Military Review

Thirty-five years of the Chernobyl accident

Thirty-five years of the Chernobyl accident

Much has been said about the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and the fate of the city of Pripyat, and they will probably say even more. The question has long gone beyond technical issues. Moreover, in addition to general principles, the absolute majority of people do not understand anything in atomic physics, preferring to operate with clever terms like “iodine pit” or “reactivity margin”, which are often used to cover up reality, drawn from IAEA reports and Dyatlov's book. Yes, and no smart words are needed here, everything has already been said and written, both in open books and in declassified KGB documents, archival file number 992 available on the Web. It has long been a matter of politics, as part of the competition in the global technology market and the confrontation between powers in general. Soviet atomic energy has not gone anywhere. And, despite the accident, it successfully competes with American and European energy, although it is now called Russian. But the school is the same, and the people are often the same.

So a lot has been said and said, and according to the principle:

After what happened, they will lie for a long time
Will the commission tell you how difficult it is to die.

At first, back in Soviet times, they publicly lied about the staff, shielding the developers. Then, at the end of the USSR, they began to lie about the developers, because publicity. In the period of rampant democracy, they began to lie about the USSR as a whole, because, in the opinion of the lying, it was not the same system. And recently, the Americans have joined in the lies. With their own set of stamps "vodka, balalaika, bears" and these same pioneers. As a result, we have a whole set of myths about that accident, and myths that are easily refuted. But people are lazy. And watching on the screen how conscripts, drunk on vodka, shoot poor dogs - it is more interesting.

Myth # 1. The staff were unskilled.

It is the easiest to refute. The biographies of that shift and, in general, there are those present there at the time of the explosion on the network.

The main person involved is Anatoly Dyatlov, deputy chief engineer for operation of the second stage of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, senior from the administration, who was present on the night of the disaster. Graduated with honors from the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute with a degree in automation and electronics. After that, he worked in Komsomolsk-on-Amur at a local shipyard, participating in the construction of a nuclear submarine for 2 years. During this time, he participated in the installation and commissioning of 14 reactors. He came to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 40, at the time of the start of construction. If this is not an experience, then I don't even know ...

The senior of the shift is Alexander Akimov. Graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute with a degree in automation of heat and power processes, at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant since 1979, not a beginner.

The operator who pressed the fatal button is Leonid Toptunov. Graduated from the branch of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute in the city of Obninsk, the cradle of the Soviet atomic energy, with a degree in reactor design. At the Chernobyl NPP he passed pre-diploma practice and worked since 1983.

The station director is Viktor Bryukhanov. He graduated from the energy faculty of the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute, became director of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant before its construction in 1969.

You can flip and flip. But the pattern is obvious: young people with special education, as a rule, and the older generation - with practical experience or energy education. Many young people have Academician Dollezhal, one of the luminaries of our nuclear industry, as a teacher.

If these are not specialists, then I do not even know - what kind of specialists should they be?

Myth number 2. The station was built poorly

There were problems during the construction.

It is better to quote the KGB documents here:

When accepting work on Unit A (the foundation of the slab for the NPP reactor) in early April of this year. It was found that the installed reinforcement does not correspond to the design in the direction of underestimation of strength ...
The receivers of the directorate of the NPP under construction have repeatedly discovered cases of poor-quality welding of reinforcement joints ...

In April 1976, during the construction of liquid waste storage tanks, due to the fault of the foreman of the Tirskaya Right Bank Office, an emergency occurred, as a result of which the lining of the 5000 m3 tank of steel was squeezed out.

Etc. And many pages.

But when were objects of such volume and complexity built ideally?

And the fact that all this was revealed by the KGB, and therefore corrected, means only one thing: the control over the construction site was the most severe, and along several lines at once. That gave its results. Complaints about the quality of buildings were also later, but insignificant and rare.

There were also problems with the technique:

At the second stage of operation, breaks in the water-moderated communications of the reactor began to become more frequent, namely: at the junction of the zirconium shells of the “TVEL” package (fuel element) with the metal of the pipelines of these communications. Their connection (there are 1700 such joints in total) is carried out by diffusion welding. The rupture usually occurs at the junction of the end of the zirconium shell.

Which, however, were actively resolved and corrected.

Both the first and the second were inevitable. Any large construction site involves thousands of people involved, most of them are low-skilled. And there will always be shortcomings. That is why there is control: both technical, and in the case of especially dangerous objects - by the special services. In the case of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, taking into account the fact that the marriage did not lead to disasters and major accidents, control was set at a high level. The station was safe on this side.

Moreover, she was constantly improving:

Taking into account the operating experience of the first power units of the Chernobyl NPP, at the subsequent power units of the plant, the operating personnel, together with design organizations, are taking measures to ensure the reliable operation of the plant. This is evidenced by the accident rate data. So, in 1982, at 3 operating power units of the ChNPP there were 3 accidents and 16 equipment failures with an underproduction of electricity of 1843 million kWh, and for 9 months of 1984 at 4 power units there were only 10 failures with underproduction of electricity 131 million kWh.

By 1986, it was already an experienced team and well-oiled equipment.

By the way, about the accidents.

Myth number 3. Permanent accidents

There were, of course. So what?

I had an accident at home yesterday - the mixer in the bathroom began to leak. It's unpleasant, of course. I had to change, so what? At any enterprise, in any apartment, accidents happen regularly, however, the threats from them are zero. A nuclear power plant is another matter. And a pipe rupture there can cause a reactor shutdown, simply because safety, brought to paranoia, is not a coal-fired boiler house, the risk is terrible. And in order to avoid this very risk, emergency measures are taken, even if the risk is expressed in hundredths of a percent.

Major accidents were of approximately the following character:

On April 19, 1981, at 11 o'clock, the shooter of the VOKhR of the Chernobyl NPP detected seepage (in the form of drops) in the pipeline of active waters of Unit 1, which she reported to the ChNPP shift supervisor Alexander Georgievich Shadrin. Shadrin did not attach any importance to this and did not take timely measures to immediately eliminate the leak. When pumping the decontamination solution in the pipeline, the leak increased, as a result of which, approximately, up to 0,5 cubic meters. m solution. At 7 o'clock, the on-duty repair service repaired the pipeline and continued flushing of the block circuit. The ChNPP radiation safety service has defined an area of ​​up to 180 sq. m with a radiation level reaching 20 microroentgens per second at a rate of 0,8 microroentgens per second. An area of ​​up to 800 square meters was polluted under the influence of the wind. m, but the radiation on it is 0,4 microroentgens per second.

Or the maximum is as follows:

On September 9, when the reactor power rose to 20 percent,
rupture of one of 1640 technological channels loaded with fuel assemblies. At the same time, the rod on which the fuel assemblies are attached was cut off, and the graphite stack was partially moistened ... Since the zirconium cladding of the fuel, according to the statement of the director of the NPP, Comrade Bryukhanova V.P. and chief engineer comrade. Akinfieva V.P., not destroyed, no radiation contamination of the technological premises occurred.

There were also operations of emergency protection:

September 18, 1983 at 12 o'clock 25 minutes due to the activation of emergency protection No. 5, the 3rd power unit of the Chernobyl NPP was shut down. At 18 o'clock. 30 minutes. On the same day, emergency protection No. 5 was activated at the 1st power unit, which was also shut down. According to the preliminary opinion of the ChNPP specialists, the shutdown of the 3rd power unit occurred due to the failure of the feed water regulator. The emergency protection at the first power unit was triggered due to the excess pressure in the reactor space.

By the way, what about our western partners with accidents?

And everything is the same. Even a little worse.

On January 3, 1961, during the work at the reactor, the control rod was removed for unknown reasons, an uncontrolled chain reaction began, the fuel heated up to 2000 K, which led to a thermal explosion that killed 3 employees, as well as to the melting of the reactor and the release of 3 TBq of radioactive iodine.

For example, like this.

And they and we studied. And accidents in the process of creating new technology were inevitable. The question was, rather, in the following: who is not the first to have the big luck. Small accidents are routine. She was, is and will be everywhere. Because pipes corrode, crane cables are frayed, repairmen leave rags in mechanisms, and employees at the end of the shift spit on leaks. What is interesting: in our country, in the West, and in the East. People and iron - they are everywhere people and iron. And if all this does not lead to disasters, then there is nothing fatal in this.

Myth number 4. Damn experiment

Many people know that that night there was a terrible experiment: they turned off the protection, so it exploded. And if there was no experiment, everything would be fine. Well, the image of Dyatlov, painted by the Americans in black colors: they say, a careerist and a totalitarian leader who forced the staff to do anything bad. But in fact ...

And the experiment was planned. Dyatlov's word:

There is no technical connection between the accident and the Program, it is pure chance that connects them and the dishonesty of the investigators. If, in the last minutes before the start of the tests, there was an automatic triggering on some signal (you really do not believe the commissions and free writers that we blocked the protections - they were all in action for the mode at a power of 200 MW), then the accident would have happened exactly like this the same. If there was an accident because of this Program, then everything is simple - prohibit the conduct at other reactors, and there are no more problems. But this is not the case.

The experiment program really had nothing to do with ... Almost.

We checked one of the emergency protection options; for this, the time for stopping the power unit for preventive maintenance was chosen, which is logical. And Dyatlov did not put much pressure on the staff. What for? And how? Excellent specialists, they understood that they were sitting on a huge barrel of nuclear fuel, and if something went wrong ... It was stupid to threaten the dead with dismissal. And the staff were not schoolgirls: young, in-demand and toothed. Why should they have been afraid of a regular experiment on the run-out of a turbine generator? Why should they have violated the Regulations? Not morons, they understood what the threat was. And therefore they did not violate much.

Myth number 5. Explosions

And the station is serviceable. And the staff are experienced. So why did it take off?

Oddly enough - it coincided.

Two factors coincided: the abnormal regime for this reactor and the easy adventurism of the personnel, however, it was within the limits of the permissible and the instructions. The error is double. The designers did not foresee that this situation is possible in principle, and the staff believed the designers, and not their knowledge and experience. At the same time, both the first and the second were sincerely mistaken, although there have already been cases of overclocking of RBMK reactors when the emergency protection was turned on. True, without such fatal consequences.


With power reductions, especially irregular ones, the operational characteristics of both the power unit equipment and the fuel inevitably deteriorate. Sharp oscillations are especially harmful for the reactor, since the core is unstable to them and so-called "neutron field distortions" (power) can easily arise in it, that is, states when the power released in the reactor is concentrated not in all channels, but only in which something to their group. This entails local overheating of the zone elements and their possible destruction. In this regard, the main task of the persons operating such reactors is to prevent such a bias in the process of power regulation (ascent, descent). The reactor is especially unstable in the mode of operation at low, i.e., off-design power. In the same mode, it is more "inertial", therefore, for a sharp (non-scheduled) increase in power from "0" to any small level, it is necessary to raise the control rods to a much greater height than that which is required to operate at this level constantly, and then lower them somewhat: such “sharp” rises are prohibited by the regulations because the reactor can enter the so-called “uncontrolled acceleration”, fraught with a nuclear accident. In practice, such cases of violation of the regulations are not uncommon.

In principle, even on May 6, 1986, it was more or less clear what had happened.

And in the certificate of the sixth department of the KGB of the Ukrainian SSR this is stated. First, on the afternoon of April 25, the reactor began to slow down. Then, on the call of the dispatcher, they stopped. And we started working at half capacity. Then, after 23:00, deceleration was resumed, but the reactor dropped to 30 mW, instead of the 700 required for testing. We began to climb, reached 200 MW instead of 700 according to the program, which were reached by about one in the morning, and a turbine generator was prepared. And at 1:23 the experiment began.

And then:

At 01 h. 23 min. 40 sec. the press of the button of the reactor core was registered to shut down the reactor after the end of the operation. This button is used in both emergency and normal situations. CPS rods in the amount of 187 pieces went into the core and, according to all canons, were supposed to interrupt the chain reaction.

But at 01 h. 23 min. 43 sec. the appearance of alarms for excess power and a decrease in the acceleration period of the reactor (high rate of increase in power) was recorded. According to these signals, the core rods should go into the active zone, but they already go from pressing the AZ-5 button. Other alarm signs and signals appear: power increase, pressure increase in the primary circuit ...

At 01 o'clock. 23 minutes 47 seconds - an explosion that shook the entire building, and after 1–2 seconds, in my subjective sense, an even more powerful explosion. The rods of AZ stopped, not even halfway through. Everything.

The rest is physics of a high degree, which is not particularly understandable.

A number of factors simply coincided, from the shortcomings of the reactor, to its unintentional corral into emergency operation. The explosion became inevitable after the rise in power in the state of the iodine pit. But who knew?

Or guessed the risk but ignored it?

You can't ask the dead. And all the main participants in the experiment died or died, how many years have passed. Who would have confessed?

In the end, this experiment was prepared for several years, and, knowing our internal problems with reporting, the situation when we could “take risks” instead of “delay and reschedule” is quite real. And, according to memories, the staff was interested. The same Tregub stayed after the shift to look, along with his turbinist. Young science fans, there's nothing to be done. Moreover, formally - practically nothing was violated, and the belief in the reliability of technology was iron. And to some extent, a series of accidents at nuclear power plants around the world was inevitable, simply because the belief of people at the end of the 50th century in the victory of reason over nature could not have been broken in any other way. The United States was lucky, their accident on Three Mile Island led to the melt of XNUMX% of the reactor, in our country - to an explosion. Quite an interesting moment - our accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was preceded by an accident at the Leningrad nuclear power plant.

A similar case took place at the Leningrad NPP, when, within about 20 minutes, control over the reactor control was actually lost, although all control systems worked normally. There, the reaction of the operators, who nevertheless recognized the situation, was to lower the rods. The same was done at this power unit, but the 4th unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was in this state for about 40 minutes.

And they have it at the Davis-Bess NPP.

The French had their own:

At 17:40 the reactor was automatically shut down due to a sharp increase in activity. It was found that there was a partial melting of the core caused by corrosion of the structural elements of the fuel channels. 2 fuel rods have melted (a total of 20 kg of uranium).

NPP Saint-Laurent-des-Eux. Interestingly, eleven years before this accident, in 1969, at the same station:

On the night of October 17, 1969, during refueling, as a result of equipment failure and operator error, the core of a nuclear reactor partially melted. Melted 50 kg of uranium dioxide, placed in a gas-cooled uranium-graphite reactor of the UNGG type of the first unit.

And it all ended with Fukushima, which is almost worse than our accident.

We all danced on the atomic rake, the only question is in scale and luck.

Myth # 6. Wrong actions

And what are the correct actions of the personnel and firefighters should have been in conditions when nothing is clear?

Both the staff and the firefighters behaved like heroes. And they did their best. It was especially difficult to change the reactor: in the dust, in radioactive steam, they tried to cool the reactor, not yet knowing that it simply did not exist, they were looking for the missing Hodemchuk and even inspected the reactor itself.

Firefighters too:

I don't know, maybe they violated some instructions, but nothing could change that. If they had put on protective dosimetric clothing, it would not have helped them. Their regular clothes were made of rough material, boots protected from radiation, but nothing could protect them from radiation - there is no such clothes. It could only be saved by automatic fire extinguishing, which did not require the presence of people on the roof of the reactor and chemical workshops. This was not the case. There was a piping around the perimeter with branches for connecting fire hoses, which were located nearby in the boxes. Nothing can be done there without people.

We did everything we could.

The fire on the roof of the third block was extinguished. The oil (about one hundred tons) was drained by the personnel. And it could have flared up so that there would have been much more victims. By the way, they do not remember about the drains of engine oil (and there were two of them, on April 26 and April 28 from two MCPs). They remember the Chernobyl divers who did not just swim under water, but walked knee-deep in the water. And they did not save the world, but did an essentially useless job. And they did not die from radiation sickness, but lived for a long time. And the fact that there was a mass of hydrogen on the block and:

On the night of April 26, 1986 Baranov A.I. performed his duties as part of the 5th shift of the electrical shop. He managed to convert the turbine generators of the third and fourth power units from hydrogen to nitrogen, which made it possible to prevent an explosion and fire in the turbine hall.

another quiet feat somehow forgotten. Firefighters and divers were declared heroes of the highest rank, and the shift was declared fools.

Result: one killed under the rubble (Hodemchuk), one from burns and a fracture of the spine (Shashenok), 19 employees from radiation sickness and six firefighters from it. Two female guards also died from radiation sickness. How many did not die directly is unknown. The doctors worked for five, of course: from the crews of the "Ambulances" to the doctors of the MSC-126.

Another tale: they did not evacuate immediately.

How immediately?

To take out 50 thousand people is transport and time. And before the export, it is necessary to conduct radiation reconnaissance. And still find where. And also prepare everything necessary for the evacuees. And also ...

They evacuated in record time, and potassium iodide was distributed in a timely manner. Who does not believe, read how it is happening now.

For example, in the Donbass for seven years, the population of the front-line areas has not been taken out by either side. Or the chronology of evacuations from the sites of natural disasters in the modern Russian Federation: a day is a record. No irony. No one could have done better.

And the nuclear power industry remained.

I could not help but stay, because there is no alternative to her. And it won't be in the near future.
As this winter in Texas has shown, playing with renewables is certainly possible. But in terms of the number of victims, something comes out at the level of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, only in every cold winter ...

There is nothing fatal in a nuclear power plant. You just need to learn the lessons already paid for in blood and health.
Photos used:
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  1. Insurgent
    Insurgent April 22 2021 11: 06
    Thirty-five years of the Chernobyl accident

    So why is it so early? Only the 22nd, and the Chernobyl NPP banged on the 26th ...

    It would be better if they remembered Lenin ... Somehow - whether someone likes him or not, but he is our story ...

    1. rocket757
      rocket757 April 22 2021 11: 30
      Indeed, this is the birthday of a person who played a significant role in the history of our state ... to overwrite such events, forget, it is not just stupid this attempt on the common sense of an entire nation, a great state!
    2. paul3390
      paul3390 April 22 2021 11: 34
      Happy birthday, Vladimir Ilyich !! You will never be forgotten.

      1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
        Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 22 2021 14: 17
        Quote: paul3390
        You will never be forgotten.

        What kind of familiarity? Maybe you shouldn't poke? ))
  2. Bashkirkhan
    Bashkirkhan April 22 2021 11: 15
    This tragedy could have happened anywhere under the conditions of that time. For example, in 1979 in the United States at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant, about 50% of the reactor core melted, after which the power unit was never restored. And even after, as we can see from Fukushima, it still happened. As for the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, the Ukrainian contractor is to blame for the construction shoals and the low quality of the construction, and the Ministry of Energy of the Ukrainian SSR played a huge role in the personnel mess, low quality of personnel and disregard for safety, which flooded its nuclear power plants with incompetent, but national personnel. Bryukhanov came to the NPP from the Slavyanskaya GRES and at the time of his appointment he was very actively pushed up by the Ukrainian party members. Fomin came from the Zaporozhye State District Power Plant. So both at the time of appointment are national cadres and creatures of the Ukrainian party bodies and the republican Ministry of Energy. And both of them have absolutely no idea about nuclear power plants and the nuclear industry in general. They are thermal power plant engineers by training. Dyatlov was the only professional nuclear engineer of the three main culprits of the disaster who were on trial. But also not quite from the necessary sphere: he charged the reactors of nuclear submarines in our Far East. Then he transferred to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant immediately as a deputy chief engineer.
    1. Walking
      Walking April 22 2021 11: 33
      There was a series of articles here, I think it was called "Chernobyl Notebooks" or I don't remember the diary, everything was described in detail there. And the staff were not so professional.
      1. NDR-791
        NDR-791 April 22 2021 13: 28
        This is a book. Grigory Medvedev "The Chernobyl Notebook". Here is a direct link to the book.
        Read and find. From the first page there is an emphasis on an irresponsible attitude to the atom, remembering that time, I am sure that most likely it was. Irresponsibility was blooming in almost all industries.
        1. sidoroff
          sidoroff April 22 2021 13: 40
          disaster on K-431 in Chazhma Bay 10.08.85/XNUMX/XNUMX.
          1. NDR-791
            NDR-791 April 22 2021 14: 01
            This is when the wrench was forgotten under the flange of the reactor lid? I say irresponsibility
        2. 72jora72
          72jora72 April 23 2021 10: 29
          There, from the first page, the emphasis on the irresponsible attitude to the atom, remembering that time, I am sure that most likely it was. Irresponsibility was blooming in almost all industries.
          Do you have any idea about how a nuclear power plant functions? How do training and professional development take place? I pass more exams in a year than you in your entire life, starting with the first grade .......
    2. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
      Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 22 2021 14: 19
      Quote: Bashkirkhan
      This tragedy could have happened anywhere under the conditions of that time. For example 1979 in the USA

      The incident happened there and then, where and when it happened - that's all, there is no need to attract the Americans and the States here. Is it easier to think that "we are not alone"?
    3. Gardener91
      Gardener91 April 22 2021 18: 57
      Quote: Bashkirkhan
      And both of them have absolutely no idea about nuclear power plants and the nuclear industry in general. They are thermal power plant engineers by training.

      Garbage, in Ukraine now and the prime minister Shmygal from the stokers of the TPP.
  3. Vladimir_2U
    Vladimir_2U April 22 2021 11: 21
    Yes, nothing good, and against the Union, Chernobyl played no weaker than Afghanistan, as it seems to me, and against science, remember the hysterical radiophobia.
    1. apro
      apro April 22 2021 12: 19
      Quote: Vladimir_2U
      Yes, nothing good, and against the Union, Chernobyl played no weaker than Afghanistan,

      Compared to what ??? with betrayal and rebirth. Before this, both Chernobyl and Afghanistan are minor misunderstandings. With which the USSR coped with especially no straining. And a change in goal-setting ... it's like a pestilence. Everything swept away in its path.
  4. Woodman
    Woodman April 22 2021 11: 22
    The conclusion suggests itself from the article - no one is to blame, nothing terrible has happened ... Strange conclusion, strange article ...
    1. Maxim Shalak
      Maxim Shalak April 22 2021 11: 41
      It is good to reason from the point of view of afterthought.
    2. Doctor
      Doctor April 22 2021 12: 03
      The conclusion suggests itself from the article - no one is to blame, nothing terrible has happened ... Strange conclusion, strange article ...

      And the article was written just according to Dyatlov's book. He writes convincingly, but the conclusions ...
      For example:
      The experiment program really had nothing to do with ... Almost.

      Very much to do with.
      Why did you start raising power after the failure? To create the conditions for the experiment.
      It was the power drops that created the conditions for the explosion.

      Without this experiment, the reactor would have simply been shut down as planned and gone home. wink

      Well, about qualifications. Instead of a planned reduction, did they fail? But with Dyatlov, "Everything is calm in Baghdad." laughing

      From the door I saw bent over the reactor control panel, besides the operator L. Toptunov, the unit shift supervisor A. Akimov, and the trainees V. Proskuryakov and A. Kudryavtsev. I don't remember, maybe someone else. He came up and looked at the instruments. The reactor power is 50 ... 70 MW. Akimov said that during the transition from LAR to AR with side ionization chambers, a power failure of up to 30 MW occurred. Now they are increasing the power. This did not in the least excite me and did not alert me. This is by no means an out of the ordinary phenomenon. Allowed to climb further and moved away from the console.
      1. Avior
        Avior April 22 2021 12: 35
        Very much to do with.
        Why did you start raising power after the failure? To create the conditions for the experiment.
        It was the power drops that created the conditions for the explosion.

        Without this experiment, the reactor would have simply been shut down as planned and gone home.

        It couldn't even be called an experiment. Checking one of the foreseen methods of emergency shutdown of the reactor. It is carried out on all blocks.

        Why did you start raising power after the failure? To create the conditions for the experiment.

        The conditions for the experiment were very simple - with a planned shutdown of the unit with a decrease in power at a certain power, turn off the reactor and transfer the generator to its own needs.
        But the operator missed this moment - he was distracted by the adjustment of thermal imbalances.
        Therefore, I had to return to the level.
        Without this experiment, the reactor would have simply been shut down as planned and gone home.

        there would be automatic thermal imbalances in the block stop mode, the experiment would be calmly carried out and went home. Now they are betting, but then they were saving on the secondary.
        there was another option - the bonus by May 1 would not depend on the experiment, they would turn it off and go home, and the experiment was carried out at the next stop of the unit.
        There was a third option - the automatics would not allow raising the reactor power in this mode - everything would be turned off and go home. But they also saved on such a system.
        1. Doctor
          Doctor April 22 2021 13: 39
          It's like that. And yet.
          There would be no experiment, there would be no need to do this:
          Therefore, I had to return to the level.

          They would just drown out and that's it.

          And again, you yourself write:

          But the operator missed this moment - he was distracted by the adjustment of thermal imbalances.

          This is how it happens.
          Was Akimov alone there?
          Organization of work is also a minus.
          1. Avior
            Avior April 22 2021 15: 29
            There would be no experiment, there would be no need to do this:

            The experiment itself did not carry any risks. To blame him is to blame your employer for the fact that you got into an accident when you were driving to work. According to the principle - I would not go to work, I would not get into an accident.

            The key problem in my opinion is that
            1. The staff did not know what exactly is dangerous to raise the power - although the developers were aware of, this detail was not included in the instructions. Although, in general, according to the instructions, the staff were not supposed to do this, so there is no doubt about it and it is his fault.
            2. The control system of the reactor did not provide for blocking the possibility of such a dangerous situation, although the technical possibility of this undoubtedly was.
            3. In general, the level of control automation in transient modes overloaded the capabilities of the operator and other personnel. Despite the fact that those people who were sitting near the control panel at the power plant are the elite part of the plant's personnel, this is the highest paid and responsible job, they do not take the first people they meet and the responsibility there is huge, so people are prepared and selected.
      2. Anton Kirov
        Anton Kirov April 22 2021 16: 49
        Experiment is not the cause. So we can conclude that the reason was the decision to build a nuclear power plant.
  5. Glory1974
    Glory1974 April 22 2021 11: 33
    Double impression of the article. Remember about the accident, you need to learn the lessons, draw conclusions.
    But according to the author, no one is to blame for the accident, the personnel on duty are heroes, and they were undeservedly forgotten. In the west, there were the same accidents, but now, in general, all are fools, especially in the Donbass.
    I would like to ask: "Who is to blame?" Why did the academician commit suicide after the accident? And there are many more why, to which there are still no answers.
  6. vvvjak
    vvvjak April 22 2021 11: 37
    Another tale: they weren't evacuated right away

    Another fairy tale: the leadership of the USSR did nothing to warn the population and minimize the consequences in the contaminated areas. As a direct witness of those events, I can say that a lot has been done.
  7. rocket757
    rocket757 April 22 2021 11: 37
    Remember FOREVER and do not repeat this.
    1. The leader of the Redskins
      The leader of the Redskins April 22 2021 12: 25
      I've been there ... On an excursion ... The village itself is even more or less alive, but Pripyat ... There, of course, darkness and sadness. And the museum in Chernobyl (in the premises of some kind of store) is terrible in terms of its exposition: baby carriages, dolls, toys ...
  8. Glory1974
    Glory1974 April 22 2021 11: 38
    Relatives sent us a parcel from Ukraine shortly after the accident. Dad brought a DP-5 dosimeter from the service, checked the contents of the parcel, left something, and threw out the bulk, because it was phonilo. And how many such parcels and other items, goods were distributed around the country?
    Until now, the equipment is stored in hundreds of units from Chernobyl. Phonite, you cannot use it, you cannot melt it either, because the radioactivity will not go anywhere, there is no money to bury. This is how trucks, tractors, helicopters, etc. stand in the open air.
    1. Naz
      Naz April 22 2021 11: 44
      They are no longer standing, they took everything away a long time ago.
      1. Insurgent
        Insurgent April 22 2021 11: 48
        Quote: Naz
        They are no longer standing, they took everything away a long time ago.

        Well, yes, as the "nezalezhnosti" began, they began to pull everything and everyone who could and wanted.
        Both wholesale and retail. And from the parking lots of equipment and from the houses of the evacuees.

        The last documented facts that received publicity took place in 2014-15xx years with the equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the "ATO" from the "Zone" ...
        1. Bolt cutter
          Bolt cutter April 22 2021 12: 19
          how did "nezalezhnosti" begin
          The guide in 2019 said that even during the Soviet Union they pulled out all the valuable bolmen.
          Here's a morning. When there was a lack of stagnation, they began to drag non-ferrous metal - even from the cars in the amusement park, as I discovered, the electric drives were pulled out.

          1. Insurgent
            Insurgent April 22 2021 13: 17
            Quote: Bolt Cutter
            The guide in 2019 said that even during the Soviet Union they pulled out all the valuable bolmen.

            And what information could she still give about the USSR in the decommunized Outskirts?

            Only - "Everything was stolen before us"... And with the panakhs-nezalezhniki - No, no ... That vi sho ?!
            1. Bolt cutter
              Bolt cutter April 22 2021 13: 23
              No, she was a real historian of the Chernobyl Zone - her father was a guard there, and she was an illegal stalker. I knew everything and everyone (who works there, it turns out to be a narrow circle of their people). She didn't seem to be a turbosvidoma either, so she's hardly lying. I remember, I was still small (Union) - my grandfather said that from there the scarce auto parts were sold from hand.
              1. Insurgent
                Insurgent April 22 2021 13: 32
                Quote: Bolt Cutter
                No, she was a real historian of the Chernobyl Zone - her father was a guard there, and she was an illegal stalker ........... So it is unlikely that she is lying.

                And she's not lying.
                Only "does not say" that it was some of the "black stalkers" in the late Soviet Union who traded in looting in the "Zone", and on the "industrial rails", this process was already launched by officials "without complexes" of the Nezalezhnaya Outskirts ...

                You publish in the press, "dirty" with revelations, both Okrainskoy and foreign media ... You will find a lot of interesting things.

                And yet ... She needs to work ... I have to say what corresponds to the trend.
                1. Bolt cutter
                  Bolt cutter April 22 2021 13: 36
                  Household goods (furniture, motorcycles, tools) were carried in the Soviet Union. After the crash, it was carried by all who could and all that was left.
                  officials of the independent outskirts.
                  By the way, they are now running a tourist business in the Zone. And there it is expensive - 1200 pounds for two in 2 days (with a visit to the station) in 2019 was.
      2. Glory1974
        Glory1974 April 26 2021 14: 37
        They are no longer standing, they took everything away a long time ago.

        In Ukraine, they may have been taken away, but in Russia they are still standing. In Siberia, near Tomsk, and in the Urals, the city of Trekhgorny
    2. Avior
      Avior April 22 2021 12: 14
      Excursions take there
      1. Bolt cutter
        Bolt cutter April 22 2021 12: 30
        My wife and I spent the night at the Hilton Chernobyl - converted (slightly) into a hostel in Chernobyl.

        Control room of the neighboring reactor (next to it - not far - a bulkhead with an armored door to the sarcophagus). It worked during and after the accident, it was stopped in 2012.
  9. Naz
    Naz April 22 2021 11: 49
    The accident is kind of like a coincidence. Then why did Valeriy Alekseevich Legasov hang himself?
  10. Pavel57
    Pavel57 April 22 2021 11: 53
    Too many versions, which one to believe? But on May 1, no one canceled the demonstration in Kiev.
    1. Insurgent
      Insurgent April 22 2021 14: 45
      Quote: Pavel57
      But on May 1, no one canceled the demonstration in Kiev.

      Aha what ... How can one fail to recall the generous Bandera Kravchuk, who in 1970-1988 held the posts of the head of the sector, inspector, assistant secretary, first deputy head of the department, head of the agitation and propaganda department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine ...

      Was it with his personal participation, for the purpose of "ideology", people were taken out into the street on May 1 ???
      1. Avior
        Avior April 22 2021 15: 57
        It was not Kravchuk who decided there.
        ... The head of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, Valentina Shevchenko, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR, Vladimir Shcherbitsky, were at the parade with their families in full force: even with their grandchildren.

        The decision to hold a demonstration was made at the Gorbachev level
    2. Podvodnik
      Podvodnik April 25 2021 16: 33
      ... Too many versions, which one to believe?

      Each submarine has a log of accidents and breakdowns in each warhead. As an edification. Human stupidity, self-confidence and carelessness. Because of which people die, ships, equipment fails. He is also in the first division of the mechanics (BCh-5). Once I approached them and asked them to read about Chernobyl. And they have ALL nuclear accidents from all over the country in this magazine. And the information is there without nonsense and inventions. As it was, it was written. Causes, consequences, conclusions. The magazine was not given, so they told.

      In short:
      - low qualification of personnel
      - erroneous actions and misunderstanding of the processes occurring in the reactor (they also mentioned the iodine pit) led to a thermal explosion.

      Due to the instantaneous acceleration of the reactor to the maximum, the coolant boiled, the pressure exceeded the strength limits (and this is more than HUNDREDS of atmospheres for understanding) and the reactor lid was torn off. There, and the standard pressure is over a hundred. What was the excess only God knows. The safety margin was good. Let's calculate the force with which such pressure presses on one square meter. For each square. see two hundred, for example, kg. See 10000 of them. Total 2000 tons. And with this force everything flew up. EVERYTHING. Turned into debris, stones, sand, dust.

      And all this is the price paid by a person who imagines himself the king of nature.
  11. Andrey VOV
    Andrey VOV April 22 2021 12: 29
    Of course, I apologize, my knowledge in physics is limited to high school, really, thank God since the times of the USSR, but ... can't it be that the nuclear power plant just works and generates electricity, and experiments are carried out in special research centers and institutes? It's like the pilots of a passenger plane : “Let's try some aerobatics?” - the result is obvious.
    Yes, happy birthday to V. I. Lenin!
    1. Avior
      Avior April 22 2021 13: 17
      This was not an experiment, but a check to shut down the reactor in case of an accident. These are carried out on all blocks
    2. Anton Kirov
      Anton Kirov April 22 2021 16: 54
      Well, you don't know what the pilots are doing there. Plus, non-standard situations arise. And people like Dyatlov would have blown up the station without experiments.
    3. Vol4ara
      Vol4ara April 22 2021 22: 13
      Quote: Andrey VOV
      Of course, I apologize, my knowledge in physics is limited to high school, really, thank God since the times of the USSR, but ... can't it be that the nuclear power plant just works and generates electricity, and experiments are carried out in special research centers and institutes? It's like the pilots of a passenger plane : “Let's try some aerobatics?” - the result is obvious.
      Yes, happy birthday to V. I. Lenin!

      If the reactor took off in Dubna, would it be easier or what?
      1. Andrey VOV
        Andrey VOV April 22 2021 23: 42
        I believe that the reactors in Dubna or other centers are less powerful than at nuclear power plants, although I may be wrong.
  12. Yuri Tverdokhleb
    Yuri Tverdokhleb April 22 2021 12: 48
    Yes, the accident caused the strongest humanitarian, financial, material and other blow to the USSR. It is scary to think about something like this in the current ukrokolonia, although without an accident there will be disintegration into small fractions.
  13. A.TOR
    A.TOR April 22 2021 13: 22
    Who was not THERE - cannot judge what happened and how.
    THIS was a nightmare.
  14. Zaits
    Zaits April 22 2021 14: 11
    Oh, how, I have not yet met this. Although, at one time, I tried to delve into the topic quite seriously. As far as possible with my "electrophysical education".

    In fact, the article boiled down to random factors and "easy adventurism". And this is not entirely true, if not completely not.

    1. Specialists and their specialization is one of the main factors. And here the negative role of Dyatlov can hardly be overestimated or underestimated. But it's not even Dyatlov himself. Personnel policy at the end of the Soviet regime simply reached an impasse (it should be added that in recent times this impasse was only deepened, and additional branches were dug, but this is a separate topic). The question of the appearance of "a person out of place" was only a matter of time.
    And fate was such that it was Dyatlov who turned out to be the very "man in the wrong place." It's hard for me to say how good he was. But the fact that he specialized in reactors of a completely different class is a fact. And a specialist in the era of scientific and technological revolution is not even according to Prutkov. It is more appropriate to compare it with growing a third hand in the right place. Not to mention the fact that the natural must grow from where it is needed.
    Just for example. Try to give a high-quality analogue-low-current source to torment the power circuit for several tens of kW (if you find one, the beast is now rare). I am not even talking about hundreds of kilowatts and megawatts, this is already quite scary. Until he becomes a "silovik", nothing good should be expected from him.

    2. The unsuccessful design of the control rods was initially known, even during the design of the reactor. The models of the behavior of the reactor within the technological tolerances of the parameters during operation were calculated for them. Both the developers and the operators were aware of the unpleasant specifics of these models. But a reactor is a complicated thing, and it was simply impossible to calculate models for all occasions, for all possible modes. And the dynamic calculation then was not at all fast.
    Thus, the operating modes outside the model for this type of reactor with the same unsuccessful design of the control rods were not only dangerous, they also tended to accelerate uncontrolled acceleration precisely because of the unsuccessful design of the control rods. And not a single specialist who understands the essence of this problem would get into such modes.
    It should be added that the developers tried to avoid this problem as best they could. But the fact is that such rods at the "Chernobyl-type reactors" after the accident began to be replaced with other, safer ones.

    4. Even a very qualified specialist will not say 100% how dangerous an experiment is carried out strictly in accordance with the regulations. But it will indicate the risks. Apparently, the main risks are just violation of the rules. Which is exactly what happened.

    The unfortunate result of the combination of two main factors was only a matter of time. Not one experiment, but another. A significant drawback of the reactor and properly unprepared personnel (regardless of personal qualities) could not help but meet each other.

    There can be no talk of any random factors and "easy adventurism".
    1. Falcon5555
      Falcon5555 April 22 2021 23: 43
      Both developers and operators were aware of the unpleasant specifics of these models.
      The operators were not aware of the mass of messages. Including Dyatlov. And in general - the "unpleasant specifics" are good, eh! For example, would you drive a car that, when you press the brake pedal - anyway, "planned" (in front of a traffic light) or emergency (a pedestrian ran out or a concrete mixer drove across the road) - first accelerates, and then can also explode? Yes, so that half of Europe is crap? laughing
      1. Zaits
        Zaits April 23 2021 16: 49
        If my memory serves me (I can't remember the source anymore), the characteristics of the CPS were in the operational documentation. Yes, and could not be. And the staff could not help but get acquainted with them. But what has not been memorized is already the merit of the system of training specialists. As well as the fact that they simply did not understand what they were dealing with. Well, unless they guessed about something, tk. after a gross violation of the regulations, they began to wait for the calculations of the current parameters of the reactor on the subject of "what to do next." But they simply could not combine their guesses with the characteristics of the control system.

        Well, as far as the control rods are concerned, yes. Here I completely agree with you. It doesn't fit well in my head. And the associations are similar.

        Why the developers made such a decision is still a mystery to me. Although, there are many similar solutions in technology (for example, "rubber" for Formula-1 is very dangerous without warming up, but there the pilots are more than aware, and the technical staff, and the organizers of the races). But in the case of a nuclear reactor, such a decision looks like a crime. Because this is a consequence of a complete loss of common sense and an outright disregard for security issues on the part of developers. After all, they could do it normally after the cancer whistled on the mountain.
  15. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
    Paragraph Epitafievich Y. April 22 2021 14: 34
    The experiment program really had nothing to do with ...

    <nothing to do with>, Ivanov. am
  16. dgonni
    dgonni April 22 2021 15: 38
    Well, the accident in fact knocked down the union, contributing to its collapse.
    The fact that they did not immediately report the accident and did not close the free movement. It was also stupid.
    Regular transport, however, as well as industrial and collective farm transport, transported all this radioactive dirt to the nearest cities. Both in Ukraine and in Belarus and Russia.
    Somewhere from May 2, posts began to appear en masse to decontaminate vehicles at the entrance to cities and towns.
    Some of the buses of the Kiev convoys that carried out the evacuation of Pripyat could not be washed and they settled as transport in the zone.
    About the burial ground and theft from the zone!
    All passenger vehicles were buried in a specially dug pit. They were previously suppressed by engineering vehicles.
    Nothing was taken there. Yes, and you could not grab sourly.
    From 86 onwards, patrol police units walked around the apartments, and all the most valuable and running things were simply thrown out of the windows.
    Like TVs, tape recorders and fashionable furniture.
    At the burial ground of heavy equipment, in fact, no one filmed anything for 20 years.
    Then a special enterprise was organized. Cut to metal from barges to helicopter aircraft engines.
    In the villages and villages of the zone, the equipment partially went beyond the perimeter.
    It is clear that it was released after testing for the level of radiation.
    In fact, the equipment was ownerless and the cooperatives and fresh farmers picked up the equipment for a healthy life.
    It was only necessary to know where the level of the dropped out radiation is not high or even zero.
    It did not fall there all over
  17. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov April 22 2021 16: 31
    A number of factors simply coincided, from the shortcomings of the reactor, to its unintentional corral into emergency operation. The explosion became inevitable after the rise in power in the state of the iodine pit. But who knew?
    Or guessed the risk but ignored it?

    1. I did not beat unintentions, but intentions to drive the reactor into emergency mode.
    2. The staff knew very well where the reactor was being driven.
    3. This regime and its dangers were well known to the personnel.
    4. Perestroika was going on and ships were sinking, gas pipelines were blown up, and Tsesna landed on Red Square. They destroyed the system as best they could.
    5. After the victory of "democracy", all the guilty were released from prison. True, they were not given an order for the fight against communism, but in vain.
    1. Pamir
      Pamir April 22 2021 23: 27
      Well, you give Kostadinov, everything is mixed in a heap, and cesna, and democracies, and regimes with perestroika, orders of socialism with prisons, all in one reactor of disaster. However, you are a greater progandist than a power engineer.
      The question is, what does nuclear power have to do with them?
      And what would you mix "Fukushima" with?
      Do you really think that Russians are suicides and are not capable of anything in nuclear power? In your opinion, the Chernobyl disaster should be made dependent on political regimes?
      Even for your information, the Ukrainians haven’t come up with this yet.
  18. Anton Kirov
    Anton Kirov April 22 2021 16: 44
    "Coincidence", "Light Adventurism of the Staff" !!! Did Navalny write this article? Almost all the graphite rods were removed there. Several instructions were violated at the same time. But everyone was educated and knew perfectly well what they were doing.
    Yes, the station's design was flawed. Yes, a lot of people were killed, out of stupidity. But the reason for the disaster is gross disregard of instructions.
    Why show any kind of humanism? Dyatlov is a criminal. He had to be placed against the wall. And the chief (for "these are not my duties"). And subordinates, because they were silent about the inadequate boss. The shootings would begin, other cases would immediately surface. But we started to fight against the legacy of the USSR. Here's to you - it turned out that Chernobyl is a trifle compared to the rest.
    1. Falcon5555
      Falcon5555 April 22 2021 23: 33
      There are no "graphite rods" there, and they did not break anything.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. Anton Kirov
        Anton Kirov 3 May 2021 15: 19
        For some reason, it seems that your opinion that "they did not violate anything" is taken from an interview with Dyatlov. But he claims that there were no violations that led to the ACCIDENT. Draw your own conclusions!
      3. Anton Kirov
        Anton Kirov 3 May 2021 19: 25
        1. The decision to start the reactor
        2. Decision to leave less than 26 rods
        3. Decision to leave less than 15 rods
        Excuses like: no one knew, it was impossible to imagine, it was not clearly indicated in the regulations, all this does not remove the guilt from Dyatlov. After all, the result could be damage to the reactor or some equipment. If everything is strictly according to the regulations, then why are there engineers? Looking at his interviews, you can clearly see that he is transferring the blame to the producers. In the series Chernoble, Dyatlov was portrayed as an openly narrow-minded person. He is the same in interviews!
        After death, it is not customary to criticize, but it's true.
        1. Falcon5555
          Falcon5555 3 May 2021 22: 53
          Haven't seen the interview. About "how many rods left" has already been said. Dyatlov has a book, quite angry, but he had a reason for it - it is available on the Internet. Here is a quote: "The cores of the RBMK reactors were formed according to the calculations of NIKIET. They were not indicated in the design materials. They knew that in this form it was uncontrollable, and yet they did it."
          1. Anton Kirov
            Anton Kirov 4 May 2021 00: 28
            I would not trust Dyatlov at all. He blew up the nuclear power plant! Another point is that he and his colleagues are protecting him. But I work with people, some of whom say "I'm sorry, but I won't do this. I think it's dangerous", and others - "Now, we'll do everything quickly. Yes, everything will be fine!" Dyatlov had to ask questions: Was such a launch safe? How necessary was it? Could it be done later? For this, he was educated, endowed with power, privileges and, correspondingly, a salary! And he was given the term quite deservedly
            1. Falcon5555
              Falcon5555 4 May 2021 13: 15
              I would not trust it either, but everything that he writes about the reactor, as far as I know, is confirmed from other sources. He himself in his book, if you have not looked into it, before this quote he quotes a document from NIKIET: "... he is uncontrollable ...". And many other documents. As far as I know, no accusations were brought against him that he invented all these documents. His personal term is a difficult question. He probably has some kind of historical responsibility. He hadn't foreseen much.
              1. Anton Kirov
                Anton Kirov 4 May 2021 16: 16
                People (who know what the control rods are made of) claim that the root cause of the disaster is that the reactor was driven into an extremely unstable state. And even if there were no "end effect", the accident would not have been avoided. In this state, the reactor was introduced for a long time and stubbornly, listening and looking into Dyatlov's mouth. They said about Dyatlov that no one knows the reactor better than him! He possessed both power and authority. And he knew perfectly well what he was doing! His colleagues criticize the verdict for the term "Explosive production" that has appeared. I argue that the least educated engineer should be aware of what kind of energy the reactor carries. Have they not heard about the atomic bomb? I do not know how his sentence sounded, but I would have soldered a term for violating the regulations regarding the minimum-minimum number of rods. And for the decision to start the reactor, no matter what, I would put it up against the wall. I am not exaggerating. I think this is a fair sentence.
                This story is reminiscent of the instruction for Americans not to wash their pets in the washer. Dyatlov blames the manufacturer for the absence of such an instruction
                1. Falcon5555
                  Falcon5555 4 May 2021 16: 47
                  And even if there were no "end effect", the accident would not have been avoided.
                  I think it would be possible. But the very possibility of such an "unstable state" is also a defect, in my opinion, and not only in my opinion, and one of the reasons.
  19. orcinus
    orcinus April 22 2021 18: 14
    I have a number of questions to the author (no mockery): 1. What university and in what specialty did he graduate, work experience ?; 2.why Bryukhanov was not on the test (if it was so interesting that people stayed even after their shift) and why, when the call about the accident came, he got out and at the bus stop got on a service bus that was going to the station, if before in the evening he came home in his car (work hard, find his testimony)? 3. "There were accidents at foreign nuclear power plants" - yes, there were, but not of this magnitude, it is blasphemous to compare !; 4. There was a rush in the construction of the third stage, including the organization of the experiment, since Bryukhanov was "promised" a hero of socialist labor - what do you say to that ?; 5. In continuation of the previous question: why the whole next day was continued, and not banned, work on the third stage, where people also grabbed a dose, who, in your opinion, is responsible for this ?; 6. Which of the employees, at what time and by whose order, was the first to conduct dosimetric reconnaissance around block 4 with real numbers? (also tell us why you could not get real numbers at the very beginning - in the period from 2 to 9 in the morning); Py sy: it's good to write that "many factors just coincided" - I have traveled to / to Ukraine through the zone several times - hair stands on end even nowadays from what I saw, and specific people are guilty of this! You can kick the Americans as much as you like for their movies with balalaikas and bears, the reactor was not mine, but ours! You don't have to go far for an example: we have a major overhaul in our house, they changed pipes in the basement in the next doorway, connected "in the words of the foreman - not under that pressure ..." within a radius of 50 meters from the house, they are looking for a breakthrough, the yard looks like a company stronghold. People with the same mentality worked at the Chernobyl NPP - this is purely my personal opinion!
  20. Desperado
    Desperado April 22 2021 19: 16
    The entire accident from and to it is a "human factor":

    1. Carrying out an experiment "at any cost", despite the change in the state of the reactor;
    2. Decommissioning of serviceable technological protections, which would simply shut down the reactor even before it entered a dangerous mode;
    3. Silence of the scale of the accident in the first days by the leadership of the ChNPP.

    We just read the report to the IAEA, clause 4, CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NPP ...

    "... The main motive of staff behavior there was a desire finish tests faster. Violation of the established procedure in the preparation and conduct of tests, violation of the test program itself, negligence in controlling the reactor plant indicate
    insufficient understanding by personnel of the peculiarities of technological processes in a nuclear reactor and the loss of their sense of danger

    The developers of the reactor facility did not envisage the creation of protective safety systems capable of preventing an accident in the event of a set of deliberate shutdowns of technical protection equipment and violations of the operating procedure, since they considered such a combination of events to be impossible.

    Thus, the primary cause of the accident was an extremely unlikely combination of violations of the order and operation mode committed by the power unit personnel.

    The accident acquired catastrophic dimensions due to the fact that the reactor was brought by the personnel to such irregular condition, in which the influence of the positive coefficient of reactivity on the growth of power has significantly increased. "
    1. Falcon5555
      Falcon5555 April 23 2021 10: 57
      This report was compiled on the basis of the lies of the Soviet delegation in 1986. "After the collapse of communism, new information became available, according to which the IAEA report of 1992 was compiled:" SAFETY SERIES INSAG-7 The Chernobyl Accident: Updating of INSAG-1 "There, this lie is very detailed Although the term "lies" is not there, but it is understandable - this is an international organization. Unlike our Mead, they have political correctness. For example (in a free retelling): "It is reprehensible that this shortcoming was known so long ago and was not eliminated. The presentation in INSAG-1 would have been different if this feature had been made public in 1986. "Etc., etc.
      1. Desperado
        Desperado April 23 2021 15: 11
        INSAG-7 is an addendum to the INSAG-1 Keynote Address.
        Reading ... "(7) In this report, INSAG does not cancel the INSAG-1 report, nor does it change the conclusions of that report, except as clearly indicated here. Although INSAG's views on the factors contributing to the accident have changed, many other INSAG conclusions -1 remained unchanged. "
        So there is no "lies" there, there are only clarifications.
        1. Falcon5555
          Falcon5555 April 23 2021 16: 30
          So the whole report is about the lies of the Soviet representatives in the previous one and its reassessment. laughing I do not know why they inserted this phrase in point 7 of the conclusions. I do not have access to the original of the first report - it is not visible on the Internet. Perhaps because they did not want to provoke a scandal (or this is a bureaucratic thing - either you cancel the previous report or not, and you need to indicate this), despite the fact that all six previous paragraphs of these conclusions ("which are clearly indicated here" laughing ), as well as the content of the main part, just lead the reader to the idea that the previous report was, in the main, incorrect.
          1. Falcon5555
            Falcon5555 April 23 2021 17: 13
            PS: On the site there is some kind of brochure with some report published for some reason in 1988, from which it is not possible to copy-paste, but it seems like this report, but in the conclusions there are only general words : like final conclusions cannot be drawn, but we are for a culture of safety and for all the good and against all the bad.
      2. Zaits
        Zaits April 23 2021 17: 00
        Duc, developers and other involved got out as best they could.
        But this does not at all deny gross violations of the regulations by the staff.
        1. Falcon5555
          Falcon5555 April 23 2021 17: 27
          Speaking about INSAG-7, he discusses and refutes a lot of alleged violations of the regulations. Maybe he refutes everything, but I did not count them.
          1. Zaits
            Zaits April 23 2021 19: 16
            Taki gave the INSAG-7 a fresh look. I expressed myself not quite correctly. And about the characteristics of the ACS, there was previously inaccuracy (information on the specific effect during the emergency operation of the ACS was not in the operational documentation, but in a separate information letter). It's been a long time since I returned to this topic.

            So, INSAG-7 does not recognize a violation of long-term operation at reduced power, because. there was no direct prohibition. That is, formally it was not a violation of the regulations, but a violation of the power reduction schedule, which was necessary for the experiment, it was. At the same time, the personnel realized that the reactor could be in an abnormal state due to xenon poisoning. And, apparently, although work at reduced capacities was not formally prohibited, this was a significant deviation from the accepted practice (as far as I understand, such a formal ban should have been made, they simply did not attend to). And this was the first major step towards the abyss.

            And INSAG-7 believes that the staff had no right to change the experiment plan and start it after an unplanned power failure. This was already a step into the abyss.

            Purely theoretically, they could still catch their cowards on the hook and not fall into this abyss, if they knew / understood the very specific effect due to the rods during the emergency operation of the SUV. And it is far from the fact that they did not know. In any case, judging by the chronology of events, this would hardly have stopped them. Unless the scale of the accident could have been different (as with safer rods), and that is not a fact. So such a scale is more likely on the conscience of the developers.

            Well, other little things are no longer so essential. Although, some of these little things are even recognized as a violation of the rules.
            1. Falcon5555
              Falcon5555 April 23 2021 19: 55
              If you knew / understood that very specific effect
              - you would quit. sad
  21. lelik613
    lelik613 April 22 2021 19: 32
    These Samodelkin brothers in their pursuit of the Darwin Prize are not at all original. Applicants are found monthly. If in the kitchen where the gas is open to highlight with a match for better visibility, an interesting "experiment" will take place. And no one will plead guilty, if he survives, of course. Where I live, a cloud with the berries of this "experiment" was laid down. And also, in the common interest. I would prefer this character to land a cloud in his apartment, dacha or in Foros. And the rest of the curious too.
    1. Podvodnik
      Podvodnik April 25 2021 16: 47
      highlight with a match for better visibility

      There was a story on TV. The woman decided to check the presence of gas in the country bottle (small, portable). I opened the valve (there was no reducer) and brought the MATCH !!!
      The apartment was burnt out. The Darwin Prize nominee survived.

      Apparently, her relatives were on the shift at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
  22. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov April 23 2021 16: 43
    Quote: Pamir
    Well, you give Kostadinov, everything is mixed in a heap, and cesna, and democracies, and regimes with perestroika, orders of socialism with prisons, all in one reactor of disaster. However, you are a greater progandist than a power engineer.
    The question is, what does nuclear power have to do with them?
    And what would you mix "Fukushima" with?
    Do you really think that Russians are suicides and are not capable of anything in nuclear power? In your opinion, the Chernobyl disaster should be made dependent on political regimes?
    Even for your information, the Ukrainians haven’t come up with this yet.

    1. Where is mixing here - there is only a logical order. It was necessary to destroy socialism and the USSR and began - a ship sank with hundreds of victims, blowing up hundreds of victims on the gas pipeline, then blowing up the reactor in violation of the instructions for exploitation and driving it into a dangerous regime. The country will endure the hardest killing in material and moral terms. Matthias Rust sits down on Red Square and this is the reason for sending the military command to retire. Everything here is logical and consistent.
    2. The USSR beat the leader in nuclear (atomic) energy and the Chernobil accident is an important part of the conscious action of its internal enemies to destroy the state. This is my view on the basis of known and confirmed facts.
    1. Pamir
      Pamir April 23 2021 22: 50
      No, not convinced. Man-made disasters do not depend on political regimes and certainly one hundred percent, political structures of states do not collapse from them. In addition, again, an attempt to mix the unmixed. Ask about the most sacrificial man-made disasters in the world, the lion's share of them was not on the territory of the USSR-RF, and not through his fault.
  23. RoTTor
    RoTTor April 27 2021 23: 52

    April 16, 19:38 •
    Vile "Dancing on the Bones" of the Chernobyl Accident Consequences
    A little sneaky, cynical, expensive for the citizens of Ukraine, especially for the liquidators, who had their pension benefits removed.

    1986 - 2021
  24. RoTTor
    RoTTor April 28 2021 12: 46
    Glory, respect and eternal memory to all military aviators - liquidators of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident, who were commanded and himself flew to the reactor by Major General of Aviation ANTOSHKIN, who was awarded the highest title of HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION for this!
    Good memory to NIKOLAI VASILIEVICH SHEVKUN, our commander of the course at KVIAVA Air Force,
    in 1986 - the chief metrologist of the 17th VA,
    who was among the first to be in Chernobyl for his military work there, awarded the Peace Sign of HONOR, which escaped the consequences of work at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.
    It must be understood that only the USSR and only the SOVIET PEOPLE could carry out the elimination of the consequences of the Chernobyl accident.
    God forbid something like that today at any of the Ukrainian nuclear power plants, on the railways when transporting dangerous goods ...
    Explosions at Ukrainian artillery warehouses showed everything - from the inability of the authorities to the desecration of people
  25. Gust
    Gust April 29 2021 12: 12
    The entire Chernobyl disaster is a monstrous chain of random factors, none of which individually led to fatal consequences. The fault of the reactor developers is no less than the fault of the personnel. They knew about the problem with the rods and other design flaws, but did nothing all the years before the disaster (they covered their backs) .. After all, there were incidents with the destruction of the outlet pipe flanges (!!!) for these reasons on the RBMK! Why no one asks the experts who developed the experiment program ?? They should have foreseen all non-staffs in the first place, and not at all Dyatlov. How can the staff be blamed for what the reactor designers lacked understanding? And ensuring the safety of the station - the calculation of ORM with terrible lags - is it like ?! The personnel are to blame for the accident no more than the pilot of the aircraft - in the breakage of the engine compressor blades, the bus driver - in the broken tire, etc.
    1. Pamir
      Pamir April 29 2021 22: 23
      I gave you Rafale, which is probably why, since the 90s, RBMK design reactors have not been installed at nuclear power plants, only VVER. Although there are still stations with operating RBMK Kurskaya, Leningradskaya, Smolenskaya, they will probably finalize their own, and will continue to build with VVER, Leningradskaya and Kurskaya have already been commissioned with new sites with VVERs. All NPPs with VVERs under construction by Rosatom are abroad.
      The RBMK apparently has a faulty design, and at the same time, it is necessary to understand that the USSR was a planetary pioneer in the development of the peaceful atom, and this is where the flaws lie, with a terrible result at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant.