About "Naval Strategy" USA 80s from its creators: interview with John Lehman
The Naval Strategy provided a breakthrough in the combat power and aggressiveness of the US Navy. The photo shows a battle group of American and Australian ships, including a missile cruiser and a battleship with the Tomahawk CD.
There is a naval information portal in the US CIMSEC - Center for International Maritime Security, in translation - "Center for International Maritime Security". Adjusted for the fact that Security is not really "security", of course ...
The organization pretends to become a kind of "thought factory", but that is later. In the meantime, this is a very good socio-political Internet portal with a naval theme, in its Western "reading", of course.
It is no secret that today the US Navy is in some kind of identity crisis, which has already led to a huge waste of money (let us mention at least the LCS), and to a drop in the level of combat training (remember the burned-out Bonhomme Richard and collisions of ships with merchant ships). But the characteristic difference between Americans and many non-Americans is that, once in such a situation, they are energetically looking for a way out of it. CIMSEC, whose founders and staff are keen to contribute to overcoming this crisis, regularly organizes writing campaigns on a given topic. For example, "light aircraft carrier", "reconnaissance", "mine warfare", "sea war of the future", etc. The authors are mostly retired officers of the Navy, but sometimes the active military writes something.
As part of the study of past American experience, CIMSEC organized a series of interviews with the creators of the Maritime strategy of the 80s, which led to the resounding success and dominance of the US Navy even near the Soviet shores, as well as the collapse of the old strategy of Admiral S.G. Gorshkova (about her in the article "Sergei Gorshkov and his Great Fleet").
It makes sense to translate at least some of them, since the study of such experience cannot but be useful. The first in the series is an interview with one of the fathers of that naval "storm" that hit the USSR, the minister (in fact, the Secretary of the Navy, and that is how he will be called in the text) of the US Navy, John Lehman, who was the engine of all those processes that turned the US Navy into a completely and unconditionally dominant force in the oceans. This interview was done specifically for CIMSEC.
The interviewer who asked the questions is Dmitry Filipoff, online content editor for the site. Lehman regularly gives quite interesting interviews for him and CIMSEC, and this is no exception.
Readers are invited to translate the interview published on the portal on March 22, 2021. Original English text available at this link... The interview has not been previously published in Russian. Everything below is a translation of the original text.
Secretary Lehman on strategic authority and the use of dominance in the seas
CIMSEC discussed 80s Naval Strategy with Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, who served as the 65th Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1987. In this discussion, Secretary Lehman takes a look at how the Navy linked Naval Strategy and naval development objectives, secured its credibility in Congress, and could offensively use naval dominance in today's big conflict.
How would you describe the "Naval Strategy" and how did it replace the concepts and plans of the 70s?
Lehman: First of all, the "Naval Strategy" was global, its driving force was not NATO. It was geopolitical and based on the realization that during the Cold War, geography was on the side of the United States and its allies. The Soviet Union was a power, partly blocked by land [1], and the United States and its allies could easily establish naval dominance. It was part of a national strategy that had three directions: to ensure nuclear parity with the Soviets; keep in mind that the Warsaw Pact has a clear advantage in ground forces; and neutralize this advantage with overwhelming superiority at sea.
President Reagan believed that the West could win the Cold War without direct armed conflict. And that was the time when it was necessary to move from containment and "detente" to an advanced offensive strategy that would demonstrate that if the East attacks NATO, it will be defeated.
An offensively oriented naval force could not only protect sea communications, but also encircle the Soviet state, drown the Soviet fleet and use the seas for blockade, mining and strikes deep into the heart of Soviet territory.
The Navy's concepts and plans in the 70s were the product of post-Vietnamese weakening, attrition and underfunding, which were mixed with some frenzied attempts by Presidents Ford and Carter to find a way to "defuse" [the Soviet Union].
Under Carter, the entire national strategy was concentrated almost entirely on the central front in Europe, assigning the Navy only an auxiliary, defensive role, with corresponding budgetary constraints.
For many of us veterans of the Kissinger National Security Council and "realists" in the academic community, this was absurd. Dick Allen, Sam Huntington [2], Bing West, Fred Ickle, myself and many others began to meet from time to time for lunch or dinner and discuss strategy, often in company with active sailors such as Jim Holloway, James "Ace" Lyons and Peter Swartz. who was then involved in a fight to the death over PRM 10 [3]... It was at these informal meetings that "Marine Strategy" began to take shape.
In your book Command on the Seas, you stated: “Many admirals believed that the secretary of the Navy should interact with the [President's] administration ... and leave strategy and all inquiries to the admirals. As Secretary of the Navy, it never occurred to me that strategy was not my business. In fact, it should have been my business. " How did you manage your position as Secretary of the Navy for the development and protection of the "Naval Strategy"? How should CPA secretaries see their role in strategy development?
Lehman: Pursuant to Section 10 [USC], the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for the manning, training, and combat readiness of both the Navy and the Marine Corps to carry out the missions of the national strategy. An effective naval strategy is what integrates and defines various types of personnel policy, ships, aircraft, weapons and the training required to carry out naval missions. Therefore, the need to ensure that naval strategy is meaningful should be seen as the primary concern of the Secretary of the Navy.
This was especially true when I took the oath on February 5, 1981. Because the new president, whose inauguration took place two weeks earlier, changed the national strategy and the role that naval strategy was supposed to play, from a defensive approach to an offensive one.
I was elected [to this position] because my education and experience were in areas such as geopolitics, strategy and military affairs. I, therefore, had to lead others in matters of changing strategy and its constituent doctrines, concepts and plans. The staff I selected included both proven strategists and practitioners who had experience not only in constructing theories, but also in verifying their words with deeds.
The role of my immediate successors in strategy was not to be a change agent, but to understand the strategy and oversee its implementation. When the Cold War ended in victory a few years later, it was time for a new strategy.
My task as Secretary of the Navy was facilitated by the fact that the Commander of Naval Operations, Admiral Tom Hayward, was himself a real strategist and already used an offensive strategy when he was in command. fleet in the Pacific, that is, before becoming the commander of naval operations.
In the future, the Secretary of the Navy must always understand naval strategy, its concepts, their application in practice and the role in procurement and training of personnel.
How was naval strategy embodied in real naval operations and exercises? How important were these teachings?
Lehman: The "Naval Strategy" immediately entailed dramatic changes in the statements and statements of the Navy. And in congressional hearings, starting with my appearances before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the day after I was sworn in. And in public speeches, in articles, in the comments of senior naval officers and civilian leaders in the media and on television.
Full-scale work began immediately to change combat training plans, doctrines, concepts, battle plans and war games. The teachings took a little longer to change. The first was the exercise "Oceans Venture 81" in the North Atlantic, Barents and Norwegian Seas. RIMPAC in the Pacific and exercises in the Mediterranean soon followed. In each of them, in addition to the usual tasks of air defense, anti-aircraft defense and other usual types of combat training, "mirror" offensive strikes were practiced.
In addition to the usual combat training tasks, the exercises now had two additional purposes. One of them was to create new tactics using all the technologies that were now going into the fleet, testing their effectiveness in real conditions, under the watchful eyes of the on-board operational analysts from the Center for Naval Analysis. [4]... The second main purpose was to demonstrate to the Soviet talkers and observers how good we are and that they cannot beat us. [5].
These exercises were held in all theaters of war and every year. After each of them, a thorough analysis was carried out of what worked and what did not, tactical schemes were changed and refined, weapons were improved. And everything got better and better together. By the end of the 80s, both Soviet and American sailors and leaders were convinced that we could easily defeat the Soviets.
This is, of course, real containment. Proof of his success was not only intelligence, but also the now famous "Map of Akhromeev" and also the well-known complaints of Gorbachev about the "encirclement" by the US Navy [6].
How did Marine Strategy interact with budgeting and goal setting? How did the budget and the adopted programs of the Navy affect the "Naval Strategy"?
Lehman: In the current period and in many periods earlier, the naval strategy (if it could be called that) was determined by the available budgets. In the 80s, the process was reversed: first the strategy, then the requirements, then the memorandum with the programs and their goals, then the budget. This was possible because the president, the secretaries of defense and the Navy, the commander of naval operations, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and the controller of the Navy were united in politics.
Due to this agreement, the simple strategic logic of the programs that followed from it, plus good connections in Congress and in a number of public companies, it became possible for us to get full support in Congress for all our programs of the 80s, even for the purchase of two aircraft carriers. Without strategy, this would not have happened.
What was the connection between the tasks of building the structure of the Navy, which were "set in motion" by the "600 ships" program, and the "Naval Strategy"? How did you connect the planned appearance and size of the Navy and strategy?
Lehman: At all meetings within the Department of Defense, at all interagency meetings, in classified and unclassified publications, at congressional hearings and at public events, we have firmly sent everyone the same message: First, a global strategy. Five theaters of military operations, where the United States has vital interests, emerge from it. From there comes a potential Soviet threat. Based on this threat, the naval strength levels are determined, sufficient to, together with allies and partners, in the person of the army and the air force, defeat this threat.
The number of forces required for superiority in each theater of operations was determined each year during exercises and war games [at the Naval War College] in Newport.
Based on these five theaters of operations, the required number of forces was obtained: 15 aircraft carriers, 100 multipurpose nuclear submarines, 140 cruisers and destroyers, 100 frigates. And so on up to 600 units.
Lehman did not mention four battleships. But they were brought into operation too during his tenure. In the photo - Lehman with an officer of the LC "New Jersey"
The logic was simple and convincing: year after year, we never hesitated. More importantly, we gave [the navy] what we promised: ships and jets on time, on budget, or even at less expense; a fleet that was within its power.
The F-14 was one of the symbols of the then rearmament of the US Navy. With the huge expenditures of the Americans on weapons, it would be impossible to build such a fleet without strict financial discipline. Photo: US Navy via Alpha Coders.
How has Naval Strategy improved the Navy's ability to communicate its point of view to an external audience? For example, before Congress, other branches of the military and allies? How was it received and challenged by an external audience?
Lehman: The easily understood simplicity and consistency of the "Naval Strategy" was a great advantage, as was its invariability from year to year. Unlike in past periods, there have been no significant leaks of discord between the Navy and the Marine Corps. In truth, there were admirals who "caught the intoxication" [7] in the previous administration and informed the Congress and their friends that they did not like the "Sea Strategy". But they soon found themselves in retirement (Stansfield Turner [8] always appeared on Sunday talk shows and spoke to people like Sam Donaldson [9]that naval strategy is "dangerous" and that a fleet of 600 ships is "too expensive").
What lessons can be learned from the Naval Strategy for engaging in today's great power competition?
Lehman: History does not repeat. But often the events of some "eras" go "into rhyme" with others. Today, history "rhymes" with itself in the past. Once again, we are facing a hostile world power, accompanied by smaller powers, including Russia, Iran and North Korea, which are linked only by hostility to the United States.
We need a new Naval Strategy. We must think like a naval power [10], not as land. Naval powers use geography to gain advantage. The land powers feel locked up in prison because of geography. As always, the strategy should start by exploring the world map. Once again, we find that geography and geopolitics are good for us and our allies.
Our main competitor, China, is much more dependent on the unhindered use of sea routes for trade and supply of resources than the Soviet Union was. China is threatened by limited access to these vital routes, which are surrounded by American friends and allies and are bounded on all sides by narrows and straits that can easily be blocked. These are serious vulnerabilities for the Chinese economy.
To our strategic advantage, China's ongoing military build-up looks like it was modeled after their study of the West's Cold Win and Alfred Thayer Mahan. The forces they are building are not optimized to deal with the strategy that best serves to deter the United States and its allies.
During the Cold War, Soviet strategy and the direction of their actions in general were organized around the clash of huge armies concentrated in Central Europe. The Chinese strategy looks like they are building the ability to deter US forces from interfering with the ongoing takeover of Taiwan, or, if containment fails, to attack and defeat US forces at sea.
Over the longer term, they appear to be seeking undeniable opportunities to manage the Western Pacific and additional shipping lanes that are critical to their economies.
Such a strategy would include a "Mahanian" ability to destroy the US Pacific Fleet in a grand naval battle. They are transforming the South China and East China Seas into coastal fortresses in anticipation of a Normandy-style American invasion. They are making a huge mistake.
American naval strategy should be quite different from the one that took place during the Second World War or the Cold War. Like the 80s Naval Strategy, it should focus on the opponent's vulnerabilities, which, in the case of China, are completely different from those of the Soviet Union. China's economy will always depend on free shipping lanes around the world.
The US strategy to contain China must, of course, include targeting critical points in mainland China, both in terms of readiness to strike with weapons and in terms of possible cyberattacks. But first of all, it should be built on the undeniable possibility of strangling the Chinese economy through the overlap of narrows and straits, the mining of harbors and safe waters. [11].
Cutting such arteries is much easier than protecting them. US capabilities must be flexible and unpredictable. Our diverse forces must be formed and trained in such a way as to be able to quickly change their structure, moving from one specific combat mission to another. [12]... There are 50000 islands in the Pacific Ocean. And most of them are suitable for temporary offensive bases holding Chinese vulnerabilities at gunpoint. "Horizontal" escalation across the seas could turn the center of gravity of China's superpower status: the global trading economy.
Without revealing some secret possibilities, the strategy should be publicized. And the achievement of its goals should be practiced in exercises.
Such a strategy will require a larger fleet than it currently does, with some different characteristics that increase mobility and flexibility. And with fast-paced technology. But it will not be significantly larger than the fleet of 350-500 ships already planned.
A critical lesson in Naval Strategy is that the Navy must restore the confidence of Congress and the public in knowing what types of ships, aircraft, and technology are needed. And it is perhaps even more important that the Navy knows which "platforms" can be bought at a lower cost than examples such as Ford, Zumwalt and LCS.
To regain that trust, the Navy must find a way to escape the monstrous shackles of a nationwide bureaucracy. Navy leaders must regain their iron grip on procurement. End the culture of making changes to orders during production. And restore competition. Thanks to the credentials gained during Senator McCain's tenure on the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy can regain the necessary rights. But it will take a strong naval secretary and naval commander to use them.
Fortunately, the Marine Commandant is already leading them with a clear strategic vision. [13].
Translator's afterword
John Lehman was not the sole creator of the same "Naval Strategy", which literally "swept" the Soviet Navy from the oceans to the extent that he was present there before, until the mid-80s. But he was one of its creators. And his role in many issues related to the American naval offensive during the Reagan administration was decisive. It was Lehman who largely forced the US Navy to tilt away from reliance on technology, on technical superiority, to which the Americans were inclined earlier and are inclined now, towards improving tactics and planning of operations - using technological superiority, of course. And they did it.
The "Naval Strategy" was successful because it was a real plan of preparation for a real war and then for its real conduct. Not a show to scare someone, not a bluff. And the Americans, inflamed by the constant defeats inflicted on them by the "communists", gave their best. And Lehman gave all the best. As a deck pilot, navigator-bombardier on the A-6 Intruder deck attack aircraft and having the rank of reserve captain, Lehman (and being already a secretary of the Navy) continued to fly from the decks of aircraft carriers, maintaining his personal skills at the proper level.
US Navy Secretary John Lehman prepares to take a seat in the cockpit of the A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft at the US Navy Air Force Base in Atsugi, Japan. October 19, 1982
This man was like a comic book hero in those years. High society millionaire. His cousin Grace Kelly is the Princess of Monaco (Prince Albert II, who now reigns in Monaco, is her son. And, therefore, a relative of John Lehman). At the age of 27, he himself was on the US National Security Council, knew Kissinger, Huntington and other gurus of geopolitics and politics. And at 38 he became the secretary of the Navy, never ceasing to fly on a deck attack aircraft.
We add that he is a truly talented writer, many American prose writers cannot write like that.
Lehman fought a little in Vietnam. His status as a pilot in the naval reserve freed him from participating in this war. But when the US National Security Council needed facts about the combat work of the Navy, Lehman (then the "liaison" between Kissinger and the White House apparatus) went to this war. And he collected facts about the combat work of the Navy, simply participating in it - performing combat missions on an A-6 carrier-based attack aircraft against the Vietnamese forces.
Can anyone imagine something similar in Russia or earlier in the USSR?
When would a young and promising deputy of some secretary in the Central Committee of the CPSU, in order to check the facts about the Afghan war, simply go there to fight and check everything on himself? Whether as a pilot on the Su-25, even as an infantryman, paratrooper or scout?
He was distinguished by truly brutal behavior, was principled in many issues. After the fall of Saigon, he settled nine South Vietnamese helicopter pilots at his home and paid for their retraining in the United States so that they could find work there. We, in the USSR, simply did not have such people, which largely determined our defeat.
The enemy turned out to be personally better, of better quality. And this fact has not yet come into the focus of our attention.
The human factor, in general, meant a lot. If not for Reagan's team, then somewhere in the mid-80s, the USSR and the United States would have agreed on peaceful coexistence. The Cold War would not have ended, but it would have started to slow down very slowly but continuously. This did not happen precisely because the new team in the White House did not want it. And in an interview with Lehman it is said about it directly.
What if such people are now at the helm in the United States?
Are we ready for a new storm with our "there will be no war anyway"? With our "respected people", whose commercial interests are in the fact that our country does not receive combat-ready ships, as well as aircraft? Or will we look stupid again, like then? Or maybe, in general, like in 1941?
Lehman was an ardent anti-communist. And for him, the fight against the USSR was a personal "crusade". It could not be otherwise. The millionaire, educated in a Catholic college, a descendant of businessmen and slave traders, who is in kinship with the ruling dynasty of Monaco, a participant in the war against the "Reds" in Vietnam, could not but be an anti-communist. And in his "crusade" he not only did everything he could to win, but actually won. He was a fanatic. Some of his critics argue that all intelligence reports on the defensive orientation of Soviet military preparations were deliberately sent to them in the bin to justify the massive offensive preparations of the Navy. He, apparently, was morally ready for a nuclear war with the USSR, because he was not at all afraid to provoke us with the actions of his admirals and commanders.
There is a lot of expression and even aggression in his speeches and speeches now. It is difficult to imagine what this person was not at 78 years old, but at 38, forty years ago.
Lehman's role was so great that even his enemies admit it. He was dismissed from his post as secretary of the fleet. It was removed from her. But now the shipyard is completing an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer named after him (USS John F. Lehman) during his lifetime.
Of course he was not an angel. Constant sex scandals, both with the participation of Lehman himself and the officers of the Navy, became the norm in those years. But this was a trifle against the background of corruption. Rikover, who accused him of working for the military-industrial complex, during that famous meeting with Reagan, was right - Lehman, according to some estimates, put $ 180 million in his pocket. And the illegal income (those that should not have been received) of the military-industrial complex, thanks to him, amounted to much and many times larger amounts. And this is not counting how much the military-industrial complex was enriched by honest methods, thanks to the fact that Lehman could knock out money for the Navy. In conditions when the USSR was already degraded and had no offensive plans, all these expenses looked somewhat pointless. But they led the United States to victory in the end. And, as we know, the winners are not judged.
The admirals raised by Secretary of the Navy Lehman did not lag behind. And things like flying an anti-submarine plane several thousand kilometers to play golf have become the norm in the US Navy for a while. Naturally, without publicity. It is worth noting that both Lehman and the dealers of the American military-industrial complex used money to strengthen the country. And it was Lehman who finally formalized how these things should be done.
And in Russia, for example, money is being made to weaken the Navy. And not on gain. As the saying goes, not all corrupt officials are equally useful. Maybe we just need to reorganize corruption?
But achievements were still the main thing. To quote the interview again:
... First, a strategy on a global scale, from which five theaters of military operations become obvious, where the United States has vital interests, a potential Soviet threat emanates from them, starting from this threat, the levels of the Navy are determined, sufficient to ensure that together with allies with partners in the person of army and air force, defeat this threat.
This is what is most interesting and necessary today in Lehmann's approach to naval development.
The presence of a sane strategy arising from the foreign policy goals of the state, which would also link the role of the fleet with the tasks of other types of armed forces and, starting from this, it would be possible to determine the required number of forces. And this is exactly what we are now fatally lacking. The Americans were able to press us so sharply for this very reason - they knew what they were doing and why. We cannot boast of this today. We have no strategy. And the fleet is actually gone. There are "naval units of military districts" with all the ensuing consequences. We build ships what we can, not what we need. What ships do we need? We simply do not know this. We do not have a sane strategy, and without it, build anything - there won't be much sense.
Long standard series of identical ships, a ban on making changes to a series under construction, the use of cost-effective solutions, encouraging competition among suppliers to reduce prices - this, by the way, is also Lehman. And this is also what we are missing.
Unfortunately, the psychological shock from the defeat we suffered in the Cold War is still such that our people simply cannot study it. And in her history there are recipes for victory. Yes, these are recipes for defeating us. But who said that one cannot learn from enemies?
The US "Naval Strategy" and the work of John Lehman are one of these recipes. And we need to study it as carefully as possible and draw all the necessary conclusions. In the era of the beginning of the second cold war, we need to understand more than ever what the first was and why we lost it. Not only at sea. And even not only in the military aspect (and not so much), but in this too.
Translation notes
John Lehman's speech is always full of catchy American expressions and, in addition, is distinguished by a somewhat specific structure of phrases and choice of words. Therefore, the translation of his speeches always puts the translator before a choice - strict literalism or the clearest transmission of the meaning of what was said. In this text, this choice also had to be made. And those who, knowing English, will compare the original and the translation, will notice this. Many specific expressions had to be replaced with others that would best convey the meaning of what was said for the Russian-speaking reader. Translation comments would be greatly appreciated.
In the text, the translator uses an approach that is different from the canonical one, namely: to avoid distorting the meaning of what has been said at any cost. So, the word Soviets, often used by Americans, should still be translated not as “Soviets”, but as “Soviet”, by analogy with Russians - “Russians”, “Russians”. The position, which we call "minister" of the Navy, is actually called "secretary", like any position in the United States, similar in status to a ministerial one. In the United States, there are no ministries; there are departments under the control of secretaries. Moreover, the Department of the Navy, which Lehman controlled, like the departments of the Air Force and the Army, are part of the Department of Defense, that is, they are not even equivalent to ministries. Therefore, secretary.
Below are some explanations for the text passages.
[1] - an important "ideological moment" - we have the phrases "continental power", "land power", but this does not quite reflect the state of affairs. Lehman here in relation to our country uses the word landlocked - literally "blocked by the land." And the fact that we are really blocked is an important fact that should be taken into account in any hypothetical naval strategy of Russia. Moreover, we clearly need new concepts, because the words that we use do not really reflect the state of affairs. For example, the phrase "sea power" only confuses, since it is impossible to understand anything from it, and the English Sea or Maritime power - literally: "[Exercising (her, th)] power over the seas" is a completely different matter. All the accents are right. This is a country or society that has power over the seas. By the way, you can lose it, but you can acquire it.
There are no "sea powers", if we call things by their proper names, as well as "land", "continental", etc. There are countries with access to the sea of different quality, and countries without it, and that's it. The rest can be changed at the request of people, although, of course, geography influences the ease of gaining such power very strongly. It is much easier for some here than for others, and Lehman says it directly. But everyone has the opportunity, including us. And we need the right meanings. Because language determines thinking, and here we are clearly losing. This is most likely fixable if corrected, but first you need to voice the problem. In the meantime, it is necessary to translate power (power) as "power". In general, it is necessary to learn the language of a potential enemy, it is very useful.
[2] - we don't know much about it, but in the 50s, when both the US Navy and the American society hesitated about the final destination of the Navy, it was Samuel Huntington, the future author of The Clash of Civilizations, who formulated the final task for the US Navy. , having substantiated with his book, among other things, the obvious fact that no peace with the West is technically possible, in principle. Read more about Huntington and the US Navy in the article - “The ideological impasse of the Russian fleet? No, Russian society! ”
[3] - PRM - Pressured rescue module - a lowering rescue pressure chamber for the evacuation of submarine crews that have crashed under water.
[4] - we are talking about the nongovernmental analytical center CNA, Center for Naval Analyzes. Lehman considered the involvement of "private traders" necessary so that the admirals could not hide the shortcomings of weapons and equipment from the political leadership. CNA is still working. For Russia, by the way, the problem of deliberate lies of responsible employees to the leadership is extremely acute. Many of our problems are due to this, especially in the navy.
[5] - in fact, the whole content of American actions was to show the USSR leadership as clearly as possible without war that if the war did start, then it would be useless to resist at sea. I must say it worked out. And the result was achieved at the level of a "military" victory. Why are the Americans confident that they won the Cold War. And they are right.
[6] - Lehman has repeatedly stated that during the meeting in Malta Gorbachev complained to Bush that (literally): "We are surrounded by your fleet."
[7] - in fact, another popular American expression drunk "kool-aid" is used here - "I drank the drink" Cool-Aid ", which has many different meanings, depending on the context, and here this expression means exactly what is written in Russian translation.
[8] - Stansfield Turner, Admiral, Director of Central Intelligence. He retired on January 20, 1981. Critic of Lehman and Reagan's foreign policy in general.
[9] - Samuel Donaldson, a columnist for ABC News, was a member of the White House during those years.
[10] is a characteristic caveat. “We must think like a country exercising naval power,” literally translated. Among domestic opponents of the fleet, the opinion is widespread that the fleet is not needed without involvement in the maritime trade and the maritime economy. This question is actually much more complicated and requires a separate review, but what is interesting here is that a man like Lehman sees the United States as a military force at sea, and not something else, and this is reflected in his speech.
[11] - in fact, the word sanctuary is used here, which means much more than a safe area. This can be roughly defined as an important water area (in a maritime context, in reality, not only a water area, but here we are talking about a war at sea), in which security is maintained, and the highest, and in which important activities are conducted. As stated earlier, we are missing words.
[12] - here Lehman's words echo what Sun Tzu wrote:
Sun Tzu pointed out that the structure and actions of troops should change depending on the enemy, that is, on the combat mission. Continuously changing (like water), hitting a weak point (into emptiness) just like water finds its way. If you "beat into the void", this is obvious. And it is applied always and everywhere. That about "form" is more and more complicated.
Changes in the structures of already belligerent units and formations "impromptu" were used by all armies and armed forces, we hear its echoes in such phrases as "tactical group" (company, battalion, brigade, etc.), for example. Systemically, the method of building such "Lego troops", when a military unit can be formed for a task and then immediately reorganized with a different structure, and without splitting subunits and disrupting control, was consistently and systematically used only in the US Marine Corps, other types of the US Armed Forces and other countries resorted to it limitedly and involuntarily, not understanding the benefits that it brings. Lehman clearly understands them and wants to apply to the Navy as a whole.
[13] - It's about the ongoing reform of the Marine Corps. You can read about this in the article "Step into the unknown, or the future of the American Marines".
Information