Artillery of Napoleon's Grand Army: Artillery Combat Tactics
French foot artillery 1810-1812 Painting by Alexander Averyanov.
Number 1 has already cleared the barrel of the cannon with a wet bath. 2nd number loads the cannon; in Napoleonic times, there was no need to fill the gunpowder with a shuffle - cartouz charges were already ubiquitous. The 1st number is already ready to send a charge into the barrel with a punch. Number 4, meanwhile, plugs the etching hole with a gloved finger; As soon as the charge is in the barrel of the cannon, the 4th number will remove his finger and insert a dressing agent into the hole, which will later pierce the cap. Meanwhile, the 4th number is aiming the gun vertically, giving commands to the correct aiming horizontally. The 5th and 6th numbers of the handshpigs control the cannon at the carriage; The 7th and 8th numbers control the bed using rules. At the command "fire", the 3rd number brings a fighter with a wick to the seed.
As a matter of fact, there were no rules for the use of artillery on the battlefield. Everything depended on the personal tastes of the commander of an infantry or cavalry general and on whether he appreciated the importance of artillery fire or considered artillery an unnecessary burden on the march of his detachments. Nevertheless, most commanders wanted to have artillery at their disposal, especially if it was horse artillery. There were also those who themselves tried to command artillery fire. But in most cases, you still had to rely on the experience of the lower ranks of artillery, who were given complete freedom of action. And since artillerymen in the rank of colonel or general did not have to command troops on the battlefield, at the same time this state of affairs gave an excellent opportunity to distinguish themselves for junior officers - captains and commanders of battalions or squadrons.
But the artillery was highly respected by the infantry. Already at the very beginning of revolutionary wars, it became obvious that the infantry fought better, and their courage and resilience only increased when they knew that their own guns were standing next to them. To smash these guns or kill the gunners often meant panic among the infantry mass. The soldiers then felt defenseless without artillery fire support.
During revolutionary wars, light 4-pounder guns followed the infantry and were distributed several barrels to a regiment and then to a semi-brigade. Such cannons, in particular, supported the French infantry in the Battle of the Pyramids, when their squares deflected attacks from the Mamelukes. Napoleon Bonaparte ordered the cannons to be placed in the corners of the square, thus achieving an excellent effect.
Nevertheless, Napoleon abandoned this system and tried to combine artillery into larger formations - several companies each. During the war with Austria in 1809, he noticed that the infantry, recruited from poorly trained peasant recruits, showed little or no mental toughness on the battlefield. Therefore, after completing the campaign, he ordered to give each infantry regiment two 6-pounders. Sometimes the regiments were given four guns of different calibers. This strengthened the mental toughness of the infantry with a good effect in the last Napoleonic campaigns.
At the same time, in 1810, artillery was divided into line artillery, which was distributed among regiments and divisions, and reserve, which remained at the disposal of the corps commanders or even the emperor himself. This reserve artillery, consisting of 12-pounder guns, was combined into "large batteries." The guards artillery remained a "guards reserve", that is, it was brought into battle only when absolutely necessary, when the fate of the battle was being decided, and the line troops could not achieve success on their own.
The artillery was assigned various tasks - the destruction of enemy manpower (infantry and cavalry), the destruction of guns, field and permanent fortifications, the setting fire to buildings inside the city walls and the spread of panic in the rear of the enemy army. The variety of tasks predetermined the use of different types of guns (cannons, howitzers and mortars), their calibers, ammunition and shooting principles. Artillery officers, as a rule, had a solid technical education and considerable combat experience. When choosing positions for their guns, they were guided by the terrain, since this factor could significantly affect the outcome of the battle. The best terrain was considered to be flat with solid ground, preferably with a slight slope towards the enemy.
Types of artillery fire
The main type of artillery fire was flat, used precisely in flat terrain with hard ground, which guaranteed the ricocheting of the nuclei. A cannon ball fired from a 6-pounder cannon flew approximately 400 meters, where it first touched the ground. Due to its flat flight path, it ricocheted and flew for the next 400 meters. There it touched the ground for the second time and, if the ground was still flat and hard enough, the ricocheting could be repeated, but already at a distance of no more than 100 meters, after which the core rolled along the ground, gradually losing its inertia. All the time from the moment the shot was fired, the core flew at a height not exceeding two meters, sweeping away all living things in its path: be it on foot or on horseback. If a cannonball hit a column of infantrymen (and soldiers on the battlefield spent long hours in such columns), it was capable of killing two or three people standing behind each other. There are cases when one nucleus killed and maimed (mainly breaking legs) up to 20, or even up to 30 people.
The shot "through the metal" looked different. It was carried out at a greater elevation angle and at a greater distance than with a flat fire. Before the first contact with the ground, the core flew about 700 meters, after which it ricocheted about 300 meters and there, as a rule, crashed into the ground. In this case, the flight path was higher than that of a flat fire. And it could happen that the cannonballs flew over the heads of the enemy soldiers. Fire "through the metal" was used mainly to engage targets at a distance of up to 1000 meters or on rough terrain.
To hit hidden targets, for example, behind walls, earthen ramparts or a forest, hinged fire was used, which required firing at a high elevation angle. At the same time, the nucleus flew along a steep trajectory and, falling to the ground, did not ricochet. For mounted fire, howitzers and mortars were used.
The shooting was done with cast iron cannonballs. They did not break, as is usually shown in Hollywood film production, but nevertheless, their action was terrible. Their kinetic energy was so high that the nuclei, even of small calibers, were able to pierce through a person or a horse. In the Museum of the Battle of Waterloo, I saw two halves of a cuirass, or rather what was left of it after a cannonball had pierced it through; I prefer not to think what was left of the cavalryman who wore it ... In many areas where battles took place, you can still see cast-iron cannonballs firmly stuck in the brick walls of fortresses, churches or residential buildings. Cracks caused by impact can often be seen.
A variety of nuclei were the so-called brandkugels for setting fire to flammable objects in besieged cities or enemy carts. Most of the artillery batteries were equipped with transportable artillery furnaces or simply cast iron baskets to heat the cannonballs. When the kernels were heated to the required temperature, they were pulled out of the fire with tongs and placed in the barrel of the gun. The shot came from the ignition of gunpowder in contact with a red-hot cannonball. There is evidence that such a brandkugel could be immersed in water several times, and nevertheless they retained their flammable properties.
Brandkugels were especially dangerous if they got stuck in the wooden roofs of churches, palaces or tall residential buildings. The besieged always had sentinels, whose duties were to observe where the brandkugels fell, and to throw them on the ground, where they could be covered with sand or overlaid with wet rags.
For firing at the cavalry, special shells were used in the form of two cores or two halves of the core connected by a chain. Such shells, rolling on flat, hard ground, broke the legs of horses; naturally, they were also dangerous for the infantry.
Buckshot was used to fire at enemy manpower at a distance of 300–500 meters. These were cardboard boxes (which gave the name to this type of ammunition) filled with lead balls or pieces of metal. The space between the metal was filled with gunpowder. When fired, buckshot flew to a height of several meters and exploded there, showering the infantry with its filling. Buckshot, as a rule, did not kill soldiers on the spot, but inflicted severe wounds. In European museums, you can see many cuirasses of that time with numerous dents and scratches left by buckshot.
In 1784, the English lieutenant Henry Shrapnel (1761-1842) perfected buckshot. The new type of projectile received the name shrapnel from his surname. The essence of his invention is that the buckshot was placed in a tin box, equipped with a remote tube. Shrapnel first used its shells in 1804 during the battles in Dutch Guiana. In Europe, the British used shrapnel only in 1810 in the battles of Busaca in Spain and five years later at Waterloo. Already in 1808, Napoleon was offered to adopt this new type of shells for the French artillery, but the emperor rejected the proposals "as unnecessary."
Another English invention was the so-called Congreve rockets, named after William Congreve (1772–1828). These rather primitive rockets were a kind of Bengal lights. The British used them for the first time in naval battles in 1806 at Boulogne and in 1807 at Copenhagen, where they burned the Danish fleet. In the British Army, two rocket companies were formed as early as 1805. But they appeared on the battlefield only towards the end of the Napoleonic wars: in 1813 near Leipzig, in 1814 in southern France and in 1815 near Waterloo. A French officer by the name of Bellair, who witnessed the use of Congriva missiles by the British during the siege of the fortress of Seringapatam, persistently suggested that Napoleon adopt this invention into the arsenal of the French army. Napoleon this time refused to innovate, although experiments with rockets were nevertheless carried out in 1810 in Vincennes, Seville, Toulouse and Hamburg.
Service
Service in the artillery was both difficult and dangerous. First of all, she demanded tremendous physical strength, moreover, in all weapon maneuvers. The guns were very heavy, some barrels could weigh one and a half tons, and the mass of carriages reached two tons. Small guns had to harness 4 horses, and large ones - 8, or even 10 horses. On the battlefield, horses often died from cannonballs or explosions from buckshot or grenades. It was not always possible to replace them with horses harnessed from charging boxes or carts. In those days, when the roads were unpaved, even the march of artillery was a significant problem, especially in the spring or autumn. The campaign of 1806–1807 entered the legend of the Great Army. in Poland, where guns and wagons were drowning in mud along the axes. Driving off the road to firing positions, especially on muddy soil, the artillerymen had to exert all their strength, or even call for help from the infantrymen passing by in order to deploy their guns.
According to Napoleon, the guns of the European armies were too heavy for the conditions of mobile warfare. The only exception were the light 3-pounder cannons of horse artillery, which are recognized by most commanders. But there were also some commanders who did not want these guns, because the results of their fire did not meet expectations, and the roar of these guns - as they argued - was too weak and did not instill fear in the enemy soldiers.
But French guns were no exception in European practice. They did not allow counting on fast service. Particularly difficult was the maneuver of connecting the gun carriage frame to the front end, into which the horses were harnessed. The very life of the gunners could depend on this connection - it was required to complete it in the shortest possible time, especially if they were under fire, and it was necessary to leave a vulnerable position.
If it was necessary to move the guns several tens or hundreds of meters in flat terrain, the guns were not connected to the front ends, but the so-called prolongations were used, that is, ropes 20 meters long, which were folded in half or even fourfold and wound on the axis of the guns. Some of the gunners pulled the prolongations, while the rest raised the carriage frame and pushed the gun forward. And in this way, requiring tremendous physical effort, the gun rolled to a new position.
The repair of the wheels caused many problems. In theory, the wheels of the implements were made from wood that had been aged for 30 years. But by 1808, the supply of such wood in France had dried up. And I had to use the wood of the inferior quality. As a result, the wheels of the guns broke on the march, and the artillery blacksmiths constantly had to repair them with pieces of wood or metal. If they did not have time to do this during the retreat, the guns had to be left to the enemy.
Service in the artillery required not only physical strength, but also mental fortitude. The opponents of the French, the Austrians and Prussians, the Russians and the British, knowing the danger the French batteries posed to them, tried to suppress them at the very beginning of the battle. As soon as the French batteries fell within the reach of enemy fire, they immediately began shelling them with cast iron cannonballs, which could break the gun carriages or their wheels and throw guns off the gun carriages. Many gunners perished under such fire.
A very large proportion of artillery soldiers and officers - not only in Napoleon's army, but also in all armies of his day - were people literally chopped up by these murderous balls, ranging in size from a large apple to a basketball. Relatively lucky ones got off with leg fractures, which often had to be amputated. Amputations meant the end of a military career and an unenviable life for a disabled person in civilian life, at best, a rear service.
The gunners in the heat of battle could not pay attention to the cannonballs flying by. But it was much worse for the sleds, ready at any moment to harness the guns and roll them to a new position. According to the charter, they were supposed to sit with their backs to the battlefield. So they only heard the whistle of the cannonballs. And each of them, it would seem, flew exactly to the place where the riders kept their horses.
The front end housed boxes with charges, but this was a small supply, sufficient for several minutes of intense fire. To avoid interruptions with ammunition, there were charging boxes with the batteries at the rate of at least two for each gun. They posed an additional danger to the calculations of the guns, because it was enough to hit one firebrand or one grenade in a box filled with gunpowder, and the whole battery was blown up into the air. This happened especially often during sieges of cities, when the batteries occupied permanent firing positions, and the besieged could eventually target them.
Since in those days guns could only conduct aimed fire at short distances, and the guns of the Griboval system, moreover, did not have the opportunity to shoot over the heads of their own soldiers, they had to be placed so that there were no troops of their own between the guns and the enemy. Therefore, the artillerymen were constantly exposed to enemy infantry fire (already from a distance of 400 meters), and there was always a danger of losing their guns. For the best effect of artillery fire, some commanders rolled their guns up to 200 or even 100 meters from the enemy infantry line. The record in this sense belongs to a certain Major Duchamp from the Horse Guards artillery, who at the Battle of Waterloo fired at British positions from a distance of 25 meters.
A few shots were enough for the artillery batteries to disappear in a thick cloud of black powder smoke, which made it impossible to see what was happening on the battlefield. In the puffs of smoke, the gunners fired blindly, guided by rumor or orders from their superiors. Preparing the gun for firing lasted about a minute. This time was enough for the enemy cavalry to cover a distance of 200 or 300 meters. And therefore, their lives depended on the speed of the gunners' actions. If the guns were not loaded with maximum speed, and the enemy cavalry, meanwhile, went on the attack, the fate of the gunners was practically decided.
The French artillerymen were armed with guns of the 1777 model, and sometimes with cavalry carbines - shorter, and thus did not interfere so much in the maintenance of the guns. In addition, the gunners had hatchets, which, however, were used more as tools than weapon.
The French foot artillerymen were dressed in the traditional dark blue uniform with a red instrument, and the horse artillerymen in dark green uniforms. The latter, who borrowed much from the uniforms of the hussars, were considered one of the most beautiful in the Napoleonic army.
Innovations
During the French Revolution and the First Empire, French artillery went through many innovations. One of them was horse artillery, which by that time was already available in Russia and the United States of America. The project for the formation of horse artillery was proposed by General Gilbert Joseph Lafayette in 1791, which means it was influenced by the experience of the US War of Independence. Lafayette, in particular, stressed that horse artillery, armed with light cannons, was better suited for joint actions with cavalry than foot artillery, which constrained the mobility of cavalry formations.
Over time, 6 regiments of horse artillery were formed in the French army, in 1810 a seventh was added to them, formed in Holland. From April 15, 1806, the Horse Guards Artillery Regiment also existed. The artillery regiment consisted of six artillery companies and a maintenance company. In 1813, the seventh companies were attached to the first three regiments. Each company consisted of 25 first-class artillerymen, second-class artillerymen and recruits; together with officers and sergeants, the company numbered 97 people.
Another innovation was the establishment by decree of Bonaparte on January 3, 1800, artillery carts. Until then, in foot and horse artillery, only gunners were soldiers, while sleds carrying ammunition, and sometimes the guns themselves, were civilians. At that time, there were entire private enterprises engaged in "delivering guns to positions." But when the cannons were already placed at firing positions, such sleds, not feeling sufficiently either soldiers or heroes, simply drove away from the theater of hostilities, abandoning their weapons to their fate. As a result, the guns fell into the hands of the enemy because at critical moments of the battle there were no horses at hand to take them out of the dangerous area.
Under Napoleon, the carts became part of the disciplined mass of soldiers, who were obliged to fight the enemy on pain of death. Thanks to such an organization, the number of guns that fell into the hands of the enemy significantly decreased, and at the same time an uninterrupted supply of ammunition to the army was established. Initially, 8 battalions of transports were formed, with 6 companies in each. Gradually, their number grew and reached 14, and during the war, reserve battalions "bis" were formed, so that in fact the Great Army consisted of 27 transport battalions (battalion number 14 bis was not formed).
Finally, when it comes to innovations, it is worth mentioning the idea of Napoleon to bring artillery pieces into the so-called "large batteries", which allowed him to concentrate artillery fire in the decisive phase of the battle. Such "big batteries" first appeared at Marengo, Preussisch-Eylau and Friedland, and then in all major battles. Initially, they numbered 20–40 guns, Wagram already had 100, and at Borodino - 120. In 1805–1807, when “large batteries” were really an innovation, they gave Napoleon a significant advantage over the enemy. Then, starting in 1809, his opponents also began to use the tactics of "large batteries" and nullified this advantage. Then there (for example, in the Battle of Borodino) hurricane artillery battles, in which, however, despite the bloody sacrifices, the French did not manage to inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy.
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