Military Review

On the role of the Russian Navy in the prevention of nuclear war

140

Article "On the oddities in setting tasks for the Russian Navy and a little about aircraft carriers" I reviewed the tasks set by the leadership of our country for the Russian Navy. There were three such tasks in total:


1) protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the World Ocean by military methods;

2) maintaining military-political stability at the global and regional levels;

3) reflection of aggression from sea and ocean directions.

Unfortunately, the publicly available regulatory legal acts, although they claim the need to build a powerful ocean fleet, but they do not explain exactly what our national interests in the world ocean are and from whom they are required to be protected. Of course, it is very important to understand that the expression “do not explain” is not at all synonymous with the concept of “absent”. If the documents do not clearly spell out the tasks for the ocean-going Russian Navy, this does not mean that there are no such tasks. But in the previous article I did not begin to formulate them myself and limited myself to presenting my personal views on some of the tasks of the Russian ocean-going fleet and aircraft carriers in its composition.

Now I suggest you, dear reader, to move on to the tasks of the Russian Navy in terms of ensuring stability at the global level.

Forms of future conflicts


They are actually a wagon and a small cart. But here it makes sense to "go over" how our main geopolitical adversary, the United States, saw the wars of the future.

In the first post-war years, the Americans relied on a strategy of massive retaliation and considered only one form of war against the USSR - a general nuclear one. But, as soon as the Soviet Union began to produce atomic weapon in "commercial" quantities, and even created more or less reliable means of delivering it to the United States (the first intercontinental ballistic missiles), the situation has radically changed. Since 1961, the United States switched to a “flexible response” or “metered use of force” strategy, allowing not only a full-scale nuclear but also a limited war with the USSR, both with and without the use of nuclear weapons.

Since that moment, the United States has repeatedly changed its strategies, but they all had one thing in common: never again did the Americans focus solely on total Armageddon. So, for example, the strategy of "direct confrontation", which operated in the last decade of the existence of the USSR, assumed the possibility of waging the following types of wars:

1) general nuclear;
2) general common;
3) nuclear in the theater of war;
4) usual in the theater of war;
5) local.

Thus, the Americans assumed that an armed clash with the USSR (in the past) and the Russian Federation in the present and in the future could occur with conventional weapons. They also do not rule out a limited nuclear war. I must say that in this I fully agree with them. For example, some kind of conflict with a NATO member (yes, at least with Turkey), which has arisen for reasons for which the Europeans do not want to die, may well turn out to be local and non-nuclear. If the Europeans or Americans try to intervene, then perhaps they will be able to convince them of the seriousness of our intentions by using tactical nuclear weapons, without leading to a total atomic catastrophe.

Armageddon Scenarios


I am deeply convinced that a global nuclear missile war can start in two scenarios.

I would call the first scenario "Big Mistake". It will look like this.

First, there will be some serious political crisis, like the Caribbean crisis, through which the USSR and the United States went through in 1962. In this case, to confirm the seriousness of the intentions of the Russian Federation and NATO, the deployment of armed forces will begin (without announcing a general mobilization). These forces, of course, will be brought out “into the fields” under the most plausible pretext. Well, here's how we, for example, conducted exercises near the Russian-Ukrainian border this year. The real meaning of such deployment will be to convince the “opponent” of the seriousness of his intentions and readiness to go to the end. Such actions fit well into the strategy of the Russian Federation (we, in general, love to conduct all kinds of exercises when someone starts to behave strangely) and the United States, with their "flexible response", that is, the willingness to wage conflicts of various levels.

And then, during a period of such an aggravation of relations and the accompanying severe stress of nerves, someone will be very much mistaken in something. And the demonstration of force will end with large-scale nuclear missile strikes against the enemy. For example, during the deployment of forces, there will be a "border incident" followed by an exchange of conventional weapons strikes. Or someone will risk attacking us in the expectation that we will not dare to use nuclear weapons. But, if a war starts, and everything goes very badly for one of the parties, tactical nuclear weapons may well be used. Such an escalation may well not be contained within a limited conflict. And everything will end with Armageddon.


The main features of this scenario are as follows:

1) in it, no one initially wants a general nuclear war, but it nevertheless becomes inevitable during the escalation of the conflict and / or as a result of a banal human error;

2) by the time the strategic nuclear forces are used, the armed forces of the conflicting countries are deployed and ready for war to the extent that it is possible without general mobilization, or are in the process of such preparation.

Is it possible to prevent such an outbreak of a general nuclear war?

Yes, but only in a political way. The world should not be brought to such serious crises. And if you have already brought it, then you need to be able to quickly find mutually acceptable ways out of them. But in times of crisis, when the parties, holding their hands on the triggers, look at each other through the sights - alas, anything is possible here.

Unfortunately, armed forces, however powerful, are unable to prevent nuclear conflicts of this kind. Nevertheless, it must be understood that the more powerful our general-purpose forces and the better protected our strategic nuclear forces (SNF), the more chances that the outbreak of conflict will be stopped without bringing the matter to the use of the "last argument of the kings." However, here we turn to the conduct of hostilities, while the topic of this article is the prevention of war.

The second scenario I would call "A Very Big Mistake". It consists in the fact that the US leadership at some point will decide that it is capable of annulling the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian Federation by means of a disarming counterforce strike. And he will deliver such a blow.

The main features of this option will be that:

1) a global nuclear missile war will be unleashed by the United States quite deliberately;

2) both ours and a significant part of the American armed forces will be located in places of permanent deployment in peacetime.

Someone may have a question - why am I excluding the scenario in which Russia is delivering a counterforce strike? The answer is very simple. The core of the United States' strategic nuclear forces is its naval component, that is, nuclear submarines - carriers of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Russia does not have today and will not have in the foreseeable future the possibility of destroying them in a counterforce strike. This means that the Americans, in any case, will retain at least 5-6 SSBNs (nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles) of the Ohio type, having 100-120 ICBMs Trident II (usually Americans go on combat duty with 20 such missiles) , on each of which there can be no less than 4 warheads, and at maximum load - up to 14. This is more than enough to inflict unacceptable damage to the Russian Federation.


Accordingly, a counterforce strike for Russia loses its meaning by definition - by starting a nuclear war, we will certainly not be able to achieve a peace for ourselves that would be better than the pre-war one. There is no point in starting.

But the Americans can try. And even with some chance of success.

About counterforce impact


The main feature of such a strike will be its surprise. Consequently, preparations for it will be carried out secretly, so that only those forces that can be deployed secretly from the Russian Federation will be involved in its application. Well, and the main means of waging a "secret" war in our country are, of course, submarines.

The Americans currently have 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. With the operational stress factor (KO) equal to 0,5, it will not be difficult for the United States to launch 7-8 such boats at the same time, even taking into account the fact that some of them may undergo major repairs. Again, this number of ships is unlikely to make us flustered if we fix their exit. And nothing will prevent these SSBNs from taking positions near our territory - in the Norwegian and Mediterranean seas, as well as in areas closer to the Far East. This will be necessary in order to reduce the flight time to the maximum, on the one hand, and in order to "stuff" the missiles with the maximum number of warheads, on the other.

Each SSBN can carry 24 Trident II SLBMs. Total for 8 SSBNs - 192 missiles. Each missile can carry up to 8 "heavy" W88 warheads with a capacity of 455-475 kt or up to 14 "light" W76 warheads with a capacity of 100 kt. It is clear that with such a load, the Trident II cannot be thrown at the maximum range. But, given the deployment in relative proximity to our borders, they do not need to fly far. Taking into account the fact that the Americans have 88 W400s, having loaded to the maximum, the Ohio is quite capable of "dragging" 2 warheads to our shores. And even if the ammunition load is reduced to 388-6 warheads per missile, then even then we will get more than an impressive figure of 10 warheads.

It is clear that all this will bypass the START III agreements, but, firstly, if the Americans decide to strike at us, no treaty will stop them. And they will be able to secretly equip the required number of missiles with warheads.

And if you take into account the American NATO allies? The same England is quite capable, if necessary, to put a pair of SSBNs into the sea, if this is agreed in advance with the United States.

But not all so simple.

Underwater missile launch is a daunting task. In order to complete it, the submarine must occupy the so-called "launch corridor" - move at a certain speed at a certain depth. During the launch of missiles, a lot of factors affect the submarine - these are physical effects during the launch of the rocket, and the change in the mass of SSBNs after the launch of the missiles, which, of course, is extinguished due to the intake of sea water, but not instantly, etc. Therefore, both our SSBNs, and American SSBNs, and in general, almost any submarines using underwater launch missile weapons, use them not in a salvo, but in "bursts": they fire several missiles, then interrupt, returning the ship to the launch corridor, and also conducting other necessary measures to organize further shooting. And all this takes a lot of time. Moreover, "Ohio" never fired more than 4 missiles in one salvo.

We conducted tests of firing with full volleys - Operation Begemot-2, when the K-407 Novomoskovsk launched all of its 16 missiles in one salvo. But this achievement should be seen as a record figure that can hardly be repeated by an SSBN with a conventional crew on normal combat duty. Suffice it to recall that the preparation for the "Begemot-2" took our sailors as much as 2 years.


Source: ura.ru

Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that the Americans can confidently shoot 4 missiles in one salvo, after which they will need time to prepare for the second and subsequent volleys (our submariners, although they did not give timing, spoke of it as essential). But in this case, there will be no question of any surprise - our missile attack warning system, in any case, will detect and report, "where necessary", about the first launches.

Thus, it would not be a big mistake to assume that the actual number of missiles and warheads that the Americans can use in a counterforce strike is significantly less than that calculated from a full load of SSBNs with warheads. If you count 4 missiles in a salvo, then 8 Ohio are capable of striking 32 missiles. And even if you load them with a maximum of 14 warheads, you get only 448 warheads. A pair of British SSBNs will bring this figure to 560. But French ballistic missiles from submarines with their circular probable deviation of 350 m are not suitable for counterforce strike. And it is doubtful that France, in general, will participate in all this.

Is this enough to destroy the Russian strategic nuclear forces?


No, not enough.

Our Strategic Missile Forces have approximately 122 silo and 198 mobile ICBM launchers. To destroy the mine plant with a probability of 0,95, you will need 2 warheads.

But with mobile complexes, everything is more complicated. On the one hand, at normal times, most of them stand in places of permanent deployment, where it is very easy to destroy them. On the other hand, identifying and destroying the complexes deployed "in the fields" will be a very, very difficult task. It is necessary to constantly track their movements, which is very difficult, even taking into account the capabilities of the American satellite constellation. Therefore, in order to more or less reliably defeat such complexes, the Americans will have to "look out" in advance for the positions to which our mobile complexes are usually deployed, and spend the warheads of their missiles to destroy all spare (and specially equipped false) positions.

If the American preemptive strike was preceded by a period of tension, during which our mobile Topoli and Yars were withdrawn from their bases and dispersed, or were in immediate readiness for such dispersal, then the destruction of at least half of them would become practically an unsolvable task, even when using hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads. But, if we are attacked suddenly, and a blow is delivered to all identified positions, then it is probably still possible to destroy most of our mobile complexes.

Of course, the required outfit of forces should be considered by professionals, but even if, having simplified everything as much as possible (for the Americans), it is assumed that to destroy one of our complex, 2 combat units will be needed (with a probability of 0,95), then even then 320 Russian complexes you will need 640 warheads. But it should be borne in mind that the strategic missile forces are not the only component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

However, in order to eliminate our SSBNs in bases and strategic Aviation even less will be needed: for this it is necessary to destroy the airbases in Engels, Ryazan and Ukrainka (Amur Region) and the naval bases in Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk with a sudden nuclear strike. Having spent 4–5 warheads for each, we get a consumption of only 20–25 nuclear warheads. Another 20-30 pieces will be required for our over-the-horizon radars in order to "blind" our warning systems for a nuclear missile attack.

Thus, according to the most modest estimates, it turns out that for the success of a counterforce strike against the Russian Federation, the Americans will need no less than 700 combat units. But in reality, this figure, of course, will be higher. Indeed, in addition to ensuring the probability of at least one warhead falling at a distance necessary to hit the target, there is a nonzero probability that some combat units will be able to be shot down by the air defense systems on alert. To reduce this probability to a minimum, it is necessary to subject the positions of these air defense systems to a blow. And, in addition to the air defense system, there is a sufficient number of targets that need to be destroyed - command posts, supposed storage sites for non-deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, etc.

Can the Americans put into the sea not 7-8 SSBNs, but a larger number of them, say, 10-12 units? This is possible if you prepare for such an exit in advance. But this will already be quite difficult to hide - satellite reconnaissance is still not only in the United States. And if we suddenly discover that the overwhelming majority of American SSBNs have left bases, this is a reason to be on the alert, announcing an increased level of readiness and starting to disperse the same mobile systems. In this case, an attempt to deprive us of our strategic nuclear forces will no longer have a chance of success.


No need to be ashamed of your complexes! Source: mil.ru

The conclusion from the above is simple: the SSBNs at the disposal of the United States and its NATO allies are not enough to deliver a sudden disarming strike.

What else can the Americans use to defeat our strategic nuclear forces?


What else can the Americans hit?

Medium-range ballistic missiles deployed in Europe will pose an extremely serious threat - they do not need to maintain the "launch corridor", the salvo is limited only by the number of launchers. But there are two important nuances here. First, the Americans simply do not have such missiles today. Secondly, I strongly doubt that the Europeans in the foreseeable future would agree to host analogues of the Pershing-2, since this automatically makes them a priority target for our nuclear strike.

Aviation? Of course not. She will be discovered in advance. And there will be no surprise.

US land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles? Also no. Both our and the American early warning systems are precisely designed to detect the beginning of such a nuclear missile attack. And give a full-scale answer during the flight time.

Nuclear submarines remain. But not strategic, but multipurpose (MAPL).

Non-strategic threat


In my opinion, a counterforce strike is completely impossible without the concentration of US MAPLs in the waters adjacent to us.

Their first task is to search for and destroy Russian strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs). In the near future, the number of such ships in the Russian Navy will fluctuate between 10-12. Taking into account the realistic for us KOH within 0,25 (and it was even lower), this will give 2-3 SSBNs on duty at sea (or on the transition to the area of ​​combat duty). In principle, the Americans are already constantly tracking our SSBNs. But, if the Americans decide to start a nuclear war, then, of course, an increased concentration of MAPLs should be expected.

Is it obligatory for the Americans to destroy our SSBNs at sea? Certainly. If the counterforce strike on our naval and air bases achieves complete success, and all SSBNs and strategic missile carriers are destroyed, and only 5% of the strategic missile forces will remain (such results can be considered a deafening success of the Americans), then even then we will have 6 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and up to 10 surviving Topol or Yars.

Counting 10 warheads for the first and 4 for the second, we get up to a hundred warheads in a retaliation salvo. Such a retaliation will certainly not overwhelm the United States. In theory, these combat units can kill up to 10 million people, striking at densely populated cities. But in practice, our missiles are launched with those flight missions that they will have at the time of detecting an attack. So some of the warheads may be aimed at any military facilities and not cause much damage to the economy and the population of America.

But even one surviving SSBN will add 16 missiles to this number. And even if each of them has 4 warheads agreed upon by the treaty, then even then it will already amount to 64 warheads. But what if the crafty Russians played dishonestly? And equipped their missiles with not 4, but 6 or 10 warheads? And they can. Ask Joe Biden if in doubt.


The second task of the US and NATO IALS is to deliver precision-guided strikes. That is, direct participation in the counterforce strike. Do not forget that the Americans currently have about 1 W400-80 warheads with a yield of up to 1 kt, which may well be deployed on Tomahawk cruise missiles of the corresponding modifications.

It seems that the "atomic" "Tomahawks" are now decommissioned, but it is far from the fact that the existing modifications cannot be equipped with nuclear warheads. And you need to understand that many targets of a counterforce strike can be hit by non-nuclear precision weapons. The latest versions of non-nuclear "Tomahawks", equipped with high-power penetrating charges, are close to tactical nuclear weapons in terms of their ability to defeat protected targets.

Of course, the use of "Tomahawks" in counterforce strike is limited. This is due to the low speed of the cruise missile. Priority targets, such as carriers of nuclear weapons, must be struck no more than 15 minutes from the start of the attack. And "Tomahawk" during this time will fly only 200 km. But nevertheless, the Tomahawks can be assigned the task of destroying objects located near the coastline: the same naval bases, for example. In addition, these cruise missiles may well be used to destroy a number of important stationary targets, so to speak, the "second stage" - parts of command posts, communication centers, etc., which may well "wait" 25-30 minutes or more from the start of the attack.

It is more than likely that MPSS carrying Tomahawks will also have some restrictions on the number of missiles in the first salvo - by analogy with SSBNs. That is, it is unlikely that a nuclear-powered ship of the Ohio type, converted into a carrier of 154 Tomahawks, will be able to fire them in one salvo. But it can be assumed that the number of missiles that a submarine is capable of launching without leaving the "launch corridor" nevertheless depends on the mass and dimensions of these missiles. The Tomahawk is much more modest than a ballistic missile. And it can be expected that in one salvo the US MPS will be able to fire significantly more than four cruise missiles.

conclusions


1. No armed forces will insure us against Armageddon, which began as a result of the uncontrolled escalation of the local conflict. Therefore, our armed forces must be ready for an all-out nuclear war. I will consider the goals and objectives of the fleet in this development of events in the next article.

2. The preparation of the United States for a counterforce strike will be accompanied by a concentration of MPSS (Americans and their allies) in our near sea zone, as well as in the areas of SSBN deployment: some - in order to search for SSBNs, others - for direct participation in the first strike.

3. A prerequisite for a counterforce strike will be the provisional escort of all Russian SSBNs in the sea by the US and its allies. If this condition is not met, the Americans are most likely to abandon the strike.

Accordingly, the main task of our fleet to prevent an unprovoked nuclear attack, that is, a counterforce strike, will be to identify the increased activity of enemy submarines at least in the coastal and near sea zones, as well as in the areas of the combat services of our SSBNs and on the approaches to them.

Solving this problem will allow us:

1. Timely bring the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation to heightened or even full combat readiness, which automatically removes the counterforce strike from the agenda. Since in this case it will not be possible to reduce our nuclear potential to values ​​acceptable for the United States, even if only simply due to dispersal (readiness for immediate dispersal) of the Yars and Topol mobile complexes.

2. Control the movement of foreign submarines in the seas adjacent to our territory and thereby guarantee the disruption of their main combat mission - the search and escort of our SSBNs on alert.

Thus, solving the tasks of monitoring the underwater situation, we “kill” two birds with one stone: we not only identify preparations for a counterforce strike, but also ensure the combat stability of the naval component of our strategic nuclear forces.

Do we need aircraft carriers to detect US and NATO submarine submarines in the seas adjacent to our coastline?

No, not needed.

Here, other forces are needed - a satellite constellation of appropriate capabilities, a system for lighting the underwater situation, including both stationary hydrophones and specialized reconnaissance ships, modern and highly efficient patrol aircraft, minesweepers and corvettes and, of course, nuclear submarines - hunters.

Those dear readers who follow my publications will probably remember my calls to:

1) The Russian Navy stopped trying to create universal corvettes in favor of specialized PLO corvettes;

2) in the construction of non-strategic nuclear submarines, priority was given to torpedo submarines of the most moderate sizes.

Without a doubt, we also need a modern patrol aircraft. Conceptually, the IL-38N Novella turned out to be an excellent machine capable of not only anti-submarine warfare, but also to control the surface and air situation, including by means of electronic reconnaissance, and also provide target designation. He has only one problem - he is outdated, not having time to really be born, and today is seriously inferior to his foreign counterparts.


The creation of a modern aircraft capable of solving a similar range of tasks is a matter of paramount importance, as, indeed, of the new PLO helicopter.

In order to prevent an unprovoked nuclear attack, in addition to the SSBN itself, we urgently need anti-submarine and anti-mine forces of sufficient strength. And I urge everyone who is used to measuring the strength of warships in the number of "Caliber" or "Zircon" that can be piled on them, to understand one simple thing. To prevent an unprovoked nuclear attack on our country, a pair of torpedo submarines of, say, 5 tonnes of displacement, equipped with high-quality HAC, effective torpedo and anti-torpedo weapons, and also with a high low-noise speed, will be many times more useful than one giant Yasen- M "with its bunch of cruise missiles. And the deployment of stationary and mobile means of monitoring the underwater situation, capable of detecting the latest NATO nuclear-powered ships, will deter the United States much more effectively than the massive construction of Poseidons and their carriers.

Minesweepers, PLO corvettes, patrol aircraft, PLO helicopters, surface and underwater situation lighting system (EGSONPO), multipurpose nuclear torpedo submarines and, of course, strategic missile submarines - that's what, in my opinion, should have started the revival of the domestic military fleet ...

Does all of the above mean that the ships of the ocean-going fleet and aircraft carriers are of no use to us? Of course not.

It is absolutely impossible to limit the Russian Navy to the above-mentioned means of waging war at sea for one simple reason. Although all of the above will help prevent a counterforce strike and ensure the secrecy of our SSBNs, but only in peacetime.

Alas, a surprise nuclear attack is by no means the only possible form of conflict in which the Russian Federation could be drawn.

To be continued ...
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  1. Yuri V.A
    Yuri V.A 15 May 2021 05: 49
    +7
    The "defensive game" is deliberately doomed to failure, as an example - like an effective and layered air defense / missile defense of Israel cannot cope with a massive attack of unpretentious Arab missiles made on the knee. At what distance from the territory of the Russian Federation using the listed means does the author intend to move the enemy's submarine missile carriers and hunters in order to guaranteed to disrupt their combat mission? This is very difficult without full-fledged oceanic KUGs.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 15 May 2021 08: 40
      -7
      Quote: Yuri V.A
      deliberately doomed to defeat

      fundamentally not true, no game except for all-evil betrayal and cowardice is doomed to nothing ... "never give up"
      1. Yuri V.A
        Yuri V.A 15 May 2021 09: 23
        +11
        Your desire not to surrender to anyone for anything (especially from a submarine) is not enough for success.
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 15 May 2021 23: 37
          -5
          Quote: Yuri V.A
          not enough for success

          no reasoning, purely your personal opinion, moreover, false
          1. Yuri V.A
            Yuri V.A 17 May 2021 02: 17
            0
            How will it be falsely argued if in every comment you are drowning exclusively for microships and submarines.
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 17 May 2021 08: 03
              -1
              I would agree with your opinion that your position is falsely argued, but this is not true, you are afraid to argue to voice arguments, because you know (and write) that your position is falsely argued and I will bomb it in no time, so you have it completely unreasoned, ..... again, nothing is arguing, purely your personal opinion, moreover, false, I do not drown in every comment, I am not for microships, but for PLO frigates and corvettes of about 3000 tons with a displacement for the oceans and for Karakurt PLO almost 800 tonnage for the seas ... but I really respect submarines and coastal aviation
              1. Yuri V.A
                Yuri V.A 17 May 2021 10: 08
                +1
                Yes, you are a gambling commentator eager to bomb your opponent. Only first, open your trump arguments, than with serious, without even remembering seaworthiness, you can equip a ship with VI 3 tons for the main combat missions in the ocean? What stations, what weapons, what energy? Or do you not want in the future to have on our ships combat hyperboloids and railguns, based on new physical principles? Give an example of a self-sufficient frigate of your size, taking into account that beyond the hill, even the most promising for this, there is not enough even 000 tons.
                1. Vladimir1155
                  Vladimir1155 17 May 2021 14: 57
                  -1
                  Quote: Yuri V.A
                  Only first, open your trump arguments, than with serious, without even remembering seaworthiness, you can equip a ship with VI 3 tons for the main combat missions in the ocean? What stations, what weapons, what energy?

                  great, finally a business conversation has begun, the main weapon of the ASW frigate, these are PLO weapons, in addition to this, it has self-defense and self-defense missile weapons, the list is in the performance characteristics of a frigate like Gorshkov or a corvette like Guarding, as an option, it can also sometimes support landing and to fight pirates, to protect fishermen ... Karakurt PLO, in my purely personal opinion, will lose missile weapons, but it will acquire means of searching and suppressing submarines, while maintaining the self-defense means of air defense
                  1. Yuri V.A
                    Yuri V.A 17 May 2021 16: 43
                    +1
                    First of all, Gorshkov is not 3 tons; secondly, in the PLO variant, it needs to have at least eight 000P91s and then there will be eight left for other strike missions (with a limited guidance range), which is not enough. Air defense will not reflect the simultaneous raid of three Hornets, so for self-defense in a group you need a dozen frigates, and this is already ruinous.
                    Guarding with the Packet in the PLO version, generally a misunderstanding, one faint hope - a helicopter.
                    Therefore, the examples you have given are just against the notorious Papuans and are only suitable. Or with large ships that you cannot digest.
                    It turns out that you have no methods against the enemy in the ocean.
                    1. Vladimir1155
                      Vladimir1155 17 May 2021 22: 04
                      -1
                      Quote: Yuri V.A
                      in the PLO version, he needs to have at least eight 91P1s and then there will be eight left for other strike missions (with a limited guidance range), which is not enough. Air defense will not reflect the simultaneous raid of three Hornets, so for self-defense in a group you need a dozen frigates, and this is already ruinous.
                      Guarding with the Packet in the PLO version, generally a misunderstanding, one faint hope - a helicopter.

                      I partially agree, it is necessary to improve these ships in order to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense, on the other hand, you need to understand that the frigate and corvette should be under the umbrella of coastal aviation, and no "three hornets" should reach them. enemy augs are destroyed by shore-based aircraft, and hornets sink with the aircraft carrier, or fall into the sea when fuel runs out, and NATO ground bases in Norway are destroyed by nuclear strikes .. do you say that there is not enough aviation? ... so you need to sell Kuzya to buy planes and missiles.
                      1. Yuri V.A
                        Yuri V.A 18 May 2021 01: 38
                        +1
                        So, you really decide, first - "... I'm not for microships, but for frigates and corvettes of about 3000 tons displacement for the OCEANS ...", and end up with the fact that these ships should be under the umbrella of coastal aviation. That is, your position is that large ships are not needed, as the ocean fleet is unnecessary, then why do you need nuclear submarines, diesel ones are enough. Looks like you are very confused in your weighty arguments.
                      2. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 18 May 2021 11: 44
                        0
                        Quote: Yuri V.A
                        That is, your position is that large ships are not needed, as the ocean fleet is unnecessary, then why do you need nuclear submarines

                        Nuclear submarines do not need to be escorted by surface ships in the open ocean, NKs would only unmask them, for NKs it is important that they are not guarded by the enemy right at the base, frigates and corvettes can carry out cleanup around bases, and NNS under the umbrella of coastal aviation, and large NKs for Of course, we do not need oceans, they have no tasks, the existing cruisers will be leaders of ASW frigates, near nuclear submarine bases, their self-defense is more essential than a frigate, but new cruisers and destroyers are not needed of course
                      3. Yuri V.A
                        Yuri V.A 18 May 2021 14: 04
                        0
                        That is, all questions on protecting the interests of the state in the oceans will be decided by the nuclear submarine? Does it bother you that no one else could have thought of this before?
                      4. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 18 May 2021 15: 04
                        0
                        Quote: Yuri V.A
                        all questions on protecting the interests of the state in the oceans will be solved by the nuclear submarine?

                        all issues of the global security of Russia will be solved by the rpsn and the airborne missile forces, ..... in peacetime, some issues can be solved by the fleet by frigates. ..... during the war, the use of surface ships of the navy of the russian federation far from its shores is unrealistic, and not need to
                      5. Yuri V.A
                        Yuri V.A 18 May 2021 15: 57
                        0
                        The global threat of terrorism from Syria was strongly prevented by the Strategic Missile Force? The fact that you live in your own world is understandable, but can you give an example of any country that has chosen your path of naval development?
                      6. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 18 May 2021 19: 42
                        0
                        Quote: Yuri V.A
                        an example of any country that has chosen your path of fleet development?

                        all countries of the world except the USA CHINA India England and France
                        all tasks in Syria were successfully solved by the NNSLBDK dry cargo ships frigates mrk and minesweepers
                      7. Yuri V.A
                        Yuri V.A 19 May 2021 02: 44
                        0
                        Again contradict yourself, you have no grounds or examples. It's time for you to think about changing your priorities.
                      8. Vladimir1155
                        Vladimir1155 19 May 2021 07: 30
                        0
                        Quote: Yuri V.A
                        Again contradict yourself, you have no grounds or examples. It's time for you to think about changing your priorities.

                        again, not a single argument but empty negation, examples, argentina and brazil and another 200 countries of the world do not have aircraft carriers
                      9. Yuri V.A
                        Yuri V.A 19 May 2021 08: 41
                        0
                        What arguments can there be for a stubborn person who is not able to substantiate his own statements and refutes himself during the conversation? Do you propose to build a fleet based on the example of second-rate countries? Brazil, by the way, has a VI helicopter carrier of over 20 tons.
          2. timokhin-aa
            timokhin-aa 21 May 2021 19: 34
            0
            Here's a bit of realities for you, Vladimir
            https://topwar.ru/183065-skrytnosti-bolshe-net-podlodki-privychnogo-nam-vida-obrecheny.html

            About your favorite submarines
          3. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 21 May 2021 21: 00
            0
            the challenge is accepted, I'm going to you
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    15 May 2021 10: 02
    +12
    Quote: Yuri V.A
    The "defensive game" is definitely doomed to defeat

    Do you propose to launch a preventive missile strike on the United States? :)
    Quote: Yuri V.A
    How far from the territory of the Russian Federation with the listed means does the author thinks to move the enemy's submarine missile carriers and hunters in order to guaranteed to disrupt their combat mission?

    Yuri, what are you talking about? :))) I didn’t suggest pushing someone away somewhere, I suggested identifying deployment - increased concentration.
    1. Yuri V.A
      Yuri V.A 15 May 2021 10: 44
      -1
      How do you propose to control the enemy's nuclear submarines in the near zone, if a couple of AUGs join the underwater hunters 800-1000 km from the base, with a real opportunity to shoot down RPK ballistic missiles at the most vulnerable launch site and at the same time accelerate corvettes and PLO aircraft?
      And a preemptive strike on the grouping of US ships was and will remain the only possible countermeasure.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        15 May 2021 14: 13
        +5
        Quote: Yuri V.A
        How do you propose to control the enemy's nuclear submarine in the near zone, if a couple of AUG join underwater hunters 800-1000 km from the base?

        If she won't join - once, for the second, how will she interfere with you in peacetime?
        Quote: Yuri V.A
        with a real ability to shoot down RPK ballistic missiles at the most vulnerable launch site

        Sorry, but no one ever planned to thrust AUG or surface ships with anti-missile missiles into the areas of SSBN deployment. This is quite suicidal for ships and makes little sense in terms of intercepting ICBMs. Taking into account the speed of the ICBM, to intercept it it is necessary to be located dozens of kilometers from the carrier, once considered EMNIP -100-150 kilometers it turned out, like.
        Quote: Yuri V.A
        A preemptive strike against the grouping of US ships

        impossible due to the fact that it makes no sense for us to start a nuclear war
        1. Yuri V.A
          Yuri V.A 15 May 2021 15: 16
          -3
          You have a strange position - to consider the opening of an increased concentration of enemy underwater hunters off our coast sufficient to prevent an attack, as if there would be no other signs, like large-scale exercises, not to mention the notorious threatened period. And if the neutralization of SSBNs for the Americans is one of the priority goals, then the squadron of forces for this task will be appropriate and the aircraft carriers will be there in the main roles, and it is not necessary for ships with anti-missile missiles to approach the launch site of SLBMs a hundred kilometers, the range of the SM-3 allows.
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            15 May 2021 18: 30
            +3
            Quote: Yuri V.A
            You have a strange position - to consider it sufficient to prevent an attack the opening of an increased concentration of enemy submarine hunters off our coast, as if there would be no other signs, such as large-scale exercises

            The article says directly - there are 2 options for Armageddon, one will be preceded by a period of tension, the second - no. And it is also directly stated that the actions of the fleet in a situation when Armageddon is preceded by a period of tension will be considered in the next article. And this one deals with a counterforce strike from the "when nothing foreshadowed" position. What exactly do you disagree with? :)))
            Quote: Yuri V.A
            And if the neutralization of SSBNs for the Americans is one of the priority goals, then the squadron of forces for this task will be appropriate and the aircraft carriers will be there in the main roles,

            They do not solve this problem, and they are not needed there.
            Quote: Yuri V.A
            and it is not necessary for ships with anti-missile missiles to approach a hundred kilometers to the launch site of SLBMs, the range of the SM-3 allows.

            Does not allow.
            1. Yuri V.A
              Yuri V.A 16 May 2021 04: 16
              +2
              In the option "when nothing foreshadowed" you recount all the warheads of the attacking side, but do not indicate how many ASW forces and to what depth of defense must be opposed. Themselves noted that usually one or two of our SSBNs are on duty, tracking which does not require additional forces to attract attention. And the main forces of the enemy's underwater carriers will be hidden by the approaching surface group of ships, which will clean up the corvettes and ASW patrol aircraft during a sudden strike. An ordinary AUG passage at a distance of five hundred miles from the coast will not cause an emergency deployment of strategic nuclear forces.
              Small torpedo nuclear submarines are needed, but it remains to be seen which is better for containment - they, or Ash / Borey with CD off the American coast.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                16 May 2021 08: 58
                +4
                Quote: Yuri V.A
                In the option "when nothing foreshadowed" you recount all the warheads of the attacking side, but do not indicate how many ASW forces and to what depth of defense must be opposed.

                We will not be able to oppose anything to SSBNs, the task of systematic control of areas from which a counterforce strike is possible is beyond our strength. We are talking about opening the deployment of MPSS in the near sea zone (up to 500 miles) and in the areas where SSBNs are deployed, where they go beyond this zone.
                Quote: Yuri V.A
                And the main forces of the enemy's underwater carriers will be hidden by the approaching surface group of ships

                Sorry, but the entrance of the ADS into the same Barents Sea should put our aircraft on ears by definition. The fact of the approach of such forces is already a reason to be seriously wary and to declare increased readiness, that is, this is the strongest unmasking factor.
                And all we need to do to disrupt the counterforce strike is to start bringing the PGRK into position.
                Quote: Yuri V.A
                An ordinary AUG passage at a distance of five hundred miles from the coast will not cause an emergency deployment of strategic nuclear forces.

                AUG never went to either Barents or Okhotsk. So - very unusual.
                1. Yuri V.A
                  Yuri V.A 16 May 2021 09: 44
                  +4
                  In these areas, you are probably right.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    16 May 2021 09: 45
                    +4
                    Quote: Yuri V.A
                    In these areas, you are probably right.

                    Glad to the emerging consensus in the discussion! hi
                2. Aag
                  Aag 16 May 2021 19: 49
                  +3
                  Andrey! Thank you for the article! And your answer to Yuri (IMHO) is stated by you in the article: "...
                  3. A prerequisite for a counterforce strike will be the provisional escort of all Russian SSBNs in the sea by the US and its allies. If this condition is not met, the Americans are most likely to abandon the strike .... "
                  But with this: "The entrance of the ADR into the same Barents Sea should put our aircraft on the ears by definition. The fact of the approach of such forces is already a reason to be seriously alerted and to declare increased readiness, that is, it is a strong unmasking factor.
                  And all we need to disrupt the counterforce strike is to start moving the PGRK to positions ... "I probably disagree ... The fact is that PGRKs have UBSP (combat training starting positions, which they visit regularly in terms of combat training, and, which, of course, have long been "exposed"), and PBSP (field combat starting positions, about which not all officers of missile regiments are aware). The number of the latter, for a number of reasons, is very limited. risky. However, how not to respond to emerging threats. ((
                  Here, as in that parable about the shepherdess: "Wolves! Wolves!" ... hi
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    17 May 2021 08: 01
                    +3
                    Quote: AAG
                    Shining them at every "naughty" is a risky occupation

                    And you don't need to shine on them, you just need to leave the place of permanent deployment and stand on wheels a little further :))))) In full readiness to continue the route. Or maybe high alert will be enough without any exit
                    1. Aag
                      Aag 17 May 2021 15: 18
                      +5
                      "... And you don't need to shine them, it is enough to leave the place of permanent deployment and stand on wheels a little further away :))))) In full readiness to continue the route ..."
                      And what bonuses will we get?
                      As a joke, not very ... As sabotage, strong!))))
                      "Stand on wheels" - 1) increase the launch readiness time by about an hour (!) .;
                      2) severely limit the capabilities of the complex to receive a launch signal and other BU (combat control) signals;
                      3) reduce the reliability of the application
                      complex due to the lack of full power backup;
                      4) load the equipment with unnecessary engine hours, and l / s with an unjustified load (the anecdote "Suddenly there is a war, but we are tired" can acquire a tragic meaning) ...
                      "... a little further away ..." would mean that we did not escape from under the attack, and, moreover, became a gift for the DRG, having lost adequate O&O (security and defense) with OS (firing installations) equipped with a stationary communication, defined and prepared sectors of fire, prepared guard, TSO (technical means of protection) -EZ (electrified barrage), various types of security sensors, in the end, -controlled by MVZ (mine-explosive barriers), etc., etc. .d ....
                      ... Not an option, in general. And in particular ...
                      And for the article, thank you! In my opinion (of course, I do not understand all aspects), the judgments are logical. hi
                    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      17 May 2021 16: 03
                      +1
                      Quote: AAG
                      ... Not an option, in general. And in particular ...

                      I will not argue, I am far from an expert, and I will always listen to the opinion of a specialist with all my attention. But, I believe that if we know about the abnormal concentration of MAPLs, we will be able to do something to divert the PGRK from the strike. If everything is so hopeless, then there is no point in fussing with them, silos is our everything. hi
                    3. Aag
                      Aag 17 May 2021 21: 40
                      +2
                      "I will not argue, I am far from an expert, and I will always listen to the opinion of a specialist with all my attention ..."
                      I'm ready to insert a similar phrase to most of my comments. hi
                      I am croaking for my swamp, but how is it in a neighboring puddle, or above, - I can only guess ... Here is straight from your example, - "with anomalous concentration of MAPL", who (- clear matter of the Strategic Missile Forces, the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, - well, this is in a chain ...), on the basis of whose reports (apparently, not only the Main Command of the Navy, or the Commander of the Navy). The higher spheres are not my business ... The memory keeps what was taught, how it should be, my opinion was formed (according to new realities, and limited reliable information) ... How is it really (?) ... I would like to believe that it is not worse than the foe's ... More precisely, than the foe's taken together.
                      "... If everything is so hopeless, then there is no point in fussing with them, silos is our everything."
                      Sorry, I didn't talk about hopelessness, all the more, in terms of the value of the PGRK as a component of the Strategic Missile Forces, and the Strategic Missile Forces as a component of the nuclear triad (in our case, the RF Armed Forces, the main component, yes, the underwater and sky strategists will forgive me ... It is not their fault that it happened so). And in this, in my opinion, the main (but not the only) problem of our triad is not balance !!! We count the quantity (I don’t presume to judge the quality) of Tu-160, Tu-95, " we multiply "by the difference in distances from the Russian Federation to the United States and from NATO airfields to the Russian Federation (agree, different things), we look at the number of" Ogai "in the world ocean, multiplied by their ammunition, compare with what and HOW they are opposed ... We are dejected. .., and pushing all the tasks to the Strategic Missile Forces. Well, at least many commentators are here, and some officials in the media are guilty of this. ... Sorry for the emotionality.
                      As an argument in defense of the PGRK, in the 88th, 89th years, Gorbachev, in order to please the United States, first finished the "Pioneers" ...
                      -Lyrical retreat, I found it as a lieutenant in Chita-46, -47 ... It's not secret already, -It's in the public domain. The people in / towns, and even in Chita itself, went out to take a look ... (Destroyed by real launches with replacement YABCH on large-sized blanks, under the control of a commission from the United States - they poked their nose everywhere, the special officers did not sleep for weeks), at the appointed time (I don't remember exactly, sort of like at 11.00,16.00,23.00, XNUMX, XNUMX local time) Everyone, with their own feelings ... perceived with enthusiasm, -world-peace, no war, long live perestroika! Others, and what in return? After all, "friendship" ... it is so .. Still others, are a fig to yourself a salute, how many people's good flew away without any special effects.
                      ... The effects were! (I'm not talking about the slides of the evening launches, it's beautiful, impressive, they are lying somewhere, it would be necessary to digitize ...) And about the fact that ALL missiles started (one with a delay). to judge reliably, - but, they say, everyone met the declared KVO) At the same time, approximately, the Americans were ending their aged stocks of ICBMs (probably the Minetmen, the first). I cannot vouch for the reliability (well, say, not from the media, -50% start-up delays, about 10% - either did not start, or in an emergency ...) (Excuse me, gentlemen, how can I not remember about the "galoshes" from the USSR?)

                      .... Yes, and the mines were blown up, and Tu-shki were shredded, straight on TV (under the hooting of many ...), the Fleet was quietly rotting, plundered (in the topic of the article under discussion - NK PLO, submarines of all types and purposes, about minesweepers, supply vessels, the question was not at all.) constituting the sea part of the triad ...
                      Do not take it for boasting, - selflessly (sorry for the pathos) worked, served many. But, in terms of the military component, IMHO, it was the Strategic Missile Forces that played a decisive role. We read carefully - "in terms of the military component ...". Of course, there is also politics (muddy business, especially with undefined goals; economics, especially if its own power is not for a number of reasons ...)
                      So ... It seems that some commanders, using this experience of the "last war" (a tradition that has developed in our country?), Are trying to solve problems in a "tried and tested way". Like, that time it went through ...

                      Once again, my apologies for the boringness, obsession ... Once again, I wanted the best ...
                      IMHO: if we talk about a real war (excuse me, -or, bypass this site), in order to win (and not just "get to heaven"), you need not only to revive the strategic nuclear forces in full, but also the "social sphere", the economy ( not on the basis of capitalism, well, capitalism with a human face does not work out in our country (is it possible?) ...
                      In the meantime, neither the basic knowledge (data in the USSR), nor personal experience (confirming the acquired knowledge), does not inspire optimism. (((
                      Apologies for leaving the topic ...
                      Although, if we do not have time, at least for ourselves, everything is interconnected ... hi
                    4. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      19 May 2021 09: 59
                      +1
                      Good day! I missed your comment, sorry!
                      Let me ask you, as a knowledgeable person, a few questions :)
                      Quote: AAG
                      Sorry, I didn't talk about hopelessness, especially in terms of the value of the PGRK as a component of the Strategic Missile Forces

                      Personally, it seems to me (from my couch) that the PGRK is a very important component of the Strategic Missile Forces. But I have always believed that its importance is that it is mobile. That is, even if during the threatened period the PGRK is ready for an immediate departure, then it has a good chance of avoiding a disarming strike even with a minimal flight time (within 15 minutes). In addition, I reasoned like this - the Americans do not know how to direct warheads at moving targets, that is, a PGRK in motion can generally be hit only by accident.
                      That is, a US satellite can detect a PGRK in motion, but what good is it to it if, by the time this satellite gives its information, this PGRK will not know where. Accordingly, in case of increased danger, there is no need to "shine" the real launch positions, it is enough to bring the PGRK onto the road, and drive a little during the passage of the reconnaissance satellite :)
                      I also believed that the danger of the DRG, although different from zero, is still insignificant, provided that the PGRK is properly escorted and the areas of its movement are controlled, which we seem to be doing. It seemed to me that it is unrealistic for the United States to form dozens of professional DRGs on our territory.
                      Where am I wrong? I will be extremely grateful to you for dispelling my illusions.
                    5. Aag
                      Aag 19 May 2021 12: 14
                      +3
                      Greetings!
                      My responses to comments are often displayed late ...
                      "... it seems that the PGRK is a very important component of the Strategic Missile Forces ...."
                      I don't think so.)) I am convinced of this.
                      "... But I have always believed that her importance is that she is mobile ..."
                      True. But, do not forget that the time of readiness for launching a PGRK from PPD (points of permanent deployment) is only not much longer than silos. Therefore, if we manage to receive an order to launch (plus the time of pre-launch operations, it is not long) approach of BB (warheads) of the enemy, there is no particular difference - mine, or "mobile". The difference will come later, if we “waste” this time. Higher levels of command, intelligence, decision-makers will “waste” ... Then, the silo will still have some chance to complete the task, the PGRK will only have a miracle ...

                      "... even if during the threatened period the PGRK is ready for an immediate departure, then it has a good chance of avoiding a disarming strike even with a minimal flight time (within 15 minutes) ..."
                      And here you are greatly mistaken.
                      During the threatened period, PGRK (sorry, without references to documents, without details ...), depending on the decisions taken at the top, either increase readiness (hardware, organizational, technical ...) in the PPD, or, as soon as possible, occupy the PBSP ( field combat starting positions), PUBSP (field combat training ...), which also requires a number of activities (reconnaissance, commandant service, sometimes engineering reconnaissance, or even preparation of routes ...).
                      ... 15 minutes ... (((. During this time, even hardware does not turn out to "get on the wheels." Not to mention the construction of the column ... Even if the column is lined up, at the maximum speed (40 km / h - from open sources) the head of the column will go 10 km It's good if the folds of the terrain are covered from the shock wave ...
                    6. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      19 May 2021 13: 54
                      +1
                      Thank you very much for the reasoned answer!
                      I'll know
                  2. Aag
                    Aag 19 May 2021 14: 59
                    +3
                    "... the Americans do not know how to direct warheads at moving targets, that is, a PGRK in motion can be hit only by accident.
                    That is, a US satellite can detect a PGRK in motion, but what good is it to it if, by the time this satellite gives its information, this PGRK will not know where ... "
                    It seems so, if we talk about strategic nuclear forces (bombers, I hope, will not reach deep into the territory). Apparently, they plan to hit the area, probable routes of movement. Unfortunately, there are not many such routes ...
                    "... the danger of the DRG, although different from zero, is nevertheless insignificant, provided that the PGRK is properly escorted and the areas of its movement are monitored, which we seem to be doing ..."
                    Nevertheless, this issue is posed acutely in the Strategic Missile Forces. It is being worked out. In my opinion, without much success. You cannot do without your own forces, without reinforcing the attached forces, means (this is provided for in the plans). Without details ...
                    So, "escort" and "control", for the most part, ensure nuclear safety: after all, you have to move nuclear warheads along public roads. guarding the route (so our captain died, blocking the path of a lezovoz, whose driver was drunk, jumped out to meet the convoy). Now all movements "on the asphalt", accompanied by traffic police cars, are in the head, the tail of the column. signs. /
                    And so, it happened, and more than once, it was necessary to cars trying to wedge into the convoy, overtake, - to blind with searchlights, - not to squeeze combat units to the side of the road, - and even shoot (into the air, blank, "unaccounted for" b / supplies; shot from KPVT with an oily rag instead of a bullet is a spectacular sight))). There is no time for proceedings, - someone is in a hurry to the hospital, the airport, or a nutcase, which the terrorist has thought of ...
                    I hope your questions are answered within the limits of permissible. hi
                  3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    20 May 2021 08: 23
                    +2
                    Quote: AAG
                    I hope your questions are answered within the limits of permissible.

                    Much fuller than I could have hoped. Thanks again! If I, in turn, can help you with something (say, on the history of the fleet), I am always ready, just ask. hi
                    It turns out that PGRKs are still more vulnerable than I expected, and the role of SSBNs in preventing counterforce attacks is even more increasing.
                  4. Aag
                    Aag 20 May 2021 17: 00
                    +1
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    Quote: AAG
                    I hope your questions are answered within the limits of permissible.

                    Much fuller than I could have hoped. Thanks again! If I, in turn, can help you with something (say, on the history of the fleet), I am always ready, just ask. hi
                    It turns out that PGRKs are still more vulnerable than I expected, and the role of SSBNs in preventing counterforce attacks is even more increasing.

                    Always, if you have time, please! Thank you for the constructive dialogue, interesting articles, comments! hi
                    For the willingness to help, special thanks. The fleet has been interesting since childhood, and until now. (When sent to the medical board before entering the VVUZ, RVC got it wrong, got into the crew on the submarine ... I wanted to, it was, "bzikanut" .. . Vision saved))).
                    Do not consider it intrusive, nevertheless, I try to stay within the framework of the discussion of the article, - about the survivability of certain components of the strategic nuclear forces ...
                    Not a strategist at all (not in terms of belonging to a family, type of troops), but I see that a reliable nuclear shield is possible only with a harmonious, balanced development, maintaining at a sufficient level all the components of the triad - in its pure form, these are the Strategic Missile Forces, MSS, SA; in a broader sense - and all those who ensure their effectiveness! / Andrey, I am sure that you understand this, - I am writing for potential readers. Let them not be offended, but to fulfill the Order is not a red button to press, and not "stupid" step out of the trench (well, they often began to show it in films) ./ This is missile defense, air defense (with all components), and TA (transport aviation), - there were cases - they hammer for every minute during folding, deployment, - as a result we are waiting for the necessary block, assembly ... Engineering troops ... Well, the climate, the relief we have is like fires, floods. engineer battalion) .Where necessary, -pantoners, ... and other necessary specialists ... Sorry, I'm talking about mine again ...
                    And even, I'll try to explain why this is so)). Here, on the VO, there was (IMHO) a powerful backbone (in a good sense of the word) of the submarine. different ... Yes, and "when God created discipline, aviation was in the air ..."drinks ).
                    Tankers often delight in their ... specifics.
                    But, almost always, all comment authors; and article authors often forget about INTERACTIONS.
                    On the one hand, this is understandable, -GSh (the General Staff does not discuss here), and people write about what they saw, they know ... "Divannye" (theorists) have the right, of course, ())), (with irony, but , without the intention of offending) .By the way, there are interesting opinions, a view from the side, so to speak (more often, - devoid of practical reinforcement, but, all the same, interesting!).
                  5. Aag
                    Aag 20 May 2021 20: 32
                    0
                    ".... It turns out that PGRKs are still more vulnerable than I expected, and the role of SSBNs in preventing counterforce attacks is even more increasing ..."
                    Sorry, for the tediousness, again I))).
                    It's just that the "RAM" fills up quickly, I'm afraid other tasks will be replaced.))
                    In general, I wanted to start with this ...
                    Ahem, in the years 83-89-93, few people imagined what was happening, in reality, not that in other troops, districts (I am by type of troops, and territorially ...), but also in the regiments, at the level rumors ... (What did the SVGT regime mean - the preservation of military and state secrets!). ... When, by launches, they destroyed the Pioneers, different feelings overwhelmed different people: finally, we will live without tension (peace, friendship, chewing gum); TV was broadcasted as shredded, in a particularly perverted form of air strategists) Many believed that this is how it happens, which means that our SSBNs have reached a level capable of compensating for all these losses! All of us were deceived! You thought the Strategic Missile Forces would compensate, we, on the contrary ... ((
                    ... Much later I learned about the fate of rotting, plundered submarine, surface ships: about the crippled fate of the officers of the Navy, their families ... (and of my colleagues of those years I don’t remember who kept the first family).
                    ... But))), there is something to be proud of, to justify oneself, let everyone interpret by virtue of their ... capabilities: (raids began, like, -do not whine, ruined, did not defend (without delving into the purpose of the Armed Forces) the Country, -be patient!) So, about pride ... Andrei, (yes, more emotionally, -but, nevertheless), you know what the Americans said (in the VO and the photo of the members of the disarmament commission, 88th year, it was , - I saw half live), after a samovar with alcohol? Regarding the PGRK (I understand that geopolitically, with the presence of "Ohio", SOSUS, they do not really need it.)?
                    "We can make a similar complex, but we cannot afford to pay a decent salary (not monetary allowance) to such a number of officers for such conditions of service." ... To a greater extent, apparently a bike ...))) But, as they say, in every joke there is a grain of a joke ... I think this applies to many aircrafts.
                    ... Be patient a little more, I'm finishing)).
                    By the difference between silos and PGRK. Well, the Strategic Missile Forces slang (With all due respect to the OS!) (OS is a separate start, missile regiments with silos) ...
                    For various reasons, there was, and, apparently, now there is a rotation of l / s (officers, warrant officers, are there still such?) Between these components of the Strategic Missile Forces. There were mixed RD (missile divisions) that had RP (missile regiments), both mobile and stationary ... Reviews of officers transferred to serve from a position, say, com. rdn (missile division) PGRK, for the post of ZBU (deputy for combat control), or com. rp (rocket regiment): "Well, what does this" company "with a flag mean to me ?!"
                    I mean that the hospital is a hospital. Everything is equipped. Medical equipment, minimum. All are trained for their functionality ...
                    I hope the missilemen will respond.
                    Sorry if I'm tired ... hi
  • Soldatov V.
    Soldatov V. 15 May 2021 13: 59
    -7
    Andrey, why are you so against a preventive missile strike against the enemy (in this case, the United States). We had such a moment in the seventies. President Ford, like a sweetheart, flew to Vladivostok with tears in his eyes, you misunderstood us, and China planted the Four, headed by the widow of Mao Zedong. Leonid Brezhnev saved the world, so he did not want war. Below A. Timokhin writes the reaction time of our command structures is more than the flight time of enemy missiles. Command structures have no reaction time to a retaliatory launch. For a month, a week, we already know when and with what we will be attacked, and we know when to get ahead. One hundred and twenty American generals demanded to remove the crazy Biden, they then understand how dangerous his threats to Russia are. soldier
  • Fedor egoist
    Fedor egoist 15 May 2021 15: 48
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Each missile can carry up to 8 "heavy" W88 warheads with a capacity of 455-475 kt or up to 14 "light" W76 warheads with a capacity of 100 kt. [...] Taking into account the fact that the Americans have 88 W400 units, having loaded to the maximum, "Ohio" is quite capable of "dragging" 2 warheads to our shores.

    There is clearly something wrong) Either 400 Tridents, not W88, or the Americans will not be able to "bring 2388 warheads" due to the fact that there are only 400 of them))
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Do not forget that the Americans currently have about 1 W400-80 warheads with a yield of up to 1 kt, which may well be deployed on Tomahawk cruise missiles of the corresponding modifications.

    Interesting information), taking into account the fact that a significant part of them has been disposed of, and the rest were decommissioned 30 years ago and need at least reassembly ("burnout" of plutonium). There below they wrote in more detail, I will not repeat myself. All the remaining actual tactical nuclear warheads are on the B61 / B61-12 ..
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Of course, the use of "Tomahawks" in counterforce strike is limited. This is due to the low speed of the cruise missile.

    You put it very mildly)) "Decent people with knives (or tomahawks) do not come to the shootout" (c) :)
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    But nevertheless, the Tomahawks can be assigned the task of destroying objects located near the coastline: the same naval bases, for example.

    What are our naval bases? Severodvinsk? Balaklava ??)) Object air defense / missile defense with the beginning of the war will disappear somewhere? What in general more or less significant tasks for the destruction of objects can be entrusted to subsonic missile launchers ??? An outfit of hundreds of KR could not disable the second-rate Syrian airfield, and you are here telling us about Russian military bases)
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    In addition, these cruise missiles may well be used to destroy a number of important stationary targets, so to speak, the "second stage" - parts of command posts, communication centers, etc., which may well "wait" 25-30 minutes or more from the start of the attack.

    ... They also have an on-site air defense system (all of a sudden!) I’ll probably surprise someone now, but even some civilian infrastructure objects, such as nuclear power plants, have their own air defense systems. What can we say about "second priority goals")
    Shells with Torahs and Buks perfectly cut any subsonic CRs, whether Tomahawks or something similar, wholesale and retail. In a nuclear conflict, for that matter, the F-35 + archaic free-fall nuclear B-61 has a better chance of reaching the target, and then there are more chances than the Tomahawk + W80-1 option .... maybe the Americans are not so Tuuupye, since they do not want to return YABCh back to the "Tomahawks"?))
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 18: 38
      +4
      Quote: Fedor Egoist
      There is clearly something wrong) Either 400 Tridents, not W88, or the Americans will not be able to "bring 2388 warheads" due to the fact that there are only 400 of them))

      400 W88 is the loading of 50 missiles (8 per missile), the rest - 142 missiles * 14 100-kiloton warheads = 1988 warheads. 1988 + 400 = 2388.
      Why is it difficult with arithmetic? :)))
      Quote: Fedor Egoist
      Interesting information), taking into account the fact that a significant part of them was disposed of, and the rest were removed from service 30 years ago

      They have not been removed from service, but removed from missiles. These are two big differences.
      Quote: Fedor Egoist
      There below they wrote in more detail, I will not repeat myself.

      misspelled
      Quote: Fedor Egoist
      What are our naval bases? Severodvinsk? Balaklava ??)) Object air defense / missile defense with the beginning of the war will disappear somewhere?

      The same Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk. Object air defense yawns Israeli missiles in Syria. But in the naval base, of course, it will work 100% from the position of a surprise attack ...
      Quote: Fedor Egoist
      An outfit of hundreds of KR could not disable the second-rate Syrian airfield

      Actually, he brought out, and not a second-rate airfield, but a full-fledged air base. And even without yabch
      Quote: Fedor Egoist
      Shells with Torah and Bukas perfectly saw in wholesale and retail any subsonic KR,

      Exclusively in your imagination. In reality, the situation is MUCH worse - our air defense systems miss missile strikes in places 20 km from Khmeimim, British air defense systems that shoot down a projectile in flight on tests do not have time to react to an attack from subsonic aircraft, etc. etc.
  • Normal ok
    Normal ok 15 May 2021 23: 57
    +2
    Quote: Yuri V.A.
    The "defensive game" is deliberately doomed to failure, as an example - like an effective and layered air defense / missile defense of Israel cannot cope with a massive attack of unpretentious Arab missiles made on the knee. At what distance from the territory of the Russian Federation using the listed means does the author intend to move the enemy's submarine missile carriers and hunters in order to guaranteed to disrupt their combat mission? This is very difficult without full-fledged oceanic KUGs.

    So, with the current fleet, no other game at all is possible.
  • Nikkon
    Nikkon 17 May 2021 01: 35
    +1
    Quote: Yuri V.A
    The "defensive game" is obviously doomed to defeat,

    The USSR defeated Hitler "on the defensive" without delivering a preemptive strike against the German army.
  • mark1
    mark1 15 May 2021 06: 21
    +7
    1) The Russian Navy stopped attempts to create universal corvettes in favor of specialized PLO corvettes;

    In this case, everything depends on the quantity; with limited production, corvettes are doomed to be universal, i.e. we must not "stop attempts to create universal corvettes" but start and sharply increase the production of specialized corvettes - everyone will find their own niche
    2) in the construction of non-strategic nuclear submarines, priority was given to torpedo submarines of the most moderate sizes.

    You cannot argue here, as well as with the need for large-scale hydrophone fields and other elements of stationary submarine warfare (I would indicate the need for large-scale "dronization" in the flesh before organizing patrols with underwater patrolling ammunition and hydrophones (and here the prospect of a blockade of the enemy's naval base is already highlighted)
    But the most effective, of course, is the advance, guaranteed withdrawal of part of the strategic nuclear forces from under attack with their placement in undetectable positions, which essentially caused the creation of Poseidon and partly the Petrel.
  • Bez 310
    Bez 310 15 May 2021 07: 37
    +8
    Quite rightly indicated in the article - PLO, PLO, and PLO again!
    But this is exactly what we have a problem with ...
    1. Sandor Clegane
      Sandor Clegane 15 May 2021 07: 57
      +5
      Quote: Bez 310
      But this is exactly what we have a problem with ...

      Yes, we have problems almost everywhere in the Navy, but the corvettes frigates PLO-Air defense should saturate the fleet, as well as a hunter-class submarine with a displacement 2 times less than ash
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 20: 57
      +4
      Good evening!
      Let me ask you a question: do you have any fundamental objections to the theses of this article? If - yes, I would be extremely grateful for at least the shortest listing of them.
      1. Bez 310
        Bez 310 15 May 2021 22: 49
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Do you have any fundamental objections to the theses of the article?

        I have no fundamental objections.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          16 May 2021 08: 58
          +3
          Quote: Bez 310
          I have no fundamental objections.

          Thank you for your reply!
    3. Aag
      Aag 16 May 2021 20: 04
      +2
      Quote: Bez 310
      Quite rightly indicated in the article - PLO, PLO, and PLO again!
      But this is exactly what we have a problem with ...

      PLO ... This is you, because the topic is close to you, familiar ...
      Unfortunately, the "problem" is not "EXACTLY" with this. ((
      Other components touched upon in the article are closer to me. And, too, there are problems. Maybe not so critical ... But, given the assigned tasks, crying
      hi
  • prior
    prior 15 May 2021 07: 55
    -5
    It is much easier in the course of a nuclear conflict to be the first to destroy NATO's Europe.
    She needs to be officially notified of this.
    And let the Europeans shout to the Americans about the non-use of nuclear weapons against Russia.
    "If you want to live, you will not be so hot."
    At the same time, we are peaceful people and we are not going to attack anyone.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 15 May 2021 08: 12
      0
      Quote: prior
      And let the Europeans shout to the Americans about the non-use of nuclear weapons against Russia.
      "If you want to live, you will not be so hot."
      At the same time, we are peaceful people

      unfortunately, the world behind the scenes of ordinary people will not listen
      1. prior
        prior 15 May 2021 08: 13
        -1
        But why. There are a lot of Jews in Europe, there are all kinds of Rothschilds ... wink
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 15 May 2021 08: 25
          -3
          Quote: prior
          There are a lot of Jews in Europe

          you have a superficial idea of ​​the Jews, Jews are different, there are rich Rothschilds, Loeb, Rockefellers, Chases, Wallenbergs Engels, each such Jew is very valuable and his needs and desires must be fulfilled. And there are all sorts of Rabinovichs and Poroshenkas Zelenskiy Kozlevichi Freidovichs with Boyarskiy Vysotskiy Groismanamies and Weberians, Lurie and all the rest ... their destiny is to be, according to Herzl's wording, "our smaller brothers" who need to be kept in check, and even sent to the gas cameras, so that there was a reason for the memory of the Holocaust, and to obey, went to work in the heat in the kibbutz, and did not hold on to their warm burgher towns in Europe ... Great Israel from the Persian Gulf to the Red and Black Sea, must be populated by someone , that is, the population of the EU and the United States must move there, and in order to move it must be chased with sticks, for this, the Arabs have already been brought there, and the threat or even more nuclear strikes by the forces of a third country would also be useful to the world behind the scenes ... one Jewish woman from Israel when her son was killed because he spoke Russian, she said about Israel, "if there were no Arabs, we would have cut each other long ago." more than a year, many communities in conflict and not negotiable
          1. prior
            prior 15 May 2021 08: 31
            0
            You love Jews much more than I do. It is obvious. lol
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 15 May 2021 08: 36
              +1
              Quote: prior
              You love Jews much more than I do. It is obvious.

              do not even understand what you mean?
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 10: 13
      +10
      Quote: prior
      It is much easier in the course of a nuclear conflict to be the first to destroy NATO's Europe.

      Much Better to Prevent Nuclear Conflict
      1. prior
        prior 15 May 2021 10: 37
        0
        It is the real threat of destruction that can help avoid a nuclear war.
        If there is an armed conflict with the United States, will the NATO countries in Europe sit on the sidelines, hoping to survive ?!
        So I suggest that the Europeans take care of the world for their own safety, and not keep silent when the United States raises the stakes to the point of lawlessness.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          15 May 2021 14: 30
          +7
          Quote: prior
          It is the real threat of destruction that can help avoid a nuclear war.

          The Europeans will not attack us, but the United States can. And the United States will not be stopped by the fact that the missiles are aimed at the Europeans.
          Finally, the counterforce strike is just conceived in order to destroy the strategic nuclear forces, that is, to prevent a nuclear strike by the enemy.
      2. bayard
        bayard 15 May 2021 14: 34
        +5
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Much Better to Prevent Nuclear Conflict

        Greetings to Andrew.
        Gorbachev has already "averted a conflict" in our country, and has not yet withdrawn.
        With the planetary punks, you can only speak from a position of strength, creating threats to them, equal and greater strength. And for the Navy, it could be a return to the "Gorshkov Doctrine" - the forward deployment of the Navy strike force.
        ... But so far the Russian Federation has no anti-submarine aviation, no MRA, no MAPL, no modern SSGN ...
        The fleets are subordinate to the districts ... except for the Northern one, which itself became the district ...
        Time has been hopelessly lost for many things. When the first volleys struck in Chemulpo and in the roadstead of Port Arthur ... it is too late to make plans for the construction of ships ...
        You will have to fight with what you have.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          15 May 2021 20: 48
          +5
          Quote: bayard
          Gorbachev has already "averted a conflict" in our country, and has not yet withdrawn.

          Well, I’m talking a little about something else :)))) The fact that having received a "signal" in the form of concentration of US submarines, to be able to disperse the PGRK and thus make the counterforce strike meaningless
          Please don't write me down as Gorbachev hi
          Quote: bayard
          With the planetary punks, you can only speak from a position of strength, creating threats to them, equal and greater strength.

          More about this in the following articles :)
    3. bayard
      bayard 15 May 2021 14: 14
      +3
      Quote: prior
      It is much easier in the course of a nuclear conflict to be the first to destroy NATO's Europe.

      Europe has always been easier to destroy, and she knows it. The means of realizing this wonderful idea is another matter. The United States took the first step towards this by breaking the INF Treaty. request - Russia has a free hand. And if you consider that the European countries are armed with SLBMs (England, France) and they are members of NATO ... then you just need to deploy your SD missiles aimed at Europe - in response to the already existing ones in England and France.
      All .
      All subsequent negotiations only taking into account the potential of these countries.
      What missiles to deploy? Firstly, CD, because we already have them - "Caliber" and promising "Caliber-M" (with a range of up to 4000 km.). There was an option of creating an MRBM based on the Iskander engine (1st stage) and Dagger (2nd stage) with a range of about 2000 km. Technically, there are no problems with this - all the components are in stock and are mass-produced. Such MRBMs would be useful in the Far East - against Japan and American bases on its territory.
      And of course the reanimation of the Rubezh project.
      But these considerations have absolutely nothing to do with the topic of the article.
      The urgent need for a sufficient number of PLO corvettes, PLO aircraft and helicopters, stationary sensor fields for monitoring water areas, modern non-nuclear submarines and MAPLs of moderate displacement ... This has been discussed for a long time, but the authorities persistently finance the prohibitively expensive and non-working Zaslon and the construction of a large series of Ash "...
      Apparently the authorities have other interests and goals in life.
      And also about the article - without aircraft-carrying ships, our fleet will not be able to build out anti-aircraft / air defense lines. Therefore, it is so important to return the Kuznetsov to service, and, if necessary, to use in the future the UDCs currently under construction as carriers of PLO helicopters and reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles, while on duty at these lines.
      A little pleased with the latest news that the transfer of the frigate "Golovko" to the Fleet is still possible in the future 2022. So the power plant was installed, albeit through the ass (afloat, with loading in parts). This gives hope that the series will go on and the fleet will have new frigates with reasonable characteristics.
      1. Osipov9391
        Osipov9391 16 May 2021 00: 12
        +3
        Note that France and Britain do not have medium-range missiles on their submarines, but intercontinental ones capable of reaching any target on Russian territory.
        Britain generally has American missiles and it is not known what charges they carry (maybe American), their compatibility with Ohio is not known.
        So that at the Florida dock (where they receive ammunition and make a test launch), missiles with American charges are not loaded into a British boat.
    4. Doctor
      Doctor 15 May 2021 14: 47
      +3
      It is much easier in the course of a nuclear conflict to be the first to destroy NATO's Europe.

      It makes no sense. Just as there is no point in destroying the United States.

      Within 5 years after mutual annihilation, the territory of Russia, Europe and the United States will be occupied by the Chinese, Easterners and Mexicans.
      That is, by destroying each other, we will clear a place on the planet for them.

      Smart people understand this very well, because we are still alive. wink
      1. Vadim237
        Vadim237 15 May 2021 19: 56
        -2
        The Chinese will definitely not go to us or to the United States and Europe, since we have a harsh climate and the entire territory will be for radioactive fallout and other chemical products of the destroyed infrastructure. Where will they go to South America, Africa and Australia for sure?
        1. Doctor
          Doctor 15 May 2021 22: 58
          +2
          The Chinese will definitely not go to us or to the United States and Europe, since we have a harsh climate and the entire territory will be for radioactive fallout and other chemical products of the destroyed infrastructure. Where will they go to South America, Africa and Australia for sure?

          In Hiroshima now they live without problems.
          Let not after 5, but even after 50. The meaning is the same - we will kill each other, and they will come to our place.

          Mao's words will come true: A wise monkey sits on a mountain and watches two tigers fight in the valley. laughing
          1. Ryusey
            Ryusey 16 May 2021 22: 04
            0
            Who will let her sit in the tree?)
        2. Spring fluff
          Spring fluff 17 May 2021 16: 35
          0
          if you read the article carefully, you probably realized that the number of warheads is very limited (and there are many targets, even if Europe is not affected). to destroy ground infrastructure, air explosions will be used, which give much less pollution than ground ones. For example, the tsar-bomb was detonated at an altitude of 4 km, the blast wave went around the ground several times, the flash was visible from 1 km away, and people landed at the site of the explosion two hours later (!). There will be no massive radioactive contamination.
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 15 May 2021 08: 10
    0
    I deeply respect Andrey from Chelyabinsk, a balanced article, not to dig, it is important that the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy read the article and understand that we will not fight with calibers from frigates (and even more so from MRK). nuclear submarines and quality control of water areas within a radius of 1000-3000 km from nuclear submarine bases are required
  • V1er
    V1er 15 May 2021 08: 16
    +5
    I fully agree with the author. Good article. All that we can do now realistically and quickly over the next 10-20 years is to improve the quality and quantity of the aircraft and the ASW fleet, as well as increase the number of the submarine fleet. It is also worth noting that you need to increase (KOH).
  • Speedy
    Speedy 15 May 2021 09: 02
    0
    How can you preemptively strike at our nuclear forces in Siberia? Where do not shoot - they will have time to react, the center of the continent, after all.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 10: 07
      +7
      Quote: Sorrow
      How can you preemptively strike at our nuclear forces in Siberia?

      Well, for example, from the middle of the Mediterranean to Orenburg, where we have the "head" of the 31st missile army, even less than 5,5 km - the flight time is about 15 minutes. Actually, "Bulava" flies from Bely to Kura for 15 minutes - alas, any place in our country is under fire from SSBNs with a relatively short flight time - up to a quarter of an hour.
      1. Speedy
        Speedy 15 May 2021 10: 19
        0
        Shoot, but there is time to react. Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Krasnoyarsk divisions, for example.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          15 May 2021 14: 28
          +4
          Quote: Sorrow
          Shoot, but there is time to react. Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Krasnoyarsk divisions, for example.

          Novosibirsk - Malta - 5 330 km
    2. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 15 May 2021 11: 56
      +8
      No, it is not correct. There is one launch corridor that is not good for us.
      1. Speedy
        Speedy 15 May 2021 12: 07
        0
        Is this fresh information? The radar is fresh near Barnaul. And they were building something in the north. I am not an expert, but my acquaintances from Sibirskiy assured that they could not be reached without light.
        1. timokhin-aa
          timokhin-aa 15 May 2021 12: 11
          +5
          There, the problem is not in the radar, but in the combination of the curvature of the earth and the area from which the launch takes place.
          Now there are stations near Yeniseisk and Krasnoyarsk, if something is noticed, then only they are already late, a few minutes before the strike.

          And the Barnaul station covers another direction
          1. Speedy
            Speedy 15 May 2021 12: 23
            0
            Will it be announced in the Strategic Missile Forces immediately, at the first flashed launch? And the flight time to Siberia is still decent in their categories. It is clear that the unpaved fields will not have time to leave, but will they be able to shoot back? It is necessary to consult with the missilemen, but they have some ideas on this matter. I did not notice any particular alarm in them about this. They said they would burn, but not alone)).
            1. timokhin-aa
              timokhin-aa 15 May 2021 12: 38
              +6
              From the moment when the rocket jumps high enough to be detected by the radar until the moment it hits the target, it will be 8-10 minutes.
              In the European part - 7-8.

              This is much less than the reaction time of our command structures.
              1. Vadim237
                Vadim237 15 May 2021 20: 00
                0
                As soon as the missiles are launched, they will immediately see and recognize wherever they are flying, there is a space echelon of an early warning system and a ground one, and the time for preparing a launch at the same Voevoda in the 80s was brought to 30 seconds.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  timokhin-aa 16 May 2021 20: 39
                  +1
                  Tundra has only 3 satellites

                  and the time for preparing the launch at the same Voevoda was brought to 80 seconds back in the 30s.


                  And the time of transmission of the launch order was not brought - sadness.
            2. Aag
              Aag 16 May 2021 20: 33
              +2
              Quote: Sorrow
              Will it be announced in the Strategic Missile Forces immediately, at the first flashed launch? And the flight time to Siberia is still decent in their categories. It is clear that the unpaved fields will not have time to leave, but will they be able to shoot back? It is necessary to consult with the missilemen, but they have some ideas on this matter. I did not notice any particular alarm in them about this. They said they would burn, but not alone)).

              Consult. hi
              How many times, and in what cases, the Strategic Missile Forces entered the Combat mode, and most importantly, how long after the threat was detected.
              Technically, the readiness for launch after receiving the order is minimal (if we are talking about the occupied positions of the PGRK). The question is how quickly the order will come (it will come quickly) - how soon the decision will be made.
              Another question is, for what purposes! Yes, the introduction of the PZ (flight task) does not exceed the preparation time for launch, it is not critical. But after all, at the top they still have to decide which volume, by what forces, means ...
              I hope that algorithms have been developed in advance and they are automated. Otherwise ... "So don't get anyone else!" ((( hi
  • Dmitry Chelyabinsk
    Dmitry Chelyabinsk 15 May 2021 09: 10
    +9
    The conclusion from the above is simple: the SSBNs at the disposal of the United States and its NATO allies are not enough to deliver a sudden disarming strike.

    Quite right, for the following reasons:
    But the Americans can try. And even with some chance of success.

    Can not. Their SLBMs are equipped with two types of warheads: W76 (manufactured in 1979-1987) and W88 (manufactured in 1988-1989). The youngest warheads are 32 years old. Their original warranty period was 20 years.
    The production of new ones was discontinued in 1989, both the assembly of warheads and the production of fissile materials.
    In laboratories and in the US Navy, a lot of measures are being taken to extend the life of warheads. The Americans have two problems: firstly, all these studies are not confirmed by field experiments. And secondly, there is the unavoidable problem of aging weapons-grade plutonium.
    The freshly produced weapon-grade plutonium has an isotope ratio of 239% plutonium-93,5, 240% plutonium-6 and 241% plutonium-0,5. Moreover, a change even by tenths of a percent is very significant and fraught with the failure of the nuclear device. The last of the isotopes, plutonium-241, has a half-life of 13 years, with the formation of americium-241. That is, over 30-40 years since the production of the W76 and W88 warheads, most of the plutonium-241 disintegrated, and a significant amount of americium-241 accumulated in the crystal lattice of the plutonium elements.
    There are only two ways to eliminate this problem: either by producing fresh plutonium, or by reprocessing the existing one with purification from americium-241. Neither one nor the other is present and is not expected.
    As a result, the Americans do not and cannot know for certain how many of the existing nuclear warheads will work and how many will not cause a chain reaction. They can only make theoretical assumptions.
    For nuclear deterrence and retaliation, such a situation is quite normal. No one will ever dare to check how many American warheads will be able to hit targets.
    But for a counterforce strike, such an alignment is completely unacceptable. If even 20% of the warheads do not detonate, then the disarming strike will be thwarted.
    It is clear that all this will bypass the START III agreements, but, firstly, if the Americans decide to strike at us, no treaty will stop them. And they will be able to secretly equip the required number of missiles with warheads.

    They won't be able to. But more on that in the next commentary in the evening ...) The weather is great in Chelyabinsk, it's time to go to the lake)
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 15 May 2021 12: 05
      +1
      If even 20% of the warheads do not detonate, then the disarming strike will be thwarted.


      Can you somehow confirm this? They can also assess the real risks of failure of their warheads and compensate for this by increasing the number of forces.
      1. Dmitry Chelyabinsk
        Dmitry Chelyabinsk 17 May 2021 10: 35
        +2
        Good afternoon, Alexander. Confirm - it will be loudly said, rather calculate.
        If we take Andrey's figures as a basis (although I do not quite agree that the PGRK needs 2 warheads, at least there it is necessary to divide the PGRK into dispersed and located in the PPD), then the Americans will allocate 320 warheads for 640 missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces, including 400 W88 and 240 W76. With 100% warhead activation (and the probability of being hit by 2 blocks for W88 - 95%, for W76 - 84%), after 640 warheads hit, 29 ICBMs of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces will survive (of which 10 out of 200 - after being hit by W88 blocks, and 19 of 120 - after being hit by W76 blocks).
        If 20% of the attacking warheads do not explode, then we have:
        - the first wave of W88 - 200 units, of which 40 do not work, 160 will hit targets with a probability of 0,8, that is, 40 + 32 = 72 targets will survive;
        - the second wave of W88 - 200 units, out of 72 surviving targets 14 are not hit (warheads do not fire), the remaining 58 are hit with a probability of 0,8, that is, 14 + 12 = 26 targets survive;
        - the first wave of W76 - 120 units, of which 24 do not work, 96 will hit targets with a probability of 0,6, that is, 24 + 38 = 62 targets will survive;
        - the second wave of W76 - 120 units, out of 62 surviving targets 12 are not hit (warheads do not fire), the remaining 50 are hit with a probability of 0,8, that is, 12 + 10 = 22 targets survive.
        In total, instead of 29 targets (when 100% of the warheads are triggered), 58 will survive (when 80% of the warheads are triggered).
        That is, even if only 20% of the warheads fail, the number of surviving ICBMs doubles.
        As for the increase in the amount of ammunition to hit targets, Andrei already writes about the shortage of warheads for the first strike (at least 700 units according to the 2 BG scheme for 1 target), if we add one more BG, then more than 1000 of them will already be required, which in the context of START-3 restrictions, it is unrealistic to deploy on SSBNs deployed at sea during a peace period.
        It should be emphasized here that a surprise strike from a peaceful position is being discussed, and also that the Americans will not take into account the percentage of warheads by themselves, but only in conjunction with other problematic issues related to the first strike.
        1. timokhin-aa
          timokhin-aa 17 May 2021 12: 59
          0
          Well, now let's balance your calculations a little and say that almost all of these 58 ICBMs will stand on the surviving PGRK, which for several hours will have nowhere to receive signs of a flight mission and unlock, and which will be hunted by bombers that freely operate in the electromagnetic chaos of a nuclear war ...
          Plus, an adversary of a year before 35 will be able to use part of an ICBM to strike, although I'm not sure about what will be capable of exploding there by that moment, but still.

          Well, then we minus another dozen or so missiles, then we count how many blocks flew to the United States in a retaliatory strike, if it is still organized.

          There will be no unacceptable damage.
          1. Dmitry Chelyabinsk
            Dmitry Chelyabinsk 17 May 2021 18: 04
            +1
            I support the move to a multi-factor analysis, not just the percentage of warheads fired. We minus the PGRK, which were subjected to an air strike, but immediately plus in our favor the flight reliability of the Tridents - according to open data, it is about 97%. That is, out of 100-120 SLBMs launched from 5-6 SSBNs, 3-4 missiles will not complete the flight mission.

            I estimated the distance to our divisions in Teikovo and Irkutsk:
            - from Whiteman airbase (B-2 Spirit) to Teikovo 8500 km
            - from Whiteman airbase (B-2 Spirit) to Irkutsk 9700 km
            - from Andersen airbase (Guam, B-2 Spirit) to Irkutsk 5600 km
            - from Andersen airbase (Guam, B-2 Spirit) to Teikovo 9600 km
            - from Barksdale airbase (B-52) to Teikovo 9200 km
            - from Barksdale airbase (B-52) to Irkutsk 10400 km

            That is, the US Air Force will have to operate at the maximum range with refueling, the bombers will not have time to search for the PGRK, so it is important for them to know the exact coordinates of the Yars. Now they cannot provide this (and never in the past could not provide), all the satellites of detailed photographic reconnaissance (KH-8 and KH-9) have ceased operation, only 3 radar Lacrosse remained (launched in 1997, 2000 and 2005), while During the 2003 Iraqi campaign, the Lacrosses issued information to the command with a XNUMX-hour delay.

            There is no doubt that SSBNs are the best weapon of retaliation. But even now, the Americans have too many buts for a missile attack.
            1. timokhin-aa
              timokhin-aa 21 May 2021 19: 14
              +1
              The question is that while the strike simply does not reduce our response capabilities to zero, but the damage is no longer unacceptable.
    2. sevtrash
      sevtrash 15 May 2021 12: 28
      +3
      Quote: Dmitry Chelyabinsk
      They won't be able to. But more on that in the next commentary in the evening ...) The weather is great in Chelyabinsk, it's time to go to the lake)

      Knowledgeable comment seems to be. Probably, the commentator is still not from Chelyabinsk itself, but from the region)))
      1. bk0010
        bk0010 15 May 2021 16: 27
        0
        Quote: sevtrash
        Probably, the commentator is still not from Chelyabinsk itself, but from the region)))
        Those who are from the "region" do not comment on specialized topics. At all.
        1. sevtrash
          sevtrash 15 May 2021 19: 58
          0
          Quote: bk0010
          Those who are from the "region" do not comment on specialized topics. At all.

          It's a pity, they certainly can be in the subject.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 17 May 2021 15: 14
            0
            Quote: sevtrash
            It's a pity, they certainly can be in the subject.

            Those who in topic, remember well the main rule of communication with those who off topic:
            Whoever gives the correct answer will receive ten years!
    3. Big_Stick
      Big_Stick 15 May 2021 22: 21
      0
      And we have such a problem .. About weapons-grade plutonium - -> [media = http: //profbeckman.narod.ru/Pluton.files/Glava8.pdf]
    4. Aag
      Aag 16 May 2021 20: 46
      +2
      ... I would like a comparative analysis. Well, according to YABCh, we seem to be younger (I won't say for the mines, how are things there?). But with the carriers ... They were on the brink of a foul for a long time, while "Topol" For those not in the know, these complexes were on duty much longer than the time allotted by designers, manufacturers. And if the units, systems could be diagnosed, repaired, then TT (solid fuel) of rocket engines ... repeat
    5. Dmitry Chelyabinsk
      Dmitry Chelyabinsk 17 May 2021 10: 36
      +2
      It is clear that all this will bypass the START III agreements, but, firstly, if the Americans decide to strike at us, no treaty will stop them. And they will be able to secretly equip the required number of missiles with warheads.

      The fact is that SSBNs will not go to sea at once. SSBNs are always deployed at sea with a reduced number of warheads in accordance with contractual restrictions, their patrol period reaches 3 months. To replace all SSBNs with a reduced number of BGs (4 units instead of 8) and missiles (20 instead of 24), you will have to consistently put boats with increased ammunition into the sea instead of returning from duty. In total, the operation to build up warheads on boats at sea will take 2,5 - 3 months. During this time, one can easily run into an inspection within the framework of START-3.
      This, incidentally, shows the importance of treaty restrictions, and that we do not need to skimp on inspections of warheads.
  • sevtrash
    sevtrash 15 May 2021 09: 29
    +4
    Everything seems to be correct, as it seems, at least, perhaps the experts have different numbers and calculations. In general, it seems to be a very realistic analysis.
    However, the author did not indicate, for example, the role of the US missile defense system. She, it seems, has not gone anywhere, is created as part of the GBMD, AegisBMDS, TMAAD components. Wave real possibilities of intercepting ICBMs, including on the SAM3 acceleration stage. This missile defense system is just capable of ensuring the security of the United States - acceptable or absolute) - in the first strike.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 10: 12
      +5
      Quote: sevtrash
      Wave real possibilities of intercepting ICBMs, including on the SAM3 acceleration stage.

      For this, the rocket must be near the acceleration section :)))
      Quote: sevtrash
      This missile defense system is just capable of ensuring the security of the United States - acceptable or absolute) - in the first strike.

      The Americans still do not pretend not to intercept at least a single ICBM with MIRVed IN. Single monobloc ICBMs only
      1. sevtrash
        sevtrash 15 May 2021 12: 16
        +5
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        For this, the rocket must be near the acceleration section :)))

        ... According to the expert, the SM-3 Block IIA is capable of intercepting the domestic ICBMs of the Topol self-propelled systems, as well as the mine systems of the previous generation, the R-36M Satana and the UR-100N UTTH (RS-18), on the acceleration section .. ...
        Information about Aegis and SM3 interceptor missiles in Romania and Poland has existed for a long time, including data on the interception of silo systems by these missiles, the SM3 range is 2500-2700 km. It is clear that the interceptor does not care whether it is a monoblock ICBM or not at the acceleration stage.
        And, by the way, about the SM4 missile, as well as partly SM3, they write about ready-made medium-range missiles that are capable of neutralizing a retaliatory strike from ICBMs.
        Considering that Ticonderogo and Arlie Berkach have 112 and 96 such missiles, one can imagine their capabilities both to intercept and to strike at ground targets. Also did not take into account))
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          15 May 2021 14: 23
          +3
          Quote: sevtrash
          ... According to the expert, the SM-3 Block IIA is capable of intercepting the domestic ICBMs of the Topol self-propelled systems at the acceleration stage

          To do this, the rocket must be near the booster section :))) Ask an expert :)))
          Quote: sevtrash
          Information about Aegis and SM3 interceptor missiles in Romania and Poland has existed for a long time, including data on the interception of silo systems by these missiles, the SM3 range is 2500-2700 km.

          This is the limiting range of defeat, and not on the acceleration section.
          Sergei, an ICBM takes off very quickly - 60-100 seconds. Well, the Americans do not have antimissiles flying at a speed of 25-27 kilometers per second :))))
        2. Vadim237
          Vadim237 15 May 2021 20: 01
          0
          Poplar Poplar M - in service with a dozen 3 of them, almost all of them were replaced by Yars.
        3. Aag
          Aag 16 May 2021 20: 50
          +2
          Quote: sevtrash
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          For this, the rocket must be near the acceleration section :)))

          ... According to the expert, the SM-3 Block IIA is capable of intercepting the domestic ICBMs of the Topol self-propelled systems, as well as the mine systems of the previous generation, the R-36M Satana and the UR-100N UTTH (RS-18), on the acceleration section .. ...
          Information about Aegis and SM3 interceptor missiles in Romania and Poland has existed for a long time, including data on the interception of silo systems by these missiles, the SM3 range is 2500-2700 km. It is clear that the interceptor does not care whether it is a monoblock ICBM or not at the acceleration stage.
          And, by the way, about the SM4 missile, as well as partly SM3, they write about ready-made medium-range missiles that are capable of neutralizing a retaliatory strike from ICBMs.
          Considering that Ticonderogo and Arlie Berkach have 112 and 96 such missiles, one can imagine their capabilities both to intercept and to strike at ground targets. Also did not take into account))

          How close will Arlie Burke come to Kansk, Irkutsk?
  • timokhin-aa
    timokhin-aa 15 May 2021 10: 21
    +6
    Based on the foregoing, it can be assumed that the Americans can confidently shoot 4 missiles in one salvo, after which they will need time to prepare for the second and subsequent volleys (our submariners, although they did not give timing, spoke of it as essential). But in this case, there will be no question of any surprise - our missile attack warning system, in any case, will detect and report, "where necessary", about the first launches.


    The first salvo - for example, 8 submarines of 4 missiles, repeat after 10-12 minutes.
    Total we have
    Time T - launch of the maximum number of missiles.
    T + 4 min - the beginning of the return of SSBNs to the initial launch conditions for missiles
    T + 8 minutes - strike with 32 missiles, up to 448 BB at 5-6 (W76-2) and 100 kT (W76-1) / against targets in the Russian Federation.
    This will be enough to destroy all communication centers, decision-makers and all infrastructure for transferring the command to a counter-strike against the command post of missile divisions, and some of their launchers will also arrive. SPRN too. Let's record this as the time of the first strike Tud1
    It is much less than the time it takes for a command to respond to a counter strike. The presence of an EWS with such an attack gives almost nothing
    T + 16 min (Tud1 + 8 min) - re-launch of 4 SLBMs from a boat. 32 rockets, up to 448 explosions - AGAIN.
    Т + 20 min - start of repeated prelaunch preparation for the third salvo.
    T + 24 min. - the arrival of the second salvo at targets.
    Well, etc.
    We don't have that many, these goals.

    The criterion for preparing the enemy for such strikes will be, first of all, the entry into combat service of a larger number of SSBNs than usual.
    1. Machito
      Machito 15 May 2021 13: 20
      +2
      Alexander, you forgot about the American boats in the bases. After the time T, T1, they can shoot directly from the bases. Mine installations are also fired after T.
      1. timokhin-aa
        timokhin-aa 15 May 2021 13: 33
        +3
        I don't know if they can shoot from the bases, but the silos are yes. Approximately simultaneously with the first blow, you can enter into battle and them.
        If they are still alive by then, the United States has problems with them now. And with charges too.
        https://vz.ru/world/2021/5/14/1099141.html
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 14: 25
      +4
      Quote: timokhin-aa
      The first salvo - for example, 8 submarines of 4 missiles, repeat after 10-12 minutes.

      Not the fact that in 10-12 minutes.
      1. timokhin-aa
        timokhin-aa 16 May 2021 20: 42
        +2
        This is something like this.
        Well, count 16. Not more
    3. bk0010
      bk0010 15 May 2021 16: 31
      0
      Quote: timokhin-aa
      It is much less than the time it takes for a command to respond to a counter strike. The presence of an EWS with such an attack gives almost nothing
      Remove "decision making" and the SPRN "gives" again. The codes _must_ be on the launchers, information about the mass launch will reach the unit commanders, the missiles will have time to leave. The price is a war by mistake.
      1. timokhin-aa
        timokhin-aa 16 May 2021 20: 40
        +1
        Well, as a result, we get Skynet on the domestic element base.
        1. bk0010
          bk0010 16 May 2021 21: 17
          0
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          Well, as a result, we get Skynet on the domestic element base.
          Yes, but this is more of a NATO problem: in the event of a nuclear war, we lose less.
  • Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 15 May 2021 13: 46
    +1
    Thanks for the good article!
    I suppose all the same, a more or less massive launch of missiles, even from a submerged position, can be detected through the expansion and improvement of the satellite constellation - including the creation of dual-purpose vehicles that secure satellites with basic functions. Wouldn't this be a more economical option for counter-force operation? The sooner we learn about the launch - the more we launch our own - the cost of damage increases, which is a deterrent.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 14: 24
      +3
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      I believe all the same, a more or less massive launch of missiles, even from a submerged position, can be detected through the expansion and improvement of the satellite constellation

      you can notice, but if only 15 minutes pass from launch to defeat, we will not have time to react
  • bk0010
    bk0010 15 May 2021 16: 03
    0
    Accordingly, a counterforce strike for Russia loses its meaning by definition - by starting a nuclear war, we will certainly not be able to achieve a peace for ourselves that would be better than the pre-war one. There is no point in starting.
    It may not have counterforce, but by starting a nuclear war we will level the industrial and mobilization potential of Russia and NATO. It's another matter whether this world will be better ...
    then 320 Russian complexes will need 640 warheads.
    Here, not only parts, but also missiles must be counted: the Minutemans (I have not heard of the rest) have a breeding radius of warheads of about 100 km (that is, if the targets are located at a greater distance, you cannot cover them with one missile), it is unlikely that the Tridents have it more, especially if you shoot at a short distance. In addition, when they say that two warheads are required to ensure the destruction of a target, they forget to add that 2 warheads from different carriers are required.
  • Conjurer
    Conjurer 15 May 2021 16: 14
    0
    3. A prerequisite for a counterforce strike will be the provisional escort of all Russian SSBNs in the sea by the US and its allies. If this condition is not met, the Americans are most likely to abandon the strike.

    I would not oversimplify that.
    Firstly, missile defense ships can be brought to the places of combat patrolling of our SSBNs at the required distance and simply intercept missiles starting from the zone from submarines at the initial stage. It is not even necessary to track boats, the range of anti-missiles is sufficient to cover the entire zone, especially since in which direction the missiles will fly is known in advance. Ie, this criterion is not reliable.
    Secondly, their SSBNs near our borders will have enough time to release all the missiles, first at long-range targets, then at close ones, so that the flight time will be approximately the same, and the number of missiles is significantly larger than you calculated. That is, they will not give up the blow for this reason.
    That is, building up the forces of the fleet in the version you propose will give nothing.
    It is necessary to automate the system for launching a retaliatory strike to such an extent that missiles from the mines took off no later than 3-5 minutes after the launch of the American ones, and from our SSBNs directly from the base and even without a crew - in 5-7 minutes. And notify the Americans about it. Then they will be puzzled for a while how to reduce the time of arrival. Well, or how to intercept all our missiles.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 18: 41
      +3
      Quote: Conjurer
      Firstly, missile defense ships can be brought to the places of combat patrolling of our SSBNs at the required distance and simply intercept missiles starting from the zone from submarines at the initial stage.

      This is unrealistic.
      Quote: Conjurer
      Secondly, their SSBNs near our borders will have enough time to release all the missiles, first at long-range targets, then at close ones.

      cannot - long-range targets are struck in 15 minutes maximum, and will be detected even earlier - the basis of the strategic nuclear forces must be knocked out precisely in the first strike
    2. Aag
      Aag 16 May 2021 20: 56
      +1

      "... It is necessary to automate the launching system of a retaliatory strike to such an extent that missiles from the mines would take off no later than 3-5 minutes after the American launch, and from our SSBNs directly from the base and even without a crew - in 5-7 minutes. And notify the Americans about it. Then they will be puzzled for a while how to reduce the time of arrival. Well, or how to intercept all our missiles. [/ Quote] ... "
      Simple as that!
      I propose an option EVEN easier, just: "... notify the Americans about this."))
  • Vadim237
    Vadim237 15 May 2021 19: 48
    0
    "That is, direct participation in a counterforce strike. Do not forget that the Americans currently have about 1 W400-80 warheads with a yield of up to 1 kt, which may well be deployed on Tomahawk cruise missiles of the corresponding modifications." Cruise missiles cannot be altered for this.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      15 May 2021 20: 54
      +3
      Quote: Vadim237
      Cruise missiles cannot be altered for this.

      Well, there are several questions. The nuclear warhead weighs less than the usual warhead of modern tomahawks, that is, in theory, it may well be that they will stand up without alterations. Aloud about this, of course, they do not speak, but ... from the very start I would not reject such an opportunity. The Americans also sounded ideas to resume the production of Tomahawks capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and we are not building a fleet for the next 5 years.
  • dementor873
    dementor873 15 May 2021 21: 11
    -1
    In principle, you can do more with less. Hit Yellowstone, the San Andreas Fault and the island of La Palma in the Canary Archipelago. The problem of tsunamas, earthquakes and eruptions on both coasts of the United States will be such that it’s not up to the fat, to be alive.
  • Anachoret
    Anachoret 16 May 2021 00: 35
    +4
    great article that lays out arguments to justify certain steps.

    question to the author:
    about the amplification of flat. taking into account the fact that the corvette program of the Navy looks, to put it mildly, without intelligible tasks and non-optimized weapons (as a combination of detection and target destruction means). and each corvette turns out to be too expensive for its class and, in fact, incapable of combat in a real combat situation (due to obscure tasks). I'm only talking about projects in the 2238X line (I don't want to mention projects 22160 in this context at all).

    I agree, also with you, that a network of stationary hydrophones and other sensors in combination with drones would now also be an excellent and quite inexpensive project.

    Based on the foregoing, wouldn't it be easier, on the basis of the inexpensive Karakurt project, to cut quickly and inexpensively several tens of short-range PLO ships according to the principle of Project 1124, taking into account modern technologies? in addition to a network of hydrophones and drones to detect the forces of a potential enemy.
    I would like to hear your opinion. Thank you.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 16 May 2021 08: 09
      +3
      Quote: Anchorite
      based on the foregoing, wouldn't it be easier, on the basis of the inexpensive Karakurt project, to saw quickly and inexpensively several dozen ships of the near-radius PLO

      for example, it seems to me that this is a sane idea
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      16 May 2021 09: 13
      +6
      Quote: Anchorite
      Based on the foregoing, wouldn't it be easier, on the basis of the inexpensive Karakurt project, to quickly and inexpensively saw several dozen short-range PLO ships according to the principle of Project 1124, taking into account modern technologies

      Where I agree with you is that this option is worthy of the closest attention. But the decisions should be made by the pros, after weighing everything carefully.
      The bottom line is that we must have ships that ensure the exit / return of submarines from / to bases. Danger - enemy submarines and mines. How exactly it is better to deal with this - with a bundle of corvette + minesweeper, or corvette + IPC + minesweeper, it is difficult to say right off the bat.
      In any case, Karakurt does not look like a suitable platform, it is still small, it is less than the IPC 1124. On the other hand, without a doubt, if the Karakurt were built with a towed Minotaur and torpedo armament of an PLO (maybe a Packet), then it would be of no use to them would not be an example anymore.
      1. dranthqu
        dranthqu 16 May 2021 21: 33
        0
        I will support. I will only note that in the same British articles, PLO / PMO ships are generally not considered less than 3500 tons of displacement - but there is an emphasis on the fact that such ships should basically be basic for all kinds of drones - surface, underwater and flying. By the way, under such a concept, it would be quite possible to make a modification of the 22160 that is unloved here, adding, for example, the possibility of placing 2-3 boats 02800, and making an autonomous PLO boat on the basis or in the dimensions of such a boat.
  • Conjurer
    Conjurer 16 May 2021 09: 59
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Conjurer
    Firstly, missile defense ships can be brought to the places of combat patrolling of our SSBNs at the required distance and simply intercept missiles starting from the zone from submarines at the initial stage.

    This is unrealistic.
    Clarify what is not real. Keep missile defense ships at a distance of 500 km from the patrol zone (or on the route of missiles from boats)? They are often found there even now, how can you prevent them in peacetime?
    Quote: Conjurer
    Secondly, their SSBNs near our borders will have enough time to release all the missiles, first at long-range targets, then at close ones.

    cannot - long-range targets are struck in 15 minutes maximum, and will be detected even earlier - the basis of the strategic nuclear forces must be knocked out precisely in the first strike

    I see no contradiction, please explain. The missile flies to distant targets for 15 minutes, to near targets 5-7 (I mean bases), the strike will be simultaneous.
  • Pavel57
    Pavel57 16 May 2021 10: 02
    0
    And not to transfer Poplar on permanent duty in the "field"?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      16 May 2021 11: 42
      +2
      Quote: Pavel57
      And not to transfer Poplar on permanent duty in the "field"?

      The problem is that they will then be spotted in places of constant duty.
    2. Aag
      Aag 16 May 2021 21: 05
      +2
      Quote: Pavel57
      And not to transfer Poplar on permanent duty in the "field"?

      What do you want to achieve by this?
      In addition, what you write about below, we will weaken the O&O (security and defense of the complexes), reduce the stability of management, power supply, the motor resource of the complex's units, strain human and material resources ...
  • Pavel57
    Pavel57 16 May 2021 16: 04
    0
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    The problem is that they will then be spotted in places of constant duty.

    Poplars at the time of advancement and waiting for launch can also be detected.
  • dranthqu
    dranthqu 16 May 2021 21: 23
    +1
    I fully support the idea that in terms of preventing a nuclear war, the tasks of ASW / ASW in both the near and far sea zones are as important as the tasks of delivering nuclear weapons and the tasks of warning about a missile attack.

    Regarding the aircraft carriers, it seems that the idea has been expressed more than once that this is a means for solving completely different tasks that the fleet must also solve - maintaining military-political stability at the global and regional levels.

    In this case, in any case, it is necessary:
    - Creation of a new PLO helicopter (more broadly - a new naval helicopter and its anti-submarine modification)
    - Development of uninhabited boats PLO
    - Creation of a new basic patrol aircraft (for example, based on the Tu-204)
    - Creation of modern means of mining and mine defense
    - Constant training in the oceanic zone on a potential enemy. That is, for example, to assemble a KUG from a destroyer (for example, 22350M), 3 corvettes (of a mass type, which should protect the areas of the NSNF deployment), a sea tug and / or tanker, and send to look for submarines to the shores of Scotland, Norfolk or San -Diego.
  • Ryusey
    Ryusey 16 May 2021 21: 32
    0
    Question: And one or two Burks who entered the Black Sea, and maybe Odessa, the Norwegian Sea, who came to Japan, these are = 92 axes in each, well, theoretically, how is it?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      17 May 2021 08: 06
      +1
      Quote: Ryusey
      And one or two Burks who entered the Black Sea, and maybe even Odessa, the Norwegian Sea, who came to Japan are = 92 axes in each, well, theoretically, how is it?

      In Crimea, there is no strategic nuclear forces, from the Norwegian - too far to fly for a counterforce strike
  • Ryusey
    Ryusey 16 May 2021 21: 43
    +1
    I think Andrei you are slightly mistaken in order to counterforce strike, rather not to destroy the enemy's strategic nuclear forces, but to reduce the retaliatory strike to values ​​acceptable for missile defense systems. Further, having decided to strike, the enemy is automatically ready for some% of losses (30-40% of the 300 million population may well turn out to be an acceptable price for them for a victory, and in this case 2-2 SSBNs will change little ...
    In other words, I return your question to you, what to do if the United States ceases to be afraid of retaliation ...?
    1. Dmitry Chelyabinsk
      Dmitry Chelyabinsk 17 May 2021 10: 50
      +1
      Population loss percentage is not everything. There are, for example, 64 nuclear power plants in the USA. If 5 or 10 of them are hit by a nuclear strike, with the entire contents of the reactors scattered across North America, are the Americans ready to risk getting 5-10 Chernobyls? Doubtful.
      1. Ryusey
        Ryusey 17 May 2021 11: 43
        +1
        Not a fact, everything has its own price, no one knows what they are willing to risk for the sake of absolute world domination.
  • Ryusey
    Ryusey 16 May 2021 21: 49
    0
    Quote: Fedor Egoist
    What are our naval bases? Severodvinsk? Balaklava ??)) Object air defense / missile defense with the beginning of the war will disappear somewhere? What in general more or less significant tasks for the destruction of objects can be entrusted to subsonic missile launchers ??? An outfit of hundreds of KR could not disable the second-rate Syrian airfield, and you are here telling us about Russian military bases)

    Today is 16.05.2021, how many Berks are there at the moment in the Black Sea (92 axes, if necessary on each)?
  • Pavel57
    Pavel57 16 May 2021 22: 32
    0
    Quote: AAG
    In addition, what you write about below, we will weaken the O&O (security and defense of the complexes), reduce the stability of management, power supply, the motor resource of the complex's units, strain human and material resources ...

    It turns out that the Poplars will only come into position during the threatened period. Will he definitely be?
  • Conjurer
    Conjurer 17 May 2021 10: 32
    0
    Quote: AAG
    I propose an option EVEN easier, just: "... notify the Americans about this."))

    I mean, provoke them into mutual suicide? Or bluff that we're so fast?