Military Review

About "Naval Strategy" USA 80s from its creators: interview with John Lehman

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The Naval Strategy provided a breakthrough in the combat power and aggressiveness of the US Navy. The photo shows a battle group of American and Australian ships, including a missile cruiser and a battleship with the Tomahawk CD.


There is a naval information portal in the US CIMSEC - Center for International Maritime Security, in translation - "Center for International Maritime Security". Adjusted for the fact that Security is not really "security", of course ...

The organization pretends to become a kind of "thought factory", but that is later. In the meantime, this is a very good socio-political Internet portal with a naval theme, in its Western "reading", of course.

It is no secret that today the US Navy is in some kind of identity crisis, which has already led to a huge waste of money (let us mention at least the LCS), and to a drop in the level of combat training (remember the burned-out Bonhomme Richard and collisions of ships with merchant ships). But the characteristic difference between Americans and many non-Americans is that, once in such a situation, they are energetically looking for a way out of it. CIMSEC, whose founders and staff are keen to contribute to overcoming this crisis, regularly organizes writing campaigns on a given topic. For example, "light aircraft carrier", "reconnaissance", "mine warfare", "sea war of the future", etc. The authors are mostly retired officers of the Navy, but sometimes the active military writes something.

As part of the study of past American experience, CIMSEC organized a series of interviews with the creators of the Maritime strategy of the 80s, which led to the resounding success and dominance of the US Navy even near the Soviet shores, as well as the collapse of the old strategy of Admiral S.G. Gorshkova (about her in the article "Sergei Gorshkov and his Great Fleet").

It makes sense to translate at least some of them, since the study of such experience cannot but be useful. The first in the series is an interview with one of the fathers of that naval "storm" that hit the USSR, the minister (in fact, the Secretary of the Navy, and that is how he will be called in the text) of the US Navy, John Lehman, who was the engine of all those processes that turned the US Navy into a completely and unconditionally dominant force in the oceans. This interview was done specifically for CIMSEC.

The interviewer who asked the questions is Dmitry Filipoff, online content editor for the site. Lehman regularly gives quite interesting interviews for him and CIMSEC, and this is no exception.

Readers are invited to translate the interview published on the portal on March 22, 2021. Original English text available at this link... The interview has not been previously published in Russian. Everything below is a translation of the original text.

Secretary Lehman on strategic authority and the use of dominance in the seas


CIMSEC discussed 80s Naval Strategy with Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, who served as the 65th Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1987. In this discussion, Secretary Lehman takes a look at how the Navy linked Naval Strategy and naval development objectives, secured its credibility in Congress, and could offensively use naval dominance in today's big conflict.


US Navy Secretary John Lehman, 1982

How would you describe the "Naval Strategy" and how did it replace the concepts and plans of the 70s?

Lehman: First of all, the "Naval Strategy" was global, its driving force was not NATO. It was geopolitical and based on the realization that during the Cold War, geography was on the side of the United States and its allies. The Soviet Union was a power, partly blocked by land [1], and the United States and its allies could easily establish naval dominance. It was part of a national strategy that had three directions: to ensure nuclear parity with the Soviets; keep in mind that the Warsaw Pact has a clear advantage in ground forces; and neutralize this advantage with overwhelming superiority at sea.

President Reagan believed that the West could win the Cold War without direct armed conflict. And that was the time when it was necessary to move from containment and "detente" to an advanced offensive strategy that would demonstrate that if the East attacks NATO, it will be defeated.

An offensively oriented naval force could not only protect sea communications, but also encircle the Soviet state, drown the Soviet fleet and use the seas for blockade, mining and strikes deep into the heart of Soviet territory.

The Navy's concepts and plans in the 70s were the product of post-Vietnamese weakening, attrition and underfunding, which were mixed with some frenzied attempts by Presidents Ford and Carter to find a way to "defuse" [the Soviet Union].

Under Carter, the entire national strategy was concentrated almost entirely on the central front in Europe, assigning the Navy only an auxiliary, defensive role, with corresponding budgetary constraints.

For many of us veterans of the Kissinger National Security Council and "realists" in the academic community, this was absurd. Dick Allen, Sam Huntington [2], Bing West, Fred Ickle, myself and many others began to meet from time to time for lunch or dinner and discuss strategy, often in company with active sailors such as Jim Holloway, James "Ace" Lyons and Peter Swartz. who was then involved in a fight to the death over PRM 10 [3]... It was at these informal meetings that "Marine Strategy" began to take shape.

In your book Command on the Seas, you stated: “Many admirals believed that the secretary of the Navy should interact with the [President's] administration ... and leave strategy and all inquiries to the admirals. As Secretary of the Navy, it never occurred to me that strategy was not my business. In fact, it should have been my business. " How did you manage your position as Secretary of the Navy for the development and protection of the "Naval Strategy"? How should CPA secretaries see their role in strategy development?

Lehman: Pursuant to Section 10 [USC], the Secretary of the Navy is responsible for the manning, training, and combat readiness of both the Navy and the Marine Corps to carry out the missions of the national strategy. An effective naval strategy is what integrates and defines various types of personnel policy, ships, aircraft, weapons and the training required to carry out naval missions. Therefore, the need to ensure that naval strategy is meaningful should be seen as the primary concern of the Secretary of the Navy.

This was especially true when I took the oath on February 5, 1981. Because the new president, whose inauguration took place two weeks earlier, changed the national strategy and the role that naval strategy was supposed to play, from a defensive approach to an offensive one.

I was elected [to this position] because my education and experience were in areas such as geopolitics, strategy and military affairs. I, therefore, had to lead others in matters of changing strategy and its constituent doctrines, concepts and plans. The staff I selected included both proven strategists and practitioners who had experience not only in constructing theories, but also in verifying their words with deeds.

The role of my immediate successors in strategy was not to be a change agent, but to understand the strategy and oversee its implementation. When the Cold War ended in victory a few years later, it was time for a new strategy.

My task as Secretary of the Navy was facilitated by the fact that the Commander of Naval Operations, Admiral Tom Hayward, was himself a real strategist and already used an offensive strategy when he was in command. fleet in the Pacific, that is, before becoming the commander of naval operations.

In the future, the Secretary of the Navy must always understand naval strategy, its concepts, their application in practice and the role in procurement and training of personnel.

How was naval strategy embodied in real naval operations and exercises? How important were these teachings?

Lehman: The "Naval Strategy" immediately entailed dramatic changes in the statements and statements of the Navy. And in congressional hearings, starting with my appearances before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the day after I was sworn in. And in public speeches, in articles, in the comments of senior naval officers and civilian leaders in the media and on television.

Full-scale work began immediately to change combat training plans, doctrines, concepts, battle plans and war games. The teachings took a little longer to change. The first was the exercise "Oceans Venture 81" in the North Atlantic, Barents and Norwegian Seas. RIMPAC in the Pacific and exercises in the Mediterranean soon followed. In each of them, in addition to the usual tasks of air defense, anti-aircraft defense and other usual types of combat training, "mirror" offensive strikes were practiced.

In addition to the usual combat training tasks, the exercises now had two additional purposes. One of them was to create new tactics using all the technologies that were now going into the fleet, testing their effectiveness in real conditions, under the watchful eyes of the on-board operational analysts from the Center for Naval Analysis. [4]... The second main purpose was to demonstrate to the Soviet talkers and observers how good we are and that they cannot beat us. [5].

These exercises were held in all theaters of war and every year. After each of them, a thorough analysis was carried out of what worked and what did not, tactical schemes were changed and refined, weapons were improved. And everything got better and better together. By the end of the 80s, both Soviet and American sailors and leaders were convinced that we could easily defeat the Soviets.

This is, of course, real containment. Proof of his success was not only intelligence, but also the now famous "Map of Akhromeev" and also the well-known complaints of Gorbachev about the "encirclement" by the US Navy [6].

How did Marine Strategy interact with budgeting and goal setting? How did the budget and the adopted programs of the Navy affect the "Naval Strategy"?

Lehman: In the current period and in many periods earlier, the naval strategy (if it could be called that) was determined by the available budgets. In the 80s, the process was reversed: first the strategy, then the requirements, then the memorandum with the programs and their goals, then the budget. This was possible because the president, the secretaries of defense and the Navy, the commander of naval operations, the commandant of the Marine Corps, and the controller of the Navy were united in politics.

Due to this agreement, the simple strategic logic of the programs that followed from it, plus good connections in Congress and in a number of public companies, it became possible for us to get full support in Congress for all our programs of the 80s, even for the purchase of two aircraft carriers. Without strategy, this would not have happened.

What was the connection between the tasks of building the structure of the Navy, which were "set in motion" by the "600 ships" program, and the "Naval Strategy"? How did you connect the planned appearance and size of the Navy and strategy?

Lehman: At all meetings within the Department of Defense, at all interagency meetings, in classified and unclassified publications, at congressional hearings and at public events, we have firmly sent everyone the same message: First, a global strategy. Five theaters of military operations, where the United States has vital interests, emerge from it. From there comes a potential Soviet threat. Based on this threat, the naval strength levels are determined, sufficient to, together with allies and partners, in the person of the army and the air force, defeat this threat.

The number of forces required for superiority in each theater of operations was determined each year during exercises and war games [at the Naval War College] in Newport.

Based on these five theaters of operations, the required number of forces was obtained: 15 aircraft carriers, 100 multipurpose nuclear submarines, 140 cruisers and destroyers, 100 frigates. And so on up to 600 units.


Lehman did not mention four battleships. But they were brought into operation too during his tenure. In the photo - Lehman with an officer of the LC "New Jersey"

The logic was simple and convincing: year after year, we never hesitated. More importantly, we gave [the navy] what we promised: ships and jets on time, on budget, or even at less expense; a fleet that was within its power.


The F-14 was one of the symbols of the then rearmament of the US Navy. With the huge expenditures of the Americans on weapons, it would be impossible to build such a fleet without strict financial discipline. Photo: US Navy via Alpha Coders.

How has Naval Strategy improved the Navy's ability to communicate its point of view to an external audience? For example, before Congress, other branches of the military and allies? How was it received and challenged by an external audience?

Lehman: The easily understood simplicity and consistency of the "Naval Strategy" was a great advantage, as was its invariability from year to year. Unlike in past periods, there have been no significant leaks of discord between the Navy and the Marine Corps. In truth, there were admirals who "caught the intoxication" [7] in the previous administration and informed the Congress and their friends that they did not like the "Sea Strategy". But they soon found themselves in retirement (Stansfield Turner [8] always appeared on Sunday talk shows and spoke to people like Sam Donaldson [9]that naval strategy is "dangerous" and that a fleet of 600 ships is "too expensive").

What lessons can be learned from the Naval Strategy for engaging in today's great power competition?

Lehman: History does not repeat. But often the events of some "eras" go "into rhyme" with others. Today, history "rhymes" with itself in the past. Once again, we are facing a hostile world power, accompanied by smaller powers, including Russia, Iran and North Korea, which are linked only by hostility to the United States.

We need a new Naval Strategy. We must think like a naval power [10], not as land. Naval powers use geography to gain advantage. The land powers feel locked up in prison because of geography. As always, the strategy should start by exploring the world map. Once again, we find that geography and geopolitics are good for us and our allies.

Our main competitor, China, is much more dependent on the unhindered use of sea routes for trade and supply of resources than the Soviet Union was. China is threatened by limited access to these vital routes, which are surrounded by American friends and allies and are bounded on all sides by narrows and straits that can easily be blocked. These are serious vulnerabilities for the Chinese economy.

To our strategic advantage, China's ongoing military build-up looks like it was modeled after their study of the West's Cold Win and Alfred Thayer Mahan. The forces they are building are not optimized to deal with the strategy that best serves to deter the United States and its allies.

During the Cold War, Soviet strategy and the direction of their actions in general were organized around the clash of huge armies concentrated in Central Europe. The Chinese strategy looks like they are building the ability to deter US forces from interfering with the ongoing takeover of Taiwan, or, if containment fails, to attack and defeat US forces at sea.

Over the longer term, they appear to be seeking undeniable opportunities to manage the Western Pacific and additional shipping lanes that are critical to their economies.

Such a strategy would include a "Mahanian" ability to destroy the US Pacific Fleet in a grand naval battle. They are transforming the South China and East China Seas into coastal fortresses in anticipation of a Normandy-style American invasion. They are making a huge mistake.

American naval strategy should be quite different from the one that took place during the Second World War or the Cold War. Like the 80s Naval Strategy, it should focus on the opponent's vulnerabilities, which, in the case of China, are completely different from those of the Soviet Union. China's economy will always depend on free shipping lanes around the world.

The US strategy to contain China must, of course, include targeting critical points in mainland China, both in terms of readiness to strike with weapons and in terms of possible cyberattacks. But first of all, it should be built on the undeniable possibility of strangling the Chinese economy through the overlap of narrows and straits, the mining of harbors and safe waters. [11].

Cutting such arteries is much easier than protecting them. US capabilities must be flexible and unpredictable. Our diverse forces must be formed and trained in such a way as to be able to quickly change their structure, moving from one specific combat mission to another. [12]... There are 50000 islands in the Pacific Ocean. And most of them are suitable for temporary offensive bases holding Chinese vulnerabilities at gunpoint. "Horizontal" escalation across the seas could turn the center of gravity of China's superpower status: the global trading economy.

Without revealing some secret possibilities, the strategy should be publicized. And the achievement of its goals should be practiced in exercises.

Such a strategy will require a larger fleet than it currently does, with some different characteristics that increase mobility and flexibility. And with fast-paced technology. But it will not be significantly larger than the fleet of 350-500 ships already planned.

A critical lesson in Naval Strategy is that the Navy must restore the confidence of Congress and the public in knowing what types of ships, aircraft, and technology are needed. And it is perhaps even more important that the Navy knows which "platforms" can be bought at a lower cost than examples such as Ford, Zumwalt and LCS.

To regain that trust, the Navy must find a way to escape the monstrous shackles of a nationwide bureaucracy. Navy leaders must regain their iron grip on procurement. End the culture of making changes to orders during production. And restore competition. Thanks to the credentials gained during Senator McCain's tenure on the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy can regain the necessary rights. But it will take a strong naval secretary and naval commander to use them.

Fortunately, the Marine Commandant is already leading them with a clear strategic vision. [13].

Translator's afterword


John Lehman was not the sole creator of the same "Naval Strategy", which literally "swept" the Soviet Navy from the oceans to the extent that he was present there before, until the mid-80s. But he was one of its creators. And his role in many issues related to the American naval offensive during the Reagan administration was decisive. It was Lehman who largely forced the US Navy to tilt away from reliance on technology, on technical superiority, to which the Americans were inclined earlier and are inclined now, towards improving tactics and planning of operations - using technological superiority, of course. And they did it.

The "Naval Strategy" was successful because it was a real plan of preparation for a real war and then for its real conduct. Not a show to scare someone, not a bluff. And the Americans, inflamed by the constant defeats inflicted on them by the "communists", gave their best. And Lehman gave all the best. As a deck pilot, navigator-bombardier on the A-6 Intruder deck attack aircraft and having the rank of reserve captain, Lehman (and being already a secretary of the Navy) continued to fly from the decks of aircraft carriers, maintaining his personal skills at the proper level.


US Navy Secretary John Lehman prepares to take a seat in the cockpit of the A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft at the US Navy Air Force Base in Atsugi, Japan. October 19, 1982

This man was like a comic book hero in those years. High society millionaire. His cousin Grace Kelly is the Princess of Monaco (Prince Albert II, who now reigns in Monaco, is her son. And, therefore, a relative of John Lehman). At the age of 27, he himself was on the US National Security Council, knew Kissinger, Huntington and other gurus of geopolitics and politics. And at 38 he became the secretary of the Navy, never ceasing to fly on a deck attack aircraft.

We add that he is a truly talented writer, many American prose writers cannot write like that.

Lehman fought a little in Vietnam. His status as a pilot in the naval reserve freed him from participating in this war. But when the US National Security Council needed facts about the combat work of the Navy, Lehman (then the "liaison" between Kissinger and the White House apparatus) went to this war. And he collected facts about the combat work of the Navy, simply participating in it - performing combat missions on an A-6 carrier-based attack aircraft against the Vietnamese forces.


"Intruders" in Vietnam. This photo is from 1968, Lehman was there a little later.

Can anyone imagine something similar in Russia or earlier in the USSR?

When would a young and promising deputy of some secretary in the Central Committee of the CPSU, in order to check the facts about the Afghan war, simply go there to fight and check everything on himself? Whether as a pilot on the Su-25, even as an infantryman, paratrooper or scout?

He was distinguished by truly brutal behavior, was principled in many issues. After the fall of Saigon, he settled nine South Vietnamese helicopter pilots at his home and paid for their retraining in the United States so that they could find work there. We, in the USSR, simply did not have such people, which largely determined our defeat.

The enemy turned out to be personally better, of better quality. And this fact has not yet come into the focus of our attention.

The human factor, in general, meant a lot. If not for Reagan's team, then somewhere in the mid-80s, the USSR and the United States would have agreed on peaceful coexistence. The Cold War would not have ended, but it would have started to slow down very slowly but continuously. This did not happen precisely because the new team in the White House did not want it. And in an interview with Lehman it is said about it directly.

What if such people are now at the helm in the United States?

Are we ready for a new storm with our "there will be no war anyway"? With our "respected people", whose commercial interests are in the fact that our country does not receive combat-ready ships, as well as aircraft? Or will we look stupid again, like then? Or maybe, in general, like in 1941?

Lehman was an ardent anti-communist. And for him, the fight against the USSR was a personal "crusade". It could not be otherwise. The millionaire, educated in a Catholic college, a descendant of businessmen and slave traders, who is in kinship with the ruling dynasty of Monaco, a participant in the war against the "Reds" in Vietnam, could not but be an anti-communist. And in his "crusade" he not only did everything he could to win, but actually won. He was a fanatic. Some of his critics argue that all intelligence reports on the defensive orientation of Soviet military preparations were deliberately sent to them in the bin to justify the massive offensive preparations of the Navy. He, apparently, was morally ready for a nuclear war with the USSR, because he was not at all afraid to provoke us with the actions of his admirals and commanders.

There is a lot of expression and even aggression in his speeches and speeches now. It is difficult to imagine what this person was not at 78 years old, but at 38, forty years ago.


Lehman these days. Source: US Naval War colledge

Lehman's role was so great that even his enemies admit it. He was dismissed from his post as secretary of the fleet. It was removed from her. But now the shipyard is completing an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer named after him (USS John F. Lehman) during his lifetime.

Of course he was not an angel. Constant sex scandals, both with the participation of Lehman himself and the officers of the Navy, became the norm in those years. But this was a trifle against the background of corruption. Rikover, who accused him of working for the military-industrial complex, during that famous meeting with Reagan, was right - Lehman, according to some estimates, put $ 180 million in his pocket. And the illegal income (those that should not have been received) of the military-industrial complex, thanks to him, amounted to much and many times larger amounts. And this is not counting how much the military-industrial complex was enriched by honest methods, thanks to the fact that Lehman could knock out money for the Navy. In conditions when the USSR was already degraded and had no offensive plans, all these expenses looked somewhat pointless. But they led the United States to victory in the end. And, as we know, the winners are not judged.

The admirals raised by Secretary of the Navy Lehman did not lag behind. And things like flying an anti-submarine plane several thousand kilometers to play golf have become the norm in the US Navy for a while. Naturally, without publicity. It is worth noting that both Lehman and the dealers of the American military-industrial complex used money to strengthen the country. And it was Lehman who finally formalized how these things should be done.

And in Russia, for example, money is being made to weaken the Navy. And not on gain. As the saying goes, not all corrupt officials are equally useful. Maybe we just need to reorganize corruption?

But achievements were still the main thing. To quote the interview again:

In the current period and in many periods earlier, the naval strategy (if it could be called that) was determined by the available budgets. In the 80s, the process was reversed: first the strategy, then the requirements, then the memorandum with the programs and their goals, then the budget.

... First, a strategy on a global scale, from which five theaters of military operations become obvious, where the United States has vital interests, a potential Soviet threat emanates from them, starting from this threat, the levels of the Navy are determined, sufficient to ensure that together with allies with partners in the person of army and air force, defeat this threat.

This is what is most interesting and necessary today in Lehmann's approach to naval development.

The presence of a sane strategy arising from the foreign policy goals of the state, which would also link the role of the fleet with the tasks of other types of armed forces and, starting from this, it would be possible to determine the required number of forces. And this is exactly what we are now fatally lacking. The Americans were able to press us so sharply for this very reason - they knew what they were doing and why. We cannot boast of this today. We have no strategy. And the fleet is actually gone. There are "naval units of military districts" with all the ensuing consequences. We build ships what we can, not what we need. What ships do we need? We simply do not know this. We do not have a sane strategy, and without it, build anything - there won't be much sense.

Long standard series of identical ships, a ban on making changes to a series under construction, the use of cost-effective solutions, encouraging competition among suppliers to reduce prices - this, by the way, is also Lehman. And this is also what we are missing.

Unfortunately, the psychological shock from the defeat we suffered in the Cold War is still such that our people simply cannot study it. And in her history there are recipes for victory. Yes, these are recipes for defeating us. But who said that one cannot learn from enemies?

The US "Naval Strategy" and the work of John Lehman are one of these recipes. And we need to study it as carefully as possible and draw all the necessary conclusions. In the era of the beginning of the second cold war, we need to understand more than ever what the first was and why we lost it. Not only at sea. And even not only in the military aspect (and not so much), but in this too.

Translation notes


John Lehman's speech is always full of catchy American expressions and, in addition, is distinguished by a somewhat specific structure of phrases and choice of words. Therefore, the translation of his speeches always puts the translator before a choice - strict literalism or the clearest transmission of the meaning of what was said. In this text, this choice also had to be made. And those who, knowing English, will compare the original and the translation, will notice this. Many specific expressions had to be replaced with others that would best convey the meaning of what was said for the Russian-speaking reader. Translation comments would be greatly appreciated.

In the text, the translator uses an approach that is different from the canonical one, namely: to avoid distorting the meaning of what has been said at any cost. So, the word Soviets, often used by Americans, should still be translated not as “Soviets”, but as “Soviet”, by analogy with Russians - “Russians”, “Russians”. The position, which we call "minister" of the Navy, is actually called "secretary", like any position in the United States, similar in status to a ministerial one. In the United States, there are no ministries; there are departments under the control of secretaries. Moreover, the Department of the Navy, which Lehman controlled, like the departments of the Air Force and the Army, are part of the Department of Defense, that is, they are not even equivalent to ministries. Therefore, secretary.

Below are some explanations for the text passages.

[1] - an important "ideological moment" - we have the phrases "continental power", "land power", but this does not quite reflect the state of affairs. Lehman here in relation to our country uses the word landlocked - literally "blocked by the land." And the fact that we are really blocked is an important fact that should be taken into account in any hypothetical naval strategy of Russia. Moreover, we clearly need new concepts, because the words that we use do not really reflect the state of affairs. For example, the phrase "sea power" only confuses, since it is impossible to understand anything from it, and the English Sea or Maritime power - literally: "[Exercising (her, th)] power over the seas" is a completely different matter. All the accents are right. This is a country or society that has power over the seas. By the way, you can lose it, but you can acquire it.

There are no "sea powers", if we call things by their proper names, as well as "land", "continental", etc. There are countries with access to the sea of ​​different quality, and countries without it, and that's it. The rest can be changed at the request of people, although, of course, geography influences the ease of gaining such power very strongly. It is much easier for some here than for others, and Lehman says it directly. But everyone has the opportunity, including us. And we need the right meanings. Because language determines thinking, and here we are clearly losing. This is most likely fixable if corrected, but first you need to voice the problem. In the meantime, it is necessary to translate power (power) as "power". In general, it is necessary to learn the language of a potential enemy, it is very useful.

[2] - we don't know much about it, but in the 50s, when both the US Navy and the American society hesitated about the final destination of the Navy, it was Samuel Huntington, the future author of The Clash of Civilizations, who formulated the final task for the US Navy. , having substantiated with his book, among other things, the obvious fact that no peace with the West is technically possible, in principle. Read more about Huntington and the US Navy in the article - “The ideological impasse of the Russian fleet? No, Russian society! ”

[3] - PRM - Pressured rescue module - a lowering rescue pressure chamber for the evacuation of submarine crews that have crashed under water.

[4] - we are talking about the nongovernmental analytical center CNA, Center for Naval Analyzes. Lehman considered the involvement of "private traders" necessary so that the admirals could not hide the shortcomings of weapons and equipment from the political leadership. CNA is still working. For Russia, by the way, the problem of deliberate lies of responsible employees to the leadership is extremely acute. Many of our problems are due to this, especially in the navy.

[5] - in fact, the whole content of American actions was to show the USSR leadership as clearly as possible without war that if the war did start, then it would be useless to resist at sea. I must say it worked out. And the result was achieved at the level of a "military" victory. Why are the Americans confident that they won the Cold War. And they are right.

[6] - Lehman has repeatedly stated that during the meeting in Malta Gorbachev complained to Bush that (literally): "We are surrounded by your fleet."

[7] - in fact, another popular American expression drunk "kool-aid" is used here - "I drank the drink" Cool-Aid ", which has many different meanings, depending on the context, and here this expression means exactly what is written in Russian translation.

[8] - Stansfield Turner, Admiral, Director of Central Intelligence. He retired on January 20, 1981. Critic of Lehman and Reagan's foreign policy in general.

[9] - Samuel Donaldson, a columnist for ABC News, was a member of the White House during those years.

[10] is a characteristic caveat. “We must think like a country exercising naval power,” literally translated. Among domestic opponents of the fleet, the opinion is widespread that the fleet is not needed without involvement in the maritime trade and the maritime economy. This question is actually much more complicated and requires a separate review, but what is interesting here is that a man like Lehman sees the United States as a military force at sea, and not something else, and this is reflected in his speech.

[11] - in fact, the word sanctuary is used here, which means much more than a safe area. This can be roughly defined as an important water area (in a maritime context, in reality, not only a water area, but here we are talking about a war at sea), in which security is maintained, and the highest, and in which important activities are conducted. As stated earlier, we are missing words.

[12] - here Lehman's words echo what Sun Tzu wrote:

“The form of the army is like water: the form of the water is to avoid heights and strive downward; the form of the army is to avoid the fullness and hit the void. The water sets its flow depending on the location; the army establishes its victory depending on the enemy. "

Sun Tzu pointed out that the structure and actions of troops should change depending on the enemy, that is, on the combat mission. Continuously changing (like water), hitting a weak point (into emptiness) just like water finds its way. If you "beat into the void", this is obvious. And it is applied always and everywhere. That about "form" is more and more complicated.

Changes in the structures of already belligerent units and formations "impromptu" were used by all armies and armed forces, we hear its echoes in such phrases as "tactical group" (company, battalion, brigade, etc.), for example. Systemically, the method of building such "Lego troops", when a military unit can be formed for a task and then immediately reorganized with a different structure, and without splitting subunits and disrupting control, was consistently and systematically used only in the US Marine Corps, other types of the US Armed Forces and other countries resorted to it limitedly and involuntarily, not understanding the benefits that it brings. Lehman clearly understands them and wants to apply to the Navy as a whole.

[13] - It's about the ongoing reform of the Marine Corps. You can read about this in the article "Step into the unknown, or the future of the American Marines".
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  1. A.TOR
    A.TOR April 21 2021 15: 21
    +4
    As a fluent English speaker, I will give the translation quality a "5".

    Regarding the Fleet - I think "the train is gone forever."
  2. Aleksandr97
    Aleksandr97 April 21 2021 15: 56
    +1
    Japan basically lost to the United States in WWII due to the overwhelming industrial superiority of the enemy. Given the nuclear status of the PRC-US after the outbreak of hostilities - will it be time to build the planned fleet of 350-500 ships needed for the "Naval Strategy" and another 1-2 years for "horizontal escalation" ???
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 21 2021 18: 15
      +4
      We will have to fight with what we have. Therefore, fleets are built in advance. The indicated 350-500 ships are planned to be built BEFORE the war with China, if it does happen.
    2. Alarmist79
      Alarmist79 April 21 2021 20: 21
      +1
      = Given the nuclear status of the PRC-USA =
      1. China is violently attacking the States - in order to run into a much more powerful response? Well no,
      2. The PRC was the first to declare the non-use of nuclear weapons.
  3. Anzhey V.
    Anzhey V. April 21 2021 16: 17
    +3
    Excellent article, thank you!
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 21 2021 18: 16
      +3
      Please.
      1. Anzhey V.
        Anzhey V. April 21 2021 19: 46
        +8
        You again raised an extremely important topic (as in the article about S. Gorshkov) - the issues of conceptual backwardness of both the USSR and the Russian Federation.

        Actually, absolutely everyone lags behind the United States in this area - China is no exception.

        In addition to the personal qualities of Lehman and Reagan, a talented administration and an aggressive attitude, the Americans overtook the Soviets in confrontation on the analytical front. They were the first (and so far, it seems, the only ones) began to form "thought factories", using huge staffs of seemingly completely non-military specialists to form a military and foreign policy strategy: historians, anthropologists, political scientists, sociologists, orientalists, etc.

        In essence, they have revolutionized the system of government, bringing geopolitical confrontation from the offices of military officials to the offices of independent analysts with complete freedom of thought.

        Unfortunately, we still do not understand the value of high-quality analytics, leaving everything at the mercy of deeply indifferent officials.
        1. timokhin-aa
          April 21 2021 20: 57
          +4
          Yes that's right.
          1. A.TOR
            A.TOR April 22 2021 13: 26
            +3
            Let me say subjectively: the level of analysis of the problems of the fleet in Russia, in principle, cannot reach the level of the United States - vast experience combined with the practice of introducing organizational innovations there and a helpful desire to voice what the "high bosses" want here. And the absence of INDEPENDENT analytical groups plays a role.
            1. Anzhey V.
              Anzhey V. April 22 2021 15: 13
              +1
              I agree with you. This is a huge and, in essence, insoluble problem in the presence of which the future of the country, alas, hangs in the balance.

              First of all, a radical restructuring of the education system is necessary - first of all, it is necessary to get rid of the ossified nasty idea that humanitarian education is supposedly useless.

              And the absence of INDEPENDENT analytical groups plays a role.


              And this is a very interesting point, because they completely undermine the state's monopoly on strategic analysis. In our country, they love to talk about an almighty military man from a high headquarters, who knows everything, everything. Likewise with high-ranking officials.

              And then, heaven forbid, it will also be discovered that it is not the gods who burn the pots.
              1. A.TOR
                A.TOR April 22 2021 15: 54
                +1
                Education will not help - you cannot build a strategy “based on what has been achieved”. So it is possible - with some assumption - to build tactics.
                The strategy is based on the strategic tasks that the country wants to achieve, but here is the problem: it seems that in Russia no one knows what these very "strategic tasks" of the fleet are.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  April 22 2021 20: 54
                  +2
                  And here is the problem: it seems that in Russia no one knows what these very "strategic tasks" of the fleet are.


                  It seems that in Russia no one knows what these very "strategic tasks" of Russia are.
                  And the fleet is already a consequence.
            2. timokhin-aa
              April 22 2021 15: 24
              +2
              Not so simple. There, all these think tanks basically just voice what they want from the bottom, this is a long-known fact. They CAN give objective results, but only when someone is interested in them, and this is not often there. Look at the financing of these offices.

              As for experience, I ask you to pay attention to how the naval battles of American ships against British ones ended in their time.

              But the Americans did not give up, and today we see the result.
              The main thing is not to give up, and everything will work out.
              1. A.TOR
                A.TOR April 22 2021 16: 03
                +1
                America was strengthening economically simultaneously with the progress of naval ideology, Russia is objectively weakening. You can "not give up" as much as you want, there are no "rear"
                1. timokhin-aa
                  April 22 2021 16: 18
                  +2
                  The question of strengthening-weakening of the state as a whole is one thing, but whether the weakening state will maintain the maximum possible level of combat readiness for it or leave everything to chance is another.

                  We must fight to the end.
                  1. A.TOR
                    A.TOR April 23 2021 12: 22
                    +1
                    As one literary hero said, "you can hear despair in your voice."
                    With an asset of about 2 percent of world GDP, projecting power "somewhere out there" is, according to the laws of economics, some form of insanity.
                    We need to be more realistic about our capabilities and, accordingly, soberly assess the possibilities and methods of opposition from opponents. Compensation for "Russia's all-round efforts" in strengthening the fleet will be countered by the same United States without any effort. It is necessary to set realistic goals, a powerful fleet is a dream for the Russian Federation.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      April 23 2021 12: 40
                      0
                      With an asset of about 2 percent of world GDP, projecting power "somewhere out there" is, according to the laws of economics, some form of insanity.


                      This verbiage for a variety of obvious reasons.
                      First, not two, but three - it should be counted like the World Bank, at PPP, and not in any currency.
                      Secondly, countries with a much smaller share for the same PPP with projection is complete order.
                      Thirdly, we are completely projecting to ourselves even now, just badly, but this is not because of money, but because of stupidity. With the same Syria, they could have finished much faster if they had bombed more corny. It would be worth a penny.
                      1. A.TOR
                        A.TOR April 23 2021 14: 09
                        +1
                        Do not get excited, please, this is not typical for you.
                        3% - even so - may be different. Countries with "ancient" cultural and linguistic ties really have an advantage here, but the Russian Federation does not.
                        There were political factors of influence, determined by the support of certain regimes, but with the departure / collapse of the latter, influence also disappeared.
                        You are talking about power influence, the projection of power with the help of the fleet ...
                        These are generally different things, here the economy determines.
                        As for "bombing more" - well ... here God is your judge. You can make enemies among the civilian population in this way. The problem is that by strengthening ties with the local "leaders", by bombing their opponents, you will embitter those who fall under these bombs.
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        April 23 2021 18: 20
                        +3
                        The problem is that by strengthening ties with the local "leaders", by bombing their opponents, you will exasperate those who fall under these bombs.


                        Such a statement will only roll in the fact that I have never seen the graffiti "Wagner Group Come Back!" In the Arabic language.

                        We make the Syrians bitter by the fact that we cannot decide everything there finally, but this is not possible while in Syria, the United States, and in the Kremlin, Putin, who still believes that something can be agreed with the West.
      2. gsev
        gsev April 22 2021 17: 53
        0
        Quote: Anjay V.
        leading the geopolitical confrontation from the offices of military officials to the offices of independent analysts with complete freedom of thought.

        In Russia, an independent analyst does not have access to military and political information and cannot replace a specialist. Political and historical sciences, as they are taught in Russia, are a tool for propaganda and change of consciousness in subordinates and not a tool for improving the political or economic model of society. In addition, starting with small firms, management (often not top management, but middle management) is used to keeping potential leaders on a short administrative and economic leash.
        1. timokhin-aa
          April 22 2021 18: 45
          +1
          In Russia, an independent analyst does not have access to military and political information and cannot replace a specialist.


          What prevents you from giving him permission? Should I take a nondisclosure subscription?

          Political and historical sciences, as they are taught in Russia, are a tool for propaganda and change of consciousness in subordinates and not a tool for improving the political or economic model of society.


          This is the case all over the world now.

          In addition, starting with small firms, management (often not top management, but middle management) is used to keeping potential leaders on a short administrative and economic leash.


          Yes, I agree here.
          1. gsev
            gsev April 22 2021 22: 36
            0
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            What prevents you from giving him permission? Should I take a nondisclosure subscription?

            I observed the reaction of a 3rd year MGIMO student and a nurse who went through the war in Chechnya to information about the inhumanity of antipersonnel mines and the need to ban them. The first was led to the desirability of the ban, the second instantly declared that the ban of mines was national treason. Here, apparently, the matter is in the level of authority. Now in production in large companies, designers are under the petty tutelage of financiers and administrators. On the other hand, designers are not encouraged to calculate their decisions on the economic results of their consequences. The financier does not know the intricacies of using a particular cutter. One drill has been working for me for 8 years, and in 2 months I changed 3 similar ones with a total price in the cost of one long-lived one. At the same time, he organizes an accurate account of screws and nuts, for example. As a result, one person is involved in the assembly and design, and three are involved in the cross-checking of the accounting.
  • NIKN
    NIKN April 21 2021 17: 02
    +3
    A competent article and without speculation, which is valuable! Thanks to the author! hi
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 21 2021 18: 16
      +1
      And thank you for your rating.
  • SVD68
    SVD68 April 21 2021 17: 28
    +2
    Lehman presents clear thoughts based on an understanding of the essence of naval warfare.
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 21 2021 18: 16
      +1
      This is what it is, that is.
  • Fan-fan
    Fan-fan April 21 2021 18: 44
    +1
    15 aircraft carriers, 100 multipurpose nuclear submarines, 140 cruisers and destroyers, 100 frigates. And so on up to 600 units

    This is the scale! It's amazing: they were able to steal and build a fleet, there was enough money for everything. And most importantly, the standard of living of the population has not been reduced.
    They cannot be compared with our present ones.
    1. max702
      max702 April 23 2021 15: 04
      +1
      Duc then robbed the entire planet and in debt .. Now here are the consequences in the form of tens of trillions of debt, but they don’t give a damn about creditors ..
  • Denis Rumyanny
    Denis Rumyanny April 21 2021 19: 15
    +3
    This is how it is. It was not about the reel (fleet), but about the state structure. Freedom of speech, competition, economy and human rights. And where do we have all this now?
    In the same place as our fleet - on paper.
  • KKND
    KKND April 21 2021 20: 00
    +3
    The enemy turned out to be personally better, of better quality. And this fact has not yet come into the focus of our attention.

    Here a simple conclusion slips in that the US population in the 80s turned out to be much smarter and more able-bodied than the population of the USSR. Hence their successes both in electronics and space and in military affairs.
    The author proposes to put the lion leader at the head of the flock of sheep, who will develop an excellent plan of war and begin to fight with the herd of lions, headed by an elderly ram with a stupid plan? The plan is fine, but I'm afraid the result will be a little predictable. wassat
    But seriously, the degradation affected not only the USSR / RF but also the Americans got sick, maybe they will collide with China, they will use up their strength, and we will sit out. This is the real plan of our Russian elite, of course it looks like it’s at random, but what plans do not build from a sheep into a lion is difficult to turn.
    Article plus. I would like to apologize to the author for past unfounded criticism hi
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 21 2021 20: 59
      +3
      This is the real plan of our Russian elite, of course it looks like it’s at random, but what plans do not build from a sheep into a lion is difficult to turn.


      This is a terrible, fatal mistake. The Americans see us as a weak "support" that China needs. In an effort to squeeze China to their feet (and they cannot completely destroy it, they have too much trade), they will inevitably think about knocking out a support, a weak link from their point of view.
      1. KKND
        KKND April 21 2021 21: 35
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        This is a terrible, fatal mistake.

        This may be a mistake, but there is simply no choice. More precisely, there is, like everyone grows wiser, start working intellectually, invent all these microcircuits with billions of transistors in a chip, but you yourself understand that it is not very realistic to turn from mediocre geniuses into geniuses. We are a "dying" civilization like Japan, for example.
        My father worked in production, including for Morinformsistema-Agat, and says that the intellectual level of workers since the times of the USSR has fallen sharply, and in the USSR the level was most likely below the United States.
        Most likely, the government proceeds from the fact that at least somehow to stop the "extinction", there is not even talk of development (in propaganda, anything can be). And I, in principle, think that the government quite adequately assesses the deplorableness of our situation, so they rely on chance.
        But a miracle can happen and we will be reborn again, in the end there were such rare cases in history.
        Let's hope for young people.
        I'm not saying that you need to raise your paws up, for example, on "Agatha" the bosses did not understand anything at all about the production, but were engaged in scribbling and fraud before the government, and received very much. By pull, they all joined in there. They often harmed real production by inept actions.
        At least to establish technocracy in the country again, for example. All the same, there are still good specialists.
        But as long as our country does not have a large number of specialists, we will "fade away".
        1. timokhin-aa
          April 21 2021 21: 39
          +2
          The question is not that, but that somewhere at the turn of the 30s, the Americans will come to cut us out, just to weaken China.
          This is the problem.
          Troubled times, of course, you can survive, yes.
          It will be impossible to survive a nuclear strike.
          1. KKND
            KKND April 21 2021 23: 40
            +1
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            The question is not that, but that somewhere at the turn of the 30s, the Americans will come to cut us out, just to weaken China.
            This is the problem.

            So I lead to the fact that what plan do not come up with, which concept do not apply, even the best one, we are unlikely to physically implement it. It is unlikely that our industry will be able to create adequate weapons to withstand the Americans and their allies in the 2030s. There is a possibility that we will weaken even more and eat up the Soviet legacy.
            One person cannot save an entire country, especially one as big as the Russian Federation. To be competitive and heavily armed in the world arena requires the work of hundreds of thousands of super-qualified specialists.
            1. timokhin-aa
              April 22 2021 10: 34
              0
              It is unlikely that our industry will be able to create adequate weapons to withstand the Americans and their allies in the 2030s.


              It is created. It is necessary to correctly arrange everything on the body and forward.
      2. Anzhey V.
        Anzhey V. April 21 2021 21: 37
        +1
        The Americans see us as a weak "support" that China needs. In an effort to squeeze China to their foot (and they cannot completely destroy it, they have too much trade), they will inevitably think about knocking out a support, a weak link from their point of view


        Let me disagree with you again.

        Do you know what the main problem is with you and ours and many other arguments? We misunderstand the current picture of the political situation in the Russian Federation. We misjudge which political clan Moscow belongs to.

        I will start, perhaps, with a very rude and unpleasant fact that needs to be voiced - we do not pursue an independent and self-sufficient policy, and we are a member of a power bloc that is not obvious to most in the face of continental Europe. This is not something terrible ... and what, in the history of Russia, there have already been such periods. In essence, we have absolutely minimal relations with China, and everyone understands perfectly well that neither we nor the Chinese will stand up for each other. Moreover, our interests clash in the few foreign outposts that Russia has.

        In fact, now we are acting as a "chain dog" of large German and French capital - in fact, this is the reason for the desire of the United States to stifle us on the sly: they do not need the strengthening and independence of the EU. But personally they are no longer interested in us, and the showdown of the European clans is not the level of Washington. The "hawks" aimed at China, and the British and the Turks will finish off Russia - and they will do this by constantly maintaining the military threat (as now with Ukraine - this is the so-called "intensification of the confrontation" and "maintaining the peak threat to the enemy" from a new British defense strategy) and soft power.

        And they won't throw warheads at us, it's expensive, ineffective, and the sales market will also disappear, as well as a source of highly qualified emigrants)
        1. timokhin-aa
          April 21 2021 21: 40
          0
          This theory requires at least some kind of confirmation from reality.
          1. Anzhey V.
            Anzhey V. April 21 2021 22: 13
            +1
            I will not lie, I never set myself the goal of collecting a complete argumentation base for this case. Here we need a serious analysis of the economic relations between Russia and European countries, an analysis of the supply of equipment strategically important for our economy, a full-fledged study of the ties of our trade elites with European ones, etc.

            I will not even begin to swing, this is too serious for one person with a limited information resource.

            For example, take all the "monstrous technological sanctions" that the EU supposedly imposes on us, and which are simply absent: this prole can be fed with bikes in the spirit of "Oceania has always fought with Eastasia", and serious people do serious things without any snobbery. For example, Germans, Italians and Austrians are building in Vyksa a state-of-the-art metallurgical plant with direct iron reduction technology. The German Wilo Group, the world leader in the production of pumping equipment, supplies them all of our oil industry, and even localized production in Chelyabinsk. Siemens gas turbines were delivered to the “sanctioned Crimea”. The French are building LNG plants on Yamal, while German and Dutch firms are building the Crimean Bridge. We buy pedigree and seed stock for poultry farms and farms in the same Belgium, Holland and Germany. Here you can continue indefinitely, to be honest. The fact is that continental Europe could really strangle us if it had such a desire - and it invests money and even protects. And this process is strangely reciprocal ...
            1. timokhin-aa
              April 21 2021 22: 43
              0
              The problem is that the economic ties you have described are declining. And not by themselves, but under the pressure of politicians. And it’s not just that.
              1. Anzhey V.
                Anzhey V. April 22 2021 00: 24
                +1
                The problem is that the economic ties you described are declining.


                I would not say that they are really declining - oil, gas and money are steadily leaving us for Europe, and we are steadily receiving equipment to generate new financial flows for EuroReich. For example, almost all of the above examples from the current / last year.

                But okay, however, I will not argue, otherwise we will completely slide into horror stories, like conspiracy theorists from REN-TV.

                If it does not bother you, please explain in more detail exactly how, in your understanding, China and Russia interact. If anything, I’m not asking for the sake of a dispute, I’m just interested to know how you see the situation, and what I may not see myself.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  April 22 2021 10: 39
                  +2
                  The question is not how Russia and China interact, but that Russia is a safe Chinese rear, a potential supplier of raw materials and food even during the blockade, and a secure guarded border.

                  We still supply them with aircraft engines, build an early warning system for them, shipbuilding still has supply chains for components for them.

                  There are reserves for supplying some electricity to China.

                  The West may again think in the same way as continental Europe in 1812 and 1940 - that if this support is taken out, the opponent will surrender. This has happened two times already, and I don't think it is worth excluding the third one.
                  Perhaps all this pressure on us is now due to this.
                  1. Anzhey V.
                    Anzhey V. April 22 2021 12: 19
                    +1
                    Thank you for the clarification)

                    So everything looks logical, now I understand you.
            2. KKND
              KKND April 21 2021 23: 29
              0
              Quote: Anjay V.
              The fact is that continental Europe could really strangle us if it had such a desire - and it invests money and even protects. And this process is strangely reciprocal ...

              In fact, everything is very complicated in geopolitics. Where it is profitable and safe for Europe, she helps us for our money. But in military technology, she is in no hurry to help us. Squeakily sells metal-working machines for military companies. Matrices for thermal imagers were bought from them for 10 years and then they sold outdated ones.
              You will remember the times of the USSR. Both Americans and Europeans sold us some technologies like poultry factories, etc. However, try asking the military or high-tech to sell them. Will be sent to walking erotic even if tenfold cost is offered.
              In business, competition and collaboration are both commonplace. It is the same between countries. However, everyone wants to win and no one will concede anything.
              In short, they sell to us so that we do not learn how to do it ourselves, or if there are competitors who are ready to sell us the same thing.
              Plus there is always the possibility of war. Wars happen for a variety of reasons, but humanity has always fought, because it is simply one of the methods of natural selection along with disease, economic competition. This is inherent in nature.
              1. Anzhey V.
                Anzhey V. April 21 2021 23: 59
                +1
                But in military technology, she is in no hurry to help us. Squeakily sells metal-working machines for military companies. Matrices for thermal imagers were bought from them for 10 years and then they sold outdated ones.


                And here everything is understandable - they are not interested in the development of our arms market, and it can create unpleasant precedents. They will not be able to make money on this normally, they do not need to make competitors for themselves, and the Russian Federation, in the current conditions, perfectly plays the role of a terrible aggressor. Again, help with military technology = outright declaration of war on the United States. The EU does not want such an epic, so the confrontation between the blocs is primarily economic and political. And we are not even playing the main role here.
                1. OgnennyiKotik
                  OgnennyiKotik April 22 2021 00: 35
                  -1
                  After the victory in XB, the USA decided that they could rule the world. We tried it. Did not like. It's too hard. Somewhere at the end of the XNUMXs, they switched to the tactics of governorship. They give certain zones to the allies, but so that the allies do not strengthen too much, they create tension between them.
                  The current Russian government is clearly under the control of the Franco-Germans, doing everything that is necessary for them, Britain does not want to give up this zone, therefore it is fighting. Notice where the "opposition" oligarchs are running. By the way, Ukraine is under Britain.
                  But you need to understand that there is rivalry between France, Germany and Britain, but their common interests are the same and coincide with the United States. As the saying goes, "Pans are fighting, but the forelocks of the slaves are cracking."
  • KKND
    KKND April 21 2021 22: 03
    +1
    Here is a good analysis from an Azerbaijani about relations between the Russian Federation and China.

    Regarding the theories of what will happen in the 2030s, whether we will be knocked out as a support for China or will be at war with Europe, I would say that now the geopolitical situation is more and more unstable and I would be careful not to make any predictions. After all, who in the early 80s thought that the USSR wasn’t long left? The Americans in the 80s thought that Japan would soon capture them economically and where is Japan now. I mean that reality is not possible to understand with the human brain (this is what Bohr himself believed) because it is too complex and our brain is too small.
    Anything can happen, this is not a movie where a blind prophet predicts the future.
  • Yuri V.A
    Yuri V.A April 22 2021 04: 23
    -1
    Lehman is, of course, the head, but to say that it was the "Sea Strategy" that led to the collapse of the strategy of S.G. Gorshkov, too much. The Soviet Fleet in the 80s was at the peak of its power, which served to revise the concept of NAVY development. And, other reasons led to the degradation of the domestic fleet.
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 22 2021 10: 33
      +2
      Study the facts. The navy in the 80s was not at the peak of power, but at the peak of its numbers, and this is a completely different matter.
      1. Yuri V.A
        Yuri V.A April 22 2021 14: 01
        0
        While I study the facts, give your arguments and name the years of maximum capabilities of the Navy.
        1. timokhin-aa
          April 22 2021 15: 26
          +1
          It depends on what you mean under the possibilities. The peak in terms of influence on the situation in the world is 1973.
          Everything is described in this article.
          https://topwar.ru/180297-sergej-gorshkov-i-ego-velkij-flot.html
          1. Yuri V.A
            Yuri V.A April 23 2021 14: 54
            -2
            In 73, in the Mediterranean, there was a special case that forced, as you correctly wrote, the Americans to reconsider their attitude to the Soviet Navy, in the ocean this would not have been possible. And in 84, in the same place "Kirov" frightened the overseas fleet no less. Since the USSR was catching up in the arms race, in the 80s the fleet simply did not have enough opportunities and time to adequately respond to the American push.
  • bk0010
    bk0010 April 22 2021 21: 26
    -1
    An offensively oriented naval force could not only protect sea communications, but also encircle the Soviet state, drown the Soviet fleet and use the seas for blockade, mining and strikes deep into the heart of Soviet territory.
    No, it was necessary to bang in the 90th, now the radiation would have disappeared.
    1. timokhin-aa
      April 22 2021 23: 44
      0
      Also sometimes such thoughts visit.
      But, of course, this is not serious.

      Although there may be a question "who bangs first" will soon arise.
  • Aleksandr1971
    Aleksandr1971 April 26 2021 10: 11
    +1
    The USSR in the 70s and 80s too succumbed to US military provocations and overextended itself in military spending. And therefore he died. However, initially, by its nature, the USSR was not an effective economic model.

    Therefore, that Lehman, that some ass, but the USSR would have died anyway. It would be better if the USSR had not been born at all.