1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Correcting Errors. Learning to use the Navy

Soviet transports heading to Cuba had no other protection

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the first large-scale collision of the Soviet and American fleets in which tracking was carried out weapons, pursuit and willingness of participants to use weapons against each other, including nuclear.

As you know, the crisis ended in favor of the United States, which ensured that all Soviet transport ships that were at sea at the time of Kennedy's decision to impose the blockade returned back, and the missiles, bombers and aviation were withdrawn from Cuba. The Americans themselves removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey with a delay, and soon deployed the George Washington SSBN on alert in the Mediterranean Sea. They were going to withdraw "Jupiters" from Turkey anyway due to their obsolescence (they did not know about it in the USSR). The only thing the USSR really achieved during the crisis was a guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. This, of course, was an achievement, but the task was more ambitious - both the immediate withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey and the organization of a permanent and open presence of the USSR Armed Forces in Cuba. It turned out only with guarantees.

Today, there is a consensus among serious researchers that more intensive use of fleet would help the USSR to more effectively achieve what the United States wanted. What is important is that the Americans think so, those who look at the world through the eyes of the enemy and think like him. This means that it really was so, at least with a high degree of probability.

Today, when Russia's naval power is literally at the bottom, and its policy in the world is still very active, it is more important than ever for us to learn how to use the navy correctly, both from a purely military point of view and from a political point of view.
Consider the options that the USSR had during the Cuban missile crisis.

Prerequisites for failure

Elementary logic calls for considering military operations on other continents in conditions when an adversary with a navy, including naval ones, is trying to disrupt their conduct. This is understandable, in order for tankers and infantrymen to begin to act, they must get to the theater of operations. If this is possible only by sea, and if the enemy's fleet opposes this, then it is necessary that its fleet provide transportation in one way or another. In war - by conquering domination at sea, in peacetime - by preventing the actions of the enemy fleet against their transports by demonstrating force or otherwise.

This understanding was lacking in planning the transfer of troops to Cuba.

Let's recall the stages of preparation.

By the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of May 20, 1962, preparations began for the transfer of troops to Cuba. The operation was planned by the General Staff, it was named "Anadyr".

The key to the success of the General Staff operation was the secrecy of the transport of troops.
It was also assumed that a Soviet squadron would be deployed in Cuba consisting of 2 cruisers of project 68-bis (flagship - "Mikhail Kutuzov"), 4 destroyers, including 2 missile (pr. 57-bis), division missile submarines (7 ships of project 629), brigades of torpedo submarines (4 ships of project 641), 2 floating bases, 12 missile boats of project 183R and a detachment of support vessels (2 tankers, 2 dry cargo ships and a floating workshop).

Initially, it was assumed that the transport ships would go on their own, without attracting attention. No escort. And so it happened, and at first the secrecy paid off.
In September, the Americans finally realized that something was wrong here - Soviet transports scurried across the Atlantic with unparalleled intensity. On September 19, 1962, an American destroyer intercepted the first Soviet transport, the dry cargo ship Angarles. American patrol aircraft began to fly over and photograph Soviet ships.

At that moment, the surface forces had to be brought into action. But on September 25, the Defense Council decided not to use surface ships in the operation.

The rest is known - after the blockade, the transport turned back, three of the four submarines that went to Cuba were found by the Americans and forced to surface.
The reasons for refusing to use NDT in that operation are still debated. In the domestic literature, one can find assertions that the secrecy of the transfer of troops would suffer, but it was already lost at that time. There are opinions of the military who were sure that they could not withstand the battle with the Americans. It was half-truth. And this will be discussed below. There is an opinion of American historians who are inclined to believe that Soviet sailors were unable to plan military operations in the open ocean. This is clearly not true.

Let's formulate a hypothesis. Surface ships were not used for a complex complex - attention - subjective reasons. It was based on Khrushchev's personal conviction that surface ships were outdated, the maniacal desire of the generals to crush the fleet under the ground forces (finally realized only under Serdyukov) and the natural pogrom of Russian naval thought in the 30s, accompanied by the execution of many leading military theorists ... We will come back to this later, but for now let's look at what opportunities the USSR had at sea at the time of the crisis.

Cash Fleet

In any case, large ships are required for ocean operations; they are the means of giving combat stability to any naval group. How to adequately assess what ships the Navy could actually dispose of by the start of the Cuban missile crisis? And what could they give?

As you know, the Navy just by those years finished going through the "Khrushchev pogrom". It is worth assessing its scale.

We look at the statistics - that's what Khrushchev managed to destroy really valuable. Various pre-war trophy scrap metal is not counted. Also not taken into account "Stalingrad", which stopped building even before Khrushchev.

Yes, a serious pogrom. It's a shame how, in fact, the ships put into operation were just destroyed.

But what matters to us is what remains at the time of the decision to deploy troops to Cuba, right?

Here's what was in stock. Cruisers that were previously transferred to training cruisers were counted as combat ones, since they could be used in battle.

Here it is necessary to make a reservation - not all ships were combat-ready at the time of the decision. But - and this is an important point - before the start of the operation, most of them could have been returned to service, and even coursework problems would have had time to pass. And some were already combat-ready.

Suppose that the USSR could use in an operation three cruisers of different projects from the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets - only 9 units, of which, for example, 7 would belong to the 68bis project.

Project 68bis cruisers were the most powerful surface ships of the Navy in the "pre-missile" era.

But besides cruisers, ships of other types are also needed, right? And here we have an answer. By that time, six Project 57bis destroyers were in service in the fleets in the European part of the USSR. With anti-ship missiles "Pike" as the main weapon. Whatever "Pike" was, the enemy simply could not ignore it in his plans.

Destroyer project 57 "Zorky" at the parade in Leningrad, 60th. Visible is the cruise missile launch rail.

And, of course, the destroyers of Project 56, which were the main naval ships in terms of numbers, capable of operating in ocean areas. The navy could allocate several dozen of these ships for the operation in any case. The fact that the ships were hopelessly outdated was irrelevant in this case, which will be discussed below.

Project 56 destroyer

What could these forces do?

If you rely on the knowledge of how the fleet works in principle, then first it was necessary to pull the American forces apart in different theaters of operations. And an example was in front of my eyes - you can simply calculate how many forces the allies needed in the Pacific Ocean was being pulled over by the Tirpitz in Norway. For example, the battleship "Washington" during the Battle of Midway was engaged in the protection of convoys in the USSR from "Tirpitz". But this battle could have gone completely differently, McCluskey was in many ways just lucky, like the Americans, in principle. What if not? Then even one battleship would have been more than "out of place", but they were engaged in "containment" of "Tirpitz", and in fact ... with the help of the Red Army, if we finally call a spade a spade.

Was this example available for study in 1962? More than. Are the others the same? There were a lot of them in that war. They were too.

So, it was possible to form a naval strike group from the Pacific Fleet and send it, for example, to Hawaii, demonstratively maneuvering ships near the border of the territorial waters of the United States, showing American aerial reconnaissance mines on destroyer decks, for example, approaching merchant ships, and so on.
Assuming that the USSR could use its Pacific forces to divert the attention of the United States (at least intelligence), we do not fall into the trap of afterthought, but operate only with the information that was available in those years. And the Pacific Fleet had the capabilities.

What's next? Then everything is very simple. Ship strike groups consisting of cruisers of projects 26bis, 68K and 68bis - all that could be prepared for the campaign by this moment, would have to be in combat service in readiness to immediately assemble scattered Soviet ships going into the Atlantic in convoys and escort them to Cuba, so that the Americans cannot count on the fact that it will be possible to intercept a Soviet ship with a single destroyer and take it to their port.

Light cruiser of the project 68K "Zheleznyakov". At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, he was in service.

It is one thing to force a dry cargo ship to stop. Another is to win a KUG in battle from a couple of artillery cruisers, a couple of missile destroyers and, yes, a dozen torpedo destroyers.

Let us examine the possibilities that the Americans had to defeat such groups at sea. Firstly, neither a separate cruiser, nor a couple of the problem would have been solved. Most likely, even a separate battleship. Since you would have to simultaneously conduct an artillery battle with cruisers, repel a strike with cruise missiles (no matter how bad they are), and then also shoot back from destroyers, even if they are outdated. In such a battle, torpedo destroyers became a significant factor - it is not a fact that they would get close to a high-speed artillery ship by themselves, but to a "wounded person" after an exchange of volleys and an anti-ship missile strike - easily. And this, too, would have to be taken into account.

Only a rather large detachment of warships could solve the problem of defeating such a convoy guard with an acceptable level of reliability and acceptable losses.

What if all Soviet forces acted as a single unit? Then, without options, it would be necessary to attract aircraft carriers, and more than one. Simply because, without nuclear bombs, air defense groups of several "Sverdlovs" and a dozen weaker ships would have to be pierced with rather large forces. The project 68bis cruisers were even shot down by target missiles based on the P-15 anti-ship missiles during the exercises, they could also cope with the aircraft.

And this is where the inconsistencies begin in any "game for the Americans". On the one hand, it seems that the United States has more than enough forces to defeat the Soviet squadrons. On the other hand, this is a full-scale war, which the United States did not want then. Stopping the Soviet convoy would require a military operation, in scale and losses commensurate with the battles of World War II. This could not but be a deterrent.

Today we know that Kennedy intended to attack Cuba if even one American plane was shot down. But when it did happen (U-2 was shot down, the pilot was killed), the Americans changed their minds. Then, of course, no one in the USSR knew this. But the fact that an attack on Soviet surface ships would lead to the Americans losing surprise in their attack on the USSR was obvious to us and to the Americans themselves.

In the United States, they learned about the presence of missiles only in the first decade of October. Before that, it was about suspicious Soviet activity. The presence of naval ships, firstly, immediately excluded the blockade from the American arsenal. They would not have had the opportunity to escalate the situation the way they did it in reality. Now they would have to choose between nuclear war and negotiations, and all at once. All planned transports to Cuba would have to be swallowed. Or start a war with the loss of surprise.

In reality, they chose to negotiate.

And when we got into this business, we were sure that they would choose negotiations. I had to go all the way. They wouldn't attack. They didn't really attack even when our fleet was in the bases. When he was at sea, they would not attack even more.

And this on condition that, in general, they would not have missed the situation, chasing the KUGs of the Pacific Fleet.

The USSR also had one more trump card.

Strategic Submarines

By the time the decision was made to deploy missiles in Cuba, the Northern Fleet had received 15 Project 629 diesel-electric submarines of various modifications. These submarines were armed with D-1 missile systems with an R-11FM ballistic missile with a range of 150 km and partially (development was beginning) D-2 with an R-13 missile and a range of 400 km. In addition, 5 submarines of the AB611 project were in service, each of which was also armed with two R-11FM ballistic missiles.

For all the primitiveness of these submarines, the Navy was able to deploy at least ten missile-carrying submarines off the coast of the United States, and most likely more.

Project 629 submarine firing a salvo of R-13 ballistic missile

What would be their chances of success? And here we again recall surface ships - they could well cover the deployment of submarines, firstly, by diverting huge reconnaissance forces, and secondly, preventing the surface ships of the US Navy from working.

Submarines would be a big factor. Even thirty nuclear missiles that reached the United States, firstly, would lead to the loss of tens of millions of people, and secondly, they would disorganize the air defense for at least several days, which would give good chances for bombers. To find all the boats without melting the surface ships, the United States, again, would not have had time, and by attacking the ships, they would have lost their surprise and were exposed to a retaliatory strike. And that would be obvious to them.

The deployment of such forces (impossible without the participation of surface ships) would give Khrushchev much more trump cards in any negotiations.

Naturally, with the right diplomatic presentation.

Gunboat diplomacy

What position should the USSR take?

First, it would be necessary to make the Americans understand that the USSR is ready for war. In reality, Khrushchev, as the Americans later said, “blinked first” when faced with their harsh reaction. And this is not surprising - there was nothing to cover the USSR with, there were no forces at sea that could hinder the actions of the Americans against Cuba. The crazy idea of ​​sending four diesel-electric submarines against all the US Navy in the Atlantic could not and did not give the USSR any benefits, even taking into account the B-4 that eluded the Americans.

The presence of surface forces capable of preventing communication with Cuba without starting a real large-scale war and ensuring the deployment of missile submarines off the coast of the United States, the presence of missile submarines themselves capable of retaliating against American territory, would well become a trump card, if presented correctly. It is worth remembering that then the United States did not have such an anti-submarine defense, as after, in the 70s and 80s, it would be difficult for the Americans to detect the quiet "diesels", it would be impossible to continuously track them in the presence of a surface fleet.

As the crisis went to its peak, it was necessary to show the Americans other things - the Tu-16 refueling in the air, which was already there and made it possible to strike Alaska with these aircraft. Launch of a Kh-20 cruise missile from a Tu-95K bomber without specifying its exact range. One could hint to them that the USSR has the majority of such missile-carrying aircraft (which was not true, but here all means would be good).

As a result, President Kennedy should have received a message with the following content:

“The USSR has deployed carriers of nuclear weapons and warheads in Cuba, in quantities that you do not know, and in places that are completely unknown to you, and the commanders of Soviet units are authorized to use them if they are attacked.

In parallel, we have deployed ballistic missile submarines off your coast. Our bombers are scattered and ready to retaliate. You know that they can strike your territory with missiles without approaching it, and your entire defense is useless. We will not strike the US first, but we are ready to respond to your attack with all our might.

No matter how strong the blow from the US to the USSR, our retaliatory strike will in any case put an end to the existence of the US. To prevent these terrible events, we offer you the following ... "

That would be the right approach - getting involved in such games had to understand what they would be and, in modern terms, "not to leave the topic." The actions of the fleet would significantly strengthen Moscow's position in any negotiations with Washington. And of course, it was foolish to hide what forces the grouping in Cuba could actually use to strike. It is impossible to intimidate the enemy, hiding the threat from him, this is even from the point of view of logic incorrect.

The Soviet Union could well impose on the United States much more equal negotiations and withdraw troops on completely different conditions than it was done. The Navy, if it was used correctly, even in its then state, would help to achieve this, if it was applied correctly. But it was not applied correctly. And everything that followed was the result of this mistake.

How did it happen? Why did the USSR behave so strange and illogical? And most importantly, what does it matter to us today?

Land Power and Continental Thinking

And here we come back to subjective factors. History Russian fleet after the end of the Civil War, on the one hand, does not abound in any wars and battles, but on the other, it is very dramatic. Dramatic due to the pogrom of military science, initiated by a group of young careerists who wanted to make a career for themselves and are ready to bring under repression those who held their desired positions. We are talking about the so-called "young school", the most famous representative of which was A. Alexandrov (Bar).

These events are described in great detail and intelligibly in the essay of Captain 1st Rank M. Monakov "The Fates of Doctrines and Theories" in the "Marine Collection", starting with issue 11 of 1990. The archive of the "Marine Collection" is available here to register: (numbers are not all).

There is no point in retelling this essay, you need to confine yourself to the main thing. The adherents of the "young school" chose the most destructive method of reprisals against their competitors - they were able, using the press of the time, to declare the theories of combat use, developed by the teachers and the head of the Naval Academy B. Gervais, as sabotage and out of date.

It must be said that the critical theories of the "young school" were frankly wretched. But the main thing these people achieved - in the early thirties, almost all the color of domestic naval theorists were repressed and later shot. B. Gervais managed to survive, but at the cost of public humiliation - in order to survive, he had to write a penitential article in which he declared the need to fight for domination of the sea, which he had been promoting earlier, was wrong. Seriously experiencing arrest, being in prison, repression of associates, public humiliation and the collapse of his career, B. Gervais soon died. He was lucky, many of his colleagues could not live to see their death. For those who do not understand what it was, an example is how to declare it a crime to fight for air supremacy for aviation and shoot the generals-pilots who demand it.

There is an opinion, and apparently not unfounded, that MN Tukhachevsky was behind all these events, for whom it was a struggle for the budget.

The consequences were dire - the fleet lost its purpose. And when there is no purpose, there is no way to organize the training of command personnel - simply because it is not clear what they should do.

The reckoning came during the war in Spain - Soviet advisers to the republican fleet (including N.G. Kuznetsov) showed their inability to wage war at sea. Stalin's order to deploy the fleet in the Mediterranean Sea and to protect the communications of the Republicans, the fleet could not fulfill - not at all. Stalin reacted to this with a new wave of bloody repressions, which simply finished off the fleet completely.

The way the "pale" fleet "performed" during the Great Patriotic War is due precisely to this. In fact, he still played an important role in it, much more important than is commonly thought today. But with the forces and means that were available on June 21, 1941, much more could be done.

After the war, restoration began. The anathema was removed from the preparation for waging a real war, and the study of tactical and operational issues of the use of the fleet in modern warfare began. Tactical, fire and technical training has also improved.

But then the army generals arrived:

"Already in 1953, speeches were made at a military scientific conference held at the Higher Military Academy, which spoke about the illegality of recognizing naval strategy, since its existence allegedly contradicted the principle of the unity of military strategy."

“In October 1955, in Sevastopol, under the leadership of NS Khrushchev, a meeting of members of the government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy was held to work out ways of developing the fleet. In the speeches of the head of state and Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov, views were expressed on the use of the Navy in a future war, in which preference was given to the actions of the forces of the fleet at the tactical and operational levels.

Two years later, the question of the illegality of the existence of naval strategy as a category of naval art was raised again. The point in its development was put in 1957 after the publication in the magazine "Military Thought" of an article by the Chief of the General Staff of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, in which the inadmissibility of separating naval strategy from the general strategy of the Armed Forces was emphasized. In this regard, V.D.Sokolovsky noted that one should speak not about the independent strategy of the Air Force and the Navy, but about their strategic use.

Guided by these instructions, the scientists of the Naval Academy prepared a draft Manual on the Conduct of Naval Operations (NMO-57), in which the category of "naval strategy" was replaced by the category of "strategic use of the Navy", and from such a category of naval art as "war on the sea ”, completely refused. In 1962, the theoretical work "Military Strategy" was published, edited by the Chief of the General Staff, which argued that the use of the Navy should be limited to actions "mainly on an operational scale."

Link

It can be seen that having "hacked" the naval strategy, the generals immediately "hacked down" their own notion - "strategic use", relegating the fleet from the type of the Armed Forces, which, in principle, is intended specifically for solving strategic tasks, to the operational-tactical level.

All this was not due to any rational reasoning. The entire experience of World War II showed the colossal importance of the fleets. Even the Red Army would not have been able to wage a war if the Germans had cut the Lend-Lease at sea and reached the Turkish border in the south. And without the fleet they would have reached - there would have been no exhausting and slowing down the blitzkrieg landing forces, nor would there have been obstacles for the Germans to massively land troops from the sea, at least in the Caucasus. What to say about the Western theaters of military operations and the Pacific Ocean! Would Soviet troops have been able to reach the Kuril Islands if the Imperial Navy had not been defeated by the US Navy? All of this was ignored.

Let's add here the fanatical conviction of N. S. Khrushchev in the obsolescence of the surface fleet and the omnipotence of submarines (the Cuban missile crisis just showed the unrealism of this dogma) and, in general, his low ability for logical thinking (to frighten the Americans with nuclear weapons, which they were not told about and did not show), and ask ourselves the question - could this political system correctly use the fleet? No, because that would require recognizing its usefulness.

Would the political leadership of the USSR have recognized it if it had at least roughly guessed what the Cuban missile crisis would be? One can fantasize about this by looking at the military-theoretical works that came out after the Cuban missile crisis.

Above mentioned was the "Military Strategy" edited by Marshal VD Sokolovsky. Its next edition came out in 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis. There, in the chapter on the building of the armed forces, the priorities in the development of the armed forces are set in the following order:

- Strategic Missile Forces. This, in general, is understandable and does not raise questions.

- Ground troops. But this is already causing. Soviet generals could not understand that if the enemy was overseas, then infantry could not reach him. To justify investing in "their" type of the Armed Forces, a continuous build-up of the power of Soviet troops in Europe was carried out. It made sense as an instrument of deterrence until reaching nuclear parity, and then not - in the event of aggression, the West could be subjected to a total nuclear clean-up, and for this tens of thousands tanks were not needed. But that didn't bother anyone. We are a land power, there is no other way.

- Fighter aircraft of air defense and air defense in general. It is logical for the side that is going to defend.

- The rest of the aviation. But in terms of supporting the Ground Forces. There are no words "air supremacy" with "military strategy", no independent tasks for aviation are envisaged. It is briefly stipulated that in some cases aviation can perform strike missions, but without specifics.

There is a strategy that in the nuclear missile age with hundreds or thousands of intercontinental bombers, with the main enemies (USA and Great Britain) overseas, is still built around infantry and tanks.

The fleet is in the last place on the list of priorities. Among his tasks are the disruption of enemy communications, the destruction of its surface forces, strikes on bases, the landing of assault forces, the main forces - submarines and aviation.

The same thesis is defended in the section describing the military-strategic features of a future world war.

At the same time, neither the need to conduct anti-submarine defense, nor the possible role of the fleet in nuclear deterrence and nuclear war (submarines with missiles are already in service) are not mentioned. The fact that submarines are already in practice, and ships are theoretically mobile carriers of missiles with a nuclear warhead and can, with their strikes, influence the outcome of even a ground war is not mentioned.

There is no mention of protecting your communications - nowhere at all. But the Americans cut them off with the blockade. It feels like no conclusions have been drawn from the Cuban missile crisis, nothing about the reissue.

US Navy patrol "Neptune" detects the transportation of dismantled Il-28 bombers to Cuba

And, of course, there is not a word about disrupting a nuclear strike from sea and ocean directions.
At the same time, the contribution of the army commanders to the failure of the submarine campaign was decisive - it was Defense Minister Grechko who set the boats speed at the crossings, which led to their detection.

Analysis of the fact of surfacing is also "impressive", take at least the "legendary" phrase of the Minister of Defense:

“What kind of battery charging? What kind of batteries? Why didn't you throw grenades at the Americans when they surfaced? "

It was necessary to throw grenades on a US Navy destroyer. And then, having found out that it turns out that the boats were diesel, not nuclear (after the operation in which he gave orders!), The minister smashed his glasses on the table in a rage.

Awesome management quality, isn't it?

The General Staff of the Navy, of course, was also to blame, too frequent contact was his fault. But where would specialists in naval warfare in the navy, which the leadership of the Ministry of Defense simply spread rot, come from? Nowhere. Now, by the way, the same problem arises.

In the end, this is what the reasons for the fact that the fleet was not used for its intended purpose in the Cuban missile crisis look like - ground thinking, which makes it impossible to understand the results that can be achieved by using the fleet for its intended purpose. And in some cases - a stupid struggle against reality, which does not fit into someone's ideas, ideological attitudes and dogmas.

Results

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, some positive shifts have taken place. Formally adhering to the previously announced strategic postulates, the military-political leadership of the USSR nevertheless "untied the hands" of S. G. Gorshkov, albeit a little, and thought about using the forces that it had.

So, a year later, the project 629 K-153 submarine with three R-13 ballistic missiles entered the first combat service. The boat was covered by three Project 74 B-76, B-77 and B-613 torpedo submarines. There is no evidence that these boats were discovered. The same could well have been done in 1962 to bolster Soviet actions. But at least after being threatened by a devastating American nuclear attack, the Soviet leadership began to use part of the naval forces as intended.

In the Navy itself, a little later, in 1964, an extensive tactical discussion began on issues of conducting missile warfare. The Navy began to contribute to nuclear deterrence with its submarines and, in general, began the path that would lead it to a psychological victory over the US Navy in the 70s.

But all this was without official recognition of the erroneousness of past approaches (at least in the specialized military press, in the same "Military Thought" and "Sea Collection"). And without admitting mistakes, no work on mistakes is possible. And it was not in full.

Conclusions for our time.

We live in a similar era today. Army generals again, as it was some time before the Great Patriotic War, liquidated the fleet as an independent branch of the armed forces. Details are described in the article “Destroyed management. There is no single command of the fleet for a long time. ”... Next in line is the Aerospace Forces, which already has an army commander. “Continental thinking” is gradually spreading in the media, and the Ministry of Defense is investing in a submarine that simply will not survive a collision with an “American” type of theater anti-submarine warfare system - whoever deployed it. Again, we have no vision of what and how the Navy is being used. The General Staff again commands the fleets, building on the experience that the General Staff officers received in the Ground Forces in the main.

There are also problems that did not exist in the early 60s.

There is nowhere to raise the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy - the Main Command has been turned into a supply structure and is engaged in purchases and parades, the General Staff of the Navy is not a military command and control body in the full sense of the word and does not participate in planning military operations. As a result, the future Commander-in-Chief simply has nowhere to gain experience commensurate with the tasks that he will have to perform. For many years now, Commanders-in-Chief have been appointed immediately from the commander of one of the fleets. For contrast, let us recall V.N. Chernavin, who came to his post, already having experience working as the chief of the General Staff of the Navy and the first deputy commander in chief. This was not a system in our country, but now there is basically no such possibility - in the current General Staff of the Navy, the potential new Commander-in-Chief will not learn anything.

In such conditions, we can easily find ourselves in a position somewhat similar to the position of the USSR at the peak of the Cuban missile crisis. Moreover, it can be aggravated by a banal shortage of ships and almost completely dead naval aviation. On the one hand, today the Russian leadership understands the use of the fleet clearly more than the Soviet one during the time of NS Khrushchev. The fleet has made its contribution to preventing the destruction of Syria until 2015, and no small one. Now the Navy is also used for its intended purpose, for example, providing supplies of Iranian fuel to this country. The fleet is used in the actions of intimidating Ukraine, more or less successfully, despite its terrible condition. The Russian leadership will not make such gross mistakes as the Cuban missile crisis. Current at least.

But on the other hand, the problems described above, making the construction of a combat-ready fleet impossible, can easily lead to the same ending, to which the lack of understanding of naval issues by the leadership of the USSR in 1962 led: the need to deviate from the declared goals, and explicitly and publicly - with all the resulting political damage.

It is clearly time for us to work on the bugs.

Comments

[The leader of the Redskins]

Whoever mastered the entire text?
To be honest, I started scrolling in the middle.
I hope the author will correct the errors and either start writing less capacious articles, or break it down into several parts.

[max702]

Somehow infa skipped about the cost of the Cuban scam for the USSR and attempts to find an exhaust from all this for the benefit of the USSR .. The picture was sad instead of the ideas of kissing distant barbudos one could provide the whole country with housing and roads with all the ensuing consequences for it .. But ...
I left the hut
I went to fight
To land in Grenada
Peasants give.
Farewell, dear!
Goodbye family!
"Grenada, Grenada,
Grenada is mine! "..
Before we start something, we need an end goal, not business for the sake of business .. Realization of this will give us an understanding of what we need and for what ..

[Serpet]

Quote: max702

Before you start something, you need an end goal, and not business for the sake of business

Everything is correct. But do not forget that in the USSR there was a goal - the world proletariat, and not everything was measured in money. Rather, the expense of money was not always taken into account.
All a happy holiday.

[max702]

Well, Trotskyism in all its glory ... A bundle of brushwood in the form of Russia is, as it were, obligatory in this fire ...

[Mar.Tirah]

not everything was measured in money. Rather, the expense of money was not always taken into account.
Happy Holidays, everyone. [/ Quote]
Then it was necessary to tell Khrushchev. He considered money in the wrong place, easily giving billions for "brotherly" aid, while hanging out across the regions like a deck of cards. The author's fears have a basis. I think the conclusions were drawn not only from the Cuban missile crisis. Tension returned. Now we have there not only CUBA but also VENEZUELA can be springboards and trump cards for containing the imperial ambitions of the States. Does Russia have such a karma to choose scoundrels as leaders, alternating them with gifted leaders? Here's what the next one will be, how he will behave, how to insure himself against traitors ?????

[bayard]

Quote: Mar. Tira

.Now we have there not only CUBA but also VENEZUELA can be bridgeheads and trump cards for containing the imperial ambitions of the States.

There is also Nicaragua, from the territory of which the land-based KR is less likely to fly. And as an additional MTO item for the operational squadron in the Caribbean. Having such in Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua, it would be possible to ensure the constant presence of the Fleet strike forces in the reach of the US territory, in response to the very likely deployment of the RSD in Europe and Asia (SE) and the presence in the waters adjacent to Russia, the enemy's submarine submarine with CD on board. And SSBN, for striking the Trident-2 ballistic missile along a flat trajectory.
But this requires not only the Fleet in the form of a sufficient number of ships and means of their support, but also an appropriate strategy.
But such (strategy), we somehow do not observe. Everything is going in some jerks, with the inevitable in this case, disruptions of programs and undertakings. There is no control over the implementation of government orders. There is no responsibility for such failures. There is not even a simple intelligible goal-setting.
And this is already a consequence of the lack of sovereignty.
A country without IDEOLOGY (read - goal-setting) cannot exist, it will inevitably degrade and degenerate. Which is what we observe.
And what kind of construction of the Navy can we talk about when flagrant acts of SABOTAGE and sabotage not only have no consequences for their authors and organizers ... but also for the performers.
- Diversion (or criminal negligence) with a floating dock, which almost killed "Admiral Kuznetsov",
- Sabotage and missed deadlines for the construction of a dry dock to repair it ("Admiral Kuznetsov"),
- Sabotage and disruption of ALL deadlines with the modernization of the cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov",
- A destructive decision to launch with the subsequent installation of the power plant afloat (!!!) of the frigate "Admiral Golovko", thus postponing the commissioning of this ship for at least 2 years! And with an unknown quality of installation of the first domestic power plant assembly.
- Construction of a large series of monstrously expensive and problematic SSGNs of the Yasen \ Ash-M type (at the cost of two Borei-class SSBNs), instead of the MPS and Borei-K SSGNs that are so necessary for the Fleet.
- An outrageous sabotage program for the construction of corvettes with an inoperative, monstrously expensive and (even after finishing) extremely low performance radar "Zazlon".
... All this looks by no means bungling and banal money-grubbing, namely, SABOTAGE and SALTAGE of a strategic nature.
And no attempts to counteract this on the part of the highest state power.
It looks like they are happy with everything.
And they are only interested in parades and bravura reports / articles about those who have no analogues in the world ... ships ... which do not exist ... and weapons that have nothing to place on.
There is a common imitation.
... After all, Khrushchev was not just a @iot, but a direct enemy who had seized power. And to explain his "eccentricities" only by the lack of intelligence and upbringing ... is naive.

Is this what we see in the last 7 years (when Russia practically declared war) in terms of military development and rearmament of the Army (with the Navy, everything is clear anyway)?
- Reducing purchases of combat aircraft (we can build them for now),
- Neglect of the issues of combat control, reconnaissance and guidance of fighter and strike aircraft (AWACS aircraft did not appear, otherwise there is ... you can count on the fingers),
- At the head of the Aerospace Forces is a tanker ... and this is not only the Air Force, but also the country's air defense ... and space reconnaissance means ...
- The fleets are subordinate to the districts ... whose commanders ... can also order the use of grenades against enemy destroyers ...
If the state does not have a goal ("ideology"), then the authorities do not need such an entity either the Navy or the Army.
And what you need ?
Propaganda.
Parades - so pretty and uplifting.
And the maximum cleaning of competent and proactive personnel in the Army, Navy and state apparatus.
... And the "Cunning Plan" did not "shoot".
Alas.

[bk0010]

Quote: bayard

Construction of a large series of monstrously expensive and problematic SSGNs of the Yasen \ Ash-M type (at the cost of two Borei-class SSBNs), instead of the MPS and Borei-K SSGNs that are so necessary for the Fleet.

And this hypothetical Borei-K will be able to fight the Virginias? If not, then it is not needed.

[bayard]

Quote: bk0010

And this hypothetical "Borey-K"

... announced at one time Shoigu - about plans to bookmark 2 pieces, after the laying of 8 SSBN "Borey \ Borey-A". However, later it was decided to bookmark 2 more Borei-A. But it is not a fact that the idea was completely abandoned.

Quote: bk0010

can fight the Virginias?

Perhaps it has even a little more chances in a duel, compared to "Ash-M", as it is much more secretive / quiet. Unlike "Ash", he has a water cannon as a propeller. And "Ash" has an open propeller.
In addition, the Borey has 40 torpedoes in ammunition (or KR for launching through a TA), and the Ash has 30.
As a strike weapon, "Borey-K" can have up to 112 CD in the VPU, against 50 CD in the VPU at the Ash.
Well, the cost: 550 million dollars. Borey has more than $ 1 billion against Ash.
- For duty "under the American coast" it is "Borei-K" that is more suitable (in terms of stealth and strike capabilities).
- For the same amount allocated from the budget, you can build twice as many SSGNs if you build Borei-K.
- The industry has mastered the construction of the "Borey" much better, but with the "Ash" from the very beginning of the problem (the head one came out completely unsuccessful), to this day, the already modernized "Ash-M" still cannot be brought up to standard. Already that year they send for revision.
- In order to unify, simplify and reduce the cost of repair and operation, as well as training l / s, it is more profitable to have a single base for SSBNs and SSGNs.
- Since both "Borey-A" and "Borey-K" will have an identical acoustic signature, you can successfully fool the enemy when he does not know what kind of submarine went to sea, and, accordingly, in which area of ​​the base it it follows that it will facilitate the separation when tracking the enemy's MAPL base.
- "Borey-K" has a much lower "novelty coefficient" than "Ash", which has no analogues, which means that there will be much fewer purely technical problems with them.
And why do we need a SSGN in service, which cannot provide stealth, and, being detected and attacked, will not be able to fight off the attacking torpedoes?
Send sailors to death?
"Wunderwaffle" didn't come out. Moreover, the failure was initially laid down and is conceptual in nature, because the open propeller is listened to from all angles. A jet propulsion unit - only from the aft corners, and to a lesser extent.
And after all, water cannons back in the USSR were installed on all new submarines, and even on diesel "Varshavyanka" ...
Due to the combination of factors, I do not see any reason why "Ash" can be preferable to "Borey-K" ... But "Ash" ... has a VERY powerful lobby. And it is exclusively self-serving.
... Not to say worse.

Now try to argue with me at least something.

[bk0010]

Quote: bayard

Now try to argue with me at least something.

What makes Ash so much more expensive?

Quote: bayard

Well, the cost: 550 million dollars. Borey has more than $ 1 billion against Ash.

30 billion rubles for a long time not 1 billion $

[bayard]

Quote: bk0010

What makes Ash so much more expensive?

A very high coefficient of novelty, a new line-up scheme, greater labor intensity, and the LOBBY must be fed. As a result, the price of "Ash" is at the level of "Virginia", but everything is known in comparison.

Quote: bk0010

30 billion rubles for a long time not 1 billion $

What year did you look at in prices?
Then the dollar was about 30 rubles.
Now the price is about 80 billion rubles.
And "Borey-A" - about 40 billion rubles.
The cost of the "Borea" remained at the level of the frigate 22350.
And "Ash" as cost two such frigates, and is.
We can calculate their comparative combat value in terms of strike capabilities in terms of price. And we get that "Borei" being almost 2,5 times more powerful in a salvo (112 KR + 10 \ 15 KR from TA versus 50 KR) and having half the cost 5 (FIVE Karl!) Times more efficient in terms of the amount spent ...
With greater reliability and sophistication of the "Borea".
And less noise.
But LOBBY is stronger.

The point is also that "Ash" is not at all a multipurpose submarine, as they say about it, but a classic submarine. And very expensive. And how MAPLs will not use it - it is too expensive, ineffective (low stealth) and irrational (chasing a carrier of 50 CR for the enemy's MAPL).
As a MAPL, a torpedo submarine of moderate VI (4-5 thousand tons) is needed. Inexpensive, uncomplicated, low-noise and MASS / large-scale. For these need to have 20 - 24 pieces. minimum. If at the price of such a MAPL comes out as corvette 20380 (since "Borey" costs as much as 22350), then the game is definitely worth the candle.
But even to start the development of such a MPS is now unrealistic, while the Yaseni are being built - they devour the lion's share of the Fleet's budget.
And the worst of all is that no conclusions are drawn and new Ash trees are ordered.
To the detriment of all other programs.

For comparison, "Ash" costs as much as a missile cruiser / destroyer VI in 12 - 000 tons with 14 missile launchers, Fort-M air defense system (S-000), two helicopters and a full minced meat. Or like two frigates 80.

[bk0010]

Quote: bayard

The cost of "Borea" as it was at the level of the cost of the frigate 22350

I would never have thought that a nuclear submarine cruiser stands like an ordinary frigate.

[bayard]

The frigate has one SAM with the Poliment radar and the SAM costs 1/3 of the entire frigate.
Well, the technology is well developed. Still, "Borey" was created on the basis of the MAPL of project 971 (power plant, a strong body and much, even in it). And "Pike-B" is, after all, the best MAPL in our fleet since the times of the USSR (others simply did not appear).
But "Ash" from the very beginning did not work. It has a lot of new solutions that we have not worked out yet, a completely different layout scheme ... and worst of all, a bare propeller remained in Yasene-M. And for so many years they have not been able to bring it to their senses and are sent for revision ... and at the same time (!!!) they continue to lay new buildings.
This is no longer naked stubbornness and incompetence, and not even banal money-grubbing, this is direct sabotage.

[Osipov9391]

Where are the British Trident missiles aimed or are they not aimed at all until the order is received? The situation there (as it actually is, apparently) is not simple. In the safe of the SSBN commander on each of the 4 submarines, the "wills" of the Prime Minister are kept. This letter can be opened if all communication with the shore is lost. There are options for action. Including launching missiles at the enemy.
Here it is not unambiguous. If SSBNs on patrol suddenly lost contact with the headquarters, the commanders opened the safes with letters and read them, then where would they launch missiles? If the coordinates of the targets were not hammered into them.
By the way, their SSBNs (like the French ones) are unattainable for our fleet. From the Indian Ocean, the safest for themselves, they can reach any target on the territory of Russia.

[bayard]

Quote: Osipov9391

By the way, their SSBNs (like the French ones) are unattainable for our fleet. From the Indian Ocean, the safest for themselves, they can reach any target on the territory of Russia.

So the American SSBNs hang out in those parts - until recently, it was from that angle that we had a hole in the field of the early warning system. But this is no longer the case.
And whoever will figure out whose rockets from the Indian Ocean are flying to us - gifts will fly back and forth to all addressees. And after the salvo itself, there is no point in chasing after the SSBN itself - they are empty, they are safe, and it will no longer be possible to recharge in the bases.
We can no longer afford to have squadrons of anti-submarine ships and MAPLs in all oceans. Therefore, only the testament of Mao-Zedong - "To beat the headquarters" \ "... on the decision-making centers" remains relevant.

[Osipov9391]

That is, not only are British / French SSBNs patrolling the Indian Ocean, but American Ohio's wandering in its waters there? This is the safest place for them.
And the bases are nearby where you can go.
But still, in the case of England, is this the case with this letter? If all communication with the shore is lost, will the commander open the safe in the cabin, get the letter and make a decision? But where will he aim the missiles if the connection is no longer there? Or are all such missiles aimed at us in advance?

[Osipov9391]

But will the 16-rocket Vanguard still be able to release at least a part of the ammunition load or fall apart / sink after this? After all, they did not fire more than two missiles in the exercises.
16 rockets this boat will take into the mines and replacement tanks a considerable amount of sea water. The boat is single-hull, as I understand it. Will it sink if it releases 8-10 missiles?
And yet, according to the Western press, in the last letter of the Prime Minister that is kept in the safe of the SSBN commander, there is a point: to follow to Australia after a missile attack. That is, the boats will no longer go to the base in Scotland?

[bayard]

Quote: Osipov9391

If all communication with the shore is lost, will the commander open the safe in the cabin, get the letter and make a decision? But where will he aim the missiles if the connection is no longer there? Or are all such missiles aimed at us in advance?

Perhaps there are several options for such letters - for several typical situations.
But with a probability of 90 - 95% - there are targets on our territory.
Well, not with China, are they to fight?
China is a partner, investor, competitor, but not an enemy.
The enemy is us.

Quote: Osipov9391

... The boat is single-hull, as I understand it. Will it sink if it releases 8-10 missiles?

The same can be said about “Ohio” - about the ability to fire more than half of the BC.
But the volleys may not be full, after each of which the boat will stabilize, after which the next volley may follow.
Our SSBNs are capable of carrying out a full salvo.

Quote: Osipov9391

And yet, according to the Western press, in the last letter of the Prime Minister that is kept in the safe of the SSBN commander, there is a point: to follow to Australia after a missile attack. That is, the boats will no longer go to the base in Scotland?

And this is reasonable. Especially if there is an opportunity to recharge in Australia.
But if you recharge and fail, all the same - Australia and New Zealand are seen as a territory of survival and rebirth.
And we must remember - England is not an island / archipelago near Europe, but a global Empire deliberately hidden from modern inhabitants. It is enough to see who is the head of state of states such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many other island states.
And recently, a lot of efforts have been made to bring the United States back to its previous status in relation to England.
Trump was strongly opposed.
And he was gone.
And they left him at any cost.

Quote: Osipov9391

That is, the boats will no longer go to the base in Scotland?

In the event of a real war, the British Isles are doomed. And they have long come to terms with it.

[Osipov9391]

Will the commander and crew of the British SSBN decide to strike at the Russian Federation if communication is lost? And yes, as the British newspapers wrote, there is a letter in which it is proposed to the submarine commander to place the ship under the command of the USA / NATO or another country. And when the crew members of the boat were interviewed for newspapers (that was 10 years ago), many mentioned that they have relatives in Australia.
That is, they can send their families there in advance? (so I would do that)
And each SSBN carries several dozen torpedoes with it. What is so much for? For a meeting with our "Pikes" if you accidentally run into them where in the Atlantic? And its crew is almost 150 people. American missiles, British charges.
How these missiles differ from those used on the Ohio is unknown. And are they interchangeable. And whether the submarine can accept the Trident with American charges unloaded from the Ohio is also a moot point.

[bayard]

Quote: Osipov9391

Will the commander and crew of the British SSBN decide to strike at the Russian Federation if communication is lost?

It all depends on the specific commander. But they are being tested very seriously on this topic.

Quote: Osipov9391

And yes, as the British newspapers wrote, there is a letter in which it is proposed to the submarine commander to place the ship under the command of the USA / NATO or another country.

Well, this is the NATO bloc. Everything is natural here, if we are talking about a global war.

Quote: Osipov9391

... And when the crew members of the boat were interviewed for newspapers (that was 10 years ago), many mentioned that they have relatives in Australia.
That is, they can send their families there in advance?

If there is a threatened period before the launch of the submarine at sea, and the families of the sailors will have such financial and logistical capabilities, then why not. The question is - who will accept these families? ... Oh yes - relatives.

Quote: Osipov9391

And each SSBN carries several dozen torpedoes with it. What is so much for? For a meeting with our "Pikes" if you accidentally run into them where in the Atlantic?

After firing a ballistic missile, any SSBN turns into a banal MAPL and is capable of sinking enemy ships and vessels with conventional torpedoes. After all, the matter will not end with an exchange of nuclear strikes, and the battles of the surviving ships, military bases, and garrisons will continue for some time. Most of the ships at sea will survive. So not only against the enemy's MPS, which are vanishingly few today.
But in the old days (when these submarines were designed), opponents still had enough multipurpose submarines. And the battle with such an exchange of a pair of torpedoes could not end. Especially if they are equipped with anti-torpedo protection.

Quote: Osipov9391

How these missiles differ from those used on the Ohio is unknown. And are they interchangeable. And whether the submarine can accept the Trident with American charges unloaded from the Ohio is also a moot point.

This is not known to me, maybe they are capable, if it was originally laid down.
But this is unlikely to be said openly.

[Osipov9391]

They also wrote that the autonomy of the Vengrad nuclear submarine is about 120 days. Is that impressive for such a ship? Where to load food for 150 people on board?
Recently, there are women in the crews. Including (there was a scandal there) and the commander of the warhead in charge of torpedoes and missiles.
And if there is a situation in which the submarine will have to shoot SLBMs, the commander, after opening the letter, will give the command to the commander of the warhead whose remote control is rocket fire. And he will hammer coordinates into rockets.
Once upon a time I watched a photo report from the inside of this boat. There is a rocket firing remote control and 16 panels on it with keys, buttons, indicators and more.
And the woman behind him ...
For such positions on such a ship, do they pass compatibility and tests with a psychologist? And the crews, as I understand it, one per boat. They can no longer, there are 4 of them. A couple is in the sea, one is on duty at the base and can go on patrol at any time. Another one at the dock or reloading missiles. It is 16-20 km from the Clyde Bay base.
And so the ships are quite perfect, functionally analogous to "Borey". And technically and in terms of missile capabilities, it may be better at what. And everything on the boat is English except the missiles. This is a great achievement for such a small country.
And yes, it was "Vengrad" that became the father of the "Astyut" MAPL. In fact, it is the same, but without the missile compartment.
They did not unify anything for "Ash" and "Borey" ...

[bayard]

Quote: Osipov9391

There is a rocket firing remote control and 16 panels on it with keys, buttons, indicators and more.
And the woman behind him ...
For such positions on such a ship, do they pass compatibility and tests with a psychologist?

Of course, everyone passes the tests, but the fact is that women, by definition, have an unstable psyche, strongly depend on their female cycles, in a critical situation they often fall into a stupor (a natural defensive reaction of the female body) instead of mobilization ... But NATO is now in vogue for how many women in the army are there just defense ministers. Apparently there is a directive for the future matriarchy.

Quote: Osipov9391

And everything on the boat is English except the missiles. This is a great achievement for such a small country.

England in the past is the "queen of the seas", the leading education system, and even today it is not just a "small country", but quite an empire hidden from view behind the name "British Commonwealth of Nations". Rolls-Royce - engines, turbines, etc. Modern electronics, fundamental science, precision mechanics - have always been their strengths.
But there are financial constraints. And the accepted role of the "small country".
By the way, KOH in 50% is unlikely to be able to them. Anyway, on an ongoing basis.

Quote: Osipov9391

They did not unify anything for "Ash" and "Borey" ...

These are still Soviet developments (both), brought already in the new RF. And in the USSR there was always an abundance of different projects.
From "Ash" had to be completely abandoned in the series, limiting itself only to the completion of an experienced head - to check and make sure that it was not optimal for us. And as a SSGN (which Ash was conceived to replace 949 Ave.) to build the Borey-K, which is both unified with SSBNs to the maximum, and has been more developed by the industry in terms of technology. And more secretive.
And as an MAPL, we need a PLA with a dimension and VI as 945 etc., such as was designed in the Soviet Union, but it did not come to a finished product, and the reactor was not ready. Only a full-size model was built to work out line-up solutions. And they abandoned it in favor of "Ash", which they decided to make a universal.
And they miscalculated.
Unfortunately .
It turned out to be expensive and not quite what we need.

[Osipov9391]

That is, the decision that the British made on the design and construction of "Astyut" on the basis of "Vanguard", including the unification of the power plant and the reactor compartment, is correct?
The layout and design of the boats is largely the same, only there is no rocket compartment.
It is also impressive that all the equipment and materials (including steel) are English ... But where can they get so much nickel, molybdenum, zirconium and other things? Probably Australia is helping with this or Africa.
But the talk about the fact that the reactors of both atomarines are charged once for 30 years (the entire service life), probably a bike.
After all, there are pumps in the circuits, their bearings, steam generators and other equipment, by definition, which does not have such a service life.
And the radiation swelling (possibly even cracking) of the zirconium shells of the assemblies in the reactor has not been canceled. How can they survive 25-30 years? And yes, British boats are working on weapons-grade uranium. Apparently because of the size and power.

[Osipov9391]

And for a large supply of torpedoes on board, there was information that if the boat had to shoot rockets from high latitudes, and the ice was thick there and the echometer could not be found thinner, then the boat would fire 2-3 torpedoes, make them a wormwood with a directed explosion, float up to launch missiles.
Although whether they walk to these high latitudes or wander in warm waters is unknown. But there was information that our "Pike" somewhere in the waters of the Norwegian Sea kept hydroacoustic contact with strategic British women. By noises (it is not known whether they are in the library of noises of acoustics, I found MAPL), you can determine it.
There is a water jet. They left the screws. On "Astyut" the same.

[bayard]

Quote: Osipov9391

Although whether they walk to these high latitudes or wander in warm waters is unknown.

Recently they have been visiting, mastering.

[Ka-52]

- At the head of the VKS - tanker

he is not a tanker, from the combined arms. But he was a muddy personality, he was twice under investigation.

[bayard]

There were rumors that he was first promised Rosgvardia to be subordinate to him, but the place was already taken and ... as compensation, he was put on the Aerospace Forces.
Since then, there has been complete silence with AWACS (A-100) aircraft, special reconnaissance aircraft, target designation, electronic warfare \ RTP, MRA ... and purchases of combat aircraft and helicopters are only decreasing every year.
So "we will win".

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Serpet

in the USSR there was a goal - the world proletariat,

And which proletariat was the USSR aiming at? African?

Quote: Serpet

and not everything was measured in money.

Everything. Ideology also has a monetary equivalent.
'We do not save on ideology' ©
Suslov.

[timokhin-aa]

To start or not to start was one question.
How to act, if they did start, is different.

[max702]

Quote: timokhin-aa

To start or not to start was one question.
How to act, if they did start, is different.

Oh, how .. That is, here you go to the store, and there once and someone in line in the face! To the question -What are you doing this for? You answer so proudly - The main thing I thought about how I will give in the face! Reminds one character who said the same "The main thing is to get involved in a battle, and then we'll see .." You know, He finished very badly ..

[timokhin-aa]

As usual, you demonstrate intellectual inconsistency.

In my article, I did not touch on the question of how to proceed from the point of view of politics.
I explained what Khrushchev made a mistake in implementing his plan.
The question of whether this plan was needed, I did not consider.
And then, with your logic, it is necessary to prohibit the combat experience of the war in Afghanistan to study - the war was wrong.

[max702]

The experience of the war in Afghanistan speaks, first of all, that it was not necessary to climb there under any circumstances, but to drag the United States there and arrange a second Vietnam for them it was necessary by all means ... Since 1961 and the Caribbean crisis, everything has changed a little more than completely, but since the days of Afghanistan, nothing special, except that the UAVs have been added and that's it ... Therefore, the experience of the war in Afghanistan is quite relevant to itself, but the patterns of the Caribbean crisis have no value due to global changes on the battlefield .. You do there is a problem with this when you constantly refer to the deeds of bygone days and the conquest of the Crimea ... And it doesn’t come to you that the stakes in land and sea conflicts are fundamentally different, and if on land the death of a couple of thousand soldiers can be completely blurred from any side by writing them off on all sorts of rebels, then the disassembly between the ship groupings by no means will be attributed to them. and losses among the pennants (and they will not be small for your fantasies) will require completely different response actions that will result, as it were, at the end of civilization .. ALL parties understand this and do not arrange naval battles under any conditions .. Consequently, all your opuses have an exclusively disinformational and subversive purpose, as it was written here on VO not long ago in one article on disinformation ..

[bayard]

Quote: max702

The experience of the war in Afghanistan speaks first of all about the fact that it was not necessary to climb there under no circumstances

There was no need for a military invasion - yes. And so, including the military presence, we were there. Amin generally asked to send him a unit for personal protection. His personal doctor was a Soviet doctor. The relationship and trust with Afghanistan has been unprecedented since the 60s. As one of my acquaintances, who has been involved in Afghanistan since the early 60s, told me, "I walked the streets of Afghan cities like one of our Central Asian republics, so the attitude was benevolent." The author and organizer of that adventure with the murder of Amin (and his slander before that - about his collusion with the Americans) was personally Andropov. It was he who insisted on the introduction of troops. The army was against it. The Politburo did not want this either ... But Andropov insisted, referring to some "super-reliable sources", which, as it turned out later, did not exist. But he himself - yes, he was in cahoots with the Americans and British intelligence. It was their joint operation "Organize your own" Vietnam "for the USSR". I know this from a participant in that operation.

Quote: max702

Since 1961 and the Caribbean crisis, everything has changed a little more than completely,

And here, I completely disagree with you. It is precisely now that both the tasks and the needs for the participation of the Fleet "off the distant shores" are as urgent as they were during the "Caribbean Crisis". And the Syrian company is forcing this, and the need to ensure the safety of the escort of tankers from Iran to Syria, and the need to support Venezuela, where our state and business have very considerable interests. And the very confrontation with the United States, to the level of the new Cold War, makes us look for an instrument to compensate for the threats posed to us by the NATO fleets and the US allied powers.
And for this, boats in the near zone will not be enough in any way.
And the plans to re-equip the Navy were reasonable and sound. But their implementation came across both the unpreparedness of the industry for such shock work, and the direct SABOTAGE of the persons responsible for its (program) implementation.
If the so-called. "land power" finds itself in a state of war / conflict with the sea power (or an alliance of such powers), then the refusal to confront at sea ALWAYS leads to the defeat of such a "land power". For the naval blockade, the blockade of trade and the initiative in the use of force will always be the tools of the enemy.
And it is the "Gorshkov Doctrine" - a proactive, offensive strategy, asymmetric moves and actions, the use of one's own advantages and weaknesses of the opposing side - the key to success in such a confrontation.
Or does Katz offer to surrender?
If a person or a state refuses to fight, to oppose aggression, he will inevitably lose.
Do you really want your state to be defeated?

Quote: max702

Consequently, all your opuses have an exclusively disinformation and subversive purpose, as it was written here on VO not long ago in one article on disinformation ..

But this is either from a small mind, or evidence of that very subversive activity.
An opinion expressed is worth something only when it is competent.
And this is not your case.

[max702]

How good it is with you, I don’t see here, but here the fish ... Yeah .. About Shpien Andropov you are very strong, of course, but the military did not have anything against the Afghan, there was no war for a long time. other amenities, the KGB also twisted its visits as without it and the war opened up good prospects, and the Politburo was not against it because intrigues, scandals, investigations .. So the Afghan was a foregone conclusion, everyone wanted it ..

Quote: bayard

Do you really want your state to be defeated?

While there is the Strategic Missile Forces, the military defeat of Russia is not possible and it doesn't matter if there is a fleet or not, Syria has perfectly confirmed everything, especially with regard to the Navy.
And Timokhin is an enemy and a vile enemy, because even realizing this, he continues his subversive activity, laying the bricks of public opinion in favor of destructive decisions for the defense of Russia. We are perfectly observing the defense order .. By the way, with the current owners of the VO, it strives for the status of a foreign agent with all the consequences .. The site's policy cries out about this ..

[bayard]

Quote: max702

... About shpien Andropov you are very strong of course

This is not only me, but also his colleagues and former subordinates. There are already enough materials on this excessively publicized (at one time) figure.

Quote: max702

but the military did not have anything against the Afghan, the war had not been going on for a long time

Were you at that meeting of the Politburo?
Have you personally seen how the military "waved a sword"?
Are you personally acquainted with the generals who have passed through Afghanistan?
I still rely on the materials and opinions of people who had a relationship to this.

Quote: max702

The KGB also spun its visits

Quote: max702

and the Politburo didn't mind

The Politburo was against it (except for Andropov). And it was he who pushed this decision, convincing the rest of the members that he had "irrefutable evidence of Amin's betrayal" from "my personal agent, whom I absolutely trust" - it was the LOD. But it worked and the military VERY Willingly agreed to the operation, while believing that the troops would enter and then immediately leave, after the change of leader.
But they were not given, immediately engaging in battles with the "irreconcilable".
But the Afghans did not expect such a betrayal from the USSR. They were simply shocked, could not believe that the "shuravi" staged a massacre in the center of their capital ... And then they began to act on instinct. The plus in the relationship changed dramatically to the minus.

Quote: max702

... So Afghan was a foregone conclusion, everyone wanted him ..

The Americans and the British wanted him. They needed to weaken the USSR, discredit it in front of the world community and especially in front of Muslim countries. And Andropov helped them with this.
How he helped by escorting their agents (who he himself was) to the highest echelons of power (Gorbachev, Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, etc.).

Quote: max702

While there is the Strategic Missile Forces, the military defeat of Russia is not possible and do not care if there is a fleet or not

The military might of the USSR was unlike the current one, but the USSR collapsed thanks to the betrayal of its top officials.

Quote: max702

Syria perfectly confirmed everything, especially with regard to the Navy ..

Syria has most vividly confirmed that such operations are not possible in principle without the fleet.
And to this day it proves.
All logistics for the supply, transfer of troops, equipment, ammunition, equipment, lies 90% on the shoulders of the Navy. Aviation (BTA) is not capable of this and resolves issues only in the most urgent cases.

Quote: max702

And Timokhin is an enemy and a vile enemy, for even realizing this, he continues his subversive activity, laying the bricks of public opinion in favor of destructive decisions for the defense of Russia ..

Only the ENEMY can write this way.
Or a very narrow-minded person.
Do not persist in your opinion, it looks very unconvincing and funny.
And sometimes it's just disgusting.
Timokhin is a former combat command officer of the anti-aircraft division. And this is the level of operational-strategic understanding and KNOWLEDGE.
What you do not possess.
Klimov is a former officer of the General Staff of the Navy of the Department of Advanced Development (as I think it was called), which also testifies to the level of competence.
And in the past I am an officer of the combat directorate of an air defense formation.
So I have basic KNOWLEDGE and concepts on the issues discussed.
And the squeals of opponents of Klimov and Timokhin, usually pitiful and unsubstantiated, only indicate that they are not doing their job in vain - they are fighting for the common sense and defense of the country.

Quote: max702

Thank God, competent people are sitting in the General Staff of the Russian Federation, and Timokhin's and K.'s opuses do not, in principle, consider what we are observing perfectly well on a defense order.

What do you know about the work of the General Staff?
What do they read and what are they guided by?
Yes, and they are not in charge of the defense order at all - it is not the General Staff and the General Staff of the Navy that form the state order, but quite the opposite. Corporations rule everything.
Or do you think that it is the General Staff of the Navy who is pushing the non-working and monstrously expensive "Zaslon" into corvettes with such stubbornness?
Or is the General Staff of the Navy insisting on the continuation of the "Ash-M" bookmarks, which for several years have not even been able to hand over the head one !!!?
NOT ! The General Staff of the Navy, as best he can, is fighting off the adoption of the "Ash" imposed on him - non-ready and incapable of combat. That is why for several years in a row they have been systematically sent to the plant for revision. And this is despite the deafening PR in all media that the "head" Ash-M "Kazan" will be delivered to the customer and put into service by the ... date .... of the year. "
You do not see this, although these are obvious things.
For you are not an expert.
And then there are ANGED "specialists" who pour slops on Timokhin and Klimov, so as not to interfere with their development of the budget and sell their homeland.
And you (perhaps out of stupidity or ignorance) are their accomplice.
For you dare to talk with such aplomb about things in which you absolutely do not understand anything.

Quote: max702

By the way, with the current owners of VO, it strives for the status of a foreign agent with all the consequences .. The site's policy cries out about this ..

Well, you still scribble an anonymous letter "where to nada".
There is no worse misfortune in the world than an enterprising ... fool.

[max702]

Quote: bayard

The military might of the USSR was unlike the current one, but the USSR collapsed thanks to the betrayal of its top officials.

Wait, are we talking about the military aspect? I’m talking about the political .. I said bluntly while the Strategic Missile Forces are defeated military the way is not possible! You put an owl on the globe ..
The military fleet in Syria showed its complete uselessness, again from a military point of view, the goods were transported to everything possible and the safety of these goods was guaranteed not by cannons, missiles, torpedoes thereof, but by the flag of the Russian Navy over these ships. The ships were quite ultimatum strategic nuclear forces and everyone understood this .. Now, regarding the aviation, the transportation did not cope, well, this is natural! She seemed to be engaged in a completely different work, because when will you wait for this fleet there (whoever threw the S-400 there when it turned out that there was zero sense from the naval air defense) Well, what did they carry? On cruisers? Destroyers? Corvettes, frigates? Submarine? Or did you bring something useful to Tartus to AUG? Everything was done by a penny Polish-built large landing ship, but dry cargo ships purchased in a hurry at the price of scrap .. Why then tart hundreds of billions to the Navy if everything you need was delivered by investing a penny? Or will you start proving directly that if the fleet were not there, then our ships would be drowned? So if anything Syria showed it is the need for the Aerospace Forces and high-quality supply of the ground grouping, because they REALLY have to fight, and the fleet stood there as watchmen on the turntable so that the gopot would not get in the least ...
The fact that the General Staff of the Navy agrees evil, incompetent hucksters sitting on kickbacks from the naval military-industrial complex .. In my mind, this whole program should be supervised by the General Staff of the Ground For the fleet works exclusively in their interests .. But not all of us ideally have something to work on .. I read about the Afghan And just all the conclusions on the basis of this, a small victorious war, everyone wanted .. They did it like in all other areas of state activity ..

[timokhin-aa]

Timokhin is a former combat command officer of the anti-aircraft division. And this is the level of operational-strategic understanding and KNOWLEDGE.
What you do not possess.
Klimov is a former officer of the General Staff of the Navy of the Department of Advanced Development (as I think it was called), which also testifies to the level of competence.

This is not true. It was Maxim from the submarine who went to the management of the PAD. And I'll tell you about myself later.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: bayard

And the Syrian company is forcing this, and the need to ensure the safety of the escort of tankers from Iran to Syria, and the need to support Venezuela, where our state and business have very considerable interests

You do not confuse the interests of business and the state. Otherwise, the need to support these interests will untie the state's navel. Before you have any interests, you need to calculate all the risks and how much it will cost. The cost of the Cuban missile crisis is far behind compared to investments in Syria and Venezuela. with unclear prospects

[bayard]

Quote: Pilat2009

You should not confuse the interests of business and the state.

I would be glad if business in our country did not influence politics, moreover, if it did not determine it to a very large extent.
We have CAPITALISM, which means the power of capital.
Alas, this is so.
We ended up in Syria for the sake of the interests of Gazprom and Novatek, in order to prevent the construction of a gas pipeline from Qatar to Europe. And we have Gazprom, as you know, the People's Property.
The gas pipeline has not been built.
Russian gas goes through pipes to Europe, and Qatar has already begun to cooperate with Novatek and Gazprom and are even going to jointly produce some equipment, they are deciding how not to interfere with each other in the market and not bring down the price of gas.
Is it bad ?
After all, Gazprom gives us one of the largest portions of budget revenues.
Venezuela OWS us a lot of money for the supplied weapons, loans and other supplies. If the coup took place, we would never see our money.
In addition, Venezuela is one of the largest owners of oil deposits. True, hard-to-recover ones, but there are a LOT of them.
There is also gold.
And therefore, from a geostrategic point of view, it is very beneficial and useful for us to gain a foothold in this region. At the same time, Venezuela has the most powerful and well-equipped army in the entire Latin American region. And it is useful for us to have a naval base and a videoconferencing base there.
It is much more profitable and more convenient than if it were Cuba.
We give them protection, they give us a place to base. At the same time, they continue to pay debts (with oil, which we bring to India to our largest oil refineries in India, and we sell oil products through our own network of filling stations throughout India - up to 4000 filling stations).
I don't think this is bad business. And the business certainly does not consider him bad.
And since the interests of defense and business begin to coincide, then this must be done. In Syria, not all the costs of our presence there are paid from the budget of the Ministry of Defense. I think that the picture is about the same in Venezuela.
There is a truth and a problem with our business - it is mainly offshore and does not pay income tax to the treasury. Doesn't pay VAT either.
This is bad .
And this issue has already begun to be addressed. Remember Deripaska's monologue?
It is safer for them and themselves to return to their native offshores (which have been prepared for them in the Russian jurisdiction) - that looks like the western "partners" will begin confiscations ...
And we also need a fleet to ensure the safe traffic of our tankers and gas carriers, of which there are more and more on the sea routes every year. And soon there will be even more, when "Zvezda" and "Kola Shipyard" are working in full force, when the gas carriers ordered by Novotek in Korea come out on the main lines.
It was for this that a base was needed in the Red Sea - in the narrow neck of world trade.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: bayard

Venezuela OWS us a lot of money for the supplied weapons, loans and other supplies. If the coup took place, we would never see our money.
In addition, Venezuela is one of the largest owners of oil deposits. True, hard to recover, but there are a LOT of them

You can forget about loans. Venezuela is one of the poorest countries in Latin America. Forget about oil too - in the light of the sanctions on Venezuelan oil, Rosneft sold its assets to the state. That is, the people will pay off for the policy of Rosneft. These assets are illiquid. Gas from Qatar is quite successfully transported. tankers, plotting an expensive military operation for the sake of the interests of the oligarchs is so-so pleasure.

[bayard]

But the war in Syria has distracted attention from Donbass. Both you and many others no longer want Russia to intercede for its compatriots, to return its people and lands.
That was also the goal.
And it has also been achieved.
I am not defending the games of the oligarchs, I am explaining them.
And I live in Donetsk, so that you can understand.

[Osipov9391]

Still, what was more important for our state? Syria or Donbass bordering on us and yes all of Ukraine? After all, if tomorrow NATO airfields appear there, the day after tomorrow, medium-range missiles. What will happen then? Will Russia become even weaker if you run this problem and allow the West to settle in Ukraine?

[bayard]

In 2014, Russia quite justifiably feared a possible sudden nuclear strike on its territory from directions that were not controlled by our early warning systems - they had not yet been deployed in full force. We could really "blink" - miss the first hit. And the enemy considered such scenarios.
But he did not dare.
Although I made at least one such attempt ... but it did not work out.
Therefore, Syria was also for the descent of steam, to divert attention from Ukraine and Donbass, and at this time the early warning systems were completed, the Army continued to re-equip, honing its skills, rapid deployment, rapid transfers over long distances on constant exercises.
Now, purely technically - everything is possible and depends only on the will.
And the fact that the Ukrainian abscess needs to be eliminated, and as soon as possible, is now obvious to everyone. Even to the authorities of Ukraine itself.
Russia cannot move on without solving the "Ukrainian question".
So you need to decide.
Are the US and NATO ready to fight for Ukraine?
The question ... the answer to which is obvious - they do not want to fight for her, but they do not mind that she herself, or in a group with someone, unleashed such a war.
In the United States, internal contradictions are now boiling so much that soon such sparks may fly that the whole "house" will burn down ... There is no fountain in Europe either. If they want to commit suicide ... let them fight China. And believe me, Russia will not rush to help him, just as he himself will not rush to help. If Biden wants to agree on exactly this, then he has a chance to succeed.
If not, then NO. And let him play Prince Florizel in Suicide Club. Although he is more in harmony with the role of Checkered.

[Osipov9391]

And somewhere else, Transnistria is dangling in complete uncertainty. On the one hand, Ukrainian troops, on the other, Moldovan - read Romanian or NATO.
And there is no land connection with him.

[bayard]

But there is the Black Sea Fleet and aviation. If Ukraine (and Moldova will definitely not dare) decides on some kind of madness against Pridnestrovie, where the citizens of the Russian Federation live and our peacekeepers are, then this will become the long-awaited reason for the Final Solution of the "Ukrainian Question", which is so awaited by all interested parties.
And in light of the fact that the Belarusian issue has begun to be resolved, and to be resolved in the right direction, everything will happen quickly and decisively.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: bayard

The final decision of the "Ukrainian question"

How do you see it? Russia is not profitable now to resolve this issue by military means. So sanctions are expensive. The problem is that the people of Ukraine do not vote for the pro-Russian president and not for the pro-Russian party in the elections. As for Donbass, this problem cannot stand forever. .Russia recognizes these republics as part of Ukraine

[bayard]

Quote: Pilat2009

How do you see it?

The question is not how I see it, but how those who are able to think and act see or want to see it in Ukraine. This is now a question for them.
The North Stream has been built.
America is assigned the fate of the USSR, and everything can be much more bloody and destructive there ... The parade of sovereignty has already begun there.
Europe needs Russian gas, not Ukraine.
Belarus will no longer save Ukraine with oil products. Everything has changed there - many vectors have been broken off, only the main traffic on the highway remains.
To a bright future.
If those who think in Ukraine do not do everything right, there will be another scenario.
But they won't like him.

[meandr51]

Have you heard about the payback of geopolitics? About the fact that the fleet has to go, scare and fight, so that the enemy would reduce economic and military pressure, has not been read anywhere? The purpose of "kissing barbudos" was to counter pressure on the United States. Without it, even more would have to be spent on defense. The passive side loses more often. And it certainly wouldn't have been enough for the road.

[max702]

Quote: meandr51

to fight and fight so that the enemy would reduce economic and military pressure, not read anywhere? The purpose of "kissing barbudos" was to counter pressure on the United States. Without it, even more would have to be spent on defense. The passive side loses more often. And the roads would definitely not be enough

And how did it all end? So, they didn’t put pressure on the USA, and they didn’t build roads and they didn’t make the barbudos happy .. True, I had to write off the debts of tens of billions / dollars (dollars of the 60s and not the current ones). would have built and even a lot of things for tens of billions of costs, and even saved on the Navy .. Or again on a rake?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: max702

As it slipped infa about the cost of the Cuban scam for the USSR and attempts to find an exhaust from all this for the benefit of the USSR .. The picture was sad, instead of the ideas of kissing distant barbudos, one could provide the whole country with housing and roads with all the ensuing consequences for it .. But ...

Firstly, Cuba was no ally, moreover, conveniently located near the side of the United States, We are now trying to persuade Sudan to allow a base for 4 ships to be built, and at that time the USSR had no bases on the oceans. Secondly, missiles were placed not just because they wanted , but because they were in Turkey. You probably do not know that at that time it was not so easy to reach the territory of the United States with nuclear warheads.
And finally, about the article itself: The author writes that it was necessary to resist to the last, threaten with the use of nuclear weapons ... Well, the author must have iron eggs. Actually, the goals were achieved? Achieved. Now it makes no sense to argue who won. The US Navy and the experience of warfare at sea they were higher in any case. Moreover, I am sure that both the United States and the USSR were rather frightened by the aggravation of the situation and began to look for ways to defuse it. Well, the fact that the United States removed the missiles after a while was part of the agreement. Kennedy did not want to lose face

[Niko]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Whoever mastered the entire text?
To be honest, I started scrolling in the middle.
I hope the author will correct the errors and either start writing less capacious articles, or break it down into several parts.

The love of reading is instilled from childhood, you are probably out of luck .... it happens .... but what has the AUTHOR OF THE ARTICLE to do with it? Is he your Dad?

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Whoever mastered the entire text?

Well, I did it. Timokhin is interesting to read regardless of one's own point of view.

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

and either start writing less capacious articles

Rather the opposite?

[timokhin-aa]

Train your brain.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

Train your brain.

Let's try.

We look at the statistics - that's what Khrushchev managed to destroy really valuable.

Of this scrap metal, it is only a pity for the freshly built "Nakhimov", although without it the built KR pr.68bis was in abundance. How can you grieve about ships that are outdated at the design drawing board? What was better - to complete and maintain poor artillery cruisers (without automatic medium and main caliber automatic weapons, with actual deck anti-aircraft guns, with outdated radars, with a direct current power plant, with blowing into the boiler room) or build new BOD, RRC, nuclear submarines? Khrushchov chose the latter - and he was right.

showing American aerial reconnaissance mines on destroyer decks, for example, approaching merchant ships, and so on.

Those. provoking the Americans to a military solution. Very wise. Those, after all, could have succumbed to provocation.

Firstly, neither a separate cruiser, nor a couple of the problem would have been solved. Most likely, even a separate battleship. Since you would have to simultaneously conduct an artillery battle with cruisers, repel a strike with cruise missiles (no matter how bad they are), and then also shoot back from destroyers, even if they are outdated.

H'm. re-read it once. Did not believe. I read it again and didn’t believe it. I reread it in the third - no, it is written in Russian in white, it seems to be not a stupid person, but sheer delirium. The year is 1962, not 1939. No artillery battles by the American fleet are planned in principle. The battleships were put into reserve. Cruisers are being converted into ZURO ships. The nuclear cruiser "Long Beach" and the new frigates ZURO, in principle, do not have anti-ship weapons. Enemy surface ships must be destroyed by aircraft and submarines. Point. No artillery battles.

because, without nuclear bombs, air defense groups of several "Sverdlovs" and a dozen weaker ships would have to be pierced by rather big forces. Project 68bis cruisers were even shot down by target missiles based on the P-15 anti-ship missiles during the exercises; they could also cope with aircraft.

Yeah. They shot down single straight-flying P-15s, knowing where and when they would arrive. Would hundreds of Skyhawks have easily recaptured a stellar raid, too?

The presence of naval ships, firstly, immediately excluded the blockade from the American arsenal. They would not have had the opportunity to escalate the situation the way they did it in reality. Now they would have to choose between nuclear war and negotiations, and all at once.

Well yes. After all, the Yankees are pussies and drystuns, seeing a couple of our cruisers with destroyers, they would immediately put them in their pants. However, the presence of our submarines did not affect the blockade in any way. They could have drifted quite well. Or they could not drift - deliver an ultimatum to our ships - turn back or we will drown you. And they would have sunk, but they would have had virtually nothing to answer.

They wouldn't attack. They didn't really attack even when our fleet was in the bases. When he was at sea, they would not attack even more.

Nevertheless. Quite probable thoughts of Kennedy: Since the Russian ships are in the bases, it means that the Soviets are not planning to start a major war. and vice versa: If the Russian ships are at sea, then Khrushchov went crazy and decided to start a big war. It's a pity, but what to do, you have to fight.

And here we again recall surface ships - they could well cover the deployment of submarines, firstly, by diverting huge reconnaissance forces to themselves, and secondly, preventing the surface ships of the US Navy from working.

The main enemy of the submarine is aircraft. With all that it implies. In the conditions of simply huge anti-submarine aircraft and the US fleet, your surface ships would not have done anything. And a submarine with a ballistic missile with a surface launch and just a ridiculous flight range - well, you know, an argument of course, but weak. The Americans were trained to nuclear war. To its inevitability. It is not serious to expect the Yankees to drift by all means. We and them (and the whole world) were very lucky that there were no hawks like you in the place of Keddedi and Khrushchevna.
There is no point in commenting on anything else.

[timokhin-aa]

Of this scrap metal, it is only a pity for the freshly built "Nakhimov", although without it the built KR pr.68bis was in abundance. How can you grieve about ships that are outdated at the design drawing board? What was better - to complete and maintain poor artillery cruisers (without automatic medium and main caliber automatic weapons, with actual deck anti-aircraft guns, with outdated radars, with a direct current power plant, with blowing into the boiler room) or build new BOD, RRC, nuclear submarines? Khrushchov chose the latter - and he was right.

There is no need to juggle - the question that without cutting the Sverdlovs it will not be possible to lay the 58th project has never stood.

Those. provoking the Americans to a military solution. Very wise. Those, after all, could have succumbed to provocation.

Would you start the Pacific War? BEFORE THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS? Believe it yourself?

H'm. re-read it once. Did not believe. I read it again and didn’t believe it. I reread it in the third - yes, no, it is written in Russian in white, seemingly not a stupid person, but sheer delirium. The year is 1962, not 1939. No artillery battles by the American fleet are planned in principle.

Now count the active (not in reserve) artillery cruisers. And ask yourself the question - what were they doing there, in the Navy?

It would have been impossible to repulse a Skyhawk strike from an aircraft carrier.
The question is that it wouldn't exist - and the article explains why. More than intelligible in my opinion.

The main enemy of the submarine is aircraft. With all that it implies. In the conditions of simply huge anti-submarine aircraft and the US fleet, your surface ships would not have done anything.

He threw off the speed to three knots, took a position above the submarine (the course pad at the disposal of the BCH-1), anti-aircraft guns for escort.
And what will Neptune do?
This is an extreme option, of course, but it is quite feasible.

And this is not counting the fact that the then aviation was not the one that the United States had in the 80s, not even close.

And a submarine with a ballistic missile with a surface launch and just a ridiculous flight range - well, you know, an argument of course, but a weak one. The Americans were trained to nuclear war. To its inevitability. It is not serious to expect the Yankees to drift by all means.

They did NOT ATTACK even though there were no submarines.

[bk0010]

Quote: timokhin-aa

It would have been impossible to repulse a Skyhawk strike from an aircraft carrier.
The question is that it wouldn't exist - and the article explains why. More than intelligible in my opinion.

Written. But unconvincing. If there was a fleet to be hit, the Americans would have hit. And so - 4 diesels. It is clear that everything is decided in another place and the USSR by the death of diesel engines (which still will not play a big role in the event of a war), it is better not to anger.

[bayard]

Quote: bk0010

Written. But unconvincing.

In my opinion it is quite convincing. Moreover, the American sailors also thought so.
And to give the order to the Skyhawks to bomb the warships of the USSR Navy ... this is not the competence of the aircraft carrier commander - the decision must be made at the highest level when it comes to a conflict between two superpowers. It is one thing to stop unarmed transports, and quite another to a convoy guarded by warships. Moreover, the outposts became relevant only after the disclosure of the goals of these transfers - photographs of deployed ballistic missiles in Cuba. A submarine could be deployed ahead of time. And in a conversation with Kenedy, Khrushch would have had much more trump cards. Moreover, if he were told about the ALREADY deployed forces and means ... After all, for some reason, until the end of the 80s, American admirals were sure that only the missiles themselves had been brought to Cuba, and the warheads were still on the way ... And about cruise missiles, already deployed, they did not know. And about sea land mines. And about the IL-28 with nuclear bombs ...
Yazov recalled that the Americans were very surprised to learn that nuclear warheads were on the missiles, and admitted that it was precisely the belief that the missiles were YET without heads that forced them to act so impudently and that many of them were for a strike on Cuba, and if necessary - across the USSR.
But several dozen megaton nuclear warheads changed the balance of power very seriously.
And I would have to negotiate with less pressure.
And if the fact of deployed (already) missiles in Cuba, the USSR would have announced publicly.
Motivated by the fact that in Turkey and England, American missiles have already been deployed ...
And there would be much more panic in the United States, and the world community would recognize our right to respond in a mirror image.
But it was as it was.
And if the USSR used your fleet, it would be better.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

There is no need to juggle - the question that without cutting the Sverdlovs it will not be possible to lay the 58th project has never stood.

For you it was not, of course For Khrushchov, he stood still. And Ave 58 was not even decisive. Khrushchev knew how to count. And his dislike for the fleet began precisely when he found out what it costs to go out to the big exercises of the Black Sea Fleet (only one maneuver, not even a building!). Now think about what the new nuclear submarines, which were not built in single units, cost the country. And the fact that artillery cruisers are outdated as an anti-ship warfare weapon - he was absolutely right.

Would you start the Pacific War? BEFORE THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS? Believe it yourself?

If, thanks to your clever advice, the Yankees had the wrong impression that the USSR was starting World War III - quite. Although the war would not necessarily be slackened. When the Taiwanese captured our ship, the war did not start. And when the Americans shot down our passenger plane over China, it didn't start. And when our RB-3s over international waters (the Yankees are still convinced of this) were shot down near the Kola Peninsula, it did not start. Would ours start a war over one or the other destroyer? Is not a fact.

Now count the active (not in reserve) artillery cruisers. And ask yourself the question - what were they doing there, in the Navy?

They provided close air defense of aircraft carrier formations, fortunately, they had better radars, and the main artillery on most ships was automatic and universal, and there was no shortage of radio fuses. Well, and work along the shore, where is it without it.

He threw off the speed to three knots, took up a position above the submarine (the directional pad at the disposal of the BCH-1), anti-aircraft guns for escort. And what will Neptune do?

Probably he will scratch his turnips - why is this Russian ship unmasking its submarine? And a submarine discovered in a war is a dead submarine, no matter whether a destroyer is standing over it or not.

And this is not counting the fact that the then aviation was not the one that the United States had in the 80s, not even close.

Well, our "bellowing cows" were far from similar to our nuclear submarines of the 80s.

They did NOT ATTACK even though there were no submarines.

You and I know for sure that they did not attack because the USSR had withdrawn missiles from Cuba. What would have happened if the USSR had not removed the missiles - we do not know. Our diplomats reported to Khrushchev that the United States would most likely start World War III if our missiles remained in Cuba - despite the fact that the United States did not know that the USSR had practically no ICBMs, that the USSR did not have nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines with submarine-launched ballistic missiles, not knew that 3M bombers would not reach America. Those. the fleet, as it were, had nothing to do with it - Khrushchov hoped that the threat of an atomic war would force the Americans to swallow our missiles in Cuba without any navy - and the Yankees had strong eggs and they themselves switched to blackmail. And it is not empty blackmail - Kennedy did not live in a vacuum, he was under tremendous pressure from hawks to show these Russian impudent "kuzka mother". Thank God - nothing happened.

[Scaffold]

The victim of the exam. Go see tick tock.

[mister-red]

Whoever mastered the entire text?

Didn't even try. The author at the very beginning drew conclusions about this event and they are fundamentally wrong.

As you know, the crisis ended in favor of the United States, which ensured that all Soviet transport ships that were at sea at the time of Kennedy's decision to impose the blockade returned back, and missiles, bombers and fighter aircraft were withdrawn from Cuba.

Cuban Missile Crisis Ends With US Removing Its Intermediate-Range Missiles From Turkey

[Shishkov]

Now commentators will come running in and say that the fleet is not needed, because if someone rockets on us, we will immediately bombard him with a nuclear bomb! Why this is an "argument" against the construction of first-rank ships and aircraft carriers, and not against other types of troops, is a mystery ...

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Shishkov

Now commentators will run up and say that the fleet is not needed,

It's funny - well, you ran over and left a remark that commentators with a different point of view are about to come running. Is it important for you to be in time first? Is that the point?

[Lech from Android.]

What we do not store, losing crying.
Perhaps this is most applicable to our country in many areas.
When will we learn from the mistakes of others, and not from ours.

[mitroha]

Quote: Lech from Android.

When will we learn from the mistakes of others, and not from ours.

More than us, in the last 35 years, only Ukraine has mowed down. But it’s difficult to study there, we won’t be able to think of many things (holy-holy-holy)

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Lech from Android.

We do not store what we have, having lost we cry

Keep, Lyokha, your Android. Do not lose it.
Permanent nagging about 'gone and lost' is inherently irrational.

[Eug]

How interesting is the undermining of Novrossiysk fits into the concept of "crushing" the fleet ... conspiracy theories again?

[Assyrian]

Whoever mastered the entire text?

Seeing the ultimatum to the American president, he stopped reading.
Happy HOLIDAY everyone !!!!

[demiurg]

Despite his rudeness, I like Timokhin. He writes interestingly, and each article is guaranteed to cause shit.
It was imperative to expel the fleets to accompany this operation, one cannot argue with that. Arranging in advance maneuvers near Pearl Harbor and Norfolk, especially to notice the submarines with ballistic missiles off the coast of the United States, there are a lot of other options. And US intelligence would spend some of its resources on maneuver observation and search, weakening surveillance of Anadyr's ships. After the discovery of the MRBM in Cuba, ships operating in the Atlantic could begin escorting transports, and cover the already serious deployment of submarines. If there are airfields in Cuba, this is all for an adult.

And here are further conclusions, as usual. The Russian fleet is not in the first place in terms of funding and attention. And then grievances and pulling the blanket begin. The main problems for the Russian Federation are on land, both in the European and Asian theaters. Japan and the Kuril Islands can be ignored as a problem. But the KR and OTRK 200 km from Leningrad and 600 to Moscow is a problem the fleet cannot offer protection against. The Russian fleet will not save from the Wahhabis and ISIS. Suddenly, the Russian Federation needs more ground forces and the air force, the fleet remains a poor relative.

Yes, and I would like there to be a lot of potters, so that WOW-6 will appear on Warsaw and Ladakh. I want to see a replacement for the Il-38, I want to see killer whales in the pl version, I want a lot of things for the fleet.

But if the world goes crazy, and I decide where to spend the defense budget, then I will first of all finance the Strategic Missile Forces, then the aviation, then the ground forces, and only then the fleet. If done in the reverse order, in the future we will either be destroyed by nuclear weapons, or simply bombed by aircraft. And there will be no sense from five aircraft carriers in each fleet. They won't protect you from tanks.

[timokhin-aa]

And here are further conclusions, as usual. The Russian fleet is not in the first place in terms of funding and attention. And then grievances and pulling the blanket begin. The main problems for the Russian Federation are on land, both in the European and Asian theaters. Japan and the Kuril Islands can be ignored as a problem. But the KR and OTRK 200 km from Leningrad and 600 to Moscow is a problem the fleet cannot offer protection against.

Well, what is there on the European continent that cannot be achieved by pacifying the Americans?

And the fleet may well offer protection - the combat services of ships with the Zircon modification at launch range against targets in the United States.
Easily.

By the way, I never offered to take money from the army in favor of the navy. I suggested using the fleet budget more rationally - you would be surprised what kind of a fleet could be built with the money that we actually didn’t let it down.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

And the fleet may well offer protection - the combat services of ships with the Zircon modification at launch range against targets in the United States.

Why exactly an expensive, non-serial and still virtually incapacitated anti-ship in its essence "Zircon", and not much like a cheaper waste "Caliber", which can be crammed on all submarines from the heart? Or also spent and serial "Bulava" and "Liners", which can be launched right at our pier? Why is this "Zircon" better if the US does not have a missile defense system capable of withstanding a massive attack by our ICBMs, and their air defense is not much better?
By the way, what kind of ships do you propose to allocate for combat service - not the Buyans and Karakurt? There are practically no others. And even if we build dozens of frigates and destroyers with Zircons (which in itself is from the realm of fantasy), the foe will have enough strength to drown them before the Zircons are launched.

[timokhin-aa]

Why exactly an expensive, non-serial and still virtually incapacitated anti-ship in its essence "Zircon", and not much like a cheaper waste "Caliber", which can be crammed on all submarines from the heart?

Due to the flight time.
Such things must be done quickly, faster than teams pass through the command and control networks. With the Americans, at least - for sure.

Or also spent and serial "Bulava" and "Liners", which can be launched right at our pier? Why is this "Zircon" better if the United States does not have a missile defense system capable of withstanding a massive attack by our ICBMs, and their air defense is not much better?

Well, now you understand, right?

By the way, what kind of ships do you propose to allocate for combat service - not the Buyans and Karakurt? There are practically no others.

Now there are frigates "Gorshkov" and "Kasatonov" in the Northern Fleet, the modernized "Shaposhnikov" at the Pacific Fleet, in 2023-2024 the "Naakhimov" is launched, by 2027 the frigates "Amelko", "Yumashev", "Chichagov", " Spiridonov ".
Possibly another upgraded BOD.
Another submarine "Severodvinsk", and apparently a couple of "Ash-M".
True, it will be difficult for them to hide, but in some cases they will also be applicable.

At the same time, I am sincerely convinced that the current order of affairs in shipbuilding will end in a loud failure within a couple of years, and then the situation will change.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

Due to the flight time. Such things must be done quickly, faster than teams pass through the command and control networks. With the Americans, at least - for sure.

Interesting. Are you proposing to be the first to start World War III? Is it okay that we are a peace-loving power and will not be the first to attack? And the Tridents will still sleep in the ocean after the Tsirocon attack? Of course no. Then the short flight time of the Zircons will not save us.

[meandr51]

Sometimes it makes sense to start first. Or second, but faster than the enemy suggests. For this, Zircons are needed.

[S. Viktorovich]

An attempt to create an ocean-going fleet in the 1970s-80s to counter the American fleet on similar principles proved untenable. Overstrained, but did not reach the goal.
The author is right that against the background of the "continental" thinking of the General Staff there is still no clear concept of the development of the fleet, which can solve strategic tasks in real economic constraints only in conjunction with the strategic subsystems of the Armed Forces as a whole - communications, control, reconnaissance and target designation, which are necessary develop first.

[timokhin-aa]

An attempt to create an ocean-going fleet in the 1970s-80s to counter the American fleet on similar principles proved untenable. Overstrained, but did not reach the goal.

In the 70s, they did.
Read here -
https://topwar.ru/180297-sergej-gorshkov-i-ego-velkij-flot.html

[A. Privalov]

It is clearly time for us to work on the bugs.

Both sides worked on the mistakes almost 60 years ago. Since then, these or those disagreements, fortunately, faster or slower, are resolved at the diplomatic level. Point.
Everything else is just an artistic whistle on a given topic, because you can fantasize with military strategies endlessly. The thing is entertaining, but completely useless, alas.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: A. Privalov

you can fantasize with military strategies endlessly. The thing is entertaining, but completely useless, alas.

That's why, paradoxically, I also read Timokhin) Quite entertaining crypto-fantasy pulp. Yesterday, the Chelyabinsk strategist rescued Gaddafi with the help of a virtual aircraft carrier fleet, today Timokhin is distributing cabbage soup to the US 4th Fleet. Very entertaining.

[A. Privalov]

Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.

That's why, paradoxically, I also read Timokhin) Quite entertaining crypto-fantasy pulp. Yesterday, the Chelyabinsk strategist rescued Gaddafi with the help of a virtual aircraft carrier fleet, today Timokhin is distributing cabbage soup to the US 4th Fleet. Very entertaining.

I have a bad attitude towards this kind of publication. Tomorrow there will be an article in which the author, with a clever look, will fantasize about the result of the Battle of Stalingrad if the Wehrmacht command had then repainted their tanks in lilac color and sent them into battle in reverse to the music of Schubert. I assure you, there will be people at VO who would like to discuss this topic as well.
I remember the old joke:

They are burying preference Rabinovich, who died of a heart attack when he received four bribes on a minuscule basis.
Behind the coffin, a little odal from his relatives are two of his prefernas partners.
Concentrated silence, as it should be at a funeral.
- Do you know Mark Solomonovich, - one of them suddenly breaks the silence, - if only
Then you went with a tambourine - it would be even worse ...

[timokhin-aa]

I have a bad attitude towards this kind of publication. Tomorrow there will be an article in which the author, with a clever look, will fantasize about the result of the Battle of Stalingrad if the command of the Wehrmacht

The progress of mankind, the achievements of each of the existing countries, all victories and great achievements owe their existence to people with imagination, and not to wise minnows.

[A. Privalov]

Quote: timokhin-aa

The progress of mankind, the achievements of each of the existing countries, all victories and great achievements owe their existence to people with imagination, and not to wise minnows.

The editorial policy of the VO allows a number of written authors to formally endure the brains of innocent readers with openly revanchist propaganda publications. Accordingly, readers openly express their personal opinion about these publications, whether you like it, dear one, or not.
As for the "progress of mankind" and "great accomplishments", then this whole phrase quoted above, excuse me for being straightforward, is nothing more than a verbal husk.

[timokhin-aa]

The editorial policy of the VO allows a number of written authors to formally endure the brains of innocent readers with openly revanchist propaganda publications.

Yes, but what have my publications to do with it?
And what's wrong with revanchism?

Accordingly, readers openly express their personal opinion about these publications, whether you like it, dear one, or not.

To which the authors may well answer - whether you like it or not.

As for the "progress of mankind" and "great accomplishments", then this whole phrase quoted above, excuse me for being straightforward, is nothing more than a verbal husk.

Well, of course, the guy who came up with the bow and arrow was only worried about how something would come of it.

[timokhin-aa]

You write as if you understood something in what you read.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: timokhin-aa

You write as if you understood something in what you read.

Pardon me, you write quite popularly with the expectation of an ordinary man in the street, so it is not difficult to understand you. This is what I like about your essays. Easy reading.

[timokhin-aa]

Precisely because I am writing for the ordinary man in the street, which I myself am, in fact, I do not believe that you have understood something.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: timokhin-aa

Precisely because I am writing for the ordinary man in the street, which I myself am, in fact, I do not believe that you have understood something.

And I'm not going to dissuade you. Your business is to write, mine is to read. What is the problem?

[timokhin-aa]

No problem. I just noted the fact that you behave as if you understood something.
What could be the problem?

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Well, why are you behaving as if you wrote something out of the ordinary? You are not so difficult to understand, I assure you)

[timokhin-aa]

I behave like a layman.
And it's not difficult to understand me, yes, and I'm sorry that you stumbled on this.
And of course, I have not written anything outstanding, but even such a text requires a certain level of intelligence to be understood.

[Yuri V.A]

Alexander, for a better understanding, correct, pzhlsta, the clause about the repression of B. Gervais's comrades-in-arms - "He was lucky, many of his colleagues could not live to see their death," otherwise it is absurd.

[timokhin-aa]

Since then, these or those disagreements, fortunately, faster or slower, are resolved at the diplomatic level.

No, since then we have fallen into the militaristic madness of the United States and tens of millions of civilians around the world killed by the Americans.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

With the Americans, everything is clear - they are imperialists and militarists, where are we chasing them? Do we also dream of becoming militarists and imperialists? Do you think that civilians in Afghanistan and Syria did not suffer from our bombs? Wherever Russia and the USSR did not provide "fraternal international assistance" and everywhere in the end we were sent to hell.

[timokhin-aa]

They will not stop hurting us until we cease to exist.
This is irreparable.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

American hawks say the same about us. In fact, all the great powers shit on each other - sometimes small things, sometimes big ones, such is life. Get used to it, C'est La Vie! If not for Ukraine, our relations with the United States would not be friendly, but not hostile either. And Ukraine is not an excuse to drive an immeasurable loot into drug lords like Maduro and sheikhs, former (and maybe current, who knows) CIA agents who changed owners like gloves, like Khavtar. And the same Syria - Iran is much closer to her than the Russian Federation - and did you read the closed speech of Javad Sharif? And this is after everything we have done for Iran! They will betray and not frown.

[Yaroslav Zhigulin]

they could well cover the deployment of submarines, firstly, by diverting huge reconnaissance forces, and secondly, by preventing the surface ships of the US Navy from working.

We look at the payroll of the US Navy fleet and understand that this is nonsense. And nk the only thing they could do to burn out in 10 minutes

The author persistently sends a fleet from the couch into a war in which he cannot win.

We do not have quality superiority, which means that everything will be measured in quantities.

And you don't need to tell me about the irreparable damage. There are people sitting at the top who are ready to pump up the people with propaganda, so we will have to give pills so that they do not rush to cut us. Pearl Harbor as an example for you. How the US isolationist pacifists ended up in a militaristic frenzy

Again, some attacks on continental thinking. Open the map again and think about why it is so.

[timokhin-aa]

We look at the payroll of the US Navy fleet and understand that this is nonsense. And nk the only thing they could do to burn out in 10 minutes

But this would only be enough for submarines with SLBMs to receive an order to attack.
And the United States could not ignore this fact.
There would be no war.

There are people sitting at the top who are ready to pump up the people with propaganda, so we will have to give pills so that they do not rush to cut us. Pearl Harbor as an example for you. How the US isolationist pacifists ended up in a militaristic frenzy

Did they want to?
McNamara:

We had to send a U-2 in order to obtain intelligence information on whether Soviet missiles were entering service. We believed that if U-2 was shot down - the Cubans had no way to shoot it down, and the Soviets - we believed that if it was shot down it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile system, and that this would represent a solution. Advice on escalating the conflict. And therefore, before sending U-2, we agreed that if he is shot down, we will not meet, but simply attack. He was shot down on Friday ... Fortunately, we changed our minds, we thought: "Well, maybe an accident, we will not attack."

Kennedy on a hypothetical war:

They, just like us, can let these things [strike against Cuba] go unreported. After all their statements, they cannot allow us to disable their missiles, kill many Russians, and then do nothing. If [even] they do not take action in Cuba, they will certainly act in Berlin.

They didn't want to do what you write about. And in theory, the Kremlin correctly calculated this moment. But just before the American show of force, they broke. All that the Americans did against us later were the consequences of this "scrapping".

[Sergey Sfiedu]

Hope the Yankees would "break" before our show of strength? What if they hadn't broken? The Japanese also thought in 1941 that they would break. Yes, and our submarines with SLBMs in 1962 - a "paper tiger", there was no hope for it.

[timokhin-aa]

So they did not start the war without a demonstration.
Would you start with her? Come on.

The Japanese really attacked.

And our submarines with SLBMs in 1962 were a "paper tiger", there was no hope for it.

Why did it happen?

[Iron_Ivan]

We look at the payroll of the US Navy fleet and understand that this is nonsense.
I apologize, but where can I get the payroll of the US Navy for at least 1960?

[evmarine]

References to help!
Even offhand for 1962: AB - 16, one atomic, AV PLO - 11, KR URO - 12, one atomic, KRT - 15, KRL - 10, FR URO - 10, EM URO - 6, EM - 340, SKR - 240, SSBN - 5, PLA - 14, PL - 120, and so on. Even if a quarter of this, taking into account the reserve, is sent to the blockade, it will not seem little ...

[timokhin-aa]

The article describes in great detail why this superiority in strength did not matter.

[Iron_Ivan]

If everything is clear with the repulse of an attack by carrier-based aircraft from a detachment of 9 pr.68s, then what do they have against an attack by submarines? Or the US submarine had ceased to exist by that time?

[timokhin-aa]

Speed. Then there were no torpedoes capable of reaching the Sverdlov on a catch-up course, the speed and anti-submarine zizgzag were taxied in those years.
And the tactics of using submarines as the main strike weapon against the NK has not yet existed.
Well, the question is that the war didn’t really start, if ours had happened to be more convincing, it wouldn’t have started.
What was the calculation.

[Yaroslav Zhigulin]

Slow torpedoes you seriously did not help Indianapolis Ashiguru and Meko ... With anti-submarine zigzag it is impossible to maintain maximum speed for physics

[timokhin-aa]

It's just that the tacks will be "flat", with a larger radius than on the economy ship.
And most importantly - and this is what you did not understand - this attack would entail a loss of surprise, and the same troops in Cuba would be able to attack first, and not wait for an American strike. And submarines with SLBMs too.

Naturally, in reality, the Americans would take all this into account and would not try to attack - just as they really did not try.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

Naturally, in reality, the Americans would take all this into account and would not try to attack - just as they really did not try.

Or they would attack everything at once - both the troops in Cuba and our defective (in those years) SSBNs. "They didn't try" - but they threatened, and this threat was enough.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

speed and anti-submarine zizgzag in those years taxied

Anti-torpedo zigzag can level the speed. This is how the Japanese sank the Indianapolis. By the way, what is the range of the Sverdlov at high speed? I’m afraid they wouldn’t have time to sprint off the coast of America.

[timokhin-aa]

The beginning of the war precisely in the form of a strike on NK - the loss of surprise. First, in any case, it would have been necessary to hit Cuba, but there a response from it would have arrived, including by the fleet.

[Sergey Valov]

The author has enough mistakes - “how many forces needed by the allies in the Pacific Ocean was pulled off by Tirpitz in Norway”, “Even thirty nuclear missiles that reached the United States”, but that’s not the point. Surprising, and this is very putting it mildly, the author's inclination to escalate the threat of nuclear war with the United States. One can see a clear lack of understanding of the realities of that time. Possessing a gigantic superiority in the US Navy and Air Force in the early 60s, they would have crushed our forces in the Atlantic and Cuba with practically impunity. And Khrushchev should be erected for the fact that he came to his senses and did not go to confrontation.
PS In the early 60s, my grandfather was in the management of one of the large factories producing control systems for ICBMs. Later, in the early 70s, he said that during the Cuban missile crisis we did not have ANY combat-ready ICBM.

[timokhin-aa]

Possessing a gigantic superiority in the US Navy and Air Force in the early 60s, they would have crushed our forces in the Atlantic and Cuba with practically impunity.

Why didn't they crush it then?

in the early 70s, he said that during the Cuban missile crisis we did not have ANY combat-ready ICBM.

Now it is well known. The question is, there were bombers and SLBMs. And the Americans could not ignore this - and they did.
Just because we gave up the slack then, they believe that they can push us further. Both Vietnam and their greyhound in Syria - all this grows from what we turned away in Cuba.

[Yaroslav Zhigulin]

Why didn't they crush it then?

probably because you would not have lost Europe?

And the landing operation Overlord showed everything ...
And if you do not quickly knock the union out of Europe with its resource base and industry combined with Europe,
the states would have nothing to catch ..

[timokhin-aa]

probably because you would not have lost Europe?

including.
This means that if we had a dozen cruisers in the Atlantic and another 28-30 nuclear warheads on missile submarines, they wouldn’t twitch, and Khrushchev would be able to speak on equal terms.

[Yaroslav Zhigulin]

Again, everything is decided on the ground.
And having a powerful land army is more important to us than the navy.
Previously, it was only possible to reach it with the help of the fleet. Now the Air Force and Strategic Missile Forces are guarding our sleep

[timokhin-aa]

What is being decided "on the ground" in a nuclear war?

[bk0010]

Quote: timokhin-aa

What is being decided "on the ground" in a nuclear war?

In the sense? With a nuclear strike, the war will start, not end.

[Sergey Valov]

"Why didn't they crush it then?" - because they also did not want war.
"The question is that there were bombers and SLBMs" - our strategic bombers had very little chance of bombing the United States. Submarines with SLBMs still had to reach the launch position, the number of combat-ready is about a third of the total, this is at best. The USSR, not out of a good life, tried to deliver missiles to Cuba.
“Due to the fact that we then gave a slack” - thanks to this “slack” you are now alive.

[timokhin-aa]

Statements:

"Why didn't they crush it then?" - because they didn't want war either.

и

“Due to the fact that we then gave a slack” - thanks to this “slack” you are now alive.

contradict each other. Don’t you?

our strategic bombers had very little chance of bombing the United States.

Every third of the intercontinental aircraft carried the X-20 KR with a nuclear warhead and a launch range of up to 600 km.
The preliminary deployment of the PLRB pr. 629 could also help "hack" the US air defense with nuclear strikes.
In a "breakthrough" bombers with bombs would have passed easily.

The USSR, not out of a good life, tried to deliver missiles to Cuba.

In truth, it was not required at all. Khrushchev is an idiot.
But since they got in, then it was necessary to act correctly.

[Sergey Sfiedu]

The question is, there were bombers and SLBMs.

Specify what kind of bombers and deployed SSBNs with SLBMs we had in 1962. IMPHO - our Tu-95M and 3M bombers posed a purely theoretical threat to the United States, and the first Soviet SLBM with an underwater launch in 1962 was just being tested.

[timokhin-aa]

50 Tu-95K with KR X-20, about the same number of other variants of the 95th and 60 units of 3M.

To strike at bases in Europe and Alaska - hundreds of Tu-16s.

[xomaNN]

The "Caribbean conflict" had to happen so that some positive changes for the fleet could take place. And after 15-20 years, the Soviet Navy has almost reached parity with the Americans.

[timokhin-aa]

It wasn't quite parity - they stayed much stronger. It just became impossible to defeat the USSR with some somehow acceptable losses.

[xomaNN]

almost reached parity with the Americans.

- self-quote the keyword is ALMOST
on nuclear submarine + diz. The submarine of the Soviet Navy was not much inferior in power to the Yankees. Unfortunately, the level of technology of the USSR was inferior to the USA even then (even more so later). I also know this as a sub-engineer. weapons and fleets SF + BF worked.

[Knell wardenheart]

Thanks, good article. On my own I would like to add that this conflict in itself is not the best topic for military modeling, but very good for geopolitical ones.
In my opinion, it "did not burn out" not so much because the plan was crude, but because geopolitically the USSR in the early 60s was in a very sour configuration.
In the early 60s, we had a break with the CPC and the CPA, but if Albania would be with it, then Maoist China, put on the path of industrialization by our efforts, posed a certain threat (which will later show itself). Our rear in the Far East was thus shaky - the US bases in Japan, in South Korea, no longer allied with China and an emerging split with the European socialist countries (with the Yugoslavs earlier, with Albania later, the Hungarian uprising of 1956 was still fresh, etc.). In other words, geopolitically, the USSR and in Europe did not feel as confident as it would have liked.

After Khrushchev's trip to the United States, they had a fairly good idea of ​​what this person was like. They saw not a cold geostrategist like Stalin who smelled enough gunpowder, but a person of a slightly different formation, quite openly aimed at peace and improving relations. Individual militarization attacks on the part of Khrushchev were probably quite correctly perceived there as a post-Stalinist sauce, on the one hand masking (in the 50s) large-scale reductions in the army, on the other hand, the playful policy of Nikita Sergeevich himself, aimed at retaining and strengthening power and authority.
The positions of Khrushchev himself in the USSR were also not ideal; he was a much less successful apparatchik than Stalin or Brezhnev.
One of the most important moments that, in my opinion, influenced the resolution of the Caribbean crisis not in our favor was the fact that Khrushchev very well remembered the hell of world war, losses, horrors, retreats, bombings - I think this sat quite firmly in his brain in this regard he was a typical follower of "if only there was no war", albeit sometimes trumping the rhetoric of militarism. In contrast to him, Kennedy practically did not see the war, and even more so did not see devastation in his country. Psychologically, JFK was much more ready to make harsh decisions than Khrushchev, due to much less life experience. In turn, Khrushchev apparently still perceived the US leadership through the prism of his experience with the previous administration (Eisenhower), who was a rather resolute and dry fighter. All of this leads me to believe that the crisis rhetoric from Kennedy Khrushchev & Co. was taken much more strongly than it probably should have been.
However, given the Korean massacre, it was impossible to underestimate the decisiveness of the American politicians in general.

So military design in this case, vryatli could have happened more successfully - initially all this was started precisely as a "deep gamble" but not as a thorough preparation in the game to raise rates. Our position at the time of the crisis was objectively inferior to the United States, the economy was weaker, the fleet was weaker, and there were fewer opportunities to deliver nuclear weapons to targets.
Even if the "Anadyr" was fully implemented, it seems to me that the consequences would have turned out much worse - the Americans would have used all this as an excuse to stuff Europe with nuclear weapons, probably would have pushed the neutrality of the Scandinavian countries and, in general, would have used the resources that were otherwise spent on the space race - for large-scale militarization and even greater cohesion of NATO. Quietly, objects in Cuba would not have stood for long - it would probably be a great reason to start World War III.

[S. Viktorovich]

The main lesson of the Caribbean crisis is that both sides realized that they were vulnerable and needed to come to an agreement. For our fleet, the heroic cruise of four boats from Polyarny showed the main directions of its development.

[Knell wardenheart]

I think everything turned out to be a little more complicated here.
In the USSR, they realized that at that time they were not particularly ready for war and that the moment had come for the post-Stalinist demilitarization to reverse, and also drew attention to the depressing state of the fleet in the context of world ambitions. Indirectly, another adventurous failure of Nikita Sergeevich contributed to his subsequent displacement.
In the United States, they have become firmly convinced that the post-Stalinist policy of the USSR is fundamentally different from the Stalinist one, and that in fact it is a reflection of the ideas of a group of people striving for 1 person and not a projection of some far-reaching plans. At the same time, the ideas about the negotiability of the leadership of the USSR improved somewhat, let's say - they groped for a successful combination of a carrot and a carrot, which would not allow HV to turn into a hot one.
After Sputnik, it was important for them to grasp the potential aim of the USSR - they grasped it and relaxed somewhat, as for me.

[Alexander Lysenko]

There was NOTHING for any tangible blow to the states then. Incomprehensible adventure, IMHO. Everything was confused, intercepted and drowned.

[S. Viktorovich]

It was the placement of the carriers in Cuba that made the territory of the states available for strikes and there was a basis for bargaining.

[Sergey Valov]

"Kennedy practically did not see the war" - half a year in command of a torpedo boat, then malaria for over a year. Wow, I haven't seen a war!

[Knell wardenheart]

Okay, I'll expand. Let's start with the fact that the war in the Pacific, I mean naval war, is an absolutely incomparable thing with what was going on in WW2 on land - no piles of corpses burned down cities, absolutely not the scale of bloody brutality that gives the brain. The fact that Kennedy fought does not mean that he SEEN THE WAR. We subsequently puffed so hard to show the world the ruins of Stalingrad precisely for this reason - this is the image of the war that changes the human perception of this event as some kind of ordered phenomenon.
The Germans, who were transferred to the Eastern Front after North Africa, faced a similar situation - it was a completely different picture, with only a vaguely similar experience.
Without in any way diminishing the heroism of JFK himself, he, however, did not retreat from the borders to Moscow and then did not return to Berlin, losing friends close to the scorched earth. For him, it was the background "somewhere". Whether he was on Guadalcanal or even bombed Japanese cities, he would have appreciated what is called, and so these things were probably much easier for him than for Khrushchev, with all the disadvantages of Khrushchev himself.

[Sergey Valov]

Khrushchev, by virtue of his position, saw the war exclusively through binoculars. Kennedy saw the war as a lieutenant, the officer has nowhere lower, commanded a torpedo boat, almost died. Read about Kennedy's service at your leisure, it's interesting.
With all due respect to the infantry, war at sea is no easier, it's just different.

[Basarev]

The defeat in the Cuban Missile Crisis was inevitable because the Cuban Missile Crisis was inevitable. And it was inevitable due to the inevitability of the beginning of the Cold War. Which happened because of the results of the Second World War, to which, with disappointing results, the Civilian had a hand. There was no need to go beyond what was supposed to be, it was necessary under no circumstances to cross the line of the Riga Treaty, to which the superpowers agreed. And in the course of the war, having restored the border of the USSR, do not go further. And to declare victory and start rebuilding the country. Or to be loyal to allied commitments and beat the Nazi forces ... But do not chase PR in the face of the capture of capitals. Here is to help the Warsaw Uprising and immediately let the government in exile - yes. And after the war, do not take any territorial increments, voluntarily surrender all of Europe and Asia personally to the States. And - try to fit into the Marshall plan, and then take a course to NATO. However, it was necessary to study seriously even earlier. Do not carry out indigenization (Civilian clearly showed that small-town separatism is much more dangerous than mythical Great Russian chauvinism). That is, there are no union republics, no privileges for the nationalities. One big RSFSR and standard areas. However, federalism is superfluous. In order not to breed centers of separatism, the country should have been made unitary. A single law throughout the country ... However, in an amicable way, it should have started even earlier. Not agreeing with the Brest Peace Treaty, keeping the front for at least a couple of months - and entering the club of winners. No independent Poland and Finland. And - immediate NEP, no war communism that brought the country to the handle, only the fullest possible cooperation with the West. In general, do not engage in manilovism like the world revolution. Communism is a utopia. It was not worth it because of the mriy to enter into contradictions with the west. All the achievements of socialism are quite attainable within the capitalist formation. It was necessary not to break capitalism over the knee, but to raise its place within the capitalist formation. To follow the path of present-day South Korea, and do not build, do not understand what.

[Artemion3]

Read my thoughts. 1945, we are in Berlin, half of Europe is at our feet, the border from Moscow is at the maximum distance. It was necessary to climb into Vietnam, which was already helped by China, then Afghanistan, and ... overstrained. Any action provokes opposition. Americans were scared of the world revolution

[meandr51]

Nobody, except Gorbachev, overstrained himself. Only schoolchildren believe in perestroika tales about the "collapse of the Soviet economy" and the "oil needle". With the Vietnam War, the USSR eased US pressure on itself.
Spending sheer nonsense - $ 2 billion a year.

[Artemion3]

The Americans funded Afghanistan in retaliation for Vietnam. Brzezinski planned Soviet Vietnam

[timokhin-aa]

Do you understand that for such thoughts you have to live in 2021 and know that in the past there was the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, Vietnam, etc.?

but to increase their place within the capitalist formation.

Well, there Putin tried it at first.

[Basarev]

It did not work out for quite natural reasons. It was not necessary to rely entirely on oil, but to invest oil tanks in non-resource sources of income. And yet the oligarchy does not fit into normal capitalism. There are billionaires in the West, but nowhere else do they have such exclusive rights. Bezos and the last bum will bear equal responsibility in the event of a sin.

[meandr51]

In the west, oligarchs simply elect the president. And they remove it, if not justified ...

[Basarev]

One more thing can be noticed: in the West, the oligarchy is emphatically patriotic. American billionaires are ready to fight and kill for their native States. And we have a mystical divergence of interests between capital and the country. It is the countries - the Western oligarchs are ready to put any high statesman down, if he is planning a betrayal, then you are right.

[Artemion3]

Do not bow to them, but do not go everywhere. Without Vietnam, there would be no Afghanistan. They took revenge on us in full.

[3danimal]

Everything developed well, but ..
He decided to take up the restoration of the empire, in one form or another.
In 2013, most Russians lived significantly better than they do now.
Of course, we are told that everything would come to the present situation in any case. This is logical, few people are ready to tell people directly that they made their lives worse.

[S. Viktorovich]

The Bolsheviks were wrong when they surrendered in the 1st World War at the mercy of the German victor?
By the way, there was no defeat in the Cuban missile crisis. ov shod.

[Basarev]

The Germans did not win. They poured themselves. It is not a shame to lose to the winner, as it was during the operation Rimon-20. It is a shame to lose to the losers, as the Bolsheviks did. And here's the most important thing: the situation was not so critical that there was no other option. Compare to Civil: two-thirds of the country is white. On European territory, in the most fertile regions (huge), the Germans are fierce. The invaders of the 14 most developed countries cut off the most important regions ... And still the Reds won. In the end of the First World War, the situation was much more favorable - the Entente was unconditionally on our side, the Germans were about to collapse, they had a terrible ferment at the front. It was possible not only to pull out, but also to win incontestably. But this is difficult, here you have to think and bear the burden of responsibility, it is much easier to surrender to dreams of a world revolution and merge all the efforts of the Empire and February.

[S. Viktorovich]

There were two similar events in recent history, caused by the only desire to maintain power at any cost:
- surrender to the Germans of Russia in 1918 (Brest Peace) for the sake of the power of Lenin-Trotsky;
- the collapse of Russia in 1991 (the Belovezhsky agreement) for the sake of the power of Yeltsin and his accomplices.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Basarev

And - try to fit into the Marshall Plan, and then take a course to NATO.

Insurmountable ideological divisions, we were simply feared

[Basarev]

I would have had to abandon ideology. You know, in Europe immediately after the war, communist parties were also very popular, communist ideology also lived in the minds ... But the authorities, in order to fit into the plan, showed remarkable discipline and courage - and as quickly as possible eradicated all manifestations of communism. When the country is bombed and plundered, when the threat of hunger is absolutely real - in such a situation there is no place for fruitless dreams, only iron pragmatism can save the country. And pragmatism says - down with communism, give Marshall.

[Doctor]

I still did not understand what our fleet was supposed to do?
Maybe it's true - with grenades!

[timokhin-aa]

It is written in the article.

[Vladimir1155]

Alexander Timokhin raised an important question, of course, it is just necessary to develop the fleet and military science, taking into account modern realities, and they are as follows ... means of destruction are ahead of means of defense, and in this case, the most important tactical technique is 1) range 2) stealth 3) mobility. .... if we talk about the Navy, then these criteria are met only by submarines and coastal aviation, coastal missiles, There were a lot of destroyers (corvettes of our time), the Americans would not have interfered with their movement. For example, quite recently, the escort of Academician Chersky was carried out by frigates ... but an aircraft carrier or battleship would not be useful for convoy functions

[timokhin-aa]

I'll write about submarines, Vladimir. Especially for you.

[exo]

Yes, Spain and the Cuban Missile Crisis are vivid examples of the fact that the fleet, a state claiming the status of a Power, will not do without a fleet. It is worth reading the memoirs of submariners from Project 641, whom the Americans forced to surface in order to understand the humiliation of the situation.
And the lack of development of the Navy is really not money, but political decisions of the country's leadership. Something, Gorshkov managed to do, and then another failure.

[Doliva63]

Shitty article. At the level of the 90s.

[Pushkar]

Thanks to the author, the article is very informative, at least for people like me (aviation). Yes, the ground forces still rule, and my native Air Defense Forces of the Country have not been restored. It is believed that the tasks of the same air defense aviation will be carried out by the Air Force. They won't. Interception and support of ground troops are completely different concepts, they even require different types of fighters.

[Adversary]

The country has corrected its mistakes and acquired the most powerful ships in its class!

[3danimal]

What kind of military operations of 9 cruisers and destroyers in 1962 near the United States can we talk about?
Surrounded by dozens of missile ships and aircraft carriers? The Forrestal class even then carried 90 airplanes and helicopters. Nearby supply bases, airfields of naval aviation ..
SAMs were still very ineffective against maneuvering targets, the ships would have repeated the fate of Yamato.
And carrier-based aircraft have learned to fly faster than sound (F-8 Crusader).
They did not have anti-ship missiles yet, but a large number of aircraft and the ability to take 4 1000-pound bombs would do the trick.

[1970mk]

Hypothetical fairy tales ABOUT ANYTHING!

[Oleg Aviator]

The article is good, but only Jupiter was removed from Italy and the Torah from England. So such a normal exchange was given that the Americans were an order of magnitude superior both in the number of warheads and in conventional weapons at sea and in the air.

[Irrigant]

Hello dear Alexander. I have been following your military blog on Topvar for a long time and read it constantly. As a retired naval officer, you write about the Navy, but maybe you know what you can read about the ground forces and aviation from what was written at your level? Of particular interest are series similar to yours "Naval Warfare for Beginners" and "Building a Fleet" in the corresponding types of the Armed Forces. Can you tell me?

PS And of course I congratulate you on the anniversary of Victory Day

[severok1979]

For comparison, in 1960, the US surface forces included: battleships - 9, strike (multipurpose) aircraft carriers - 24, anti-submarine aircraft carriers - 19, cruisers - 58; destroyers, frigates, patrol ships - 1059, landing helicopter carriers - 6, tank landing ships - 134.
And against the background of this superiority, the author claims that a dozen light cruisers decommissioned by Khrushchev would give us a chance to win the Third World War at sea over some kind of Cuba?

[Givi_49]

The Cuban Missile Crisis should be called more precisely - the Turkish-Cuban Missile Crisis - this is closer to the truth.

[Recoil]

The Americans themselves removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey with a delay,

Author, you contradict yourself

[Glagol1]

I do not agree that the Americans won the Caribbean. We defended Cuba - it was a signal to the whole world that we can defend the allies and removed the inconvenient Amer. rsd from Turkey. At least a draw, but rather a win. Amers atomic warheads had many times more, if everything started spinning ... well, I don't know. And then - the agreement on the prohibition of tests in 3 environments. Americans didn't want to, but Caribbean was one of the arguments. And of course, the tsar bomb.

[DeFalco]

The author's confidence that "they will not dare to attack" is striking. This was at a time when almost all the military were in favor of a military solution to the "Cuban problem" and only Kennedy's team was holding back the "hawks."

[Curious Katya]

First, why did the author suddenly decide that we lost the Cuban missile crisis? The exchange there was equal, even with a slight advantage in our favor. The Americans are stirring missiles in Turkey - ours is responding by deploying missiles in Cuba. The Americans agree to remove missiles from Turkey - ours agree to remove missiles from Cuba. And the Americans also pledge never to attack Cuba. The overall alignment is in our favor, especially considering that in a nuclear war, then we would most likely lose. It's like bluffing bad cards and winning!
Yes, the Americans removed their missiles from Turkey with some delay, but this was only needed to put a good face on a bad game. Say, look, what fellows we are - we scared the USSR and forced it to remove missiles from Cuba! And about the fact that we ourselves are also removing the missiles - of course, our media will not write. They say that Kennedy personally asked Khrushchev to give him this opportunity to "save face" for the "internal consumer."

Secondly, the author clearly does not understand how the operation was prepared and what tasks were set. No one was going to initially fight the Americans and prepare for the Third World War. It was only planned to secretly, quietly transport the missiles to Cuba, install there and carefully conceal their presence there. That is why it was supposed to operate in conditions of maximum secrecy and without involving land ships. No one planned to break the surface fleet there, arrange a war at sea, provoke the Third World War. Later they began to improvise on the go ...
And certainly no one expected that America would launch a naval blockade - in fact, this is a violation of all international norms and an act of war under international law!
But we didn't care about the laws, but ours in those days still believed in them ...

And thirdly, the author advises to play hard and provoke the Americans as much as possible. Does he even understand that we are talking about the Third World War? And what kind of fire is he playing with?
Even in the current reality, the world has been on the brink of nuclear war and mutual destruction a couple of times during the Cuban missile crisis. Does the author propose to further intensify the intensity of the confrontation?