"Pitfalls" "Severodvinsk-M" (APKR "Kazan")
On May 5, the acceptance certificate was signed on the lead serial nuclear submarine cruiser (APCR) "Kazan" of project 885M (legally, this is the date of the beginning of service in the Navy), and on May 7, a public event was held to raise the naval flag.
Employees of "Sevmash", crew members and commissions after signing the acceptance certificate. Photo: forums.airbase.ru, user VKoshkin, link
In 2014, the author published an article in the "Military-Industrial Courier" "Pitfalls of Severodvinsk"up to date.
It is enough to cite only one fact. Ice firing, the extreme necessity of which was written in this article (for the new APCR project 885), was carried out for the first time in the Russian Navy (and the USSR) only now, and even then - they did not dare to carry it out from Severodvinsk.
Alas, we have to admit that the acute problems raised by this article and in a number of subsequent articles in the "Military Review":
"AICR" Severodvinsk "surrendered to the Navy with critical deficiencies for combat readiness",
"Arctic torpedo scandal",
"Anti-torpedo catastrophe of the Russian fleet",
are still relevant.
With regard to the reception of the new agro-industrial complex "Kazan" by the Navy, we have to talk about the "pitfalls" of "Severodvinsk-M" ("Kazan").
The first (and not the main thing). Low noise
The absence of a water cannon (typical for all modern nuclear-powered submarines) on the AICR "Kazan" unambiguously indicates the presence of a significant lag behind the AICR project 885 (M) from modern submarines of the US Navy, Great Britain and France in stealth. First of all - by the value of low-noise speed.
Photo: mil.ru / wikipedia.org
At the same time, this is not a particularly critical issue, since it rests on the objective capabilities of our mechanical engineering. At the same time, at low speeds, the noise level of our nuclear submarines is very low. And with unconventional tactical actions (see article“At the forefront of the underwater confrontation. "Cold War" submarine ") allowed our submarines to resist foreign ones.
But a higher low-noise travel speed would definitely not be superfluous, but it is not.
Second. Submarine search and stealth issues
The media have repeatedly raised questions of the alleged "critical lag" of domestic hydroacoustics from foreign ones. In reality, the technical level of domestic hydroacoustic complexes (SAC) submarines is very high. But again - adjusted for the objective capabilities of the industry (for example, the need to use a domestic element and component base).
Figuratively speaking, two "athletes" enter the competition: the "western" one in "shorts and sneakers" and ours "full combat gear". And taking into account this (objective!) Factor, the results of the domestic developers of hydroacoustics are quite decent.
However, there is a problem, and a serious one: our significant lag in the introduction of new technologies for searching for submarines, including multi-position ones, with low-frequency "illumination" of the water area (which can be covert)... This problem is recognized among specialists. And how long. Measures were proposed. However, they did not receive due attention from the customer (the Ministry of Defense).
This situation is further aggravated by the introduction in industry of a rigid centralization of work on radio-electronic means, and especially hydroacoustics. The last one is the formation of a concern of marine instrumentation. As a result, where it is necessary to do it “yesterday” and quickly implement it on ships, we have a complex organizational structure of the “monster”. Yes, work is underway. However, due to organizational problems, their deadlines are unacceptably long.
"It is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our submariners?"
An even more acute problem is in fact the already held revolution of new means of searching for submarines, already non-acoustic. First of all, this concerns the capabilities of special radars to detect disturbances on the water surface caused by the movement of submarine hulls in the water column.
Although it was in our country (in the USSR back in the 70s) that the study of these search methods began, now a number of specialists and managers are questioning their real effectiveness (despite the availability of objective detection results). There is a well-founded opinion that one of the reasons for this is that, taking into account this factor, serious questions arise about the feasibility of building submarines of large displacement.
Here it is worth quoting the Soviet head of the advanced design department of the Central Research Institute. Krylova A.M. Vasilyeva, with the assessment of this issue by the last Soviet deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy for shipbuilding and armament, Admiral Novoselov:
... At the meeting, he did not give the floor to the head of the institute, who was eager to talk about experiments to detect the surfaced trace of a submarine using a radar ... Much later, at the end of 1989, he asked him why he dismissed this question. To this Fyodor Ivanovich replied as follows:
"I know about this effect, it is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our divers?"
"I know about this effect, it is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our divers?"
And here a very serious question arises - how optimal, in general, are the dimensions and characteristics of the 885M project? Or are they already "dinosaurs" and "targets" for the enemy?
Questions that no one wants to deal with. This is confirmed by the frankly pitiful project of the allegedly "promising" nuclear submarine of the Navy "Husky", presented to the President a year and a half ago at the Navy exhibition in Sevastopol.
USET-80 propeller and torpedoes on a supposedly "promising" 5th generation nuclear submarine. It would be very funny if it weren't very sad.
Another important point is working in shallow water. Our opponents are actively training to operate in such conditions, including under the ice - such skills of the crews will be critically important during any conflict, for example, in the Arctic.
The US Navy is actively preparing to operate in shallow water
The question arises - how will the submarines with the dimensions of "Kazan" and "Severodvinsk" operate there?
Note. A number of aspects of the nuclear submarine dimension were discussed in the article "Does our fleet need a small multipurpose nuclear submarine?".
Third (and most important). Weapons and countermeasures
Our submarines still need to reach the point of volley of excellent "Caliber", "Onyx" and "Zircon" and survive. The reality of this against a modern strong enemy, given the lack of effective anti-torpedo protection in our submarines, is in question.
The Modul-D nuclear submarine countermeasures complex has a deliberately low (extremely low) efficiency.
Rear Admiral A. N. Lutsky, an article in the "Marine Collection" and products of the "Module-D" complex
Despite the excellent backlog of anti-torpedoes (“Lasta” for submarines), in fact, domestic submarines have no anti-torpedo protection (in fact, we have “Tanks without armor ").
Briefly on "Laste". After the summer of 2013, there is no doubt about the ability of "Fins" to reliably kill attacking torpedoes. The anti-torpedo turned out much better than expected.
However, all the terms for equipping our submarines with them have been disrupted (a number of details are in the materials of the arbitration courts) for purely organizational (non-technical) reasons.
In general, the issues of anti-torpedo protection were disclosed in the aforementioned material. "Anti-torpedo disaster" of the Russian fleet.
There can be only one solution here: the customer's tough position on the unconditional delivery of the nuclear submarine with the anti-torpedoes provided (by the requirements and state contracts for them).
Scuba weapon... We have absolutely insufficient statistics of tests, with which not only its normal development is impossible, but also a simple identification of all problems and shortcomings. Specifically for "Kazan" (project 885M) - a visually noticeable change in contours (from "Severodvinsk" of project 885) in the area of torpedo tubes clearly indicates problems with them on "Severodvinsk". Moreover, problems that were clear at once. And it was written about them, including in the media ("Pitfalls of Severodvinsk").
The analysis of materials of the US Navy shows a number of technical problems with damage and vehicles, and torpedoes, which they received on board the TA and for a long time eliminated them. Taking into account the fundamentally different torpedo complex and the new torpedo, the following (minimal!) List of only “valid” tests of the “Physicists” from “Ash” was suggested:
• firing all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed without remote control;
• firing all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed with remote control;
in combination with shooting at various targets, single and salvo (including remote control) under hydroacoustic counteraction (GPA), recording and measuring the noise of gunfire and torpedoes (including - and this is very important - discrete components).
• firing all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed without remote control;
• firing all torpedo tubes at maximum firing speed with remote control;
in combination with shooting at various targets, single and salvo (including remote control) under hydroacoustic counteraction (GPA), recording and measuring the noise of gunfire and torpedoes (including - and this is very important - discrete components).
Have all the necessary tests been carried out at Severodvinsk and Kazan?
I'm sure not. First, it is “expensive”. Secondly, "you will have to redo". And thirdly, "the boat must be taken urgently."
And here it will once again be appropriate to recall the literal phrase of one of the developers of the complex of underwater weapons and counteraction to the 885 project:
The project - 885 - somehow went through all the design stages and was accepted for construction. For us, this project has long been the only real embodiment of the 4th generation TA. Now projects 955 and 955A are underway ... The same parameters of the power plant of the torpedo tubes were left, either sadness or laughter, as they were for the 3rd generation.
That is, what we received on the 885 project is a deteriorated version of the 3rd generation nuclear submarine weapon systems (that is, developments in the 70s of the last century).
PS
Calling a spade a spade, the AICR "Kazan" was accepted by the fleet simply in order to report its acceptance to the Supreme. Accepted with a mass of critical flaws and, in fact, did not meet the requirements and the state contract for the construction.
Taking into account all this and the unfolding tough discussion about the Navy, people who vehemently criticize the balanced development of the Navy (especially when they have, to put it mildly, a biased opinion about the supposedly "invulnerable submarine") are frankly bewildering:
It is a nuclear submarine, invulnerable at great depths, poorly detectable, with modern weapons on board in launch silos - that's the real tomorrow. Whatever the fans of budget-eating ships with hangars try to prove. For even three aircraft carriers will not be able to do anything special on the scale of the war of tomorrow.
The best answer (fact) to this will be an illustration from the 90s of the change in the “visibility” of submarines of the USSR and Russian Navy during passive search and in conditions of low-frequency “illumination”.
Added to this are new non-acoustic detection tools. And here the words of the last deputy head of the USSR Navy for shipbuilding and armaments should be quoted again:
“I know about this effect, it is impossible to defend against such detection, so why upset our submariners "?
But what if the crew of "Kazan" "upset" a real enemy in a real war?
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