the point for submarines in this record in a thousand meters of diving depth?

Traditional theses: "hide from detection" and "hide from weapons"Are distantly related to reality.

At great depths, the effectiveness of acoustic protection means sharply decreases, and, accordingly, the noise level of the submarine inevitably increases significantly.

V.N. Parkhomenko ("Complex application of acoustic protection means to reduce vibration and noise of ship equipment", St. Petersburg "Morintech" 2001):

The transition to block equipment layouts further exacerbates the problem of non-support connections. The hydrostatic pressure increasing during submersion of the submarine causes an axial thrust force in the seawater circulation routes. At a certain depth, this force can exceed the weight of the block, and it "floats" over the support dampers, held essentially only by non-support links, which have become the main acoustic bridge between vibroactive equipment and noise-emitting parts of the housing.
Calculations show that a 600-ton block at immersion depths exceeding 300 m has an acoustic contact with the hull practically only through vibration isolating pipes. In this case, the acoustic efficiency of the nozzles determines the noise emission.

And further:

... Disadvantages of shock-absorbing structures and fastenings of modern ships ... the above-noted low efficiency of means for reducing vibrational energy propagating along non-supporting links (pipelines, shafting, cable routes). Extended acoustic tests of modern ships have shown that in a number of pumping units, up to 60% or more of the vibrational power goes overboard through pipelines.

This is further exacerbated by the generally very favorable hydrology for the detection of submarines submerged to great depths. There are simply no “jump layers” at such depths (they can only be at relatively shallow depths), moreover, the submarine is located near the axis of the hydrostatic underwater sound channel (figure on the left).


At the same time, a submerged submarine with good search means, from a great depth, has, as a rule, a much larger illumination and detection zone (the figure on the right is the illumination zone using the example of a powerful modern lowered helicopter HAS (OGAS) FLESH).

Within the reach of weapons, a kilometer is only protection against small-sized Mk46 torpedoes and early modifications of heavy boat Mk48. However, the massive small-sized (32 cm) Mk50 and heavy (53 cm) Mk48 mod.5 torpedoes have a stroke depth of more than a kilometer and fully ensure the defeat of a submarine target there. Here, however, it should be borne in mind that at the time of the entry into service of the K-278 Navy, at its maximum depth, no samples of US and NATO anti-submarine weapons could "reach", except for atomic depth charges (Mk50 and Mk48 mod.5 torpedoes entered service after the death of K-278 in 1989).

2. Background


With the advent of nuclear power plants (NPPs), submarines have truly become "hidden", not "diving" ships. In the conditions of tough confrontation of the Cold War, a race for technical superiority began, one of the important elements of which in the early 60s was considered the depth of immersion.

It should be noted that at that time the USSR was in the position of catching up, the United States was significantly ahead of it in the development of great depths.

Today, after all the deep-sea successes of our submarine (and especially the special underwater means of the GUGI - the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research), this looks somewhat surprising, however, it was the United States that first began to build deep-sea submarines.

The first was the experimental diesel-electric AGSS-555 Dolphin, laid down on November 9, 1962 and delivered to the fleet on August 17, 1968. In November 1968, she set a record for diving depth - up to 3 feet (000 m), and in April 915, the deepest torpedo launch was performed from it (details of the US Navy were not disclosed, except that it was a remote-controlled experimental torpedo on electric base Mk1969).

The AGSS-555 Dolphin was followed by the atomic NR-1, with a displacement of about 400 tons and a submersion depth of about 1000 meters, laid down in 1967 and handed over to the fleet in 1969.

The bathyscaphe "Trieste", which first reached the bottom of the Mariana Trench back in 1960, does not forget to build here.


NR-1 and AGSS-555 Dolphin

Subsequently, however, the deep-sea theme in the US Navy was radically revised and practically “multiplied by zero” for two reasons: first, a significant redistribution of US military spending caused by the Vietnam war; the second and the main one is the revision of the priority of the tactical elements of submarines, as a result of which, on the basis indicated in paragraph 1, the large immersion depth is no longer considered by the US Navy as a priority parameter.

A certain echo (and "inertia") of the US prospecting work on deep-water topics of the 60s was some published studies, for example, on deep-water (with an estimated immersion depth of 4500 m) rather large (3600 tons of displacement) submarine with "spherical" compartments of a strong hull (a kind of "American louse") in the Journal of Hydronautics in 1972.


In the USSR, in the early 60s, active development of great depths also began.

Of the obvious predecessors of the 685 project, one should name the 1964 pre-draft design of a single-shaft deep-sea nuclear submarine with torpedo armament (10 torpedo tubes and 30 torpedoes), a normal displacement of about 4000 tons, a speed of up to 30 knots and a maximum depth of up to 1000 m (data from OVT "Arms of the Fatherland" AV Karpenko).

The very concept of such a nuclear submarine and its hydroacoustic armament were very interesting: GAS "Yenisei" with a detection range of SSBNs of the "George Washington" type up to 16 km. It was assumed that in one voyage with full autonomy of 50-60 days, the nuclear submarine will be able to successfully attack the enemy up to five or six times. The high security of the nuclear submarine was provided primarily by a very large immersion depth. At the same time, TsNII-45 (now KGNTs) in its conclusion on this project noted that in those years (1964) it was considered expedient to design a deep-water nuclear submarine with a maximum immersion depth of 600-700 m, the immersion depth of 1000 m was overestimated and could cause large technical difficulties in its implementation.

3. Creation of the ship


Tactical and technical assignment (TTZ) for the development of an experimental boat with an increased immersion depth of project 685, code "Plavnik", was issued by TsKB-18 (now TsKB "Rubin") in 1966, with the completion of the technical design only in 1974.

Such a long design period was due not only to the high complexity of the task, but also to a significant revision of the requirements and appearance of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine (with the task of dramatically reducing noise and increasing sonar armament), and, accordingly, changing the composition of key equipment (in particular, a steam-generating unit (PPU) with a nuclear reactor OK-650 and a hydroacoustic complex SJSC "Skat-M"). In fact, Project 685 was the first 3rd generation nuclear submarine accepted for development.


Chief designers of the 685 project N. A. Klimov and Yu. N. Kormilitsin (since 1977).

"Fin" was created as an experienced, but full-fledged combat ship to perform tasks, including search, and long-term tracking and destruction of enemy submarines, to combat aircraft carrier formations, large surface ships.

The use of titanium alloy 48-T with a yield point of 72–75 kgf / mm2 made it possible to significantly reduce the mass of the hull (only 39% of the normal displacement, similar to that of other nuclear submarines).


"Fin" under construction.

4. Project evaluation


The first thing to note about the Fin is the exceptionally high quality of construction, both of the ship itself and of the components. The author of the article heard such assessments of the ship from many officers. It should be noted that the USSR defense industry complex produced quite high-quality ships (several "freaks" were literally piece failures), but against their background, the "Fin" stood out noticeably for the better.

This is especially important, both taking into account the factor and requirements of low noise and a significant objective lag of our mechanical engineering, as far as the possibility of producing equipment with low levels of vibroacoustic characteristics (IVC) is possible, and especially taking into account the deep-sea specificity of the ship, where all "usual" problems with IVC and noise are exacerbated multiple times (see item 1). And here the very good quality of the ship's construction in many respects made it possible to level the indicated traditional problems of the machine building of the USSR. The K-278 turned out to be a very low-noise nuclear submarine.


Section of nuclear submarine project 685. Source: http://forums.airbase.ru

The armament for such an experienced deep-sea nuclear submarine of 6 TA and 20 torpedoes and rocket-torpedoes should be considered quite sufficient.

An interesting feature of the Fin was not group hydraulic torpedo tubes (as on the rest of the 3rd generation nuclear submarines, where the torpedo tubes of the corresponding side were “grouped” into common impulse tanks and a piston power plant of the firing system), but individual power plants for each submarine.

The armament consisted of USET-80 torpedoes (alas, those adopted by the Navy in a substantially "castrated" form from what was asked to develop by the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, about this in a subsequent article), anti-submarine missiles of the Waterfall complex (with nuclear and torpedo warheads). The torpedoes of the 2nd generation (SET-65 and SAET-60) indicated in some sources as part of the Fin's ammunition have nothing to do with reality, they are nothing more than the fantasies of individual authors.

With regard to the "early" USET-80 torpedoes, it should be noted that it is absolutely possible to fire them from a depth of 800 meters (which was not provided by the "late" USET-80 torpedoes, and not only because of the replacement of the "Waterfall" equipment with a structurally weaker "Ceramics", but and on replacing the silver-magnesium combat battery with a copper-magnesium one, with corresponding problems with the "cocking" on "cold water").

As noted above, the main search tool for nuclear submarines was SJSC "Skat-M" ("small modification" of the "large" SJSC "Skat-KS" for submarines of medium displacement and SSBNs of project 667BDRM). Its main difference from the "large" "Skat-KS" was the smaller main (bow) antenna of the SAC (which was due to the corresponding dimensions of its carriers). Taking into account the fact that the "big" SJC did not get up on the "Plavnik", it was quite an acceptable and good design solution with one "but" ... Unfortunately, the "Small Skat" did not include a low-frequency flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA ). For the specific application of the Fin, it would be very good and extremely useful: both for detecting targets, and for controlling the intrinsic noise (including recording their change when diving to different depths).

Speaking about the real detection ranges of low-noise targets by "Fin", we can cite the following evaluation of user of the forum RPF "Valeric":

And the low noise of the Sharks are not legends ... The Shark, of course, does not reach Sea Wolfe or Ohio. It reaches Los Angeles, almost :)), if not for some discrete components. And according to the reduced noise level, there are no special questions for the Sharks.

Submarine pr. 685 before leaving for its last autonomous system on tasks found us on 7 cables. Barracuda (one of the first) detected us at 10. Although these numbers, of course, apply only to specific conditions.

Taking into account the fact that the processing of the Plavnik and Barracuda SJCs is close, the difference in the detection range was due to the different size of the main antennas of the SJC. And here I would like to emphasize once again - “Plavnik” really missed GPBA. And here there are no complaints about the ship's designers - at the time of commissioning, there were simply no such GPBA (the variant with the "large" GPBA on the Skat-KS required a complex firing device and was not suitable for the Plavnik).

In general, it should be noted that the Plavnik nuclear submarine was undoubtedly a successful and quite effective nuclear submarine of the Navy (which was largely due to the very good quality of construction). As an experienced one, it fully justified the costs of its creation and provided both a study of the issues of practical application of great depths (both from the point of view of detection and issues of secrecy), and could be very effectively used, for example, as a nuclear submarine of a reconnaissance and shock curtain (for example , in the Norwegian Sea). I repeat, up to the moment of her death, the US and NATO navies did not have non-nuclear weapons capable of hitting her near its ultimate depth.

Here it is worth noting this, not at all "insignificant" moment of the fact that the groundwork for the 685 project, primarily in titanium, helped the Lazurit specialists a lot in creating the multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 945 Barracuda project. Veterans of Lazurit recalled that, seeing Lazurit as a competitor, Malachite, to put it mildly, "was not eager" to share its "titanium experience." In this situation, the Rubin Central Design Bureau ("we are doing one thing") helped with the materials of "Fin" (which went ahead of the "Barracuda").

5. In service


On January 18, 1984, the K-278 nuclear submarine was included in the 6th division of the 1st flotilla of the Northern Fleet, which also included submarines with titanium hulls: projects 705 and 945. On December 14, 1984, the K-278 arrived at the place of permanent basing , - Western Faces.

On June 29, 1985, the ship entered the first line in terms of combat training.


"Fin" in the database

From November 30, 1986 to February 28, 1987, the K-278 completed the tasks of its first combat service (with the main crew of Captain 1st Rank Yu. A. Zelensky).

In August-October 1987 - the second military service (with the main crew).

On January 31, 1989, the boat received the name "Komsomolets".

On February 28, 1989, the K-278 "Komsomolets" entered the third combat service with the second (604th) crew under the command of Captain 1st Rank E.A. Vanin.

6. Death


On April 7, 1989, the submarine was sailing at a depth of 380 meters at a speed of 8 knots. It should be noted that the depth of 380 meters, as a long-term one, is absolutely uncharacteristic for most nuclear submarines and for many of them is close to the limit. The advantages and disadvantages of such a depth - clause 1 of this article.

At about 11 o'clock, a powerful intense fire broke out in the 7th compartment. The nuclear submarine, having lost its speed, surfaced in an emergency. However, due to a number of gross errors in the struggle for survivability (BZZH), a few hours later she sank.

"Komsomolets" at the bottom at a depth of 1700 m

According to objective data, the real cause of the fire and its extremely high intensity was a significant excess of the oxygen content in the atmosphere of the stern compartments due to the uncontrolled (due to a long-term malfunction of the automatic gas analyzer) oxygen distribution in the stern.

For the maintenance of the "so-called BZZh" 4 open sources are recommended, with their brief description.

First source. "Chronicle of the death of the nuclear submarine" Komsomolets ". The version of the senior teacher of the cycle of Management, navigation safety and BZZh PLA of the 8th training center of the Navy, captain 1st rank N.N.Kuryanchik. It should be noted that it was written without full support for documents, largely on the basis of indirect data. However, the author's extensive personal experience made it possible not only to qualitatively analyze the available data, but also to see (“presumably,” but accurately) a number of key points in the negative development of an emergency.

Second origin. The book of the deputy chief designer of the project DA Romanov "The tragedy of the submarine" Komsomolets "". Written very harshly, but fair. The author also acquired the first edition of this book in the 1st year of the Higher School of Medical Sciences; it made a very strong impression on all interested classmates. Therefore, at the very first lecture on the discipline "Theory, structure and survivability of the ship" the teacher (captain of the 1st rank with extensive experience in the ship crew) was asked a question about it. I will quote his answer verbatim:

This is a slap in the face for the officer corps, but absolutely deserved.
My son serves in the north on the BDRM, and I bought this book and sent him with instructions to re-read it before each "autonomous".

Third source. A little-known, but very useful and very worthy of reprint book by V. Yu. Legoshin "Struggle for survivability on submarines" (editions of the Frunze VVMU 1998) with a very tough analysis of a number of accidents and disasters of submarines of the Navy. It should be noted that at the time of publication by the Deputy Head of the VVMU named after Frunze was the captain of the 1st rank B. G. Kolyada - the senior on board the "Komsomolets" in the fatal campaign and a man extremely tough and strict. Knowing that (in a number of cases with extremely harsh estimates) was written in the draft of the book by V. Yu. Legoshin (senior lecturer of the Department of Theory, Arrangements and Survivability of the Ship), we, the cadets, then froze in anticipation of whether she would leave the printing house and in any form? The book came out without any "editorial revision", in an initially rigid form.

Fourth source. Book of Vice Admiral E. D. Chernov "Secrets of Underwater Disasters". Despite the fact that the author does not agree with a number of its provisions, it was written by an experienced Professional with a capital letter, whose opinions and assessments deserve the most careful study. I repeat, even if I disagree with him on a number of issues. His opinion was given in the article “Where does Admiral Evmenov" run? ".

Returning to Chernov's book. The question is that it is not enough to allocate "regular time" for working out tasks. If an "experienced" foreman of the hold command opens the outboard opening with his own hands, actually sinks the boat (as was the case on the Komsomolets), this speaks not so much of the "lack of time for preparation" as of the systemic problems of the Navy in training for damage control (BZZh ).

As for the "systemic problems" in the preparation of our submarine BZZ, this issue will be discussed in detail in a separate article. It is worth emphasizing here that the problem is much more complex and deeper than the one often attributed to the Komsomolets disaster: “there was a strong main crew and a weak second one”.

Firstly, a number of officials in the second crew were from the first (including key ones for the BZZh).

Secondly, there were "questions" about the first (main) crew. An episode with the loss of a pop-up rescue chamber (VSK) during tests in the White Sea was on the verge of a nuclear submarine disaster (death). Details ("That"" Separated the sea "from the central post of the nuclear submarine and how it actually happened) this" tried to quickly forget ", but in vain. This example is extremely tough, literally "under the breath", of the fact that there are no "trifles" in the underwater business. And if somewhere "began to drip", then you need to clearly and according to the guidelines to declare "emergency alert" and understand (and not take "some independent actions" without a report).

Explanation: according to the mention that “the foreman of the hold command opens the outboard opening with his own hands”, we are talking about this episode (quote from the book by D. A. Romanov):

Warrant officer V. S. Kadantsev (explanatory note): “The mechanic gave me the order to close the bulkhead door between the 4th and 5th compartments, close the 1st lock on the exhaust ventilation of the aft block ... I closed the bulkhead and began to close the 1st lock exhaust ventilation, but I could not close it completely, as water began to flow into the ventilation shaft ”.
One more confirmation that there is no fire in the emergency compartments and that the solid hull is cooling down. Fulfilling an illiterate order to close the 1st exhaust ventilation constipation, Midshipman Kadantsev simultaneously opened the exhaust ventilation shaft flooding valve, that is, he unwittingly contributed to the faster flooding of the submarine. Another evidence of poor knowledge of the material part of the personnel.

Note. According to Captain 1st Rank N.N. Kuryanchik (who had, including personal, experience in eliminating the "consequences of mistakes" of personnel with "manipulations" with 1 ventilation constipation), at the time of these actions, it was this source of water that was the key and did not allow (due to a sharp decrease in the area of ​​the operating waterline of the nuclear submarine) to stay afloat until the rescuers arrived.

7. Lessons and backlog of the project 685


The technical revolution of the search engine for submarines that took place de facto over the past fifteen years (see article "There is no more secrecy: submarines of the usual kind are doomed") makes us take a fresh look at the experience of creating nuclear submarines of project 685. Including in relation to the creation of promising nuclear submarines of the 5th generation (what was presented to the President of the Russian Federation a year and a half ago in Sevastopol at the exhibition of naval weapons under the guise of a supposedly "promising" project "Husky ", Obviously, in no way corresponds not only to the 5th, but also to the 4th generation of the nuclear submarine).

The key issue here is the complex use of non-acoustic and acoustic search means by the enemy. Departure to great depths from "non-acoustics" leads to a sharp increase in the visibility of our nuclear submarine in the acoustic field. However, an increase in diving depths (when solving issues of low noise) in the future will be one of the key ways to avoid detection by non-acoustic aviation and especially space vehicles.


That is, it is necessary to sharply increase the usual submarine immersion depths (the author refrains from giving specific estimates, taking into account the open nature of the article). Yes, a kilometer is probably not needed here (or is it “not needed yet”?), However, the values ​​of the calculated, maximum depth and “depth of long-term presence” are related.

Here it is necessary to say separately about the so-called "working depth", that is, the depth where formally the submarine can be "indefinitely". But what time is it?
In one of the issues of the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" in the mid-90s, there was a very interesting article about the Central Research Institute "Prometheus", including their work on nuclear submarine hulls. And there were such words that (cited from memory), when they nevertheless began to count and figure out how many submarines actually could be at working depth, it turned out that this resource was not only very finite, but for many submarines of the USSR Navy it turned out to be completely chosen.

In other words, heavy loads of huge hydrostatic pressure strongly load both the housing itself and such acoustic protection means as various shock-absorbed pipes (once again to paragraph 1 of the article - they are extremely important in terms of low noise). What will happen if, for example, the shock-absorbing cords of the bottom flapping section of the main condenser breaks at a depth of, say, 500 meters (that is, 50 kgf presses on every square centimeter)? The dimensions of these cords (highlighted in red) can be estimated from the above and enlarged layout of the steam turbine unit of the nuclear submarine of project 685.


And the answer to this question, even in spite of the presence of the first and second sets of slamming of this circus route, will be, as they say, “on the verge of“ Thresher ”(US Navy submarine, which died on a deep dive in 1963).

In addition to technical issues, the issues of long-term stay at great depths entail serious organizational problems. The required service life of a strong case for “long-term depths” can be set by an increased design depth (and, probably, using titanium alloys, which have not only better specific characteristics, but also fatigue characteristics in front of special steels). But the issue of “deep-water resource” is much more acute for outboard pipes and cords. Replacement of the largest of them (such as the circulating lines of the main condenser) is possible on a regular basis only during mid-life repairs (with the removal of the steam turbine unit from the casing).

Let me remind you that until now, not a single third-generation nuclear submarine has undergone average repairs (the first one, Project 3 Leopard, was recently withdrawn from the shop, work on it has not yet been completed), having a significant part of large outboard branch pipes for a long time. expired terms of operation. Obviously, for such nuclear submarines, a relatively safe stay at sea can be ensured only at relatively small actual depths of submarine submersion.

Accordingly, the future grouping of submarines of the Navy must be reliably and fully supported in technical (including constructive) and organizational terms by ship repair. What we had with the VTG ("nonhost" term - "restoration of technical readiness") of the 3rd generation nuclear submarines (instead of their full-fledged repair) is further unacceptable.

That is, the problems of creating deep-sea (and, moreover, low-noise nuclear submarines) are extremely difficult, and here the groundwork of the Plavnik has become extremely valuable today.
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  1. Marachuh
    Marachuh 1 June 2021 18: 23
    +14
    Interesting article, thanks
    1. Subtext
      Subtext 1 June 2021 22: 39
      -4
      It would be helpful for the author to read this document:

      1. timokhin-aa
        2 June 2021 10: 29
        +10
        What makes you think the author hasn't read this?
  2. S. Viktorovich
    S. Viktorovich 1 June 2021 18: 24
    +8
    The correct article.
  3. mark1
    mark1 1 June 2021 18: 47
    +10
    The article is interesting + unambiguously. But .. how bad it is to be stupid! I did not understand not about the thermocline, not about the layers of the temperature jump.
    Is there a thermocline in the above diagram? - there is!
    There are simply no "jump layers" at such depths (they can only be at relatively shallow depths),

    There are no jump layers at depths below 800 m, but above they are! And those who swim higher will look for it!
    In general, I realized that my stupidity is limitless ... -explain and denounce the flotogeny, float lovers and naval experts.
    1. timokhin-aa
      1 June 2021 19: 53
      +5
      There are no jump layers at depths below 800 m, but above they are! And those who swim higher will look for it!


      The bottom hydrophones are lower, and the Americans have a standard beat to dive under the layers and listen to the sound channel. welcome.
      1. mark1
        mark1 1 June 2021 20: 04
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa

        Bottom hydrophones below

        I agree, and submersibles can be lowered by 850 meters. But this is mainly object (forcing the submarine barrier). Well, and in the open sea-okiyan (for example, delivery of Poseidon to the recipient) in unprepared positions? ... And hydrophone barriers can, for example, be forced at high speed (50-100 knots) or vice versa ... solve). In general, the relevance of great depths in the light of the secrecy of the movement of the submarine has not yet been refuted for me.
        1. timokhin-aa
          1 June 2021 21: 45
          +1
          I agree, and submersibles can be lowered by 850 meters. But this is basically object (forcing the submarine barrier).


          For a noisy object near an underwater sound channel, the detection range in the noise direction finding mode can be estimated at THOUSANDS of km.
          1. mark1
            mark1 2 June 2021 05: 29
            +1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            For a noisy object near an underwater sound channel, the detection range in the noise direction finding mode can be estimated at THOUSANDS of km.

            Well then, our submarine fleet is an open book for an adversary? But this is not so (no matter how we are convinced of this), as life has shown - there are no such barriers that our nuclear submarines would not overcome. You idealize one quality and completely reject the other (a kind of dualism), and this, in my opinion, is not the right approach. Strength is in the combination of qualities and in the variety and improvement of tactics.
            1. timokhin-aa
              2 June 2021 10: 30
              +1
              Well then, our submarine fleet is an open book for an adversary? But this is not so (no matter how we are convinced of this), as life has shown - there are no such barriers that our nuclear submarines would not overcome.


              Wrong. Life has shown something completely different
              1. mark1
                mark1 2 June 2021 11: 41
                +1
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Life has shown something completely different

                What life has shown you, I'm even afraid to assume, but "Atrina" is a historical fact
                And then, my friend, SOSUS sees both our and its submarines in the same way (that is, this is not our inborn disadvantage) and it is necessary to carry out some kind of special operations against it, using special technical means.
                1. mark1
                  mark1 2 June 2021 12: 10
                  +3
                  We have moved away from the pivotal theme - the thermocline and jump layers. Of course, I do not understand anything about this (I think that the bulk of the audience does not care about the thermocline or the thermo-pencil), but, nevertheless, I had a question and you could not answer it. I cannot hold a discussion about hydrophones and the SOSUS system, because I understand no more in them than in the thermocline. Difficult barrier? -Complicated. Overcome? - Overcome. This is all that I know and think about this topic, you can not discuss it. I can't tell you anything else. hi
      2. mark1
        mark1 1 June 2021 20: 33
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        diving under the layers and listening to the sound channel for Americans is a standard beat. welcome.

        What do they "dive" on (about 850 meters) and what are they trying to hear there (the reception is standard)?
      3. kapitan92
        kapitan92 1 June 2021 20: 55
        0
        Alexander Timokhin, hi
        Prompt, Chief Designer of Project 685 N.A. Klimov and the author of the article M. Klimov are namesakes or have family ties.
        Thank you.
        1. timokhin-aa
          1 June 2021 21: 45
          +2
          Same names
      4. Glad
        Glad 5 June 2021 00: 05
        0
        The bottom hydrophones are lower, and the Americans have a standard beat to dive under the layers and listen to the sound channel. welcome.

        I beg your pardon ... Maybe I don't understand what ... Do the Americans currently have bottom hydrophones in working order? Is SOSUS still working?
        Further. Non-acoustic means of detecting submarines is, of course, strong ... And in the Arctic, how are the Americans going to detect something with non-acoustic means? Or is there an opportunity to look from space under the ice?
        And one more nuance ... Maybe I'm wrong, but the scheme of sound propagation in the ocean is a very complicated thing. It should not fit into simplified models like there is a thermocline - there is no thermocline ... Everything is much more complicated there. Everything "lives" and "breathes" there, and changes can occur within a matter of hours.
        And the thickness of the ocean is not silent. The higher the sensitivity of the detection equipment, the more problems with the separation of submarine noise against the background of ocean noise. Here, as in that joke: "A tourist, in order not to fall into the paws of a bear, does not need to run faster than a bear. It is enough to run faster than another tourist." The situation is the same with submarines. She doesn't need to be completely silent. It is enough to make less noise than the natural background ...
  4. Eug
    Eug 1 June 2021 19: 18
    -4
    In theory, a mass of water displaced by a submarine from a depth of at least 800, at least 1000 meters, even mixing with the surface layer, will give a relatively small "cold" spot on the surface, sharply narrowing the search area for a deep-sea boat ... it remains to "get" it, which is not the case it's easy.
    1. Usher
      Usher 2 June 2021 20: 25
      +1
      Quote: Eug
      In theory, a mass of water displaced by a submarine from a depth of at least 800, at least 1000 meters, even mixing with the surface layer, will give a relatively small "cold" spot on the surface, sharply narrowing the search area for a deep-sea boat ... it remains to "get" it, which is not the case it's easy.

      She does not swim in a bathtub, but in the ocean. ))))
  5. sergo1914
    sergo1914 1 June 2021 19: 23
    +4
    ... responsible deliverer V.M. Chuvakin,


    Vladimir Mikhailovich also wrote a book of memoirs. There is about a record dive and about an accident. I gave one copy to my parents (we lived one storey higher, neighbors). I scanned it in one of the arrivals. Somewhere lies in the archive folders.
  6. Alien From
    Alien From 1 June 2021 19: 59
    +1
    Thanks to the author! I agree with many things. Deepest respect for divers! hi
  7. Thrifty
    Thrifty 1 June 2021 19: 59
    +1
    Once I read an article by an officer from the submariners, where he proved with calculations that the noise of the boat "outside", that is, in the sea-ocean, strongly depends on the noise and microvibrations inside the submarine. And, the solution was offered in the form of special thick rubber nozzles in the place of fastening of one or another unit or structural element to the floor, or the main unit of the structure itself, the base of the submarine. There was such an article in the early 90s, the magazine, alas, I don't remember which one! hi
    1. Bobrick
      Bobrick 6 June 2021 14: 11
      0
      Maybe, just as far as I remember lectures on vibration protection on life safety, rubber tips may not quite be a panacea. Nevertheless, the damping of vibrations of elastic elements depends on their rigidity, and therefore they only damp certain frequency ranges.
      And what ranges are critical for the submarine and what kind of frequency distribution there is is a big question.
  8. geniy
    geniy 1 June 2021 20: 40
    .
    At great depths, the effectiveness of acoustic protection means sharply decreases, and, accordingly, the noise level of the submarine inevitably increases significantly.

    This is probably a lie! Because now all submarines are covered with a layer of rubber sheathing, and its effectiveness cannot in any way decrease with increasing depth.
    In addition: the author claims that external pipelines make noise with increasing depth. but this is also a hoax, because the nuclear submarine simply does not have any external pipelines. And also, contrary to the opinion of the author, the submarine's own noise does not increase - on the contrary, it decreases with increasing depth. The fact is that the main noisy object of the submarine is not at all its mechanisms, but its propeller. And the propeller is noisy to a large extent due to cavitation. And cavitation occurs due to vacuum - a decrease in pressure on the suction side of the blades. but with increasing depth pressure increases and cavitation stops altogether! This means that with increasing depth, the so-called "singing propellers" disappears - which is especially characteristic of surface ships and the Americans called our destroyers "singing frigates" because of the singing of the propellers.
    And also with increasing depth, the ability to detect the boat by sonar worsens - because the response ultrasonic signal weakens. Here you also need to take into account that the sea vob is full of all sorts of organisms - and they dive to a depth of 600 meters at night - and if the boat goes below this depth, then they hide it well.
    And there is also one more factor - the deeper the submarine travels - the closer it is to the seabed and the ultrasonic signal of the sonar is reflected from the seabed and loses the submarine. This is not to mention the fact that the ocean floor is not at all even, but on it there are mountains and underwater ridges and depressions. Therefore, a deep-sea submarine can go in a depression between two ridges, and then no hydroacoustics will detect it.
    1. timokhin-aa
      1 June 2021 21: 49
      +4
      The answer of the author of the article, M. Klimov :?

      now all submarines are covered with a layer of rubber sheathing, and its effectiveness cannot in any way decrease with increasing depth.


      MK:
      DO NOT SHOOT SHOOT, IT HURTS
      Squeezes, and how - at depths of more than 200 meters from the efficiency of the GWP there are "horns and legs" (even for a "sandwich")

      In addition: the author claims that external pipelines make noise with increasing depth. but this is also a hoax, because the nuclear submarine simply does not have any external pipelines.


      MK:
      Tell me, were letters taught in YOUR Bursa? Did you teach to read?
      Are you able to generally read and understand what is written clearly in Russian in the text ??? What kind of "external pipelines" - the term is different this time, and three times - on the limits of the submarine hull, some of them actually go out (for example, pylons of intakes of circulating routes)

      And also, contrary to the opinion of the author, the submarine's own noise does not increase - on the contrary, it decreases with increasing depth.


      MK:
      Monsieur, YOU are incompetent from the word ABSOLUTELY

      The fact is that the main noisy object of the submarine is not at all its mechanisms, but its propeller.


      MK:
      NO

      And the propeller is noisy to a large extent due to cavitation.


      MK:
      NO
      Submarines generally run in 99,9% of cases at pre-cavitation speeds.

      cavitation stops altogether! This means that with increasing depth, the so-called "singing of propellers" disappears.


      MK:
      it has nothing to do with cavitation

      full of all sorts of organisms - and they dive at night to a depth of 600 meters - and if the boat goes below this depth - then they hide it well.


      MK:
      Monsieur, are you able to give any confirmation of this YOUR FUCK?
      or YOU have "google on coupons" and YOU are not able to read at least what an air defense system is (sound scattering layer)

      sonar ultrasonic signal


      MK:
      monsieur ultrasound to search for submarines was used during the Second World War
      so don't talk shit hurting her

      reflects off the seabed and loses the submarine.


      MK:
      in practically significant cases, this is extremely difficult to achieve
      especially for PLA

      This is not to mention the fact that the ocean floor is not at all even, but on it there are mountains and underwater ridges and depressions. Therefore, a deep-sea submarine can go in a depression between two ridges, and then no hydroacoustics will detect it.


      MK:
      Ooooo what kind of bushy fly agarics! Did you teach GEOGRAPHY at all? And Ely-Pali, do you have at least one globe in your Bursa? Do you even imagine the depths of the oceans? Come to your senses!
      1. geniy
        geniy 1 June 2021 22: 40
        .
        Squeezes, and how - at depths of more than 200 meters from the efficiency of the GWP there are "horns and legs" (even for a "sandwich")

        And do you know the law from your school physics course that all solid solids and liquids are actually incompressible? And the rubber outer sheathing is incompressible.
        But the truth here is to understand that if there is an air volume in a solid, then this body is really compressed. And now the solid hull of all submarines is subject to compression - the skin just bends a little inward between the frames.
        1. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa 2 June 2021 01: 21
          +7
          Quote: geniy
          And the rubber outer sheathing is incompressible.

          Dear Mr. "X", you have probably never "live" seen the sheets of the PGP, so you firmly believe that they are "solid". And therefore: there is no need to argue about the details with the pros who "walked with their feet" on them.
          1. geniy
            geniy 5 June 2021 11: 57
            -1
            Oh how! I was busy for several days with more important things, and during this time I was thrown as much as 56 minuses - a kind of record! But in fact, this is not at all an indicator of my ignorance, but rather an indicator of general illiteracy in technical No matter how paradoxical it may seem to all of you, I have studied a lot of constructions in my life and concluded that almost all human technology was created extremely unprofessionally with huge mistakes ... So all planes could take off and land on the heel of the earth - for example, a huge four-hundred-ton Boeing 747 or Mriya near the outskirts of some village Gadyukino. All tanks could be absolutely impenetrable due to special elastic sheets, ships and especially submarines are absolutely unsinkable, trains should not knock on the rails at all, and indeed everything could be much better. But the introduction of improvements is hampered by the wildest lack of professionalism. I had to face many times - for example, explain to a woman from another department how their mechanism actually works for lifting one mini-submarine out of the water. And then I talked with the officers of the same mini-submarine and was shocked to learn that they also do not know how this mechanism works! There was such a principle: in any storm, a thin line was thrown out by a small rocket and a lifting grip was dropped along this line, which, thanks to the line, was perfectly connected to the submarine. But the sailing officers did not know this! And in any storm they were obliged to jump onto the submarine deck and MANUALLY direct the lifting device! This does not mean that I exalt myself over other people, and supposedly infallible - in fact, I also made huge mistakes. But the difference is that in a technical society, universal delusions have lived for decades. Here is one of them:
            Dear Mr. "X", you have probably never "live" seen the sheets of the PGP, so you firmly believe that they are "solid". And therefore: there is no need to argue about the details with the pros who "walked with their feet" on them.

            Although I have not walked with my feet on the PPP, I have some idea of ​​them, which aggravates your guilt of ignorance of the essence of the matter.
            This rubber cover is really not solid at all, but with internal ribs. That is, it is smooth on the outside, but on the side of the steel hull sheathing - with ribs. And it is precisely between these ribs that the rubber sags when a person steps on it, in contrast to the steel body. BUT, in reality, it is your common delusion that from the bending of the rubber inward, it reduces its volume in the least! The fact is that steel is, of course, much stronger than rubber. But according to the laws of strength, absolutely any material bends when a load is applied to it. But the difference is that if steel from a human leg bends by hundredths of a millimeter, then rubber - by a few millimeters. However, this is not at all an argument that the rubber is supposedly changing its volume. Not! No solids or liquids change their volume upon bending or any other change in shape. For example, good rubber can be stretched 5 times (400%), while ordinary steel can be stretched by a maximum of 22%. But at the same time, rubber will not at all increase its volume by 5 times - because when stretched, it will sharply decrease its cross-sectional area. As a result, the volume will remain unchanged. And that's why, when a person steps on a foot, the rubber bends but does not decrease its volume! And in the same way, when the submarine is immersed to a great depth, the water pressure increases tens of times, but the volume of rubber does not decrease at all!
            But how, then, to understand the phrase of the author of the article:
            Squeezes, and how - at depths of more than 200 meters from the efficiency of the GWP remain "horns and legs" (even a "sandwich").
            That is, professionals understand this that supposedly the volume of rubber during compression decreases many times? But in fact there is a completely different phenomenon!
            The fact is that air is compressed very strongly by water pressure. And there are thousands of cubic meters of air inside the strong submarine hull. And only the casing and a set of a durable case do not give it a shrink. However, under the influence of a gigantic water pressure, even a thick PC casing is pressed inside - about 40 mm. But despite its thickness, it bends slightly inward between the ribs of the frames. And the frames themselves are also not perfect - they also slightly bend inward. It is precisely from this that at great depths of the PK, any submarine reduces its volume and, as a result, loses a little buoyancy, which has to be compensated for by pumping water from the equalizing tank. But the essence of the general misconception is that this fact of the compression of the Solid body is allegedly transferred by everyone to the compression of the rubber sheathing!
      2. geniy
        geniy 1 June 2021 22: 44
        -8
        MK:
        Ooooo what kind of bushy fly agarics! Did you teach GEOGRAPHY at all? And Ely-Pali, do you have at least one globe in your Bursa? Do you even imagine the depths of the oceans? Come to your senses!

        And what are the depths in the ocean - remind me?
        And I will say for uninformed people that apart from the Mariana Trench with a depth of 11 km, the depths are very shallow near the shores of any ocean. If the depth of the shelf is 200 m, then there is a continental slope where the depths change dramatically and are very different, including 1000 m.
        1. geniy
          geniy 1 June 2021 22: 46
          -7
          The fact is that the main noisy object of the submarine is not at all its mechanisms, but its propeller.
          MK:
          NO

          How to prove it?
      3. geniy
        geniy 1 June 2021 22: 56
        -4
        full of all sorts of organisms - and they dive at night to a depth of 600 meters - and if the boat goes below this depth - then they hide it well.
        MK:
        Monsieur, are you able to give any confirmation of this YOUR FUCK?
        or YOU have "google on coupons" and YOU are not able to read at least what an air defense system is (sound scattering layer)
        Wikipedia:

        The sound scattering layer was discovered using sonar when ships found a layer that scatters sound, which is sometimes mistaken for the seabed. For this reason, it is sometimes called "ghost bottom" [1]. Sonar operators using new sonar technology during World War II were puzzled by what looked like a false seabed at depths of 300-500 meters during the day. The layer stretches between two continental slopes. In the daytime, it is located at depths of 300-1300 meters [1]
    2. Usher
      Usher 2 June 2021 20: 27
      +1
      the Americans called our destroyers "singing frigates" because of the singing of the propellers.
      not because of the screws, but because of the gas turbines.
  9. rudolff
    rudolff 1 June 2021 21: 16
    +6
    The book of the deputy chief designer of the project DA Romanov "The tragedy of the submarine" Komsomolets "" - perhaps the most detailed analysis of the loss of the ship. Made an impression in due time. Very tough.
  10. Flashpoint
    Flashpoint 1 June 2021 23: 26
    0
    Thanks to the Author for the article and to Alexander Timokhin for the comments! I will still reread and analyze.
  11. alystan
    alystan 2 June 2021 00: 41
    0
    1. Why do we need a depth of a kilometer?
    However, the question arises: what was the point for submarines in this record in a thousandkilometer immersion depth?
    Probably a misprint due to inattention ?!
  12. Glory1974
    Glory1974 2 June 2021 11: 00
    +4
    Fulfilling an illiterate order to close the 1st exhaust ventilation constipation, Midshipman Kadantsev simultaneously opened the exhaust ventilation shaft flooding valve, that is, he unwittingly contributed to the faster flooding of the submarine. Another evidence of poor knowledge of the material part of the personnel.

    Why is it not done in our houses so that when you throw garbage into the garbage chute, you can be thrown from the 9th floor? Everywhere there is protection from the fool. It is not a whim. The peculiarity of the human psyche is that in stressful situations, a "tunnel" effect is manifested. A person sees only what is in front of him and cannot analyze the situation as a whole. How can you design that when the ventilation is closed, the flooding valve will open ?!
    In addition to the fact that sailors have little knowledge of the materiel, it would be nice to tell about the designers. How can you design such things on a submarine that one person can easily drown it?
    How was the pop-up camera designed that ripped it off and endangered the boat? How did it happen that when it was actually used, it could not save the lives of sailors (except for one who survived by a miracle)? And many more why. And at the same time, it is argued that this is one of the best quality boats in construction.
    1. agond
      agond 2 June 2021 11: 44
      +2
      Quote "The use of 48-T titanium alloy with a yield point of 72-75 kgf / mm2 allowed to significantly reduce the mass of the hull (only 39% of the normal displacement, similar to the indicator of other nuclear submarines" - sounds like some kind of achievement that you should be proud of, but if it were cast iron? for example cast iron grade SCh 24 - 44, has a compressive strength of 85 kgf / mm 2, and if it were made of maraging steel with a yield strength of 150-195 kg / mm For strong hulls, the boat could be lighter by these same 2%, titanium in a double-hull boat is a dubious feature, for example, the Piranha submarine with a titanium hull has only 39 m of maximum immersion depth, and there is nothing to do here.
  13. Non-fighter
    Non-fighter 2 June 2021 18: 41
    +1
    I read Romanov. Eh, some things are surprising and VERY
    1. Preparation at the training center. Yes, according to the documents, everything is in openwork, but I know something else: while I served at Kirov, NOBODY was on fire. Actually!!! Even the officers were passed over by this cup. Although according to the documents everything is in openwork, none of us saw the fact of the fire "alive" :(
    2. Inoperative devices that do not directly affect combat effectiveness - this is all too often. I read some memoirs as a submarine commander personally (!!!) waving caps (flag alphabet !!!!) to communicate with a neighboring nuclear submarine at a line-of-sight distance. Because flags are the only kind of communication at that moment :(
    3. Assistance to the sailor when switching from IDA to IP. In general, such things are recommended only if absolutely necessary.
    4. Surprise is the working navigation equipment. Is it on a dying submarine running on batteries when every amp-hour counts ?? Disable nafig !!!
    5. Circus with rafts. Interestingly, and upon delivery they were tested in the sense of disclosing? VSK tested but crooked. And they also open from the pedal. The opening mechanism is overboard. It must be lubricated and checked for performance, at least periodically. Yes, I understand that there is a problem with the emergency devices: they MUST NOT work "just like that" from a sailor's sneeze, but work flawlessly in an emergency. Moreover, this system is the only one of its kind for all the Navy. I suspect that during the entire period of service there was not a single check.
    Someone tried to press the ill-fated pedals to lower the rafts? Romanov has not a word about this. But it was in the water that most of the submariners died.
    6. Non-standard provisions and supplies in compartment 7. Are we, like the Fritzes, shoving provisions in all corners up to toilets inclusive? Where is the regular storage place for all this stuff and why did not it lie there?
    1. rudolff
      rudolff 5 June 2021 19: 19
      +1
      "Someone tried to press the ill-fated pedals to lower the rafts? Romanov has not a word about this."
      Why "not a word", he describes in detail the situation with the rafts. Opened the top rack connector. The way it was done when inspecting the rafts in the base. The lower one was not touched. They did not touch it because they did not carry out the appropriate instructions, did not conduct exercises. They did not really know how the water discharge system works, they were afraid to simply drown. And then they began to pull out of the packaging ...
  14. Pamir
    Pamir 3 June 2021 21: 31
    0
    An excellent article, Maxim Klimov, very excellent. So in depth, except for the submariner, no one writes, the whole problem of submarine is described, in the event of an emergency, it’s dark, not only on the submarine, but also on the nomenclature, and in the first But the external rescue service also concerns, which, in fact, is minuscule.
  15. Evgeni78
    Evgeni78 7 June 2021 12: 18
    0
    "Fulfilling an illiterate order to close the 1st constipation of the exhaust ventilation, midshipman Kadantsev simultaneously opened the valve for flooding the exhaust ventilation shaft, that is, he unwittingly contributed to the faster sinking of the submarine."
    That is, the system is designed in such a way that closing the 1st lock automatically opens the flooding valve? I'm not an expert, so I wonder why it was done this way?
    1. agond
      agond 7 June 2021 12: 54
      0
      Perhaps other people would have given other orders, but the boat has 31% buoyancy !!! drowning from fire in one of the compartments, and this is the last compartment, and moreover, she sank after surfacing !!!