Military Review

Intelligence about German troops near our border

27

The following abbreviations are used in the article: AK - army corps, GSh - General base, INO - the foreign department of the Cheka, Spacecraft - Red Army, u (md, mp) - motorized corps (division, regiment), NCOs - People's Commissariat of Defense, pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft (or the 5th Directorate of the Red Army), TGr - tank Group, td (tbr, mn, tb) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion).


80 years ago, Hitler's Germany treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Millions of our people died at the hands of the Nazis, their allies and fellow citizens-traitors. Therefore, the topic of the events that took place in our country on the eve of the war remains relevant for many decades. After all, these events are directly related to the losses of our troops in the first days of the war.

There are many versions of the pre-war events. Most of these versions are based on reliable RM, with which the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR was familiar. The author will present his version of the events that took place on the eve of the war, based on the fact that the RM did not correspond to reality.

In a series of articles on intelligence, it was shown that RMs were unreliable (the last parts of the articles, which contain links to the previous parts: Reconnaissance about German divisions, Radio intelligence about enemy headquarters, German mobile troops in the General Government).

The author analyzed all published RM on the deployment and transportation of enemy troops, maps and diagrams of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO and ODVO headquarters, German maps of the operational department of the Wehrmacht ground forces, RU reports dated 22.06.41 and operational reports of the General Staff for 22-23 June. The analysis showed that the leadership of the border districts, the spacecraft and the USSR could make their decisions only based on the erroneous picture of the concentration of German troops near the border. Which, in turn, should have led to their erroneous decisions ...

Inaccurate data from our intelligence


In the first part I will remind you of the main provisions of the series of articles on intelligence.

Under the term "Troops concentrated on the border of the USSR" or "Concentrated against the Soviet Union" The 5th Directorate of the Red Army (later RU) in the summer of 1940 considered German troops concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland (Warsaw direction, Lublin-Krakow region and Danzig region, Poznan, Thorn).

4.04.41 in RU, the grouping of German troops concentrated on our border was supplemented with divisions located in Romania (in Moldova and in Northern Dobrudja), and from April 26 - with divisions located in the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary).

In May 1941, a grouping of German troops was determined, concentrated against the USSR, which was deployed in the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (Moldova and North Dobrudzha), Carpathian Ukraine and Slovakia.

The figure shows the actual data on the presence of German divisions at our border and RM, received from intelligence.

Intelligence about German troops near our border

It can be seen that the data presented differ significantly from each other. Different slope angles of the dependences indicate that the coincidence of data by the beginning of the war is a random factor.

Similar data on the number of German motorized and armored divisions... In accordance with RM RU, as of May 31.05.41, 120, there were 122-13 divisions near the border, including 14 MD and 83 TD. In fact, there were 3 divisions near the border, including XNUMX tank divisions.

From the number of mobile troops from the fall of 1940 to mid-April, two TDs (1st and 6th) were stationed near the border of the USSR, and at the end of April 1941 the third arrived (4th TD). There was not a single MD near the border until June 1941. The exception is the 60th MD, which departed from the territory of Poland by 23.11.40. It turns out that the RU in assessing the mobile troops on the eve of the war was mistaken nine times!

Everything that related to the RM about the enemy troops, the NKGB intelligence and the NKVD border troops were sent to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Do not think that the data of these two intelligence services were more accurate. Article it was shown that in April 1941, the intelligence of the NKVD border troops overestimated the number of German troops redeployed to the border in relation to the given RU.

The NKVD certificate (issued after 24.05.41) says

on the concentration: “on the territory of East Prussia and the Polish general government ... 68-70 pd, 6-8 md, 10 cd and 5 td ... In April-May of this year. in Romania, up to 12-18 divisions of German troops were concentrated, of which: 7 md and up to 2 td ”.

Reconnaissance of the border troops discovered up to 101-111 divisions on the Soviet-German and Soviet-Romanian borders. This number does not include the troops on the territory of Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, as well as the grouping in the Danzig-Poznan-Thorn area. According to RU, there were up to 14 divisions in these territories.

Due to different terms in the preparation of documents between the RM RU (31.05.41/24.05.41/XNUMX) and the border troops (after XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX), there may be a difference in a small number of divisions. Therefore, we can say that the data of both intelligence services on the total number of divisions are comparable to each other.

Reconnaissance of the NKVD border troops found 13-15 md and 7 td. It can be seen that the number of ppm found by reconnaissance is practically the same. The data differ in the number of etc. Let me remind you that many TD in the RM RU are formed from separate TP, which the border guards could simply not combine into a TD or combine according to a different principle.

It should be noted that all the detected deployment locations of regiments and divisions of motorized and tank forces did not coincide with the divisional areas of concentration of the 1st, 4th and 6th etc.

The reconnaissance authorities mistook for tank and motorized regiments and divisions anything, but not specified units. For example, in RU, large headquarters, the 615th automobile regiment, a light infantry division and ordinary infantry divisions were taken as the places of deployment of mobile troops. It turns out that the intelligence services provided false information. Based on unreliable RM, the KA leadership made the wrong decisions and confidently defended them with Stalin.

Why did the RMs turn out to be unreliable?

This can only be explained by the absence of our intelligence officers and sources of information in large German headquarters (with the exception of the Air Force headquarters).

And why did our intelligence not bring up sources in large German headquarters?

Intelligence repression


The repressions of 1937–1938, taking place in our country, also affected intelligence. In a series of essays by M. Ktorov "100 years in the service of foreign intelligence" (magazine "National Defense" No. 9, 10) considered история INO. M. Ktorov:

On 2.06.37, at a meeting of the Military Council of the NCO, Stalin said: “In all areas we defeated the bourgeoisie, only in the area of ​​intelligence were we beaten ... Our intelligence along the military line is bad, weak, clogged with spies. Inside the KGB intelligence there was a whole group working for Germany, Japan, Poland ... "

[A few months later - approx. ed.] 24.01.38/XNUMX/XNUMX, Yezhov stated:

“In some places they cleared themselves, were arrested and calmed down ... Comrades, understand, with the relations that existed with us before, it was difficult for foreign intelligence to rush to us? Of course, it's easier than easy ... We must take a closer look at each specific ...

They took a closer look, arrested and shot a lot. In 1937-1938, a series of arrests of intelligence officers swept through. Residents in Germany, England and France were arrested and shot.


In place of qualified specialists dealing with intelligence issues for many years, people who did not have the necessary training often came. They had to perform better than their repressed colleagues. Therefore, in order not to follow the arrested, new employees were required to provide more accurate and comprehensive RM. But how can this be done if there are no sources of information in the German headquarters? If there is no one to recruit new sources? If any recruitment by the authorities could subsequently be turned against an intelligence officer?

It is likely that the new intelligence officers took the easier route. For example, to determine the exact numbers of regiments and divisions by rumors or by signs placed on the shoulder straps of German servicemen. Of course, this data was cross-checked with the help of other sources and other departments.

By the signs on the shoulder straps of servicemen, it was possible to determine the number of the regiment, division, corps and even the army. By military colors (waffenfarbe) on uniforms and shoulder straps it was possible to determine the type of troops. It turned out that it was quite easy to get “reliable” RMs ...

The head of the 5th Directorate of the General Staff, II Proskurov, spoke about the lack of people in military intelligence and the difficulties with sending employees on business trips in 1940 when discussing the experience of military operations against Finland (April 14-17, 1940).


Correctly the employees were afraid. Some of them remembered that they often arrested colleagues years after foreign business trips, accusing them of collaborating with foreign intelligence services. At the same time, they often simply knocked out the testimony necessary for the investigation ...

For a long time, the materials received by the RU were not even sorted out. Probably due to the lack of employees, some of whom were repressed. At a meeting on April 14-17, 1940, I. I. Proskurov noted:

“The archive contains a lot of undeveloped valuable materials. Now we are developing, but there is a whole basement, a colossal amount of literature, on which a whole team of 15 people should work for a couple of years. "

Also, the intelligence chief said that many materials were not even viewed by high-ranking military leaders. The military leaders immediately "turned the arrows", noting that the literature is secret and difficult to work with ...

Information from intelligence in 1940


Studying the RM, one gets the impression that the intelligence is well aware of the German troops concentrated at the border. As an example, the figure shows the data of the 5th control of the General Staff. Comparing the actual data on the presence of German troops at the border and the Republic of Moldova, it is clear that the established numbers of German units, formations and formations do not correspond to reality.


In the fall of 1940, the General Directorate of State Security of the NKVD provides information about the German grouping near our border, which does not differ significantly from the information of military intelligence.


The main problem of the RM was that a significant part of the German troops were not at the border ...

But RM was considered proven! In other words, information about the German troops was confirmed by several sources and often by different intelligence services, but nevertheless it turned out to be unreliable.

How could this happen?

This could only happen because of the mass misinformation of our intelligence services with the help of the measures of the German command.

Disinformation of the German command


After the capture of Poland, the German command changed the names of two army groups (out of two that fought in Poland) and four armies (out of five) to hide the headquarters of large formations being transferred to the West. Consequently, the German command understood that it was necessary to hide the names of the troops in order to counter enemy intelligence.

The German command was obliged to know about the need to conceal signs that would reveal the redeployment or the appearance of mobile troops (motorized and tank) at the front. Indeed, by the places of their concentration, one can determine the directions of the main blows. Therefore, they were obliged to give instructions on the concealment of the belonging of the military personnel to the mobile forces. In this case, insignia on shoulder straps and military colors should have been hidden or distorted. For example, the insignia on the shoulder straps were allowed to be hidden with muffs made of uniform cloth.

The Allies on the Western Front were unable to locate the concentration of German mobile troops, which invaded France in May 1940. It is possible that the German command already at that time was taking measures to conceal the military color and the specific uniform of the tank forces.

In the summer of 1940, according to our intelligence, there were many units and formations of mobile troops near the border. Most likely, they were portrayed as fake units or units with the aim of overstating the number of these troops so that the group would not seem too weak to the Russians.

Since our intelligence services had no other, more reliable, method of obtaining RM, apart from observing the uniform of German servicemen and collecting rumors, we had to be content with the available information.

In May - early June 1941, the "cunning Germans" removed the insignia (numbers) from the shoulder straps or cut them off, but traces of the insignia remained on the faded shoulder straps. Our scouts probably laughed at the "stupid" Germans ...

Just before the war, the suspicion arose that the Nazis were using false signs for misinformation. There are two requests to clarify the RM, received from the insignia on the shoulder straps, but it was already impossible to fix something ...

Access to the places of deployment of arriving MD, etc. was strictly limited and prohibited on pain of shooting. Probably, similar measures were practiced at railway unloading stations. Therefore, our scouts did not manage to find the places of concentration of MD, etc. before the start of the war.

Scout Sedov's report


Consider a message from an employee NKGB Sedov 20.06.41:


Personnel intelligence officer Sedov arrived in Zamoć and followed through many settlements. He spoke with his sources of information. The RM refers to the deployment of infantry units with anti-tank artillery and a cavalry regiment in different places. The report also mentions numerous depots, airfields and a long-range artillery battalion and several artillery batteries. The report does not contain a single word about the presence of motorized and tank units.

Article shows fragments of German maps of the operational department of the Wehrmacht ground forces as of the evening of June 16 and 19, 1941. When comparing these maps, we can conclude that the grouping of mobile troops in the Zamoć-Tomashev area practically did not change.

The figure below shows a map with the situation as of the evening of June 19. Some of the settlements mentioned in the report are marked on the map. The route of Sedov's movement passed near or through the places of concentration of the mobile group, but neither the scout nor his sources obtained information about its presence ...


Misinformation by the German special services


Could the German special services use the fake uniform of their servicemen to misinform our intelligence services?

During the war, our special services often used this technique themselves. For example, the offensive of our troops near Moscow, unexpected for the Nazis, the encirclement of their troops near Stalingrad and in Belarus, as well as hundreds of other large and smaller operations. Therefore, the Germans were obliged to use similar techniques, which they had already tried! They showed fake subunits (units) to simulate the presence of mobile troops far from the direction of the strikes of all four TGRs.

If we consider that the Germans did not use fake units, then it is impossible to find answers to the following questions:

1) Why did about 70% of German submarines and submarines with known and rechecked numbers not exist in the Wehrmacht at the time of their discovery by our intelligence services or were they far from the places of their discovery?

2) Why did not 100% of the MP and MD with known numbers exist in the German armed forces at the time in question?

3) Why were regiments and divisions with known numbers for a long time tracked by our reconnaissance when they either did not exist or were far enough away? For example, in France.

4) Why did our intelligence services know for sure about the presence of ten md, etc. in Romania, if there were none of them there? Why were our intelligence services confident that 18 infantry divisions were on the territory of Romania, although by the beginning of the war there were only six of them?

5) Why did our intelligence services know exactly about the presence of nine German divisions in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine by June 1.06.41, 22, and by June 13 - 15–XNUMX, if there was not a single division there?

6) Why were all TP and so on discovered by our reconnaissance forces located far from the places of strikes of all four TGRs?

Consider an example of misinformation of our command using fake subunits or units.

By June 1.06.41, 6, intelligence knows exactly the numbers of the seven md (8th, 17th, 37th, 58th, 175th, 215th and 161th) and seventeen md. RM about the 22st MD demanded verification, but on June XNUMX, its number was already attributed to verified data.


In the report of RO PribOVO dated 18.06.41/161/21, the information about the presence of the 34st MD is beyond doubt. At the headquarters of the ZapOVO, by June XNUMX, it is also known about the presence of the XNUMXth MD. It should be noted that not a single number of MD or MP, which was mentioned above, did not exist in the German armed forces at the indicated time.

23.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, the Handbook on the insignia of the German army was signed for printing. There are no motorized infantry colors in the guide. Intelligence officers know about MP and MD, but they don't know about the color of the motorized infantry. How can this be? This can only be the case when our intelligence officers or sources have not seen the servicemen of the MP and MD, whose numbers the intelligence knows for sure. Unless, of course, these were not fake units ...


At the end of August 1941, a short guide to the German armed forces was published and it indicated that the motorized parts were pink. There is not a word about motorized infantry units again ...

Why was the German command not afraid to show our intelligence services fake MPs or MDs?

In the fall of 1940, all the Wehrmacht MDs were reorganized - instead of three MPs, only two remained in them. A light howitzer battalion was removed from the artillery regiment. There were 24 105-mm and 12 150-mm howitzers left in the regiment. In MD there were up to 37 armored vehicles and there was not a single tank or assault gun. In fact, MD was a third weakened PD on cars, which could only be quickly transferred to the places of possible strikes by spacecraft troops.

The mistake of the German special services was that our intelligence services could not find out about the reorganization of the motorized troops. If they suspected this, they would try to throw in the necessary information about the changed structure of the MD ...

According to our intelligence, the German MD had significant forces: three MPs, an artillery regiment consisting of four divisions (48 guns), 68 armored vehicles, 60-72 light tanks and 24 assault guns with a caliber of 75 ... 105 mm.


If the Germans tried to show the presence of fake MD, then it becomes clear why the data of the RU and the intelligence of the NKVD border troops on motorized divisions coincide. After all, they could see fake connections ...

A somewhat similar situation was with the tank forces. The intelligence did not manage to find out about the reorganization of the TD, from which one TP was withdrawn, and the Tbr headquarters were withdrawn from many divisions. The scouts were confident in the presence of two TP in the composition of all TD of the Wehrmacht.


In the already mentioned short guide, published after the start of the war, the structure of MD and heavy etc. was given. The table of contents mentions these divisions.


The author reviewed four reference books posted on the Internet. And in all copies there are no inserts with the structure of these divisions. Probably, they were removed after the printing of the circulation, since the Germans did not have heavy etc.

The structure of the MD, etc. did not correspond to the data that our command staff possessed before the start of the war. For example, in the reference book there was a text about the length of the column TP, TBR, etc., from which it follows that the division had a TBR, consisting of two TP.


Unlike MD, the German command was not going to show our intelligence services the presence of TD, MK and TGr at the border. After all, these formations are the main means of blitzkrieg.

By June 1.06.41, 8, only one TD number (8th) was known to intelligence, allegedly concentrated in Lancut (KOVO). At the same time, in accordance with the RM RO of the headquarters of the Western Military District, the 22th TD was stationed in Warsaw until June XNUMX. At the same time, information about the presence of this division with the number «8» in different places is reflected in the RU document. In fact, the 8th TD in June arrived at the 4th TGr, which was located in East Prussia.

Our scouts knew the exact numbers of nine tp. It is possible that the German special services could show the presence of separate TPs that could be attached to the AK, but they were forbidden to show the presence of TD, MK and TGr.

In 1940, a "Brief Guide to the German Army" was published under the editorship of Major General IM Tokarev. The handbook was intended for the commanding staff of the spacecraft and was available in stores. Naturally, German intelligence knew what it contained.

The handbook said that “TD is the smallest combat unit that can set independent tasks». This is probably why the German command did not show the presence of full-fledged TDs near our border, which could solve independent tasks after breaking through our defense line.

The tasks that the German command set for the MK and the TGr were an order of magnitude more significant and therefore showing their presence contradicted the plan to conceal the concentration of shock groups. In turn, tp and tb could be attached to AK and, less often, pd.



Thus, the tp and tb, discovered by our intelligence, could well have been attached to the AK and had to solve the tasks assigned to these corps. The movement speed of the AK was equal to the movement speed of the infantry. Therefore, the AK could not make rapid deep marches after the breakthrough of the defense line of the spacecraft forces. Perhaps that is why the speed of advance of German troops was considered at the war games of about 12 km / day.

conclusions


Based on the presented material, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1) Our intelligence provided inaccurate information about the places of concentration of German troops near our border.

2) Our intelligence was unable to obtain information about the concentration at the border of TD, MK and TGR. Therefore, the leadership of the spacecraft and the border districts had no idea about the possible places of strikes by mobile groups and did not know about their concentration.

3) The German command widely used disinformation measures to mask the movement of tank and motorized troops to the border, to create a picture of the concentration of false large groups on the southern flank of the Soviet-German border.

These measures were consistent with the task of the 11th Army headquarters assigned to it in the Barbarossa plan:

“To ensure the success of the offensive of Army Group South, the army must, demonstrating the deployment of large forces, shackle the opposing enemy. "

The High Command of the Wehrmacht gave appropriate instructions to the Abwehr:

"To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria."

The disinformation measures carried out within the framework of the above orders led to the fact that our intelligence found by June 22 in the southern part of the General Government, in Slovakia, in the Carpathian Ukraine and on the territory of Romania, up to 94-98 German divisions, of which up to 26 were motorized and tank. According to intelligence data, up to 35–37% of mobile units were located against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO (in the secondary direction), which were dispersed along the entire border.

Of the 16 TDs, 1.06.41 were full-fledged (according to the intelligence of RU on June 11, 11). The remaining five TDs were conditionally combined from the TP (rifle and artillery regiments, as well as separate battalions of these divisions, were not detected by intelligence). Of these 10 full-fledged divisions on the territory of the southern part of the General Government and Romania, there were XNUMX. The picture emerged that the main mobile groupings of the German invasion troops were stationed in Romania (against the ODVO and the southern flank of the Lvov salient), as well as against the summit of the Lvov salient ...

The real picture turned out to be more ominous ...


To be continued ...
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  1. Far B
    Far B 30 May 2021 05: 40
    -14%
    Isn't it necessary to clean the intelligence? Without exaggeration, of course - Yezhov completely lost his head, for which he was quickly spanked. But intelligence is not a sacred cow, it also needs cleaning. There were no repressions after Stalin, so what? A parade of defectors, including very high-ranking ones, slipshod work, when the clean recruited Yakovlev was missed, and so on, and so on. In short, the fact that intelligence before the war was cleaned up, among other departments, is perhaps even good. In the then state of affairs, when the entire foreign country was stuffed to the eyeballs by the white emigration, Trotsky's admirers and other rotten intelligentsia, recruiting was a common thing, and the foreign special services, presumably, did not spare money for this. In general, this is the very case when it is better to overbid than later, on the eve of the war, to receive sheer misinformation. But, again, I repeat, without excesses, without Yezhovism.
    1. vladcub
      vladcub 30 May 2021 12: 01
      +13
      Dalny, about the purges: "Yezhov is a scoundrel: he killed many innocent people" (c).
      "Intelligence before the war was cleaned up, among other departments - perhaps even good", as it were, not so. At the beginning of the 30s, Soviet intelligence was, if not the best, then one of the best. And by 1941 she was an outsider. There is an interesting book: "Technical Intelligence. From Ilyich to Ilyich" and there is a lot about it
      1. Old electrician
        Old electrician 31 May 2021 06: 18
        -2
        After the civil war in the RCP (b), a stratum of hurray-revolutionaries arose, which could not imagine itself in a peaceful life. The war gave them everything - power, impunity, a beautiful life and reverence for hangers-on. In principle, they could not go over to peaceful construction.
        One of them was Trotsky - the author of the ideology of Trotskyism, an ideological mixture of anarchism and Socialist-Revolutionaryism. According to Trotsky, the USSR had to get involved in any wars for the sake of the World Revolution and constantly provoke social conflicts in the country for the sake of dissent and the subsequent fight against it. Permanent Revolution is called.
        The main goal of the Permanent Revolution was the destruction of the USSR, either by intervention or counter. Because, according to Trotsky, the USSR is the main obstacle on the way to the World Revolution. Against the background of Trotsky's plans for a World Revolution, the Great Patriotic War looks like a minor border incident.
        The Trotskyists were part of the party, so they crawled everywhere and everywhere spoiled the country as best they could. In 1937, the cat celebrated Maslenitsa, but Nikita the Wonderworker in 1956 turned them all into innocent victims of political repression in one fell swoop. Since then, a legend has been cultivated that Stalin, having got up in the morning, only thought of who else he would shoot.
        Foreign intelligence (BP) attracted the Trotskyist adventurers like a magnet. However, if Stalin needed BP to prevent military conflicts, the Trotskyists saw BP as a tool for fanning the World Revolution. Reiss (Nathan Poretsky), who escaped in 1937, published an angry letter to Stalin in French newspapers, which became an international sensation. Just one excerpt:
        ... Forward to new battles for socialism and the proletarian revolution! For the organization of the IV International ...
        - this scoundrel did not want a peaceful life.
        I will cite a fact carefully concealed by Soviet propagandists. During the war, Trotsky's IV International openly collaborated with Hitler. Trotsky called Hitler the "Icebreaker of the World Revolution." Subsequently, the traitor-defector Rezun (according to the author, this is apparently also a failed innocent victim) attributed these ideas of Trotsky to Stalin.
        Is it any wonder that Trotsky got it with an ice pick, and Poretsky was shot like a dog?
        The head of Poretsky Krivitsky (Samuel Ginzburg) also gave dyor for ideological reasons and handed over to the British over 100 employees, agents, trusting ties and contacts around the world, primarily in England. Meanwhile, the entire spy network of the Verkhovna Rada (that is, the NKVD-NKGB) by the beginning of the war numbered just over 600 people. According to the author, this betrayal did not in any way affect the performance of VR, so he does not even mention it as some kind of minor incident. Although only Krivitsky turned in several times more agents than they were rightly shot during the purge.
        Poretsky and Ginzburg were far from alone. Among the defectors was, for example, the head of the NKVD of the Far Eastern Territory, Genrikh Lyushkov. After his escape, he devotedly worked for Japanese intelligence and, for example, helped them organize an assassination attempt on Stalin.
        Therefore, I do not believe in the accidental failure of the pre-war BP. Not all were cleaned out, and the rest, apparently, were not eager to work against Trotsky's idol - the "Icebreaker of the World Revolution".
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  4. Unknown
    Unknown 30 May 2021 06: 50
    +4
    [/ quote] But how to do this if there are no sources of information in the German headquarters? If there is no one to recruit new sources? If any recruitment by the authorities could subsequently be turned against an intelligence officer? [Quote]
    As if recruiting in OKW and OKH is a trifling matter.
  5. A. Privalov
    A. Privalov 30 May 2021 06: 52
    +7
    Kudos to the author for looking at four old reference books posted on the Internet. But the article lacks links to the digital data source. Without them, all statements are unfounded.
    Thus, In this way, anything can be asserted. And quotes from Baghramyan will not go far. hi
    1. AsmyppoL
      30 May 2021 07: 35
      +13
      Thank you, Alexander!
      The first part is a short summary of three cycles, the link to which is available.
      They contain almost all available materials on intelligence reports, on maps and diagrams (with links). For example, in the last cycle, all information about the tank and motorized troops of Germany is considered in detail. About their locations according to intelligence and German maps. Analyzed on the basis of specific data, the information of the summaries of the first days of the war. True, there is information on dozens of pages ...
      Therefore, in the presented part there are no references to sources ...
      1. A. Privalov
        A. Privalov 30 May 2021 07: 36
        +10
        Thank you, I will wait to continue. hi
        1. AsmyppoL
          30 May 2021 07: 38
          +16
          The part about the Great War is under moderation and part 3 is finished after the end of the Great War and until May 1940. Perhaps something about them will also interest you ...
          1. A. Privalov
            A. Privalov 30 May 2021 07: 41
            +10
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Perhaps something about them will also interest you ...

            No doubt about it! hi
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 17 June 2021 18: 54
        -22%
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        They contain almost all available materials on intelligence reports, on maps and diagrams (with links).

        The author is lying as always, because he does not quote any of the intelligence reports that came to the RU of the Red Army from the districts in the period from June 1 to 22, and all his "conclusions" were sucked from the monthly Intelligence No. 5 for May 1941, which intended for a wide range of military leaders of different levels.
        His lies are refuted by Marshal I.S. Konev in his memoirs, which were recorded on tape. This is how he describes the quality of intelligence materials of the KOVO headquarters, and how they did it every day at the RU GSh:
        Arriving at the district headquarters in the morning (on the 19th - K.O.), unfortunately, I did not manage to get to the commander M.P. Kirponos, I was informed that he was ill ...

        .... I knew I.X. Baghramyan since 1928. In the summer of 1928, we, at that time both regiment commanders, rested together in Gurzuf, made friends, and trusted each other. Half an hour later, when Ivan Khristoforovich returned, we were with him in his office. heard the report of the head of the intelligence department. As soon as the scout opened the map of the southwestern border of the district, the large density of conventional symbols drawn in blue pencil, and, as you know, the enemy, was evident in blue ... It was evident that a large German grouping was concentrated on the border of the Soviet Union: motorized divisions , corps, headquarters, concentration of tanks, aviation; the map also recorded the flights of German aircraft along our border. There could be no doubt that the enemy's strike group was being deployed for the offensive.
        I asked Ivan Khristoforovich and the intelligence chief one question: "Does Moscow, the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff know about this?" “Yes, he knows,” was the answer, “we reported this to Moscow every day.” And he added that, apparently, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, the Military Council and the district headquarters will leave for the forward command post in the Ternopil region, they will be there in full combat readiness.

        Like every military man, I could have only one conclusion: yes, this is war.
        Returning to the headquarters of my 19th Army in Cherkassy, ​​I gave all orders on the combat readiness of the troops and asked by phone the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov to allow me to fly to Rostov to the headquarters of the district, since I was not relieved of the post of commander of the troops of the North Caucasian district. It was necessary to personally give a number of orders, to acquaint the district headquarters with the situation on the border and bring the district troops to full combat readiness. G.K. Zhukov gave permission and asked me not to leave the RF government communications wire anywhere in Rostov.
        I arrived in Rostov on the evening of the twentieth. On the night of June 22, I was at my apartment. At two o'clock in the morning on June 22, there was a call on HF. Zhukov said that the situation was threatening, gave the command to bring all the means of air defense of Rostov on alert. "Leave the commander of the district, Reiter, your deputy, and yourself immediately fly into the army, be there in full combat readiness."




        Source: https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/369-tragediya-22-iyunya-chast-2-kak-marshal-is-konev-podkuzmil-svoimi-vospominaniyami-marshalu-gk-zhukovu-i- zamechatelnomu-istoriku-a-isaevu-do-kuchi.html
        1. AsmyppoL
          17 June 2021 20: 32
          +16
          As usual, you are cheating again. All sites say Milchakov's lies ...
          Firstly, report N5 is characterized by the fact that it has an appendix based on intelligence data from all border districts and administrative departments. The appendix contains the location of all corps and division headquarters known to intelligence, the location of divisions, regiments and even battalions. At the same time, the deployment of divisions and regiments with known and rechecked numbers does not correspond to the locations of the actual divisions. That is, the intelligence data are false, and the known numbers simply do not exist in the Wehrmacht, or they are very far away and were not re-distributed at the end of May.
          Secondly, the reconnaissance data rechecked for some reason correspond to the instructions of the German command to the Abwehr in terms of showing the concentration of troops in the south, and not in the north. It is forbidden to show the dislocation of large groups in the north. Intelligence does not see them. On May 31, there is only one full-fledged tank division near Warsaw, where reconnaissance sees it on the evening of June 21, 1941.
          Thirdly, up to 70% of the units and formations that the intelligence allegedly saw in the appendix to the N5 report remained in the same places where they had never been. There is information about this in the intelligence reports of the PribOVO for June 18 and 21, 1941, in the reports of the ZAPOVO for June 20 and 21 ... For more than three weeks, dozens of German divisions are seen and tracked where they have never been.
          Fourth. The first intelligence report confirms the pre-war data, which was false.
          For example, for nine motorized divisions that never existed in the Wehrmacht and were never deployed in the places indicated by the intelligence service. In the first reconnaissance report of the intelligence department, there are no tank groupings on the Suvalkinsky ledge, in the Brest region and the place of actual deployment of the 1st tank group.
          But there are 33-35 German divisions in Romania, including 10 motorized and tank divisions. And there were only six of them infantry. Up to 13-15 divisions in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, where there was not a single one.
          A powerful mechanized group at the top of the Lviv ledge (direction Krakow-Lvov). Exactly where she was expected to appear at the headquarters of KOVO, but where she was never there.
          Fifth. From the first intelligence report of the intelligence department, it follows how many German divisions were on June 19 and by June 22. And an extremely poor intelligence picture is emerging. In particular, until June 19, 2-3 infantry divisions were added to the enemy grouping concentrated against KOVO and ZAPOVO, although in fact they transported much more. Ten times more!
          The fact that the intelligence did not know the places of concentration of enemy strike groups follows from the operational reports of the General Staff for June 22 and 23. One unreliable intelligence ...
          In my materials, ALL published intelligence materials are considered, in which there is information about the deployment of German troops. All of them are analyzed and their difference from the actual data is shown.
          There was not a single intelligible refutation except screeching and screaming.
          Above, I have listed many materials on which neither you nor your employer Kozinkin wrote anything. Again squeals and empty air ...
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 17 June 2021 22: 35
            -20%
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            That is, the intelligence data are false, and the known numbers simply do not exist in the Wehrmacht, or they are very far away and were not re-distributed at the end of May.

            You are just a pitiful amateur in military affairs, which is why you cannot understand that the concentration of troops near our borders took place in stages, and not all formations in full force arrived at the border in one day, and their arrival could be stretched out for weeks.
            .
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Thirdly, up to 70% of the units and formations that the intelligence allegedly saw in the appendix to the N5 report remained in the same places where they had never been.

            This is a heinous lie, if only because the author did not present a single reliable document with the location of German units, and the scraps of maps that he sells to the public are not proof, if only because even our parts are not marked there, and the maps are compiled in May is unknown by whom. They could have been deliberately planted as disinformation or they were compiled in our time using Photoshop.
            So when the deceitful author presents scans of genuine Wehrmacht maps with a source link, then it will be possible to compare them with what our intelligence knew.

            Quote: AsmyppoL
            A powerful mechanized group at the top of the Lviv ledge (direction Krakow-Lvov). Exactly where she was expected to appear at the headquarters of KOVO, but where she was never there.

            The author cannot confirm this lie.
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            The fact that the intelligence did not know the places of concentration of enemy strike groups follows from the operational reports of the General Staff for June 22 and 23.

            Again, a heinous lie, because on June 22 and 23, all the headquarters of the groupings had already changed their deployment, which is why until their new location was established, they were not included in the report. Learn materiel, verbiage on military topics ...
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Above I have listed a lot of materials,

            This waste paper was compiled from the Internet, and often from dubious sources, as I established, and therefore cannot justify the author's lies. He has not even seen the original text of Intelligence Report # 5, and uses the book version, and already poses as an expert in intelligence materials. Especially for the illiterate author, I repeat the words of the marshal:
            I asked Ivan Khristoforovich and the intelligence chief one question: "Does Moscow, the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff know about this?" - "Yes, he knows," was the answer, "we reported this to Moscow every day."

            Where these daily reports are and what was reported in them before June 22, our deceitful author does not know, and therefore his home-grown conclusions cannot be taken seriously.
            By the way, to my question why Golikov was not repressed, but, on the contrary, was promoted to the level of People's Commissar for negotiating with the allies, and in the spring of 1942, more than twenty officers of the GRU General Staff were awarded military orders for 1941, he did not answer, and fled from answer. Once again I will ask the same question to the swindler from history - how can this be explained if intelligence worked poorly on the eve of the war.
            1. AsmyppoL
              18 June 2021 05: 44
              +13
              You simply cannot comprehend the material presented by me.
              It is obvious. About two years ago, I was faced with the fact that you could not comprehend the text of the intelligence report of June 22.
              What else to talk about?
              In the parts of the article on intelligence, a full assessment of all regiments and divisions was carried out, which are noted in the appendix to the summary of June 15, according to intelligence data from different districts and RU before the war. ALL WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS.
              And 70% does not come from my articles, but from a comparison of official materials ...
              The material simply does not reach you, because there is a lot of it.
              Search for articles in an easier way ...
              Or agitation ...
              For example, about the mobilized 19th army, about which you leave comments with delight ...
              What nonsense! ABOUT
              The main striking force of the 19th Army is the Mech Corps! What is he mobilized ??
              I don't want to have a conversation with amateurs ...
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 18 June 2021 13: 22
                -14%
                Quote: AsmyppoL
                You simply cannot comprehend the material presented by me.

                Your vile lie about how the radio station delivered information for three days, how radio intelligence could not correctly determine what kind of connection works on the air by epaulettes, about the fact that the Wehrmacht headquarters needed to have our agents, of course I will not comment, because you just a liar and generally have no idea how intelligence is conducted and materials are obtained.
                Quote: AsmyppoL
                In the parts of the article on intelligence, a full assessment of all regiments and divisions was carried out, which are noted in the appendix to the summary of June 15, according to intelligence data from different districts and RU before the war. ALL WITHOUT EXCEPTIONS.

                This is another heinous lie, because, by definition, Intelligence Report No. 5 only defines the May data on the enemy, but there is no data for June in it, and you have no idea about them. On June 19, the KOVO intelligence chief told Konev that they were reporting regional intelligence reports on a daily basis. But since you are a complete amateur in this matter, let me remind you that there were still ten-day intelligence reports, special survey materials, newsletters, analytical notes, and all of them in copies were usually sent to the RU KA.

                Quote: AsmyppoL
                For example, about the mobilized 19th army, about which you leave comments with delight ...

                Well, try to refute Marshal Konev for a start, let's see what you can do to justify your lies about the 16th Army.
                Quote: AsmyppoL
                I don't want to have a conversation with amateurs ...

                Yes, you are just a "genius" of history, but your knowledge of military history is too primitive, so lie further, but do not get carried away too much - people are already fed up with your articles, pouring one and the same lie from empty to empty ..
  6. Unknown
    Unknown 30 May 2021 08: 06
    +12
    [/ quote] This can only be explained by the absence of our scouts and sources of information in large German headquarters (with the exception of the Air Force headquarters). [quote]
    Schulze-Boysen, of course a major success of our intelligence, but also an exception to the rule. The General Staff of the OKW, OKH, and almost the entire officer corps of Germany, were brought up on Prussian traditions and notions of honor. Recruiting a simple source of information requires art and the General Staff of OKW and OKH generally impossible. These are not informers, among the creative intelligentsia, to rake in batches. Plus, for the carriers of classified information, secret surveillance is being conducted, which they have no idea about. Schulze-Boysen, was recruited on the basis of sympathy for the Communists and the USSR, and the aristocrat's persistent antipathy, for Hitler and his entourage, which he did not quickly and concealed . Was under surveillance, and as soon as our resident made a mistake in the radiogram, Schulze-Boysen was figured out, and the entire intelligence network was opened. Sudoplatov, in his memoirs, says that the sources of information remain in development regardless of whether the recruiter and his leader are repressed or not.
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. Shiden
        Shiden 30 May 2021 09: 11
        +13
        It is not the intelligence officers who are to blame, but those who received the information. The trouble of our intelligence services was that there were no analysts who could compare all my information and give the result to the top management. It's no secret that only Hess's flight shook Stalin's opinion that Germany would not dare to fight on two fronts ... And what a sin to conceal, the leadership of the intelligence services adjusted to the wishes of the owner.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 30 May 2021 09: 42
        +2
        Quote: Liam
        The objects of the raids of the German aviation are, first of all, the Svir-3 power plant, the Moscow factories producing individual parts for the aircraft, as well as car repair shops?

        He listed the priority objects, and not an extract from the operational plan of the Luftwaffe - do you have any idea that this is not the same thing to evaluate the work of this agent? The objects of the aircraft building industry were at that time of primary importance, so there is no mistake in the report, on the contrary, even specific goals are indicated.
        Quote: Liam
        In this case, it is difficult to disagree with Stalin's resolution on the report with this intelligence service.

        Of course, Stalin can be considered a saint, but only June 22 showed that he was far from being a genius in conducting intelligence and assessing the materials coming to him. And his resolution only confirms this.
        1. The comment was deleted.
    2. vladcub
      vladcub 30 May 2021 11: 07
      +8
      In fact, the reconnaissance groups: the "Corsicans" and the "foremen" fell asleep for two reasons: 1) A betrayal of one of the radio operators of the "red chapel"; 2) the reconnaissance error: many communication sessions were required, and the "listeners" from SD worked perfectly .; 3) the "Corsican" and the "foreman" neglected the rules of conspiracy
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 30 May 2021 18: 25
        +2
        Quote: vladcub
        Actually, the reconnaissance groups: "Corsicans" and "foremen" fell asleep for two reasons: 1) betrayal of one of the radio operators of the "red chapel";

        There was no betrayal of the radio operators, but there was the capture of the radio operator, moreover, through the fault of those who violated the requirements for the safety of communications, and forced them to work for several hours on the air:
        Many years after the war, Walter Schellenberg, one of the leaders of intelligence in Nazi Germany, recalled:

        “Before leaving Germany, Russian Ambassador Dekanozov did a really good preparatory work. However, it was only in the middle of 1942 that we managed to infiltrate the largest Soviet espionage organization, which appeared in our field of vision in the summer of 1941, creating an extensive radio communications network. We gave this organization the name "Red Chapel" ...
        Its radio network covered the entire territory of Europe, stretching from Norway through Switzerland to the Mediterranean Sea and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Baltic. The first “musicians” - as we called the radio operators (hence the “Red Chapel” - N.Sh.) - were employees of the Soviet embassy in Paris, who, after the German troops entered France, dispersed to different countries. We were on our guard after how, shortly after the outbreak of the war with Russia, one of our checkpoints, conducting intensive radio reconnaissance, discovered a transmitter whose coordinates were in Belgium. The chief of intelligence, General Thiele, Admiral Canaris, Müller and I discussed the incident.
        We came to a consensus that it is necessary to jointly start the search for an unknown transmitter ...
        Müller equipped a special radio intelligence station that would monitor Belgium and Northern France. The first tracks led to one of the outskirts of Brussels. By prior agreement with Canaris, at the end of 1941 it was decided to try to seize the Belgian station. During this operation, two Soviet intelligence officers were arrested. One of them was the head of the intelligence center, the other was an experienced radio operator. One Russian, named Sofia, worked with him, performing the duties of a cipher officer. This spy group lived in a small mansion. There was also a secret radio station. Their interrogations took place with great difficulty, since all three refused to testify and in various ways tried to commit suicide ... "
        Walter Schellenberg said that after the mathematical department of the radio intelligence and decryption service of the High Command of the Wehrmacht managed to get the book used to encrypt the radiograms by the Brussels intelligence officers, they managed to "figure out" the code.
        “They were able to decipher the new radiograms found in Brussels and intercepted. It became clear that we were dealing with an extremely ramified network of Soviet intelligence, the threads of which stretched through France, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Germany, and from there to Russia. The most important agent acted under the nickname Gilbert (in fact - Gilbert. - N.Sh.), the other in the programs is called Kent. In Germany itself, there were two main agents under the nicknames Corot and Arvid, whose information could only come from the highest German circles ".

        The blame for the failure lies with the leaders of the NKVD, who, having lost their radio stations with radio operators at the beginning of the war, forced the radio operators of the GRU General Staff to work for them, which led to an increase in the time spent on the air.
        Quote: vladcub
        reconnaissance error: many communication sessions were required,

        This was not a mistake of the intelligence center, but a direct order from Beria that the radio operators of the GRU General Staff begin to work for the agents of the NKVD, which is a gross violation of the rules of reconnaissance.
        Quote: vladcub
        "Corsican" and "foreman" disregarded the rules of conspiracy

        Yes, it was not they who broke the conspiracy, but the long communication sessions in which their information was transmitted, and led to the loss of these agents.
        1. vladcub
          vladcub 1 June 2021 15: 39
          +4
          So yes a little wrong. S. Rado spoke about representation. It seems that Zdanovich also has something about this.
          Willie Lehmann "Breitentbach" was not directly in the "Red Chapel", but died in 1942 due to betrayal
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 1 June 2021 18: 36
            +1
            Quote: vladcub
            Willie Lehmann "Breitentbach" was not directly in the "Red Chapel", but died in 1942 due to betrayal

            The facts of betrayal among our agents of residencies took place during the war, some simply could not stand the torture. But the cipher radio operators did not betray the "Red Capella", because the failure occurred as a result of violations of the rules for conducting radio broadcasts. Moreover, this blame lay with the leadership of the NKVD and Beria personally, who did not reckon with the fact that the enemy possessed more advanced radio interceptors than our special services. And after the war, in order to hide their organizational mistakes, the leaders of the NKVD specially arrested many of our intelligence officers, attributing them treason and work for foreign special services. Unfortunately, this was hushed up for a long time, and only much later, when the archives were opened, it became clear that these people honestly served the Motherland.
  7. ccsr
    ccsr 30 May 2021 09: 48
    -17%
    Author:
    Alexey Ivanov
    The author will present his version of the events that took place on the eve of the war, based on the fact that the RM did not correspond to reality.

    That's all, you can not read further, because this author laid out his illiterate version over many articles, for which he was repeatedly ridiculed, due to the lack of an idea of ​​how intelligence worked on the eve of the war. Especially his pearls about how the entire intelligence of the USSR was deceived by changing the buttonholes on the shoulder straps, which showed the level of the author's knowledge.
    In general, "on a cola bore, start over" ...
  8. vladcub
    vladcub 30 May 2021 10: 50
    +7
    "I counted 30 pieces of 45 mm anti-tank guns" in the Wehrmacht there were no 45 mm guns! They had 37mm anti-tank guns
  9. vladcub
    vladcub 30 May 2021 11: 17
    +18
    On June 22, 1941, the Abwehr had the best intelligence: they perfectly knew how to mystify that they had demonstrated
  10. ee2100
    ee2100 30 May 2021 11: 19
    +18
    The article is very interesting. It can be seen from the past articles and the author in the "topic".
    Everyone had their own idea of ​​the tragic failures of the beginning of the Second World War. Information published to authors will always be useful.
  11. AsmyppoL
    18 June 2021 07: 24
    +15
    Quote: ccsr
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    They contain almost all available materials on intelligence reports, on maps and diagrams (with links).

    The author is lying as always, because he does not quote any of the intelligence reports that came to the RU of the Red Army from the districts in the period from June 1 to 22, and all his "conclusions" were sucked from the monthly Intelligence No. 5 for May 1941, which intended for a wide range of military leaders of different levels.
    His lies are refuted by Marshal I.S. Konev in his memoirs, which were recorded on tape. This is how he describes the quality of intelligence materials of the KOVO headquarters, and how they did it every day at the RU GSh:
    Arriving at the district headquarters in the morning (on the 19th - K.O.), unfortunately, I did not manage to get to the commander M.P. Kirponos, I was informed that he was ill ...

    .... I knew I.X. Baghramyan since 1928. In the summer of 1928, we, at that time both regiment commanders, rested together in Gurzuf, made friends, and trusted each other. Half an hour later, when Ivan Khristoforovich returned, we were with him in his office. heard the report of the head of the intelligence department. As soon as the scout opened the map of the southwestern border of the district, the large density of conventional symbols drawn in blue pencil, and, as you know, the enemy, was evident in blue ... It was evident that a large German grouping was concentrated on the border of the Soviet Union: motorized divisions , corps, headquarters, concentration of tanks, aviation; the map also recorded the flights of German aircraft along our border. There could be no doubt that the enemy's strike group was being deployed for the offensive.
    I asked Ivan Khristoforovich and the intelligence chief one question: "Does Moscow, the People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff know about this?" “Yes, he knows,” was the answer, “we reported this to Moscow every day.” And he added that, apparently, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, the Military Council and the district headquarters will leave for the forward command post in the Ternopil region, they will be there in full combat readiness.

    Like every military man, I could have only one conclusion: yes, this is war.
    Returning to the headquarters of my 19th Army in Cherkassy, ​​I gave all orders on the combat readiness of the troops and asked by phone the Chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov to allow me to fly to Rostov to the headquarters of the district, since I was not relieved of the post of commander of the troops of the North Caucasian district. It was necessary to personally give a number of orders, to acquaint the district headquarters with the situation on the border and bring the district troops to full combat readiness. G.K. Zhukov gave permission and asked me not to leave the RF government communications wire anywhere in Rostov.
    I arrived in Rostov on the evening of the twentieth. On the night of June 22, I was at my apartment. At two o'clock in the morning on June 22, there was a call on HF. Zhukov said that the situation was threatening, gave the command to bring all the means of air defense of Rostov on alert. "Leave the commander of the district, Reiter, your deputy, and yourself immediately fly into the army, be there in full combat readiness."




    Source: https://liewar.ru/tragediya-22-iyunya/369-tragediya-22-iyunya-chast-2-kak-marshal-is-konev-podkuzmil-svoimi-vospominaniyami-marshalu-gk-zhukovu-i- zamechatelnomu-istoriku-a-isaevu-do-kuchi.html

    Unfortunately the readers are being deceived by the author of the provided comment. Why?
    Because similar maps of the KOVO headquarters are reviewed several times in parts of the article. In particular, on these maps, the mobile troops of the fascists are not located in the places of concentration of the formations of the first tank group. Therefore, the blow of the Corusians of this group was unexpected for the command of the district and the NKO. Bagramyan and Vladimirsky also wrote about this in addition to the situation on the maps and intelligence reports.
    In addition, there are distorted data in the memoirs of Marshal Konev. For example, it is written that in May the conscription began in the army division up to the military state. Divisions of the 34th brigade began to receive assigned personnel only after June 1. Two divisions of the 25th SC (127 and 162) generally began to replenish only from June 10.
    In addition, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, it was forbidden to call for the collection of conscripts who passed the training camp in 1939-40. That is, in the division they called in the wrong people who were most ready for military service. There were even untrained conscripts ...
    Regarding the mechanized corps, which changed as part of the army, it is generally impossible to talk about staffing there ...
    When people on such episodes from memoirs build absolutely correct theories about pre-war events, then they are either scammers (increase interest in their paperwork) or professionals at the level of primary school students ...
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 18 June 2021 13: 33
      -14%
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Because similar maps of the KOVO headquarters are reviewed several times in parts of the article.

      A disgusting lie, if only because all the maps referred to by the author have nothing to do with the intelligence department of KOVO, and moreover, they did not even know who they belonged to.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      In addition, there are distorted data in the memoirs of Marshal Konev.

      Another vile lie, because this would-be researcher cannot refute Konev's words with anything. And his lies about the promotion of the 16th Army are generally on the level of cheap comics.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      In addition, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense, it was forbidden to call for the collection of conscripts who passed the training camp in 1939-40. That is, in the division they called in the wrong people who were most ready for military service. There were even untrained conscripts ...

      What this has to do with KOVO intelligence, the author does not know, but, as always, he blabs the topic with various nonsense.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      When people on such episodes from memoirs build absolutely correct theories about pre-war events,

      When the forger AsmyppoL slips some clippings from scans of unknown origin, then any author's text, and even more so the voice of the participants in the war, looks like a reliable fact against this background, even if he may indicate something inaccurately, because it can be checked by others sources. But AsmyppoL always carefully hides its sources and draws all information from Internet tales, which are immeasurable in the network, and which amateurs are bought for.