Military Review

Crisis manifestations regarding the Cuban missile crisis

50

In the midst of work on the next part of his cycle "Not only about aircraft carriers ..." the author read on the VO website an article by Alexander Timokhin “The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Correcting Errors. Learning to use the Navy ".


Analysis of this, without a doubt, key for the domestic naval stories episode was part of my plans. This was planned to be done in the fourth article of the above cycle. However, the text of A. Timokhin forced to make some corrections in them.

In itself, the publication of an article on this topic should be welcomed. Moreover, its original messages are shared by the author of these lines. But the conclusions that Alexander comes to as a result of his reasoning, and even more so the invectives (attacks) with which he accompanies these arguments, cause the most decisive rejection.

Therefore, as it was sung in the old Soviet anthem, “our indignant mind boiled over” and wanted to put the plans aside for a while and answer this text.

So, let's begin.

What I agree with


As already mentioned, A. Timokhin's initial assumptions are in full agreement. There are two of them.

First message. The Cuban missile crisis was a defeat for the USSR. It is important to formulate this clearly, for there are many myths mixed around this issue. The most popular of them says that there were no winners or losers in this clash of the two superpowers. And the whole world benefited from it, because it was possible to avoid the start of a world conflict with the use of a nuclear weapons... And the credit for this belongs to the leaders of our countries, who, having shown courage and wisdom, found the strength to take a step back and not cross the “red line” that separated the world from the global catastrophe. I think that in its general form, this myth is familiar to the reader.

In reality, the USSR actually lost, since the United States during the crisis managed to realize its interest, that is, to stop the deployment of weapons in Cuba that could be used to strike the territory of their country: missiles and aviation... That is, the plan for the covert deployment of these weapons there was thwarted. And Moscow was forced, now openly, at the sight of the television cameras of world news agencies, to return the ships with these cargoes home. It cannot be called anything other than defeat.

Second message... If in the area of ​​the "quarantine" declared by the Americans, in which their fleet intended to inspect Soviet transport ships, Soviet surface warships appeared, this would change the balance of forces and make it possible to count on a different outcome of the crisis.

This is what I certainly agree with A. Timokhin.

But further ...

What I disagree with


I will try to list those points from his article with which I strongly disagree. And I'll explain why.

So the first thing. Considering the reasons for the rejection of the use of surface ships in the Soviet operation in Cuba, Alexander mentions the point of view that is present in the American literature on this topic, about the inability of Soviet headquarters to plan operations in the open ocean. Then he declares it to be clearly incorrect and does not return to it again. The reasons for this categoricalness seem completely incomprehensible.

There is nothing “obviously wrong” in this hypothesis. Or, perhaps, it is refuted by the facts of actually carried out similar operations in the same historical period? But, as far as I know, there were none. Therefore, this hypothesis deserves respect and analysis, and not swept away "from the doorway."

Further, Alexander "lays out on the table" a set of, so to speak, his main proofs, which he uses further in the course of the article. These are the reasons why, according to Timokhin, the fleet could not prove itself properly during those events:

"Khrushchev's personal conviction that surface ships are outdated, the maniacal desire of the generals to crush the fleet under the ground forces (finally realized only under Serdyukov) and the natural pogrom of Russian naval thought in the 30s, accompanied by the execution of many leading military theorists."

Let's try to assess the seriousness of these arguments.

So, Khrushchev (where without him!) Did not allow the fleet to do as the current situation demanded. Say, what other surface ships are there? - Don't you dare to send them! So they didn’t send it.

Well: this version, like any other, requires a serious attitude and verification, if not documentary (hardly possible in conditions when documents capable of shedding light on the motives that guided the naval command in that situation were not introduced into the scientific turnover), then at least logical.

And here I must say that this version of A. Timokhin, alas, does not stand up to such a logical test.

For he himself wrote before that that when, in pursuance of the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of May 20, 1962, the General Staff began to plan an operation to transfer weapons to Cuba, it was planned to use, among other things, formations of surface ships. Consequently, Khrushchev's negative attitude towards them at this stage did not manifest itself in any way.

Then, as Alexander also correctly writes, on September 25, after the Americans opened Soviet supplies to Cuba, the Defense Council decided not to send surface ships to that area. Moreover, as emphasized in another paragraph of the text, this decision was made based on the desire to ensure the secrecy of their own actions.

Yes, this stealth already was violated - it is. But where is the manifestation of the evil (and any other) will of the leader of the party and state here? It just isn't visible. It turns out that the attempt to link the refusal to send NK with the negative attitude towards them, as such, of Khrushchev, is a maxim in the spirit of "an elder in the garden, and in Kiev there is an uncle."

The next point of Alexander's reasoning (more precisely, accusations) is devoted to army commanders, driven by the desire to "crush the fleet under the ground forces." And one could partly agree with this, too. But, as they say, having said "a", one must also remember to say "b". Let's try to do it for Alexander.

What were the motives behind these commanders? In the same way as most professional military men - the instinct of winners. The feeling of victory is vital for people of this kind (as, for example, for athletes). In war, they realize this desire in the fight against the enemy, risking their lives, bringing glory to themselves, and salvation to the country they serve. But in peacetime, the situation is more complicated. The need to feel like a winner is sublimated into fierce, "on the brink of a foul" competition with representatives of other branches of the armed forces. And this is by no means characteristic of our soil. Violent skirmishes between sailors, pilots and representatives of the ground forces took place in other countries. I intend to talk about one of the most famous of them in the next article.

But here it is important to understand: thanks to what the "land" were able to realize their intention to dominate the "sea". And this happened also because they managed to put forward some arguments that would testify in favor of their right to such domination. And the main of these arguments is obvious: these are successful operations carried out under their leadership in the recently ended war with Germany. Unfortunately, our admirals did not include such operations.

It is clear that appealing to one's own victorious experience, which the other side cannot boast, is always an important argument in the competitive struggle. This, by and large, largely determined the alignment of forces in the country's top military leadership.

The lack of agreement on this subject in Alexander's article leaves room for the assumption that this happened due to some negative moral qualities of generals and marshals, which distinguish them from "pure souls", naive and inexperienced in the undercover struggle of admirals. Unfortunately, the real behavior of the naval leaders during the Cuban missile crisis leaves no room for such assumptions.

To begin with the summer exercises of the Northern Fleet "Kasatka", at which Khrushchev was shown the launch of an R-21 ballistic missile from a submerged position. At the same time, the head of state was informed that the launch was carried out from the nuclear submarine K-3, although in reality it was a diesel K-142, and the first rocket launch from under the water by the nuclear-powered K-19 was carried out only in the summer of 1964. Like this. We love to scoff at the incompetence of Nikita Sergeevich in naval affairs, but instead of dispelling this incompetence, the naval commanders allowed themselves an open lie to their Supreme Commander-in-Chief. But on the basis of this false information, he later made the most important political decisions affecting the fate of not only the country, but the entire world.

When the fleet sent its submarine forces to the shores of Cuba, none of its leadership went to sea, but preferred to stay on the coast. And then, after the inglorious return of the submariners to their home bases, these same chiefs made them "extreme", accusing them of failing to fulfill their combat missions. Whatever you look at, these actions do not really agree with the idea of ​​decency.

This is what, probably, it would make sense to mention in an article devoted to an analysis of the mistakes made during the Cuban missile crisis.

And, speaking of the unused chance to deploy an entire grouping of our missile submarines off the coast of the United States, recall the real capabilities of the American anti-aircraft missile system during that period, which our intelligence did not even suspect: the SOSUS system, etc. After all, if the Americans discovered and forced to surface three of the four Soviet submarines actually directed across the Atlantic, then on what basis is the assumption made that their larger group would have acted more successfully?

These considerations should not be neglected when analyzing this event. And not to focus the reader's attention on the episode with A. Grechko, who, during the debriefing, smashed his glasses on the table in a rage, having learned that the submariners had obeyed the Americans' demand for surfacing. The following stroke testifies to the level of its historical reliability in the article: Andrei Antonovich is named in it as the Minister of Defense, although in fact he held the post of his first deputy during the period under review.

Finally, the time has come to analyze Alexander's argument: that the defeat of military theory (and its carriers), arranged in our country in the 30s, explains all naval problems, up to at least the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Here, in fact, a natural question arises: if our naval commanders were all incompetent after that, then, apparently, the reasons for the fleet's troubles must be fully explained by this circumstance, and not look for them in the intrigues of competitors or in the hostile attitude of the country's leadership. For if they were taught the wrong thing and the wrong way, then what, in principle, the right decisions could they make in their posts? Including all decisions during the 1962 crisis itself?

In short, this argument simply cannot be taken seriously. And its appearance cannot be explained otherwise than by the desire to "wash away" the reputation of the fleet at all costs, to protect the honor of the uniform. Such an approach is incompatible with the intention to actually learn lessons from the Cuban missile crisis, to understand exactly what and from what moment “went wrong”.

And the last thing.

In the concluding part of his article, A. Timokhin writes that the relegation of the fleet, following the results of the events under consideration, from the type of the Armed Forces, which is fundamentally intended for solving strategic tasks, to the operational-tactical level, was a gross mistake.

Our opinion is exactly the opposite. If this decision was carried out consistently and steadily, the country's interests would only benefit from this. But, unfortunately, it happened differently.

However, this is a completely separate topic, which I will definitely touch upon in the future.
50 comments
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  1. Petrik66
    Petrik66 12 May 2021 12: 12
    +4
    And you can remember another, already real campaign - the Rozhdestvensky squadron, ending with Tsushima. And Stalin was not, and 37 was not, but I think the result would have been the same.
    1. Exval
      12 May 2021 12: 15
      +6
      You still ask yourself what the surname of the admiral who commanded the Second Pacific Squadron actually looked like before publishing such uninformative and irrelevant comments.
  2. NDR-791
    NDR-791 12 May 2021 12: 16
    +13
    In reality, the USSR did indeed lose, since during the crisis the United States managed to realize its interest, that is, to stop the deployment of weapons in Cuba that could be used to strike the territory of their country: missiles and aircraft. That is, the plan for the covert deployment of these weapons there was thwarted.
    I cannot agree with this. In fact, there was no covert deployment, at least for the US military. It is enough to look at the photographic intelligence data to see it

    And in the end, under the treaty, the Americans removed the RSD from Turkey. So whatever (not skill, poor planning, disgusting logistics), but not a loss.
    1. Niko
      Niko 12 May 2021 16: 24
      -3
      Rockets in Turkey at the time of the events were not worth a damn, they were planning to clean them like that.
  3. paul3390
    paul3390 12 May 2021 12: 18
    +13
    If you recall, the USSR began deploying missiles in Cuba in response to American missiles in Turkey .. As a result, they were removed from both Cuba and Turkey. And - Cuba received guarantees from direct US military aggression. Then - where is the loss of the Union, then? Kind of like he managed to get rid of the original cause of the conflict, didn't he?
    1. Exval
      12 May 2021 12: 23
      +1
      The withdrawal of American Jupiters from Turkey was planned even before the Cuban missile crisis, since it was planned to replace these liquid-propellant missiles with a new generation - solid-fuel ones. A. Timokhin clearly speaks about this in his article. Therefore, I am focusing on something else: that the Soviet Navy COULD NOT complete the task assigned to it.
      1. Anzhey V.
        Anzhey V. 12 May 2021 12: 33
        +1
        Thank you for the article, Valery!)

        A very interesting and debatable topic.
        We look forward to continuing from you)
      2. Per se.
        Per se. 12 May 2021 12: 53
        +11
        Quote: Exval
        the Soviet Navy COULD NOT complete the task assigned to it

        Valery, was this a task for the Soviet Navy? Attracting 4 diesel submarines can hardly be considered a serious task capable of providing cover for Cuba and our transport ships.

        Secondly, was it really so important to leave the missiles in Cuba when it was possible to preserve the construction of socialism in Cuba under the nose of the United States? Let the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey have already been "planned" (this is still a question). But, detente of international tension began, an agreement became possible between the USSR and the Anglo-Saxons on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in space, atmosphere and under water, a direct telephone line was established between the leadership of the USSR and the United States. The USSR did not lose anything, on the contrary, yielding then to the United States in many types of weapons, including at sea, achieved that Cuba became socialist, the United States lifted the blockade.

        Agree with Timokhin or not, you can argue about the fleet so endlessly. For me personally, the main thing is obvious - a strong country must have a strong army and a full-fledged navy. A full-fledged fleet has all classes of ships, in order to carry out all tasks at sea. Otherwise, we have "economists" who wanted "the best", advocating for the coastal fleet, or agents of foreign influence working in the network for other people's interests, when Russia does not need a fleet at all, to the delight of the "partners".
      3. paul3390
        paul3390 12 May 2021 13: 08
        +9
        Not a conclusion, but that a replacement. Which, as a result of the conflict, never took place. Once again, there were missiles in Turkey before the crisis. After - no. What then is the defeat of the USSR?
        1. Catfish
          Catfish 12 May 2021 14: 04
          +5
          I agree with you on all points. It is strange that the author did not find words to discuss with you; it would be interesting to look at his arguments.
      4. Krasnoyarsk
        Krasnoyarsk 12 May 2021 14: 03
        +4
        Quote: Exval
        The withdrawal of American Jupiters from Turkey was planned even before the Cuban missile crisis, since it was planned to replace these liquid-propellant missiles with a new generation - solid-fuel ones.

        But what difference does it make, in this context, which missiles, liquid or solid propellant, are in Turkey? The main thing is that they were no longer there.
        Is it possible to predict the reaction of the mattress makers, if the USSR refused to withdraw its missiles from Cuba and create a base for submarine missile carriers there?
        What would be the actions of the United States in this case?
      5. dzvero
        dzvero 12 May 2021 14: 27
        +6
        The USSR Armed Forces were still able to complete the task - secretly deliver и expand grouping in Cuba. American intelligence discovered already deployed missiles, bombers, air defense systems and more.
      6. Glory1974
        Glory1974 12 May 2021 14: 51
        +6
        The withdrawal of American Jupiters from Turkey was planned even before the Cuban missile crisis, since it was planned to replace these liquid-propellant missiles with a new generation - solid-fuel

        Planned to change to others. Changed, but removed from Turkey.
        Cuba was not touched.
        Mission accomplished. Not?
      7. bk0010
        bk0010 12 May 2021 14: 54
        +3
        Quote: Exval
        The withdrawal of American Jupiters from Turkey was planned even before the Cuban missile crisis, since it was planned to replace these liquid-propellant missiles with a new generation - solid-fuel ones.
        But there was a conclusion, not a replacement - the result was achieved.
      8. alexander1
        alexander1 12 May 2021 15: 01
        +8
        We have that today the salary in Langley or money from the NSA for NGO-schnicks was transferred, that again articles began to appear about how the USSR lost and the great states won everyone !?
        But seriously:
        - The main result of the Cuban missile crisis was the understanding of the Americans that in the event of a war, bombs would explode in California and not in the distant European theater of operations. And the TV broadcasts of all the news programs showed this very clearly. My relatives who served in the GSVG during this period told how the western canals caught near the border showed crowds of Americans who rushed north from California blocked all roads, so that the army could not break through to the south!
        And Kenedy adjusted his brains a little and wanted to talk to Khrushchev. And after that, the arrogance of the Americans diminished and they started talking about disarmament and peace.
        - And I completely agree about the fleet, the Union did not have one even during the time of Gorshkov and his heirs.
        The variety of projects, small-scale production, commissioning at any cost at the next anniversary of the great October and "writing off to sailors", especially those who perished are to blame for all accidents, the number of which was due to stupidity and a desire to curry favor ahead of the rest of the world! Therefore, when the boat has been on trials for five years, it is better than paying for the life of the sailors than on the Komsomolets.
        - They wanted not to withdraw the missiles from Turkey, but to replace them with more advanced ones, and after the crisis they were withdrawn!
        - The SOSUS system was just put into operation in 61, and according to the Americans, it helped to detect only one Foxtrot-type boat during the Caribbean crisis.
        Considering that during the crisis, the USSR used only diesel boats and a small underwater autonomy, it was a matter of time to detect them with such a huge number of states' PLO forces in this area.
        And for all my personal disrespect for Khrushchev during the Caribbean crisis with three R-7 missiles, the preparation time for which was measured in weeks, several diesel boats capable of using nuclear weapons within a radius of 150 km and a missile brigade in Cuba, he managed to put NATu in place "with all its enormous nuclear capabilities and bases around the world.
        So, don't put an owl on the globe! Tell tales about who fucked whom to kids in Texas.
      9. Vladimir_2U
        Vladimir_2U 13 May 2021 03: 44
        +1
        Quote: Exval
        The withdrawal of American Jupiters from Turkey was planned even before the Cuban missile crisis, since it was planned to replace these liquid-propellant missiles with a new generation - solid-fuel ones.
        Have these solid-propellant missiles been deployed in Turkey?
    2. Exval
      12 May 2021 14: 08
      -5
      Not. The purpose of this operation was to deploy Soviet offensive assets in Cuba. This goal was not achieved. In this case, I repeat, I fully agree with A. Timokhin and see no reason to return to this aspect.
      1. paul3390
        paul3390 12 May 2021 14: 14
        +2
        Not. The goal was to force the removal of missiles from Turkey. And it was successfully achieved.
        1. Anzhey V.
          Anzhey V. 12 May 2021 14: 25
          -3
          The goal was to force the removal of missiles from Turkey. And she - was successfully achieved


          Exclusively due to the fact that it did not contradict the interests of the United States, which was already going to remove the obsolete Jupiters.

          In addition, the USSR suffered significant reputational losses - first at the UN, when Soviet diplomats, who denied the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, were disgraced in front of the whole world by showing pictures of the launching positions, and then when, under international pressure and in the presence of observers, the Union took the missiles back home. ...

          The Americans, on the other hand, withdrew the Jupiters as part of the planned action, and for a long time no one suspected that this was done within the framework of the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy.
      2. Voenmeh
        Voenmeh 12 May 2021 15: 02
        0
        Misconception about purpose
      3. alexander1
        alexander1 12 May 2021 16: 23
        +7
        The goal of the Soviet leadership was to create a threat proportional to the threat to the USSR from US missiles in Turkey, and this goal was fulfilled!
        This mission was accomplished by covertly deploying missiles to Cuba and deploying missiles that pose a threat to the United States, similar to the threats posed by American missiles. The missiles were secretly deployed and deployed! The United States did not intercept ships with missiles at sea, but saw them in aerial photography, already deployed in Cuba! Mission accomplished? - Yes!
        Did the missiles pose a threat to the United States and forced them to sit down at the negotiating table on the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and Turkey? - Yes!
        Did the Americans intercept the missiles before they were delivered to Cuba? - not!
        Did the Americans withdraw missiles from Turkey? - Yes!
        Then what did the USSR lose? There is only one answer, only in the fantasies of the author! Author, do you get funding from Langley in the form of cannabis?
  4. Ka-52
    Ka-52 12 May 2021 12: 37
    +1
    it was planned to use, among other things, the formations of surface ships. Therefore, Khrushchev's negative attitude towards them at this stage did not manifest itself in any way.

    The escort of surface ships was not intended to protect cargo ships, and even more so to break the naval blockade, but to base the fleet on Kuba Island in order to create a military contingent there within the framework of Operation Anadyr.
    1. Exval
      12 May 2021 12: 40
      0
      Well, of course. And what follows from this?
  5. Doccor18
    Doccor18 12 May 2021 12: 57
    +1
    ... speaking of the unused chance to deploy a whole grouping of our missile submarines off the coast of the United States, recall the real capabilities of the American submarine ... After all, if the Americans discovered and forced to surface three of the four Soviet submarines actually directed across the Atlantic ...

    4 diesel submarines, of course, could not influence the course of the entire operation in any way ... But several missile submarines under the cover of a squadron of cruisers / destroyers are completely different, and an American submarine (no matter how effective it was) in this case would be powerless ... In my opinion, this is exactly what Alexander had in mind ...
    The presence of surface forces capable of preventing interfering with communication with Cuba ... to ensure the deployment of missile submarines off the coast of the United States ...


    Regarding the defeat of the "old school" - after all, it was ... And many serious specialists disappeared in the meat grinder of repression. And how would they come in handy in 20 years. One rejection of 41 destroyer projects is worth a lot. After all, they simply did not figure it out initially and "threw to the sidelines" the project of an excellent post-war ship. And the reason is in the extremely small number of serious specialists ...

    About Khrushchev's incompetence. After all, with his "light hand" they cut several cruisers 68bis, froze for many years all the work on the ship's large-caliber artillery, and the reduction of the Marine Corps ... So I would be careful not to "protect" this political intriguer and illiterate person. This "man" with his "reforms" (including in the Navy) brought more destruction than some irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet state.
    1. tihonmarine
      tihonmarine 12 May 2021 13: 56
      +4
      Quote: Doccor18
      So I would be careful not to "defend" this political intriguer and illiterate person. This "man" with his "reforms" (including in the Navy) brought more destruction than some irreconcilable enemies of the Soviet state.

      And the Navy, and the army, agriculture, the country and the common people. And most of all the damage was done by the "new reformer" to the international communist movement.
      1. Voenmeh
        Voenmeh 12 May 2021 15: 04
        +1
        totally agree
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 12 May 2021 14: 03
      -4
      The National Union of Artists was part of a large group of like-minded people - they supported him and spit on him alone is ridiculous ................................. ...................................... then moved to the side.
      not the role of the individual (NSHr) in history - THE POWER OF THE USSR WAS NOT ENOUGH TO CONFRONT, THE FLEET IS SMALL IN THAT CONFRONTATION. Many decades of development have yielded results, performed poorly.
    3. d1975
      d1975 12 May 2021 14: 03
      +5
      I agree with you completely, my relative said exactly that. Moreover, he was demoted in rank, although he was a participant in the Second World War, Mykita, he is still mediocre in politics and everywhere. Who spoiled relations with China, and in the country he punished very During his reforms, all the trees were cut out at home and all the livestock were slaughtered at home, after all, Novocherkassk happened under him, this is a consequence of his policy.
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 12 May 2021 14: 44
      +3
      Quote: Doccor18
      About Khrushchev's incompetence. After all, several 68bis cruisers were cut with his "light hand"

      Undoubtedly, "clean" artillery cruisers were badly needed by our Navy in the 60s. smile
      The degree of need for these ships is evidenced by the fact that the fleet did not even bother to modernize the air defense of already built ships - most of the air defense systems of the project 68bis served their time with the 37-mm MZA V-11 pre-war development, with manual guidance, which could only scare the aircraft enemy and were absolutely useless against anti-ship missiles.
      Quote: Doccor18
      froze for many years all work on naval large-caliber artillery,

      While all over the world such artillery was put into service? Or is it still not?

      And let's remember what the fleet got under Khrushchev? The fleet received RRC pr. 58 and began to design their heirs - pr. 1134. EM pr. 56 received URO (nasty, but URO). The Navy received EM pr. 57, originally designed for URO. Laid down a series of BOD pr. 61 - "singing frigates".

      In the navy, Nikita bent the same line as in aviation - all carriers of exclusively unguided weapons were declared obsolete, but the "platforms for URO" were given the green light.
      1. Doccor18
        Doccor18 12 May 2021 20: 47
        +1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Undoubtedly, "clean" artillery cruisers were badly needed by our Navy in the 60s.

        And what did the USSR fleet have at the end of the 40s?
        The USSR, as the second pole of power in the world, was simply obliged to have a powerful multipurpose combat fleet. But the Second World War demanded an extreme exertion of forces, and the shipbuilding program was stopped (it was impossible otherwise).
        So what could the surface fleet of the USSR put up? Yes, against the backdrop of a giant American ...
        Why was the 68bis cruiser bad for the first post-war program?
        The ship lacked stars from the heavens, and was not the best, but what was in its place?
        Quote: Alexey RA
        ... that the fleet did not even bother to modernize the air defense of already built ships ...
        So it's the Navy's fault? 17 thous. the ton cruiser had a gigantic modernization potential. What prevented him from updating his air defense? After all, turning them into superfluous control ships - the mind (no, not the mind) was enough ... And by the 70s, the rooster "pecked at the back point" (it finally came to light) that there were simply no ships in the fleet that could support artillery, and away we go ... project 956, with two 130-mm. fast-gunners ... but for a decent GAK, a hangar for a helicopter and other necessary components of a modern destroyer of the 80s, there is no more room ...
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The fleet received RRC pr. 58

        Nikitin was a brilliant designer, but he was not in power, so all his creations were defiled, 41 projects were leaked, and 58 were not as successful as they are presented, became outdated incredibly quickly, and was built by the Lilliputian series ... But there is no fault here Nikitin, it is impossible to cram the capabilities of a missile cruiser into the displacement of a frigate, even with geniuses in the team ...
        What was good about the 56th project?

        And wasn’t it possible to develop naval artillery in parallel with missile weapons?
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 13 May 2021 13: 23
          +1
          Quote: Doccor18
          And what did the USSR fleet have at the end of the 40s?

          For the end of the 40s, etc. 68bis was more or less at the level.
          But to continue building purely artillery cruisers in ten years, at the end of the 50s, is already a squandering of the people's money.
          Quote: Doccor18
          Why was the 68bis cruiser bad for the first post-war program?
          The ship lacked stars from the heavens, and was not the best, but what was in its place?

          I have nothing against pr. 68bis in 1947. But why build them in 1959? When there is already ave. 58.
          Quote: Doccor18
          So it's the Navy's fault?

          Who else? How many we played with experimental ships based on the KRL, with anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft missile systems, how many projects were drawn to re-equip pr. 68bis in the air defense missile defense system - and that's it, all the steam went off to the whistle.
          Quote: Doccor18
          After all, turning into superfluous control ships - the mind (no, not the mind) was enough ...

          How else to fully manage OPESK? In the "Gangut" there was an article on command cruisers - there the headquarters and communications equipment occupied a third of the cruiser.
          Place a headquarters on a warship? On the "Bigler", pomnitsa, they wrote about the everyday life of the "parquet cruiser" pr.1164 - about how the crew works when the combat posts and cabins are packed with the "second set" of staff.
          Quote: Doccor18
          Nikitin was a brilliant designer, but he was not in power, so all his creations were ruined, 41 projects were leaked, and 58 was not as successful as he was presented, it became outdated incredibly quickly, and was built by the Lilliputian series ...

          So Project 58 is the first pancake, an EM with RRC armament. A sort of Soviet "Tomodzuru". smile
          According to the results of its operation, under the same Khrushchev, they began to design a more adequate pr. 1134.
          Quote: Doccor18
          What was good about the 56th project?

          In the pure - nothing. Traditional artillery-torpedo EM, late for its war. But it was modernized, a URO was installed - and it survived.
          1. Doccor18
            Doccor18 14 May 2021 08: 38
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            But to continue building purely artillery cruisers in ten years, at the end of the 50s, is already a squandering of the people's money.

            5 ships in 1955 cut 72-84% when ready ... Isn't this a waste of funds? In the end, it was possible to slightly change the composition of their weapons.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            I have nothing against pr. 68bis in 1947. But why build them in 1959? When there is already ave. 58.
            To put 2X4 PU P-35 instead of aft towers on those five slightly unfinished ships, and 58 the project generally lost any sense ...
            Quote: Alexey RA
            how many projects were drawn for the refurbishment of pr. 68bis in the air defense KR - and that's it, all the steam went off into the whistle.
            If admirals could decide for themselves in the USSR what and how to build for the needs of the Navy ...
            But it was completely different people who decided, from the general secretaries to the directors of factories and ministers.
            Quote: Alexey RA
            How else to fully manage OPESK?

            But altering warships for floating headquarters is also a luxury, an unreasonable excess.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 14 May 2021 11: 48
              +1
              Quote: Doccor18
              5 ships in 1955 cut 72-84% when ready ... Isn't this a waste of funds? In the end, it was possible to slightly change the composition of their weapons.

              They removed 7 KRLs from the building. And not in 1955, but in 1959.
              Regarding the change in the composition of the armament - see pr. 70 and 71. The navy itself hacked the resulting options for converting an artillery cruiser into a KR URO.
              Quote: Doccor18
              If admirals could decide for themselves in the USSR what and how to build for the needs of the Navy ...

              If the admirals could provide the top with a more or less sane project of re-equipment of the artillery KR in KR URO - the last seven KRL pr. 68-bis would be completed. How were the original artillery EM pr. 56 completed in the version with KSShch.
              In general, under the NSH, as soon as the product acquired the ability to launch missiles, all questions about obsolescence were immediately removed. IL-28 with its "cast iron" went under the knife. And the Tu-16 and Tu-95, having acquired a CD and anti-ship missiles, continued to be built.
              Quote: Doccor18
              But altering warships for floating headquarters is also a luxury, an unreasonable excess.

              This alteration just shows how "combat" the Navy considered the KRL pr. 68-bis, since it had already decided to use them for re-equipment.
              I can also remind you about the KRL "Dzerzhinsky" and "Admiral Nakhimov". And about the fact that to strengthen the air defense on the KRL pr. 68-A, the Navy found only AK-230 (and only for three cruisers).
  6. nikvic46
    nikvic46 12 May 2021 13: 11
    +2
    There were a lot of kitchen disputes about this. But what is interesting, all these disputes were already after the Cuban missile crisis. And during it, everyone was stuck and silent. But after that, the ancient Roman slogan - "Long live the truth! And let the whole world die! ! ". To the cheer, the opponent answered," Whose truth? Yours? " In general, everything is like after a fire.
  7. Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 12 May 2021 14: 04
    +4
    Cuba was too far away and too far from the bases. We had no experience of effective combat operations by the fleet at such distances from our bases and concentrations of other forces. The Soviet fleet was not in the top three of the strongest fleets in the world - at the same time, it would have to threaten the strongest fleet in the world in close proximity to the territory of the United States and the support forces of this fleet.
    In case of an increase in our rates at sea, it would be an outright gamble leading straight to the hell of the Third World War - at best with some delay and long-playing conclusions of the United States, in the worst case, what is called "outright" - with the loss of this very fleet.
    Objectively, it was impossible to do anything here, because the whole operation was organized almost immediately, without plan "B", not thoroughly.
    All replaying of the "Cuban missile crisis" would lead to objectively worse options than the one that took place.
  8. Exval
    12 May 2021 14: 19
    -3
    Quote: paul3390
    Not. The goal was to force the removal of missiles from Turkey. And it was successfully achieved.

    This goal was invented after the fact. No need to argue. Soviet ships were supposed to reach Cuba, but the Americans did not allow them there. Why this happened is the main question in the analysis of the Cuban missile crisis.
  9. Exval
    12 May 2021 14: 21
    -3
    Quote: Knell Wardenheart
    Cuba was too far away and too far from the bases. We had no experience of effective combat operations by the fleet at such distances from our bases and concentrations of other forces. The Soviet fleet was not in the top three of the strongest fleets in the world - at the same time, it would have to threaten the strongest fleet in the world in close proximity to the territory of the United States and the support forces of this fleet.
    In case of an increase in our rates at sea, it would be an outright gamble leading straight to the hell of the Third World War - at best with some delay and long-playing conclusions of the United States, in the worst case, what is called "outright" - with the loss of this very fleet.
    Objectively, it was impossible to do anything here, because the whole operation was organized almost immediately, without plan "B", not thoroughly.
    All replaying of the "Cuban missile crisis" would lead to objectively worse options than the one that took place.

    Your idea is clear. But it does not contain an answer to the question: what in this case gave such confidence to the Americans?
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 12 May 2021 21: 44
      +3
      Quote: Exval
      Your idea is clear. But it does not contain an answer to the question: what in this case gave such confidence to the Americans?

      Don't you think that you, as the author of an article on the Cuban missile crisis, should have answered such a question?

      We, the readers, express our assumptions .. And you, the author, are suddenly demanding from us justification, links and, in general, detailed articles on a topic that you yourself have not really been able to reveal ..
  10. Exval
    12 May 2021 14: 34
    -2
    Quote: dzvero
    The USSR Armed Forces were still able to complete the task - secretly deliver и expand grouping in Cuba. American intelligence discovered already deployed missiles, bombers, air defense systems and more.

    No, it’s not like that. The missiles were not deployed to combat positions. If this were the case, the outcome of the crisis would have been different. And let's still talk more specifically about the role of the Soviet navy. I see the desire in every possible way to "push back" this unpleasant topic. (Not only specifically for you, but for very many authors of comments).
    1. Glory1974
      Glory1974 12 May 2021 15: 01
      +1
      And let's still talk more specifically about the role of the Soviet Navy

      As I understand it, Khrushchev was deceived by the admirals, reporting that nuclear submarines were sent to Cuba, and diesel ones were sent. Therefore, when they surfaced, there was a shock in the Kremlin.
      The missiles were not deployed to combat positions. If this were the case, the outcome of the crisis would have been different.

      The missiles were still deployed. Those not deployed could deploy. The United States threatened to start bombing, so they did not aggravate (start a nuclear war).
      In one of the episodes of the "Seeker" program, divers near Cuba discovered and showed in the film a sunken Soviet cruiser. In clear water, you can clearly see the characteristic anti-aircraft installation in the bow, the helipad at the stern, etc. What is this ship? Why is he lying there?
      1. Anzhey V.
        Anzhey V. 12 May 2021 16: 39
        0
        In one of the episodes of the "Seeker" program, divers near Cuba discovered and showed in the film a sunken Soviet cruiser. In clear water, you can clearly see the characteristic anti-aircraft installation in the bow, the helipad at the stern, etc. What is this ship? Why is he lying there?


        Can you tell us more about this?

        It became interesting, but I couldn't find anything on this on my own.
      2. Bolt cutter
        Bolt cutter 12 May 2021 16: 55
        +5
        divers near Cuba discovered and showed
        Cuban (built in USSR) Koni-class frigate. It was flooded there in 1998 especially for divers. The name Moncada. Number 353 (although 383 was written before the sinking)
    2. dzvero
      dzvero 12 May 2021 15: 40
      +2
      Could not deliver R-14. But the P-12 and special warheads were delivered to them. As well as CD and bombs for the Il-28. Plus SAM, aviation and troops.
      As for the fleet, they delivered missile boats from the Kyrgyz Republic. The expedition of the main group of NK was planned in October. But then the Americans already imposed a blockade, pulled up their ships, and most likely the leadership of the USSR decided not to escalate and not to risk - purely my speculation.
      Why didn't you send a nuclear submarine with an ICBM to Cuba? What for? They also held out from the North Atlantic. By the way, each DEPL also carried one torpedo with a special charge. Moreover, the captain had permission to use it in the event of a real attack. So the PMSM of the USSR Navy began to fulfill its task, and as regards the volume of execution, there were claims to the leadership. If there had been an order to advance the group, they would have gone. DEPL went, despite the near-zero chances of success ...
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 13 May 2021 14: 41
        +2
        Quote: dzvero
        Why didn't you send a nuclear submarine with an ICBM to Cuba? What for?

        There is a better question - who to send?
        As of October 1962, the Navy has:
        K-19 - for decontamination after the reactor accident.
        K-33 - getting ready to get up for repairs and modernization.
        K-55 - being tested after repair.
        K-40 - combat-ready, awaiting release.
        K-16 - after delivery to the fleet, it works out the tasks of combat training.

        That is, the fleet has only one combat-ready SSBN pr.658.
        Quote: dzvero
        They also held out from the North Atlantic.

        During the Cuban missile crisis, Project 658 had R-13 SLBMs. Range - 600 km. Start - surface. The launch time for three SLBMs is 12 minutes.
    3. alexander1
      alexander1 12 May 2021 16: 28
      +1
      If it was not reached, and ships and vessels did not reach, then what the Americans saw on aerial photography
  11. BAI
    BAI 12 May 2021 15: 44
    +3
    If Soviet surface warships appeared, this would change the balance of forces and make it possible to count on a different outcome of the crisis.

    And the outcome would be as follows: they would start pushing the sides and end up with an exchange of nuclear strikes.
  12. Exval
    12 May 2021 22: 51
    0
    Quote: Saxahorse

    Don't you think that you, as the author of an article on the Cuban missile crisis, should have answered such a question?

    We, the readers, express our assumptions .. And you, the author, are suddenly demanding from us justification, links and, in general, detailed articles on a topic that you yourself have not really been able to reveal ..

    I'm afraid you confused me with someone, because I don't remember that I demanded anything from you. I didn't understand at all: why did you suddenly decide to answer the question that I asked a completely different person?
  13. kig
    kig 13 May 2021 02: 00
    0
    that is a completely separate topic, which I will definitely touch upon in the future.
    - and who am I? Why are there more and more anonymous articles in VO?
  14. ban
    ban 13 May 2021 09: 43
    0
    In the concluding part of his article, A. Timokhin writes that the relegation of the fleet, following the results of the events under consideration, from the type of the Armed Forces, which is fundamentally intended for solving strategic tasks, to the operational-tactical level, was a gross mistake.

    Our opinion is exactly the opposite. If this decision was carried out consistently and steadily, the country's interests would only benefit from this. But, unfortunately, it happened differently.


    Generally beyond reason.
    No comments
  15. Antokha
    Antokha 1 July 2021 13: 27
    0
    Bold plus