Probable causes of the death of the Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala-402

The deceased diesel-electric submarine Nanggala 402 of the Indonesian Navy

On April 21, 2021, while practicing combat training measures north of the island of Bali, the Indonesian diesel-electric submarine Nanggala (KRI Nanggala-402) of project 209/1300 (built in Germany, 1981) was killed.

Taking into account the depth of the place where the submarine disappeared (more than 800 meters) and the discovery of an oil slick near the diving point on the morning of April 21, the death of the submarine and 53 people on board was immediately obvious. On the Indonesian side, three submarines, 21 surface ships and a vessel, and five aircraft were involved in the search operation. In addition, to participate in the search for KRI Nanggala-402, an Indian Navy rescuer (with a rescue vehicle), two Australian Navy ships and a US Navy P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft were sent. Russia offered its help.

On April 23 and 24, Indonesian ships conducting search operations discovered and fished out on the surface of the sea a number of objects from a submarine, indicating the probable destruction of the strong hull of the boat. Including a fragment of a torpedo tube guide, a bottle of lubricant for a periscope, and prayer rugs for the crew.

On April 24, the command of the Indonesian Navy officially declared the submarine Nanggala lost and 53 people on board - dead (49 people, who are named by the members of the regular crew, headed by the commander Lt. Col. Heri Octavian (and 13 more officers), and the commander of submarine forces II fleet Indonesian Navy Colonel Harry Setiavan with two officers (Lieutenant Colonel Irfan Suri, Service Officer armory materials and electronics and a major), one civilian torpedo weapons specialist).

The incident was not only a tragedy for the family members on board, there was also a frank shock from what happened at the command of the Indonesian Navy, in connection with which statements such as were sometimes sounded:

The submarine could crack ... Nanggala was clearly overloaded, as the sub was designed for 34 crew members, and at the time of the disappearance there were 53 people on board.

Obviously, this was clearly said in a very stressful environment. Because, in fact, the question of "overload" is physically impossible, since before going to sea, differentiation is performed with the acceptance or pumping of the necessary ballast into the equalizing tank of the submarine). But the number of people on board raises questions - the regular crew of the boat is indeed less than 49 people. Is it possible that some of the dead are combat swimmers, whom the Indonesians use very actively?

Brief background

Indonesia's submarine forces were created in the early 60s of the USSR. Moreover, in the shortest possible time and almost immediately after Indonesia gained independence from Holland, by transferring 12 Project 613 submarines and other weapons from the Pacific Fleet (including the Ordzhonikidze cruiser of Project 68bis, 8 destroyers and 25 Tu-16 missile-carrying bombers with anti-ship missiles KS-1).

The head one KRI Pasopati-410 (formerly our C-290) is preserved as a museum in Surabaya.

However, soon, as a result of the coup d'etat, the political course of Indonesia sharply changed to the west. Accordingly, subsequent purchases of weapons were made in Western countries.

In the late 70s, a contract was signed with the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft shipyard for the construction of two submarines for the Indonesian Navy under the new (then) project 209/1300. The submarine KRI Nanggala-402 was launched in 1981 and joined the Indonesian Navy the same year.

In 1989, Nanggala underwent repairs at the Howaldtswerke shipyard and, two decades later, a major overhaul in South Korea at the Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering shipyard (completed in January 2012).

A complete revision and repair of all systems was carried out, with the modernization of the submarine's electronic armament and the weapon complex (with the provision of anti-ship missiles, among other things).

After repairs, KRI Nanggala-402 actively participated in combat training (including in the performance of special reconnaissance missions).

This excursion into history important in the sense that it is safe to speak about the significant experience and professional skill of the Indonesian Navy submariners, and in particular the crew of the KRI Nanggala-402. They had a training system, and a long and well-tried one.

Submarines "don't just die"

Contrary to popular belief about the "extremely high risk" for submariners, in fact, this is no longer the case. The strong hulls of modern submarines are really very strong, and the systems critical for survivability have not only automatic and remote control, but also manual control: you can always manually supply air to ballast tanks.

The outboard systems are also of equal strength to the robust hull, have two locks and are regularly checked and serviced in dock repairs. At the same time, the usual navigation of submarines occurs at relatively shallow depths, in fact, submarines are very rarely submerged to great depths. For diesel submarines, with relatively (in comparison with nuclear) weak hulls, diving to great depths also has such inconvenient operational consequences as the need to demagnetize again after deep diving and carry out deviation work on the magnetic compass.

At the same time, it should be understood that the conditions for the operation of submarines are an unconditional serious risk factor, and mistakes here can have an extremely high price. That is, for submariners today, the danger lies not in the conditions of an extremely hostile environment, but in the cost of errors in these conditions.

Obviously, what happened to KRI Nanggala-402 was extremely fleeting. Moreover, the discovered ruptured submarine hull indicates that it was crushed at depth with an “explosion” effect, and was not largely filled with water until it was submerged to the depth of destruction.

The reasons for this may be as follows.

Version 1. Sinkhole due to a sudden inflow of seawater through a destroyed branch pipe or other outboard opening

An example of such an accident (by a hair's breadth from the death of a submarine) is in the description of an officer who served on the submarine at the time described events:

Summer 1981, one of the Baltiysk landfills, project 142 submarine S-665, the horse is 30 years old, all overhaul periods have been extended more than once. The boat is mainly engaged in providing combat training for everyone ... It's like an old rag hare on a dog race, the participants in the races change, but he keeps running. The crew worked out to lazy automatism and unforgivable routine. This exit was normal, our IPC had to provide ... After spitting out the KSP (a combined signal cartridge fired from a VIPS apparatus with a caliber of slightly more than 12 cm), in the 8th compartment a cap. l-l Andrei R. and Mrs. Suluimanov, bringing everything back to the original position, only moved the sliding stop to the side and then pulled a column of water under a pressure of about 6–6,5 kg per square centimeter through the VIPS pipe. From the 7th, they managed to slam the bulkhead on the latch, it was torn off. The second time they had already thrown on the lambs.

Despite the swirling lambs, water whistled along the entire perimeter of the bulkhead doors.

Immediately a large trim to the stern, report from the 7th, alarm signal. The boat is crashing. The depth of the seat was 104 m (all bulkheads in the stern were 1 kgf / cm², that is, 10 meters). How did the bulkhead, designed for 1 kgf / cm², withstand about 7–9 kg, or even more? The foreman of the electricians' team, Midshipman T., said that he saw the bulkhead arching ...

The situation was saved by the foreman of the hold command, midshipman V., from the first, overcoming the weight of the bulkhead doors (the trim is very large, I will not say in numbers) flew into the central center and accidentally blew out the stern and after a few seconds the rest of the ballast. The boat jumped to the surface as if on an elevator.

That is, due to the powerful sudden inflow of water into the 8th compartment (as a result, it was almost completely filled), the submarine received a large negative buoyancy and trim (which excluded its compensation by the lifting force on the hull). The boat was saved by the quick actions of the foreman of the hold command to blow off ballast and the fact that the bulkhead of the 8th compartment miraculously withstood the extreme pressure. With its destruction, the flooding of the 7th compartment and subsequent ones into the nose, the death of the submarine was inevitable. And how it happens, the C-80 disaster has shown in practice. By Oleg Khimanych "S-80. Autonomy of the dead ":

On January 26, 1961, 38 minutes before midnight, the S-80 became under the RDP (the mine works with a diesel engine under water with a float valve) ... To prevent the valve from "seizing" by ice in frosty conditions, it is heated with hot water from running diesel engines. This system was not included on the S-80 - and this is the first fatal mistake ...

The catastrophe developed rapidly. The boat rocked violently, and at some point the boatswain, who controlled the rudders, could not keep the depth. The wave swept through the air line of the RDP mine, the ice-bound float valve did not work ... The sea rushed into the boat through an air duct with a diameter of 450 mm.

The water inflow was noticed at about the 10th second of the accident. It was discovered late, according to experts, due to the fact that the shaft ended under the deck flooring. In addition, the roar of the diesel engine drowned out the noise of the water flow. Water filled the bow and stern holds, the shaft line with a tire-pneumatic clutch sprayed it over the compartment. The diesel engine ran out of air, and a vacuum was created in the compartment. At 01:27 the right diesel had to be turned off. The left one was not included. The propellers pushing the boat at a speed of 5,3 knots stopped.

To close the air flap of the RDP, it was required to turn the handle to the "closed" position. But in the confusion, the hold (of the "assigned" sailors) confused the manipulators - there were several of them, located close to each other, and even without indication of their destination.

The motorists could still stop the water - manually close the 2nd constipation. Under normal conditions, this is eleven turns of the handwheel with the handle in a few seconds. Here people had to overcome the pressure of water. The sailors managed to make only 8 revolutions. This was done by superhuman efforts - a steel valve stem with a diameter of 10 centimeters was bent. Those two minders were the first to die.

There was still hope for an emergency ascent. But such a decision could be made by the commander of the BCh-5, but he was out of place - in the sixth compartment.

By the 30th second, the boat almost lost its speed and began to fall astern - the trim reached 20 degrees. By the 40th second, they decided to blow through the main ballast tanks from the central post, but two more, already the last mistakes, were made. The first - they did not use the system of quick blowing of the emergency ballast tank No. 5. Second - in the sixth compartment, the electricians did not follow the command of the officer of the watch and did not give a move to the main propellers of the electric motor. The boat with a trim of 45 degrees stopped, for a moment it seemed to hang - it no longer had enough high-pressure air to overcome the negative buoyancy - and with increasing speed, sternly rushed down to the bottom ...

Approximately 60 seconds after the start of the disaster, the boat sank into the bottom soil astern. Calculations show that the speed of the ship was 5 meters per second, and the depth of "burying" the stern into the ground was 15 meters. The hull withstood both the blow and the pressure, but the water continued to enter the boat through the RDP shaft and increase the pressure of the air remaining there ... The bulkhead between the third and fourth compartments was literally torn apart by a hydro-air blow - the sea swept away everything in its path.

Residual energy destroyed the bulkhead of the second compartment, and water filled it, with the exception of a volume of 40 cubic meters in the bow. The sailors who were in compartments from the fifth to the third, as well as in the conning tower, died within the first three minutes. Those who managed to move to the sixth, seventh and first compartments survived. After 10 minutes, through leaks in the bulkhead, the water began to flood the sixth, and later broke through the bulkhead into the seventh compartment.

The last to die were the submariners of the first compartment, which was considered a compartment - a refuge.

Raised C-80, one of its compartments, dead submariners.

According to Vice Admiral R. D. Filonovich:

Water ripped through spherical bulkheads of finger-thick steel. Locks of metal curled towards the nose - the water hammer came from the fifth, diesel, compartment. The water tore off mechanisms from the foundations on its way, swept away the felling, fences, and crippled people. Almost everyone who was removed from the fourth and third compartments had their heads smashed ...

The S-80 sank at a depth of about 200 meters and was raised in 1969, which made it possible to fully establish the circumstances of the disaster. In this case, it should be noted "Alternative opinion" (and most likely reliable) about the reasons for the initial occurrence of the emergency:

After the boat was lifted, the commission found that during the last maneuver "urgent diving" due to poor assembly during the ship's modernization period, the sealing rubber ring on the RDP air flap plate (its diameter is 450-500 mm) twisted out. At the same time, outboard water began to flow through the formed gap into the air duct of the RDP with increasing pressure as the boat failed, and from it through the lower mushroom for supplying air to the diesel engine into the fifth compartment of the boat. A mushroom is called the second duplicate clap, the plate of which structurally resembles a mushroom - the subject of a mushroom picker quietly hunting in the forest.

At the central post, apparently, within a couple of tens of seconds allotted to them by the elements, they could not assess the situation, since the alarm told them that all the ducts were sealed, therefore they were late with the emergency blowing of the main ballast tanks.

That is, the question of an extremely dangerous technical defect in the repair of the valve disc was raised, which, taking into account the difficult accompanying circumstances, led to the development of a catastrophic situation.

In the case of KRI Nanggala-402, there could be a situation of "diving into the depth" for high-quality removal of the sound speed cut in depth before firing, with leakage overboard of one of the outboard openings (far from a new submarine) and strong water ingress into the hull. Taking into account the fact that blowing the main ballast tanks with air at great depths is ineffective because of the back pressure, only the ascent is left. However, damage to the electrical equipment by the incoming seawater can lead to a power outage of the submarine and its death.

Version 2. Failure to depth due to violation of trim of the submarine before diving

An example of such an accident from Rear Admiral A. N. Lutsky in 1964 in the Sea of ​​Japan:

- Bridge! Strong signal from the aircraft radar on the left 150!
- Stop charging! Everybody down! Urgent dive! Boatswain, to a depth of 120 meters.
At a depth of 30 meters:
- Blow out fast!
At a depth of 40 meters:
- Right on board! Both motors forward small!
Everything in the central post, as it should be, is clear - commands, reports, no unnecessary fuss, but ...

The boat goes well to depth, I look at the depth gauge needle and suddenly I feel a chill in my chest and, as it were, a "compressed spring", and to the commander of the BC-5, I sharply throw:

- Mechanic! Aren't we flying fast?
- Well no. It's okay. This is "Lead". The initial buoyancy margin due to the onboard fuel tanks is less than on a simple 613 project, and the fast dive tank is the same.

The depth gauge needle approaches 90, the "spring" in the chest continues to press, and I command:
- Boatswain, trim the stern!
With the departure of the trim:
- Both motors forward full! Bubble in the middle! Equalizing pump overboard!
Etc.

In short, we stayed only at a depth of 190 m, having passed the working depth.
They flew to the surface like a cork.

Looked around, figured it out. A young sailor, a bilge understudy, having prepared an electric compressor for replenishing VVD, made a gross mistake - he prepared a cooling system for the electric compressor according to the scheme "from overboard to equalization", and not as it should be "from overboard overboard", and overnight swelled into equalization cistern "tie-up", which completely torn the boat apart. Negative buoyancy turned out to be more than according to the project the boat could carry even at full speed.

It was saved by the timely emergency blowing of the main ballast.

Of course, I made a proper analysis of what happened on the ship's loudspeaker. To the lazy "godku" who did not check the actions of the apprentice sailor, colleagues explained everything as it should.

Version 3. Rudder lock (for immersion)

Despite the information about the problems with the steering of the KRI Nanggala-402 in March 2021, the rudder jam could not be the reason for the death of the submarine. And here the point is not even that problems with the vertical rudder were announced, but depth control is carried out by horizontal rudders. The main thing is that diesel submarines usually run at very low speeds. And, accordingly (unlike high-speed nuclear ones), it could not lead to a sharp increase in the submarine's immersion depth (to which the crew would not have had time to react with emergency blowing).

Version 4. Crash of a weapon or a torpedo complex

In the case of KRI Nanggala-402, attention is drawn to the fact that the catastrophe occurred at a point in time close to the planned period (or actual) use of the weapon (practical torpedo firing, including a combat torpedo). Link, Indonesian:

At about 04:00, the Navy said KRI Nanggala-402 was to fill its torpedo tubes in preparation for launching the torpedoes. Major General Ahmad Riyadh, a spokesman for the Indonesian military, said the last contact with Nanggala-402 was at 04:25, when the head of the exercise authorized torpedo firing. The chief of staff of the Indonesian Navy, Yudo Margono, reported that KRI Nanggala-402 fired a combat torpedo and a training torpedo before contact with it was lost ...

The torpedo launcher in torpedo tube # 8 is the last dispatch from KRI Nanggala-402 at 04:25 pm, when the exercise leader gave permission to fire the torpedoes. This is where the connection with KRI Nanggala-402 was cut off, Riad said at a press conference quoted by Kompas TV on Thursday (22.04.2021).

Obviously, the meaning of this statement differs significantly from another statement (link):

The Indonesian Navy announced in a written statement that KRI Nanggala-402 has requested a dive permit to launch the SUT torpedo at 03:00 West Indonesian time (20:00 UTC, April 20). Approximately an hour after receiving permission, the boat lost contact with ground personnel.

And the questions are, in fact, the following:

1. Was there a connection with KRI Nanggala-402 at 04:25?

2. Was there a combat or practical torpedo in pipe No. 8 (combat - with a warhead (with explosives) to sink the designated target)?

3. Were both torpedo shots (with a combat and practical torpedo) actually executed? Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Yudo Margono said the shots had been fired. How did it become known if communication with the boat disappeared immediately after it received permission to shoot?

4. Who was fired at with a practical torpedo? If on a submarine target, it was unambiguously supposed to observe (hydroacoustics) the death of KRI Nanggala-402. And by whom?

Actually, the question is: could there be a connection between the accident, which grew into a disaster, with the use of KRI Nanggala-402 torpedoes?

Torpedo firing KRI Nanggala-402.

From the book by R. A. Gusev "Foundations of the miners' craft":

In May 1968, the American nuclear submarine Scorpion was killed. She died off the Azores, at a depth of about 3000 m, as reported then in the press, due to exceeding the diving depth for an unknown reason.

American experts already knew then that the reason for the death of the boat was the unauthorized activation of the power battery of the MK-37 electric torpedo, which led to the torpedo heating and the explosion of its combat charging compartment. Now it has become known to everyone. They had cases of unauthorized activation of the power battery, it turns out, were noted earlier. A special instruction was developed, according to which it was necessary to urgently fire a "hot" torpedo straight ahead and evade it by turning the boat to the opposite course.

The Scorpion commander did just that, but a hot torpedo exploded either in the torpedo tube, or made a circulation and overtook the submarine after firing. The submarine at the time of the crash had a course that differed by 180 ° from the prescribed one.

PLA "Scorpion" and its wreckage at the bottom of the ocean.

The options here could be:

1. Intensive inflow of water through the torpedo tube in violation of its safety interlocks.

2. Aiming at the firing submarine of its own torpedo or its accidental hit in the event of a malfunction of the control devices (leaving for circulation).

There were cases of the latter (including submerged submarines). For example, our B-101 in 1977, before a long military service in the Indian Ocean, had its own practical torpedo SAET-60M hitting the side, in the vicinity of the diesel compartment, (the head part of the torpedo was removed from the punctured main ballast tank almost a year after Indian Ocean and eliminated).

Noteworthy is the presence on board of a civilian torpedo specialist, that is, most likely, they were "not quite regular SUT". It can be assumed that these are not very new torpedoes undergoing repair and rework by Indonesian specialists (while there was no information about contracts on this issue with the developer and manufacturer of this torpedo in the public domain).

Discovery of the remains of a submarine

On the night of April 25, the hull of the boat at the bottom was previously discovered by the sonar of the Indonesian hydrographic vessel Rigel.

The Singapore rescue vessel Swift Rescue and the Malaysian rescue vessel Mega Bakti arrived on 25 April. From the first of them, a remotely controlled underwater vehicle (ROV) was immediately sent to check this contact. And at 09:04 he visually confirmed the detection of KRI Nanggala-402. The wreckage was found at the bottom just 1500 yards (7,5 cables) south of the last dive of Nanggala on the night of April 21st.

Wreckage of the submarine at the bottom and items raised during the search and rescue operation

The Indonesian Navy released photos of KRI Nanggala-402 wreckage at the bottom, but they do not provide an explanation for what happened. Nevertheless, the fact that the hull is represented by three local fragments next to each other says that the destruction of Nanggala occurred when the hull hit the ground. At the same time, the strong hull of the submarine has already been significantly weakened by the destruction of internal structures by a powerful stream of incoming water. That is, the emergency inflow of water was powerful (otherwise, the submarine would simply explode at a destructive depth). And it began before the boat was at depth.

Time will tell which version of what happened is correct.

PS

The list of those killed on board (in the original language, in order to avoid inaccuracies in the translation of names and titles). Some names are not given in full, as the information is still being clarified.

1. Heri Oktavian - Letkol Laut (P) - Komandan KRI Nanggala-402
2.Eko Firmanto - Mayor Laut (P)
3. Wisnu Subiyantoro - Mayor Laut (T)
4. Yohanes Heri - Kapten Laut (E)
5.I Gede Kartika - Kapten Laut (P)
6. Muhadi - Lettu Laut (P)
7. Ady Sonata - Lettu Laut (P)
8. Imam Adi - Lettu Laut (P)
9. Anang Sutriatno - Lettu Laut (T)
10. Adhi Laksmono - Letda Laut (E)
11. Munawir - Letda Laut (P)
12. Rhesa Tri - Letda Laut (T)
13. Rintoni - Letda Laut (T)
14.M Susanto - Letda Laut (P)
15. Ruswanto - Serka Bah
16. Yoto Eki Setiawan - Sertu Bah
17. Ardi Ardiansyah - Sertu Ttu
18. Achmad Faisal - Sertu Kom
19. Willy Ridwan Santoso - Sertu Kom
20.M Rusdiyansyah - Sertu Eko
21. Ryan Yogie Pratama - Sertu Eki
22.Dedi Hari Susilo - Sertu Mes
23. Bambang Priyanto - Serda Bah
24. Purwanto - Serda Kom
25. Eko Prasetiyo - Serda Kom
26. Harmanto - Serda Ttu
27. Lutfi Anang - Serda Ttu
28.Dwi Nugroho - Serda Atf
29. Pandu Yudha Kusuma - Serda Ede
30. Misnari - Serda Eta
31. Setyo Wawan - Serda Saa
32. Hendro Purwoto - Serda Lis
33. Guntur Ari Prasetyo - Serda Mes
34. Diyut Subandriyo - Serda Lis
35. Wawan Hermanto - Serda Lis
36. Syahwi Mapala - Serda Lis
37. Wahyu Adiyas - Serda Lis
38. Edi Wibowo - Serda Lis
39. Kharisma DB - Kopda Eta
40. Nugroho Putranto - Kopda Tlg
41. Khoirul Faizin - Kopda Mes
42. Maryono - Kopda Trb
43. Roni Effendi - Klk Eta
44. Distriyan Andy P - KLK Eta
45. Raditaka Margiansyah - KLS Isy
46. ​​Gunadi Fajar R - KLS Isy
47. Denny Richi Sambudi - KLS Nav
48. Muh Faqihudin Munir - KLS Mes
49. Edy Siswanto - KLS Nav

Seconded officers and civilian specialist:

50. Harry Setyawan - Kolonel Laut (P) - Dansatsel
51. Irfan Suri - Letkol Laut (E)
52. Whilly - Mayor Laut (E)
53. Suheri - PNS

Rest in peace.

Comments

[Lech from Android.]

The author's article is like a nightmare ... God forbid to be in the place of dying sailors.
There is nowhere to run, there is no way to escape ... and the understanding that impending death cannot be stopped.

[Mountain shooter]

Quote: Lech from Android.

The author's article is like a nightmare ... God forbid to be in the place of dying sailors

The analysis is very competent and very ... merciless. the sea does not forgive mistakes, laxity, inattention and slovenliness ... And still, there are still technical failures and ... "Accidents inevitable on the sea" ...

[Vladimir_2U]

Thanks to the author for a detailed analysis of the probable causes of the death of the boat.

[seregatara1969]

Aftopy-no differentiation was shared on the boat. There was no one

[timokhin-aa]

The boat cannot sail without trimming. Only sink.

[George 2]

The boat cannot sail without trimming. Only drown

Trimming is needed so that the submarine in the submerged position is on an even keel. What is the fur for. conducts appropriate calculations for the presence of cargo in the stern and bow compartments of the submarine. And on trimming, these calculations are checked and corrected by distilling water into the bow or stern equalizing tanks. So, without trimming, the boat does not sink, but receives a constant trim to the bow or stern in the submerged position, although it is not recommended to swim with such trim. A submarine can sink only if negative buoyancy is obtained, and on an even keel. When submerged, the fast tank is filled, which must be blown out to a depth of 40 meters. In this case, a large negative buoyancy is created in order to neutralize the effect of "sticking" of the submarine to the surface. If you are quickly late with blowing to a depth of 40 meters, the submarine gains great inertia during the dive and the depth gauge begins to count the meters like a high-speed elevator. In order to stop the submarine's immersion, in this case, it is necessary to shift the rudders to ascent, give a move, up to full speed, and if this does not help up to 100 meters, purge the Central City Hospital. After the submarine stops at depth and the ascent begins, the reverse process begins. Pl is gaining momentum to ascend and then it is necessary to have time to remove the bubble from the Central City Hospital in order to stay at 40 meters and not fly out to the surface under a ramming strike. At 40 meters fur. carries out the final trim and so on we swim.

[timokhin-aa]

You wrote some nonsense.

So, without trimming, the boat does not sink, but receives a constant trim to the bow or stern in the submerged position, although it is not recommended to swim with such trim.

It is not recommended to swim with a nose trim, right? Otherwise, the boat will go deep or hit the ground in shallow water. Is that so?
And we also ignore the fact that with a certain differential the breakdown of equipment from the foundations occurs?

A submarine can sink only if negative buoyancy is obtained, and on an even keel.

And if the trim to the stern is tens of degrees? Don't want to imagine the consequences?

Now the answer is from Klimov, he himself is banned, so I write:

G. Bukovsky, some submariners are derived from the word "supply", and this is just about YOU.

I repeat once again - YOU ARE A LIAR. Proofs for this have already been brought and it will not bother me if necessary to bring again. Moreover, a new (regular) "visit" of your swindlers with "Ritsa" raises the question of how to finally whip and flog your "Ritsa" gang in public.

YOUR "knowledge" of underwater affairs is dense and illiterate, which does not prevent YOU from "tearing the vest off the armored car" (well, lying "behind your back"). So at that time, YOU are again carrying an illiterate nonsense. Accordingly, you will receive a "face by table".

1. Trimming is done to give the submarine such residual buoyancy (!!!) and trim, in which it is able to dive and freely maneuver underwater in depth and course using the stroke and rudders (and not that nonsense about "swimming on an even keel" which YOU wrote - “purely for reference” for swimming at depth for certain submarines, the control instructions define the optimal angles “somewhat different from zero”).

2. Trimming is carried out by the commander of the electromechanical warhead on the order of the submarine commander: "Trim the submarine at a depth of ... meters with trim ... degrees bow (aft) on the move ... knots!". Educational program further - https://podlodka.info/education/19-management-of-submarine/243-when-trim.html

3. KUVMF Art. 829. On a submarine, when it is submerged, the watch officer must: ...
b) monitor the trim, buoyancy and submersion depth of the submarine and, if necessary, trim it ...

4. Your ignorance, Monsieur Bukovsky, is such that YOU are confused in the names of tanks, there are no “bow and stern leveling tanks”, there are DIFFERENT (which are specially spread as far as possible from the CG), and there are EQUALIZING (which are specially placed as close as possible to the CG) .

[George 2]

You wrote some nonsense.

I will answer you, because I am not interested in communicating with Klimov. He is not an interesting interlocutor to me. The devil knows what makes himself seem like it is not in vain that he is banned in all forums. This is already a diagnosis. So, dear, according to the schedule on the submarine pr. 641B, the beginning of the RTS-com. BCH-4 is a full-time officer of the watch. Only in this position I passed two BSs with a duration of 240 days each. And this is not counting combat training in BP training grounds and other BS in other positions. Can you share your personal experience in the field of damage control in real emergencies? Well, for example, have you ever been on a submarine that crashed into the ground at a depth of 100 meters? Or can you imagine what is going on in the submarine with a nose differential of 35 degrees? Or what is done in the compartment during an explosion of regeneration and a further fire, and you, as luck would have it, were in this compartment? Or what to do when the submarine sinks a hundred meters with the periscope raised, or submerges with the open ventilation valve of the upper deckhouse hatch, when sea water flows into the central control center? Can you imagine what happens in the central processing unit when the whole boat is de-energized at a depth of 90 meters and it starts to sink slowly, they cannot find the reason, but 4 km under the keel? Do you know how submariners feel when a failed submarine is steadily submerging, despite the operation of three motors fully forward and the operation of all serviceable drainage systems overboard, when the depth gauge needle approaches the maximum depth indicated by the red line? So I'll tell you, dear, there is dead silence in the CPU, because everything that could be done has already been done, nothing depends on you and you just have to wait for the situation to change. At this time, all eyes are fixed on the devil's depth gauge, starting from the commander and ending with the last sailor. Only reports are accepted from the bow and stern compartments on changes in depth. So it's not for you to teach me. First, go to sea, stand on the bridge in a five-point storm at -30 full watch, then tell us your feelings if you stay alive. Neither you, nor the banned Klimov for me in these matters are not any authorities. I have my own experience. I can share with anyone.

[timokhin-aa]

Answer from Klimov:

Monsieur Bukovsky, once again: YOU ARE A LIAR and a “submariner” only from the word PADVOD. At the same time, YOU have such "moral qualities" (in quotation marks) that YOU are now in a torn vest, screaming heart-rendingly, despite the fact that with a post above, YOURSELF signed in their RUNNING NON-COMPETENCE, not just in elementary issues of underwater service, but in questions that YOU simply MUST have been known since the first lieutenant's clearance (with subsequent confirmation every year).

I'm talking about the ELEMENTARY and MINIMUM requirements of the PBZh (the Rules for training for the BMZ), acc. plates from which, defining the list and scope of requirements for the categories of personnel. Incl. officer. Those. YOU cannot hide behind a "fig leaf" of the fact that YOU are an "acoustician" and YOU, ASKED, "can" "not know". YOU HAVE TO KNOW - INCL. questions of theory and control of submarines. Above YOU yourself wrote as YOU "knew" (in quotation marks) - CARRYING an ILLITERATE, ABSOLUTELY NON-COMPETENT ACHINA.

I will answer you, because I am not interested in communicating with Klimov.

LIE Bukovsky. For YOU are very closely following the publications, hysteria about them on the same RPF. And the reason is simple: YOU were simply SOLDERED and GOTTED in your specialty (hydroacoustics), and moreover, TAKEN BY THE SHIVOROT and STUFFED into YOUR lies (YOU again stick into proofs?!?!?), Exposed YOU as a SCAM

He is not an interesting interlocutor to me. The devil knows what makes himself seem like it is not in vain that he is banned in all forums. This is already a diagnosis.

Yes, Monsieur Bukovsky, you sometimes have to “work as a DERATIZER”. And this is precisely why there is a heart-rending squeal of such an audience.
And what is typical - NOT ONE of any sane objection in response. Only SCREAM and nonsense.

So, dear, according to the schedule on the submarine pr. 641B, the beginning of the RTS-com. BCH-4 is a full-time officer of the watch.

Bukovsky, taking into account that ILLITERATE TRAINING that YOU carried in the control of the submarine above, that someone through a misunderstanding (or rather, out of hopelessness that such a stupid and incapable subject "by the grace of a payroll" took a regular place) allowed YOU to the officer of the watch at YOU cost to be silent! Have you even seen the score sheet on VO?!?! There are big doubts about this, - given YOUR ILLITERATE screeching and howling further.
However, since YOU have no conscience, let's go over these YOUR "tearing a vest" with a "face on a table" YOU.

Can you share your personal experience in the field of damage control in real emergencies?

May I.

Well, for example, have you ever been on a submarine that crashed into the ground at a depth of 100 meters?

1. YOU personally had NOTHING to do with the management of the submarine and the maintenance of the BZZH on it.
2. YOUR illiteracy in matters of managing submarines and BZZH, and the admission (Supposedly) of YOU in such a "fainting" state to VO clearly hints that there were questions with the training of the crew (including BZZH), to put it mildly.
3. The fact of “cutting into the ground” (including at depth) is logically SHAMED and not “PROUD”.

Or can you imagine what is going on in the submarine with a nose differential of 35 degrees?

In a spent carriage, they "hold on and act", there are enough examples, for the same Shtyrov it was colorfully and effectively described.
With one BUT, only "FULL TRACKS" can be "Proud" of such "feats" (in quotes).
How is Lutsk, then the young Commander, after a similar incident? - "After this incident, I received the moral right to train the crew in the most severe way."

Or what is done in the compartment during an explosion of regeneration and a further fire, and you, as luck would have it, were in this compartment?

I will open the "horrors of military secrets", Bukovsky, - regeneration "just like that" and "by itself" does not explode (if you observe everything that is required). Only with the "help" of the PERSONAL STAFF - poorly trained and irresponsible.

As for the fire in the compartment, I personally did not have a "full-fledged" one. "Simply" because a whole series of PRECONDITIONS for this by the actions of the personnel (and me personally), incl. "Throwing" into the emergency compartment, even with "certain violations of the RBZh", were promptly localized and eliminated and did not escalate into an accident.

Or what to do when the submarine sinks a hundred meters with the periscope raised, or submerges with the open ventilation valve of the upper deckhouse hatch, when sea water flows into the central control center?

"Take off your pants and run."
AFTER BREAKING FROM APPROPRIATE SUPERVISORS.
For what YOU have described is BORDEL, not a "ship organization".

Let me explain for non-divers - even in a properly prepared crew there can be mistakes, equipment failure, etc. Therefore, "in order to avoid" there is a system of "cross reports and control" (in a PROPERLY PREPARED crew). And the "dip" to the depth is not only the "jamb" of the central post, but also evidence that the watchmen have "hammered" in the compartments (for example, about the control and reports at the beginning of the dive every 10 meters).

And here "excuses" such as "the sailor forgot to ventilate the pipelines of the depth gauges" DO NOT ROLL, because when preparing the submarine for battle and campaign, these specific actions of the sailor MUST check a number of crew officials.

Can you imagine what happens in the central processing unit when the whole boat is de-energized at a depth of 90 meters and it starts to sink slowly, they cannot find the reason, but 4 km under the keel?

Drink some water, validolchik. And stop ERASING Monsieur Bukovsky. For there is NOTHING SCARY in this. If the boat is properly trimmed! As a last resort, if it suddenly turns out to be hard to give a bubble to the middle group.

Do you know how submariners feel when a failed submarine is steadily submerging, despite the operation of three motors fully forward and the operation of all serviceable drainage systems overboard, when the depth gauge needle approaches the maximum depth indicated by the red line?

Bukovsky, I KNOW WELL, and not only the arrangement of the submarine and the BZZ questions, but also the fact that in order to ADMIT this you need to "try" very, very well, and not just one crew member, and such a ship "organization" would be more correct called BORDEL.

So I'll tell you, dear, there is dead silence in the CPU, because everything that could be done has already been done, nothing depends on you and you just have to wait for the situation to change.

"Dead silence"?!!!!!!!!

Monsieur "Podvoda", you DIDN'T TRY A SHIP TO LEARN?!?!? TO STUDY ITS THEORY AND ISSUES OF MANAGING THEM ???? IT IS NORMAL TO WORK ON BZZH ????

To begin with, in order not to ALLOW THIS, and in the end (already if it happened) to get out of this situation !!!
"Dead Silence" ... Ie. not even reports from the compartments.
Non-submariners, once again I advise you to reread Lutskiy - how NORMAL TRAINED submariners operate (and not the "BORDEL trade union").

At this time, all eyes are fixed on the devil's depth gauge, starting from the commander and ending with the last sailor. Only reports are accepted from the bow and stern compartments on changes in depth.

Ahhh, so the reports are still "accepted". "Penetrated" so to speak.
I would like to hope that after such "FEATS", the SAMOTOPES still have something in their heads, and they at least slightly revised their "attitude" (POPIGIZM) to the issues of the device and control of submarines and BZZh (Bukovsky, the latter is not about YOU, - YOU will be corrected by "only the grave").

So it's not for you to teach me. First, go to sea, stand on the bridge in a five-point storm at -30 full watch, then tell us your feelings if you stay alive.

Well, I was also 8 points. So we caught the wave so that the waves were really walking in the central post (the KBR suitcase just floated).
At - 30 (that year the Kola Bay froze over) it was practically washed (at night in a storm) overboard. VO managed to catch the alpaca by the sleeve.
So what????

Neither you nor the banned Klimov for me in these matters are not authorities. I have my own experience. I can share with anyone.

Yes, YOU have already shared, Bukovsky. PERSONALLY, YOURSELF “signed” that on the boat YOU were a “TRIP”.

[George 2]

Answer from Klimov

Timokhin, do not write answers from Klimov. I don’t know him, I haven’t seen him in the eyes, I have never communicated with him. And he does not know me and has never communicated with me. He does not know how to conduct polemics. All his anger arises when someone writes critical comments on his articles, he obviously wakes up a pathologically negative attitude towards the author of the criticism. It just blows the roof off. On this basis, it is obvious that he goes crazy and he writes all sorts of fables, while thinking out what he does not know. Well, it happens. I told you, he is not interesting to me. I'm not going to argue with all sorts of unfamiliar trolls. As the saying goes, it is a sin to take offense at the sick, they can only be treated or pitied.
You seem to be a sane person, inclined to analytics.
Klimov's article is entitled: "Probable causes of the death of the Indonesian submarine KRI Nanggala-402." There is only one reason for the death of the submarine, it fell to a depth below the limit. This is understandable even to those who have never been to the submarine. Of course, it is possible to list several possible options for why it failed, but this does not remove the existing uncertainty and does not shed light on what happened there, because of what it failed. In general, after this article, the uncertainty in this matter has not dissipated. You consider yourself an analyst. Answer me, you, after this article, it became clear why the boat died, falling to an incredible depth? Personally, as a submariner, no, which I said. After all, the author could have put a question mark in his title. It would be more correct. Well, or came up with another name.

[timokhin-aa]

As for me, this is a normal analysis of possible reasons, he does not give an answer to the question of what exactly happened, but it cuts off unrealistic options, and so, let's say, clearly hints where to look - torpedo shooting. By the way, Americans also think in this direction.

Regarding Klimov's answers - a person asks, I spread it.
That is:

Musier swindler Bukovsky
1. YOU do not have any “critical remarks”, if only due to YOUR extremely low level (not a submariner, but an illiterate “emergency supply”, and which is also proud of it!), There is only whining in response to articles. To be convinced of this is elementary, one has only to open YOUR profile.

2. The reason for your reaction and your seething anger, my public (and non-public) exposure of the "Ritsev" group of swindlers (one of the accomplices of which are YOU, Monsieur Bukovsky).

3. Actually, PS on “Ritsevsky and Co” was summed up by the story with “broken wires” (which YOU, Bukovsky are well aware of and about which YOU had no objections), when one of the acoustics officers cut off the wires of "Ritsa" connected to the submarine GAK, while the "Ritsa" itself "continued to issue targets" (with BROKEN WIRES), and the operators who "discovered" them were members of your gang of swindlers.

Yes, at the INITIAL moment of Ritsa's work it had meaning and result. However, it was your gang that was "leaked" and replaced with forgeries, falsifications and deception of the command.

4. "Ritsevskaya scam" is by no means "overgrown with reality." In spite of Monsieur Bukovsky's BOLD LIES that he supposedly "since 1992 retired" from this gang, as it was shown above, Bukovsky LIES as usual, being its accomplice in subsequent years.

5. The patient in this situation is YOU, Monsieur Bukovsky. YOU are sick with pathological LITTLE, a thirst for "at any cost to stick to the budget bubble", and at the expense of (actually undermining) the combat capability of the Navy and the country. And Klimov in this situation "only acts as a DERATIZER."

[George 2]

As for me, this is a normal analysis of possible reasons, he does not give an answer to the question of what exactly happened, but it cuts off unrealistic options, and so, let's say, clearly hints where to look - torpedo shooting. By the way, Americans also think in this direction.

You can think anything you want. All these thoughts are worthless until they are supported by certain evidence. For example, they also thought about the Kursk that the cause of the disaster was possibly a mine explosion during the Second World War, or a collision with a foreign submarine, or, in last place, an accident with a torpedo. Gradually, during the collection of evidence and their analysis, they came to the only conclusion, the explosion of a torpedo on board. Here the situation will develop according to the same scenario. Examination of the wreckage, collection of evidence, their analysis in the light of possible situations and conclusions. But only when all this is published, it will be possible to talk about the development of some probable, in the opinion of analysts, other scenarios of an emergency and the reasons for its escalation into a disaster. Sometimes events can occur on the boat that no one would ever have thought of. And they could lead not only to emergency, but also catastrophic events. So, any official version that the authorities will announce after the investigation of the disaster is over will remain only an option that the obtained evidence will logically fit into. But we will never know the true answer to the question of what exactly happened there and why it happened, although the field for different versions will remain. Then an analytical article with such a title and with an analysis of various versions within the framework of the evidence obtained would be relevant.

[Che-RT]

Dear Georg 2 (Yuri), will you allow me to intervene with my five kopecks?
I read your comments with great interest and, not being a submariner, I agree with them. From the point of view of banal logic, human psychology and the principles of operation of machines and mechanisms, I see no reason why I should not take your position and side. The fact that the title of the article does not correspond to its content does not require any special discussion. Special thanks for the culture of discussion and endurance! However, I would like, let it surprise you, but correct you in one key statement - the nuclear submarine "Kursk". You are greatly mistaken about this boat. The fact is that the Kursk did not die for the reason you indicated. The investigation was able to introduce this "cart" with a training torpedo into "wide underwater masses" only because among the Russian submariners over the past 50 years, there was no one who would understand how the submarine works. I know what you are now thinking about the author of this judgment :-), but, alas, this is a fact. This, incidentally, is the main tragedy of the Kursk nuclear submarine.
Given the unusual situation, I would like to offer you a deal: in no more than 10 seconds (based on your experience and knowledge), I will explain to you the uterine cause of the Kursk nuclear submarine sinking, and you, recognizing this fact, will bear this "good, light, eternal ”further into the underwater, and not only, masses, not forgetting, at the same time, to praise the source of this sudden revelation (not me, but the source). Do you agree?

[George 2]

However, I would like, let it surprise you, but correct you in one key statement - the nuclear submarine "Kursk". You are greatly mistaken about this boat. The fact is that the Kursk did not die for the reason you indicated.

Nobody knows the exact reason for what caused the catastrophic development of events on the Kursk. There are various versions of these events, within which the corresponding consequences occurred. There is an official version, which came to the investigation. I agree with this version, because it most fully describes the consequences of what happened. Moreover, on the second day after the tragedy and the official publication of materials on this topic in the press, I assumed that: 1. A torpedo explosion occurred on the submarine. 2. The personnel of the submarine died and there will be no rescued. Unfortunately, I was right.
If you have your own version, please voice it.

[Che-RT]

Yuri, thank you for finding the opportunity and time to answer me. I want to apologize for the fact that when addressing you, I write my personal pronoun with a small letter. To my surprise, I recently learned that writing personal pronouns with a capital letter is not correct. However, it is not difficult for me to return to the days of former ignorance. :-)
As soon as you remembered those "glorious times", then for my part I will say that on Tuesday, that is, on the third day after the tragedy, I was asked the same question "What's with the boat?" So I then said as it is - the boat is over, the entire crew was killed. And he added, "there will be happiness if in the process of all this stupid and senseless fuss the military does not drown someone else." So it was on the third day, and at that moment I was several thousand kilometers away, both from the fleet and from the place of events.
Making assumptions in conditions of misunderstanding of the situation is one thing, and here I have no questions, no complaints, no one, but believe in all this "official", after everything presented, taking into account knowledge, qualifications, and such a long time allotted for awareness is completely different. The official version, excuse me, is based on the materials of the official investigation. Hence a small question: can you name the number and qualifications of the official criminal case against Kursk? For me, your answer is obvious. From this it follows inexorably that the "official" version with a training torpedo has no iron causal connection with the official criminal case. How is it possible, forgive me this rhetorical question, so gullible to take for the "official" version something that has nothing to do with the official version?
“Nobody knows the exact reason that ...” (I am quoting you) only because, as I wrote to you earlier, no one knows how the submarine works, well, and so on, in little detail.
I will acquaint you, as I promised, with the real reason for the death of the Kursk, even though you did not confirm your acceptance of my terms. Moreover, and I want to emphasize this, this will not be my version, as you put it, but reality. Let the professionals measure their versions. :-)

[George 2]

I will acquaint you, as I promised, with the real reason for the death of the Kursk

Thank you, your position is clear. I do not share it.

[Che-RT]

Please, Yuri. I am for freedom of opinion and I guess in which part you do not share my position. Note, however, that the strong hull of the Kursk is crumpled inside the boat (the frames clearly demonstrate this); this clear and simple fact turned out to be inaccessible for the understanding of specialists; the qualification of the criminal case is fully consistent with the fact and none of them mentioned the actual qualification ...; in PD-50, only those parts of the structure that bore the traces of the collision were cut off from the Kursk. Do you think, nevertheless, that these are the consequences of the explosion of a training torpedo in torpedo tube No. 4 (a rhetorical question, and it is not necessary to answer it)? Or such a moment - can an explosion of 10 tons in TNT have any tangible effect on the hull of a ship located 40 km from the explosion site? Or, for example, 35 dead crew members, whose bodies were found in the aft compartments (6,7,8,9), how is it combined with the well-known figure 23? This is all, by the way, about that very "Kursk". But which of the experts knows about this? Nobody! This is also the question of qualifications. For me, the inability to use the knowledge gained is tantamount to the lack of this knowledge! If this is not the case for you, then so be it.

[Che-RT]

You don't have to be frank with me, Yuri, but try to be honest with yourself.

[George 2]

The "call" of your swindlers with "Ritsa" raises the question of how to finally whip and whip your "Ritsa" gang in public.

Klimov, there is a type of people who lives only by quarreling with everyone for any reason. You are obviously of this breed. Therefore, I am not going to react to all sorts of fabrications of an inadequate person. I am writing only for one reason, namely, someone, splashing saliva, tore at his vest with a promise to write an article about "Ritsu". I am still waiting for this promise to be fulfilled. Yes ..., and stop biting your ass to be angrier, better write an article about "swindlers" and the "Ritsa" gang. After all, not everyone can be honored with the pen of such a popular observer, albeit in some fuflomet, but in some issues, nevertheless, versed, to be objective. And I, as one of the "swindlers" and the creator of the "Ritsa" gang, will be very curious to read something about myself, i.e. written on this issue not by me, but by another person. By the way, and my family, in whose eyes all this was created. I think they will make the most objective judgment. Therefore, do not lie and do not think out, write only what you can confirm. Because all the "swindlers" of the "Ritsa" gang are alive, except for Yura Sinyakin, and may be offended by the biased coverage of past events. Good luck in your work, hurry up.

[timokhin-aa]

Klimov's answer

Klimov, there is a type of people who lives only by quarreling with everyone for any reason.

LIE Bukovsky. YOU SCREAM and ELIMINATE because I personally "spread" YOU with a "thin layer" about "Ritse", and your gang of swindlers.

It is a pity that there is no good to put out some simply "amazing documents" from "horns and hooves" LLC "Two eggs (and" organ at half past five ")" nephew of YOUR Kuryshev, people who understand technology would just RYCH then such a TRASH (in the documents !) GREAT "lights of hydroacoustics".

You are obviously of this breed. Therefore, I am not going to react to all sorts of fabrications of an inadequate person.

Once again, Bukovsky, YOU are not just a LIAR. YOU A LIAR, MULTIPLY CAPTURED FOR A LONG FALSE TONGUE.

Here's an example:

Has your biography changed in hindsight?

I am writing only for one reason, namely, someone, splashing saliva, tore at his vest with a promise to write an article about "Ritsu".

After about 8 articles. There are more priority tasks than YOUR "Alice and Basilio".

And I, as one of the "swindlers" and the creator of the "Ritsa" gang, will be very curious to read something about myself, i.e. written on this issue not by me, but by another person. By the way, and my family, in whose eyes all this was created. I think they will make the most objective judgment.

And I think that the MOST OBJECTIVE judgment was made by Gavrilov (!) When he asked him about Ritsa. That's who I didn't expect to hear THIS ...

Therefore, do not lie and do not think out, write only what you can confirm. Because all the "swindlers" of the "Ritsa" gang are alive, except for Yura Sinyakin, and may be offended by the biased coverage of past events.

Bukovsky, you are pitiful and OOBOGI. Including your Kuryshev with his LIES and ridiculous attempts to "hypnosis". Maybe it affects someone, but it only causes laughter and SECURITY to me.
Especially when at this moment I ask (him) questions, with the answers to which he himself "drives himself into a corner."

And Ritsa? And there was a grain of rationality in Ritsa, and very healthy. Only now YOU yourself buried him with your LIES to the command and his scams in your "heap of dung"! And the "cherry" on this "cake" "named after Kuryshev" is that the person who signed you the very first positive conclusion was included in his "execution lists" (Problem laboratory at the Civil Code of the Navy)

[seregatara1969]

The article does not mention trimming at all! Differentiation only.

[George 2]

Thanks to the author for a detailed analysis of the probable causes of the death of the boat.

Such probable reasons can be thrown over a cart and a small cart. In this particular case, there is too little data for a more or less reliable assessment of the real causes of the disaster. And talking about the deaths of other submarines, the reasons for which have already been determined, do not need a lot of mind. It is clear that the submarine fell to an incredible depth, but the reason for this failure is still not clear at all. And this reason will not be clear for a very long time. So, it is too early to write such articles. Any version can be put forward in this field of uncertainty. There is no analytics in this article on the stated topic, from the word at all. And by the way, submarine trimming is carried out before its release. At sea, trimming can be carried out only in a long voyage, with the expenditure and replenishment of water and food supplies. In short, the author hastened with his article and estimates.

[Vadim Ananyin]

Tough, but nothing can be changed.

[Cananecat]

I am not a diver, but in my opinion the article is written in an interesting and competent language.
Thanks to the author for analyzing the situation.

[timokhin-aa]

Author Maxim Klimov, rank 3 captain, served on nuclear submarines for 10 years

[George 2]

Author Maxim Klimov, rank 3 captain, served on nuclear submarines for 10 years

Some of them served on the nuclear submarine for more, served up to rank 2, and the sea was seen only in the pictures. Why did he not tell anything from his submarine service, but inserted his other people's memories into an article, perhaps there were none of his own? Or did he forget everything out of fear? For example, I know how people behave in various real emergency situations.

[timokhin-aa]

Why did he not tell anything from his submarine service?

Well, as he did not tell ... I did not write in the article.

Maxim wrote you an answer, I will post it tomorrow.

[Evgenii Xolod]

Somehow your appanent looks weak.

[timokhin-aa]

Answer from Klimov:

Some of them served on the nuclear submarine for more, served up to rank 2, and the sea was seen only in the pictures. Why did he not tell anything from his submarine service, but inserted his other people's memories into an article, perhaps there were none of his own? Or did he forget everything out of fear?

LIE Bukovsky again.
YOU "face on the table" to poke where YOU PERSONALLY hysterical about "who allowed Klimov into the sonar cabin"?

For example, I know how people behave in various real emergency situations.

Bukovsky, I KNOW how emergencies are NOT ALLOWED, or if a "situation on the brink" has already arisen, they ACT quickly, decisively and literally (and not like YOU "silently staring at the depth gauge" depth)

[George 2]

I KNOW how emergencies are NOT ALLOWED

Well, that's good knowledge. They probably helped you never find yourself in a real emergency on a submarine. Therefore, all examples in the article are not taken from personal experience. In general, this is also not bad. True, this does not give knowledge about how people behave in a real situation, how they act. Therefore, you should not speculate on these topics and criticize others. Personal experience in these matters is of great importance.

[Roman070280]

This was done by superhuman efforts - a steel valve stem with a diameter of 10 centimeters was bent.

Damn .. is that even possible ??

Shl .. the article is cool !!

[timokhin-aa]

Amplifier tube bent

[Glory1974]

The article is interesting, thanks.
I was surprised by the information on "Scorpio". For the first time I hear about the version with a torpedo. Are there traces of a torpedo explosion on the wreckage of the boat? There should be a trace either from the explosion in the torpedo tube, or on the hull if the torpedo caught up with the outgoing boat.
And about these "hot" torpedoes. Did they really have to be used in this mode? To constantly monitor the temperature and if something happens to shoot right there. Some kind of surrealism.

[ALEX_SHTURMAN]

Yes, that's really where the men with the steel ones serve ... These are submariners! For me, there has always been a terrible dream: darkness, limited space and running out of oxygen. God rest your servant, Lord of the Soul!

[Ryaruav]

divers are people much more deserved attention than all astronauts

[Alien From]

Thanks to the author! Very informative and clearly written! Respect for submariners

[Aviator_]

Competent and thorough analysis of possible options for the death of submarines with examples. Respect to the author.

[Battle Cat]

Thanks to the author, a competent article.

[Evil eye]

Um ... Gary Octavian? Are Roman surnames used in Indonesia?

[deddem]

Quote: Evil Eye

Um ... Gary Octavian? Are Roman surnames used in Indonesia?

The Christian minority.
All sorts of Lucius Cornelias, etc.

[Evil eye]

Nichosi. Interesting, I'll know.