Nuclear triad. Poplar and Minuteman - yesterday or today?

108

Photo: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

To begin with, as a preface. Nuclear weapon every country that has it is a very complex component of state security. It is clear that this is a single-use weapon, since the first use automatically becomes the last one, condemning the whole world.

In this cycle, we will try to talk and compare the nuclear security components of Russia and the United States. Perhaps the weapons of China, Great Britain and other countries of the "nuclear club" would also look appropriate here, but it will be quite beautiful with two main contenders for the main roles in the nuclear Apocalypse.



And we'll start with the ground component.


Ground-based nuclear weapons systems are divided into two classes: mine and mobile. The Americans do not have mobile systems, all 400 ground-based ICBMs are mine LGM-30G Minuteman-III.


The LGM-30G "Minuteman III" is a rather old rocket from the seventies of the last century. Yes, it is constantly being modernized, which allows the missile to be an effective component of the nuclear triad, but the US military does not consider it necessary to develop this topic, the topic of silo-based ICBMs. And there are certain reasons for this.

I will allow myself a small digression.

Silo-based ICBMs are of course the last century. In fact, they are not very useful. Yes, when the very principle of operating ICBMs was being developed, there were not many things: satellite orbital groupings in the first place and decent submarines in the second. Over-the-horizon radars, of course, are a topic, they could detect launches, but satellites are still much more effective.

In addition, over the past time, the opponents have not only thoroughly studied the location of the launching shafts, but with their eyes closed, they will hit the mines. Natural and logical. So today it is simply not worth considering a mine-based launcher as a serious weapon. And here is the reason.

The standard distance along the Earth's surface that ICBMs cover is about 10 km. This is enough for both us and the Americans to reach targets on enemy territory. The flight time is about 000 minutes.

Since the missiles fly along a ballistic trajectory, it is clear that even a small decrease in the flight range leads to a sharp decrease in flight time. And the time factor can be significant, if not critical, in a situation where the attacker delivers, for example, a preemptive strike against the enemy's control centers and nuclear forces.

By this I mean that the closer an ICBM or CD with a nuclear warhead is to the enemy's territory, the less time the enemy will have to develop countermeasures.

Retaliation is not reaction. Countermeasures are attempts to prevent missiles from exploding where intended. And in this light, mine PUs do not look serious. The maximum, in what their "usefulness" is to give the enemy time to mobilize and prepare for a response. Half an hour is an eternity by the standards of the Apocalypse.

Probably, realizing the obsolescence of this weapon, the United States stopped work on the creation of mine-based ICBMs, throwing all its forces into maintaining the Minutemans in working order and at the proper level in terms of modernization.

In Russia, the approach is somewhat different. Work on the creation of new missile weapons is going on in two directions, both mine and mobile deployment. Everything is clear with mines, but mobile complexes can have their say, being not as vulnerable as missiles in mines. Again, in well-known mines. The mobile complex, which managed to move away from the calculated basing site, where, no doubt, the strike will be struck, is a guaranteed launch towards the enemy. And MAZ-MZKT-79221 is capable of delivering up to 40 km / h. There are options.

Therefore, Topol and Yarsy, which exist in a mobile version, are, of course, preferable to missiles in mines.


It is possible to talk about the performance characteristics of missiles on both sides, but without fanaticism. About "Minuteman-3" is known enough, and all the innovations that have been made recently, the Americans keep secret. Roughly the same thing is with our missiles.

Topol-M, which was replaced by Yars, is the fruit of the creativity of the Moscow Institute of Heat Engineering, which developed the RT-70PM Topol ICBM back in the 2s of the last century. These two missiles are modifications of the Soviet ICBM with all the ensuing consequences, that is, they are quite lethal technology. Moreover, based on the quality of Soviet developments, in the 2000s, an openly propaganda myth was born that there is no effective anti-missile defense against Topol.

In fact, the differences between Topol-M and Yars are not that big. Home - "Yars" carries several warheads, and "Topol" one-piece. And one more difference, no less significant - the Ukrainian design bureau Yuzhnoye was directly involved in the creation of Topol-M. It is clear that today any interaction with the Ukrainians in the military field is unrealistic, so a completely Russian Yars looks preferable. And the fact that the aiming system was invented within the walls of the Kiev Avangard Design Bureau and assembled at the plant of the same name ...

In general, Yars is a Russian Topol carrying several warheads. That's the whole difference. How much better is the Minuteman?

In general, there is almost no information about Yars. But since this is a modification of Topol-M, which is stated in open sources, “compared to Topol-M, TPK Yarsa has a higher level of protection against small arms damage. The warranty period for the operation of the complex was increased by one and a half times, and the introduction of technical solutions and measures for fire protection of equipment increased nuclear safety, ”that can be taken as the starting point of the Topol-M performance characteristics.


Length 22,5 m, maximum diameter 1,9 m, takeoff weight 47 tons. It has 3 stages with solid propellant engines and a warhead weighing 1,2 tons, which is equipped with a 0,55 Mt warhead. In addition to the warhead, the payload includes several dozen false targets, including those of a radio-electronic nature.

You can also find such an interesting detail as KVO. Circular probabilistic deviation. This figure gives us the approximate radius of the circle in which the warhead will hit with a probability of at least 50%.
This is a very important indicator when striking such complex targets as underground command posts and missile silos. KVO for "Topol-M" is 200-350 m. The figure is somewhat vague, but there is nothing to be done about it.

The maximum range for the missile is declared at 11 km, which is more than enough to reach any target in the United States in about 000 minutes. This is if the warhead is separated at an altitude of about 27 km and rises to a maximum height of 300 km.

However, if we take into account the repeated statements of the military that the Topol-M has a low / flat trajectory, and the separation of the warhead occurs at an altitude of only 200 km with an initial pitch of 5 degrees, then the maximum climb height will be 350 km. In this case, the range will be "only" 8 800 km and this distance will be covered in 21 minutes.

The power of the warhead, consisting of 4 parts, 100 kt each, turns out to be 400 kt.

More than decent performance. The range is sufficient to reach any point in the United States when launched from central Russia. The time is reduced by as much as 9 minutes. There is something to think about. Plus additional complications for the missile defense, which needs to carry out a complete selection of targets during this shortened approach time. But in general, such a reduction in flight time is more important precisely with a preemptive strike than with a retaliatory one.

What about Minuteman 3?


Length 18,2 m, maximum diameter 1,67 m, takeoff weight 36 tons. It has 3 stages with solid propellant engines and a warhead of 1,15 tons. The latest modification of the Minuteman, the LGM-30G, has a W87 warhead with a yield of 300 (according to other sources, 475) kilotons.

The Minuteman-3's range is about 13000 km with an arrival time of 36 minutes. True, these data were for a variant with a MIRV of three W78 warheads. Monoblock W87 is much lighter, so the data may be different. There is indirect evidence that the "Minuteman-3" with a combat monoblock has a range of 15 km. This is frankly redundant.

KVO "Minutema" is estimated at 150-200 meters.

What else can you squeeze out of the numbers? The power of the engines is approximately the same, the starting thrust of the first stage is estimated at 91-92 tons. Based on the fact that the "Minuteman" is considerably lighter, it can be assumed that it starts a little faster and its blocks can pick up great speed. The American rocket has data on the maximum speed of the blocks at 24 km / h, it can be assumed that this figure is lower for Yars.

It is clear here that a Russian rocket's body simply has to be stronger precisely because of its mobility. The body of the rocket when moving (especially over rough terrain) will have a fair amount of physical impact, which is not typical for a silo-based rocket. A mine rocket is transported once in a lifetime. Before the mine. And the mobile has to move systematically, so everything is clear here.

Otherwise, the missiles are actually the same. Yes, Yars seems to have inherited from Topol the ability to maneuver a monoblock using mini-engines. It is difficult to assert something, since some of the sources (more serious) say that there is a "possibility" of equipping the blocks with such engines, some of the sources are frankly joyfully hysterical about the fact that the "Topol" / "Yarsa" warhead is nothing more than a hypersonic glider capable of maneuvering on the ballistic leg of the trajectory.

There is no serious confirmation. But the question immediately arises: why? Why does the warhead need this frankly stupid maneuvering?

If you look at it intelligently, any maneuver of the warhead takes it out of the protection of a cloud of decoys, sources of radio interference, metal debris in which it moves, maddening enemy ballistic computers, which burn processors in an attempt to determine exactly what is flying where.

It turns out that the warhead will remain "naked", which will immediately remove the selection task for the missile defense system. After the first maneuver, the monoblock will be visible on radars, but how much fuel it will have enough to rush from side to side at great speed is a question. Indeed, in addition to yawing along the course, you also need to aim at the target.

If you look at the characteristics that are known, then "Minuteman-3", which as a model has almost half a century, is no worse than its Russian counterpart. And in some cases it even surpasses.

However, the issue of superiority in the same range should be treated without fanaticism. Why do you need a range of 15 km if all targets are at a distance of 000-8 km? The number of warheads is almost parity. A monoblock system has been developed in accordance with the START-10 treaty, but both the United States and Russia have MIRVed warheads.

The American W78, in which 3 charges of 340 kt each, is clearly more powerful than the Russian one, which has 4 charges of 100 kt each.

True, there is a 800 kt monoblock from Topol-M, but this is a very specific charge.

On the side of the Americans, there is such a delicate thing as targeting accuracy. If we are talking about modern guidance methods, then the more accurate the GPS system is than GLONASS, so it is easier for the Americans with guidance. If we talk about the use of an inertial guidance system, then it is very difficult to judge. But I think that our system is at least as good as the American one.

Plus, the Americans actually have more deployed missiles, but this is also not critical.

Russian missiles have an advantage in overcoming missile defenses. This is affected by a more modern development, taking into account modern realities. And the mobility of ground-based complexes, which increases the survival rate.

In general, a certain parity is outlined. If you do not take into account the fact that Russian missiles were adopted relatively recently (Topol-M in 1997, Yars in 2010), and Minuteman almost 50 years ago.

It turns out that the Americans, through a series of modernizations, were able to keep their missile at a very competitive level.

And, based on all that has been said, it is very difficult to give the palm to a Russian or American rocket.

However, speaking of ground-based ICBM systems, it is worth noting that the Russian approach based on the use of mobile systems is generally more viable. There is a chance that even in the event of a first strike, some of the complexes that are on alert at a distance from their permanent deployment sites will be able to retaliate.
Mine-based missiles should gradually give way to more modern missile systems, primarily because of their vulnerability.

The times when silos (silo launchers) guaranteed the safety of missiles and the possibility of launching ended with the advent of weapons capable of disabling the silos with a high probability. Accordingly, it makes no sense today, in the age of high-precision weapons, to pay much attention to frankly outdated weapons.

Indeed, even in the event of a launch, ICBMs launched from another continent are quite calmly tracked by modern means. And anti-missile systems and countermeasures (like the same NORAD) may well cope with the task of destroying the warheads of ICBMs.

In general, land-based ICBMs can be safely called the most obsolete components of the nuclear triad of any country. Precisely because it is easiest to track and not very difficult to neutralize.

Accordingly, it is not so important how much "Minuteman-3" is better or worse than "Yars", in any case, these are representatives of a rapidly aging class of strategic weapons. Therefore, the Americans abandoned the idea of ​​developing new land-based missiles, paying attention to other methods of delivering nuclear warheads to enemy territory. But we'll talk about this next time. About air carriers of nuclear weapons.
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  1. -13
    27 May 2021 03: 44
    Our nuclear weapons are the best in the world!
    1. +16
      27 May 2021 05: 49
      Quote: Ilya-spb
      Our nuclear weapons are the best in the world!
      Most peaceful! laughing


      And in this light, mine PUs do not look serious. The maximum, in what their "usefulness" is to give the enemy time to mobilize and prepare for a response.
      The author overlooks the fact that the enemy will be FORCED to send considerable forces to these very protected objects for, and with an unobvious result, for me it is so very useful!

      In general, Yars is a Russian Topol carrying several warheads. That's the whole difference.
      The right word is what a "trifle"! Hand face, or whatever.

      If you look at it intelligently, any maneuver of the warhead takes it out of the protection of a cloud of decoys, sources of radio interference, metal debris in which it moves, maddening enemy ballistic computers, which burn processors in an attempt to determine exactly what is flying where.
      Generally something! What are the clouds of decoys when entering the atmosphere ?! What trash ?! Glider, for the information of the author, is a PLANER and it can maneuver strictly in the atmosphere, and once again, for the information of the author, a significant part of the missile defense system intercepts the BB on approaching the target and it is in the atmosphere, and it is the BB maneuvering that dramatically reduces the ABM capabilities.
      1. +3
        27 May 2021 11: 16
        hi There are more questions to the article. As I remember, the Americans had projects of mobile complexes, even moved by a special helicopter, but they were turned off. Why? Take a look at the map. Many mines are located in the interior of the country, they already will be launched in the event of a war. Neighbors in the United States in this regard pose no threat to them, neither Mexico, nor Canada, "51 states" and a member of NATO. Geography allows them to abandon mobile systems, but we cannot afford such a luxury! All they had to do was improve the missiles themselves, including the missile defense penetration systems, and the protection of their bases.
        Next:
        Therefore, the Americans abandoned the idea of ​​developing new land-based missiles, paying attention to other methods of delivering nuclear warheads to enemy territory.
        Uh ... But what about GBSD, R&D on which they are boiling? Even in the title: ground-based Strategic Deterrent.

        The primary reason for some lagging behind the United States (while their triad can still easily fulfill its mission) is the absence of a serious adversary for two decades. Yes, and these two decades, it was also a formidable force, which lost a little in the speed of development, but still modernized. This was a guarantee of security for us, they needed other troops more. Russia in the times of 90 and 00 was completely friendly, China too. But now more large-scale expensive update programs are being urgently started. The same GBSD.
      2. +3
        27 May 2021 14: 27
        Quote: Vladimir_2U
        The author is missing the fact

        The author not only misses the fact, he compares the mobile complex with a silo rocket. At the same time, it is concluded that the Americans were in the 80s, and we were able to do it only in the 90-2000s. In fairness, then you need to compare Minuteman3 with our UR100 or Satan.
      3. +7
        27 May 2021 15: 43
        Strange article. If Roman compares Russian and American land-based ICBMs, then why does he mention only Russian 40-ton solid-propellant Topol and Yarsy? request He is not aware that the lion's share of nuclear charges on a potential enemy will be carried by liquid-fuel missiles - is it a 100-ton UR-100 Stiletto and a 200-ton Satan? recourse
      4. +1
        28 June 2021 05: 48
        Quote: Vladimir_2U
        Quote: Ilya-spb
        Our nuclear weapons are the best in the world!
        Most peaceful! laughing


        And in this light, mine PUs do not look serious. The maximum, in what their "usefulness" is to give the enemy time to mobilize and prepare for a response.
        The author overlooks the fact that the enemy will be FORCED to send considerable forces to these very protected objects for, and with an unobvious result, for me it is so very useful!

        In general, Yars is a Russian Topol carrying several warheads. That's the whole difference.
        The right word is what a "trifle"! Hand face, or whatever.

        If you look at it intelligently, any maneuver of the warhead takes it out of the protection of a cloud of decoys, sources of radio interference, metal debris in which it moves, maddening enemy ballistic computers, which burn processors in an attempt to determine exactly what is flying where.
        Generally something! What are the clouds of decoys when entering the atmosphere ?! What trash ?! Glider, for the information of the author, is a PLANER and it can maneuver strictly in the atmosphere, and once again, for the information of the author, a significant part of the missile defense system intercepts the BB on approaching the target and it is in the atmosphere, and it is the BB maneuvering that dramatically reduces the ABM capabilities.

        Garbage, in the cloud of which, according to the author, a warhead is flying, cannot be compared in speed with it. And decoys imitate a warhead and fly along different trajectories.
    2. Aag
      -1
      27 May 2021 07: 52
      Quote: Ilya-spb
      Our nuclear weapons are the best in the world!

      Can you confirm?
      1. +1
        27 May 2021 13: 03
        Quote: AAG
        Can you confirm?

        It's easy - the Americans only reckon with us because of this, otherwise we would have been finished under Khrushchev.
        1. Aag
          -2
          27 May 2021 15: 58
          Quote: ccsr
          Quote: AAG
          Can you confirm?

          It's easy - the Americans only reckon with us because of this, otherwise we would have been finished under Khrushchev.

          Not at all an argument in terms of the statement "our nuclear weapons are the best in the world." ...
          Ah, I get it! "in the world!" ... and not "... in the world!" in the absence of war! good
          Seriously, dear ccsr, we have talked with you on this topic many times. I also believe that if it were not for the Strategic Missile Forces, it is not known how history would have turned under Khrushchev, in 91-93 ... and beyond. But! This absolutely does not mean that our nuclear weapons are the best! Sufficient YES is necessary! (Otherwise it would be, apparently, as you write).
          I'm just ... annoyed by shouts like "Hurray!" out of the blue ... Come on, ladies and gentlemen, comrades, this is more serious ... The situation is compelling.
          If you need arguments, - I have given part in other comments under this ... article. (Samsonov's articles on social topics are very interesting. I wondered why he was so rotten for topics related to weapons. And, behold, "waited" - an article on the topic where I understand something ... May the author, respected in other epostases, forgive me, - nonsense ... By all indicators ... IMHO, of course, but I'm ready to confirm (within the limits of what is permitted). hi
          1. -1
            27 May 2021 18: 38
            Quote: AAG
            Seriously, dear ccsr, we have talked with you on this topic many times. I also believe that if it were not for the Strategic Missile Forces, it is not known how history would have turned under Khrushchev, in 91-93 ... and beyond.

            This is obvious to any literate person.
            Quote: AAG
            This does not mean at all that our nuclear weapons are the best!

            I believe in this, because I know how seriously they were engaged in the development of these systems - not a single branch of the armed forces had such high-quality developments as was done in the interests of the Strategic Missile Forces. The best minds in the country worked for them, so there was no hack there. As a simple example, I will give an example of what was developed in the interests of nuclear weapons in terms of long-term storage batteries. A few years ago, near Cologne, they found an agent radio station, where a unified long-term storage radio operator's battery was supposed to be - experts know what it is. So what the Strategic Missile Forces had, in terms of quality and storage time, had much better parameters than it was done in the interests of undercover intelligence - make a conclusion yourself.
            1. Aag
              0
              27 May 2021 19: 25
              Quote: ccsr
              Quote: AAG
              Seriously, dear ccsr, we have talked with you on this topic many times. I also believe that if it were not for the Strategic Missile Forces, it is not known how history would have turned under Khrushchev, in 91-93 ... and beyond.

              This is obvious to any literate person.
              Quote: AAG
              This does not mean at all that our nuclear weapons are the best!

              I believe in this, because I know how seriously they were engaged in the development of these systems - not a single branch of the armed forces had such high-quality developments as was done in the interests of the Strategic Missile Forces. The best minds in the country worked for them, so there was no hack there. As a simple example, I will give an example of what was developed in the interests of nuclear weapons in terms of long-term storage batteries. A few years ago, near Cologne, they found an agent radio station, where a unified long-term storage radio operator's battery was supposed to be - experts know what it is. So what the Strategic Missile Forces had, in terms of quality and storage time, had much better parameters than it was done in the interests of undercover intelligence - make a conclusion yourself.

              Thank you for the answer.
              But how does this affect the parity of strategic nuclear forces?
              (even more so in TE, and today?).
              IMHO: the achievements, which, it seems, were managed to be preserved, are the uncertainty of opponents, enemies, adversaries (underline the necessary) - in inflicting an unrequited nuclear attack Moreover, - on an unacceptable scale / for opponents. EVERYTHING !!! Do not believe me (understandable). Listen to our Commander-in-Chief (I realize, for many He is not an authority, but other persons defining the concept of using nuclear weapons are not close to be seen ...) -we are in paradise, ... the rest ... will just die ...
              To whom, what is not clear?
              I will chew ... We cannot ensure the complete safety of our territories from the enemy's nuclear weapons, (I suspect, we cannot ... and we don’t need to ...) But ... And we will make your ... existence ... unacceptable. in fact (especially with your habit of comfort), it is not possible.
              IMHO: correct, non-mirrored, answer to the challenge.
              I would like more, of course ...
              But, according to experience, it will not be oligarchs who will pay for this, but people who work for 10-12 hours for the same salary as 10+ years ago ...
              Sorry for the "off topic" ...
    3. Aag
      +3
      27 May 2021 13: 15
      [Quote] [/ quote]
      In addition to the "minuses" arguments will be?
      No, I'm not talking about the experience of combat use ... What is the best? In what part of the nuclear triad? As far as I know (and this is more or less controlled information), in the air, sea components we are significantly behind the United States (and there are also NATO countries with and without nuclear weapons, but they can significantly complicate the deployment, the use of our naval and air strategists) according to the number of carriers, and possible areas of their deployment.
      According to the Strategic Missile Forces ... Are silos better protected? What are the indicators? KVO is less? The ranges (declared) in both cases are sufficient.Reliability? (Difficult to verify information, I'm sure you do not have it) .Charge power? ...
      Our PGRK, of course, has nothing to compare with (it can be with China, Korea). The United States has some analogue in terms of combat use can be "Ohio" ("Columbia") ... hi
    4. -1
      28 May 2021 09: 08
      Quote: Ilya-spb
      Our nuclear weapons are the best in the world!

      Americans mostly prefer to attack the weak in a cowardly way, therefore they do not pay due attention to nuclear weapons, but we are forced to develop them, because this is the only guarantee of our security, otherwise they will bomb both Serbs and Libya
  2. The comment was deleted.
    1. The comment was deleted.
      1. +8
        27 May 2021 09: 42
        Unfortunately, I completely agree. Censorship destroyed freedom, and Wo began to slip a long time ago. Earlier I tried to prove something, defended my point of view ... And then I was chopped off. Apparently the return to totalitarianism suits the majority ...
    2. +5
      27 May 2021 09: 07
      Totally agree with you. An attempt to compare systems, performance characteristics and real combat capabilities of which are unknown, can no longer be taken seriously. And to draw conclusions without having data is generally ridiculous. Well, the obvious repetition of the Western thesis about the uselessness of mine launchers only confirms the incompetence of the author.
    3. +2
      27 May 2021 10: 15
      and yet the topic of MX is not disclosed
    4. +2
      27 May 2021 13: 17
      Quote: Al_lexx
      Novel. This is not your topic.
      That's right.

      I completely agree, and the arguments about the futility of our silos in the future are generally at the level of journalistic "investigations" and differ from the views of military professionals, especially those who are in the subject.
      Taking into account the cost of their operation and the creation of new missiles with high speeds and maneuvering warheads, on the contrary, it is in the mines that we must place the main power of the Strategic Missile Forces, and create all kinds of mobile complexes on the residual principle. All the same, due to the transience of preparing and delivering the main nuclear strike, practically all mobile complexes will work practically from places of permanent deployment, i.e. from hangars or next to them, if sliding roofs have not yet been created. So what's the point in creating more complex and expensive mobile systems if the existing silo network will complete its task successfully. By the way, the mobile systems themselves are more easily revealed by reconnaissance during their preparation for an attack, which means that even because of unmasking signs, they must be reduced. The silos are spared from this, and the control system of stationary objects of the Strategic Missile Forces is not opened by the enemy and they cannot find out what we will be preparing for, right up to the release of missiles from the mines.
      1. +2
        27 May 2021 13: 54
        Quote: ccsr
        I completely agree, and the arguments about the futility of our silos in the future are generally at the level of journalistic "investigations" and differ from the views of military professionals, especially those who are in the subject.

        Let him write. This information is primarily for "our Western partners". Who controls more than 80% of the content is the one who owns the minds. If you want, write that the Ukrainians dug the Black Sea, and if you want, that the first Pithecanthropus was an American, etc. wink
        On the Internet, Russia (USSR) lost all wars - that the Second World War, that Afghanistan, etc.
        But whoever really saw - he really knows - what, where and where. He will describe and explain the correct picture to his children and grandchildren.
      2. Aag
        +1
        27 May 2021 20: 58
        "..., ie from hangars or next to them, if sliding roofs have not yet been created ..."
        crying belay winked
        Sorry. Sorry for the time spent communicating with you ... Where are you from .... fell from? "Sliding roofs" have been around since the days of the "Pioneers"! They have survived to this day on "Topoli", "Topoli-M", "Yarsakh" - Far from the main problem in terms of application!
        And the time of readiness to start
        in PPD is comparable to silos ...
        What are you talking about, experts? The patrimony of the PGRK-field! ... With any serious hipish, only imitators of the regiment's life should remain in the PPD (and this is no secret for a long time). The secret is where they will go (IN ADVANCE !!!), where they will stand up. on the DB (or will "patrol"), the real APU.
        1. +4
          27 May 2021 22: 02
          Quote: AAG
          The secret is where they will go (IN ADVANCE !!!), where they will stand on the database (or will "patrol"), the real APUs.

          If you have ever looked at the locations of the PGRK - and looked at the road network around these bases ...
          Knowing the mass of the PGRK, the carrying capacity of the roads, examining in detail satellite maps (preferably not Google, but specialized satellites), turns, bridges, road signs - then you can perfectly determine all potential places of dispersal.

          Besides.
          These places need to be prepared.
          There had to be carried out in advance a lot of work to strengthen the soil and maintain them in working order. What leads to an increase in the activity of work on "a seemingly useless piece of road and some forest nook."
          And all work carried out within a radius of 50 km from the same Teikovo is monitored in real time ...
          This is now really 100%.
          so your understanding of the situation is 50 years old ...
          1. Aag
            +3
            28 May 2021 18: 06
            Quote: SovAr238A
            Quote: AAG
            The secret is where they will go (IN ADVANCE !!!), where they will stand on the database (or will "patrol"), the real APUs.

            If you have ever looked at the locations of the PGRK - and looked at the road network around these bases ...
            Knowing the mass of the PGRK, the carrying capacity of the roads, examining in detail satellite maps (preferably not Google, but specialized satellites), turns, bridges, road signs - then you can perfectly determine all potential places of dispersal.

            Besides.
            These places need to be prepared.
            There had to be carried out in advance a lot of work to strengthen the soil and maintain them in working order. What leads to an increase in the activity of work on "a seemingly useless piece of road and some forest nook."
            And all work carried out within a radius of 50 km from the same Teikovo is monitored in real time ...
            This is now really 100%.
            so your understanding of the situation is 50 years old ...

            Just an hour before your comment, I watched!)) And long before that, everything that you suggest to me to "look" was driven under the skull, put on my working map (the commander of the GPP preparation and launch group).
            As for road signs, - especially amused! I will reassure you, - not all older units comply with traffic rules))) ... (unfortunately, not everyone knows. (((). If you are talking about the restrictions on the mass of the vehicle in front of bridges, viaducts .. .Don't worry - hanging to disorient the enemy!
            Naturally, there are limitations in terms of weight and dimensions, the main one being the mass. But, say, the specific pressure on the ground, is comparable to the classic "Zhiguli". Arable land, virgin land, is no worse than the BTR-80 rushing! So the tight connection to the road network is a myth! I agree that due to weather conditions, the intervention of the OISB is sometimes required (a separate engineer-engineer battalion, - with each division ... there was, besides the regimental engineering equipment-BATs, etc.).
            Did it not occur to you that the road work in the "forest nook" is not an orientation maneuver?
            And why did you stick to Teikovo? Nearby? Do you know what the Teikovo division is called in Kansk and Irkutsk?
            So, dumping roads - more often, so that those who test the experience do not shake it up!
            Engineering work is carried out in advance. Forsmajors, of course, happen ...
            Yes, my knowledge, apparently, is outdated, I'm afraid not for the better ... (((MDK - moral and business qualities of the l / s, as well as the whole society as a whole, were greatly shaken (IMHO). (99th year) the positions of NSh rdn (chiefs of staff of missile divisions) became ... people who had never (!) Participated (!) In field exits. not at all representing how the l / s (soldier) should be fed, slept, heated, yes, and excuse me, how!
            Truly, -PGRK, this is not an OS (silos) with full board ...
            Don't get excited about my understanding of the situation .... I'm talking about a 50-year lag ... (maybe, first, let's decide how many years ago the PGRK appeared? ! But the "Pioneer" became a real threat to the main foe!
            Glory to the developers, workers, employees who put them on duty, exploited! - my first military teachers!
            ... Probably not for nothing that the Americans at EBN first of all strangled the "Pioneers" ?! ...
            As a last resort, write an appeal to the Strategic Missile Forces, the Ministry of Defense, the Supreme Command ... Maybe they have more weighty arguments than mine.
            No, not evil ... According to a number of other comments, under other articles, I am deeply sympathetic to you. And even under this article, your comment about "uryakolok" ... good drinks hi - They said almost everything, almost as I wanted - and I could not! Really? Thanks!
            Sorry, here, specifically, arguably, - I'm ready to argue. hi
        2. -2
          27 May 2021 22: 28
          Quote: AAG
          Sorry. Sorry for the time spent communicating with you ... Where are you from .... fell from?

          I dealt with other issues, and our Strategic Missile Forces did not interest me at all - I had a different profile. Nobody asked you to communicate with me - I didn’t pull you by the tongue.
          Quote: AAG
          And the time of readiness to start
          in PPD is comparable to silos ...

          Then why did they create them at all - didn't you try to think about it?
          Quote: AAG
          The patrimony of PGRK-field! ...

          They won't have time to leave the field - you still don't understand why, it's a pity you wasted your time explaining this to you.
          Quote: AAG
          .With any serious hipish, only imitators of the regiment's life should remain in the PPD (and this is no secret for a long time). The secret is where they will go (IN ADVANCE !!!), where they will stand on the DB (or will "patrol"), the real APUs.

          You have no idea about the time standards for a future war if it starts suddenly. So think at times of King Pea, not realizing that they will not have time to get out anywhere - our enemy is not so stupid as to make decisions on a sudden strike not to do everything so that we could not reveal their preparation for such a strike. I don't know whether it will reach you or not ...
          1. Aag
            +1
            28 May 2021 18: 32
            Quote: ccsr
            Quote: AAG
            Sorry. Sorry for the time spent communicating with you ... Where are you from .... fell from?

            I dealt with other issues, and our Strategic Missile Forces did not interest me at all - I had a different profile. Nobody asked you to communicate with me - I didn’t pull you by the tongue.
            Quote: AAG
            And the time of readiness to start
            in PPD is comparable to silos ...

            Then why did they create them at all - didn't you try to think about it?
            Quote: AAG
            The patrimony of PGRK-field! ...

            They won't have time to leave the field - you still don't understand why, it's a pity you wasted your time explaining this to you.
            Quote: AAG
            .With any serious hipish, only imitators of the regiment's life should remain in the PPD (and this is no secret for a long time). The secret is where they will go (IN ADVANCE !!!), where they will stand on the DB (or will "patrol"), the real APUs.

            You have no idea about the time standards for a future war if it starts suddenly. So think at times of King Pea, not realizing that they will not have time to get out anywhere - our enemy is not so stupid as to make decisions on a sudden strike not to do everything so that we could not reveal their preparation for such a strike. I don't know whether it will reach you or not ...

            Hello dear ccsr!
            I must apologize for my excessive harshness yesterday.
            Forgive me, please, all the negativity towards incompetent commentators fell upon you ... feel
            If the apology is accepted, I am ready to argue with you further.))
            Excuse me, - and controversial topics, and frank ... you threw nonsense.
            Sincerely. hi
  3. +2
    27 May 2021 05: 20
    Strange text.
    At first I wrote that there was no exact data.
    Then he came up with some numbers.
    Then I realized that the numbers are by no means in favor of our "new-modern" and the ancient American women are still better.
    Therefore, he said that in principle they are not needed (why then are we sculpting a new "Satan"?)
    Thoroughly it is necessary, more thoroughly ... (c)
    1. +2
      27 May 2021 08: 49
      It's just that the author, like a child, has read a lot of nonsense about the vulnerability of mine systems, loves the word "high-precision weapons" and does not even imagine how vulnerable mobile installations are.
      1. +4
        27 May 2021 10: 20
        Quote: Victor Sergeev
        It's just that the author, like a child, has read a lot of nonsense about the vulnerability of mine systems, loves the word "high-precision weapons" and does not even imagine how vulnerable mobile installations are.

        With mobile units, not everything is so simple either. They are of course vulnerable, just try to find them. The difference is that mine launchers are known where, but it is difficult to destroy, and mobile installations are relatively easy to destroy, but difficult to detect.
        1. +4
          27 May 2021 11: 06
          Quote: 1976AG
          Quote: Victor Sergeev
          It's just that the author, like a child, has read a lot of nonsense about the vulnerability of mine systems, loves the word "high-precision weapons" and does not even imagine how vulnerable mobile installations are.

          With mobile units, not everything is so simple either. They are of course vulnerable, just try to find them. The difference is that mine launchers are known where, but it is difficult to destroy, and mobile installations are relatively easy to destroy, but difficult to detect.


          According to the START treaties, the locations of the deployment are known.
          PGRK bases - at a glance.
          Take a look at Teikovo.
          here are its coordinates in Google -
          first site 56.893571357561974, 40.57456109635359
          second site 56.931907998183206, 40.549860043791114
          you can see for yourself ..
          there is a difference of 3 kilometers between them.
          18 PGRK Topol-M on one site.
          18 PGRK Yars - on another site.
          Surrounded by forests and villages.
          The saturation level of roads with good and powerful coverage is extremely low.
          Directions (roads) - so that the PGRK could in the case of a BP - take off and scatter in directions - no !!!

          All 36 PGRKs will be crowded on a couple of three roads.
          And a strike (Trident-2 SLBM on a flat trajectory) on Teykovo with 3-5 MIRVed missiles will cover the entire area of ​​both bases and places of potential dispersal.
          And it will deprive us of 90 warheads from those same PGRK.

          The trouble is that there are not so many roads that all 36 PGRKs could very quickly, in a matter of 5-7 minutes, have time to disperse so that they would be really less vulnerable.

          And now Teikovo is extremely vulnerable.
          Just look at the map and everything will become clear.
          1. +6
            27 May 2021 12: 53
            The arrival time of the American rocket is 36 minutes.
            The speed of the PGRK is 40 km / h.
            In 30 minutes, the PGRK can drive away from the point of deployment by a maximum of 20 km.
            On the way to.
            The roads are known.
            There are very few roads.

            And besides, it takes time to leave the place of deployment.
            Virtually all PGRKs will be within 10 km of the garage.


            In short, hardly anyone will be able to drive off a safe distance.



            In 30 minutes, mine rockets are able to leave the mine and set off in the footsteps of Columbus.
            1. Aag
              0
              28 May 2021 20: 23
              Quote: For example
              The arrival time of the American rocket is 36 minutes.
              The speed of the PGRK is 40 km / h.
              In 30 minutes, the PGRK can drive away from the point of deployment by a maximum of 20 km.
              On the way to.
              The roads are known.
              There are very few roads.

              And besides, it takes time to leave the place of deployment.
              Virtually all PGRKs will be within 10 km of the garage.


              In short, hardly anyone will be able to drive off a safe distance.



              In 30 minutes, mine rockets are able to leave the mine and set off in the footsteps of Columbus.

              Sound reasoning, in fact ...
              They are at odds with the current, sorry, existing standards (I don’t think that they have changed drastically, -even not counting the hardware work, -try to build a column of different types of units) ...
              Once again, from open sources, the media (I am not citing the articles of the BU -Fighting Charter of the Strategic Missile Forces!): Depending on the current situation (assessed by the General Staff, the Civil Command of the Strategic Missile Forces, the Supreme Command, the FSB, Rosskomnadzor, Telegoenergovelosbyt ...) PGRKs should go to the regions dispersal of up to (!) the threat of the enemy's use of nuclear weapons! Keeping as much secrecy as possible, -optical, thermal, RTR ...
              YES! At the start, at the exit from the PPD at the PGRK, the road network, as a rule, is very limited ((.
              Further, it branches exponentially .... There are limitations ..... of all kinds. And who said that it would be easy ?!
              You know, being an operator, me and 80 km / h over the shoulder mech-water on the speedometer
              From the mountain, of course ... Okay, the lyrics are all ..
              We're not talking about that?
              I do not know the plans of the General Staff, and I do not advise you ...
              IMHO: what the United States has achieved in the strategic submarine, (agree, it is an accomplished fact ..)
              Apparently, it is necessary to compensate with something.
          2. +1
            27 May 2021 13: 27
            Quote: SovAr238A
            All 36 PGRKs will be crowded on a couple of three roads.

            Who told you that they would start moving at all, and not launch directly from their bases? Even in the eighties we knew that Pershing-2 would be launched almost from parks in order to minimize the launch preparation time and not unmask the preparations for a nuclear strike. What could have changed with our mobile complexes in this regard?
            Quote: SovAr238A
            And now Teikovo is extremely vulnerable.

            They are no more vulnerable than all the other Strategic Missile Forces - their task is to release the entire standby ammunition within 6-10 minutes after receiving the signal, and then you can not fantasize about their fate.
            1. +3
              27 May 2021 13: 54
              Quote: ccsr
              Quote: SovAr238A
              All 36 PGRKs will be crowded on a couple of three roads.

              Who told you that they would start moving at all, and not launch directly from their bases? Even in the eighties we knew that Pershing-2 would be launched almost from parks in order to minimize the launch preparation time and not unmask the preparations for a nuclear strike. What could have changed with our mobile complexes in this regard?
              Quote: SovAr238A
              And now Teikovo is extremely vulnerable.

              They are no more vulnerable than all the other Strategic Missile Forces - their task is to release the entire standby ammunition within 6-10 minutes after receiving the signal, and then you can not fantasize about their fate.



              Well, we were so strongly inspired that the PGRKs are highly mobile, that they are capable of leaving the strike zones and moving in different directions ...
              And it turns out that they belong to a new type of missiles? "wheeled missile systems that fail to move"?
              And then why are they better than mines?



              1. +3
                27 May 2021 18: 26
                Quote: SovAr238A
                Well, we were so strongly inspired that the PGRKs are highly mobile, that they are capable of leaving the strike zones and moving in different directions ...

                Yes, it was the industry that imposed various nonsense on Ustinov, and he fell for it, which is why he believed that mobile complexes would give us serious advantages in the nuclear confrontation with America.
                Quote: SovAr238A
                And then why are they better than mines?

                Nothing, except that mobile complexes are more expensive and less reliable than mine systems.
          3. +6
            27 May 2021 15: 41
            Dear, PGRK are dispersed in advance, and not 5-7 minutes before the strike. Moreover, they are almost never "in the heap", these are all fairy tales, I don't even know for whom. Therefore, it is practically impossible to determine the coordinates of all PGRK, since they are not continually in the field of view of reconnaissance assets. For some reason, many people think that narrow-minded people who do not understand common truths are sitting in the Ministry of Defense, fortunately this is not so.
            1. 0
              31 May 2021 08: 38
              Quote: 1976AG
              Dear, PGRK are dispersed in advance, and not 5-7 minutes before the strike. Moreover, they are almost never "in the heap", these are all fairy tales, I don't even know for whom. Therefore, it is practically impossible to determine the coordinates of all PGRK, since they are not continually in the field of view of reconnaissance assets.

              And where is the confidence that the launch time will be known to us? And if you don't know, no one will have time to disperse ...
              Moreover. they are almost always in the heap on the PPD-maximum 1 division, sometimes in the fields. And you are telling the ideal theory of how the PGRK should work, but in fact everything is a little different .. In principle. if we proceed from the fact that we know in advance the day and time of the strike on us, everything will be as you said, but ... how will we know this?
  4. +6
    27 May 2021 05: 21
    I thought it was Verkhoturov. It turned out to be Skomorokhov. The value of the material, to be honest, is close to zero.
    1. Aag
      +4
      27 May 2021 07: 50
      Quote: Sergej1972
      I thought it was Verkhoturov. It turned out to be Skomorokhov. The value of the material, to be honest, is close to zero.

      "... The value of the material, to be honest, is close to zero ..."
      Maybe it's good that it is close to zero.
      Because it is negative.))
  5. +3
    27 May 2021 05: 26
    the opponents have not only thoroughly studied the location of the launching shafts, but with their eyes closed they will hit the mines.

    I'm not an expert on rockets. However, I read that even Soviet mines had active and passive protection of mines from the strikes of an adversary. As they say, if they get it, they get it. Who will give them.
    hi
    1. 0
      27 May 2021 05: 38
      It's not about protecting them. You must at least fly to them. The mines are not on the outskirts. Apparently Roman decided that while something would fly to destroy them, we would sit and wait.
      1. +2
        27 May 2021 06: 09
        And in defense the same, 210 kg / cm2 (standards of the late 70s) - megatons with a direct hit must be knocked out. And also all sorts of mozyrs-shmozyrs ... - either they are, or like gophers ...
  6. +11
    27 May 2021 05: 29
    And if on the subject, then I do not believe that mine complexes are worse than mobile wheeled ones.
    Firstly, you still need to get into the mine, which the KVO of our Yars, and even more so Bulava or Sineva, does not guarantee at all.
    Secondly, the mines are well protected by concrete and other attachments - the same missile defense, air defense, KAZ directly above the cover, and so on.
    A wheeled complex in an open field in plain sight, not covered by anything, it is enough to hit plus or minus kilometers, and it will be blown away by the wind. Again, he must really have time to leave the garage, which in the event of a sudden impact is also not guaranteed at all, and there are not so many of them on duty.
    1. Aag
      +2
      27 May 2021 07: 44
      "... I do not believe that mine complexes are worse than mobile wheeled ones ..."
      And, you are almost doing it right, almost because they have different tasks in terms of application (except for applying RNU).
      "...
      To argue worse or better, especially in terms of the "arguments" carried out by you, - to support the article ... in terms of its stupidity ...

      "... the mines are well protected by concrete and other attachments - the same missile defense, air defense, KAZ directly above the cover ..."
      Very curious! Where do you get the information? As far as I know ABM we have covered only the Moscow region (the A-135 system, in the long term, - A-235 ... with a hypothetical possibility (?) To shoot down up to 10 BB). the monstrousness of the system, the number of its components, to doubt that the S-400 (S-500) is capable of performing such missile defense functions. (Let me remind you that the A-135 operates fully in automatic mode).
      KAZ? Against nuclear weapons ???
      "... he must really have time to leave the garage, which in the event of a sudden impact is also not guaranteed at all ..."
      Guaranteed! Will not have time !!
      "... there are not so many of them on duty ..."
      Compared to What? Compare data from open sources. hi
  7. +2
    27 May 2021 06: 01
    In this cycle, we will try to talk and compare the nuclear security components of Russia and the United States.

    In my personal opinion, in order to do this, you must at least have complete information about the state of affairs in this area in both countries. But alas, it is impossible to judge this, owning only generally known facts. Otherwise, why do we need such concepts as military secrets and classified information.
    And you can talk, why not talk. hi
  8. +12
    27 May 2021 06: 02
    I absolutely disagree with the author, as he served at the UR-100 mine. The first is the price and quality. The second is the minimum maintenance, after installing the rocket, you can not approach it at all for ten years. This is the lack of access by unauthorized persons. The division, two S-400s perfectly protects division of the Strategic Missile Forces from a surprise attack. About a surprise attack is hard to believe. Yes, mobile installations have some advantages, but they also have disadvantages. They are many times more expensive. More service personnel, finally, there is nothing to hide from space reconnaissance. It's funny, but what kind of aunt with a smartphone will lose any secrecy. About the KVO. In the seventies, the practical KVO UR-100 was 50 meters. An explosion hole 200 meters deep. Interception of warheads is a fairy tale to reassure ordinary voters.
    Most of all, the Americans are afraid of the mines, because there are a lot of them, even if they knock down half, the other half will reach exactly.
    1. +5
      27 May 2021 09: 13
      Quote: V.
      The crater from the explosion is 200 meters deep.

      Are you exaggerating anything? >> 20 Mt?
      1. +3
        27 May 2021 10: 33
        This is a funnel from a ground thermonuclear explosion with a capacity of one and a half megatons.
        1. +3
          27 May 2021 10: 54
          Quote: V.
          This is a funnel from a ground thermonuclear explosion with a capacity of one and a half megatons.

          I am interested, I do not argue. I compared it with the amount of TNT that would be needed to finely crush such a volume of rock. hi
  9. +1
    27 May 2021 06: 17
    Nothing new has been said ... no one will shoot at shpu, tk. in the event of a missile launch, they will no longer remain there ... thanks to satellites and RS. Modern rockets are not the first R7 with days to launch
    1. +5
      27 May 2021 11: 08
      Quote: Split
      Nothing new has been said ... no one will shoot at shpu, tk. in the event of a missile launch, they will no longer remain there ... thanks to satellites and RS. Modern rockets are not the first R7 with days to launch


      They will definitely shoot.
      But on the first strike and only using the Trident SLBM.
      1. -4
        27 May 2021 11: 13
        Over-the-horizon radars are good ... but there are satellites. The only problem is the reaction time .. and then the human factor. Satellites will immediately detect numerous missile launches ... but they will not be launched from one nuclear submarine ... and our complexes will cope with them. Missile defense problem coordination of launches on targets ... and thank God here we are in front of the entire planet
        1. +2
          27 May 2021 11: 29
          Quote: Split
          Over-the-horizon radars are good ... but there are satellites. The only problem is the reaction time .. and then the human factor. Satellites will immediately detect numerous missile launches ... but they will not be launched from one nuclear submarine ... and our complexes will cope with them. Missile defense problem coordination of launches on targets ... and thank God here we are in front of the entire planet


          What complexes will cope with a flight time of 5-7 minutes?
          Satellites need at least 1 minute for 90% confirmation of a mass launch.
          And no one believes only one satellites.
          There are many false positives every year.
          Until the ZGRLS confirms the launch - Odintsovsky KP - does not give the command to prepare for a retaliatory strike, the suitcases will not go to work with the Supreme and the Ministry of Defense.
          And this has already passed 5 minutes.
          A warhead from Trident is already approaching Teikovo (and others too) ...

          And what "Our complexes" ???
          Are you talking about any classified materials again?
          Only Moscow has ABM defense.

          And more.
          Did you really study at Moscow State University? And you were the beginning of the Secretariat of the Headquarters in Dombarovka?
          It's just that there are so many mistakes and tongue-tied language - I did not expect to see ...
          1. +1
            27 May 2021 12: 59
            Where did you get 5-7 minutes from? Will they launch from the waters of the White and Azov Seas or from the Gulf of Finland? So here and ZGRLS is not necessary, here you can visually see everything. The more I read your posts, the less I understand "who are you cultural workers with?"
            1. +9
              27 May 2021 14: 09
              Quote: Roman_VH
              Where did you get 5-7 minutes from? Will they launch from the waters of the White and Azov Seas or from the Gulf of Finland? So here and ZGRLS is not necessary, here you can visually see everything. The more I read your posts, the less I understand "who are you cultural workers with?"


              And see for yourself?
              Well a map?
              From Teikovo to ...
              - The west coast of Norway (North Sea) 2050 km.
              - Tromso 1750 km.
              - Murmansk (Barents Sea) is generally 1400 km.
              Accordingly, from almost anywhere in the Barents Sea, the North Sea - you can painlessly fire volleys at Teikovo.


              "Who am I with"?
              Well, I'm not a cultural figure to love.
              But I'm not pretending to be a fool either.
              And I don't like fools much.
              Especially the belligerent fools who categorically do not know anything themselves and do not want to know something ...
              Although they consider it necessary to shout agitation, throw up their caps, shout for no reason.
              Militant illiterate masses.

              I consider it necessary for such an illiterate and militant to answer with numbers.
              That there is no wunderwaffe.
              On the other side are humanoids just like us.
              Which have the same level of brain development.
              And that it is criminal to think that we will defeat them all, and they will not do anything to us!
              You need to know the enemy, all his strengths and weaknesses.
              And to live the way uryakalki do - deliberately not noticing and belittling the strengths and very emphasizing the weaknesses of the enemy - I consider it a crime!
              From which there will be many problems!
              The king turns out to be naked, but at least something in the eyes of the uryakalka is all God's dew!

              But I still consider for myself to answer such uryakalka.
              Because not only they read my messages, but also tens of thousands of other people.
              Which, as a result, on the basis of our correspondence, our discussions, form a much more competent position.
              Patriotism is knowledge.
              Not publicly insulting the enemy from your couch!
              1. -8
                27 May 2021 14: 42
                Ohio off our coast?) It's fun, I think everyone will be curious about what she's doing there. In addition, it makes sense to launch a missile where it will be intercepted by the S-400 / S-500 at the start.
                1. +8
                  27 May 2021 15: 11
                  Quote: Prjanik
                  Ohio off our coast?) It's fun, I think everyone will be curious about what she's doing there. In addition, it makes sense to launch a missile where it will be intercepted by the S-400 / S-500 at the start.


                  Those. Likewise, you do not look at the map and do not read what I am writing.
                  The North Sea or the Barents Sea - is it our or our shores?

                  regarding the interception of SLBMs by the S-400 systems - it remains to be seen whether they can.
                  If they could, then all sorts of Nudol would not be needed ...
                  It doesn't seem to you that when you are here and now writing about the interception of the S-500, this is already shouting and throwing a bonnet.
                  For Nuts and Vanguards in the North Sea and the Barents Sea can be at any time, even now.
                  And the s-500 was not built a single piece and it is not known when they will build and where they will put ...
                  1. -5
                    27 May 2021 18: 08
                    The Barents Sea is bordering and under the supervision of our anti-submarine forces, and Ohio is not so small and quiet to be sent to it, usually their areas of duty in the oceans, with cover of their own naval and air assets.
                    And you also suggest that the Americans launch a missile from there along a low-altitude flat trajectory, where it is intercepted by our air defense. This does not require Nudol, intercepting warheads on the final trajectory.
                    As for the S-500 - there was news that it had passed the tests and that this year it is entering the troops
                    1. +9
                      27 May 2021 18: 34
                      Quote: Prjanik
                      The Barents Sea is bordering and under the supervision of our anti-submarine forces, and Ohio is not so small and quiet to be sent to it, usually their areas of duty in the oceans, with cover of their own naval and air assets.
                      And you also suggest that the Americans launch a missile from there along a low-altitude flat trajectory, where it is intercepted by our air defense. This does not require Nudol, intercepting warheads on the final trajectory.
                      As for the S-500 - there was news that it had passed the tests and that this year it is entering the troops

                      Have you seen the current, actually operating, composition of the Northern Fleet?
                      Have you looked at the map of the Barents Sea?

                      Can you outline a radius of 1000 km from Murmansk?

                      Where did Baton Rouge collide with Kostroma?
                      Where did Kursk die there? 200 km from Murmansk? Why were three foreign submarines sighted there?
                      What anti-submarine defense?
                      Do you really get information only from agitation?
                      Here's my question, have you ever been interested in looking at coordinates?
                      Looking at and collecting disparate facts into a big picture?
                      Not? Complicated?
                      Isn't it much easier to chew what has already been put in your mouth?
                      Just slogans and editorials?
                      The Barents Sea is a foreign sea.
                      There are more enemy submarines at a time than in the entire Northern Fleet of active forces ...

                      Nut is the quietest nuclear submarine in the last 40 years. Everyone admits it.
                      There are a minimum of cases of taking her for escort. Probably there will not be a couple of dozen in history. And every contact with her, almost order-bearing for the crew members of our nuclear submarines.
                      1. -2
                        27 May 2021 19: 59
                        Of course, you can serve on the Northern Fleet to declare so categorically about the entrance courtyard in our water area. But, be that as it may, the Barents Sea is regularly patrolled by everything that the Federation Council has. All I have heard is about the hunting submarines grazing there, who are curious to follow our strategists and teachings. Ohio, although quiet at low revs, is a healthy carcass in itself, the detection of which by radio and sonar is a feasible task. In any case, no one in their right mind will send anywhere without reliable cover for strategists from the usual areas of duty.
                      2. +6
                        27 May 2021 21: 56
                        Quote: Prjanik
                        Of course, you can serve on the Northern Fleet to declare so categorically about the entrance courtyard in our water area. But, be that as it may, the Barents Sea is regularly patrolled by everything that the Federation Council has. All I have heard is about the hunting submarines grazing there, who are curious to follow our strategists and teachings. Ohio, although quiet at low revs, is a healthy carcass in itself, the detection of which by radio and sonar is a feasible task. In any case, no one in their right mind will send anywhere without reliable cover for strategists from the usual areas of duty.


                        They will send.
                        If there is a strike plan and the commander of the enemy SSBN receives an order to patrol in a given area of ​​the North or Barents Sea, he will execute this order.

                        By the way, you probably did not read my message completely, or you don’t want to think.
                        But from the waters of the North Sea, practically at a distance of up to 150 miles from the coast of Norway - any enemy SSBN can strike at Teikovo - a preemptive strike along a flat trajectory. The range of missiles on such a trajectory is sufficient.
                        And in the North Sea, our Navy is not and was not ...

                        And the enemies are not "curious."
                        They have no desire to "take an interest".
                        They have an order to "escort and hold at gunpoint."
                        And these are different things with curiosity.
                        But you do not understand this difference or do not know about it.


                        In terms of detection range by sonar - without low-frequency illumination equipment, which we still do not have - have you read anything? Well, I just asked ... Suddenly, on the other side - still at least something reading ...
                      3. 0
                        28 May 2021 05: 57
                        Now I will be so "curious" to quote or put an ironic smiley, so that next time I do not waste your time on inappropriate scolding.
                        Well, if they give such an order, it will go, but it is suspicious, to put it mildly, when the strategist "suddenly" is found not "in his place." On missiles launched from the North Sea, the air defense of Kaliningrad will be worked out on the floor.
                        And why would we not have low-frequency emitters. Here's an old illustration for example
              2. +1
                28 May 2021 09: 33
                Yes, about 2 thousand km to Tromso, just somehow forget that there is a minimum distance over which an ICBM flies. And this is ... about 5 thousand km. So Tromsø will not have any Ohio due to the PHYSICAL limitations of missiles.

                And if you look at the open information about the deployment areas of submarines with ballistic missiles, we will see that they are in the Atlantic beyond the VASUD lines.

                And KR fly at subsonic speed and for a long time. There, flight time is measured in hours. And the charge is small.
                1. +3
                  28 May 2021 10: 44
                  Quote: alstr
                  Yes, to Tromsø about 2 thousand km, just somehow forget that there is a minimum distance over which an ICBM flies. And this is ... about 5 thousand km. So Tromsø will not have any Ohio due to the PHYSICAL limitations of missiles ..


                  Before writing about
                  will not be due to PHYSICAL limitations of missiles
                  please study the issue of SLBM flight by flat trajectories...
                  This will be very useful - for the development of knowledge in physics. which you probably don't know enough.
                  I recommend reading this document: "Flat Trajectory Sea-Based Ballistic Missiles: Technical Assessment and Control Capabilities"
                  Check out this very interesting document from 1992. Take a closer look.
                  link to PDF here.
                  http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/ru/archive/sgsr03gronlund.pdf
                  1. +1
                    28 May 2021 11: 38
                    Well, yes, you can pull it for 2 thousand. Only now
                    "Back in 1988, the Lockheed company, commissioned by the Navy, carried out theoretical calculations of flat launch trajectories for Trident-2 SLBMs over short distances - two to three thousand kilometers for" soft "targets. Calculations were made according to the types of trajectories from NT-60 to NT -180 at a distance of 2000 kilometers and from NT-95 to NT-370 by 3000 (the index means the height of the apogee of the trajectory.) The results of the research were partially published and the corresponding conclusion was made: firing a D-5 rocket at NT at short distances is possible even with a reduction in the flight path. time by 40 percent. But for such an opportunity will have to pay dearly. Since most of the rocket flight on NT will take place in dense layers of the atmosphere, it is necessary to increase the platform acceleration speed from 6,5 to 8,7, and in some cases even to 9,2 kilometers per second. And this can only be done with a reduced number of warheads, that is, from one to three. At the same time, the accuracy of shooting is significantly deteriorating, the CEP increases by orders of magnitude - up to 6400 meters when firing by 2000 kilometers and 7700 meters by 3000. "

                    And in your link, the use of a flat trajectory is assumed only for "soft targets", ie. not having sufficient protection. Those. a blow along such a trajectory is not effective against silos.

                    If you read carefully, then again, as always, we confuse what is and what can be.
                    "To be of military use, the BMBM on
                    NTs must pass proof tests
                    to determine accuracy and gain confidence
                    throughout the system. If such
                    the type of weapon was intended for a sudden
                    attacks where a high degree of confidence is needed,
                    to the test program
                    flights should have included enough
                    a large number of tests to ensure
                    good performance test statistics. "

                    Have such tests been carried out?
                    1. +3
                      28 May 2021 13: 00
                      Quote: alstr

                      Have such tests been carried out?


                      Yes, in September 2019 there was 100% confirmation that Tridents can fly in low-altitude trajectories. In a flat trajectory.
                      A high-quality video was made, which was filmed by the pilots of a civilian plane.
                      Experts 100% confirmed that the rocket was on a flat trajectory.
                      The rockets fired at Nebraska for days.
              3. 0
                2 June 2021 19: 54
                Divide 1750 km by 7 minutes and multiply by 60. We get 15000 km / h. Where have you seen such media?
  10. +4
    27 May 2021 06: 20
    Written popularly, but somehow unscientific.
    In the light of what has been written, I would like to get the author's view of the Sarmat program, which has been used by countless billions of money, at least 10 years of labor of dozens of enterprises and thousands of people.
    How relevant is this direction in the field of silo rockets to the author?
    1. +6
      27 May 2021 09: 09
      I wrote my opinion above, but I will repeat myself. I myself am from Yasny, just where they stand and was the head of the secretariat in the military registration and enlistment office (form 1) and friends are rocket men, incl. the friend who built them (silo).
      Believe me, after the launch of their missiles, ours will also fly, the reaction time is very short, they will not even be helped by nuclear submarines near our shores to hit the silos before launch. Yes, and I myself saw launches, the same Dnieper a couple of times ... and I was inside ... such a structure will almost withstand a direct hit and the silo will stand in the middle of the crater winked
      So that the author's ranting has no ground and therefore we are developing this direction. But I think that it is necessary to increase the number of both nuclear submarines and mobile yars and start the BJRD again, this is what confuses them (it is not in vain that a BJRD was put under the knife with ebn and not only)

      And about the Sarmatians there is very little information to write an article ... all that is known is the approximate range, etc. and the throw tests have been successfully completed and everything seems to be going according to plan (which pleases drinks )

      And the fact that the Americans are only modernizing is because they no longer have weapons-grade plutonium and they constantly reduce the power of the charges by purifying the decayed material. And officially the development has long been discontinued, incl. and we (but we have decent reserves and nasov satellites, in particular, fly on our plutonium). Let me remind you that plutonium is also needed for thermonuclear fusion. the actual atomic explosion initiates the fusion of nuclei in lithium deuteride
      1. +2
        27 May 2021 11: 29
        On Yasnaya, nothing has cost 25-30 years. And there was a 47 missile division with P-16, P-17, UR-100. Next to the Guards Port Arthur regiment, the Stepnoy airfield from which pilot Belenko flew away. This year will be 45 years from the day of the death of Mao Zedong. Who served there at that time, they probably remember how you were in the army. There were up to 400 combat aircraft in the air. The whole semi-desert in tanks, BM-21. As they say, it was a glorious time.
        1. 0
          27 May 2021 11: 35
          CLEAR ... and everything is there (fortunately there is no secret anymore) and near Dombarovsky too ... it's not a secret there all silos have long been removed by satellites
          In Yasnoye there is the main grouping of missiles, well, judging by the comments, you are not aware
          1. 0
            27 May 2021 11: 46
            Well if so. I have information from the website of the veterans of the 2008th division in 47. At that time there was some kind of motorized rifle regiment. Interestingly, the division was restored with the same number.
            1. +1
              27 May 2021 11: 52
              Unfortunately, in 2002 I graduated from the position, but I do not think that the silos were transported from there somewhere wink
              about Yasnaya ... I don't know anything. The division is located in the city of Yasny, Orenburg region. partly in the Dombarovsky district, it became part of the Yasnensky district 20 years ago
        2. 0
          27 May 2021 11: 37
          If you do not understand, this is your personal problem, put on lenses or glasses, what I wrote about
        3. 0
          29 May 2021 18: 45
          Quote: V.
          airfield Stepnoy from which pilot Belenko flew away

          If I'm not mistaken, Belenko flew away from the Chuguevka airfield. Rather - Sokolovka.
  11. +4
    27 May 2021 08: 06
    Gigastrateg Skomorokhov anneals wassat
    1. 0
      27 May 2021 09: 11
      Yes, he should go to popmeh or stir up a channel on YouTube, but schoolchildren should write abstracts on how to write (although it seems like there is no such thing right now).

      ZY By the way, when I studied at the Faculty of Physics at Moscow State University in the late 90s, we had everything. The stern retired colonel was very much surprised at my knowledge that I even received a credit automatically.
  12. +11
    27 May 2021 08: 43
    And now I will try to explain to the author what is his delirium about the vulnerability of mine installations and the invulnerability of mobile ones.
    1. Two missiles, or even more, are allocated to destroy one silo. The enemy can place missile defense systems exactly in the location of the silo, thereby ensuring, at least, the need for the enemy to allocate even more of its missiles, thereby weakening the strike on other targets. On Poplar, as we were taught at one time, somewhere in the region is allocated 2 rocket per installation.
    2. In order for Topol (Yars) to leave, it is necessary to prepare it for the exit, start it up, collect the crews, plus it takes time to make a decision, hell, in 30 minutes, it will leave the zone of destruction of a nuclear missile, by 5-7 km. least. About what 40 km. says the author, God forbid, this machine crawls 20 kilometers, because the missiles are not located near the Moscow Ring Road, but in Siberia, away from cities, where the roads are small, so that it will crawl 5 km in 20 minutes.
    3. In my time, before Poplar left the base, in a few hours on the roads from the base (and they are a song for us), they first poured a pile of sand, leveled it, that is, the preparation took half a day.
    4. Mobile installations are vulnerable to attack, no matter what kind of protection they provide, send saboteurs in advance, set mines on the roads, explode, and that's it, your complexes will not go anywhere in the next hour.
    The best system is trains, they can run almost continuously, but you can't drive a car for a long time.
    All complexes are designed for one thing: to conduct a response salvo until the first enemy missile falls, which is why they fought with the Pershing, and they with the SS20.
    1. +2
      27 May 2021 10: 34
      In order for Topol (Yars) to leave, it is necessary to prepare it for the exit

      And why, in the case of a large Atatuya - Poplar, go somewhere? Isn't it easier to smack right from the spot? As far as I understand, they have to constantly move along the routes on alert, don't they? And not to try in which case it is stupid to dump to hell. For this, of course, they will not have time to do this.
      1. +4
        27 May 2021 16: 06
        So here I am about the same thing, the meaning of the mobile complex is almost zero, the main thing is to strike before the arrival of the enemy missile, and here you cannot compare with the mine, it is always ready.
        Poplars do not move constantly, only when threatened or according to plan they will crawl out occasionally, as well as in places of permanent deployment. Yes, and they are noticeable for intelligence, you can't hide.
    2. +5
      27 May 2021 11: 15
      Quote: Victor Sergeev

      The best system is trains, they can run almost continuously, but you can't drive a car for a long time.


      This is the greatest delusion.
      The rocket train is very unmasked, it requires exorbitant "gestures" for millions of schedule approvals, maintenance, security, and many other reasons.
      1. +6
        27 May 2021 14: 55
        Quote: SovAr238A
        The rocket train is very unmasked, it requires exorbitant "gestures" for millions of schedule approvals, maintenance, security, and many other reasons.

        Uh-huh ... the stealth of the bzhrk is especially good because they move along the paths belonging to a commercial structure and under the control of a civilian ICS. This is about how to make the pgrk go only along the Moscow Ring Road. smile
        Plus, the requirements for the launch site for the BZHRK are quite tough.
      2. -2
        27 May 2021 16: 08
        It used to be huge, now it is lighter and lighter missiles. The schedules are coordinated, no problems, you can't keep track of everything by reconnaissance and you can't put it in rockets, a much more mobile thing than Poplar and Yarsa.
        1. +4
          27 May 2021 19: 21
          Quote: Victor Sergeev
          It used to be huge, now it is lighter and lighter missiles. The schedules are coordinated, no problems, you can't keep track of everything by reconnaissance and you can't put it in rockets, a much more mobile thing than Poplar and Yarsa.

          Once again: BZHRK moves along the tracks belonging to Russian Railways. And its movement obeys the laws of the road - that is, it is controlled and controlled by a civil ACS. Access to which at the road level allows you to track its position.
          Second: BZHRK cannot launch from any point on the way. What's the point in mobility and stealth, if, before launching the RZD-shniki, it will be necessary to shove the trains somewhere along the way from the location of the BZHRK, then the nearest segment of the route suitable for launch. And then on the current segment on the sides of the canvas there is a swamp, a cliff or a notch.
  13. -1
    27 May 2021 09: 28
    If you look at it intelligently, any maneuver of the warhead takes it out of the protection of a cloud of decoys, sources of radio interference, metal debris in which it moves, maddening enemy ballistic computers, which burn processors in an attempt to determine exactly what is flying where.
    Now it remains to clarify the size of the cloud, remember the false blocks. And bad manners to compare the mine rocket of the last century and the mobile of the present.
    1. -3
      27 May 2021 16: 09
      And what to compare them? They are different, but Poplar has one advantage: it is much cheaper than the Minuteman, including in maintenance.
      1. +3
        27 May 2021 16: 41
        So don't compare hi
  14. -6
    27 May 2021 09: 47
    The future of the ground-based component of the strategic nuclear forces is small-sized, single-charge, silo-based ICBMs with a launch mass of ~ 10 tons and a BB power of ~ 300 Ktn.

    Since the termination of the START treaty, mines for small-sized ICBMs have to be built under metallized awnings with an area of ​​several square kilometers, rockets should be loaded under the same awnings and then filled with soil so that their coordinates cannot be determined on footage from space. Then, to defeat one small-sized ICBM, the enemy will need to plow square kilometers with dozens of their APs.

    As a result, the counterforce strike will become quantitatively disadvantageous.
    1. +5
      27 May 2021 13: 05
      Quote: Operator
      The future of the ground-based component of the strategic nuclear forces is small-sized, single-charge, silo-based ICBMs with a launch mass of ~ 10 tons and a BB power of ~ 300 Ktn.

      Since the termination of the START treaty, mines for small-sized ICBMs have to be built under metallized awnings with an area of ​​several square kilometers, rockets should be loaded under the same awnings and then filled with soil so that their coordinates cannot be determined on footage from space. Then, to defeat one small-sized ICBM, the enemy will need to plow square kilometers with dozens of their APs.

      As a result, the counterforce strike will become quantitatively disadvantageous.

      All this disguise until the first puncture ... in a year or two or ten (if not at the construction stage under a super-mega canopy) years, with the help of satellites and other reconnaissance channels, the enemy will find out the exact position of the mine ... and what's the point of such secrecy? The main thing is that the rocket leaves BEFORE the enemy rocket arrives, those within 10-15 minutes, the rest is almost a waste of money ...
      1. -4
        27 May 2021 13: 51
        No satellite, even with a ground penetrating radar on board, is able to detect a mine under a layer of soil, which is covered (shielded) with metal shot, as well as the area around the mine for several square kilometers around. The shaft itself must be thermally insulated so as not to differ in temperature from the surrounding soil.

        Why don't we take risks in order to monitor the beginning of the enemy's anti-force nuclear missile strike in 24x365 mode? It is much easier to provide guaranteed retaliation in any situation by placing the main part of the strategic nuclear forces in completely disguised mines. Which, by the way, is an order of magnitude cheaper than building a submarine fleet of missile carriers and a surface fleet of ships covering them together with their coastal bases (as the Americans did).

        We have enough land in Western and Eastern Siberia to place 1 small single-charge ICBMs in disguised mines on 10000 million square kilometers.
        1. +7
          27 May 2021 16: 04
          Quote: Operator
          No satellite, even with a ground penetrating radar on board, is able to detect a mine under a layer of soil, which is covered (shielded) with metal shot, as well as the area around the mine for several square kilometers around. The shaft itself must be thermally insulated so as not to differ in temperature from the surrounding soil.

          Why don't we take risks in order to monitor the beginning of the enemy's anti-force nuclear missile strike in 24x365 mode? It is much easier to provide guaranteed retaliation in any situation by placing the main part of the strategic nuclear forces in completely disguised mines. Which, by the way, is an order of magnitude cheaper than building a submarine fleet of missile carriers and a surface fleet of ships covering them together with their coastal bases (as the Americans did).

          We have enough land in Western and Eastern Siberia to place 1 small single-charge ICBMs in disguised mines on 10000 million square kilometers.

          There are many ways of reconnaissance other than a satellite, a banal bribe and receiving plans, projects, etc., say, for 100 million greenbacks, it is cheaper than building a canopy and other solutions you propose (you obviously never had any relation to construction) ... besides, submarines are capable carry not only nuclear weapons, it is always a very serious projection of power (as an example, because of the British submarines, the Argentine fleet did not dare to go to sea during the war) ... and they also force the enemy to spend significant funds on the search and destruction of these submarines ... besides, if the enemy knows the exact position of the mines, we can find out about this at the very last moment, but if anti-submarine men approach several boats, it is immediately clear that it smells fried ...
          So the most important thing is the ability to make a decision as quickly as possible and strike back, and not camouflage and so on ... there is no way to get out of detection and missile defense systems ...
          And finally - all the existing stocks of missiles in the United States that we do not even have enough to completely destroy the opponent, not even the whole world, maximum unacceptable damage ...
          1. -10
            27 May 2021 16: 46
            About 10000 small-sized ICBMs with 300-ktn charges for the destruction of NATO countries, Japan and South Korea, I do not know about enough / not enough. But together with 1000 Poseidon missile launchers with 100 Mtn charges, these ICBMs are clearly enough to destroy all countries of the world taken together - excluding the Russian Federation, of course.
            1. +10
              27 May 2021 16: 58
              Quote: Operator
              About 10000 small-sized ICBMs with 300-ktn charges for the destruction of NATO countries, Japan and South Korea, I do not know about enough / not enough. But together with 1000 Poseidon missile launchers with 100 Mtn charges, these ICBMs are clearly enough to destroy all countries of the world taken together - excluding the Russian Federation, of course.

              What are these Paseidons? With which 1000 pieces? What a mixture of juche and cartoons?
              Then the Americans will summon Chuck Noris and the Terminator, and the Japanese in general will summon combat mechs ...
              Oh, sorry, I forgot, you suggested covering the floor of Siberia with a canopy and there, in the regime of incredible secrecy, to build silos for nuclear missiles ...
              1. -10
                27 May 2021 17: 39
                Don't be complex, you'll head to hell in the forefront bully
        2. +8
          28 May 2021 00: 10
          Quote: Operator
          No satellite, even with a ground penetrating radar on board, is able to detect a mine under a layer of soil, which is covered (shielded) with metal shot, as well as the area around the mine for several square kilometers around. The shaft itself must be thermally insulated so as not to differ in temperature from the surrounding soil.
          ...
          We have enough land in Western and Eastern Siberia to place 1 small single-charge ICBMs in disguised mines on 10000 million square kilometers.


          What a ridiculous and very unreasonable person you are ...
          Yes Yes...

          You will, unnoticed by the Americans, arrange races on concrete mixer trucks ...
          :)))
          For the construction of your Wishlist in Western and Eastern Siberia (probably in the swamps of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug, and in the Vasyugan, Cheuzhtam), you will suddenly, and completely unnoticed by all means of technical and analytical intelligence:
          1. build thousands of concrete plants in the middle of the swamps of Western and Eastern Siberia, lead roads to them - and no one will notice :)
          2.Increase the production of cement by about two times (and for concrete grade 450 you need a lot of cement), in comparison with the usual consumption of the whole of Russia - and no one will notice it :)))
          3. to triple, in comparison with the usual consumption of all of Russia, the production and logistics of crushed granite (for concrete grade 450 you need it) - and no one will notice it :)))
          4.To increase the production (and purchase) of thousands of dump trucks, tank trucks, concrete mixers - and no one will notice this :)))
          5. build roads in the middle of the swamps of Western and Eastern Siberia, so that thousands of dump trucks and mixers can transport concrete and metal to the places of future secret mines - and no one will notice :)))
          6. build cellular and wire communication systems (thousands of poles or under a thousand cell towers and a total of tens of thousands of kilometers of communication cables) between objects in swamps, or cutting down glades in the taiga - and no one will notice :)))
          7. build power supply systems for construction support facilities and the facilities under construction themselves (in total, tens of thousands of kilometers of power cables on power transmission line towers) between facilities in swamps, or cutting down glades in the taiga - and no one will notice it :)))
          8. Do you still need to write about the number of required workers and the human factor?

          Or, finally, an understanding will come that your wishes are divorced from reality and you have never understood the possibility and impossibility of ensuring secrecy in the modern world *

          Alternatively gifted operator!
          Very alternative.
          Thinks globally, but doesn't even know how to cook porridge ...
          1. -6
            28 May 2021 01: 02
            Untalented in Nothing: What's the Connection Between Disguises construction sites missile silos and the lack of the need to camouflage such construction industry facilities how are concrete plants? bully

            At the same time, refresh your memory where the Siberian Uvaly and the Central Siberian Plateau are located - in contrast to the Israeli rogue, we have free millions of square kilometers in bulk.
            1. +6
              28 May 2021 08: 05
              Quote: Operator
              Untalented in Nothing: What's the Connection Between Disguises construction sites missile silos and the lack of the need to camouflage such construction industry facilities how are concrete plants? bully


              Uuuu ... how everything turns out to be running ...
              You still don't understand anything I've written ...
              Do you have thousands of cars transporting concrete, water, metal - from nowhere to nowhere?
              Like a cartoon?


              Quote: Operator

              At the same time, refresh your memory where the Siberian Uvaly and the Central Siberian Plateau are located - in contrast to the Israeli rogue, we have free millions of square kilometers in bulk.

              Well, I say - Wikipedian ...
              Moreover, he does not know what he squeaks about.
              Your Siberian Uvaly is a zone that covers all the swamps of Western and Central Siberia ... KhMAO, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Vasyugan ...
              I work there and know these places.
              And you are a dreamer.
              1. -8
                28 May 2021 10: 15
                You obviously work for the Mossad - look at the map: where is Vasyugane and where is Uvaly bully
                At the same time, the vocabulary in the great and mighty pull up - how the swamp differs from the hills.
                1. +7
                  28 May 2021 10: 48
                  Quote: Operator
                  You obviously work for the Mossad - look at the map: where is Vasyugane and where is Uvaly bully
                  At the same time, the vocabulary in the great and mighty pull up - how the swamp differs from the hills.


                  We take the same Wikipedia and read it.
                  Siberian Uvaly is a system of uplands in the north of Western Siberia, stretching from west to east from the Ob to the Yenisei for 900 km. Located in the Yamalo-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrugs and in part of the Krasnoyarsk Territory; is a watershed between the right tributaries of the Ob and the upper reaches of the Kazym, Nadym, Pur and Taz rivers. The western and eastern parts have a moraine-hilly relief, the central part of the upland is flat and highly swampy. Height up to 278 m (massif in the Syrkaltporelsek tract in the upper reaches of the Saran River, according to other sources - 285 m). Sometimes the Severo-Sosvinsk Upland on the left, western bank of the Ob is included in the Siberian Uvaly, the heights of which reach 307 m (Mount Lyulimvor in the bend of the Northern Sosva, according to other sources - 301 m). The flora is dominated by coniferous-small-leaved taiga. There are oil and gas fields.




                  I don't work for the Mossad.
                  I'm working against the circus that some people in the alternative fantasy genre are trying to arrange here ...


                  And yes, I visit those places for 2-3 months a year.
                  The same alleged mountain Lyulimvor - it stands 5 km from the winter road from Punga to the Pripolyarka.
                  And I drove even further, through the Urals to Vuktyl ...
                  The villages of Khulimsunt, Igrim, Agirish - my machines work there.
                  Gas pipelines are running there.
                  And I was there.
                  There are swamps all around, right up to the Northern Urals.
                  There is no civilization.
                  Only a helicopter and barges and on the river, provided that there is high water.
                  Northern delivery of fuel and materials.

                  So do not fantasize about where you have not been and have not seen and do not even understand what you are talking about ...
  15. +3
    27 May 2021 13: 25
    It seems to me that the current ground component has a certain plus relatively underwater - despite the flight time, etc. - this plus is the relative massiveness of the launch, even in the event of a retaliatory strike. It also follows from this that within this system maybe a better distribution of goals has been arranged - more consistent with the current situation and not with some kind of advance construction. Relative frontality (with respect to the underwater component) can be attributed to both pluses and minuses - in a certain area it is easier to overload a good missile defense system, and sufficient range allows you to select this area within wide limits.
    Part of the SSBNs will be located at the basing points (known to the enemy), the part that will be on duty may not immediately receive information about the outbreak of the war, while being in conditions that imply not a 100% guarantee that they will not be detected by the enemy in advance. An out-of-sync missile launch against predetermined targets may be less effective than massive retaliation (but has its advantages in the case of a first strike or part of a first strike).
    All this is purely speculative reasoning, maybe I'm wrong.
  16. +2
    27 May 2021 16: 46
    Quote: 1976AG
    Totally agree with you

    However, my post was once again deleted, "by a willful decision."
    Chess-speaking, I don't even know what to say to that. Except that ... someone who's got a kick out of it.
  17. Aag
    +5
    27 May 2021 18: 07
    Quote: qqqq
    Quote: Vladimir_2U
    The author is missing the fact

    The author not only misses the fact, he compares the mobile complex with a silo rocket. At the same time, it is concluded that the Americans were in the 80s, and we were able to do it only in the 90-2000s. In fairness, then you need to compare Minuteman3 with our UR100 or Satan.

    The author, respected by me in other topics, showed complete incompetence in the topic of the article presented!
    And yet, excuse me, the reaction of commentators with "hurray" slogans - "We'll tear everyone apart!"
    The indisputable merit of our Strategic Missile Forces - with incomparably smaller "infusions" into the Strategic Nuclear Forces, in the Strategic Missile Forces in particular, - to make the result of the use of nuclear weapons completely uncertain for one purpose or another!
    Otminusovavshikh, I ask you to argue your. Assessment. Not because I'm worried about the "rating". Concerned about the rating. Is it worth "butting" with someone? It seems that many are more pleasant to be in blind, complacent ignorance than to identify problems, to look for ways to resolve them. The stump is clear, - they will figure it out without us, they will make a decision ...
    But I am very impressed by the authors Klimov, Timokhin ... In the sense that they raise hidden, silenced problems on their topic! ...
    Again! To minus, (I am not very worried about my "rating" - more, for the adequacy of the VO). Please argue !!! I do not promise that quickly, but I will answer! hi
  18. 0
    27 May 2021 19: 03
    Amazing analysis. The author really forgot to mention the frequent refusals of the Minutemans on test launches. But, in order not to be unfounded, let's give the floor to "partners"

    April 21, 2021 Charles Richard - Chief of US Strategic Command said ..
    “We are at a point where life constraints and the cumulative effect of underinvesting in our nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure amid a growing threat leaves me no room for maneuverability. Our country simply cannot endlessly try to extend the life of the weapons systems left over from the Cold War and successfully implement the chosen strategy, ”Richard said.

    The Pentagon raised the alarm about the weak combat capability of American nuclear weapons back in 2018.
    In the annual review of nuclear policy, the military said bluntly that
    "Russia has significant advantages in the production of nuclear weapons and in non-strategic nuclear forces over the United States and its allies."

    However, the issue of superiority in the same range should be treated without fanaticism. Why do you need a range of 15 km if all targets are at a distance of 000-8 km?

    Indeed, even in the event of a launch, ICBMs launched from another continent are quite calmly tracked by modern means. And anti-missile systems and countermeasures (like the same NORAD) may well cope with the task of destroying the warheads of ICBMs.

    Oh how! Have you heard about the trajectory through the South Pole? Oh, you can't. Sarmat just can. The tests will take place this year.
    Accordingly, it is not so important how much "Minuteman-3" is better or worse than "Yars", in any case, these are representatives of a rapidly aging class of strategic weapons. Therefore, the Americans abandoned the idea of ​​developing new land-based missiles,

    Rapidly obsolete, or rather hopelessly outdated - this is about the Minuteman. They have not abandoned mine rockets and are not going to do so. This is the author's gag. They are aware of this their lag and will desperately try to overcome it.
    Associated Press
    [/ quote] The US Department of Defense has increased the cost estimate for replacing silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) LGM-30G Minuteman III to $ 95,8 billion. Previously, the amount of projected costs was $ 85 billion.
    The complete replacement of the Minuteman III arsenal is part of the United States' nuclear triad modernization program, the total cost of which is more than $ 1,2 trillion.
    The dismantling of the Minuteman III and the installation of next-generation ICBMs are scheduled to begin in 2029. At the same time, the Pentagon expects to improve 450 mine launch complexes. As the head of the US Air Force Global Strike Command, Timothy Ray, said earlier, the main goal is to continue to fully ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of American systems.
    [Quote]
    They will start in 2029. At the beginning of 2022, we are putting into service the Sarmat. The Vanguards are already in service.
  19. +4
    27 May 2021 19: 08
    It should only be noted that Russian ICBMs are not even aimed
    to the mines of the Minutemans. Therefore, Americans do not make mobile installations
    Only for large American naval
    bases, shipyards and million-plus cities.
    But the American Minutemans are targeting ICBM mines,
    Then to the city of Moscow.
    Then to the largest factories of raw materials, factories for the production of missiles, missile fuel
    and the largest power plants.
    1. 0
      27 May 2021 19: 37
      Quote: voyaka uh
      But the American Minutemans are targeting ICBM mines,

      Who told you such nonsense? Americans are not naive enough to strike at empty mines.
      Quote: voyaka uh
      Then to the city of Moscow.

      This priority object has always been and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
      Quote: voyaka uh
      Then to the largest factories of raw materials, factories for the production of missiles, missile fuel
      and the largest power plants.

      All this will be amazed at the first blow - there will be no "later".
  20. -2
    28 May 2021 15: 15
    Generally speaking, our mine missiles are also protected. At least air defense-missile defense systems. And not only.
  21. +1
    28 May 2021 20: 01
    1. "mine launchers don't look serious." - are you serious? IMHO, mines are much easier to defend than mobile systems. And we will have time to take off.
    2. "Mobile complexes can have their say without being as vulnerable as missiles in mines." One shot of a saboteur at a rocket from a penny shooter can disable it. The defenders of the ICBM convoy on ancient armored personnel carriers look downright funny. How far will the turtle travel in an "hour x" from its base? In short, IMHO, basing missiles on an automobile platform looks like an expensive gamble. Another thing is on the railway platform.
    3. The most dangerous carriers are submarines. And they will have more of them. How to protect yourself from them?
    4. Are we sure we will intercept their super-super bombers? And how much will a sufficient amount of C400-C500 cost?
  22. +1
    29 May 2021 00: 54
    Quote: vladimir1155
    bombed like the Serbs and Libya

    They won't be bombed while we sell oil for $.
    Refusal of $ in international settlements is a nightmare of the President of the United States.
    They (the USA) print $, and we and other countries with an elite dependent on the hegemon are obliged to sell resources for this $, buy their securities.
    PS The driver from our division accelerated MAZ from the PC12, when leaving the "field" up to 60 km / h, though then he "flew" hard.
  23. 0
    1 June 2021 14: 23
    "however, the US military does not consider it necessary to develop this topic, the topic of mine-based ICBMs."

    - this is bullshit. the Yankees are now sawing a new ICBM to replace the Minuteman
  24. 0
    7 June 2021 00: 03
    In recent years, out of 16 test launches of "Minuteman-3", 8 were unsuccessful, so it can be assumed that half will not leave the mines, will lose control during flight, and this is without opposition from the enemy.
    Such an accident rate is not surprising, Minuteman-3, were developed in the 60s of the last century, produced in the 70s and 80s, everything in them is outdated, the old man is not saved for modernization, the rocket has soured.
    We must not forget that the Americans traditionally exaggerate the performance characteristics, the most vivid example of the much-vaunted F-35 turned out to be so "good" that it was decided to stop production and start doing something like the 4+ generation F15EX.
  25. 0
    21 July 2021 17: 57
    The author does not take into account two points in his review.
    1. The silo launch pads are stationary and their own coordinates are well known to their General Staff. This means that flight missions for each installation can be laid down in advance, and, given that the carriers are solid-fuel, preparation for launch is very short. Consequently, the crew of the launch complex has 20-30 minutes to carry out all the work and launch their weapons, becoming completely useless for the strike inflicted on them. The mine is most likely a one-time construction, and restoration work is required to re-launch from there, which is absolutely impossible in a real nuclear war. Thus, the "miners" need to have time to start. The blow will be carried out on an already empty mine, which is a waste of such an expensive weapon. The crew will most likely die. But the aim of the strike will not be achieved.

    2. Wanderers need, for the launch, to accurately calculate their own current coordinates, or to stand on a predetermined position in order to carry out the preparation and launch. And this additional time, and, possibly, with "driving" your current coordinates into any unit, is not possible in principle. Otherwise, the rocket will not fly where it should. If it does fly at all. There was a case with the launch of a rocket from the Vostochny, which (according to rumors) had the coordinates of Baikonur in its flight mission. The result is known. That is, the indicated disadvantage of a mine-based system turns out to be a huge advantage.