Military Review

Tsushima. Accuracy Factors of Russian Artillery

305

Battleship "Sisoy the Great"


Introduction


If in the naval battles of 1904 the artillery did not sink a single large ship, then in Tsushima it became the main striking factor. Numerous hits by Japanese shells in the battle on May 14 destroyed the Oslyabya, Alexander III and Borodino, deprived the Prince Suvorov of the combat capability, and caused serious damage to many other ships. Russian fire was not so effective. If we discard the myths about the use of new miracle shells or their crazy consumption, it becomes clear that the outcome of the battle was determined by the absolute superiority of the Japanese fleet in the number of hits due to the significantly higher accuracy of firing.

In the memoirs of the Russian participants in Tsushima, the question of the effectiveness of their own artillery usually boiled down to a listing of technical shortcomings. The shells had little explosives, often did not explode, so the results of the firing were not visible. Rangefinders "lied". The scopes got dirty and lost. Organizational reasons were rarely mentioned, and most often they spoke of a lack of practical artillery experience. At the same time, no one spoke at all about the method of fire control.

At the same time, V.E. Grevenits, the flagship artillery officer of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, called the reason for the low accuracy not rangefinders, sights, guns or gunners, but the shortcomings of the fire control technique caused by a lack of practical experience. The cruiser "Russia", whose artillerymen continuously improved their skills, showed good results then from a distance of 56 ... 40 cab. And who knows how the Battle of Tsushima would have ended if the artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had the same skills ...

The purpose of this article is to revise the key technical and organizational factors that formed the accuracy of the fire of the Russian squadron in the Battle of Tsushima.

At that time, the firing range of modern guns made it possible to fire even with a medium caliber at a distance of 60 cab., And the main caliber "Oslyabi" finished off as much as 115 cab. At the same time, the mastered shooting techniques provided accurate fire only at a direct shot distance (no more than 10 cab.), At which no additional means were required to determine the range, except for a mechanical sight. Getting into the enemy at long distances was a huge problem, primarily due to the difficulty of determining the exact distance and calculating various corrections (for the move, for the wind, for circulation, etc.).

The key technical factors providing effective long-range fire were:

• devices for determining the distance (range finders);
• aiming devices (optical sights);
• means of transferring information to tools;
• shells that provide visibility of hits at long distances.

The key organizational factors were:

• organizational structure of artillery;
• method of fire control;
• target selection;
• training for gunners.

Rangefinders



Rangefinder "Barr & Stroud" on the battleship "Glory"

When firing at distances exceeding the range of a direct shot, it was necessary to accurately determine the distance to the target. Protractors, which became widespread at the end of the 10th century, were effective only up to 15 ... XNUMX cab. They were replaced by new devices - rangefinders, which could measure much greater distances.

To determine the distance to the enemy on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, 4,5-foot rangefinders "Barr & Stroud" of the latest model FA3, the production of which began in 1903, were used. The rangefinder base was about 1,37 m and the scale was graduated to 10 yards (000 m). The principle of operation was based on calculating the length of the unknown leg in a right-angled triangle along the length of the known leg (the base of the device itself) and the opposite angle, which is determined at the time of measuring the distance. The operator had to move the prism to combine the upper and lower half of the image in the eyepiece and get the distance to the object on the scale.


The device and principle of operation of the rangefinder type "combination"

On the ships of the combat line, from two to four rangefinders were installed.

According to the passport, the relative error of the FA3 model at a distance of 3 yards (000 m) was 2% (743 m) and increased in proportion to the firing range. At a distance of 1 yards (27,5 m), it reached 6 meters. At that time, rangefinders were improving very quickly. And already in 000, a new, 5-foot model FQ486 will be released with a passport accuracy of 110 m at a distance of 1906 yards (9 m). For this reason, already in 2 in our fleet 78-foot rangefinders "Barr & Stroud" are considered obsolete and will begin to be replaced by more advanced ones.

The practical error of rangefinder measurements was much higher.

The detachment of Rear Admiral NI Nebogatov was the first to reveal this problem, when on March 27, 1905, during the first detachment combat firing from a distance of 50 ... 25 cab. could not achieve hits in any shield. But the conclusions were made promptly: they carefully verified the rangefinders by the stars and introduced regular training to determine the distance to the vessel going to the side. As a result, on April 11, 1905, in the second detachment combat firing from a distance of 60 ... 40 cab. managed to show good results.

The degree of possession of rangefinders on the ships of the detachment of Vice-Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky was known from the results of the exercises conducted on April 27, 1905 according to the methodology developed in the detachment of N.I. Nebogatov. The cruiser "Ural" was approaching the squadron, and the range finders had to determine its speed by making two control measurements with an interval of 15 minutes at the same time. Here are the results:


The real speed of the Ural was 10 knots ...

During the Tsushima battle, both the range finders and the people behind them were very vulnerable to fragments of enemy shells. Moreover, in combat conditions, the instruments greatly lost their accuracy even without direct damage. So, on the "Emperor Nicholas I" for the same target, the bow rangefinder showed 42 cabs, and the stern - 32 cabs. On "Apraksin" the readings differed by 14 rooms, on "Senyavin" - by 5 rooms.

Thus, Tsushima showed that rangefinders were an unreliable means of determining the distance due to both the low training of specialists and the failure of devices for various reasons.

Optical sights


When shooting at long distances, traditional, mechanical sights no longer allowed to see the target clearly. For accurate aiming, an optical sight with multiple magnification was required.


Perepelkin's optical sight

On the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, almost all guns with a caliber of 75 mm and above (except for some obsolete ones) received optical monocular sights of the Perepelkin system. They had an 8x magnification and an angle of view of about 7 degrees.

Unfortunately, Perepelkin's sights were developed, manufactured and put into service in a great hurry, so they had numerous flaws. The most serious problem was the misalignment of the sighting line and the axis of the gun, which sometimes occurred after two or three shots. In addition, in battle, the lenses quickly got dirty from soot, dust and splashes. When the use of telescopic sights became impossible, some gunmen switched to mechanical sights.

Means of information transmission


The organization of long-range shooting made high demands on the efficiency and reliability of the transmission of commands and firing parameters to the guns, because the gunner could no longer determine the distance "by eye" and independently calculate the corrections.

By the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, all large modern ships of the Russian fleet had a system of fire control devices from the St. Petersburg plant of N.K. Geisler, model 1893/1894, which ensured the transfer of data between rangefinder posts, a conning tower, a central post, guns and ammunition storage. This system consisted of transmitting and receiving devices connected by a 47-wire cable with a constant voltage of 23V.

Tsushima. Accuracy Factors of Russian Artillery
Scheme of the Geisler system


Devices of the Geisler system

At the rangefinder station there was a rangefinder key - a device for transmitting the distance to the target in the conning tower and to the guns, and a control rangefinder dial, which showed the same distance that the guns received. There were several ranging stations. Usually they were located in the conning tower or on the fore-mars and on the stern bridge.

In the conning tower there were rangefinder dials that received information from different rangefinders. There was also a separate rangefinder indicator and rangefinder key for transferring the adjusted distance to the guns, and switches for switching the mode of transferring the distance to the gunners either directly from the rangefinders or from the wheelhouse.

In the conning tower there were also: two combat indicators (left and right sides), a signal indicator and a projectile indicator.

The combat indicator was an alidade on a graduated disc with a telescope. When this pipe turned to the target, the selected direction was transmitted to the receiving pointers at the guns. Thus, the gunners received information about the ship on which to fire.

The signal indicator transmitted the commands: "fraction", "attack", "short alarm".

The projectile indicator provided information to the guns and in the cellars which projectiles should be fired (armor-piercing, high-explosive, etc.).

A combat dial and a rangefinder dial were located near the guns. The combat dial showed the direction to the target and the firing commands. The rangefinder dial showed the distance to the target and the type of shells used.

At the entrance to the artillery cellars, projectile markers were placed to convey information about which shells should be supplied.

On the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, the Geisler system was modernized. Firstly, it could transmit rear sight amendments to the guns from the conning tower. Secondly, it was able to report the distance from its individual ranging station to each group.

In addition to the Geisler system, other methods of transmitting information were also used. Communication pipes were used to connect the combat posts with the guns. At the same time, all commands transmitted through the communication pipes and the Geisler system should have been duplicated by voice transmission. For this, people were placed in certain places, who repeated the commands with a voice. Orderlies were assigned to key officers, whose duties included the transfer of commands in the event of failure of regular means of communication. There was also a telephone, which was not popular even in peacetime due to its low reliability.

In combat conditions, the issue of information transmission was very acute. Geisler's wiring and communication pipes were open and easily damaged by shrapnel or fire (they were made using flammable materials). Communication through the negotiating pipes became impossible with a lot of noise from their own shots and the explosions of enemy shells. The voice transmission was all the more not audible. And then they had to communicate with notes through messengers, and this method could not ensure the promptness of information.

Shells


A very important factor affecting the effectiveness of long-range firing was the ability to observe the fall of your own shells. In turn, this depended on the device of the main types of ammunition intended for firing at enemy armored ships: high-explosive and armor-piercing. According to the instructions for the 2nd Pacific squadron, the fire should have been started with high-explosive shells, when approaching 20 cab. switch to armor-piercing 10 "and 12" guns, and from 10 cab. - also 6 ”and 120mm.

All armor-piercing shells and high-explosive shells with a caliber of 10 ... 6 "had a two-capsule delayed-action fuse (Brink tube). When hitting the water, such ammunition usually did not detonate, but when it hit the target, it exploded deep inside the enemy ship or even overboard. Together, this made it very difficult to observe the results of their own shooting.

Only high-explosive shells of 12 ”and 120 mm caliber had a fuse of 1894 (Baranovsky tube), which ensured operation when hitting water or the outer parts of the ship.

A very noticeable break with a cloud of black smoke was produced by a cast iron projectile equipped with an 1894 percussion fuse and equipped with black powder. It was he who was used for zeroing in the previous naval battles of the Russo-Japanese War. Pig-iron shells were loaded onto the detachment of ZP Rozhestvensky as practical shells, were used in firing practice and in small quantities on individual ships were preserved until the battle. There were no such shells on the ships of N.I. Nebogatov's detachment.

Thus, the problem of poor visibility of the falls of shells equipped with a Brink tube could well have been stopped by the use of cast iron shells, both for zeroing in and with fire to kill. Moreover, the warehouses had huge stocks of such ammunition. But in fact, this problem was not given due attention. In battle, Russian artillerymen often did not see the results of their firing, which had an extremely detrimental effect on the final accuracy.

Artillery organizational structure



Artillery organizational structure

On the ships of the Russian fleet, organizational weapons were combined into groups and plutongs. This division made it possible to conduct concentrated fire simultaneously on several targets.

Plutong is a collection of guns of the same caliber, located within the reach of voice commands and having the ability to fire at the same target. The composition of the plutong is constant: it is either a tower or one or more casemate guns. Each plutong had its own commander, who had to independently control the fire at close combat ranges (up to 10 cab.). In other cases, he had to strictly follow the instructions of higher commanders.

A group is a collection of several plutongs under a single command and firing at the same target. There were two (one per side) or four groups on the ship, usually led by a junior artillery officer. Each group had its own rangefinder.

On battleships of the "Borodino" class, the group commanders were located in the "corner" towers of medium caliber, on the "Oslyab" - in the upper "corner" casemates. The weapons of the plutongs in which they were located were used for sighting and were called "sighting".

Plutoons, which were not carrying group leaders, were called reserves. They came under the control of one group or another, depending on the tactical situation. The leadership within the group was carried out through negotiating pipes.

The central control of the ship's artillery was carried out by the fire control officer - a senior artillery officer who was subordinate to the ship's commander. To transfer commands to plutongs and groups, he most often used negotiating pipes and the Geisler system.

Central fire was the main method of controlling artillery, in which all guns received commands (including target selection, distance, correction) from the fire controller. If it became necessary to fire several targets at the same time, some of the guns were transferred to control from the group. For example, in the first phase of the Tsushima battle, the stern guns switched to group fire due to the fact that the enemy's flagship left their sector of destruction. Another reason for the rejection of the central fire was the damage to the fire control devices in the conning tower, the means of transmitting commands, or the failure of the fire controllers.


Organization of communication through communication pipes

The big problem of fire control in the Russian fleet of that time was archaic ideas, rooted in the sailing era, that the accuracy of fire depends solely on the skills of the gunners. Therefore, the gunners often did not want to listen to the commanders and made amendments on their own. And the artillery officers did not strongly resist this, first of all considering themselves specialists in technology, and not in ballistics and tactics.

Fire control technique



6 "Kane cannon

By the beginning of the war with Japan, the Rules of Artillery Service on Navy Ships, published back in 1890, were hopelessly outdated.

New fire control techniques were developed independently in individual fleets, squadrons, squads, or even ships. In 1903, a training artillery detachment successfully fired at the command "Management and action of ship artillery in battle and during exercises" drawn up by the flagship artilleryman of the Pacific squadron A. K. Myakishev. But neither the main naval headquarters, represented by ZP Rozhestvensky, nor the naval technical committee of the fleet, represented by FV Dubasov, gave further progress to this document.

Thus, during the Russo-Japanese War, there were no uniform rules for controlling artillery in battle that would meet the spirit of the times in the navy.

For the artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, the flagship artillery officer, Colonel F. A. Bersenev, developed a separate document: "Organization of Artillery Service on the Ships of the 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet", which hereinafter will be called "instructions." Let's consider its main points.

Distance 40 cab. was considered the limit for effective fire. At a longer range, only zeroing in with single shots from medium-caliber guns was allowed in order to determine the moment when to open fire to kill. The first shot was to be fired with the expectation of not reaching the target. The next one - only after receiving the results of the previous one and making adjustments.

The order for the squadron specified that zeroing at a distance of more than 30 cab. the flagship should have started. Having achieved the cover, he had to transmit the data to open fire to the ships coming from behind. At the same time, zeroing was not mandatory. When opening fire from small distances, it was allowed to immediately switch to rapid fire, determining the range by the rangefinder.

After zeroing in (if there was one), at the command "short alarm", it was necessary to switch to rapid fire with the main and medium caliber, that is, to the maximum rate of fire, in which each gun fired a shot when ready. When firing to kill, the firing manager determined the actual distance based on the readings received from the rangefinder stations, calculated corrections for own course, target movement, wind and circulation for medium-caliber guns using tables, and transmitted this data through the Geisler system and by voice. The corrections for the main caliber guns were calculated in plutongs according to the tables based on the corrections for the medium caliber guns.

The fire control technique adopted by the 2nd Pacific Squadron had several significant flaws.

First, the experience of the battle at long distances in the Yellow Sea was ignored, where the "Poltava" managed to hit the "Yakumo" from a distance of about 80 cab. Despite the fact that one of the orders for the 2nd Pacific Squadron said:

The enemy will not dare to oppose ... his fleet except from long distances ... If only we knew how to reach it with fire at the distances from which it will hit us ...

Theoretical and practical training in this direction was not conducted. Fortunately, at the decisive stages of the Tsushima battle, the distance was not great, so this shortcoming did not become critical.

Secondly, when using rapid fire to kill, the problem of distinguishing between falling shells from several ships was not considered.

"Suvorov" in Tsushima, after opening fire, gave the detachment not the targeting data, but the signal to "hit the head", obeying which everyone concentrated fire on the "Mikasa".

As a result, at the beginning of the battle, gunners from different ships of the squadron saw a large number of bursts around the Japanese flagship and could not identify their own among them. Taking into account the problems with determining the range described above, it turned out that almost all the shells flew nowhere.

At the same time, the solution to the problem has long been known and even spelled out in the instructions of A.K. Myakishev for the 1st Pacific Squadron: this is firing in volleys.

Thirdly, only the readings of rangefinders were used to adjust the fire for defeat, the issue of observing the results of their own shooting was not worked out.

Such a method of shooting would be relevant, provided the rangefinders work flawlessly, which, in fact, was not observed. The shells flew with significant hops or undershoots. There was no way to adjust the fire based on the observed results due to poor visibility of the bursts.

For what reasons, at the 2nd Pacific Squadron, it was decided to fire according to the readings of rangefinders at a distance of up to 40 cab. - dont clear. It can only be assumed that it was due to the complexity of managing concentrated squadron fire. But there were other options as well. For example, the instruction of A.K. Myakishev suggested firing according to the indications of rangefinders only from a distance of 20 ... 25 cab., And at distances of 30 ... 40 cab. it was recommended to adjust the fire based on the results of sighting. And, accordingly, the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron had shells that provided visibility of the results of zeroing and fire at these distances.

Based on the results of practical firing in Madagascar, Z.P. Rozhestvensky, observing the shells flying away to nowhere, one after the other, made additions to the existing methodology with several orders.

First, the admiral clarified the conduct of the zeroing:

When zeroing in, one should, without throwing the first round, by all means throw the second one and, if the first one lay to the right, then by all means put the second one to the left ... Having taken the target at least in a wide fork, one should dispose of the third shot after thinking.

Secondly, he drew attention to the need to adjust the distance and rear sight based on the results of the fall of shells before each shot:

Each gunner must know where the shells of the last shots from neighboring guns fell, and wait for the corresponding correction of the sight.

... Do not throw shells in vain, but correct each tip according to the results obtained.

However, the question of a comprehensive change in the methodology and its development remained open.

Target selection


The instruction ordered to focus the fire of the entire squadron on the enemy's lead ship. Then this moment was specified in one of the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky. For each unit, the target could be specified separately. If this is not done, then they should have fired at the lead ship or the enemy's flagship.

Artillery exercises


To save the resource of guns and shells, barrel firing was widely practiced in those days, which differed from practical ones in that the fire was not fired by shells of its own caliber. So, in the Russian navy, during exercises, 47-mm or 37-mm barrels were put into large and medium-caliber guns, and special hollow shells, along the axis of which a rifle barrel was placed, into small-caliber “auxiliary cartridges”.


Layout of a 37-mm barrel in a 120-mm or 6 "gun

The training course, described in the instructions for all gunners of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, was started with barrel firing at anchor from small-caliber cannons, first at fixed, and then at inactive shields from a distance of 2 ... 3 cab. (lessons No. 1–3, 20 shots in total).

Then the course continued from the same guns already on the move along the towed shield from a distance of at least 1 cab (lesson no. 4, 50 shots).

After that, they switched to barrel firing on the move from their guns at fixed and towed shields from a distance of 8 ... 9 cab., Including at night (lessons No. 4-8, 25 shots in total).

The course ended with practical firing on the move at fixed shields with training or cast-iron shells during the day (lesson No. 9, 3 shots) and at night (lesson No. 10, 2 shots).

As can be seen from the content of the course, most of it consisted of barrel firing, which was excellent for developing the gunners' skills in aiming the sight at the target and accurately determining the moment of the shot (when the ship is on an even keel). This would be enough for direct fire, that is, at a distance of no more than 10 cab.

However, barrel firing did not help in any way to develop such extremely necessary skills in combat conditions as determining the distance and observing the results of firing, zeroing in and focusing fire, calculating corrections and transmitting commands. This could only be worked out on practical shooting, and only 2 lessons were devoted to them, and only one was daytime.


75-mm Kane cannon with a telescopic sight

The training of artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific Squadron began in the Baltic. In July - September, firing from barrels at fixed or towed shields was practiced. One practical shooting was carried out in Revel: 2-3 shots from large and medium guns at the shields located on the shore. In fact, the squadron set out on a campaign without completing training.

During the few stops between the crossings, artillery exercises continued. Both stem and practical firing on the move were carried out at floating shields from a distance of 15 ... 25 cab. Let us dwell on the latter in more detail: they were organized in Madagascar in January 1905.

According to the results of the first shooting on January 13, Z.P. Rozhestvensky wrote:

Yesterday's squadron firing was extremely sluggish and, to our deep regret, found that not a single ship, with the exception of the Aurora, took seriously the lessons of artillery control in the execution of exercises according to plans.
Valuable 12 ”shells were thrown without any consideration ... Firing from 75 mm cannons was also very bad ...

The next firing on January 18 and 19 went slightly better, but still unsatisfactory:

The expenditure of large-caliber shells is still the same impermissible indiscretion ...

The artillery exercises did not end on a positive note:

Firing large guns on January 25th was a waste of ammunition. Some threw the first two shells in one gulp, and the third after a quarter of an hour, others put all three shells with huge and monotonous undershoots or equally persistent flights, without changing the sight ...

More practical firing was not carried out for reasons of ammunition economy.

The last barrel firing was organized in Cam Ranh on April 3-7, 1905. Thus, 4 months have passed from the date of the last practical shooting to Tsushima. This was a long enough time to lose those few skills that I managed to get.

On the ships of the detachment of NI Nebogatov, the first practical shooting was carried out on March 27, 1905 in the Gulf of Aden at canvas shields from a distance of 50 ... 25 cab. The results were unsatisfactory: not a single projectile hit the target due to errors in range determination. But by the next exercises, held on April 11, they learned how to use rangefinders. And already from a distance of 60 ... 40 cab. two shields were destroyed, and two more were badly damaged.

conclusions


The ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron had modern technical means to ensure the accuracy of artillery fire: rangefinders, optical sights and a fire control system. The weak point was preparation, not technique. In the Navy, due attention was not paid to the issue of squadron fire control at long distances. The technique adopted by ZP Rozhdestvensky's squadron had significant flaws. Measurement of distance by rangefinders has not been worked out. There was a lack of artillery practice. The precious experience gained in previous battles was not taken into account. In sum, this led to a rout.

Information about the damage to Japanese ships received in the Tsushima battle suggests that the Russian artillerymen, with the exception of one episode, hit infrequently and irregularly. This exception was the first 15 minutes, during which Mikasa received 19 hits. By many indirect signs, it was possible to determine that the "author" of most of these hits was only one ship - "Prince Suvorov" - the only one on which they had mastered the determination of range by a rangefinder.

In the next article, we will look at the accuracy factors of Japanese artillery.
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  1. Niko
    Niko 5 May 2021 18: 54
    +9
    Thanks to the author. FINALLY something can be read with interest. (PS We are waiting about the Japanese for completeness)
    1. Hypertension
      Hypertension 5 May 2021 20: 33
      -8
      Rangefinder "Barr & Stroud" on the battleship "Glory"

      Damn British! Forcibly forced our sailors to put their rangefinders ...
      1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
        Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 5 May 2021 20: 56
        -3
        Quote: Hyperion
        Damn British!

        scots)
        1. Hypertension
          Hypertension 5 May 2021 21: 06
          -12%
          Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
          scots)

          What's the difference? West is West! He is always against us! The whole West! Entirely! Especially the UK! And during the Napoleonic Wars, and during the First World War, and during the second!
          PS In fact, the shaves were on our side during all the big wars, one way or another.
          1. Kronos
            Kronos 5 May 2021 23: 11
            +1
            The Crimean War were against for example.
            1. Hypertension
              Hypertension 6 May 2021 00: 34
              -5
              Quote: Kronos
              The Crimean War were against for example.

              The Crimean War with Napoleonic, WWI and WWII cannot be compared.
              1. unknown
                unknown 8 May 2021 08: 12
                0
                The only Napoleon that really existed is the one that historians have under the number THIRD.
                Namely, the real history of our last human civilization can be traced back to the so-called "Crimean War".
                Everything before that is not science, but a part of fiction, a section of unscientific fiction.
                The "Crimean War" is the first world war of our civilization.
          2. Alien From
            Alien From 6 May 2021 02: 55
            -1
            And also Ksenia is naughty ......... do not take everything on yourself .......)
          3. unknown
            unknown 8 May 2021 08: 16
            -2
            No wonder, there is a point of view that in WWII we fought together with the United States against Germany and Great Britain. Great Britain was forced to join the anti-Hitler alliance, but this did not save it from the collapse of the empire.
            In continuation of this point of view, there is a version that the "British queen" is actually the daughter of the American General Eisenhower, and her "plato of teeth" is the son of MacArthur.
      2. rytik32
        5 May 2021 20: 57
        +2
        EMNIP sold as many as 47 units in 1904 and put them on 2TOE ships
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 5 May 2021 21: 22
          -7
          this is how the colonial naval empire was dying (and the victories were against the Ottomans and Swedes in the 18th and early 19th centuries, then the loss in the Eastern War, the fleet did not save). The land ship remained for another 15 years.
          So from afar, technical lag led to the collapse of the state.
          The entire 20th century passed in defense of the conquests of the 19th century ....
          lost ... a lot ... and not yet! or already ?.

          This analysis is also important for the future "10 units of AB for 100 VI" - Tsushima - the last sea battle of the Republic of Ingushetia.
          Was it worth it to send so much dough so far in one squad?

          Add conclusions to the section: to correct the situation in 21c - spend money on excess money, then Av, in 17th place.
          1. unknown
            unknown 8 May 2021 08: 32
            0
            From an astrological point of view, only two annual signs are marine.
            This is the Rat and the Monkey.
            The Rat is Great Britain.
            The monkey is Japan.
            The rest of the signs are land signs.
            1. antivirus
              antivirus 8 May 2021 19: 22
              0
              astrologers are wrong - that's what the true Moremans put down to me - they know for sure that Russia needs to look for glory and profit in okyan-puddles and bottomless hollows.
              their native steppes and swamps are not enough for them.

              that the air is not enough for me, I drink the wind, I swallow the fog ... further words about the cost of the fleet ...
        2. Hypertension
          Hypertension 5 May 2021 22: 45
          -2
          And on the other ships of whose production were the rangefinders?
          1. rytik32
            5 May 2021 22: 49
            +6
            At 1TOE were Barr & Stroud FA2 - the previous modification with half the passport accuracy and the scale was graduated to shorter distances. In the amount of 1..2 pieces for a large ship.
            And then there were Lujols - on small ships and in the plutongs of large ships. But these are devices of the previous generation, unsuitable for the combat distances of the RYA.
            1. Hypertension
              Hypertension 5 May 2021 22: 56
              -9
              Quote: rytik32
              At 1TOE were Barr & Stroud FA2

              Also Englishmen (Scots), would they not be okay? Lujol? Guardians I suppose? It was because of them that we lost. They put a pig on it, you know ...
        3. Comrade
          Comrade 6 May 2021 03: 58
          +4
          Quote: rytik32
          EMNIP sold as many as 47 units in 1904 and put them on 2TOE ships

          Sorry, dear colleague, but this figure is questionable.
          The firm in 1903 received an order for only seventy-seven (77) FA 3, and the lion's share of them went to the English fleet, not who had them in general.
          By the way, such a rangefinder was worth very expensive.
          We like to kick the Russian imperial fleet for technical backwardness, but the poverty of the English fleet on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war in terms of rangefinders Bara and Struda is simply amazing.
          1. rytik32
            6 May 2021 09: 00
            +3
            Valentine, good afternoon!
            Quote: Comrade
            The firm in 1903 received an order for only seventy-seven (77) FA 3, and the lion's share of them went to the English fleet, which did not have them at all.

            Here is information on the supply of rangefinders to RN

            Further, unfortunately, only in pounds

            So the British had better rangefinders than you think

            The number of rangefinders for 2TOE can be checked by circulars No. 115 and 121, if in doubt.
            1. Comrade
              Comrade 7 May 2021 03: 07
              0
              My compliments, Alexey!

              Quote: rytik32
              Here is information on the supply of rangefinders to RN. Further, unfortunately, only in pounds

              Alas, the information from Table 2.1 has nothing to do with the supply of Barr and Stroud rangefinders to the British fleet.

              1) We open the anniversary edition dedicated to the centenary of the company, and read the following:
              "In 1903, Barr and Stroud received an order for seventy-seven new instruments (FA 3), and the Admiralty, which ordered only eleven FA 2 rangefinders between June 1899 and September 1903, purchased a large number of FA 3 rangefinders.".


              2) According to table 2.1 from your commentary, in 1901-1903 the English navy made orders to Barr and Stroud for a total of £ 21, and as follows from the above passage, neither in 060 nor in 1901. The British navy did not buy Barr and Stroud rangefinders.
              Output.
              The table is not about rangefinders, but about other types of products of this company.

              By the way, these tabular sums (against the background of the company's total revenue for the corresponding years) look rather modest, and what lies behind them, one can only guess.
              Only one thing can be said for sure, they have nothing to do with rangefinders.


              Quote: rytik32
              The number of rangefinders for 2TOE can be checked by circulars No. 115 and 121, if in doubt.

              If you have a document image, it would be interesting to take a look.
              1. rytik32
                7 May 2021 08: 53
                +1
                Valentine, good afternoon!
                Quote: Comrade
                Alas, the information from Table 2.1 has nothing to do with the supply of Barr and Stroud rangefinders to the British fleet.

                I sent my source to you in the mail. The book is quite serious and there are links to data sources in the table.

                Quote: Comrade
                If you have a document image, it would be interesting to take a look.

                Unfortunately, there is no scan. There is a text

                Circular No. 115 dated August 2, 1904. The commander of the 2nd squadron ordered: To the commanders of the battleships: "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino", "Eagle", "Prince Suvorov", "Oslyabya", "Sisoy the Great", "Navarin", cruisers of the XNUMXst rank "Aurora" , "Oleg" and "Dmitry Donskoy" urgently take the Barr and Strud range finders from the galvanic firing devices warehouse and now install them in place. When handling rangefinders, strictly adhere to the instructions that will be released along with the rangefinders. Departure from these instructions for handling leads to premature damage to the instruments.

                Circular No. 121 dated August 3, 1904. In addition to circular No. 115 of the 2nd August, the Headquarters, by order of the Squadron Commander, announces that the 14 Barra and Struda range finders sent to the port of Kronstadt must be received by the following vessels: “Emperor Alexander III - 2 range finders.” Borodino "- 2 rangefinders." Prince Suvorov "- 2 rangefinders." Oslyabya "- 2 rangefinders." Sisoy Veliky "- 2 rangefinders. Navarin - 2 rangefinders." Aurora "- 1 rangefinder." Dmitry Donskoy "- 1 rangefinder. In addition to these 14 range finders, around August 10, 5 range finders will be delivered to the Orel, 2 range finders. Oleg, 1 range finder. Svetlana, 1 range finder, and an armadillo. " Prince Suvorov "- 1 rangefinder (except for the 2 above).
                1. Comrade
                  Comrade 8 May 2021 01: 17
                  0
                  Hello, Alexey!

                  Quote: rytik32
                  I sent my source to you in the mail. The book is quite serious and there are links to data sources in the table.

                  I got the book, thank you.
                  On p. 79, a phrase stands out, immediately followed by table 2.1:
                  "The value of orders received for rangefinders and associated items grew steadily in value from 1901", which can be translated as:
                  "The value of orders for rangefinders and related products has grown steadily since 1901."

                  Pay attention to the phrase "related products", it is key here.
                  The amounts appearing in the table illustrate the cost of not only ordered rangefinders, but also and the cost of related items ordered over six years.
                  Since we know from Range and Vision: First Hundred Years of Barr and Stroud that neither in 1901 nor in 1902 did the British navy buy Barr and Stroud rangefinders, we can conclude that during these two years the fleet for a total of £ 9 purchased not rangefinders, and related products to them.


                  Quote: rytik32
                  Unfortunately, there is no scan. There is a text

                  From the text it follows that nineteen rangefinders (2 + 14) were released on the ships of the 5nd Pacific squadron, while you wrote that
                  Quote: rytik32
                  EMNIP sold as many as 47 units in 1904 and put them on 2TOE ships
                  1. rytik32
                    8 May 2021 09: 58
                    +1
                    There are 115 more ships in the 10th circular, i.e. at least 10 rangefinders.
                    And Nebogatov's detachment also got it?
                    1. Comrade
                      Comrade 8 May 2021 19: 30
                      0
                      Got it, just do not know which system?
                      On the "Admiral Ushakov", for example, there was no FA 3. Moreover, used rangefinders, seized from the training artillery detachment, were sent there.
                      If there were 15-18 brand new FA 3 rangefinders in stock, why would you do that?
                      Apparently, there was nothing in the warehouse, so they scraped out the rangefinders, where they could, equipping the Third Pacific Squadron.
                      1. rytik32
                        8 May 2021 23: 26
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        On the "Admiral Ushakov", for example, FA 3 was not

                        Valentine, you wrote that you were
                        https://topwar.ru/141243-na-dorabotku-nizkaya-unikalnost-bronenosec-admiral-ushakov-v-boyah.html
                      2. Comrade
                        Comrade 9 May 2021 02: 20
                        0
                        Hello, Alexey!
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Valentine, you wrote that you were

                        Sorry for the oversight, there really were.

                        Total, on the ships of the Second Pacific Squadron, according to circular No. 121 of August 3, 1904, there were rangefinders:
                        "Emperor Alexander III - 2 rangefinders
                        "Borodino" - 2 rangefinders
                        "Prince Suvorov" - 2 + 1 rangefinder
                        "Eagle" - 2 rangefinders
                        "Oslyabya" - 2 rangefinders
                        "Sisoy the Great" - 2 rangefinders
                        "Navarin" - 2 rangefinders
                        "Oleg" - 1 rangefinder
                        "Aurora" - 1 rangefinder
                        "Svetlana" - 1 rangefinder
                        "Dmitry Donskoy" - 1 rangefinder
                        In total: 19 rangefinders.

                        You wrote that
                        Quote: rytik32
                        There are 115 more ships in the 10th circular, i.e. at least 10 rangefinders
                        .

                        Could you cite the text of the circular in full, because in the text of circular No. 115 of August 2, 1904 you cited, there is no information that in addition to the above ships more ten ships of the Second Pacific Squadron received rangefinders.
                        Who else besides "Admiral Nakhimov"?
                      3. rytik32
                        9 May 2021 10: 21
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Could you cite the text of the circular in full, because in the text of circular No. 115 dated August 2, 1904, cited by you, there is no information that, in addition to the above ships, ten more ships of the Second Pacific Squadron received rangefinders.
                        Who else besides "Admiral Nakhimov"?

                        Dear Valentine, I have brought everything that I have.

                        In fact, there was one rangefinder for each group and possibly spare ones.
                        Borodino and Oslyabi had 4 groups each. Sisoy's - most likely, too, the title photo clearly shows 2 rangefinders on the nose bridge. "Nakhimov" had 2 groups. There is no information about "Navarina".
                      4. Comrade
                        Comrade 10 May 2021 02: 12
                        0
                        Hello, Alexey!

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Sisoy's - most likely, too, the title photo clearly shows 2 rangefinders on the nose bridge.


                        Dear colleague,
                        This photograph, taken by N.N.Apostoli, was published on a postcard in 1902 (the photo posted by you is cut off on the right)
                        Below is the reverse side of this postcard, the date on the left. For convenience, I cut out the fragment with the date, made it black and white, added brightness, magnified it three times and placed it on the image.
                        In 1902, the Great Sisoy could not have Barr and Stroud rangefinders. and even in quantity
                        Quote: rytik32
                        4 groups.


                      5. rytik32
                        10 May 2021 09: 38
                        0
                        Quote: Comrade
                        In 1902 the "Sisoy Velikiy" could not have Barr and Stroud rangefinders

                        Why so?
                      6. Comrade
                        Comrade 10 May 2021 13: 54
                        0
                        "Why" - I will answer you about twelve, now I'm at work.
                        In the meantime, Alexey, if possible, please point with arrows at the two range finders installed, as you wrote to me, on the "Sisoye Velikiy".
                      7. rytik32
                        11 May 2021 00: 17
                        +1
                        Valentine, I figured it out. These are 5-barreled 37-mm Hotchkiss cannons.
                      8. Comrade
                        Comrade 11 May 2021 03: 42
                        0
                        Hello, Alexey.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Valentine, I figured it out.

                        Excellent, dear colleague, then let's move on.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        Why so?

                        Because, having received the document you have posted for consideration, the manager of the Maritime Ministry gave the GUKiS the go-ahead to purchase only ten rangefinders.
                        (The image opens on "click")

                        That is why in 1902 there could not be Barr and Stroud rangefinders on the Sisoy the Great.
                        PS
                        There is information from a reliable source that the battleships of the Second Pacific Squadron in principle there could not be as many FA 3 rangefinders as indicated by you.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Borodino and Oslyabi had 4 groups each. Sisoy's - most likely, too, the title photo clearly shows 2 rangefinders on the nose bridge
                        .
  • unknown
    unknown 8 May 2021 08: 38
    0
    Moreover, Japan simply amazes.
    A country that emerged from nowhere, whose real history can only be traced back to the so-called "Meiji revolution". That is, since 1867. Everything that was earlier is fake.
    The magnificent material "Country with the painted sun" is still preserved in one already closed live journal.
  • Jura 27
    Jura 27 6 May 2021 15: 06
    0
    With rangefinders of the next generation and an incomparably better SUAO, the battle is devastatingly lost. ЗПР, - our FSE!
  • Victor Tsenin
    Victor Tsenin 5 May 2021 19: 07
    +1
    Very, very interesting and informative. One suggestion to the author is to make a minidirectional / footnote regarding specialized terms, otherwise you have to google a lot. I'm not overworked, but an article that increases education, brain boost should be more meaningful in this regard.
    I'm talking about cables, fore-mars and much more)
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 5 May 2021 19: 32
      +5
      cables - 1/10 nautical mile or 185 meters.
      Mars is a platform on a mast. fore-mars, respectively, on the foremast. combat mars - the same site but with cannons or machine guns

      By the way, Rozhestvensky was opposed to the installation of artillery on Mars.
      1. Victor Tsenin
        Victor Tsenin 5 May 2021 19: 36
        +1
        Thank you very much for the explanations, but it is a little unclear why then fore-mars, and fock-mars. Tradition?
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 5 May 2021 19: 49
          +4
          But fig knows him :))) Since the time of Peter the Great, we have adopted Dutch terms, and I am not strong in this language. But yes, fore-mars, fore-topmast ... by the way, on the mainsail there is a mainsail, and on a mizzen there is a cruise-topmain.
          1. Victor Tsenin
            Victor Tsenin 5 May 2021 19: 52
            +2
            Thank you again, I only know the bollard, from the experience of my life, so a conditional glossary for such a land creature as I am is, of course, needed)
          2. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 5 May 2021 22: 21
            +4
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            But fig knows it :))) since the time of Peter the Great we have adopted Dutch terms, and I am not good at this language. But yes, fore-mars, fore-mast ... by the way, at the main-match - the main-top,

            Fore is front, forward. The main grotto is the largest.
        2. mmaxx
          mmaxx 6 May 2021 17: 23
          0
          There is no dispute about the terms. And they agree. This has been the case for 300 years.
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 6 May 2021 03: 31
        0
        We must! At least in some ways, the ZPR was reasonable.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 6 May 2021 08: 52
          0
          Quote: mmaxx
          At least in some ways, the ZPR was reasonable.

          Believe not only.
          But most researchers, like the same Gribovsky, try in every possible way to retouch these moments ... But, in fairness, Vladimir Yulievich at least mentions them.
          1. unknown
            unknown 8 May 2021 08: 46
            0
            And what about the clinical underestimation of speed?
            Among researchers, there is still a tendency to overestimate the characteristics of Japanese RYAV ships.
            Although, the first shoots are already there.
            For example, S.V. Balakin, who at one time was the executive editor of the Marine Collection supplement to the Modelist-Konstruktor magazine, in his monographs devoted to Japanese battleships and "armored cruisers", albeit reluctantly, in passing, in the notes, but gives real data on the speed of the Japanese ships in the RYAV.
  • Turist1996
    Turist1996 5 May 2021 19: 08
    +4
    That is, as I understand it, the Vladivostok cruiser squadron turned out to be the most combat-ready (both in terms of performance, overall activity and the final result) in the entire Pacific theater, so what?
    At least according to the now-vaunted criterion of "efficiency - cost", he is clearly in the lead against the background of both the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons.
    The weakest combat ship formation that was "not a pity." And so it was used. Which shows once again - the weapon should not "lie in the sheath". It should be trained, at least, and not exhibited at parades as a museum value.
    1. Bashkirkhan
      Bashkirkhan 5 May 2021 19: 40
      +2
      Quote: Turist1996
      At least according to the now-vaunted criterion of "efficiency - cost", he is clearly in the lead against the background of both the 1st and 2nd Pacific squadrons.

      According to this criterion, the Amur minelayer covers the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers like a bull to a sheep.
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 5 May 2021 21: 28
        +1
        covers the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers like a bull to a sheep.

        - crush and the sheep does not give birth to offspring --result
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 5 May 2021 22: 25
        0
        Quote: Bashkirkhan
        According to this criterion, the Amur minelayer covers the Vladivostok detachment of cruisers like a bull to a sheep.

        And the second mine layer, 1st TOE Yenisei, was brilliantly blown up on its own mines almost immediately after the start of the war.
        1. unknown
          unknown 8 May 2021 08: 48
          +1
          As well as the abandoned "Boyarin", which was valued more than "Novik" because of its better seaworthiness.
    2. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 5 May 2021 19: 51
      +4
      Not so straightforward.
      The allocation of a separate detachment of cruisers was the right decision made by the naval leadership even before the war, and it worked. The Japanese simply did not have the strength to block it as well. If blocked, I would have defended in the same way, just not in the inner basin of Port Arthur, but in the Golden Horn.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 5 May 2021 22: 29
        +1
        Quote: Senior Sailor
        Distinguishing a separate squad of cruisers was the right decision.

        The decision is correct and the ships have chosen the wrong one. Ever since the days of the sailing fleet, it was customary to put large frigates in line. Separating the armored cruisers into a separate detachment was an inappropriate division of forces. How unjustified is the sending back to the Baltic of Chukhonin's detachment with old battleships. And in Vladivostok, Bogatyr with Askold and Varyag would have done just fine.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 6 May 2021 08: 46
          +3
          If you please write nonsense. The Rurikovichi were very poorly suited for battle in the line, but very good for raiding. And while they were engaged in raiding, everything went well.
          But we must remember that the VOK was allocated not only for raiding, but also in order to force the enemy to divide forces. And armored cruisers for this, obviously, did not fit very well. This is not to mention the fact that they were inferior in autonomy.
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 6 May 2021 21: 55
            +1
            Quote: Senior Sailor
            If you please write nonsense. The Rurikovichi were very poorly suited for battle in the line, but very good for raiding.

            What are you talking about .. what kind of raiding? From Vladivostok to Japan in a straight line 780 km, it is two days for a round trip. To the island of Tsushima 1000 km, it is three days there and back. Three days is the autonomy of a torpedo boat, why the hell are raiders needed here?

            Russian 6000-ki are significantly superior to all Japanese "dogs" in firepower. And in a group of three cruisers, they will disassemble the entire detachment of the same Uriu into rivets without even choking. In any case, the Asams will have to be nominated to parry such a threat. Moreover, unlike the Ruriks, the 6000s can easily break away from the enemy by finding, for example, Asama in the cover squad, or even worse, just bypass the same Asama along a curve and continue the raid further while she puffs from behind.
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 7 May 2021 08: 25
              0
              Quote: Saxahorse
              What are you talking about .. what kind of raiding?

              The usual, for which these cruisers were created.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              From Vladivostok to Japan in a straight line 780 km, it is two days for a round trip. To the island of Tsushima 1000 km, it is three days there and back.

              Still, in these places, a little bit of trade traffic was observed, the price would not be your inventions :))))
              Meanwhile, the first part of the book "Operations of Vladivostok Cruisers" is devoted to the description of Japanese ports and trade routes. I highly recommend reading it.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              Three days is the autonomy of a torpedo boat

              Which are not yet. This is the first thing. To the place you need not only to walk, but also to hang out there for some time, waiting for production, while keeping most of the boilers under steam in order to be able to
              Quote: Saxahorse
              calmly break away from the enemy by finding, for example, Asama in the cover squad

              This is the second.
              Quote: Saxahorse
              In any case, the Asams will have to be nominated to parry such a threat.

              What is the threat? They'll have enough to go to Tokyo Bay, at best, there and back, without any raiding. Up to Chemulpo, where the caravans with reinforcements for Kuroki and Nogi go, about the same.
              In real life, three VOK armored cruisers distracted four Kamimura cruisers. When you offer one for the eyes.
              well, about the speed, in order to "calmly bypass" Asama "
              During the next day, the cruisers' speeds were checked for full speed. It turned out that Russia gives 18.5 knots. "Stormbreaker" - 19, "Bogatyr "- 19... "Rurik" - 17.
              page 66 of the aforementioned book.
              about "Varyag" and its real speed on the Internet broke all the spears. Remains "Askold" ... he will fight a lot?
              1. Saxahorse
                Saxahorse 7 May 2021 21: 05
                0
                Quote: Senior Sailor
                The usual, for which these cruisers were created.

                Cruisers were created for raiding in another ocean. In the Indian there, in the Atlantic .. In this particular war, there was no need for raiders of this class. Dobroflot ships were bought to hunt for military contraband. And in the 1st TOE there were such, Moscow and Angara. But Alekseev disarmed Moscow and declared it to be the Red Cross ship (at the same time setting up his headquarters there, the orderlies probably ..) And Angara, which was hardly kicked out into the raid, discovered a malfunction in the cars and retreated to San Francisco for repairs! (this is autonomy ..)

                But there was an urgent need for ships of the line. He did not hesitate to put Nissin and Kasuga in the battleship detachment. Russia and Thunderbolt are definitely stronger than these two Italians.

                Quote: Senior Sailor
                about "Varyag" and its real speed on the Internet broke all the spears. Remains "Askold" ... he will fight a lot?

                Just with this phrase you ruined everything. wassat

                "Bogatyr" - 19. "- I DO NOT BELIEVE! It was believed that the Bogatyr's cars were the best in quality from the six-thousanders. The German assembly is the same as Askold. And the stream of fairy tales and lies about the allegedly weak Varyag is already setting teeth on edge. in the last tests before the war, the Varyag showed 22 knots, exactly the same number he showed with the Japanese.
                1. Senior seaman
                  Senior seaman 7 May 2021 23: 36
                  0
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  Dobroflot ships were bought to hunt for military contraband.

                  They have an order of magnitude higher autonomy due to cargo holds. How they were disposed of is another question.
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  Russia and Thunderbolt are definitely stronger than these two Italians.

                  I'm afraid to even suggest how you thought :)))
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  "Bogatyr" - 19. "- I DO NOT BELIEVE!

                  I do not discuss matters of faith. Read Yegoriev, he is like an eyewitness. (to be honest, I'm shocked myself, but ...)
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  Let me remind you for the tenth time, in the last tests before the war, the Varyag showed 22 knots,

                  Only in your fantasies :)))
                  However, as usual. On the latest he hardly scored 20 and immediately the bearings began to warm up. More or less passed normally penultimate, but even then he did not gain more than 20. Listen, we just discussed with you both the maximum and average speed on that run. Well, a person cannot have such a selective memory :)))
                  Quote: Saxahorse
                  he showed exactly the same amount among the Japanese.

                  Yeah, once after a two-year renovation (and that is doubtful). But when it was bought back by more than 17 for some reason, it did not work ...
                  1. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 8 May 2021 02: 44
                    0
                    Quote: Senior Sailor
                    Well, a person cannot have such a selective memory :)))

                    So I think about the same thing. Like 10 times they reminded that during the tests on October 16, the Varyag calmly accelerated the cars to 140 rpm. This corresponds to 21.7-22 knots at normal displacement. Why did Rudnev shove 1330 tons of coal into it before testing, the question is for him. In Chemulpo, the Varyag is no longer overloaded. I hope you remember what a normal supply of coal the Varyag has?

                    Like 100 times discussed, and you diligently repeat the same fantasies.
                    1. Senior seaman
                      Senior seaman 8 May 2021 10: 44
                      0
                      You see, the whole point is that I have a strange habit of reading the sources that I refer to.
                      and in Melnikov's monograph it is written in Russian and white that latest the tests happened a month later, namely on November 15th.
                      On November 15, the tests lasted only three hours, the rotational speed from 80 to 130 rpmbut then reduced to 50 - bearings again warmed up... There were 29 boilers under the steam, the pressure was from 14 to 15,8 atm.

                      Why are you once again so diligently putting your seat in a puddle for me personally an unsolvable mystery ...
                      1. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 8 May 2021 21: 27
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        and in the monograph of Melnikov, it is written in Russian and white that the last tests happened a month later, namely on November 15.

                        Not testing, but running in a new bearing. Bearings on the Varyag were always warmed up, from birth. Apparently a consequence of the too light foundation of the machines. This is why Crump used a high-temperature alloy for the bearings of the main machines. The last, many hours of speed tests after the overhaul at the Varyag were on October 16, where he confirmed these same 22 knots.

                        It is clear that it is difficult for the lawyers of Rudnev and Rozhdestvensky to recognize the obvious and documented facts. But this is a question for you, why do you have cowards and traitors in your clients ... As if you cannot find really worthy Russian sailors ... And there were a lot of them.
                      2. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 8 May 2021 22: 01
                        -1
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        The last, many hours of speed tests after the overhaul at Varyag were on October 16, where he confirmed these same 22 knots.

                        aha, but after a month I could not develop even 20 for any long term.
                        But I want to remind you that we are not discussing the hypothetical speed of the Varyag on the Chemulpo raid, but the possibility
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        just go around the same Asama along the curve and continue the raid further while she puffs from behind.

                        And "the documented facts are very simple." After many months of repairs, the cruiser was able to reach a speed of 20 knots once. But based in Vladivostok, where the repair capacity is an order of magnitude lower than Port Arthur's, in your opinion, of course, he will have a second wind.
                        yours sounds especially strange
                        In Chemulpo, there is no longer any overload at the Varyag. I hope you remember what a normal supply of coal the Varyag has?

                        And you understand that in any way he will go into raiding with pits and other rooms full to the eyeballs, otherwise it will end at the island of Dazhalet. And therefore your argument is a little absurd.
                        Bearings on the Varyag were always warmed up, from birth. Apparently a consequence of the too light foundation of the machines.

                        or there is a defect in the geometry of the case (one friend told me about this). But in both cases, this can only be eliminated at the factory.

                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        It is clear that it is difficult for the lawyers of Rudnev and Rozhdestvensky to recognize the obvious and documented facts. But this is already a question for you, why do you have cowards and traitors in your clients?

                        did not understand why this stream of consciousness ...
                        You still do not understand that I am just an opponent of aggressive lies and ignorance. And therefore you and I are unlikely to ever agree.
                      3. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 9 May 2021 20: 31
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        aha, but after a month I could not develop even 20 for any long term.

                        It is really difficult to develop noticeable speed when standing at the dock to run in cars. wassat

                        Tie to fantasize, 140 turns equals 22 knots Karl! It is a fact.

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Do you understand that he will go to raiding anyway with full holes and other premises,

                        For those who are "in the tank" again .. A walk to the Tsushima Strait is three days, no full pits there and not close, enough 1 \ 5 of supplies. Well, you can add the same amount to the force of "inevitable in the sea of ​​accidents." But there is no need for a full supply of coal, even close.

                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        You still do not understand that I am just an opponent of aggressive lies and ignorance.

                        However, the impressions of your comments leave exactly the opposite. Rudnev, who fled to consult with the British about the destruction of the cruiser, you suddenly have a hero. But half of the officers of the Varyag, led by senior officers Stepanov, who categorically refused to sign the cowardly act on the destruction of the slightly damaged cruiser, do not even deserve mention in your country.

                        Semyonov, who prepared in advance both the white and the Japanese flag for surrender at the very first meeting of the enemy, you have again a hero and a respected witness. And Kostenko in the eyes, who accused Rozhdestvensky of mediocre management of the squadron while still in Japanese captivity, is a liar.
                      4. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 9 May 2021 21: 13
                        -1
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Standing at the berth for running in cars is really difficult to develop noticeable speed.

                        yes. Either you have a car in full lace, then a month later you needed to run in the bearings. Did you change it because the old one is very good and the machine team has nothing else to do?
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Tie to fantasize, 140 turns equals 22 knots Karl! It is a fact

                        Learn to read. On November 15, only 130 rpm were developed. This is a fact.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        For those who are "in the tank" again .. A walk to the Tsushima Strait is three days, no full pits there and not close, enough 1 \ 5 of supplies. Well, you can add the same amount to the force of "inevitable in the sea of ​​accidents." But there is no need for a full supply of coal, even close.

                        I'll tell you more, there is no need to run to Tsushima and back. Well, there are no worthy targets there, the main traffic goes through Tokyo Bay.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Rudnev, who fled to consult with the British about the destruction of the cruiser, you suddenly have a hero. But half of the officers of the Varyag, led by senior officers Stepanov, who categorically refused to sign the cowardly act on the destruction of the slightly damaged cruiser, do not even deserve mention in your country.

                        Still want to know where you could read this in my comments or works? :))) Although, probably, in the same place as about the "Monomakh" running with 17 junction moves :))))
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        And Kostenko in the eyes accused Rozhdestvensky of mediocre management of the squadron while still in Japanese captivity, is a liar.

                        You see, what is the matter, the fact that Kostenko treated Rozhestvensky badly does not make him an indisputable authority in my eyes. But the fact that he absolutely lied about the number of hits in the "Oryol", about the ammunition remaining in the cellars (although here he could be honestly mistaken) and was confused about the amount of coal in the pits, makes us treat his testimony with at least caution.
                        For example, we can also recall the notorious lieutenant Vyrubov. That's really who treated the ZPR badly, but the point is only that his nobility hammered a bolt into his duties and he did not get a torpedo from the mine apparatus during the exercises. And essno Zinovy ​​Petrovich otmother him ...
                        R.S. Happy Holidays :)))
                      5. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 10 May 2021 22: 58
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Learn to read. On November 15, only 130 rpm were developed. This is a fact.

                        Aren't you tired of lying at every step? 140 rpm Karl ..

                      6. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 10 May 2021 23: 33
                        0
                        That is, you have not mastered the date?
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        15 November

                        Who cares what happened a month before?
                      7. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 12 May 2021 22: 35
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Who cares what happened a month before?

                        And then he just stood in Chemulpo for two months. This clearly proves that its speed is strictly zero! fool
                      8. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 13 May 2021 11: 48
                        0
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        It proves for sure

                        this proves that the condition of his cars could not improve in any way, due to the lack of a repair base.
                        And even more so, there is no reason to expect that this cruiser will suddenly be able to
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        just go around the same Asama along the curve and continue the raid further while she puffs from behind.
                      9. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 14 May 2021 23: 06
                        0
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        this proves that the condition of his cars could not improve in any way, due to the lack of a repair base.

                        This proves that you and Andrey are not interested in any arguments, so wake up, closing your eyes and plugging your ears, telling the same mossy tales in a circle, entirely from Rudnev's excuses.

                        The last, many hours of speed tests of the Varyag were on October 16, 1903. In these races, he showed a top speed of 22 knots, with an average of at least 20.5 knots. That's the point.
                      10. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 May 2021 09: 28
                        0
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        The last, many hours of speed tests of the Varyag were on October 16, 1903. In these races, he showed a top speed of 22 knots, with an average of at least 20.5 knots. That's the point.

                        Alas, only a semicolon. If everything was so good, then what happened a month later? Why did you change the bearings? no answers ...
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        Rudnev's excuses.

                        You, my friend, are extremely stubborn, and to the point that in the heat of the discussion you did not even notice that we were not discussing Rudnev or Chemulpo, but the possibility of sending the Varyag into raiding. And this is definitely a bad idea, given the general condition of the cruiser's CMU. Since his problems were not limited to bearings.
                        Quote: Saxahorse
                        arguments are not interested

                        I can address this reproach to you too. Remember how you, just now, persistently told that the pebbles and "Almaz" have the same CMU? And even when they stabbed you with your face in the materiel, they continued to persist ...
                        The events of November 15 do not fit into your picture of the world, and therefore you pretend that they did not exist. But you know what's interesting? The theoretical possibility of the cruiser to develop a 20 knot speed ... does not justify or blame Rudnev in any way.
                      11. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 16 May 2021 10: 44
                        0
                        Lord! Fucking shame ...
                        The length of the hull is over 160 meters ... For the basin of the Sea of ​​Japan and the Pacific Ocean - optimal - 125 meters ...
                        The Varyag's hull was bent on the excitement and the bearings of the shaft line WERKED - Trump is to blame - he changed the hull design technology ..
                        The Russian representative agreed ... Well, he did not know what wave oscillations the cruiser would have ... Speed, coal consumption, displacement ... washed and signed ..
                        The battleship .. the hull is stiffer .. and the rowing shafts are not sausage .. from the vibrations of the ship's hull ..
                        "VARYAGO" was NOT LUCKY with the commander, with the structure of the corps, the place of the battle ..
                        AND SO WE WOULD NOT REMEMBER HIM !!!.
                      12. Senior seaman
                        Senior seaman 16 May 2021 15: 56
                        0
                        Quote: Shturman_50
                        The length of the hull is over 160 meters ... For the basin of the Sea of ​​Japan and the Pacific Ocean - optimal - 125 meters ...

                        You are here: http://wunderwaffe.narod.ru/Magazine/MK/2003_03/08.htm
                        Dimensions, m: maximum length ............................................ ............................. 129,56

                        length at cargo waterline .............................................. ................................ 127,8
  • Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 9 May 2021 14: 13
    0
    The overload of coal for the run created the "Varyag" trim aft ... for successful tests ...
    1. Jura 27
      Jura 27 9 May 2021 16: 23
      0
      Quote: Shturman_50
      The overload of coal for the run created the "Varyag" trim aft ... for successful tests ...

      On the contrary, unless, of course, you do not load coal into the officers' cabins.
    2. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 9 May 2021 20: 34
      0
      Well, not in the same amount of overload .. :) I suspect that the point is in some economic details. Apparently after the overhaul, the SRZ paid for the stocks and the captain could not deny himself the purely hamster desire to load for free in full. :)
    3. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 10 May 2021 14: 04
      0
      There was such a monk Okkam (he walked with a razor - once, if cho, up the throat and into the well) and sentenced entities do not multiply ...
      There is such a science of hydrodynamics and it influences the speed of the ship notably. If the ship sits "pig", then it will not give speed .. it will eat fuel and that's it ..
      There are exceptions, but not in this case. By the way, when the Emerald came off - threw the anchor - the chain (1500 poods) lifted his nose and only he was seen ... until he jumped out on a glimpse.

      Rudnev had to show that the repair was successfully completed ... otherwise the cruiser could be driven into reserve.
      In those days, there were no ballast tanks and fuel tanks, so they practiced moving cargo (coal) .. not to carry crackers ..
    4. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 10 May 2021 22: 35
      0
      Quote: Shturman_50
      Rudnev had to show that the repair was successfully completed ...

      But not a fact. It seems that constantly referring to technical problems was in vogue with the then command staff. It seems that the commander is not responsible for the state of the ship, the mechanics are always to blame for everything.

      The fact that after docking the Varyag received 1330 tons of coal is separately emphasized in all recent books, from Melnikov to Kataev. Despite the fact that the normal displacement implies 705 tons of coal, and the speed should have been measured with such a load. However, this was neglected. However, then, in most cases, the speed was determined by revolutions.
    5. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 11 May 2021 07: 30
      0
      No .. The speed was determined on the measured mile ... This is a test. money, repairs and docking ..
      And on a squadron at sea in terms of revolutions .. (Rzhu I can not!) The speed depends on the revolutions, individually ... especially in multi-colored parrots .. Rozhdestvensky and the others did not understand this ... and that's all .. but it was necessary to give an order - he gave..
      When you follow the icebreaker ("Tsar") gives the command to hold so many knots ... and begins .. the mechanic (after 5 revolutions we cannot regulate, only 10), but on the bridge it is clear that we are stuck in front .. the revolutions are not reduced. ... the distance is decreasing .. Then a scream, watch the distance ... Yourself with a mustache ..
    6. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 13 May 2021 06: 25
      0
      1) Rudnev just became ... the commander ... of the Varyag.
      2) And fly to the armed reserve and eternal repairs? Perspective ..
  • unknown
    unknown 8 May 2021 08: 55
    0
    What do you mean you chose the wrong one?
    Four Japanese "imperfections" with much better "paper" characteristics, with a greater mass of an onboard salvo, and a higher, in theory, speed, could only damage the oldest cruiser, which was not originally intended for battle in the line.
    They could not catch up with the newer cruisers. The speed was not enough. The real continuous speed of the "Azuma" is only 15 knots. And the fire performance was not enough. Light "colonial" shells weighing 93,5 kg.
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 8 May 2021 21: 37
      0
      Quote: ignoto
      The real continuous speed of the "Azuma" is only 15 knots. And the fire performance was not enough.

      However, in the long pursuit of WOK, Azuma did not lag behind. It seems that the tales about the poor quality of German and French-built cruisers are a figment of the imagination of British observers, the same Puckinham. Quite banal propaganda of its own, English quality :)

      But with insufficient firepower, you can probably agree. With such dimensions, it was quite possible to enter 10 "towers into Asams, having sacrificed a certain amount of 6" guns, for example. Fortunately, the Japanese did not think about this option, they relied on the opinion of the British.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 9 May 2021 21: 15
        0
        Quote: Saxahorse
        With such dimensions, it was quite possible to enter 10 "towers in Asams, sacrificing a certain amount of 6" guns, for example.

        Why sacrifice something? by weight, the single-gun 10 "is just like the two-gun 8".
  • saigon
    saigon 6 May 2021 05: 09
    0
    A seditious thought is wandering in my head, why didn’t they shell the coast of Japan?
    Put a couple of howitzers on the deck and destroy the coastal areas, (of course, bloodthirsty and not correct from the point of view of modernity, but given the Japanese mentality, it is fair)
    I think the effect would not be small.
    Taking into account what Shirokorad writes, the protection of the coast of the Japanese was practically absent.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 6 May 2021 08: 56
      0
      Haunted by the glory of "infanticide" Hipper?
      I suppose the effect would be the opposite.
      By the way, why do you need howitzers?
      1. saigon
        saigon 6 May 2021 10: 02
        0
        Oh, this glory of Hipper's infanticide, oh, these Englishmen, somehow sweetly forget the feat of their admiral to defeat the capital of the state, and without declaring war on this state.
        I think the effect would be normal, destruction of fisheries, distraction of cruisers and other things.
        Howitzers because of the trajectory in principle (the example of the British in the Dardanelles probably worked).
        Such smallness as the attitude of the Japanese towards foreigners provides a moral justification for these actions.
        Gaijin is not so much a stranger as he is not a man.
        Yes, and I always have one thought - the shelling from the guns of the ground forces of the besieged city is good, but the shooting of Hipper's cruisers and the label of a child-killer.
        Such are the oddities in the perception, in principle, of the same actions of the army and the navy (shelling of cities) and the difference in reaction to this.
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 6 May 2021 16: 32
          +1
          Quote: saigon
          Howitzers because of the trajectory in principle (the example of the British in the Dardanelles probably worked).

          Uh-huh. The 122mm howitzer of 1909 (which does not yet exist, but the closest in time to the RYAV) had a maximum range of 40kbt .... should I continue?
          As for the shelling, it makes sense only if, at least theoretically, it is possible to damage something important. You are familiar with such objects.
          As for the shelling of Yarmouth, it had no military significance.
        2. unknown
          unknown 8 May 2021 09: 01
          0
          The attitude of the Japanese towards foreigners.
          This is not Nazism.
          This is tribalism, from the word "tribe".
          The nation, which the Europeans are opponents of Russia, was collected from Polynesian and Macronesian garbage. Moreover, since 1867.
          Therefore, the crimes of the Japanese against the civilian population during WWII are not surprising.
          It takes three generations (25 years each) to get the first generation of the elite, plus another 15 years for a generation to enter the age of government. And Japan did not have time for this.
  • Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 5 May 2021 19: 20
    +4
    For the work done, an unambiguous +!
    But ...
    The cruiser "Russia", whose artillerymen continuously improved their skills, showed good results then from a distance of 56 ... 40 cab.

    As I understand it, we are talking about exercises, and not about real shooting at Ulsan?
    Thus, the problem of poor visibility of the falls of shells equipped with a Brink tube could well be stopped by the use of cast iron shells, both for zeroing in and with fire to kill.

    I wonder how?
    First, when firing such projectiles, it was forbidden to use a full charge.
    Secondly, you are constantly pedaling on the superiority of Russian shells in armor penetration, and cast-iron shells are completely sour with this.
    By many indirect signs were able to determine that the "author" of most of these hits was only one ship - "Prince Suvorov"

    And what?
    1. Turist1996
      Turist1996 5 May 2021 19: 39
      +1
      About "Russia" - I think that this is exactly the case, about the teachings. But for "Russia" the range of "56..40 kbt" with hits is a very good result, as it seems to me. Well, he shows the cruiser's gunners from a very good side.
    2. rytik32
      5 May 2021 21: 23
      +5
      Good afternoon, Ivan!
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      As I understand it, we are talking about exercises, and not about real shooting at Ulsan?

      Yes, these are teachings. In general, I recommend reading the Grevenitz instructions. If not - write in a personal.
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      First, when firing such projectiles, it was forbidden to use a full charge.

      Right! Or you could shoot with a full charge, but reduce the amount of gunpowder by installing a piece of wood. Remember the drawings of the English observers?

      Quote: Senior Sailor
      Secondly, you are constantly pedaling on the superiority of Russian shells in armor penetration, and cast-iron shells are completely sour with this.

      I agree. But one or two shells in a salvo of 6-inch guns are enough for visibility.
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      And what?

      In my original text there was no "managed to determine"))) Let's leave it on the conscience of the proofreader.
      1. Direction of arrival. Known for 6 shells. Of these, only 6-inch is knocked out into the side under the bow tower - it flew in at 45 degrees (obviously not Suvorov). The other five are close to the traverse, with a tendency to shift the angle forward from the traverse!
      2. Accuracy. Horizontally. We lay down in the forward conning area with a tendency to shift to the stern. By the way, this is perfectly combined with the trend from item 1.
      3. Accuracy Vertically. Lay down at the level of the upper deck with a tendency to fly. Let me remind you that for Krzhizhanovsky and Clapier-de-Colong, the first shot gave a flight and the range was set to 2 cab. less, although by order the first shot must be undershot. Those. there was some kind of error giving flights.
      4. Time. The hits stopped abruptly just when the Suvorov was heavily damaged in the wheelhouse.

      Picture from naval_manual
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 5 May 2021 22: 41
        +1
        Quote: rytik32
        1. Direction of arrival ... The other five are close to the traverse, with a tendency to shift the angle forward from the traverse!

        By the way, this is not a fact. Mikasa was ahead at a fairly steep angle to the course for all ships of the 2nd TOE. For him, they were all almost traverse in the first minutes of the battle ..

        Quote: rytik32
        2. Accuracy. Horizontally. We lay down in the forward conning area with a tendency to shift to the stern.

        As far as I remember, it was customary to aim at the front mast. The tendency of displacement in the stern speaks more likely for hits from the next matelots in the 2nd TOE formation.
        1. rytik32
          5 May 2021 23: 30
          +4
          Quote: Saxahorse
          By the way, this is not a fact. Mikasa was ahead at a fairly steep angle to the course for all ships of the 2nd TOE. For him, they were all almost traverse in the first minutes of the battle.

          Unfortunately, there is no good map of the beginning of the battle, there are questions for any existing one.
          Yes, according to most of the cards Mikasa should have been ahead of the Suvorov traverse, but ...
          1. If ours went NO23, then they would certainly have run up against the Japanese.
          2. By changing the distance, the squadrons were intensively approaching until 14:22 or even a little later. Data from Mikasa (Japanese time)
          14: 10 6 400
          14: 11 6 200
          14: 21 4 900
          14: 22 4 600
          14:28 5 400 ... 5 700
          3. Krzhizhanovsky's data, but his time is most likely shifted

          It turns out "Mikasa" almost made a wand over T
          4. We remember that the "Orel" confirms the exit of "Mikasa" from the corners of the firing of stern guns
          1. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 6 May 2021 22: 41
            +2
            "So Mikasa almost made a wand over T"
            This is after Rozhdestvensky returned to NO23. In fact, he made his own wand ...
            Before that, especially after the 1st lapel for 4 rumba, Mikasa simply pulled ahead, there seemed to be no coverage.
            1. unknown
              unknown 8 May 2021 09: 08
              0
              Burst forward ...
              As S.V. Balakin, the battleship "Fuji" in the years of the RYAV could not walk more than 15 knots.
              Taking into account what Andrei wrote from Chelyabinsk about the significant overloading of Japanese ships with fuel, at what real speed were the Japanese ships moving?
              "Fuji" in normal displacement - no more than 15 knots. "Azuma" - for a long time no more than 15 knots. And in an overloaded state? 14 knots?
              1. A_Mazkov
                A_Mazkov 8 May 2021 10: 21
                +2
                Well, based on the maneuvers of the opponents, it is clear that the Japanese had an advantage in speed, it was anyway. But I didn’t write about that.
                At about 14.05 Rozhestvensky turned 2 rumba to the right (yes, I was wrong, 2 instead of 4), in order to "bring Mikas back to the traverse of Suvorov". And about 5 minutes later, Rozhdestvensky returned to NO23.
                Until 14.10 no "stick over T" Togo could not, Rozhestvensky put it to himself.
                That is, Togo embraced the head of the Russian column not because of his speed, but because of Rozhestvensky's mistake.
        2. rytik32
          5 May 2021 23: 41
          +3
          Quote: Saxahorse
          The tendency of displacement to the stern speaks more likely for hits from the next matelots in the 2nd TOE formation.


          The shells (and this is a volley) clearly came from the bow corners. Time 14:23 (jap) Here 100% "Suvorov".
          So until 14:22 (yap) or a little later, "Suvorov" and "Mikasa" were on a collision course and were at each other's bow corners from the traverse.
      2. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 6 May 2021 09: 00
        +1
        Hmm ...
        Therefore, it is logical to assume that if the fire was not focused on the Japanese flagship, and everyone was firing at their counterpart abeam, the effect could be higher?
        1. rytik32
          6 May 2021 09: 12
          +5
          In terms of accuracy, the result would be clearly better. We would be able to adjust the fire based on the results of the previous shot.
      3. Jura 27
        Jura 27 6 May 2021 14: 38
        +2
        [/ quote] Or you could shoot with a full charge, but reduce the amount of gunpowder by installing a piece of wood. [quote]

        How does the charge inside the projectile and the wood in the same place affect the strength of the cast-iron walls of the projectile?
        1. rytik32
          6 May 2021 14: 56
          +3
          The question is not about strength, but about the ignition of the powder when fired. They fought with this.
          1. Jura 27
            Jura 27 6 May 2021 15: 01
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            The question is not about strength, but about the ignition of the powder when fired. They fought with this.

            It was in the strength of the walls that cast iron fell apart from firing with full charges of 12 "/ 40 and 10" / 45 guns.
            And when did this gunpowder inside the shells ignite when fired? I've never heard of such a thing.
            1. rytik32
              6 May 2021 15: 40
              0
              Then give your explanation of why the pieces of wood were put into the shell.
              1. Jura 27
                Jura 27 6 May 2021 16: 01
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                Then give your explanation of why the pieces of wood were put into the shell.

                Saving gunpowder - these are drawings from the beleaguered Arthur. Another option is a damper. In general, the mention of a tree in the chamber, only in these figs. saw.
                1. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 6 May 2021 22: 19
                  +2
                  Quote: Jura 27
                  In general, the mention of a tree in the chamber, only in these figs. saw.

                  But in vain. They encountered the problem of detonation of black powder when fired even in the first bombs and shrapnel. Wooden pallets were used to soften the impact when fired. In conical shells, for the same purpose, wooden gaskets were used inside the shell, dividing the explosive charge into parts.
              2. mmaxx
                mmaxx 9 May 2021 17: 09
                0
                This is more likely because all the gunpowder did not have time to catch fire and the projectile exploded before the entire charge ignited. Then you need to reduce the charge so that at least this happens normally.
                There is such a feature in black powder. It does not detonate. It lights up and burns. It burns quickly. But the amount of gases that cause the explosion quickly becomes large, the projectile explodes, and the charge of gunpowder is not yet completely ignited.
    3. antivirus
      antivirus 5 May 2021 21: 29
      +1
      also the accuracy in the Gul incident was not determined .......................................... .................................................. .............
  • Konnick
    Konnick 5 May 2021 19: 47
    +1
    The problem is not shooting, but shooting order. The Japanese were targeting strictly in sequence, so as not to confuse their breaks, and our squadron was targeting randomly and the gunners could not distinguish the bursts of their shells. And then it started ... the grenades of the wrong system ...
    1. rytik32
      5 May 2021 21: 31
      +7
      How the Japanese aimed and distinguished their hits - in the next article.
      1. Split
        Split 5 May 2021 22: 39
        +2
        But this topic is interesting ... We are waiting for an article! fellow
    2. unknown
      unknown 8 May 2021 09: 16
      +1
      Exactly.
      In reality, if we proceed from real technical capabilities, and not "paper" ones, the first Japanese detachment did not have an advantage in speed over the new domestic battleships and the Oslyabey. Bringing the battle to a classic linear battle, when one ship fires at one enemy ship, and, accordingly, is fired at only by them, could greatly facilitate the situation.
      In turn, outdated domestic ships, numbering more than Kamimura's detachment, inferior to him in speed, but having heavier weapons, could already concentrate fire on the loop on the head "imperfections", especially since two of them carried the armor of a very bad harvey quality.
  • geniy
    geniy 5 May 2021 20: 07
    -2
    And priests! Yes, this whole article is a continuous accusation of Admiral Rozhdestvensky as an inveterate criminal!
    After all, from this article it follows that it was Rozhdestvensky who disorganized all Russian artillery! But what about the articles whitewashing Rozhdestvensky: "The Experiences of Rozhdestvensky" and "The Myths of Tsushima" where it is written that Rozhdestvensky had genius foreseen everything and conducted all the necessary teachings.
    The degree of possession of rangefinders on the ships of the detachment of Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky was known from the results of the exercises conducted on April 27, 1905 according to the methodology developed in the detachment of N.I. Nebogatov.
    Yes, priests - how did Nebogatov develop the technique - after all, Rozhestvensky was the head of the training artillery detachment before?
    The cast-iron shells were loaded onto the detachment of Z.P. Rozhestvensky as practical ones, were used in firing practice and in small quantities on individual ships survived until the battle. Thus, the problem of poor visibility of the falls of shells equipped with a Brink tube could well be stopped by the use shells, both for sighting, and with fire to kill. Moreover, the warehouses had huge stocks of such ammunition. But in fact this problem was not given due attention.
    And sho-razi "smart" Rozhdestvensky did not order to use these shells for sighting before the battle?
    -----------------------------
    By the beginning of the war with Japan, the Rules of Artillery Service on Navy Ships, published back in 1890, were hopelessly outdated.
    How is it, how is it? And if the "smart" Rozhdestvensky, who was the head of the training and artillery detachment, did not order to develop new rules?

    In 1903, a training artillery detachment successfully fired at the command "Management and action of ship artillery in battle and during exercises" drawn up by the flagship artilleryman of the Pacific squadron A. K. Myakishev. But neither the main naval headquarters, represented by ZP Rozhestvensky, nor the naval technical committee of the fleet, represented by FV Dubasov, gave further progress to this document.
    So it turns out that Rozhestvensky is actually a criminal who killed the squadron.
    Thus, during the Russo-Japanese War, there were no uniform rules for controlling artillery in battle that would correspond to the spirit of the times in the navy. For the artillerymen of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, the flagship artillery officer, Colonel F. A. Bersenev, developed a separate document: "Organization of artillery service on the ships of the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet", which will be referred to in the text as "instructions".
    -----------------------
    The fire control technique adopted by the 2nd Pacific Squadron had several significant flaws.
    First, the experience of the battle at long distances in the Yellow Sea was ignored, where the "Poltava" managed to hit the "Yakumo" from a distance of about 80 cab.
    And who is to blame for this? Isn't it Rozhdestvensky?
    The weak point was preparation, not technique. In the Navy, due attention was not paid to the issue of squadron fire control at long distances. The technique adopted by Z.P. Rozhdestvensky's squadron had significant flaws. The precious experience gained in previous battles was not taken into account. In sum, this led to a rout.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 5 May 2021 20: 31
      +1
      Quote: geniy
      Yes, priests - how did Nebogatov develop a technique? After all, Rozhdestvensky was before head of the training and artillery detachment?

      Nebogatov, actually, too. In the Black Sea Fleet. And before that (1900-1903), he was the assistant to the chief of the training artillery detachment in the Baltic.
      Rozhdestvensky before since 1902 he has been correcting the duties of the chief of the General Music School.
      1. geniy
        geniy 5 May 2021 21: 14
        -2
        Well, you and Nebogatov tried to weave. But Rozhestvensky was still more important! especially since he was the head of the General Music School. BUT the result is the same - according to the author of the article, no new shooting rules have been developed since 1890 !!! Don't you think this is Rozhdestvensky's fault?
        1. Senior seaman
          Senior seaman 6 May 2021 08: 49
          +1
          I just drew attention to a logical inconsistency in your message. Nebogatov also commanded a training artillery detachment, so it is not surprising that he was able to offer something new in this matter.
          And we must remember that the General Staff is by no means an analogue of the General Staff. At that time, it was rather the main department of personnel of the fleet.
          1. geniy
            geniy 6 May 2021 09: 37
            -2
            Yes, I know that you - Ivan Ochenkov - are a big fan of Rozhdestvensky. Here's just one fact: This scoundrel Rozhdestvensky made a squadron test of the skill of the rangefinders almost on the eve of the battle on April 27! That is, after the joining of Nebogatov's squadron, whose officers probably prompted the fool Rozhestvensky. But such checks could have been carried out almost every day during the six months of the voyage, and moreover several times a day! And what is the difficulty? Well, any ship goes to the side of the squadron - the same Ural, and the motro-rangefinder looked at the rangefinder and named the distance - it takes only a few seconds, and in six months of sailing such lessons could be done thousands of times! And Rozhdestvensky made such a check only once and only just before the battle.
            1. Senior seaman
              Senior seaman 6 May 2021 16: 35
              +1
              You don't know anything about me.
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 6 May 2021 03: 38
        +3
        Nevertheless, Nebogatov drew conclusions from the shooting. And what did the ZPR do? The orderly has composed the next one.
    2. mmaxx
      mmaxx 6 May 2021 03: 37
      +2
      We've been tired of writing about this for 100 years. And now there are people who declare Rozhdestvensky almost a genius.
      What do not dig, - the ZPR has a flight everywhere.
  • Aaron Zawi
    Aaron Zawi 5 May 2021 20: 14
    +1
    Great article. Literate and written in a very light language. Very interesting illustrations. Thank you. hi
  • out of habit
    out of habit 5 May 2021 20: 43
    +2
    Russia had two allies, and both were a mess.
  • Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
    Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 5 May 2021 21: 02
    -3
    I read it with interest. Thanks to the author for the hard work. Let's move on to the comments)
  • geniy
    geniy 5 May 2021 21: 11
    -3
    All armor-piercing and high-explosive shells with a caliber of 10 ... 6 "had a two-capsule delayed action fuse (Brink tube). When hitting water, such ammunition usually did not detonate,
    О
    th, what are you talking about! I will explain for those who do not know: as you know, the percentage of Russian hits on Japanese ships was about 1,2%, which means that about 98,8% of them fell into the water. And as you write "usually" they didn't explode. And what was the percentage of these non-explosions in your opinion? Maybe about 50%? And how did the Russian artillerymen react that about half of their shells did not explode?
    And by the way: after all, even before the start of the RYA, they sometimes fired live shells - they also did not explode by half, and all the Russian sailors saw it perfectly? How do you explain that no one has reported about massive explosions?

    О
    1. rytik32
      5 May 2021 21: 36
      +4
      Quote: geniy
      as you know, the percentage of Russian hits on Japanese ships was about 1,2%

      How did you calculate this percentage?
      Can you describe the number of shells fired by ships and calibers?
      Quote: geniy
      about 98,8% of them fell into the water. And as you write "usually" they didn't explode

      According to the impressions of Abo Kiyokazu (senior artillery officer of the Mikasa in Tsushima), 1/3 of the Russian shells exploded on the water.
      Quote: geniy
      after all, even before the start of the RYAV, they sometimes fired live shells

      When and where?
      1. geniy
        geniy 5 May 2021 22: 46
        -4
        How did you calculate this percentage? 1,2%

        Personally, I didn't count anything at all - I took this percentage from some article about Tsushima. But don't hesitate - a lot of calculations like this have been done by different authors, and all of them have a very small percentage of Russian hits - much less than 10%. And it doesn't matter what he really is - the main thing is that more than 90% of Russian shells fell into the water.
        According to the impressions of Abo Kiyokazu (senior artillery officer of the Mikasa in Tsushima), 1/3 of the Russian shells exploded on the water.

        Do you understand well what you have written? This is of course a witness, but it turns out that about 60% of Russian shells DO NOT EXPLODE!!! If you do not understand what is the point, then I will explain.
        This means that after the manufacture of shells, the factories produce acceptance firing. Of course, very few shells are selectively fired, but there should be no non-explosions at all! Old workers of shell factories generally remember one and only case when a shell did not explode in decades, while the whole ministry and the entire plant were put on the ears, and the verification commissions went in droves. And you so calmly report that about 60% of Russian shells did not explode? And you all don't care about it? Doesn't all this discussion remind of a madhouse, when history buffs are not interested in the percentage of unexploded shells?
        1. rytik32
          5 May 2021 23: 35
          +6
          Quote: geniy
          but it turns out that about 60% of Russian shells did not explode !!!

          Did not explode on impact water!
          But from hitting about armor the response was 100%.
          Something unusual for a fuse armor-piercing shell ???
          1. geniy
            geniy 6 May 2021 00: 16
            -4
            Oh, what interesting clarifications you have!
            Well, for starters, I'll say that you just don't remember what you wrote in the post earlier. That is, in the previous post you wrote that it was the shells that did not explode that fell into the water. Let me remind you of a quote from your post:
            Abo Kiyokazu (senior artillery officer of Mikasa in Tsushima) 1/3 of the Russian shells exploded on the water.

            But let's say that for a laugh, I believed your resourcefulness as if the shells that hit the armor exploded. But then what about those shells that did not hit the Japanese ships at all, but immediately into the water - and the overwhelming majority of these missiles missed: that is, from 98,8% to about 95%. So - it turns out that all 100% of the Russian shells that fell into the water did not explode at all? And none of the hundreds of "history experts" cares about this amazing fact?
            1. rytik32
              6 May 2021 00: 39
              +5
              Quote: geniy
              So - it turns out that all 100% of the Russian shells that fell into the water did not explode at all? And none of the hundreds of "history experts" cares about this amazing fact?

              I'll tell you more. If we now arrange shooting from a modern tank with sub-caliber projectiles into the water, then there will be 100% continuity!
              Take this issue urgently! Go personally to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, but do not give up this case!
              1. geniy
                geniy 6 May 2021 00: 51
                -5
                Ahh! You are already starting to get nervous and trying to cheat! That is, you are impudently replacing the concepts: non-explosive sub-caliber ammunition, which, as everyone knows, has neither explosives nor fuses, you compare, if possible, an explosion with real Russian projectiles that had both an explosive and an explosive. Here is a quote from your post:
                I'll tell you more. If we now arrange shooting from a modern tank with sub-caliber projectiles into the water, then there will be 100% continuity!
                That is, you want to cast a shadow over the fence and are trying to prove that the Russian shells in Tsushima should not have exploded and in your opinion this is completely normal?
                Moreover, the local public is so illiterate in military matters that they also give you advantages - for the fact that you do not distinguish, if possible, an explosion of sub-caliber shells from ordinary high-explosive and armor-piercing explosives ... who darkens and hides the truth, and drown the one who wants to find the truth?
  • bk0010
    bk0010 5 May 2021 22: 14
    +1
    Tell me, for our last artillery cruiser (68bis), these problems were solved (accurate range determination (it is clear that there were already radars, but you never know), centralized fire control, security of centralized fire control means, sights that can withstand shooting, etc. or have they stayed that way?
  • evgen1221
    evgen1221 5 May 2021 22: 16
    +1
    Rangefinders rangefinders, and who bought them, and what didn't they make if the overseas ones are bad? And the crews should not be trained for the ceremonial shows of their Imperial Highnesses. So we got the sum of all the minuses.
  • KSVK
    KSVK 5 May 2021 22: 41
    +3
    The author is a definite plus!
    And for the work done and for the style of presentation.
    1. geniy
      geniy 5 May 2021 23: 06
      -8
      Oh, you all do not understand what kind of deception this whole article is and the author actually did not understand anything, but only pulled on the well-known accusations of the Russians.
      1. A_Mazkov
        A_Mazkov 6 May 2021 22: 53
        +2
        Oh well! Let's blame the Japanese for preparing well for war, including battles at sea. We studied the world experience and innovative ideas of those times, worked out and applied them in practice.
        That's better?
        1. unknown
          unknown 8 May 2021 09: 27
          0
          When did the Japanese manage to do this?
          A nation that Europeans have begun to collect since 1867?
          From scratch.
          And create a society, estates?
          And the industry?
          And what about education?
          And the language?
          So it also needs to be invented and implemented?
          Even in modern Japan, the language, due to its clinical complexity, is taught until about the age of thirty.
          And in Japan in the nineteenth century, when a samurai could kill an ordinary person just like that, what was the education system?
          It is clear .... the general literacy of the population.
          Not funny.
          1. A_Mazkov
            A_Mazkov 8 May 2021 10: 39
            +1
            Alas!
            RI did not succeed in a "small victorious war" largely due to the fact that the Japanese were wonderful and diligent students, "greedy" for new knowledge.
            Thanks to this, as well as financial support from England and the United States, the Russo-Japanese War ended the way it ended.
  • Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 5 May 2021 22: 55
    +6
    Not bad! The author raised an extremely important but very poorly covered topic. Problems of fire control of the Russian fleet during the RYAV. The topic is closely tied to both technical issues of precision fire, and issues of direct organization of fire in battle.

    There was, of course, the feeling that the author only touched on the very first, top layer of these questions, however, and for this one can and should say many thanks to the author! I would like to hope that the author will not leave this topic and will delight us with new materials on these problems of the RI fleet!
    1. unknown
      unknown 8 May 2021 09: 30
      0
      The topic of RYAV is generally very poorly covered.
      There seems to be a lot of material, but a lot of "paper", not real information.
      Real information leaks out, but very slowly.
      They are afraid to go against tradition.
      1. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 8 May 2021 21: 44
        0
        Quote: ignoto
        Real information leaks out, but very slowly.
        They are afraid to go against tradition.

        And there is. It seems like a mountain of links on the Internet, but 99% of them are banal, popular propaganda materials from the time of the Romanovs. Many times and thoughtlessly reprinted. Real, informatively meaningful research is found with great difficulty.
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 5 May 2021 23: 08
    +3
    Alexey, well done, very interesting! We are waiting for the Japanese and comparisons!
  • 27091965
    27091965 5 May 2021 23: 50
    +1
    However, barrel firing did not help in any way to develop such extremely necessary skills in combat conditions as determining the distance and observing the results of firing, zeroing in and focusing fire, calculating corrections and transmitting commands. This could only be worked out on practical shooting, and only 2 lessons were devoted to them, and only one was daytime.


    It is clear that practical shooting is necessary. For example, the British battleship "Majestic" for "prize-firing" in 1903 used 12 inch shells 37 pieces, 6 inch 154 pieces, but besides these firing, there were also long-range firing, and so every year, and such a consumption of shells for training purposes in Russia they could only dream.
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 6 May 2021 00: 17
      +3
      Quote: 27091965i
      It is clear that practical shooting is necessary.

      It is clear that shooting is needed, but first it was necessary to understand exactly how to shoot. While at anchor and with 1-10 kbl, fire at least 1000 shells, this will not add to the understanding of how to shoot in a real squadron battle.
      Quote: 27091965i
      and such a consumption of shells for training purposes in Russia could only dream of.

      At the time of Essen, they shot in the Baltic so that not one or two barrels were shot into the trash, but as it came to WWI, Rurik II never hits the German KRL almost point-blank, and Byakhirev at Gotland is completely eliminated from fire control and sluggishly mumbles like act as you see fit, and the whole squadron firing hit and miss with a predictably poor result.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 6 May 2021 08: 37
        +1
        Quote: Saxahorse
        It is clear that shooting is needed, but first it was necessary to understand exactly how to shoot. While at anchor and with 1-10 kbl, fire at least 1000 shells, this will not add to the understanding of how to shoot in a real squadron battle.


        At that time, they did not make a big secret of this, they printed reports, training systems in different countries, it is very difficult to assume that they were not read in our country. There was plenty to choose from. I don’t know how much money was spent in Russia on training one gunner, in England more than 500 pounds.
  • Knell wardenheart
    Knell wardenheart 6 May 2021 01: 48
    0
    Thanks author, very informative article! The Japanese naval commanders took a more responsible approach to the matter along the way, and financed them in the way befitting a naval nation.
    1. unknown
      unknown 8 May 2021 09: 33
      0
      The question is whether they were "Japanese" naval commanders.
      They financed really well.
      Shakht financed them.
      He also financed the Russian revolutions starting in 1905.
  • Comrade
    Comrade 6 May 2021 03: 27
    +3
    To determine the distance to the enemy on the ships of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, 4,5-foot rangefinders "Barr & Stroud" of the latest model FA3 were used

    Not only, there were other rangefinders as well.

    The British observer Captain T. Jackson, following an inspection of the coastal defense battleship "General-Admiral Apraksin", wrote in his report:
    "Barr and Stroud's rangefinder rack and tank were on the deck aft of the ship, where the handheld rangefinder was also located, but it was badly upset and badly damaged by the moisture. It consisted of a telescope screwed to a metal box, at the far end of which were two semicircular lenses, driven by a cap screw. The distance was read, without taking the eye away from the telescope eyepiece, on a scale. Manufacturer (device) name was not found."

    Four rangefinders were delivered to the battleship Admiral Ushakov: two, seized from the artillery class of the Baltic Fleet Training and Artillery Unit (presumably one FA 2 from Barr and Stroud and one from Carl Zeiss).
    There was information that, in addition to the British, a batch of German rangefinders was delivered to the Rozhdestvensky squadron.

    On the ships of the combat line, from two to four rangefinders were installed.

    There were five on "Emperor Nicholas I".

    During the Tsushima battle, both the range finders and the people behind them were very vulnerable to fragments of enemy shells.

    The Japanese on the battleship "Mikasa", for example, had rangefinders in an open area, and on the "Prince Suvorov" - in the conning tower. Nevertheless, both rangefinders in the conning tower were disabled on the Suvorov, and the Japanese successfully worked through the entire battle.
    Next to Admiral Togo, the FA 2 rangefinder was served by Ensign Kyoshi Hasegawa.
    1. rytik32
      6 May 2021 10: 30
      +2
      Quote: Comrade
      The Japanese on the battleship "Mikasa", for example, had rangefinders in an open area, and on the "Prince Suvorov" - in the conning tower. Nevertheless, on "Suvorov" both rangefinders in the conning tower were disabled, and the Japanese successfully worked through the entire battle.

      The answer will be in the next article.
      In short - the Japanese achieved excellent accuracy from the very beginning of the battle.
      ARMORCLAD FUSŌ TO KONGŌ CLASS BATTLE CRUISERS - Capital ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1868 - 1945 (Volume I) Paperback - 2019
      Hans Lengerer, Lars Ahlberg
      there is a diagram of the beginning of the battle, in which hits are marked on "Suvorov" according to Japanese data. I was impressed. Gribovsky grossly underestimated the accuracy of the Japanese.
      I will post this scheme.
    2. rytik32
      6 May 2021 10: 55
      +3
      Quote: Comrade
      It consisted of a telescope screwed to a metal box, at the far end of which were two semicircular lenses, driven by a cap screw. The distance was read, without taking the eye away from the telescope eyepiece, on a scale. Manufacturer (device) name was not found

      This device most likely determined the distance to their neighboring ship. Those. it was a navigation device, in order to "keep the line"
      1. rytik32
        13 May 2021 00: 06
        0
        Circular No. 54 dated June 28, 1904.
        At the same time transmitting one copy of Bel's prism, along with a description and instructions for using it. The headquarters, by order of the Squadron Commander, asks Mr. the ship's commanders instruct the senior navigational officers to draw up mast drawings for determining the distances using a Bel prism according to the following rules and submit them to the headquarters.
        Drawings are drawn to a scale of 3/8 "per 16 feet, with a straight line perpendicular to the mast every 16 feet, with a straight line passing through the klotik denoted by 0; 1/2; one; 1 1/1 etc. cab.
        The points of intersection of the horizontal lines with the ship's mast, indicated by the above numbers, indicate the point at which the reflected image of the ship's clot should come, to which the distance obtained from columns 1 and 2 of the drawing is measured.
        The numbers on the left side of the diagram are used to determine distances with a 16-foot prism - on the right, a 32-foot prism.

        Description of the Bel prism and instructions for using it to determine the distance in the formation to the neighboring material and to keep its place in the formation.
        Bel's rangefinder prism consists of a wooden handle with glass prisms embedded at the ends.
        The angle of these prisms is equal to: the one that is marked 16 feet - the angle at which the height of 16 feet is seen, from a distance of 1 cable; the same one that is marked with 32 feet - the angle at which a height of 32 feet is seen from the same distance, as a result of which at a distance of 1 cable, the reflected image of the clot will be 16 feet lower than the direct one, and at a distance of 2 cables - it will be 32 feet below the line of sight, etc. when viewed with a 16-foot prism.
        The use of the tool is as follows:
        1) In order to determine the distance to the front matelot with the help of the Bel range-finder prism, you need to: take the prism in your right hand and place it in front of your eyes at a distance of about 1 foot, then looking through the prism with one eye, and the other directly at the mast swing the instrument slightly until the reflected image of the front mast mast is on a straight-line mast.
        Comparing the place where the reflected image of the clot on the straight-line spars happened with the scale of the diagram, the distance is counted on the latter.
        2) To maintain a place in the formation, the rangefinder-prism is used as follows: having come to the assigned distance or having determined it, they notice the place of the direct-visible spar, which contains the reflected image of the front matelot's clot.
        If the distance does not change, then the reflected image of the clottik remains in the same place; if it decreases, then the reflected image of the clot rises to the direct view and vice versa.
        For long distances a 16 'prism should be used, for short distances
        32 feet.
    3. Pushkowed
      Pushkowed 7 May 2021 06: 58
      0
      Nevertheless, both rangefinders in the conning tower were disabled on the Suvorov, and the Japanese successfully worked through the entire battle.
      So on the "Suvorov" and the conning tower (together with the admiral) was disabled, and on the "Mikasa" the admiral stood on the open bridge the entire battle - and nothing happened to him. And in general - "Mikasa" has survived to this day, and "Suvorov" is drowned.
      1. unknown
        unknown 8 May 2021 09: 34
        0
        Is it the same Mikasa.
        The battleship, according to official figures, sank in an explosion.
    4. rytik32
      7 May 2021 16: 15
      +2
      Quote: Comrade
      and one by Carl Zeiss

      Rangefinders "Karl Zeiss" are not for artillery
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 6 May 2021 03: 51
    +1
    The article is definitely good. Until now, everyone has many questions about that war. We didn't get it in the head like that.
    And polemics is also a useful thing.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 07: 22
    +2
    Oh-ho-ho :))))))
    Okay, I'll wait for the description of the Japanese shooting.
    1. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 6 May 2021 09: 19
      +1
      And here it is a little sorry :))))
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 10: 52
        0
        Ivan, good day and happy people!
        The problem is that, along with the obvious advantages of the article, it also has obvious disadvantages. That is, while the author is talking about devices / rangefinders, everything is more or less true, but as soon as he begins to turn to the thesis about poor preparation of 2TOE, it begins ... A simple example
        First, the experience of the battle at long distances in the Yellow Sea was ignored, where the "Poltava" managed to hit the "Yakumo" from a distance of about 80 cab.

        Nobody hit it from 8 miles. By 15.00 the distance between the Russian squadron and the 1st combat detachment was indeed about 8 miles, but the Yakumo at that time had not yet joined the main forces of Togo. And if we read Essen's report on the battle in the ZhM, we will see that the Poltava and Sevastopol fired at the Japanese cruisers (Yakumo and the 3rd combat detachment) from a distance of no more than 40 cables

        And then - the same thing.
        To be honest, I get the feeling that it became important for Alexey to prove the flaws in 2TOE combat training at any cost. The article contains a bunch of truthful facts, but when it comes to artillery preparation 2TOE - either gross errors begin (as above) or ...
        But take the same range finders - from the text of the article it turns out that the clever Nebogatov thought of a method for checking the range finders, but Rozhdestvensky's dunce did not. At the same time, attention is not focused on the fact that the reason why rangefinders were taken up at 3TOE was a completely disastrous shooting, there were no such firing at 2TOE. And somehow it is already written in passing that there was no sense in checking the rangefinders by Nebogatov in battle. And how is this to be understood?
        The instruction ordered to focus the fire of the entire squadron on the enemy's lead ship. Then this moment was specified in one of the orders of ZP Rozhestvensky. For each unit, the target could be specified separately. If this is not done, then they should have fired at the lead ship or the enemy's flagship.

        There is a distortion, because order number 29 of January 10, 1905 sounds like this
        The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. This issue should focus if possible the fire of everything detachment.
        If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy.

        That is, even for ships of one detachment, it is indicated "as possible", no "should have fired at the head or flagship." It seems to be a slight difference, but Alexei's "reading" of the order leads to the fact that Rozhestvensky, having indicated the target to the 1st armored detachment, by default gave the order to fire at the Mikasa for the rest, which is fundamentally wrong.
        And, what a shame, Alexey cannot not know about this - we have already discussed this more than once.
        And so on ...
        1. rytik32
          6 May 2021 12: 18
          0
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Nobody hit it from 8 miles. By 15.00 the distance between the Russian squadron and the 1st combat detachment was indeed about 8 miles, but the Yakumo at that time had not yet joined the main forces of Togo. And if we read Essen's report on the battle in the ZhM, we will see that the Poltava and Sevastopol fired at the Japanese cruisers (Yakumo and the 3rd combat detachment) from a distance of no more than 40 cables

          Essen apparently writes about a later time, when the Japanese cruisers approached and opened fire. And the hit was before the combat alarm was sounded.
          K. Abo wrote about this in his lecture:
          When the distance was about 13000 yards, the trailing ship, the Poltava, opened fire from the left 6-inch turret and one of the shells hit the center section of the Yakumo's upper deck on the right side. The explosion, which went to the main deck, killed 22 people, smashed the engine speed control drive and the main fire line on the lower deck


          And along the trajectory of the projectile - obviously not 40 cab.
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          And then - the same thing.

          And then with your counterarguments - the same)))

          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. The fire of the whole squad should be focused on this number, if possible.
          If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy.

          And now the question:
          Who should provide the ship number? Admiral or squad leader? I didn't understand anything from the order!
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          By default, he gave the order to fire at the Mikasa as well, which is fundamentally wrong

          Very correct
          "If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy."
          So everyone did, except for "Nicolas 1", who shot "in a bunch" and hit "Asama"
          And further. The squadron leader had to choose a target. Which one? And in the "instructions" it is clearly spelled out what! Of course "hit the head!".
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 12: 40
            0
            Quote: rytik32
            Essen apparently writes about a later time, when the Japanese cruisers approached and opened fire. And the hit was before the combat alarm was sounded.

            I don't know who's got it and what was fired, but there is a fact - our people believe that they opened fire on Yakumo when the distance to him was about 40 cables.
            Quote: rytik32
            K. Abo wrote about this in his lecture:

            And what did he write? :)))
            Quote: rytik32
            When the distance was about 13000 yards

            Let's admit. 13 yards is roughly 000 meters or 11 international cables. But Abo indicates ABOUT, that is, the distance may be less.
            In total, we have the version of Essen about 40 cables and the version of Abo about "about 64"
            And where is your recommended 80 cables?
            Quote: rytik32
            And then with your counterarguments - the same)))

            Quite right :))) You didn't even bother to calculate the distances even now.
            Quote: rytik32
            And now the question:
            Who should provide the ship number? Admiral or squad leader? I didn't understand anything from the order!

            Well, whose problem is it? The signal can be indicated by the one who has the right to order the signal to another ship. That is, an admiral, or the commander of another detachment
            Quote: rytik32
            If there is no signal, then, following the flagship, fire is concentrated, if possible, on the lead or flagship of the enemy. "

            Should I explain to you the meanings of the words "whenever possible"?
            1. rytik32
              6 May 2021 13: 25
              +2
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              I don't know who's got it and what was fired, but there is a fact - our people believe that they opened fire on Yakumo when the distance to him was about 40 cables.

              You brought Essen, and Poltava was shooting. Then where does 40 cab come from ???
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Well, whose problem is it? The signal can be indicated by the one who has the right to order the signal to another ship. That is, an admiral, or the commander of another detachment

              "Suvorov" raised the number of the enemy ship "1". To whom this order was intended - the detachment or the entire squadron - is not clear. Almost the entire squadron realized that this was an order to them.
              1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 13: 35
                0
                Quote: rytik32
                You brought Essen, and Poltava was shooting. Then where does 40 cab come from ???

                It was not "Poltava" that was shooting, but "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" were shooting, and it is not known exactly where the shell came from. I'm not even talking about the fact that, since the distance was determined from Sevastopol, then, probably, Poltava, which was walking the rear, was even closer.
                It is also not known where Abo got his "about 13 yards" from, there is a feeling that the projectile, in his opinion, fell quite vertically, hence he considered that the projectile was fired from a greater distance than it actually was.
                Quote: rytik32
                "Suvorov" raised the number of the enemy ship "1". Who this order was intended for - the detachment or the entire squadron - is not clear.

                But the order says clearly
                The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the score from the lead in the wake or from the right flank in the front. This number should focus, if possible, the fire of the entire squad.

                That is, even for the 1st detachment it was "as possible", not to mention the entire squadron.
                Alexey, it clearly follows from the order that the signal set the priority of the target, but not the obligation to shoot at it.
                1. rytik32
                  6 May 2021 14: 17
                  +1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  from where Abo got his "about 13 yards"

                  He was a senior artillery officer and could know the distance with a rangefinder.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  That is, even for the 1st detachment it was "as possible", not to mention the entire squadron.

                  The inability to shoot is when the target is covered by something (another ship, atmospheric phenomena, smoke, etc.) or the range does not allow.
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 14: 22
                    0
                    Quote: rytik32
                    He was a senior artillery officer and could know the distance with a rangefinder.

                    To whom? :)))) How could he know from which ship the shot was fired? Are you in general sure that he measured the distance at that moment, and did not estimate the range by the "too steep" fall of the projectile?
                    Quote: rytik32
                    Inability to shoot

                    There was no talk of "impossibility." It was "whenever possible." That is why the ships transferred fire from Mikasa to other ships, when they were convinced of the inefficiency of the latter.
                    1. rytik32
                      6 May 2021 20: 09
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      To whom? :))))

                      Andrey, our conversation has gone a long way.
                      In fact, my comment was that the experience of the past battles of the RYAH showed the ability to effectively fire at a distance of more than 40 cab., And for 2TOE the tables were calculated only up to 40.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      That is why the ships transferred fire from Mikasa to other ships, when they were convinced of the inefficiency of the latter.


                      This is more of a physical impossibility than inefficiency. Inefficiency could be realized in 10 minutes.
                      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 20: 55
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Andrey, our conversation has gone a long way.

                        Well, I would not call the discussion of your argumentation a "sidetracking".
                        Quote: rytik32
                        In fact, my comment was that the experience of the past battles of the RYAH showed the ability to effectively fire at a distance of more than 40 cab., And for 2TOE the tables were calculated only up to 40.

                        The experience of the past battles did NOT show the possibility of effective fire at a distance of over 40 cables. And this is an absolutely obvious fact. The battle at long distances 1TOE from Togo ended in nothing, the ships of Vitgeft did not suffer serious damage. Further. Suppose it even turned out that they could. And what's next? You swear that the tables were not edited. Was it much use to edit them? What, from this will arise the ability to shoot more than 40 cables? You will remember how many experiments the British set to learn how to shoot at long distances. You propose to learn new methods of shooting on a campaign, and even with a shortage of shells.
                        Rozhestvensky did his best - he tried to organize training in shooting at a distance of up to 60 kbt by sighting the best artillerymen of the squadron (apparently, such were Suvorov and Oslyabya). Seriously expecting to train the squadron in combat over 40 kbt with materiel obviously unsuitable for this is a utopia.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        This is more of a physical impossibility than inefficiency.

                        Don't absolutize Japanese cards. The Japanese too ... the storytellers are still. And yes, to evaluate the accuracy of the shooting of the Japanese according to JAPANESE data, how are you going to do it ... Well, then let's measure the results of shooting 1TOE in ZhM according to the testimony of Russian eyewitnesses :))))))
                      2. rytik32
                        6 May 2021 21: 34
                        0
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        The battle at long distances 1TOE from Togo ended in nothing, the ships of Vitgeft did not suffer serious damage

                        And if Togo shot every day with impunity from our squadron from great distances, and every night attacked with destroyers. Would it get a lot? And if it did, they would queue up for repairs.

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Rozhestvensky did his best - tried to organize training in shooting at a distance of up to 60 kbt

                        Where does 60 cab come from? What is the source? I have a maximum of 40 both according to the tables and according to the instructions.

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        And yes, to evaluate the accuracy of shooting of the Japanese according to JAPANESE data

                        How else? The Japanese saw the result of each of their volleys. And adjustments were made based on the result.
                        If they stopped seeing, they stopped fire.
                      3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 6 May 2021 22: 38
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        And if Togo shot our squadron with impunity every day

                        But he didn't attack :)))) Apparently, he was also far from your conclusions :)
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Where does 60 cab come from? What is the source?

                        The testimony of the artillerymen of the squadron. There are quite a few of them. The same Malechkin, I have been quoting for many years.
                        Shooting was carried out at long distances, starting from about 70 cab. and up to 40 cab., but "Sisoy the Great" usually started firing from 60 cab. from 12 "guns, and from 50 cab. from 6" guns, because the elevation angles of the guns did not allow using a larger tabular range.

                        Quote: rytik32
                        How else?

                        (heavy sigh) Only according to Russian data. And Japanese damage - according to Japanese data.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The Japanese saw the result of each of their volleys. And adjustments were made based on the result.
                        If they stopped seeing, they stopped fire.

                        Or "saw" something that was not in reality and continued to fire
                      4. rytik32
                        6 May 2021 22: 51
                        +1
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        But he didn't attack :)))) Apparently, he was also far from your conclusions :)

                        Togo had a different plan for Tsushima:
                        Rapprochement on a collision course with an imitation of a divergence on a counter course, then a turn from 8 m and an attack on a converging passing course. Opening fire from 000 m. The senior artillery officer personally looked through the rangefinder so as not to miss the moment when the distance would be 6 m, in order to start the famous "Togo loop" on time.
                        You didn't know that ??? ))))
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        The testimony of the artillerymen of the squadron. There are quite a few of them. The same Malechkin, I have been quoting for many years.

                        I read - the testimony is very different.
                        That's just the official materials got 15 ... 25 cab.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        (hardest sigh) Only according to Russian data

                        Do you agree with the figures for Shvede / Kostenko? ))) It can not be!!!
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Or "saw" something that was not in reality and continued to fire

                        Where do the doubts come from? WWI and WWII saw the results of firing from much greater distances.
                      5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 May 2021 09: 02
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Togo had a different plan for Tsushima:
                        Rapprochement on a collision course with an imitation of a divergence on a counter course, then a turn from 8 m and an attack on a converging passing course. Opening fire from 000 m.

                        Did Togo tell that later? :)))))) Well, well
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I read - the testimony is very different.
                        That's just the official materials got 15 ... 25 cab.

                        The testimonies of the officers are the official materials, there is nowhere more officially. What do you mean by official materials?
                      6. rytik32
                        7 May 2021 09: 29
                        +2
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        Did Togo tell that later? :)))))) Well, well

                        These details are in the literature with reference to Japanese sources.

                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        What do you mean by official materials?

                        The work of the historical commission on the description ...
                        And the officers told such tales ...
                      7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 May 2021 09: 59
                        0
                        Quote: rytik32
                        These details are in the literature with reference to Japanese sources.

                        And the Japanese sources in this case are Togo's report on the battle, of course :)))))
                        1) Such a turn of Togo put the Japanese ships in a dangerous position. It gave some advantages to Togo at the completion of the turn, but with its superior speed, these advantages could be achieved without the Togo loop.
                        2) Information about the position of the squadrons at the time of the turn is different - while the Japanese point of view is beneficial to the Japanese, since according to their data, the angle formed by the course of the Russian squadron and the bearing to the Japanese at the time of the turn is much sharper than the Russians claim.
                        From the above, it is easy to draw a simple conclusion - Togo cheated a little in the report, passing off the need for virtue
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The work of the historical commission on the description ...
                        And the officers told such tales ...

                        There is only one problem - the "Work of the Historical Commission" in relation to the testimony and reports of officers is of a secondary nature - it was created on their basis :)))) This does not mean that "Work" is always wrong and the officers are always right - they also wrote on memory and could be mistaken in something, but in general, in case of discrepancies, it is worth adhering to the opinion of the officers, and not the information of the commission
                      8. rytik32
                        7 May 2021 10: 33
                        +1
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        1) Such a turn of Togo put the Japanese ships in a dangerous position.

                        There was no danger. From that distance (7-8 km), a hail of shells could not be expected.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        much sharper than the Russians claim

                        I have read many "Russian" versions. And they are all very contradictory. And Rozhestvensky rewrote the version several times.
                        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                        There is only one problem - "The work of the historical commission" in relation to the testimony and reports of officers is of a secondary nature - it was created on their basis :))))

                        Why only on their basis? There were also circulars on the squadron (No. 39, 40, 48, 67, 71) just on the Madagascar firing
                      9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 May 2021 16: 24
                        +2
                        Quote: rytik32
                        Why only on their basis?

                        Where do I say - "only"? :) No, of course, and on the basis of other documents.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        there were also circulars on the squadron (No. 39, 40, 48, 67, 71)

                        I did not understand, but what have the circulars of the aforementioned numbers to do with it? The first is not about that at all.
                        Quote: rytik32
                        There was no danger. From that distance (7-8 km), a hail of shells could not be expected.

                        35-38 cables, is it now 7-8 km? :)
                        Quote: rytik32
                        I have read many "Russian" versions. And all are very contradictory

                        Announce the entire list please
                    2. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 7 May 2021 11: 51
                      +1
                      1) The fact that Togo began to turn his noose was caused by a number of factors, including the weather, the position of the sun, and the course of the Russian troops.
                      At the same time, based on the battle in the Yellow Sea, Togo did not expect that the Russians would quickly target.
                      2) What do you mean cheated in the report?
                      Based on Togo's report, the courses were converging. Rozhestvensky also pointed out that the courses were convergent.
                      Well, when leaving the loop, Togo decided that his course was too sharp in relation to the course of 2TOE and maneuvered to lie on a less sharp one. And in the report he did not clearly describe it.
                      Togo could have decided at all, and it is quite fair that this is not the most important thing for the report.
                      One well-known commander managed only 3 words in his report: "I came, I saw, I won!"
                    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 7 May 2021 16: 26
                      0
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      ) The fact that Togo began to turn his noose was caused by a number of factors

                      The main one of which was the need to urgently escape from the unfortunate outset of the battle that had developed for him.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      What do you mean cheated in the report?

                      Bearing angle.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      One well-known commander managed only 3 words in his report: "I came, I saw, I won!"

                      At least this report is true :)
                    4. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 7 May 2021 17: 55
                      +3
                      Excuse me, but in what way was the plot of the battle unsuccessful for Togo?
                      He also writes in the report (in the interpretation of Semyonovna) that the Russians, expecting a battle on a head-on course, began to build an uneven wake column.
                      Well, wasn’t it so?
                      In fact, Rozhestvensky turned out to be even worse, which he did not describe, because he did not see.
                      With the bearing angle it is generally not clear, even eyewitnesses from the Russian side could not exactly indicate it, the testimonies differ. What to demand from That then?
                      Moreover, I am ready to agree with some that Togo, with all his naval talents, had an unusually bad eye.
                      Considering this, as well as his tendency to omit in his reports those moments that seem important to today's researchers, he certainly "has something to show", but certainly not cheating.
                      You yourself analyzed Rudnev's reports! Rudnev can be wrong, but Togo is no longer possible?
                    5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 8 May 2021 10: 37
                      0
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      Excuse me, but in what way was the plot of the battle unsuccessful for Togo?

                      "Loop Togo", of course
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      In fact, Rozhdestvensky turned out to be even worse,

                      At Rozhestvensky, everything turned out much better than it could have. With the advantage in speed that Togo had, given his somewhat correct actions, Rozhestvensky had to get "crossing T" and a complete defeat in the first 30-40 minutes of the battle.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      With the bearing angle it is generally not clear, even eyewitnesses from the Russian side could not exactly indicate it, the testimonies differ.

                      But there is a simple fact - the lead Russian ships could shoot at Mikasa, so they both shot and hit. Togo's report is simply illogical.
                      The Japanese commander in his report said that, based on the intelligence data, he had made a decision to attack the left column of the Russian squadron. Obviously, from this goal he switched from the right shell of the Russian squadron to the left one. H. Togo explained his subsequent actions as follows:
                      "The 1 combat unit temporarily turned to SW to make the enemy think that we would go with him in a nasty course, but in 13.47 immediately turned to Ost, pressing the enemy's head in a curved line."

                      It must be said that the explanation of this maneuver, which was given by Kh. Togo, is completely unsatisfactory. There was no point in “forcing the enemy to think about a countercurse.” What could be achieved by this? Only that the Russians would try to reorganize into one wake column. But if X. Togo initially conceived such a maneuver, then he should have built his maneuvering in such a way as to put a "crossing T", or to achieve another significant advantage. However, all that the Japanese commander achieved as a result of the “Loop of Togo” - turned out to be in almost parallel columns somewhat ahead of the Russian squadron - was quite achievable even without extreme turns at gunpoint of the heavy battleships of the battleships Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.
                      In other words, it was possible to believe the Japanese admiral that his maneuvers were part of a predetermined plan, if, as a result of their implementation, the Japanese would have a clear, tangible advantage that could not be achieved in a different way. But there was nothing of this. Therefore, it is most likely that H. Togo, going to the left shell of the Russian squadron and turning it on a countercourse, was really going to fall on its left column, believing that the battleships of the Borodino type did not have time to lead the Russian system. And when he saw that the Russians had nevertheless managed, he was forced in a hurry to urgently invent something. He probably did not dare to turn "all of a sudden", since in this case the battle control passed to his youngest flagship. There remained only a turn consistently that H. Togo executed, that is, this decision was forced for him.
                    6. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 8 May 2021 15: 06
                      0
                      1) It took 15 minutes for all Japanese ships to complete the Togo loop.
                      The results of these 15 minutes:
                      The Yapov had Asama out of order. Not pleasant, but not critical, he did not drown.
                      We got serious damage to the "Oslyabya" (later sank).
                      We could not knock out the flagship of the Japanese.
                      So what was the danger of the "Togo loop" for the Japs ?!

                      2) "... Rozhestvensky was supposed to get" crossing T "and a complete defeat in the first 30-40 minutes of the battle."
                      The battle began at 13.49, "Suvorov" went out of order at about 14:30 - 14.35 (maybe 14.40).
                      This is the very 40 minutes!

                      3) "... most likely that Kh. Togo, having come out to the left shell of the Russian squadron and turned to its countercourse, was really going to fall on its left column, believing that battleships of the Borodino type did not have time to lead the Russian formation."
                      Togo's task: not to let the Russian squadron into Vladivostok, and first of all its strongest ships - the Borodinians. To do this otherwise than being "under the muzzles of the heavy guns of the battleships of ZP Rozhestvensky" is not possible with all the imagination.
                      At the same time, Togo had the experience of fighting with 1TOE on the countercourse, when later he had to catch up with the Russian squadron.
                      It is unlikely that Togo was tempted by the option in which he smashes the 2nd and 3rd detachments, having a detachment of Borodino in the rear.
                      But with his maneuver, Togo achieved the main thing! Forced Rozhdestvensky to push the Borodino people forward, and even with the possibility of their coverage and defeat.
                      According to the results of the first 40 minutes of the battle, Togo achieved even more than he could count on.

                      At the same time, I agree with your thesis that the decision in the form of a "Togo loop" was forced for him.
                      But he did not come to him when "he saw that the Russians did manage to do it", but earlier, when he made the decision "to switch from the right shell of the Russians to the left one."

                      It is a pity, of course, that Togo's report is less informative than that of the same Rozhdestvensky, but I do not observe anything in it at all.
                      Just a brief description of what Togo saw, what he decided, and what he did.
                    7. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 8 May 2021 19: 16
                      0
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      1) It took 15 minutes for all Japanese ships to complete the Togo loop.
                      The results of these 15 minutes:

                      The Japanese flagship received 19 hits, which, with the proper quality of Russian shells, could lead to severe damage to the ship, and the death of Togo itself.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      The Yapov had Asama out of order.

                      Didn't come out
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      We got serious damage to the "Oslyabya" (later sank).

                      If in place of "Oslyabi" there was a ship of normal construction (the same "Peresvet") - it would have fought further. The premature death of "Oslyabi" is connected with the quality of its construction
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      So what was the danger of the "Togo loop" for the Japs ?!

                      That is, if you play Russian roulette, loading the "revolver" with three cartridges, and win, this will mean that your life was not endangered? :)))
                      Well, well.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      2) "... Rozhestvensky was supposed to get" crossing T "and a complete defeat in the first 30-40 minutes of the battle."
                      The battle began at 13.49, "Suvorov" went out of order at about 14:30 - 14.35 (maybe 14.40).
                      This is the very 40 minutes!

                      For which the Russian squadron was not defeated - the flagships were incapacitated, however, the actions of "Alexander III" obviously showed the fighting efficiency and readiness to fight the rest of the ships of the squadron.
                      With crossing, in 40 minutes we would have lost both Suvorov and Alexander, and, most likely, Borodino ...
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      But with his maneuver, Togo achieved the main thing! Forced Rozhdestvensky to push the Borodino people forward, and even with the possibility of their coverage and defeat.
                      According to the results of the first 40 minutes of the battle, Togo achieved even more than he could

                      Sorry, but this is completely outside the scope of the theory of naval warfare. He was not forced to push the "Borodino" people forward, and he did not need it. He could, seeing the Russians, get close to them on the counter-courses, without going over to the left side of the Russian squadron, then turn to the right, and roll out both of our head columns, for example. We simply would not have had time to rebuild. There are tons of other options as well.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      At the same time, I agree with your thesis that the decision in the form of a "Togo loop" was forced for him.
                      But he did not come to him when "he saw that the Russians did manage to do it", but earlier, when he made the decision "to switch from the right shell of the Russians to the left one."

                      That is Togo, you want to say that the Japanese admiral abandoned a number of methods of practically guaranteed winning the battle for the sake of a dangerous "loop" deliberately? :)))) I still have a better opinion of Togo
                    8. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 8 May 2021 20: 09
                      +1
                      Well, having the experience of the previous battle in the Yellow Sea, Togo hardly dreamed of drowning all Borodino residents in 40 minutes. Its task is to cover the head of the Russian column and concentrate fire on them (Borodinians) in order to inflict the most severe damage on them. He coped with this task in 40 minutes.
                      Also, based on experience, he did not expect any effective fire from the Russians. Yes, the latter turned out to be a surprise for the Japs, which even Pekinham mentioned, but he proceeded from the opposite!

                      "Then turn right ...".
                      Well, some believe that Togo planned something like this, but the roofing felts "missed" the exit point (he had such a disadvantage), or because of other factors (sun, wind, waves) began to "creative" (and so it was listed).
                      At the same time, it is quite logical: the sun is to the left of the Russians, plus the wind. Accordingly, it is more difficult for our gunners, the sun hits the eyes, the fumes from the shots, again, waves.
                      So, based on these factors, Togo's decision is quite logical and balanced.

                      Well, and precisely because, for all his shortcomings, Togo was not a completely illiterate naval commander, I do not believe that he would have attacked the 2nd and 3rd detachments of the Russians on the counter courses, and would have left Borodino in the rear. What are the prospects from the rear from Rozhdestvensky to get?
                      Kamimura is not an assistant here, no BrK can take 19 hits, this is not Mikasa.

                      Well, and the fact that as soon as Togo indicates his intention to attack the left column on the countercourse, Rozhdestvensky will push Borodino people forward, is also quite predictable. It is possible that he expected something like that from Rozhdestvensky.
                      So, the question of who and whom "outplayed" in the outset of the battle remains open.
                    9. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 8 May 2021 20: 36
                      +1
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      Well, having the experience of the previous comparison in the Yellow Sea, Togo hardly dreamed of melting all Borodino residents in 40 minutes.

                      If you mean that the Russian EBRs in the ZhM kept under its fire for a long time, then the greater the need to put a crossing, which would maximize the power of the Japanese fire, and minimize the power of the Russian.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      His task is to cover the head of the Russian column and concentrate fire on them (Borodinians) in order to inflict the most severe damage on them. He coped with this task in 40 minutes.

                      Not certainly in that way. In fact, his "coverage" was reduced to the fact that, concentrating fire on Suvorov, he exposed the tail of his 1st detachment under Russian fire. the relatively lightly armored Nissin and Kasugu and the cruiser Kamimura. This, frankly, is quite difficult to recognize as a highly effective maneuver.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      Well, some believe that Togo was planning something like this.

                      Well, Togo and the Japanese officialdom say unequivocally - Togo wanted to attack the left column, for which he went to the left side of the Russians. In fact, the attack of the left column was a very logical step - Togo could defeat half of our squadron with minimal risks and in the shortest possible time.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      At the same time, it is quite logical: the sun is to the left of the Russians, plus the wind. Accordingly, it is more difficult for our gunners, the sun hits the eyes, the fumes from the shots, again, waves.

                      This is all indisputable, the only question is that in order to take the desired position, the "loop" was not necessary.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      Well, and precisely because, for all his shortcomings, Togo was not a completely illiterate naval commander, I do not believe that he would have attacked the 2nd and 3rd detachments of the Russians on the counter courses, and would have left Borodino in the rear. What are the prospects from the rear from Rozhdestvensky to get?

                      Just the opposite.
                      A relatively weak 2nd Russian armored one, and a frankly half-dead 3TOE would have been subjected to point-blank fire by 4 of the best Japanese battleships, BRKR would have been varnished with fire. After such a divergence, horns and legs would remain from the Russian ships. From the rear, they would not have gotten from Rozhdestvensky - Kamimura was faster, and could break the distance if it got too hot.
                      The advance of the Borodino people could not frighten him with anything - after the defeat of the left column, he would have formed an overwhelming superiority in forces, while maintaining a significant superiority in speed.
                      That is, the attack of the left column made great sense and promised a quick victory in the battle with minimal risk. So the decision to attack the left column should be considered correct.
                    10. A_Mazkov
                      A_Mazkov 8 May 2021 21: 27
                      0
                      I am writing from the phone, so no quotes.
                      1) And so it happened.
                      2) Togo has only 4 EBRs, others were not delivered, therefore he acted with the forces that he had.
                      3) I told you that there is an opinion: Togo "screwed up" and missed the exit point. I had to "reinvent the wheel".
                      Assessing the situation (including the weather conditions), he decided to attack from the right, but not one column on the countercourses, but to put a "stick over the T", and at the same time, the advancement of Borodino to defend the right column is quite predictable.
                      4) If Togo wanted to attack the right column, and precisely on the countercourses, then the advancement of the Borodino people could not affect anything. Anyway, they would have to fight.
                      But he could hardly have liked the prospect of catching up with the Russian squadron later.
                      And here, in general, everything worked out wonderfully, albeit thanks to "extra body movements."
                    11. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 8 May 2021 21: 51
                      0
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      1) And so it happened.

                      19 hits in Mikasa out of the blue do not agree with you
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      ) Togo has only 4 EBRs, others were not delivered, therefore he acted with the forces that he had.

                      And I named the priorities for these forces - this is either crossing, or the defeat of the left column
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      I said that there is an opinion: Togo "screwed up" and missed the exit point. I had to "reinvent the wheel".

                      Of course, you can guess endlessly. But I am not multiplying entities beyond what is necessary - attacking and routing the left column while diverging on the countercourses was an excellent decision, and Togo was going to do just that. Then it turned out that "the fakir was drunk and the trick failed" - the Russians reorganized faster than he had expected, so they had to "reinvent the wheel". Everything fits into this picture, all of Togo's actions are as logical as possible.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      If Togo wanted to attack exactly the right column, and precisely on the countercourses, then the advancement of the Borodino people could not affect anything.

                      Not the right one, but the left one :)))) Well, the advancement of the Borodino people just influenced the fact that the object of the attack ceased to exist - there was no longer a separate left column.
                      Quote: A_Mazkov
                      But he could hardly have liked the prospect of catching up with the Russian squadron later.

                      not a squadron, but half a squadron :))))) Not to mention that Rozhestvensky, most likely, would have turned back - he simply could not go forward, abandoning the beaten 2nd and 3rd detachments and the cruisers covering the transports he could not ...
                    12. rytik32
                      8 May 2021 22: 16
                      +2
                      Andrey, I beg your pardon for interfering!
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      19 hits in Mikasa out of the blue do not agree with you

                      "Suvorov" received much more during this time.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And I named the priorities for these forces - this is either crossing, or the defeat of the left column

                      Togo refused crossing according to JM's experience. It's too easy to parry with a turn "under the tail".
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Of course, you can guess endlessly. But I am not multiplying entities beyond the necessary - the attack and defeat of the left column when diverging on the counter courses was an excellent decision, and Togo was going to do just that.

                      Do you have any links that Togo thought so?
                      And the version about the attack of the left column on the counter-courses is absurd, if only because of the distance. I already wrote that Togo planned to open fire from 6 m. We would have dispersed at a much greater distance.
                    13. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 10: 14
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      "Suvorov" received much more during this time.

                      Taking into account the later sighting of the Japanese? It is highly doubtful.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Togo refused crossing according to JM's experience. It's too easy to parry with a turn "under the tail".

                      Togo did not exhibit crossing in WM, therefore, he had no experience. Second - crossing is not parried by turning under the tail
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Do you have any links that Togo thought so?

                      Togo himself writes about the attack of the left column in his report "Based on this information, I could draw up a decision - to meet the enemy with my main forces at about 2 pm near Okinoshima and attack the lead ships of the left column"
                      Quote: rytik32
                      And the version about the attack of the left column at the counter-courses is absurd, if only because of the distance.

                      Alexey, again problems with calculations? :)))
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I already wrote that Togo planned to open fire from 6 m. They would have dispersed at a much greater distance.

                      If Togo was on a counter course and, being at an angle of 45 to Suvorov (we take the value indicated in the Russian officialdom as the starting point), turned at a distance of 32-35 cables, then if he continued on his way, then the distance at the moment of divergence would not exceed 23 -25 cables, which is much less than 6000 m
                    14. rytik32
                      9 May 2021 11: 10
                      +2
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Taking into account the later sighting of the Japanese? It is highly doubtful.

                      "Mikasa" at 14:11 (yap) completed zeroing and went to fire to kill from the main command and control
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Togo did not cross in WM

                      Because he was not allowed to do it
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Togo himself writes about the attack of the left column in his report

                      But he does not write about the attack on the counter courses. You invented it.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      If Togo was on a counter course and, being at an angle of 45 to Suvorov (we take the value indicated in the Russian officialdom as the starting point), turned at a distance of 32-35 cables, then if he continued on his way, then the distance at the moment of divergence would not exceed 23 -25 cables, which is much less than 6000 m

                      Togo began the turn at 14:05 (yap) from the distance to Suvorov 8. The course to Suvorov is 000 degrees. 170-32 cab was after the turn.
                    15. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 12: 26
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      "Mikasa" at 14:11 (yap) completed zeroing and went to fire to kill from the main command and control

                      Alas, this idea is not at all confirmed by eyewitnesses. It is known that ours opened fire at about 13.49, well, 13.50, that is, at 14.09-14.10. on Japanese the Japanese opened fire later, which is noted by everyone, so they could not switch to rapid fire at 14.11.
                      And if we recall that according to the testimony of our eyewitnesses, they began to hit about 10 minutes after the start of the battle, then we can assume that the damage of the Suvorov began to endure somewhere from 14.20 Japanese
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Because he was not allowed to do it

                      Togo, in fact, did not try to cross - crossing the Russian course almost 8 miles away cannot be considered as such
                      Quote: rytik32
                      But he does not write about the attack on the counter courses. You invented it.

                      Who's arguing? I figured it out. Although, in fairness, it was invented long before me - the same Chistyakov, for example. If Togo writes that he wants to crush the left column, goes to the left side of the Russian system and then goes on a counter-course, then this assumption is more than justified.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Togo began the turn at 14:05 (yap) from the distance to Suvorov 8. The course to Suvorov is 000 degrees.

                      It's like a heading angle of 10 degrees, or what? :)))))) So in this case, following the same course, the Japanese generally had to rub their sides against our ships.
                    16. rytik32
                      9 May 2021 16: 00
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Alas, this idea is not at all confirmed by eyewitnesses.

                      Very much even confirmed.
                      Semenov

                      Krzhizhanovsky

                      Demchinsky

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Is it like a heading angle of 10 degrees, or what? :))))))

                      As I understand this direction from the north. 180 degrees is clean south, and 170 is 10 degrees east.
                    17. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 20: 10
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Very much even confirmed.
                      Semenov

                      And what - Semyonov? :))))
                      At 1 h. 49 min. in the afternoon, when from the Japanese squadron only Mikaza and Sikishima, two out of twelve, managed to take a new course, the first shot of the Suvorov rang out from a distance of 32 cables, followed by the whole squadron ...
                      I looked eagerly through binoculars ... Flights and undershoots lay close, but the most interesting, that is, hits, as in the battle on July 28, could not be seen: our shells almost do not give off smoke when bursting, and, in addition, pipes they are arranged with the expectation that they burst, breaking through the side, inside the ship. The hit could be noticed only when the enemy knocks something down, degrades ... This did not happen ...
                      About two minutes later, when they managed to turn behind the first two battleships and the second two - "Fuji" and "Asahi" - the Japanese began to answer.

                      That is, the Japanese opened fire at about 13.51 or 14.11 Japanese time. OPEN THE FIRE. At you, they not only took aim, but also began to hit.
                      Or ... Are you going to argue that since Semyonov's "first hit" is recorded opposite the information about Suvorov's first shot? !!! :)))
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Krzhizhanovsky

                      Doesn't confirm you. From his words, it turns out that Mikasa was detained with fire for 2 minutes, and then he did not immediately shoot himself. That is, at 14.11 in Japanese I could not hit in any way.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Demchinsky

                      Doesn't confirm. Do you even read what you copy?
                      Quote: rytik32
                      As I understand this direction from the north. 180 degrees is clean south, and 170 is 10 degrees east.

                      Please name the corner to Suvorov.
                    18. rytik32
                      9 May 2021 21: 58
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Doesn't confirm you.

                      What does not confirm?
                      I gave evidence of Japanese shells hitting earlier than 10 minutes after the start of fire from three people.

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Please name the corner to Suvorov.

                      I have no such data. There is a course, I gave it.
                    19. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 10 May 2021 09: 55
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      What does not confirm?
                      I gave evidence of Japanese shells hitting earlier than 10 minutes after the start of fire from three people.

                      And where is your recommended hit at 14.11? :))))
                      Semenov testifies that between 13.49 and 14.05 Russian time (14.09-14.25 Japanese time), 5 shells hit Suvorov. When they got there is unknown
                      Krzhidanovsky completely refutes you - he claims that the Japanese opened fire with a delay of 2 minutes, that is, at 14.11, while at first their shells did not hit. Ie there could be no hits at 14.11 according to Krzhizhanovsky.
                      Demchinsky does not indicate the time of hits in Suvorov AT ALL, limiting himself only to the fact that they were in 10-15 minutes.
                      Alexey, how do you manage to work with sources, reading what is not even close to them?
                      And why are you replacing the subject of discussion? You stated that the first shell hit Suvorov at 14.11, and I did not agree with that. Now you have switched to hits in the first 10 minutes. Well, yes, it is possible that Suvorov received his first hits not 10, but 8 minutes after the start of the battle. This does not follow from the reports, but - perhaps
                    20. rytik32
                      10 May 2021 10: 23
                      +1
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Ie there could be no hits at 14.11 according to Krzhizhanovsky.

                      That's how interesting it is. If Krzhizhanovsky did not notice, then it could not be? )))
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Demchinsky does not indicate the time of hits in Suvorov AT ALL, limiting himself only to the fact that they were in 10-15 minutes.

                      Have you read Demchinsky yourself?
                      "After several flights and undershoots, the hits began."
                      Explain how "several flights and undershoots" turned out for you in 10-15 minutes?
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And why are you replacing the subject of discussion? You stated that the first shell hit Suvorov at 14.11, and I did not agree with that.

                      And you wrote that there were no hits in Suvorov for 10 minutes. And they were.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Well, yes, it is possible that Suvorov received his first hits not 10, but 8 minutes after the start of the battle. This does not follow from the reports, but - perhaps

                      Or perhaps in a minute. Time is not specified.
                    21. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 10 May 2021 10: 56
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      That's how interesting it is. If Krzhizhanovsky did not notice, then it could not be? )))

                      Alexey, you are great. That is, Krzhizhanovsky confirms your point of view that a hail of shells fell on Suvorov in the first 10 minutes, and he received the first hit at 14.11 by not writing anything about them - well, of course, he could not have noticed! :)))
                      What's going on with your logic? :)))
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Explain how "several flights and undershoots" turned out for you in 10-15 minutes?

                      I wrote
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      And if we recall that according to the testimony of our eyewitnesses, they began to hit about 10 minutes after the start of the battle, then we can assume that the damage of the Suvorov began to endure somewhere from 14.20 Japanese

                      What 15 minutes are we talking about?
                      Quote: rytik32
                      And you wrote that there were no hits in Suvorov for 10 minutes. And they were.

                      Maybe. But all the sources you cite indicate that:
                      1) The Japanese started shooting later than the Russians
                      2) The Japanese did not immediately begin to fall into Suvorov
                      At the same time, in the first 10-15 minutes of the battle, 5 described hits on the battleship were recorded. According to some turns of speech, it can be assumed that the first 4 shells hit the ship before 14.00, that is, in the first 11 minutes of the battle, but this is not certain.
                      Semyonov describes in his memoirs
                      After the flights, there were undershoots. Closer and closer ... The fragments rustled in the air, clinked against the side, against the superstructure ... Not far away, opposite the front chimney, a giant pillar rose water, smoke and flame ... They ran to the front bridge with a stretcher. I leaned over the rail.
                      - Prince Tsereteli (Prince Tsereteli - midshipman, flag officer)! - Shouted from below to my silent question Rare, heading for his tower.

                      That is, the first hit in his report might not have been a hit at all - Tsereteli could have been wounded by a shrapnel from a shell that exploded next to the ship.
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Or perhaps in a minute. Time is not specified.

                      Indicated. It has been repeatedly indicated that the Japanese started shooting 2 minutes after us. So they could not hit in a minute, from the word "in any way"
                    22. rytik32
                      11 May 2021 00: 15
                      0
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      1) The Japanese started shooting later than the Russians

                      The Japanese agree.
                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      2) The Japanese did not immediately begin to fall into Suvorov

                      Absolutely right.

                      Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                      Indicated. It has been repeatedly indicated that the Japanese started shooting 2 minutes after us. So they could not hit in a minute, from the word "in any way"

                      And then we agreed with you. I'll reveal the cards. The first hit according to Japanese data was later 14:11)))
                      After all, covering is not necessarily a hit, is it? Right?
                    23. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2021 07: 21
                      0
                      Quote: rytik32
                      I'll reveal the cards. The first hit according to Japanese data was later 14:11)))
                      After all, covering is not necessarily a hit, is it? Right?

                      There could not have been a cover at 14.11 either :)
                    24. rytik32
                      11 May 2021 09: 01
                      +1
                      Here is the combat report of "Mikasa"
                      2 時 10 分 射 距離 6 千 4 百 に り 嚮導 艦 「ス ワ ロ フ」 型 に 向 て 右舷 6 尹 前 砲台 の 一 斉 試射
                      2 時 11 分 6 千 2 百 に 至 り 右舷 砲台 の 並 射 撃 を 開始 徹 甲 鍛鋼 交互 に 発 射

                      Try to refute)))

                      Will you rely on the testimony given after the summer for raspberries or even on a literary work? )))
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 8 May 2021 22: 26
    0
    I just presented our columns from the side of Togo, so I wrote "right". It is clear that this is our left column. :)

    19 hits - an unpleasant surprise for Togo. Based on the experience of the battle in the Yellow Sea, he really did not expect this, therefore he did not take it into account.

    Well, no need to overestimate Togo, not the fact that half the squadron would remain.
    Our "old man" was not so badly armed. And by the way, exactly in the battle on the countercourse, the chances that the Russians would close up the Mikasa bridge and smear Togo on the flooring would have been greater. :)

    Well, you yourself write that Rozhdestvensky would return. Well, I also write that Togo was not so crazy in his old age as to leave Borodino in his rear.
    Therefore, his version that he decided to put the same "stick over T" 2 columns at once, albeit not on the right, but on the left, is quite acceptable.

    And I would like to understand why you consider the advancement of Rozhdestvensky Borodino residents forward as a surprise for Togo?
    This is a completely logical and predictable maneuver, if there is a threat to the left column, to put forward more powerful ships on the right to defend it.
    Togo decided to show that he intended to attack the left column on the countercourse, and see what our people would do in response?
    Ours began to "build an uneven wake column."
    The fact that at the same time ours had an enchanting mess, he naturally did not suspect, otherwise he would not apply to note in his report.
    And then he turned his loop, embodying his idea (no matter how "curve" it was), into life.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 10: 23
    0
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Well, no need to overestimate Togo, not the fact that half the squadron would remain.

    And you look at how the short-term attention of the Japanese to the ships of the 2nd armored vehicle ended in reality.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    ... And by the way, it was in the battle on the countercourse that the chances that the Russians would close up the Mikasa bridge and smear Togo on the flooring would have been greater. :)

    In fact - no, since, apparently, only the first 5 battleships and, possibly, the flagship of Nebogatov, fired well at ours.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Well, you yourself write that Rozhdestvensky would return. Well, I also write that Togo was not so crazy in his old age as to leave Borodino in his rear.

    And what confuses you? :))) What is the problem?
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    And I would like to understand why you consider the advancement of Rozhdestvensky Borodino residents forward as a surprise for Togo?

    Because the visibility was not so hot, and the Rozhdestvensky maneuver began already at 13.20, that is, very much in advance
    That is, it was possible and logical to put the right column in the head, only Rozhestvensky would not have had time to do this when the Japanese crossed over to the left side of the Russian squadron. And so - the Russians slowly moved forward, and it was not so easy with Mikasa to understand that they were doing this
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Togo decided to show that he intended to attack the left column on the countercourse, and see what our people would do in response?
    Ours began to "build an uneven wake column."

    All would be fine, but Rozhestvensky began rebuilding even before Togo turned to go to the left side of the Russian squadron. He started it when the main forces saw each other
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 9 May 2021 15: 19
    +1
    I congratulate you, Andrey, on a holiday! Happy Victory Day!

    1) If you believe the Japanese schemes, then Kamimura turned his separate loop, and his ships just fired at the 2nd detachment of the Russians.
    "Oslyabya" cannot be taken into account, since it and the ships of Togo were fired upon. And they finished off, it seems, Nissin and Kasuga. Yes, you yourself noted that he held out for a long time.
    So that the old man from the beginning of the battle was under fire from Kamimura.
    Where, then, is the "short-term attention"?

    2) Here from "Nikolay" That would have arrived a present. And now we would be discussing how the Japanese naval commander managed to substitute himself like that?

    3) The problem is that Kamimura's detachment could not "pin down" the actions of the Borodino detachment for a long time, except by the loss of their ships as a result of a long battle.
    In the best case, for that case, there will be a "exchange" of Rozhestvensky's samotopes for the Kamimura brigade.
    A very dubious outcome.

    4) No. They increased the speed just after they saw that Togo was crossing the course of the detachments, passing from right to left.
    This follows from the report of Rozhdestvensky.
    And if you believe Semenov, while Togo was crossing the course, they also managed to count his ships, being on the bridge.
    Orders to increase 1st Detachment's speed and turn left came later.
    Chistyakov's version contradicts the explanations of Rozhestvensky himself. It is strange that she is still popular.

    And you, like Chistyakov, think that Rozhestvensky was in time.
    But based on the testimony of the officers of "Eagle", then, when he just started to move out from behind the corps of "Oslyaby", he already had damage and fires.
    That is, the battle was already underway, and it took as long as the Japanese needed to zero in on the Oslyabya.
    If my memory serves me, then according to Filipovskiy, the 4st detachment began a 1 rumba turn to the left, as you indicated, at 13.20, and the Suvorov lay down on NO23 at 13.30.
    The first shot was fired at 13.49.
    Where did the Eagle "hang out" all this time?
    Only one thing is clear: the maneuvers of both the 1st and 2nd detachments at the most crucial moment were constrained by some factor.
    1st did not have time to go anywhere, and 2nd began to slow down.
    It's not even worth comparing the results of the 1st Detachment maneuver and Togo's loop. :)))
  • rytik32
    9 May 2021 16: 08
    +2
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Only one thing is clear: the maneuvers of both the 1st and 2nd detachments at the most crucial moment were constrained by some factor.
    1st did not have time to go anywhere, and 2nd began to slow down.
    It's not even worth comparing the results of the 1st Detachment maneuver and Togo's loop. :)))

    Anton,
    I will also draw your attention to the point that zeroing should be carried out already on the combat course, otherwise its results will be knocked down when turning.
    And zeroing in on the circulation is generally a dead number. In principle, it is impossible to accurately calculate the correction for circulation.
    So that's it. Togo began the battle on a combat course. And our ship - as in vain. Even "Suvorov" most likely turned to NO23 after the first shot. It's a shame to talk about the 2nd detachment, which was in the "heap".
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 9 May 2021 17: 25
    0
    Good afternoon, Alexey!
    Happy Holidays! Happy Victory Day!

    Yes, I agree with that. That is the problem, that it is completely incomprehensible how the Japanese so quickly "beat" Oslyabya!
    In theory, ships that had not yet entered the circulation, including the Kamimura BRK, could "throw" their shells over their other ships that had already completed it.
    But I doubt that the Japanese gunners were so talented, otherwise I would have to agree with Andrei that Togo could have dealt with 4 Borodinians in 40 minutes.
    Regarding the fact that Suvorov fired the first shot even before he lay down on NO23, this is how it looks on the Japanese diagrams.
    And Togo writes about this in his report!
    But it is believed that Togo in the report and the Japanese in their schemes lied so much.
    On the other hand, in any case, with all the talents of the Yap, it takes at least 5 minutes to zero in. To damage the "Oslyabya" as described by eyewitnesses from the same "Eagle", it also takes time, at least the same 5 minutes, but rather even more.
    So the question arose, where all this time, and with what speed the "Eagle" dangled, and why?
    The biggest irony is that it was Nebogatov's flagship that turned out to be the most productive in the first minutes of the battle.
  • rytik32
    9 May 2021 19: 47
    0
    Anton, happy holidays to you too!

    Quote: A_Mazkov
    But I doubt that the Japanese gunners were so talented, otherwise I would have to agree with Andrei that Togo could have dealt with 4 Borodinians in 40 minutes.

    The Japanese commanders were talented. Unfortunately, I cannot reveal all the cards ahead of time.
    If anything - write in a personal.
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 9 May 2021 21: 29
    +1
    Thank you, Alexey!
    But I'll wait for the article.
    I want to keep the intrigue for myself and stay in anticipation of interesting and informative reading :)
    I wish you creative success!
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 20: 31
    +1
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    If you believe the Japanese schemes, then Kamimura turned his separate loop, and his ships just fired at the 2nd detachment of the Russians.
    "Oslyabya" cannot be taken into account, since it and the ships of Togo were fired upon. And they finished off, it seems, Nissin and Kasuga. Yes, you yourself noted that he held out for a long time.
    So that the old man from the beginning of the battle was under fire from Kamimura.
    Where, then, is the "short-term attention"?

    The attention of the battleships. And Oslyaba had enough 2-3 heavy shells to go to the bottom
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Here from "Nikolay" That would have arrived a present.

    How are you sure of this?
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    The problem is that Kamimura's detachment could not “shackle” the actions of the Borodino detachment for a long time, except by the loss of their ships as a result of a long battle.
    In the best case, for that case, there will be a "exchange" of Rozhestvensky's samotopes for the Kamimura brigade.
    A very dubious outcome.

    They did not have to "shackle" anyone, they just parted with them. The threat was minimal - if the Russians had gone in two columns, they did not have time to rebuild, and Borodino would not have had time to shoot at the BRKR. And if they had time, then by sighting - coordonat and that's it, that's exactly what the Japanese did and everything worked out for them.
    You consistently forget one simple thing. In reality, the Borodinians just shot at Kamimura, and there was not too much sense in this - pushing forward their EBRT Togo set up Alexander, Borodino, Orel and the 2nd Kamimura detachment under fire on parallel courses. So what? Alas, nothing.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Not. They increased the speed just after they saw that Togo was crossing the course of the detachments, passing from right to left.

    You are mistaken. It was after the discovery that Rozhdestvensky FIRST increased his speed, and then ordered to turn in order to get to the head of the left column
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    This follows from the report of Rozhdestvensky.

    Please specify the name of the alternate universe where this happened. Here, on planet Earth, Rozhdestvensky pointed out in a report:
    As soon as Mikaza was opened from Suvorov, Suvorov immediately increased speed to 11½ knots, having made a signal: "I — the detachment has 11 knots," and bent slightly to the left to enter the head of the left column.

    Quote: A_Mazkov
    And you, like Chistyakov, think that Rozhestvensky was in time.
    But based on the testimony of the officers of "Eagle", then, when he just started to move out from behind the corps of "Oslyaby", he already had damage and fires.

    There is no "but". Rozhestvensky managed to bring the Borodinians forward, but due to an error in the calculations, it turned out that at the end of the maneuver, the Eagle was abeam Oslyabi,
    by the time of my first shot, I had brought into battle not 12 ships, but only 11. It is necessary, however, to keep in mind that when the Suvorov fired the first shot at the battleship Mikaza, from a distance of 32 cables, then, "Mikaza" was less than one rumba ahead of the traverse "Suvorov"; and, since the length of the formation of the three battleship detachments of the second squadron was supposed to be 2,8 miles, the distance from the end matelot in the III detachment to the battleship Mikaza should have been no more than 42½ cables. Thus, I brought into battle the second squadron in a formation in which all my battleships had to be able to fire at the first moment at the head of the Japanese line from the distances of its aiming reach for the main calibers.

    I don’t claim that everything was exactly like that, options are possible, but the fact is that at least 5 Russian ships could shoot at Mikasa, while only 2 Japanese ships could respond to Russian ships.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    It's not even worth comparing the results of the 1st Detachment maneuver and Togo's loop. :)))

    In your universe, perhaps. If we talk about ours, then I ask you to familiarize yourself at least in the general order of maneuvering of the Russian and Japanese squadrons. Questions and Answers
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Where did the Eagle "hang out" all this time?

    will disappear by themselves :)
    Anton, you do not know the maneuvering of the parties, you confuse "exactly the opposite" the report of Rozhdestvensky, to which you refer ... Is there any point in continuing the discussion?
  • rytik32
    9 May 2021 22: 15
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    How are you sure of this?

    Everyone else was hitting Mikasa. And "Nikolay" beat "in a bunch". There was no one else to get into.

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    but the fact is that at least 5 Russian ships could shoot at Mikasa, while only 2 Japanese ships could respond to Russian ships.

    They could shoot, but could they hit ???
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 10 May 2021 09: 35
    +1
    Quote: rytik32
    Everyone else was hitting Mikasa. And "Nikolay" beat "in a bunch".

    Alexey, we are talking a little about something else - the option of attacking the Japanese on counter courses is being considered
    Quote: rytik32
    They could shoot, but could they hit ???

    19 hits. Could :)))
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 9 May 2021 22: 54
    0
    "Between 1 and 1 h. 20 m. The front of the Japanese cruisers suddenly began to turn to the right and at the same time as the beginning of this turn we were seen from the needle, at a distance of about 7 miles, rumba 3 to the right of our course, the wake line of the enemy battleships marching The 11st battalion detachment immediately increased its speed to XNUMX knots, bent to the left to go to the head of the left column, and the transports and guards were given a signal to leave to the right.
    Meanwhile, the enemy battleships, having run a considerable distance with a long course to the west, that is, to the left of the squadron, changed their course towards ours, and when they were in 4 points ahead of the left traverse of "Suvorov", they began to consistently turn 16 points to the left "( Report of the Adjutant General Rozhdestvensky to the Minister of the Navy, July 1905.).

    “On May 14, 1905, at 1:25 pm in the afternoon, the enemy's main forces, moving at a large speed into SW a quarter in the wake formation, appeared along the bow, emerging from the fog area, and immediately began to turn sequentially to the right by several points.
    At this time, our 11st armored detachment increased its speed to 4 knots, turned 12 rumba successively to the left, going into the head of the II and III armored detachments, building one common wake column of our 1 ships (Report of the Flag-Captain Captain XNUMXst Rank Clapier- de Colonga).

    As for "We, on planet Earth, Rozhdestvensky pointed out" As soon as Mikaza was opened from Suvorov, Suvorov immediately increased its speed to 11½ knots ... ", this is from the answer to the question of the commission, and not the reports ...
    And, by the way, 4 rumba, it's not a little to the left, but pretty decent.

    At the same time, at Filippovskiy "At 1 o'clock 30 min. Lay down in NW in a quarter course, converging with II and III armored detachments, stroke 11 knots; at 1 o'clock 40 min. Entered the head of the left wake column at NO 23 °; battle began at 1:49 pm ", and at Rozhestvensky" So, the head of the first detachment (Suvorov) leaned to the left at 1:20 pm, and at 1:49 pm he straightened on the NO 23 ° course ahead of Column II and III armored detachments; 2nd, 3rd and 4th matelots of I - the detachment was kept in his wake all this time. "
    I honestly find it difficult to answer which of them is from which universe, and from which planet, but the difference in the readings of the Commander and the Flagship Navigator is 10 minutes!

    Does it make sense to continue the discussion?
    With such discrepancies between Rozhdestvensky and Filippovsky, it is pointless to understand whether Togo cheated in his report or not.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 10 May 2021 09: 48
    0
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    As for "We, on planet Earth, Rozhdestvensky pointed out" As soon as Mikaza was opened from Suvorov, Suvorov immediately increased its speed to 11½ knots ... ", this is from the answer to the question of the commission, and not the reports ...

    Which is fully confirmed by the reports. Including those that you quote. What is the problem?
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    I honestly find it difficult to answer which of them is from which universe, and from which planet, but the difference in the readings of the Commander and the Flagship Navigator is 10 minutes!

    This is completely normal - some of the reports indicate the wrong time. People write such things from memory, and even more so - in battle, alas, it fails. The Russians usually filled out the logbooks after the battle, and if the ship died in the battle, then the documents did not remain at all.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    With such discrepancies between Rozhdestvensky and Filippovsky, it is pointless to understand whether Togo cheated in his report or not.

    My strong advice to you is to read the reports of the Japanese commanders about the battle in Chemulpo. There you will find not such deviations. And what, we will not take into account the Japanese reports? :)))
    This is not to mention the fact that the difference between Rozhdestvensky and Filippovsky has nothing to do with the issue under discussion and does not affect it.
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 10 May 2021 11: 31
    0
    I gave you the testimony of 3 people who are on the same ship in the same conning tower, and not the commanders of different ships.
    Moreover, based on the time indicated by Clapier-de-Colong, that the main forces of the Yapas saw at 13.25, given the time required to issue orders and raise signals, most likely, they increased their speed and turned at 13.30. This is 10 minutes later than indicated by Rozhdestvensky. Do not forget that the ships of the 1st squad should rehearse your signal as confirmation that it has been received and accepted. This also takes time.
    There was no trace of "speeding up in advance".
    2) Chistyakov, like you, used the term "leaned slightly to the left." Four rumba, it is "not slightly", and not so that it is not noticeable at all.
    3) So what time, using the terminology of the author of the article, did you go to the combat course "Prince Suvorov"?
    4) If the "Eagle" moved out from behind the board of the "Oslyabya" at least 10 minutes after the start of the battle, then where at 13.49:XNUMX was "Borodino" and how many ships supported the "Suvorov" with fire? Precisely at least five, not less?
    5) Did Togo write his report during the fight on his knee, or did he write later, from memory?
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 10 May 2021 12: 33
    0
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    I gave you the testimony of 3 people who are on the same ship in the same conning tower, and not the commanders of different ships.

    It doesn't change anything at all. All three testified from memory, much later than the battle.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Moreover, based on the time indicated by Clapier-de-Colong, that the main forces of the Yapas saw at 13.25, given the time required to issue orders and raise signals, most likely, they increased their speed and turned at 13.30. This is 10 minutes later than indicated by Rozhdestvensky. Do not forget that the ships of the 1st squad should rehearse your signal as confirmation that it has been received and accepted. This also takes time.

    Already wrong. The signal could be prepared in advance in order to pick it up immediately upon the arrival of the Japanese (Rozhestvensky still needed to rebuild somewhere, for this he needed speed) "Suvorov" could also increase the speed immediately upon detection of the enemy - the rest would be pulled up, leveling the interval ... It is necessary to rehearse the signals, but the whole point is that you do not need to postpone the execution of the signal until it is confirmed. It is needed when performing complex maneuvers.
    Finally, your version doesn't stand up to the simplest timing.
    Clapier de Colong points
    1 hour 40 minutes The 23st armored detachment took its place in the head of the wake and the "Suvorov" lay down on the previous course of NO XNUMX °, which was the same as the ships of the II and III armored detachments went and continued to go.

    In 10 minutes, having superiority in speed of only 2,5 knots, the right Russian column would be ahead of the left by only 4 cables, that is, it is impossible in principle to get out into the head and take your place
    Filippovsky generally writes
    At 1 hour 38 minutes turned 4 R to the left.
    At 1 hour 40 minutes lay on the old course NO 23 °.

    This is geometrically impossible :))) Rozhdestvensky shows that he was moving at an increased speed for 29 minutes - this is just like the truth.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    There was no trace of "speeding up in advance".

    Not, he began to increase speed as soon as the Japanese main forces opened.
    In my opinion, you forgot how the discussion began :)))) We talked with you about when Rozhdestvensky decided to increase the speed and rebuild 2 columns into one. Now you already agree that he gave the necessary orders as soon as he saw the Japanese - which, in fact, was required to be proved.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    2) Chistyakov, like you, used the term "leaned slightly to the left." Four rumba, it is "not slightly", and not so that it is not noticeable at all.

    It all depends on the angle, but it was bad for the Japanese. Visually, the distance between Suvorov and Oslyabya should have decreased when moving to the left side of the Russian squadron, if they continued to march in two columns.
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    3) So what time, using the terminology of the author of the article, did you go to the combat course "Prince Suvorov"?

    13.49
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    4) If the "Eagle" moved out from behind the board of the "Oslyabya" at least 10 minutes after the start of the battle, then where at 13.49:XNUMX was "Borodino" and how many ships supported the "Suvorov" with fire? Precisely at least five, not less?

    Rozhdestvensky points
    At the present time, apparently, it turns out that the battleship "Eagle" (4th - in the 1st detachment), with the above formation, pulled back and at 49:XNUMX pm was not in its place, but behind the starboard side of "Oslyabya ". I have no right to dispute this.
    Maybe "Oryol" was delayed due to its own fault or the fault of the third in the line (the second number followed "Suvorov" in an impeccable distance).

    That is, the "Eagle" was in the worst position of all ships. Nevertheless, according to the artilleryman Sisoi, it follows that "Suvorov", "Alexander", "Oslyabya" and "Sisoy" entered the battle immediately, and from the words of Shcherbachev ("Eagle") it follows that "Eagle" opened fire on Mikase immediately after 13.50.
    I look at the clock: 1 hour 50 minutes. (I cannot vouch for the particular accuracy of the watch, since I put mine approximately on the ship's). On the dial, the arrow starts to move and shows: "sighting". Shots are heard ahead: our detachment enters the battle. So we start shooting from the left bow 6 "tower. Then on the dial the arrows show:" 34 cables, rear sight corrections - 7 ". The enemy battleships begin to overtake us. First" Mikaza ", and then" Fuji "," Shikishima "and the rest come out of the corner of the shelling of my tower.

    Obviously, "Borodino" entered the battle before "Eagle".
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Did Togo write his report during the fight on his knee, or did he write later, from memory?

    Let's not confuse God's gift with scrambled eggs :))))) Ours were mistaken in the minutes, which is quite forgiven - they had to follow the enemy and fulfill their official duties, and not lead the timing. But Togo is clearly disingenuous, talking about his plans, which he clearly could not forget. Or do you blame him for sclerosis? :)
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 10 May 2021 17: 02
    0
    Nowhere is Togo disingenuous about his plans! I already wrote that Togo's report is compressed and uninformative. In Russian translation, he is also tongue-tied.
    From the phrase "... I decided to attack the enemy with my main forces at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon near Okinoshima and, moreover, to attack the lead ships of the left column", it does not at all follow that he planned to fight on the countercourse. This is Rozhdestvensky's conclusion.
    "Under the pressure of our squadron battleships, the enemy lead ship turned a little to the right and at 2 hours 8 minutes (13 hours 49 minutes) opened fire."
    You yourself indicate that it was so. But then there is a high probability that the fire at the beginning of the battle was fired by "Suvorov", "Alexander" and "Oslyabya", that is, three ships, not five.
    "and" Sisoy "entered the battle ...". Didn't the Sisoy open fire on the Nissin ?!
    "But we did not answer for some time, and only when we got close to about 6000 meters (30 cab.), We concentrated our fire on the lead ships of the enemy columns."
    Togo's intention was not to fight on the countercourse, but he originally wanted to put a "stick over the T". Two flagships fell under the distribution at once, which actually happened, since the withdrawal of the strongest ships of the right column to defend the left is logical and, accordingly, predictable.

    Togo's plan is controversial, because it is extraordinary, but this is not a reason to believe that he cheated in the report!

    It's good that you remembered Shcherbachev from his 13.50!
    And what does Slavinsky, who was just in the left "sighting" tower of "Eagle", tell us?
    "Oslyabya" answered the enemy, "Suvorov" also, we were silent for the distance. I noticed that the Oslyabya and the vessels following it reduced their speed to low speed in order to let us pass and leaned slightly to the right in order to enter our wake as soon as possible. When we entered a stand, that is, took a place in front of the "Oslyaby", it already had holes in the bow and a knocked down gaff. At 1 hour 40 minutes. half., according to the order received from the conning tower on the battle index, I opened the sighting with cast-iron shells at the head flagship battleship "Mikaza" from a distance of 57 cables. After three shots had been fired, we had to abandon zeroing, in view of the complete impossibility of observing the fall of our shells in the mass of bursts, which at times completely covered Mikaza from our eyes. "
    Wow, how interesting it turns out! According to Slavinsky at 13.40, not only did the Oryol open fire, but it had already been fired for a period of time!
  • rytik32
    11 May 2021 00: 36
    +1
    Obviously, Shcherbachev did not have the exact clock set, which he himself writes about.
    And in Slavinsky's testimony, the description of the damage to the Oslyabi precedes the announcement of the opening of fire, from which it can be concluded that by the time the Eagle entered the battle, the Japanese had not just opened fire on the Oslyab, but had already given it a good shot.
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 11 May 2021 00: 55
    -1
    So I wrote about it to Andrey!
    But, if at the exit of the "Eagle" from the side of the "Oslyaby" the latter was already well attached, then the question arises, where at 13.49 were the "Orel" and "Borodino", and how many Russian ships supported the "Suvorov"? Five, three, more, less ?!
    There are 2 versions.
    First, Chistyakova: Rozhdestvensky lured Togo into a trap.
    The second, no one knows whose, but arose like immediately after the battle: Togo lured Rozhdestvensky into a trap.
    Both cannot be proven or disproved.
    As a result, it turned out better, or rather, almost turned out for Togo.
    "Almost", because Togo didn't have enough speed to "stick over T". He could only keep ahead and to the left, and gradually cut the course of the 2TOE, which was easily parried by the lapels to the right. So you can try to cover the head of the Russian squadron until dusk without much success.
    That is, even taking into account the chaos that arose at the beginning of the battle, at least at 14.05 everything was not so unambiguous.
  • rytik32
    11 May 2021 01: 27
    +1
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    and how many Russian ships did the Suvorov support?

    By the way, according to some, both Russian and Japanese (!) Data, the first shot at Mikasa was made by Oslyabya, not Suvorov
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 11 May 2021 07: 01
    -1
    Quote: rytik32
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    and how many Russian ships did the Suvorov support?

    By the way, according to some, both Russian and Japanese (!) Data, the first shot at Mikasa was made by Oslyabya, not Suvorov

    I only read about such a version in testimony from the Russian side.
    For the first time I hear about the Japanese.

    I think that Togo is talking about Suvorov in his report, so he fired the first shot, but Oslyabya immediately supported him. It is possible that "Alexander III" was also able to open fire right away.
    But these are three Russian ships, against two Japanese, and not like five!
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2021 07: 28
    0
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    You yourself indicate that it was so. But then there is a high probability that the fire at the beginning of the battle was fired by "Suvorov", "Alexander" and "Oslyabya", that is, three ships, not five.
    "and" Sisoy "entered the battle ...". Didn't the Sisoy open fire on the Nissin ?!

    Once again :)))) "Eagle" entered the battle with minimal delay, "Borodino" - even faster than "Eagle". Sisoy could only shoot from the bow tower (but immediately) - according to Malechkin
    The battleship "Sisoy the Great" opened fire on the enemy immediately after the "Oslyabya" from 12 "bow turret guns, and from the battery 6" guns it could fire only at the 5th or 6th enemy matelot.

    Thus, we have 4 ships at once, "Borodino" with a minimum delay, and "Eagle" - after a couple of minutes from the start of the battle.
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 11 May 2021 08: 31
    -1
    Did the yapi take "Oslyabya" in a couple of minutes?
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2021 09: 04
    +1
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Did the yapi take "Oslyabya" in a couple of minutes?

    And who said what a couple? :) This is what Shcherbachev writes about the events before the opening of fire by "Eagle"
    We are approaching "Oslyabya", which has reduced the speed to let us pass; balls are raised on it at "low speed". I don’t remember exactly on “low speed” or “stop”. That the balls were - it is true. His entire port side is on fire; he had already started the fight. The enemy answers. Around it, not splashes rise, but huge, black columns of water and smoke: enemy shells burst into the water. We describe the circulation and I see the enemy.

    "port side on fire" - the question, in whose fire, fires, or the fire of the shots of their own guns? :))) Shcherbachev describes the first hits on Oslyabya after Oryol opened fire
    В
    from and we start shooting from the left bow 6 "tower ... ... All enemy fire is concentrated on the Oslyab so far. He has shot down a gaff. The stern flag is raised on the left side of the main yard. The shell explodes on the main top and it, having broken near Mars, falls on the left side. The enemy especially shells the nose of the Oslyabya. First, the undershoot is about 1 cable, then the flight is about 1 cable, and the water column rises much higher than the forecastle of the Oslyabya when the shell bursts into the water. against the background of the horizon, such a black pillar should be clearly visible. Then, after a quarter of a minute - a hit. The shell bursts against the light side in the cheekbone of the Oslyabi with bright fire and a thick ring of black smoke. Then you can see how the side of the enemy ships; "Shrouded in fire and clouds of yellow-brown and black smoke. In a minute the smoke dissipates and huge holes are visible in the side.
  • rytik32
    11 May 2021 09: 14
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Shcherbachev describes the first hits on Oslyabya after Oryol opened fire

    And Slavinsky? He first damaged the Oslyabi, and then they opened fire.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2021 12: 02
    +2
    Quote: rytik32
    And Slavinsky? He first damaged the Oslyabi, and then they opened fire.

    I agree that we have a discrepancy with Slavinsky. I'll dig through the reports again, I'll try to make a consistent picture of this episode
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 11 May 2021 12: 12
    -1
    "Borodino" seemed to be leaving the column for some technical reason, at about 14.30.
    Maybe they arose even earlier, during rebuilding. Rozhestvensky, however, points out that they could "pull back" the end caps, and "Alexander" walked flawlessly.
    Eagle didn't seem to have any problems.
  • Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2021 12: 28
    +1
    Quote: A_Mazkov
    Eagle didn't seem to have any problems.

    Accordingly, there were no problems and "Borodino" for which he followed - if there was something significant, they would probably have indicated in the reports
  • Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 13 May 2021 06: 40
    0
    Yes ... by stopping the cars, he represented a target at the range and he was shot as in an exercise ..
  • A_Mazkov
    A_Mazkov 13 May 2021 21: 40
    -1
    If you are talking about "Oslyabya", then it is not clear whether he stopped the cars, or simply reduced the speed.
    Well, according to the statements of some participants from the Russian side, the Japanese were turning 16 points just abeam "Oslyabya", so it was a convenient target.
    But I believe that Ber had good reasons to slow down, and he missed not one ship ("Eagle"), but also "Borodino".
  • Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 13 May 2021 06: 39
    0
    In general, all the officers of the RIF kept notebooks - special ...
    The watch log was kept in draft, and then copied into a clean copy - the main thing during the watch .. It's just that a person is arranged like this - he looked at his watch 18:10 ... a shell banged .. made an entry in the book ... but after a few minutes .. . about another event - the rangefinder crashed, etc.
  • unknown
    unknown 8 May 2021 09: 44
    0
    About one famous commander.
    In fiction they will not write such a thing yet.
  • unknown
    unknown 8 May 2021 09: 42
    0
    I would like to learn more about the speed advantage.
    With the analysis of real technical capabilities, and not "paper" data.
    And not a clinical underestimation of speed on the part of our commander.
  • Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 13 May 2021 06: 30
    0
    Well, I had to speak in court ...
  • Comrade
    Comrade 11 May 2021 04: 14
    +3
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    I have the feeling that it became important for Alexey to prove the flaws of the 2TOE combat training at any cost

    You are not the only one, deeply respected colleague.
    For my part, I can add that the author overestimated the number of rangefinders available on the battleships of the Rozhdestvensky.
    Almost twice (some details - in our little discussion with him on this topic).
    Obviously, this is a conscientious delusion on his part, but against the background of a clear personal dislike for Zinovy ​​Petrovich, it looks as if Rozhdestvensky had the latest rangefinders in a wagon and a small cart, but did not deign to teach his subordinates how to use them.
    Behind the brackets - he had no time, because he was obsessed with coal.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 11 May 2021 12: 03
      +1
      Greetings, dear Valentine!
      Quote: Comrade
      Almost twice (some details - in our little discussion with him on this topic).

      I read it with pleasure, I missed this moment of discussion
      1. Comrade
        Comrade 11 May 2021 14: 55
        +1
        My respect, dear Andrew!
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        I read it with pleasure, I missed this moment of discussion

        After the start of the war, twenty-eight rangefinders were ordered, not forty-seven, as the author pointed out. How many of the ordered ones were received is not known exactly, but even if all of them were received and distributed between the ships of the Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, Rozhdestvensky did not have such a huge number of FA 3 rangefinders, as the author writes.
        Everyone is wrong, of course, but errors are typical here. Therefore, the impression is involuntarily created that the goal was not to create an objective picture, but a subconscious desire to convince the public of Rozhdestvensky's stupidity and incompetence.
        1. rytik32
          12 May 2021 14: 14
          +1
          Quote: Comrade
          After the outbreak of the war, twenty-eight rangefinders were ordered, not forty-seven, as indicated by the author.

          Valentine, can you ask about the source of this data?
      2. rytik32
        12 May 2021 21: 58
        +1
        Andrew,
        I tried to summarize in one table the data on the issuance of rangefinders (planned and actual) for 2TOE according to circulars.
        That's what I did.

        I think Valentin will be interested too :)
  • Navigator_50
    Navigator_50 6 May 2021 09: 46
    0
    Another pulling of the owl on the globe, but using silicone grease ...
    Because the owl is still silent (the globe too) ...
  • geniy
    geniy 6 May 2021 11: 37
    -9
    The author of this article, A Rytnik, does not seem to understand the basics of artillery shooting, and this whole article is just a set of banal information that should be known to every reader almost from childhood. But among the public grazing on VO there are a lot of dark, illiterate people who seem to know nothing at all, and therefore respond positively. Well, this is something like in the famous play by Moliere "The Bourgeois in the Nobility": the rascal-teacher told the bourgeois that he was speaking prose, and then there was poetry. This is how VO readers thank Rytnik for telling them that they turn out to be talking in prose.
    But in fact, in my opinion, huge secrets are hidden in the history of the RJV, and they are not just hidden, but deliberately classified. For example, the question of organizing artillery fire is tightly classified. The bottom line is that, in spite of the ignorance of the profane, an artillery gun must not only be aimed at the target, but besides this, a bunch of artillery corrections must also be taken into account. So for example, in addition to determining the range to the target, and the associated vertical guidance angle, it is also good to know the temperature of the powder in the cellars, and the shooting of the gun - the degree of wear (which is approximately equal for all the ship's guns), and the effect of the wind - it can then increase then reduce the range of the projectile. And also horizontal aiming - in addition to the horizontal gun pointing angle, there is such a phenomenon as derivation - lateral deflection of the projectile. Moreover, the value of the derivation is variable - it is either more or less. And if at close distances - for example, on destroyers, derivation can be ignored, then at long distances - it is obligatory. And besides - for the guns on the starboard side, the derivation deflects the shells to one side of the enemy ship, and for the guns on the left side - in the opposite direction. Of course, the horizontal guidance angle is affected by the speed of the enemy target ship and the distance to it - with a distance of, for example, 30 cables, the projectile will fly for about 10 seconds, and with large ones - even longer. Well, of course, in horizontal guidance, you need to take into account the influence of the crosswind. And I haven't told you yet about the influence of the ship's pitching!
    So - if the gunner of the ship's gun is stupidly aiming his cannon at the target - then if he does not take into account the numerous amendments, then he will probably miss. But do you really think that a simple, illiterate gunner of the RYAV times was able to count and keep in his head all these numerous amendments? Yes, for this you need to be a professor of mathematics! or do you all the profane believe this deceiver Alexei Rytnik - TEN RUSSIANS FIRED GUESS?
    And I believe that the organization of ship firing is still completely classified. In my opinion, in fact, all the amendments for the precise aiming of the guns were calculated by the assistants of the senior artillery officer. And they introduced these amendments to the Geisler system for data transmission. Therefore, each gun received the so-called FULL vertical guidance and FULL horizontal guidance. And the gunner, seeing this data in his dial, simply rotated the aiming flywheels and aimed his gun in exact accordance with the data received. And Alexey Rytnik deceives stupid readers, as if from a group of fire controllers with the help of alidada and range finders they supposedly received only a general direction towards the enemy ship, but supposedly each gunner calculated additional amendments independently. In my opinion - THIS IS A LIE! That is, Alexey Rytnik knows nothing and understands nothing. In fact, each gunner received the full vertical and horizontal guidance of the gun and did not need to look through the sight eyepiece at all. But here stupid readers may ask: why, then, were optical sights on each gun? And so that there are emergencies: when, for example, the electrical wires of the Geisler system are broken, or all the officers of the artillery post are killed and wounded. Or when shooting at destroyers at night and at close range - when no amendments need to be taken into account at all. But the entire system of organizing artillery fire is still completely classified. And none of you really knows anything about it.
    1. mmaxx
      mmaxx 6 May 2021 13: 35
      +6
      Before the war, the gunners were trained to shoot at short distances. For better flatness of the trajectory and speed of the projectile, the projectiles were lightened. At those distances, all these amendments (especially the derivation) did not bother anyone at all. Even Verkhovsky opposed both rangefinders and optical sights. Really, at those distances it was not necessary.
      And then the war came and it turned out that you can shoot and hit from afar. And our fleet was not completely ready.
      Even the guns didn't really have the correct long-range firing tables. Melnikov wrote about this in "Battleship Potemkin". It is a pity that no one, except for Melnikov, investigated the issue of post-war shooting. Melnikov himself was still emotional. He has too many adjectives. I know from myself: when there are no numbers, you have to put pressure on emotions))).
      And how will amendments help, even if the tables are incorrect? You can't create tables in a war. Here, a set of barrels, at least, must be shot in polygon conditions. None of this has been done. Somewhere in the Black Sea Fleet in calm conditions. Even a volley on an even keel was given to the gunner. Only here a couple of degrees VN error at once. Even with appliances.
      Most likely everything was outrageously primitive. That is why it is "secret".
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 7 May 2021 15: 28
        0
        Yes, that is so ... Our fleet was not ready. But denyushki pay for articles. So everything will be like with "grandmother"!
        If you have a gun and are offered a telescopic sight? Well, will you strap it with duct tape or duct tape? Well, or screw it to the butt .. it won't give anything ..
        Installation of an optical sight requires adjustment and alignment during installation, otherwise it is a profanation or an IDB. If the factory design of the guns did not provide for an optical sight, then how? ...
        Well, at least one instruction is found on the installation or alignment of the optical sight ("on all calibers" guns?).
        In my opinion there is a letter from N.I. Nebogatov. in which he asked to send some optical sights with a passing steamer .. this is already on the march to Tsushima.
        Well, as it turns out: there were rangefinders, optical sights were, the speed was, the shells were also good ... and so on. Maybe we won? The Japanese do not recognize the current ... the pichalka .. we have been tormented for the second hundred years.
        1. mmaxx
          mmaxx 7 May 2021 17: 42
          +2
          What to do with the sight is written in the instructions for its operation. But fixing it is a whole business. Even on a regular rifle, the brackets are needed very high quality and expensive. And 7,62 with 6 or 12 inches cannot be compared in any way. Now, on any weapon, everything is provided. And then I had to do something on the collective farm. There is no information.
          1. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 8 May 2021 11: 30
            0
            A very good remark that there is no information ... But no, and there is no trial!
            The fact is that the RIF did not understand the meaning of optical sights and rangefinders. Here is the tragedy!
            The optical sight, when calibrated, allowed all the ship's guns to be aimed at one point. Togo said in the instructions - to aim along the stem of the target ship, while the projectile is flying - the target will move 30-60 meters (depends on the course angles and speeds) and the volley shells - will collapse in a heap in the area of ​​approximately the bow bridge and the conning tower .. And the point was in the volley fire! And in the RIF, it was required to aim, shoot at maximum speed ... which was done in practice.
            Having made a volley, the Japanese (on an even keel) transmitted information to the next ship (matelot) behind the data on the distance by the rangefinder. And he went to this range a little even changing course, and the gunners brought the optical axes of the barrels to one point .. The volley followed exactly .. and the one in front and the matelots from behind saw the shells of the volley lay down .. without confusing anyone (!).
            The Japanese practiced the technique by shooting a rock (sticking out of the sea) on one of the ranges .. going to the point of the volley according to the data of the one in front .. Well, at the same time, they achieved maximum accuracy at maximum range and on an even keel ... So they polished .. the blade ...
            Then, with the increase in the range, a second question arose - they had to shoot according to the tables, and for this all the guns had to be verified at the factory ranges - if the required accuracy was not achieved - the gun was rejected and was not installed on the ship ... RIF approached this before the start of WWI. .. and even then not completely.
            You can attach a telescopic sight to a rifle, but to shoot at 1,5 - 2 km you need to learn a lot and take into account a lot of things .. this is not "A constant sight, at the enemy, or !!!".

            I'm just wondering how the next "May" passage will end ... I'm watching ..
            1. rytik32
              10 May 2021 00: 03
              0
              Quote: Shturman_50
              Togo said in the instructions - to direct along the stem of the target ship

              I thought for a long time whether to put this picture in an article about the Japanese ... I decided not to. But if the speech came in the comments, then I could not resist
              1. Navigator_50
                Navigator_50 10 May 2021 13: 41
                0
                And I will not even comment ..
                There are Kh.Togo's Combat Instructions translated long ago .. There is a museum, there is "Mikasa" ..
                You should run to Japan .. Everything is chewed up there .. and by the way, there are also exhibits from the RIF ..
                Probably I was lucky - I hustled there for several years, talked with the Japanese .. I went to sea on a Japanese shun .. My opinion is this ... Your copyright can be anything.

                Here is another Japanese feature .. The Japanese gunner constantly kept the target in the sight of the sight from the moment the gun was ready to the volley - it was about 30 seconds .. Accompanying the target, like an automatic tracking machine ... Well, "macaques", what can you take from them ..
                1. rytik32
                  11 May 2021 00: 22
                  0
                  Quote: Shturman_50
                  There are long-translated combat instructions of H. Togo

                  These? http://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_20/bibl-jap-port-artur-doc/japonskije-bojevyje-instrukcii/
                  Quote: Shturman_50
                  The Japanese gunner constantly kept the target in the sight of the sight from the moment the gun was ready to the volley - it was about 30 seconds .. He accompanied the target like an automatic tracking machine ... Well, "macaques", what can you take from them ..

                  Can you provide the source of this information?
                  I read about the "stream" by Melnikov, he has long refuted this option.
                  I read that the British practiced constant target tracking ...
                  But I haven't read about the Japanese.
                  And 30 seconds is too much. What's the point in waiting so long?
                  1. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 11 May 2021 07: 17
                    +1
                    I honestly don't remember ... the source. Something at Polutov ..
                    Because both the Tsushima forums and the "Tim System" and a lot of other things ..
                    I found out about the landfill with a rock in Japan ... The Japanese also did experiments on a tip by one person, both vertical and horizontal ... that is, the Japanese was sitting on a bicycle-type saddle .. with his hands he held the horizontal aiming "left-right", and with his foot pedals vertical tip from rolling .. BUT THIS they did not succeed. A person is so constructed that he does not split in two ..
                    The point is not in the "stream" of shells, but in the fact that the salvo occurs in the same conditions for all gun mounts (in terms of range, roll, trim). If artillery mounts (and ammunition) are mass-produced, with shooting for accuracy at ranges - which was not the case in the Republic of Ingushetia and the USSR before the war, the effect is clear ... Immediately fired projectiles (in one gulp) at one aiming point and created the invented "jet" effect .. But the effectiveness of concentrating the fall of so many shells at the same time into the common aiming point made Tsushima inevitable ..

                    By the way, on Russky Island there is still (possibly) the Geisler system - a museum in nature on the Voroshilov battery .. There, from 1935-1937, they installed .. 2 towers from the "Poltava" of 305 mm caliber .. Artpogreb, Geisler's control system in their original form. Then they made a museum .. And a year ago Shoigu signed an order - to remove it from the balance sheet and hand it over to some "Patriots" .. By the way, 305-mm shells were drowned in a special polygon .. in the amount of 2600 pieces. I didn't go on excursions at the battery ... I didn't ask too much ..
                    This battery in one gulp could drown any battleship, aircraft carrier (within range .. The trick of the RKKF military men was that the range finders of the battery had a base of more than 250 meters .. The aiming, taking into account corrections for air humidity, pressure, wind, made it possible to destroy any target. . in sight! (no locators). There were tables. The shell is guaranteed to hit a square 25X25 meters at a distance of 20 km .. THE FIRST SHALL !!

                    There are 2 more points:
                    If you want information about the Geisler system, try asking them (in the museum). Until they killed it .. the technical documentation was at the headquarters of the garrison ..

                    In relation to 30 seconds .. The gunner cannot aim the gun until it is ready to fire (!). Charged .. started .. the pitching period in the Sea of ​​Japan is 20-30 seconds, the pitching natural oscillations .. the timing for accuracy and reliability is normal .. Well, the ships go one after another .. 1,5-2 kbt (at 15 knots - 2,5 kbt / min) .. less than a minute to the point of the salvo of the one in front ...
                    Sorry, maybe something is not clear .. but how could ..
                    1. Navigator_50
                      Navigator_50 11 May 2021 17: 37
                      +1
                      I would like to suggest a few more points:
                      1) On Japanese ships the time is from the Tokyo meridian, and on Russian ships - the Vladivostok meridian .. Therefore, the time of the Japanese clock and records is 19 minutes later .. (to the east, the time is older). In Japan, the sun rises earlier .. Well, then the time was counted. Then they began to count from Greenwich .. This is where the good news ends.

                      2) On the nautical charts of Mr. Mercator's system, the meridians are true, that is, from the geographic pole (!). And the magnetic compasses pointed to the magnetic pole .. The difference is called magnetic declination and for the Sea of ​​Japan is about 10 degrees to W, that is, it is necessary to subtract the western declination from the compass course (add the eastern one).

                      From the pilot: Terrestrial magnetism. In the northwestern part of the Sea of ​​Japan, the magnetic declination (as of 1990) varies from 8 ° W in the southwest of the region (38 ° 00 'N, 134 ° 00' E) to 10,8 ° W in the northeast ( 47 ° 00'N, 139 ° 00'E). The average annual change in magnetic declination is 0,0 °. The isogon direction is northeast.

                      A magnetic anomaly is noted along the northwestern coast of the Sea of ​​Japan from the Invisible 30 Bay (43 ° 15'M, 134 ° 35'E) to the Limestone Lake (44 ° 02'N, 135 ° 32'E), including the bays of Olga and Vladimir ... The magnetic declination here varies from 16 ° W to 6 ° W. In addition, a magnetic anomaly is observed off the coast between Rynda Bay and Cape Mayachny (45 ° 23'N, 137 ° 09'E), where the magnetic declination is 11 ° W, and also in the area from Cape Utesny (45 ° 33'N, 137 ° 19'E) to Cape Belkin, where the magnetic declination varies from 13 ° W to 2 ° W.

                      Anomalous points of magnetic declination are found in the area of ​​Rudnaya Bay and Oprichnik Bay.

                      But to get the course = the actual path of the ship for laying on the sea map, you also need to subtract (or add the magnetic deviation from the iron of the hull, armor, etc.cannons) This thing - deviation - is different for each ship, for each compass it has its own and also depends on space on the ship (!) can add up to 10-15 degrees or vice versa reduce the compass readings .. The trash of deviation is that it depends on the course of the ship (!!!). turned away degrees by 30 .. and the compass shows that only 20 ..

                      And yet, when the compass is placed in the conning tower, it is verified by comparing it with the one installed on the upper bridge (!). So there is a margin of error here.

                      Why, I am - records in the logbooks about courses and heading angles - differ greatly. This is one of the reasons for the impossibility of maneuvering correctly ... for example, "turn everyone suddenly 30 degrees to the right" - and go to the StW course .. Each ship will have different courses - they will move like "crooked rakes in a splash" .. ...

                      But the trouble is that if the declination is indicated on the maps (the people took care of it), then the deviation is an individual thing on each ship .. And that's not all! During that voyage, which was performed by 2TOE, all this deviation, destroyed in the Baltic, was completely changed in the Sea of ​​Japan. And nobody knows how.
                      Therefore, it is senseless to try to plot something on the maps .. and argue about entries in the logs .. Entries in the ship's log must meet the rule: what we see, we write .. what we don't see, we don't write .. So they write compass courses .. and everyone is different ..

                      I tried to keep it as simple as possible .. I'm sorry ..
                      1. Pushkowed
                        Pushkowed 12 May 2021 11: 58
                        0
                        On Japanese ships, the time is from the Tokyo meridian, and on Russian ships - the Vladivostok meridian. Therefore, the time of Japanese clocks and records is 19 minutes late.
                        Tokyo meridian = 139,7, Vladivostok = 131,9 (in decimal degrees). Difference = 7,8. A 60 minute time difference is provided by a 15,0 degree difference in longitude. But 7,8 degrees should give a difference of 31 minutes, but not 19.

                        On the other hand, in Japan, from 01.01.1888 to the present day, there is a single time, which is 9 hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT + 09: 00) and is never translated. This time corresponds to the 135,0 meridian, but in this case the difference from Vladivostok should be 12 minutes.

                        Something is not being danced ...
                      2. Saxahorse
                        Saxahorse 12 May 2021 22: 50
                        0
                        On the ships of the Republic of Ingushetia they used the local time, allegedly. Those. the latitude at which we were now. For the 2nd TOE, this is the time of Tsushima, not Vladik, for the Japanese it is Tokyo. Something like that ..
                      3. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 13 May 2021 04: 01
                        0
                        Time is only a meridian ... For the Japanese, H.Togo could establish ship (ship) time along the meridian of the theater of war ... But it should be coordinated with the ground forces ... after all, they flooded to Korea and China together ..
                      4. Navigator_50
                        Navigator_50 14 May 2021 04: 00
                        +2
                        Here's a trick ... Local time - set for the territory by the time zone ... well, with the addition of maternity or spring winter. This is for civilian use.
                        And there is a local astronomical time - according to the culmination of the Sun in a given place - where the theodolite (plumb line) is installed .. If you have a chronometer with the time of another meridian .. you can determine the longitude of the observation point by the time difference .. You can use the climax of the Sun at the local meridians determine the moment of noon (12:00). and correct the chronometer. That is, the problem is direct and inverse ...
                        And if you move a meter to the West or East, then a new meridian is a new local meridional time at a new point ... It's too inconvenient. When the exact time began to beep on the radio .. relief came ... But that was only later ..
                        Boring, brothers .. Sorry for the offtopic ..
                    2. Navigator_50
                      Navigator_50 13 May 2021 03: 52
                      0
                      Still, you don't need to be literal ...
                      1) I tried to convey the idea that the time of recordings of events is different on Japanese and Russian ships;
                      2) I tried to simplify as much as possible .. Without plunging into the jungle of astronomy, geodesy, sidereal time, universal time, etc.
                      3) On ships and vessels, ship (ship) time is used ... In a formation and a squadron - common on all ships and vessels, etc.
                      4) When moving from west to east or from east to west - the clock is shifted ... by the decision of the commander (captain) in a solo voyage (voyage), and on a squadron, detachment, expedition by order of the senior commander. In order not to disrupt the rhythm of life in the crew, they are usually transferred at 23 o'clock (say) 1 hour ahead .. about which an entry is made in the logbook ... and the engine log. If a ship (vessel) is operating in Antarctica or there in the Arctic, where the meridians converge, the clock does not change, but runs (say) Moscow time. And with the approach to the port of destination, the clock translates ... to the desired one. But they may not translate on the ship, but live as before. In the caravan behind the icebreaker, the time is determined by the captain of the icebreaker, that they were not confused ... and the records were correct. Radio operators ONET finally are crazy all the time on watch in Moscow ..
                      5) I do not know what time Z.P. Rozhdestvensky or his headquarters there for the squadron .. but the difference was revealed in 19 minutes in relation to the Japanese ...
                      Something like that..
                    3. Navigator_50
                      Navigator_50 13 May 2021 16: 53
                      +1
                      I scratched my turnip and realized ... Tokyo meridian and Khabarovsk ...
                      Because in Vladivostok, the time according to Khabarovsk ... longitude is 135,084 degrees. and 139,7 degrees. The difference is 4,616 degrees. X for 4 minutes \ u18,46d 19 minutes ... we will reset to the errors in determining the culminations on the meridian in those times and instruments .. So it will be 2 minutes .. So at XNUMXTOE - the ship's time was considered in Khabarovsk, and for the Japanese - along the Tokyo meridian ...
                  2. Saxahorse
                    Saxahorse 12 May 2021 22: 58
                    0
                    Both comments are very helpful. They remind where the constant confusion with the courses in the documents comes from. Although the last time the deviation seems to be in Kamran, the Russian squadron checked.

                    Well, there is a good reminder about the continuous accompaniment by two gunners. Volley systems on a zero keel only appeared in the 1930s, and before that it was, they kept the sight on the target until they fired. As far as I understand, "direct when loaded" this refers to the towers, they have loading at certain angles only (not always and not at all). The casemate guns were loaded and directed in parallel.
                  3. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 13 May 2021 04: 19
                    +1
                    It is quite difficult to check the deviation ... only at the polygon with alignments in magnetic directions (!) ... We could have made the alignments themselves, but here ... the accuracy of the alignments is very important ..
                    I was completely killed by the flag navigator Esipovsky, who took the compass in the tiller of the flagship to the conning tower, when the wheelhouse was unstuck and had to switch to manual - there was no compass there ... I would have "ripped off" his hands, but he was more afraid of the admiral than the Japanese! (I was afraid that the compass in the wheelhouse would lie when firing, apparently it was so!). And the flagship dangled semi-controlled on the battlefield .. until they drowned ..
                  4. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 13 May 2021 10: 38
                    0
                    Not Esipovsky, but Colonel Filipovsky V.I.
                    I made it up a little ...
          2. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 13 May 2021 04: 06
            0
            If you find Melnikov's book "Rurik" was the first "- there is in Chapter 5, a lot of things and footnotes .. about PAS-1901, etc. The source is reliable ..
          3. Navigator_50
            Navigator_50 13 May 2021 04: 24
            0
            Not in the jet, but in a simultaneous volley ... The multiple launch rocket systems from the Katyusha went off .. several cars (battery) threw shells in seconds ... and left .. And some of us, in the old-fashioned way, count how many in an onboard salvo tons .. but how to shoot in one gulp, so oh-oh-oh ..
            1. Navigator_50
              Navigator_50 13 May 2021 06: 58
              0
              Here practice is the criterion of truth ...
              1) Oslyabyu standing was made like a rock on a training ground ..
              2) The Varyag also immediately took Asam - just left from behind the island of Iodolmi .. The distance was already set on the island ... and the optics aimed at the Varyag ... Immediately 3 hits and 8 on the retreat, when Asama fired one tower longitudinally. ..
              Rudnev and "sour" immediately ...
              3) All damaged ships of the 2TOE were shot at elementary levels ... On damaged ships - roll and trim ... The aiming plane of the gun and the plane of flight of the projectile differ by several degrees at once .. The projectile flies somewhere there .. and the Japanese, as at the range, shoot they are almost completely safe. "Surround" - yes no, they line up in a spent element - an arc (or circle) and without changing the range and shoot ... HOW LEARNED ..
  • unknown
    unknown 8 May 2021 09: 59
    +1
    Again "lightweight" shells.
    And someone is already starting to compare the Japanese "underdeveloped" with "overexposure"
    Yeah, 93,5 kg. against 225 kg. The very thing ...
    The mass of domestic 12 "shells was less than the mass of the British.
    The mass of the French shells was less than the mass of the British.
    But, these were 12 "shells.
    During WWI, British 12 "shells were inferior in weight to both German and Austro-Hungarian, and the new French, and even more so Russian. But, they worked effectively on enemy ships, and there was no cry about their smaller mass.
    The Baern shells had a mass of 750 kg. against 885 kg. at Queen Elizabeth's. With the same caliber.
    Where is the cry for the lesser mass of the projectile?
    The Bismarck shells had a mass of 800 kg. against 720 kg. at the "Prince of Wales". The mass of the Englishman's shells was quite a bit undershot, with a smaller caliber. That's where the Germans need to cry.
  • Tavrik
    Tavrik 6 May 2021 15: 11
    +2
    What kind of Dartagnan you are ... Flashed with knowledge, charmed those present. Fogged about some secrets. "You are all in shit, and I am in white gloves" ...
    1. geniy
      geniy 6 May 2021 15: 30
      -5
      What kind of Dartagnan you are ... Flashed with knowledge, charmed those present.

      Well, I was also hunted hundreds of times on various resources, although in terms of the volume of my knowledge, in general, the only person in the whole world who figured out almost all the secrets of the naval war.
      Fogged about some secrets.

      And if you and everyone else think that there are no secrets - so please - I can ask a few very simple questions and it will immediately turn out that you do not know anything. But the questions are very simple, such as what is the shape of the wheel: round, square or triangular? And if all the "experts" in history knew and understood at least something, they would immediately answer my questions.
      For example, a very simple question: how was the artillery firing of the Russians (and all foreign ships) actually organized: Collective under the control of a senior artillery officer or individual, that each gunner directed his gun independently? Do you know the exact answer to this simple question: a round wheel, square or triangular? And you and everyone else have never read the official docs on this? And don't you think it's just that, but in fact the documents are classified?
      1. 27091965
        27091965 6 May 2021 16: 15
        0
        For example, a very simple question: how was the artillery firing of the Russians (and all foreign ships) actually organized: Collective under the control of a senior artillery officer or individual, that each gunner directed his own gun independently?


        You yourself answered your own question. The shooting could be carried out both under the control of a senior artillery officer, and individually. It all depended on the distance.
        1. geniy
          geniy 6 May 2021 16: 34
          -2
          The shooting could be carried out both under the control of a senior artillery officer, and individually.

          You see, in almost any business, there are commonly used, widespread ways of doing it. And the word "could" be performed in any alternative way is practically unacceptable. So, for example, you can shoot at the enemy at the front in principle in different ways: you can, for example, approach the tied enemy soldiers and shoot them in the head with a pistol, or you can shoot with a sniper rifle - what method do you think was the most used?
          Or, for example, you can go to work on your hands - upside down, or you can jump on one leg, or you can still walk normally and calmly on two legs in the usual upright position. Or, for example, in the air battle over Pearlharbor, one Japanese fighter took and turned upside down to show its prowess and shot down an American plane. What do you think - usually in what position were air combat?
          It is exactly the same with the Russian-Japanese war. The word "could" and how they actually shot are two big differences. Of course, thousands of sailors knew perfectly well how the shooting was conducted: by individual guidance or general guidance under the control of a senior artilleryman. But only none of them wrote to our descendants about this. And in the archives, of course, there are documents as it was regulated, only these documents are classified. So how did they usually shoot: individually or with general ship guidance according to the Geisler system? You probably don't know?
          1. 27091965
            27091965 6 May 2021 16: 47
            0
            Quote: geniy
            Of course, thousands of sailors knew perfectly well how the shooting was carried out: individual guidance or general guidance under the control of a senior artilleryman. But only none of them wrote to our descendants about this.


            Refer to the "target practice" reports, until 1909 they describe in detail not only the methods of firing, but also describe how practical firing took place in the fleets and coastal batteries of different countries.
            1. geniy
              geniy 6 May 2021 16: 53
              -2
              Have you read them yourself - these are Target practitioners? Maybe you can refute me with a quote (and preferably in Russian). Have you ever seen quotations from Russian-language documents of this kind?
              So I ask you to refute me if I am wrong.
              1. 27091965
                27091965 6 May 2021 17: 12
                +1
                Quote: geniy
                Have you read them yourself - these are Target practitioners?

                Was reading.
                So I ask you to refute me if I am wrong.

                Honestly, I don’t understand what I have to refute you and why?
                1. geniy
                  geniy 6 May 2021 17: 29
                  -4
                  Honestly, I don’t understand what I have to refute you and why?

                  Well, at least to educate the local people how the artillery fire was actually conducted: by individual guidance or according to the senior artillery officer.
  • mmaxx
    mmaxx 8 May 2021 14: 28
    +1
    I read something again. Why scare people so much with derivation and crosswind? None of this is difficult. Derivation is the removal of a projectile by the aerodynamic force arising from the rotation of the projectile. In general, at each distance, it has some kind of constant value. For example, meters or feet. It is enough to indicate this value in the tables. It is even better to immediately correct the angle of rotation of the gun. All things. The distance is such and such, the amendment is such. The artillery officer transfers the angles to the gun. It's almost the same with the wind. But the wind, the dog, is one near you, but different along the path of the projectile. Here the amendment is only for the first sighting volley. This is all nonsense. But taking into account the movement and your dispersion is already shamanism. Before the advent of radars.
    But in Tsushima, the distances were not the same. With proven hardware and good practice, the result would be different. There was neither one nor the other. But when 4 battleships beat everyone that is on their heads ... Not understanding where their falls, where are strangers ... Well, these are the brains of the most important, in the past, artilleryman ZP Rozhestvensky.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 12: 41
      -1
      Quote: mmaxx
      Why scare people so much with derivation and crosswind?

      Because our "genius" does not understand at all what he is writing about.
      All the errors about which he makes noise give a scanty impact. For example, lateral deviation with all errors, including derivation, at a distance of 30 cables will give at most a few meters from the aiming point. A 152 mm projectile flies at this distance of about 10 seconds, during which time the ship will travel about 12 meters at a speed of 36 knots. Thus, it is enough to aim at the stem (this is what they did, by the way) and no derivations will prevent you from getting on board the ship.
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 9 May 2021 16: 57
        +1
        The thought about the mythical point through which the ships of Togo turned at the beginning of the battle also worries all the time. Like, if you shoot there, then Togo Khan.
        How did people imagine it? An analogue of barrage fire on airplanes? So with the rate of fire of anti-aircraft guns, it was not so effective. What would it look like with 12-inch guns? And during the movement of both our and the Japanese columns? All this is nonsense. Moreover, the point is absolutely just a place on the water. During the time that everything happened, then it was unrealistic. It's easier to hit the turned ship. The ship, you can see it. He's real. It can be seen and measured. Gunner, range finder or artillery officer.
        Here I read an article that the cruiser "Maxim Gorky" came out to shoot at the Germans. Preparing data for shooting. Torpedo boats attacked. Dodged. Then again preparing the data for shooting. Then torpedo boats again. Preparing new data again. He did not shoot until the stern was blown off. And he was supposed to shoot along the shore. In later times, as soon as the ships began to mutually maneuver, the effectiveness of the fire dropped sharply.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          Andrei from Chelyabinsk 9 May 2021 19: 52
          0
          Quote: mmaxx
          The thought about the mythical point through which the ships of Togo turned at the beginning of the battle also worries all the time. Like, if you shoot there, then Togo Khan.

          Strictly speaking, this really simplified zeroing at ships, since having determined the distance to the turning point, then you will know the distance to any ship that passes through it.
          And yes, theoretically, having aimed at a given point, it would be possible to hit with rapid fire, without wasting time on zeroing when the next ship passes it. But this is all very ... speculative.
    2. Navigator_50
      Navigator_50 9 May 2021 14: 03
      0
      You are correct about derivation .. and wind ..
      But then in another "the dog rummaged", as one famous person said.
      The system of heading angles is tied to the ship's hull (!), But the course is unstable ... The magnetic compass has +/- 5 degrees of yaw of the ship (well, such inaccurate navigation), especially when the towers move and guns shoot ... different sides ... A spectacle, especially for the helmsman and officer of the watch. The ship prowls ("wags") and tries to hold on to the one in front. For insignificant distances to the enemy, this is nothing, but at 60 kbt, the cruiser "Varyag", for example, will take less than one angular degree .. (lagged) sideways, either bow or stern to the observer quite a few minutes of angular ... No, 40 kbt already nearer. But you won't be able to aim .. One more nuance. The roll and trim of the ship were not intended to be corrected by any amendments, but the vertical plane of the projectile's flight differed from the one at which they wanted to shoot it with aiming ... well, at the cables - one and a half ... So the staff did not hit anywhere, although with a strong arrow. So savages drive away evil spirits and the Chinese with fireworks, for which gunpowder was invented .. Pichalka. Yes, sir.
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 9 May 2021 17: 21
        +1
        Duc, Yoly-Pali, in those days, the angles of the course were measured with points. Well, on calm water half a rumba could still be held. And this is 5 degrees with a penny.
        The most interesting thing was that it was enough to open the whole world.
        1. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 10 May 2021 13: 30
          -1
          That's right .. You can open America with rumba .. And shoot from bullet-puffed cannons too ..
          But when you have a telescopic sight field of 5-7 degrees, and the steamer is prowling 10 degrees (+/- 5), then the target designation by the heading angle is such that you will not aim at the target ... Also the pitching of degrees +/- 5..from board to board (I take it to a minimum) .. Well, why are these optics ?? gunman ... they flew without her and nothing ..

          A couple of years later, the ships already had gyrocompasses ... repeaters, there was already +/- 0,5 degrees .. But after that ... Tsushima ..
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 10 May 2021 15: 33
            0
            It looked like a bike. About some joint demonstrations of ours and NATO. Went in tyrnets. It was necessary to sink the buoy. And from a short distance. Only no one took into account that it was rubber. That is, for modern stealth radar systems. Here the NATO troops passed and no one even began to shoot. Nowhere. And ours blasted and drowned the buoy. When we looked at the radar station, there was nothing. Aim through an empty muzzle and fired. A bike, but beautiful. Skillfully and without a sight you can.
            1. Navigator_50
              Navigator_50 11 May 2021 06: 07
              +1
              Good day! The bike, of course, is ridiculous ... About 50 years in our fleets there are no guns to look through the barrel (hung with automation, hydraulics, pneumatic blowing, etc.). It was possible on the 68bis cruisers of the project - through the main caliber - 152mm to see the light, and to aim and shoot and hit ... This is from a fairy tale "by the pike's command .." Artillery mounts already then had automatic target tracking modes according to radar data and had a semi-automatic mode .. For him, on the wings of the bridge and the stern, too (depending on the ship and the amount of artillery), an optical sight, binocular type, was installed, the gun in this mode was synchronized with this sight, and not the radar. The CRU (calculator) calculated the angles for parallax, etc. That is, it fired directly at the target point .. And if the ship had movement relative to the target, then corrections for the lead ... The main task of this shooting is to hit a small target, mine, boat, inflatable boat ... etc ...
              PS I forgot ... there were fireworks guns on the tank (caliber 37-45mm), but they did not allow aiming and there were current blank shells at them ... well, for the salute of nations, the queen's birthday ... something like that.
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 11 May 2021 11: 59
                +1
                Yes, here too ... Maybe there is some kind of installation, into the trunk of which you can look from the treasury. But how, in motion, can you then bounce yourself, charge, shoot and still hit? Let's leave the storytellers on the conscience. Let's support you for your ingenuity. Let the noodles hang.
      2. mmaxx
        mmaxx 9 May 2021 17: 24
        +1
        There is a book of an artillery officer from the cruiser Derflinger. That data is considered the most accurate for determining mutual maneuvering in the Battle of Jutland. The gunner recorded all angles and distances exactly for each swim. And what was written in the magazine on watch ... apparently no one looked at it.
  • Olddetractor
    Olddetractor 6 May 2021 12: 17
    0
    Quote: geniy
    And none of you really knows anything about it

    The article is clearly intended for specialists from other fields and poorly trained readers ... It will be of little interest to naval artillerymen. Everything seems to be clear.
    It remains to understand who to consider oneself, a dark and illiterate person or just stupid, to whom the commentary of this genius seems banal ...? Yo
    1. geniy
      geniy 6 May 2021 14: 32
      -5
      It remains to understand who to consider myself,
      You, like everyone else, should consider yourself dark and illiterate. I assure you that I should ask you, like anyone else, the simplest question here: for example, how was the volley organized from the two-gun turret of any battleship of that time (who pressed what exactly) - how will you immediately float down the river of ignorance.
      And if you think that they say modern naval officers-artillerymen know at least something about how the shooting of the last century was organized - then I assure you that they are all modern, the same profane as you are - that is, modern artillerymen about that time nothing at all know. For example, ten years ago, I read on the Tsushima website a dispute between two modern gunners about how a shot from Russian dreadnoughts of the Sevastopol type was organized - and I immediately realized that they didn’t know a thing!
      1. mmaxx
        mmaxx 6 May 2021 17: 21
        +5
        It's just that pure military men are distinguished by great inertia. They try to kill any clever people in the lieutenant. That's all they taught them. A step aside, or worse, into history, and you're already smart. Only war puts in place, when the bosses stay away from the front end.
        They invented shooting from closed positions. So who took over first? Japanese. And they hit ours. We had to apply it too. And what about the Germans? At the beginning of WWII, they focused on direct fire in field artillery. And this is an advanced military school.
        It's the same everywhere. Until the roasted cock pecks ... In RYAV, even when it pecked, no one in the fleet moved. We set up rangefinders and sights and that's it. In practice, everything from the concussion stopped working. Just how Rozhestvensky was thrown with a supply of shells for firing is nowhere more indicative. Where did they come from that they sent shells to Vladivostok?
        Past knowledge is easily lost. That is why such articles are interesting. Any reenactors can try to reproduce something from the wars of the past. But you can't shoot from the battleship now ... Bad.
        1. Navigator_50
          Navigator_50 8 May 2021 10: 55
          0
          Here's the thing ... A soldier has no right to amateur performances, especially without the knowledge of his superiors !!! They are rehearsed in the bursa - until the skills and thoughts are at everyone's level!
          Well, imagine, in a battalion there are three companies or a dozen platoons ... the task is set, and if someone from platoon or company commanders takes up amateur performance, the battalion commander will shoot him in front of the formation! Otherwise, the battalion commander will be shot .. Die, but complete the task .. What amateur performance? ..
          Although some officers in the RYaV understood something, but apart from the paper reports, the matter did not move .. About what there are papers in the Military-Historical Commission. You can have a mind, but do only what is ordered! This is where the army stands (well, and the Armed Forces of different countries). But when they are prescribed from the very top, then new directives and orders will be given ... they will be sent to master new technology, etc.
          Therefore, it does not matter whether there were rangefinders or not, there were sights or not ... if they were not preparing to shoot at 40-60 kbt, then they could not and could not ... Hence Tsushima ...
          The shells were sent to Vladivostok, because they were sure that the ZPR would lead the squadron there .. And he did not shoot the existing training ones .. and he did not fuss. I thought that the level of training was sufficient ... (well, the Japanese - macaques still shoot worse) ..
          1. mmaxx
            mmaxx 8 May 2021 14: 36
            0
            The fact of the matter is that there is a boss, but there is. If the superior is not going to listen to the subordinate, very smart, outside the war, in combat training, then there is no progress. And there are almost no smart bosses ...
            1. Navigator_50
              Navigator_50 9 May 2021 13: 35
              0
              Good day! You, excuse me, did not serve, as I see it ..
              There are several statutes in military service ... official and not very ...
              Here is a "prayer" for the first year: ... "read the charter for the coming dream,
              and in the morning - rising from sleep - read intensely tired! "..
              CHARTER:
              Article 1. The boss is always right.
              Article 2. If the Chief is wrong - read Article 1.
              Article 3. Serve according to the Charter - you will win honor and glory !;

              All the "wisdom" of military service in three articles ..

              In Chiefs, they are promoted not for intelligence, but for quick wits .. If in a critical situation when checking to "cover" the top Chief's ass (take his mistake upon himself), then the career will be slowed down ... unlike the "especially talented" this area ...
              1. mmaxx
                mmaxx 9 May 2021 16: 17
                0
                It is these sacred things that prevent us from moving forward. Any idea will be buried in the boss's mood.
                And I served. Therefore, I have the right to evaluate.
              2. mmaxx
                mmaxx 9 May 2021 17: 16
                0
                Here's an example:
                Quote: geniy

                In 1903, a training artillery detachment successfully fired at the command "Management and action of ship artillery in battle and during exercises" drawn up by the flagship artilleryman of the Pacific squadron A. K. Myakishev. But neither the main naval headquarters, represented by ZP Rozhestvensky, nor the naval technical committee of the fleet, represented by FV Dubasov, gave further progress to this document.

                For there is no need for some clever lieutenant to teach admirals to shoot. Let him first learn to shoot according to their instructions. And if nicherta does not work, then a bad lieutenant. A reprimand to him. Those times were still humane. Here and there he served and somehow moved forward. And now they would have put him somewhere on the Caspian flotilla to command barges. And the end of a career. Like gritsa: "Souls are beautiful impulses."
                1. Navigator_50
                  Navigator_50 10 May 2021 13: 19
                  +1
                  Absolutely correct ... And you shouldn't have gotten angry. On this in Russia and the Republic of Ingushetia, everything is also worth it.
                  Well, the principle: "I am the boss, you are d ..!" after all, I did not formulate ...
                  Still clever Griboyedov Alexander Sergeevich in the comedy "Woe from Wit" on behalf of Chatsky said: "... I would be glad to serve, it is sickening to serve ..." This is what civil service in any department is based on. (I do not mention ABVGD different, because it is simpler there - the performer does not know the whole idea, but only his own piece ... Something like that.
                  They say in the damned west they partially get rid of it ... the police do not serve, but work .. Police chiefs are chosen and changed like gloves .. and so on. etc.
                  We have our own way - "WE WILL NOT REDUCE !!!"
                  PS Well, those who did not serve also have the right to evaluate ..
                  1. Navigator_50
                    Navigator_50 11 May 2021 06: 19
                    0
                    By the way, the instruction of Lieutenant Myakishev did not give anything special ... the firing range remained within 25 kbt! He slightly improved the Lujol manual rangefinder, increased the accuracy of distance measurements. But the current PAS-1902 rules defined 20 kbt as a big one .. Reasonably, the authorities judged .. there is no win ... Lyuzhol-Myakishev rangefinders began to be made ... And you immediately - a Caspian, a barge ... Lieutenants are goods (in those days) was a piece ... I think he was marked ... for diligence - Annensky lanyard (for example) ...
                    1. Navigator_50
                      Navigator_50 13 May 2021 07: 00
                      0
                      PAS-1901 ... clarified ..
  • Tavrik
    Tavrik 6 May 2021 15: 03
    0
    Thank you! Interesting article. And very instructive, as, indeed, the whole Russo-Japanese war. This is what the mess "on the ground" leads to, even if there is good funding and a high-quality material base in terms of weapons and equipment. The high command is busy with intrigues, among the generals and admirals of people who care for the task entrusted and know how to organize it - at least. The rest are more concerned with the outside, showing off and dusting. The officer corps, seeing such an attitude of their commanders, also "give up" and are engaged in "personal selfishness", and not the training of personnel. The sailors read revolutionary agitation and do not seek to "study military affairs in a real way." Plus shapkozakidatelny propaganda. The result is a little predictable ... Very relevant.
    1. geniy
      geniy 6 May 2021 16: 14
      -1
      This is what the local mess leads to,

      And on this I cannot agree with you. In fact, Russian artillery and especially shells were the best for that time! And although they were lightweight and equipped with wet pyroxylin, they could penetrate Japanese armor at close distances, but Japanese ones, in principle, could not penetrate Russian armor. And if most of you do not understand, then behind the armor of the towers and casemates there are guns, and to them - necessarily charges of gunpowder and shells. And the charges of gunpowder flare up from the slightest spark - even just from the friction of metal on metal. For example, in powder mills, it was forbidden to have shoes lined with iron nails - because the entire mill could explode from the slightest spark. So - if the entire Russian squadron immediately turned its nose at the Japanese squadron, then there would certainly be a rapprochement at an extremely close distance and the execution of the Japanese with the penetration of their towers and casemates.
      You will say that the Russian ships had a low speed. But this is cheating! Because the newest Russian battleships have 16 knots - just like the Japanese ones. And there is also such a principle - the speed of any squadron is equal to the speed of its slowest vessel.
      You will say that the Russians had a lot of slugs. So, if you go for a rapprochement, then the Russian slugs will certainly lag behind in the wake, but on the other hand, the Japanese battleships would also be under concentrated fire. And it is enough for at least one of them to get a shell in the engine room and boiler room, and he would have stopped right there! And here the principle immediately comes into play: "Will you give your trash can to be eaten by us?" That is, just one lagging Japanese battleship immediately becomes a bait for the entire Japanese squadron - they have a choice - to leave the trash can to be devoured or to protect it and stop with it? That is, to take the battle at an extremely close distance, advantageous for the Russian armor-piercing shells.
      1. Tavrik
        Tavrik 6 May 2021 19: 07
        +4
        Why did you write all this?
        I did not deny high-quality weapons and equipment (see above):
        even if there is good funding and a high-quality material base in terms of weapons and equipment

        It's just that guns, shells and range finders still need "brains" and "hands". And then the tsarist regime showed itself in all its glory ... At first, having funding, they ordered a bunch of different types of ships in different countries, then they could not competently apply all this beauty. It is characteristic that neither the First Squadron, nor the Second, nor the Varyag with the Korean inflicted serious damage on the enemy. Apparently because it's not about Rozhdestvensky, but deeper. This is what should be studied in schools and academies in the context of "how not to do it."
      2. unknown
        unknown 8 May 2021 10: 07
        0
        The speed of the Japanese battleships is less than 15 knots.
        Unit speed is the speed of the slowest ship in the unit.
        In his monograph on Japanese battleships S.V. Balakin, albeit very modestly, in a note (probably so few people would notice. Indeed, why destroy dogmas.) Writes that "Fuji" in the years of the RYAV could not walk more than 15 knots.
        Andrey from Chelyabinsk, including on this resource, wrote that the Japanese ships were very heavily overloaded with fuel. It is likely that the speed of the Japanese First Division is 14 knots.
        The situation is similar with the "underdogs" of Kamimura, these "unsurpassed" slow-moving "cruisers". The slowest is Azuma. Long-term -15 knots.
        1. geniy
          geniy 8 May 2021 10: 27
          +1
          The speed of the Japanese battleships is less than 15 knots.

          First, thank you very much for this clarification.
          And secondly - in fact, the speed is not so important (if it is not too low - as Rozhdestvensky ordered 9 knots). The fact is that if the Russian squadron at the very beginning of the battle suddenly turned 90 degrees and began to approach the Japanese squadron, even in the formation of an "ugly heap", then all the same the distance between the squadrons would begin to decrease very quickly (at the normal speed of the forward Russian ships 15 nodes). And then the Japanese inevitably also had to turn 90 degrees and start RUNNING away from the Russian squadron.
          Just think about this word - the entire Japanese fleet immediately took flight!
          BUT, few people know that it is fundamentally important how the shells hit the ship: LONGITUDINAL OR LONGITUDINAL. Because lateral hits are not so scary, but longitudinal hits are DEADLY! The fact is that an armor-piercing projectile flying along the ship inevitably decreases along a ballistic trajectory and it will either pierce the armor of the aft tower or casemate of medium artillery and cause an explosion of ammunition, or it will dive under the armored deck and then it will smash steam engines or boilers, and any ship will definitely stop. And then the entire Russian squadron will overtake him, albeit in the formation of an ugly heap and begin to fire from different sides, and Russian destroyers in a common dump will come up and sink him with torpedoes.
          And in fact, the speed does not matter - even if the Japanese cruiser has 22 knots, the shell still flies faster - 300 knots! And the flying projectile will catch up with the cruiser anyway. And when the opposing ships stand LONGITUDINAL to each other - that is, some run away from others, then the shooting accuracy increases by about 10 times! Amateurs do not know this, of course. But the Japanese shells were not armor-piercing, but immediately exploded. So, if the firing accuracy of Russian ships in the longitudinal position increased by 10 times with excellent armor-piercing, albeit non-explosive, shells, then the Japanese fleet would be doomed!
          1. nemoXX
            nemoXX 13 May 2021 10: 35
            0
            Your thought is interesting! However, the inevitable loss of control in battle in the form of a "dog dump" would have fatal consequences for the 2nd TO, which did not have a battle plan with the complete suppression of the initiative by the commander. It is appropriate to recall in this regard the much more destructive for Russia "land Tsushima" of 41, where the "unjustified repressions of 37-38" completely suppressed the initiative of the fighters and commanders, with their mouths completely shut up for any utterances. The Germans struck, and the huge Red Army - according to the orders of the "genius" command - did not succumb to provocations "and often did not open fire. To fight the enemy fleet, superior to the forces of the 2nd TO, a non-trivial decision was required and commanders with the mentality of the commander of the" Emden "von It is obvious that organizing such a decision at the state level, taking into account many factors and in different versions, was beyond Russia at that time, and even today it does not always work, ending in the ruthless exploitation of "mass heroism" - the self-destruction of the remnant of the Russian people.
            1. geniy
              geniy 13 May 2021 12: 36
              0
              nemoXX:
              Your thought is interesting! However, the inevitable loss of control in battle in the form of a "dog dump" would have fatal consequences for the 2nd TO, which did not have a battle plan with the complete suppression of the initiative by the commander.

              You are absolutely right that if even before entering the Korean Strait, Rozhestvensky had not developed a plan of attack for the Japanese fleet and brought it to the attention of the ship commanders, then even if one leading flagship rushed at the enemy, nothing good would have happened. This is exactly what happened when the battleship Alexander the third suddenly rushed at the Japanese, but no one supported him, the other battleships did not increase their speed. Yes, and in the battle in the Yellow Sea, the commander of Retvizan also sent his ship alone in order to strike a ramming blow, but no one supported him either. Therefore, an unprepared spontaneous attack could by no means bring success. Only a plan for an attacking battle developed in advance and agreed with all the commanders of the ships could bring victory to the Russian fleet.
              1. nemoXX
                nemoXX 14 May 2021 09: 39
                +1
                As you know, battalier Novikov (surf), who poured shit on the Russian fleet for 13 Stalinist pieces of silver, famously imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the sidelines. In his opinion, at the moment of the "Togo loop", the Russian squadron had to rush at the Japanese in front formation and arrange a "dog dump." Sounds tempting! Only, the Japanese would have shot the nasal towers and conning towers of the Russian battleships point-blank at a constant course angle, moreover, with rapid-fire 6-dm-kami. Which, according to V. Kofman, authoritative for me, provided the Japanese with the bulk of hits on Russian ships. I'm not going to pretend to be a naval commander, but I think that Russia should have bet on dragging out the war. Japan is extremely scarce in resources and dependent on imports to this day. And Russia could calmly deploy, if not a new fleet, then a new army, ruining Japan for a long war.
                But if we talk only about the 2nd TO, then I would propose to seize the initiative from Togo, imitating the movement of the Russian squadron around Japan. Why ... attack Nagasaki and / or Sasebo with destroyers at night, leaving the squadron to the appropriate point east of the Tsushima Strait. It does not matter how many of the "dozens of steamers" described by the captured Novikov surf on the Nagasaki roadstead would have been sunk. The noise generated by the attack on the port / ports would force Togo to do something immediately. But what? It is highly likely that he would have divided his forces, leaving part in the Tsushima Strait, and partly moving to catch the Russians ... it is not known where. He could not appear immediately at Sasebo and Nagasaki - we know where he was. And if I was in Sasebo, I would have lost 1-2 large warships. In the meantime, the 2nd TO could describe an arc in a southerly direction and enter Tsushima watering at night. Moreover, having previously loaded up with coal and torpedoes from transports in Japanese (!) Waters, bays, and even in view of small settlements. As an option - with their temporary capture, at the same time, demonstrating movement around Japan. The chances of passage through the Tsushima Strait, where there are no 1st and 2nd armored detachments of Togo, would increase significantly, and the Izumi-type scouts guarding the strait could be identified and destroyed by a sudden night attack by destroyers before they informed Togo about the Russians.
                1. geniy
                  geniy 16 May 2021 08: 19
                  0
                  I completely agree with you that delaying the RYA for Russia would be the best way out. And besides, you are right in the fact that with the correct organization, the Rozhdestvensky Squadron could easily pass without a fight both the Tangar Strait and the La Perouse Strait - of course the Japanese squadron would catch up with the Russian, but only near Vladivostok itself. But the truth is, I would like to add to you that if Rozhestvensky ordered to go through the Korea Strait at a speed of 14 knots (by reducing the slow-moving ones) and at the same time interfering with the enemy with false radio signals, then he could lead his squadron without a fight through the Korean Strait without a fight. And then the Japanese would catch up with the Russians near Vladivostok. And it was there that, if any of the three straits passed, a general battle would take place in favorable conditions. And also I believe that if all the Russian submarines were sent from Vladivostok to the port of Busan (they had quite enough range, especially the Kasatoks), then they could torpedo several Japanese ships even before Tsushima.
                  But in no case can I agree with you in the assessment of an artillery battle that Japanese ships would shoot the bow towers at a zero heading angle. And Kofman is not a prophet here, I must say that over the past hundred years, no one at all guessed how the artillery actually operated in Tsushima - I am the only person - it is very difficult and multidimensional, and I do not want to prematurely disclose this secret. But in short, you are completely mistaken that the Japanese shells could destroy the towers and wheelhouses. The fact is that the Japanese and Russian shells were fundamentally different from each other and not at all in their weight. The Russian shells were filled with 30% water in pyroxylin, so they did not explode when hitting the armor, but pierced it. But the fact is that when shooting from a long distance, an armor-piercing projectile greatly loses its speed and armor penetration, and there is another factor that is unknown to anyone except me - in fact, the Russian projectile lost its armor penetration ten times more! However, at close range, its armor penetration increased tenfold! Therefore, the Japanese ships would quickly be pierced by both the towers and casemates. And there the ignition of gunpowder and the explosions of cellars.
                  In contrast to this, Japanese shells - even armor-piercing - they had and such, due to instant braking when hitting the armor, spontaneous detonation of explosives occurred - even ordinary gunpowder and melenite. And the Japanese shell, which did not have time to penetrate the armor, due to the gigantic internal pressure, exploded into thousands of small fragments that could not penetrate the armor of the Russian towers. But, however, the towers of Russian ships could still receive damage from concussion, from jamming by shrapnel from the separation of barrels and an explosion of gunpowder inside the tower - as on Suvorov. And in the cabin, too, would have wounded and killed Russian officers and sailors.
                  But you do not take into account the most important fact - that after receiving some damage, any ship slows down its speed or makes a turn and breaks down, and moreover, the wounded ship from the head of the column goes to its end. So at the very beginning of the battle, "Oslyabya" and Borodino rolled out of order to the right, and at 2:30 am Suvorov rolled out of order, turning 180 degrees. Then, after various maneuvers, Alexander failed and stood in the wake behind Sisoy. And at the end of the battle, Suvorov fell so far behind that he walked far behind the entire Russian squadron. Sisoy, Navarin and Nakhimov also went to the tail of the column, having suffered from the fire. With this, I emphasize the fact that a wrecked ship always slows down and goes into the tail of the column.
                  But this rule applies in general for all ships in the world - not only for the Russians, but also for the Japanese!
                  So at the beginning of the Tsushima battle, the armored cruiser Izumo was knocked out, then Asama whose steering was out of order.
                  So: when fighting on parallel courses, all the wrecked ships calmly move to the tail of the column. But the situation changes dramatically if one squadron is chasing and trying to catch up with another! Because when chasing one squadron after another, it is simply impossible for the destroyed ships to go to the tail of the column - because this tail is precisely the most dangerous, most bombarded place! And if you all realized that having organized the pursuit of the Russian squadron for the Japanese, albeit at a lower speed - but the shells will still catch up - their speed of 300 knots, then the knocked out Japanese ships will inevitably begin to lag behind and end up in the middle of the formation of the Russian squadron, fired from all parties. Whereas, in contrast to this, the knocked out Russian ships from the head of the column will calmly move to its tail and find themselves outside the shelling of the Japanese. And when two or three or four knocked out Japanese battleships or armored cruisers find themselves in the middle of a Russian squadron of 12 armored ships and shoot at close range, and torpedoes will be fired at them, then the Japanese admiral will have a choice - either he will rush into this pile on help your own, or stand aside and shoot from a long distance. And then, when three or four knocked out Japanese ships are sunk by torpedoes, the Russian squadron will again organize a chase, and so on until the complete destruction of the Japanese fleet.
  • Tavrik
    Tavrik 6 May 2021 16: 12
    +1
    Quote: geniy
    In terms of the volume of my knowledge, I am generally the only person in the whole world who has figured out almost all the secrets of the naval war.

    Yes, I understand that you are geniy.
  • sevtrash
    sevtrash 6 May 2021 17: 48
    +2
    Well, finally, an article about the most important thing - how the shooting was controlled. And the announced comparative analysis is also very interesting. It would be nice to compare not only the Russian, Japanese, but also the British and German fleets.
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 6 May 2021 23: 40
    +3
    Quote: Jura 27
    Saving gunpowder - these are drawings from the beleaguered Arthur. Another option is a damper. In general, the mention of a tree in the chamber, only in these figs. saw.

    Due to the bursting of shells due to spontaneous ignition of black powder when fired at the turn of 1880/90. our shells of large calibers were not loaded at all. S.O. Makarov, being an inspector of naval artillery, drew attention to this outrage, and after carrying out a lot of experiments it was decided to reduce the column of black powder in the projectile by installing a wooden blank. For the explosion, a sample tube was used. 1894 - slightly modernized Baranovsky pipe. For steel shells, this was a temporary solution, since from 1894 they began to equip them with pyroxylin, but for cast iron shells it remained.
  • Alexandra
    Alexandra 7 May 2021 02: 12
    0
    Quote: rytik32
    But from hitting the armor, the trigger was 100%.


    Well, in general, pyroxylin self-detonated when struck into a fairly thick (let's assume, of the order of caliber) armor.

    From the most comprehensive report on the Ministry of War on the activities and condition of all branches of military command in 1904

    "... In order to increase the destructive effect of armor-piercing shells, the question was raised about equipping such shells with any strong explosive. But since all the explosives used to equip high-explosive shells, such as pyroxylin or melinite in pure form, are not withstand the impact of a projectile on the plate and explode with such an impact before the projectile has time to penetrate the plate, it was decided to test some chemical compound of an explosive with inactive substances for equipping armor-piercing projectiles (as a result of which the explosive becomes more inert), and at present the commission on The use of explosives settled on explosive B, which promises to give good results. "

    And so it is estimated that from 1/4 to 1/3 of the Russian large-caliber shells that hit the Japanese ships at Tsushima did not explode:

    https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/18956.html

    "In total - from 28 to 33 hits with shells of 8" ... 12 ", of which 6 ... 8 did not explode. This is closer to Brown's well-known estimate * (24 hits by 12" shells - 8 did not explode) "
    1. rytik32
      7 May 2021 12: 07
      +1
      Quote: AlexanderA
      Well, in general, pyroxylin self-detonated when struck into a fairly thick (let's assume, of the order of caliber) armor.

      This information is not correct.
      Quote: AlexanderA
      And so it is estimated that from 1/4 to 1/3 of the Russian large-caliber shells that hit the Japanese ships at Tsushima did not explode

      None of the unexploded ones hit the armor (we don't count ricochets)

      Krylov wrote that it was only after Tsushima that it was possible to make a fuse, which was guaranteed to work from 1/2 inch side plating.
      1. Alexandra
        Alexandra 7 May 2021 21: 06
        +1
        Quote: rytik32
        This information is not correct.

        In the sense of Nicholas II in the most submissive report was given erroneous information on this issue? What is your evidence?
        "Cap. Maksimov was very friendly with me and consulted on all the chemical issues that arose during his work ... He was the first to have the idea to introduce such compounds for equipping projectiles that, having sufficient detonating properties, would not explode when passing through So, for example, an armor-piercing projectile equipped with such an explosive must pass through the armor and then explode from the action of the detonator in the shock tube. He shared this idea with me and offered to work with him to implement it. I willingly agreed for this joint work, and began to investigate in the laboratory various combinations of aromatic nitro compounds with picric acid tri-nitrocresol and not only to study their suitability from a physicochemical point of view, but also to investigate their explosive properties when exploding in the Sarro and Viell bomb. work
        the obtained data were reported to the Commission, and it was decided to carry out experiments of equipping the shells with the intended explosives. Already after the death of Maksimov, which followed at the beginning of 1898, such combinations of nitro compounds found great application in the equipment of shells, and my student at the Academy cap. A. A. Dzerzhkovich, who took the place of Maksimov, successfully continued the development of this issue. "

        V.N. Ipatiev was also mistaken in his recollections, that moist pyroxylin with sufficient detonating properties did not explode when a projectile passed through thick armor?
        Krylov wrote that it was only after Tsushima that it was possible to make a fuse, which was guaranteed to work from 1/2 inch side plating.

        This he wrote about the Brink pipe, but not about the Baranovsky pipe, or the 11DM fuse ("Fuse 11 DM (Fig. 62) was adopted for 6- and 10-inch shells, filled with wet pyroxylin and taken from the Naval Department after the declaration of the Japanese war." Rdultovsky). Actually a quote from "My Memories" by Krylov:

        "The minister was Admiral IM Dikov. After listening to my report, he not only authorized the reading of this report in the Duma, but also said ... This is the content of my report ... Another disadvantage of the failure to ensure the operation of the bursting tube occurred due to the lack of manufacture of the tube itself ... Currently, the tube has been worked out, which cost many hundreds of shots, and its sensitivity has been brought to a guaranteed explosion of a 12-inch projectile when it strikes a 1/2-inch steel shield .. ..."" ... Previously, an explosive charge in shells was used from pyroxylin or smokeless powder. Both substances are of a relatively low density, about 1,1, so there was not much of it in the projectile. In addition, the products of the explosion are colorless, and therefore the burst of a shell at large distances of the last war did not help to see the places where the shells fell and did not make it easier to zero in, just like the black smoke of the shimosa showed this clearly. At first, in our scientific and technical laboratory, an attempt was made to increase the charge density of pyroxylin, and indeed it was possible to achieve such a density by pressing that this pyroxylin, which received the name "elephant", completely resembled ivory even in appearance, but the force of its explosion was in no way inferior shimose, but its dressing was difficult and expensive ... "

        The fact that 12-inch high-explosive shells 2TOE were equipped with smokeless powder, and the fuse was not a Brink tube, but a Baranovsky tube, we know from another source.
        1. rytik32
          8 May 2021 00: 31
          0
          Quote: AlexanderA
          In the sense of Nicholas II in the most submissive report was given erroneous information on this issue? What is your evidence?

          At least what test results did you give, for example https://alex-cat-1975.livejournal.com/7687.html?utm_source=3userpost
          1. Alexandra
            Alexandra 8 May 2021 03: 36
            0
            "Pyroxylin passed the 1,5" test but failed with the 2 "plate."

            When I wrote: "... pyroxylin self-detonated when struck into a fairly thick (let's assume, of the order of caliber) armor" which of the writing did you consider incorrect?

            And the composition of the maximit will suddenly come in handy.
  • Andrey152
    Andrey152 7 May 2021 06: 38
    +1
    Quote: AlexanderA
    Well, in general, pyroxylin self-detonated when struck into a fairly thick (let's assume, of the order of caliber) armor.

    From the most comprehensive report on the Ministry of War on the activities and condition of all branches of military command in 1904

    Well, in general, the pyroxylin did not explode when it hit the thick armor. It was moistened in order to reduce sensitivity to shock, and not only from the point of view of storage safety.
    When experiments were carried out in 1907 to replace pyroxylin, shimose, TNT, and elephantite were compared. And if TNT was adopted for high-explosive shells, then pyroxylin equipment was left for armor-piercing shells, since TNT exploded when it hit the armor. Only after the development of an armored alloy - phlegmatized TNT, he went into armor-piercing shells.
    And you shouldn't have cited the Military Department as an example. In this matter, it was extremely backward from Morskoy. For the fleet, the shells were equipped with pyroxylin from the beginning of the 1890s, and on the coastal batteries of the War Department there were only cast-iron shells with black powder, which were regularly fired with reduced charges to save the resource of barrels, segment shells and armor-piercing shells with INERT equipment, since the "method their equipment with pyroxylin has not yet been developed. " Makarov was very surprised by this when he arrived in Port Arthur. He ordered the transfer of 10-inch pyroxylin shells from the naval reserves to the battery of the Electric Cliff.
  • Pushkowed
    Pushkowed 7 May 2021 07: 18
    0
    the scale was graduated to 10 yards (000 m).
    These are 49 cables.

    And further:
    The cruiser "Ural" was approaching the squadron, and the range finders had to determine its speed by making two control measurements with an interval of 15 minutes at the same time. Here are the results:
    In the table, the values ​​are 56-110 cable. How could this be measured if the scale of the device does not even reach 50?
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 7 May 2021 21: 21
      +1
      Quote: Pushkowed
      In the table, the values ​​are 56-110 cable. How could this be measured if the scale of the device does not even reach 50?

      Good question by the way. Once they measured and made the plate, it means there were some numbers for such distances. The truth is not the fact that the company guaranteed an acceptable error at such distances.
    2. rytik32
      8 May 2021 14: 44
      +2
      Perhaps I have an error in the article.
      I took data from Zolotukhin's book, there is even an image of this scale.
      And Lemtyuzhnikov's later book has the following data:

      I will assume that Zolotukhin could write about the FA2 model. And in our fleet, both models were referred to as the "4,5-foot Barr and Stroud rangefinder".
      1. Navigator_50
        Navigator_50 13 May 2021 07: 04
        0
        And the Japanese (it seems) also had rangefinders with a base of 9 feet - 2,7 meters ... I forgot where I read it ... I ran and went on .. Takshta may have lied ..
  • rytik32
    7 May 2021 22: 40
    +1
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Announce the entire list please

    Christmas
    Ovander (scheme https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079693#?page=70)
    Gertner (up to "Mikasa" 55 cab, heading angle 30)
    Unger-Sternberg (scheme https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079693#?page=84)
    Artshavanger (scheme https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079693#?page=88)
    Pell (scheme https://dlib.rsl.ru/viewer/01005079693#?page=123)
    And this is not a complete list)))