Bombers and nuclear retaliation

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Strategic bomber B-52, modification "C" (B-52C) in flight. Before mass rocketing, these aircraft were the backbone of American nuclear power. Source: Richard Lockett, Air-and-Space.com

It is important to recognize ... that ballistic missile forces
both in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, represent
potential for conducting strategic nuclear war
at the most indiscriminate level, at the highest level, at the level,
least controllable.

Application of this weapons in a lower level conflict,
will likely lead to an uncontrolled escalation of the situation to an intensity,
which can be largely
disproportionate to the scale of the initial collision.



Consequently, the use of ICBMs and SLBMs
is not a rational or reliable response to provocations,
which, while serious, still pose a lesser threat,
than an immediate threat to the survival of the nation.

For this reason, among other things, I believe that national security
will continue to demand flexibility, efficiency
and the possibility of selective application
manned strategic weapons systems
throughout the range of cold, limited and general war.


Curtis LeMay

Nuclear deterrence


The concept of nuclear deterrence is that an adversary who has attempted to deliver a sufficiently strong nuclear or non-nuclear strike capable of causing damage unacceptable to the attacked side becomes a victim of a nuclear strike himself. The fear of the consequences of this blow keeps the opponent from attacking.

Within the framework of the concept of nuclear deterrence, there are retaliatory and retaliatory-counter strikes (the first strike in any form is beyond the scope of this article).

Their main difference is that a retaliatory strike is delivered at the moment when the enemy is attacking - from establishing the very fact of an ongoing attack (triggering an early warning missile system) to detonating the first warheads of enemy missiles on the territory of the attacked country. And the recipient - after.

The problem of a retaliatory strike is that systems that warn of a missile attack or any other form of nuclear attack (there are some) can, as they say, malfunction. And there were such cases more than once. Many times, unconditional and blind adherence to the retaliatory strike algorithms, both by the Soviet and American military, could have led to the unintended start of a global nuclear war simply due to abnormal triggering of electronics. The automation of issuing a command for a retaliatory strike could lead to the same. These situations entailed some changes in the sequence of issuing a command for a retaliatory nuclear strike, which were aimed at reducing the risk of a strike by mistake.

As a result, there is a possibility that the actuation of the missile attack warning system (EWS) as a result of a real attack at some level of decision-making will be mistaken, including for psychological reasons - the cost of an error here is simply prohibitively high.

There is one more problem, which is more acute. No matter how much we believe in mutually assured destruction, the same USA today has the possibility of delivering a surprise nuclear strike faster than the command to our retaliatory strike will pass. This speed can be achieved by using ballistic missile submarines from short (2000–3000 km) distances in the first strike. Such a strike carries a huge risk for them - too much can go wrong in such complex operations, it is extremely difficult to maintain secrecy and ensure the secrecy of the strike.
But it is nevertheless possible. It's just very difficult to organize it.

At the dawn of the Cold War, the USSR also had such an opportunity.

In the event that the enemy delivers such a blow, there is a risk that the order to inflict a retaliatory strike will simply not reach the executors. And the ground forces that should have inflicted such a blow will simply be destroyed - completely or almost completely. Therefore, in addition to a retaliatory strike, a critical opportunity was and is the possibility of a retaliatory strike.

A retaliatory strike is delivered after the first strike by the enemy, this is its difference from a retaliatory strike. Therefore, the forces that inflict it must be invulnerable to the first blow. At the moment, both in Russia and in the United States, submarines armed with ballistic missiles are considered such means of a guaranteed retaliatory strike. In theory, even if the enemy's first strike is missed and all the forces capable of waging a nuclear war are lost on the ground, the submarines must survive this and attack in response. In practice, any party planning the first strike will try to ensure that the retaliatory forces are destroyed, and they, in turn, must prevent this from happening. How this requirement is met today is a separate topic. The fact is that it is.

Ensuring the combat stability of strategic submarines is the basis of nuclear deterrence for any country that has them. Simply because only they are the guarantors of retaliation. This is true for the United States, Russia, and China. India is on its way. Britain and France have generally abandoned nuclear deterrence other than submarines.

And this is where ours begins story.

Unlike all other nuclear countries, the Americans were able to ensure the possibility of delivering a guaranteed retaliatory strike not only with the help of submarines, but also with the help of bombers.

It looks strange. Taking into account the fact that even a Soviet ICBM had less flight time to targets on American territory than is necessary under normal conditions for organizing the departure of a multi-engine aircraft and its withdrawal beyond the range of the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion.

The Americans, on the other hand, ensured that their bombers could launch en masse and get out of the attack of ICBMs flying to airbases faster than these missiles reached their targets.

The only ones in the world.

General LeMay and his bomber aircraft


There is still debate about what is more important in history - objective processes or the role of individuals. In the case of the tasks and capabilities of the US Air Force in the system of nuclear deterrence and the conduct of a nuclear war, there is no dispute. This is the merit of a very specific person - a general of the US Air Force (formerly an officer of the US Air Corps), a participant in World War II, commander of the Strategic aviation the command of the United States Air Force, and later the Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis Emerson LeMay. His biography is available here to register:.

Bombers and nuclear retaliation
Curtis Emerson LeMay, General of the United States Air Force, Commander of the Strategic Air Command. 1951 Source: Wikipedia.

LeMay was one of those people who, it is believed, can only live in war. If an analogy is needed, it was a character like the fictional Lieutenant Colonel Bill Kilgore from the movie "Apocalypse Now", the same one who commanded the landing under Wagner's "Flight of the Valkyries". LeMay was psychologically about this type, but much more ruthless and, it must be admitted, much more intelligent. The infernal bombing of Tokyo, for example, is his idea for the task. He tried to provoke a nuclear war between the USSR and the USA. Many consider him a maniac and a psycho. And this is, in general, the truth. The catch phrase “to bomb into the Stone Age” is his words. It is true, however, that if the United States had followed Lemay's brutal advice, it might have achieved forceful domination and victory in the Cold War by force back in the late fifties. That would certainly be a bad option for us.
But for America it is good.

Had the United States followed LeMay's advice in Vietnam, they could have won that war. And if China and the USSR intervened in it, as the general's critics feared, then the Soviet-Chinese split, apparently, would have been overcome, and America would have received its big war with tens of millions of corpses - and, apparently, today they would not behave like that brazenly, as it is now. Or everything would have cost a local collision, with a quick brainwashing of the Americans.
Vietnamese, by the way, in any case, would have died less than it actually happened.
In general, he is a maniac, of course, a maniac, but ...

Such a person usually cannot serve in peacetime within the military bureaucracy. But LeMay was lucky. The scale of the tasks that the US Air Force faced with the beginning of the Cold War turned out to be quite "military" for itself, and LeMay lingered for a long time in the highest echelons of power, having managed to build the Strategic Air Command in accordance with his views. He resigned already from the post of Chief of Staff of the Air Force in 1965 due to a conflict with the Minister (Secretary) of Defense R. McNamara, a "paramilitary" bureaucrat. But by that time everything had already been done, traditions and standards were laid, cadres were trained who continued the work of Lemey.

It is believed that aviation is extremely vulnerable to a sudden nuclear strike, and will generally not survive it. LeMay, who had an extremely negative attitude towards ballistic missiles (including for irrational reasons - he put bomber aviation and its personnel above all else, often speaking insultingly about fighter pilots, for example, that is, his personal attitude to bomber aviation played an important role), set himself the task of creating such a bomber aviation, to which this would not apply.

And he created it. The absolutely unprecedented combat readiness of strategic aviation that the Americans showed during the Cold War is to a very large extent his merit.

LeMay took over the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1948. Already in the mid-fifties, he and his subordinates formed a set of ideas that would form the basis for preparing bomber aviation for a war with the USSR.

First and foremost, when receiving a warning about an enemy attack, bombers must get out of the attack faster than this blow will be delivered. It was not so difficult, but in 1957 the USSR launched a satellite into space. It became clear that the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles among the "communists" was not far off. But the SAC decided that it does not matter - since the flight time will be measured in tens of minutes, and not in many hours, it means that it is necessary to learn how to remove the bombers from the air strike faster than the ICBM or the warhead will fly the distance from the point of detection of the early warning system to the target.

It sounds like fantasy, but they finally got it.

The second step (which later had to be canceled) was combat duty in the air with nuclear weapons on board. It was held for only a few years, and in general, it was not necessary. Therefore, let's start with him.

Combat duty in the air


The origins of Operation Chrome Dome go back to the fifties. Then the first attempts began to work off the combat duty of bombers in the air with ready-to-use nuclear bombs.

General Thomas Power was the author of the idea to keep the B-52 with nuclear bombs in the air. And the commander of the SAC LeMay, of course, supported this idea. In 1958, the SAC began a study program called Operation Headstart, which was accompanied, among other things, by 24-hour training flights. And in 1961, Operation Chromed Dome began. In it, the developments of the previous operation were implemented, but already with sufficient (and not excessive) security measures and on a much larger scale (in terms of attracting flight personnel and aircraft).

As part of the operation, the United States flew a number of bombers with thermonuclear bombs. According to American data, up to 12 vehicles could be in the air at the same time. Most often it is mentioned that in the ammunition of the aircraft there were two or four (depending on the type of bombs) thermonuclear bombs.

The time of combat duty was 24 hours, the aircraft during this time several times refueled in the air. In order for the crews to withstand the loads, the crews took amphetamine-containing drugs, which helped them to be able to perform such flights. The command knew about the consequences of using such drugs, but continued to issue them.

In addition to the combat duty itself, within the framework of the "Chromed Dome" activities were carried out with the code names "In a circle" (Round Robin jargon) to study tactical issues in the Air Force and "Hard Head" (Hard Head) to visually monitor the state of the US early warning radar in Greenland, at the Tula base. This was necessary to make sure that the USSR did not destroy the station with a surprise attack.

From time to time, bombers landed in Greenland, while violating the agreements with the Danish government on the nuclear-free status of Denmark.


B-52 in Tula, Greenland.

In fact, the US Air Force resorted to the same methods as the Navy - strategic carriers of nuclear weapons were withdrawn to those areas where the enemy could not get them in any way, and were there in readiness for an attack. Only instead of submarines in the ocean, there were planes in the sky. The combat stability of the bombers was ensured by the fact that they were in motion, often over the ocean. And the USSR did not have any means to get them.

There were two areas in which the bombers flew: the northern (covering the north of the United States, Canada and western Greenland) and the southern (over the Mediterranean and Adriatic seas).


Selected routes of Operation Chromed Dome in 1966


One of the routes of Operation Chromed Dome

The bombers went out to the initial areas, refueled in the air, were on duty for a while, then returned to the United States.

The operation lasted 7 years. Until 1968.

In the course of the Chromed Dome, bomber disasters occurred from time to time, during which nuclear bombs were lost or destroyed. There were five significant disasters, but the program was curtailed following the results of the last two.

On January 17, 1966, a bomber collided with a KS-135 tanker (a refueling bar hit the bomber's wing). The wing was blown off the bomber, the fuselage was partially destroyed, in the fall, four thermonuclear bombs fell out of the bomb bay. Details of the disaster are available on the Internet at the request "Plane crash over Palomares".

The plane crashed to the ground near the Spanish city of Palomares. Two bombs detonated the explosive of the detonators, and the radioactive contents were scattered over an area of ​​2 square kilometers.

This event resulted in a sixfold decrease in the number of aircraft sorties, and R. McNamara was the initiator, arguing that the main tasks of nuclear deterrence are performed by ballistic missiles. At the same time, both the OKNSH and the SAC were against the reduction of bombers on duty.

We will come back to this later.

Two years later, in 1968, another disaster occurred with radioactive contamination of the area in Greenland, which went down in history as a disaster over the Thule base. This was the end of the Chromed Dome.

But let's say two things. The first is that earlier similar disasters with the loss of bombs did not interrupt the operation. Before Palomares, they did not affect the intensity of flights at all.

Why is that?

Of course, political factors influenced here. It's one thing to lose a bomb over your territory without contaminating the area. The other is over someone else's. And even with infection. In addition, over a country with a nuclear-free status, which gave guarantees of non-deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory. But something else was even more important - while the number of ballistic missiles was considered insufficient, the United States considered the risks of the "Chromed Dome" quite acceptable. As well as the costs - in the form of amphetamine-crippled crew members of bombers. Moreover, there were few seriously injured.

All of this was justified for the role played by bombers in nuclear deterrence. For the guaranteed retaliation capability they provided.

However, after the termination of the "Chromed Dome" this opportunity has not disappeared anywhere.

Combat duty on the ground


Operation Chromed Dome has been completed. But the United States still sometimes resorted to air combat duty with nuclear weapons.

For example, in 1969, Nixon lifted and held 18 bombers in readiness for attack for three days. This provocation was called Operation Giant Lance. Nixon planned this as an act of intimidation of the USSR. But in the USSR they did not become intimidated. Still, in 1969, the use of only 18 bombers in the first strike could no longer impress anyone.

Regular flights of this type were no longer performed.

But this was not due to the fact that the SAK, the Air Force in general, or someone in the Pentagon became disillusioned with the use of bombers as a means of retaliation. Not at all.

It was just that by this time the desired and planned methods of withdrawing bombers from the airstrike had been polished to such an extent that it became unnecessary.

By the beginning of the seventies, the practice of combat duty on the ground, which, if necessary, made it possible to remove some of the bombers from the attack of ballistic missiles, had finally taken shape. This was the result of a very long and hard work of the Strategic Air Command, which began under Lemey.

It is hard to imagine how carefully the Americans planned and prepared everything. We simply cannot afford this level of organization. At least there are simply no precedents.

Full combat readiness does not happen in any part of the Air Force. Therefore, it was practiced to allocate part of the forces on combat duty. Then a replacement was made. The aircraft were parked with suspended thermonuclear bombs and cruise or aeroballistic missiles, also with a thermonuclear warhead.

The personnel were in specially built structures, de facto representing a hostel with a developed household and entertainment infrastructure to maintain a good morale for all personnel. The living conditions at these facilities differed favorably from what was in other types of the US Armed Forces. And this was also the merit of Lemey. It was he who achieved the highest level of comfort for the flight crew in service, as well as various benefits, payments and the like.

The room was directly adjacent to the bombers' parking lot. Upon leaving it, the personnel immediately found themselves directly in front of the aircraft.

At each airbase, it was distributed which aircraft crews should get into their planes at a run, and which - in cars. For each aircraft, a separate vehicle on duty was allocated, which was supposed to deliver the crew to it. This order has not been interrupted for many decades and is still in effect. The cars were taken from the air base's fleet.

Further, it was required to ensure the fastest possible leaving the parking lot. To ensure this, there were certain design features of the B-52 bomber.

The design of the aircraft is such that the crew does not need any ladders in order to get in or out of the bomber. There is no need to remove any structures for the plane to take off. This distinguishes the B-52 from almost all bombers in the world.

It seems like a trifle. But let's take a look, for example, at the Tu-22M. And let's ask ourselves the question, how many minutes are lost during an emergency takeoff - cleaning the gangway?


And if you don't remove it, you can't take off. The B-52 does not have such a problem.

Next came the stage of starting the engines. The B-52 has two launch modes.

The first is a regular one with sequential engine start. With such a start, the 4th engine was started sequentially from an external source of electric current and air, from it the fifth (from the other side). These engines were used to start the rest (the 4th started the 1st, 2nd and 3rd at the same time, the 5th started the 6th, 7th and 8th, also - at the same time). It was not a quick procedure, requiring technicians on the aircraft and equipment. Therefore, on alarm, a different triggering method was used.


Normal launch - the airplane is connected to a source of compressed air (right) and electricity. Source: media.defense.gov

The second is the so-called "cartridge-start". Or in modern American jargon - "go-cart".

The essence of the method is as follows. Each B-52 engine has a pyrostarter, similar in principle to the one that spins up the engines of cruise missiles, only reusable.

The pyrostarter consists of a gas generator, a small-sized turbine operating on the gas flow from the gas generator, and a small-sized reducer with an uncoupling device, which drives the shaft of the bomber's turbojet engine.

The source of gases in the gas generator is a replaceable pyrotechnic element - a cartridge, a kind of cartridge the size of a mug. The energy stored in the "cartridge" is enough to rotate the shaft of the turbojet before starting it.

This is the trigger that is used during panic missions. If suddenly all the engines do not start, then the B-52 starts moving along the taxiway on some of the engines, starting the rest along the way. This is also technically provided. No equipment, ground personnel or anyone's help is required for such a launch. The launch is carried out literally by pressing a button - after the on-board electrical system has started working, the right pilot on the command "start all engines!" ("Start all engines!") Starts all the pyrostarters with the button simultaneously and puts the throttle in the desired position. In literally 15–20 seconds, the engines were started.

This is what such a start looks like. Time before starting the engines. First, the landing of the crew is shown (no ladders are needed), then the installation of the cartridge, then the launch. Dark smoke - exhaust gases in the pyrostarter. As soon as the smoke disappeared, the engines were started. Everything.


In case the bomber could return from a combat sortie against the USSR and would have to land at an alternate airfield, there was a special bracket in the niche of one of the rear landing gear pillars in which spare cartridges were transported. The installation was very simple.

After starting the engines, the aircraft moved along the taxiways to the runway. And here the most crucial moment begins - take-off with minimal intervals, known in the West as MITO - Minimum interval take-off.

What is the specificity of such a take-off? In time intervals between aircraft. Cold War SAC regulations required an approximately 15-second interval between oneself and any aircraft taking off or following ahead.

This is what it looked like in the 60s. The film is fiction, but the planes in it took off real. And at this very pace. This is not a montage.


This is an extremely dangerous maneuver - there are more than two aircraft on the runway during such a takeoff, which will no longer be able to interrupt takeoff in any emergency situation due to the gained speed. Cars take off in a smoky runway. For comparison: in the USSR Air Force, even in an emergency situation, heavy aircraft rose into the air at minute intervals, that is, 4-5 times slower than the Americans. Even without taking into account all the other delays that we also had.

More video, only now not from the movie. Here, the intervals between bombers are less than 15 seconds.


In our country, such a takeoff as MITO heavy multi-engine aircraft simply would not be allowed due to safety conditions. At the Americans, he first became a regular in strategic aviation, then migrated to all kinds of Air Force forces, up to transport aviation.


Takeoff of transport C-130 according to the MITO scheme from Dyce airbase, Texas, 1988

Naturally, the tankers, who were on alert along with the bombers, also had the opportunity to launch from pyrostarters.


"Cartridge-start" of engines of the aircraft refueling aircraft KS-135

Another video. This, however, was already filmed after the end of the Cold War. And there are no tankers here. But there are all stages of raising aviation on alarm - including the delivery of personnel to the aircraft by cars.


As you can see, if there are 20 minutes before an ICBM strike at an airbase, then some of the aircraft have time to escape from under it. Experience has shown that 20 minutes is enough to send 6–8 aircraft, of which during the Cold War two of the aircraft could have served as refuellers. However, the separate basing of bomber and refueling air wings made it possible to remove more B-52s from the blow. Bases with refuelers, but no bombers, were far less priority targets.

After takeoff, the planes had to follow to the checkpoint, where they would either be given a new target, or they would have canceled the old one assigned before departure. The lack of communication meant the need to carry out the combat mission that had been assigned to the crew in advance, on the ground. The procedure established in the SAC provided that the crew should be able to perform a meaningful combat mission even in the absence of communication. It was also a factor in ensuring the retaliation.

This system existed in the United States until 1991. And in 1992 SAC was disbanded. Now such training exists, so to speak, in a "half-disassembled" state. Emergency take-offs are practiced, but only by bombers, without the participation of tankers. There are problems with refuellers. Bomber flights are carried out without weapons. In fact, this is no longer a guaranteed retaliatory strike, which aviation can inflict under any circumstances, but simply a practice of withdrawing forces from under the strike.

Thirty-odd years without an enemy could not but affect combat readiness. But once they could. On the other hand, we would have such degradation.

In 1990, HBO released the feature film By dawn's early light. We dubbed it in the 90s with the title "At Dawn", more or less close to the original. Now he is in Russian voice acting (extremely poor, alas, but with a "new" name) available on the internet, in English (it is recommended to watch it in the original for everyone who knows this language at least a little) too.

The film, on the one hand, contains a lot of "cranberries" from the very beginning, especially in the storyline on board a bomber flying to bomb the USSR. On the other hand, it is highly recommended to watch. And the point is not even that this is not being filmed now.

Firstly, it shows, with almost documentary accuracy, the raising of a bomber on alarm, informing the crew about whether it is a combat alarm or a training alarm (after preparing for takeoff in an airplane with running engines). It is shown that no one knows in advance whether it is a combat alarm or a training alarm; in any case, everyone is given their best at every alarm. This, by the way, is also important because if the personnel on the ground realizes that they have no more than 20 minutes to live, and they cannot run (the planes have not yet taken off), then there may be various excesses. The Americans excluded them "at the hardware level."

After takeoff, the crew refines the task using the log (table) of code signals, compares this with individual code cards and selects a card with a combat mission using them, in this case it is striking if there is no recall at the checkpoint (according to the plot, they were re-targeted to a new one target - the command bunkers of the USSR in Cherepovets).

Secondly, part of the filming took place on board real B-52s and E-4 command aircraft. For this alone, it is worth seeing, especially for those who flew the Tu-95 in those same years, it will be very interesting to compare.

A fragment of the film with the raising of bombers on alarm. At the beginning, an Air Force general from the SAC in a bunker under the Cheyenne Mountain reports to the President about an ongoing counterforce (aimed at means of retaliatory strike) strike from the USSR, then a message from the USSR arrives via teletype with an explanation of what is happening and then shows an alarm at Fairchild airbase. Some of the plans were filmed inside a real B-52. It is well shown how quickly the aircraft is ready to take off on alarm, including starting the engines. The filmmakers had very good consultants.

The fragment is only in English. The rise of aviation from 4:55.


Thirdly, the human factor is well shown in the film - random mistakes of people, psychopaths who accidentally found themselves in command positions, honest people mistakenly insisting on catastrophically wrong actions in this situation, and how all this can lead to an undesirable ending - nuclear war of destruction.
There is one more important point there.

Fail-safe or why bombers


According to the plot of the film, a group of Soviet military, who do not want to "detente" and improve relations with the United States, somehow delivers to Turkey a launcher with a medium-range ballistic missile equipped with a nuclear warhead, after which it inflicts a nuclear strike on Donetsk with its help. thus provoke a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States, and under the guise of carrying out a coup in the USSR.

In the USSR, according to the plot, at that moment a system is working, which, when signs of a nuclear war are received, gives the command to launch ICBMs automatically. A kind of "Perimeter", which does not ask anyone about anything.

If you can laugh at the provocation with Donetsk (although an attempted coup in the USSR did take place in 1991, just without armed provocations), the Americans here sucked the plot out of their fingers, then there is no need to laugh about the automatic retaliatory strike - not only do we have and there was, and is, the technical ability to automate this process, so there are also many who want to do this in the highest echelons of power, seemingly guaranteeing a retaliatory strike under any circumstances.

In the film, for all its "cranberry", it is very well shown how such a system wrong... And then how the Americans made a mistake again with the decision on the second retaliatory strike. We were terribly wrong. And what did it cost both the USSR and the USA in the end. The problem here is that such a system can go wrong without a nuclear explosion over Donetsk. And people acting in conditions of lack of information and time can make a mistake even more.

Let's move on to reality.

On November 9, 1979, the North American missile defense system NORAD displayed on the computers of the main command posts a Soviet nuclear strike by 2200 ICBMs. The time for which the President of the United States had to decide on a retaliatory strike against the USSR was calculated, taking into account the fact that it took time for the launch command to pass. The required reaction time was no more than seven minutes, then it would be too late.

At the same time, there were no political reasons why the USSR would have fired such a volley so suddenly, intelligence also saw nothing unusual.

Under these circumstances, the Americans had two options.

The first is to wait until the arrival of Soviet missiles is detected by radars. But this time was just six to seven minutes, there was a high risk that the launch of the ICBM would not be possible.

The second is to deliver a retaliatory strike with missiles with a 100% success rate.

The Americans decided to take a chance. They waited for the time that was necessary in order to be sure whether there was a real missile attack or not. After making sure that there was no attack, they canceled the alarm.

An investigation later revealed that a faulty 46-cent chip was the cause of the failure. Not a bad reason to start a global nuclear war, isn't it?

Some of the incidents that may have triggered the start of a missile exchange can be found here.

What is important in this and many other incidents? The fact that it was immediately impossible to determine exactly whether the attack was underway or not. Moreover, in a number of cases it would have been possible to determine this only when it would have been too late.

In addition, one must understand something else. There were no guarantees that the Soviet Navy would not have time to melt the American submarines - then there was a different time than now, and our submarines fleet there were many in the sea. There were also cases of tracking American SSBNs. It was impossible to guarantee that all SSBNs, or a significant part of them, simply would not be destroyed by the time they could signal an attack. Namely, SSBNs formed the basis of the retaliatory strike potential.

What gave the Americans the confidence that a retaliatory strike, if they missed the first Soviet strike then, would still be delivered? In addition to the first-class submarines, these were bombers.

In every serious case of a false nuclear alarm, the aircraft were at the start, with crews in the cockpits, with flight missions and assigned targets, with suspended thermonuclear weapons, with refuelers. And most certainly, in ten to fifteen minutes, some of the cars would have come out of the blow, and given the fact that the Americans sometimes dispersed their planes, this would be a rather big part.

And the leadership of the USSR knew about it. Of course, we did not plan an attack on the United States, although they suspected us of it. But if we had planned, then the factor of bombers would seriously complicate our task of delivering a sudden and crushing strike with minimal losses.

The bombing scheme also fit well into the American political system - in the event of a successful Soviet decapitation strike, the military could not order a retaliatory strike without the appropriate sanction of the political leader. Americans have a list of presidential successors that dictates the order in which other leaders take over as president if the president (and, for example, the vice president) is killed. Until such a person takes office, there is no one to give the order for a nuclear strike. Naturally, the military will be able to bypass these restrictions if they want, but they must manage to agree with each other and give all orders while the connection is still working. These are illegal actions, not stipulated by any rules, and they will meet with serious resistance in the face of uncertainty.

According to the procedure adopted in the United States, the military, in the event of the death of the political leadership, must find someone from the list of successors and consider him as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. It takes time. Airborne bombers give the military this time. That is why at one time both the SAC and the OKNSh were opposed to canceling the "Chromed Dome". However, they then got out with phenomenally effective ground duty.

This is exactly how bomber aviation "worked" in the US Air Force's nuclear deterrent system. It gave politicians the opportunity not to be wrong. Bombers that have taken off to strike can be turned back. While they are flying, you can understand the situation. You can even negotiate a ceasefire.

But if, after all, the war really began, and it is unrealistic to stop it, then they will simply do their job. And even in this case, they provide additional capabilities - unlike missiles, they can be retargeted to another object located within the combat radius and studied by the crew of the area, if the situation requires it. In emergency cases - to any target, up to the line of use of weapons on which they can fly. They can hit several targets that are far from each other, and when some of them come back, they can be sent to strike again. Rockets can't do any of this.

This is a system for which the American phrase Fail-Safe can be applied. Failure in this case is a nuclear strike delivered by mistake. Interestingly, in 1964 an anti-war film with the same name was shot in the United States, where bombers inflicted a nuclear strike on the USSR precisely by mistake, but this was definitely extremely unlikely.

For the opponents of the United States, this is an additional incentive not to attack - after all, now the blow could have been inflicted not only by ICBMs and SLBMs, but also by surviving aircraft, of which there could be too many. They, of course, would have to break through the air defense of the USSR, which was, at first glance, extremely difficult.

This issue is worth considering too.

The probability of a breakthrough of the USSR air defense


The air defense of our country is usually thought of as omnipotent. Let's just say - the country's air defense capabilities were enormous, it was a truly unique system in terms of capabilities.

However, these possibilities were finally formed only in the 80s, partially in the late 70s.

Before that, everything was not so, but rather the opposite.

In the 50s, the organization of air defense in the USSR was such that the Americans ruled in our skies as they wanted. Repeated flights of RB-47 scouts in Soviet airspace remained unpunished. The number of American aircraft shot down was numbered in units, and the number of their incursions into our airspace - in the hundreds during the same period. In addition, the Soviet aviation lost dozens of people killed. At this time, it was possible to safely guarantee that any more or less massive attack by bombers on the USSR would be successful.

In the 60s, a turning point was outlined - anti-aircraft missile systems and MiG-19 interceptors began to massively enter service, from which American intelligence officers (and therefore potentially bombers) could no longer escape. That year, the Americans lost the U-2 reconnaissance missile system from the air defense system, the MiG-19 shot down the RB-47 near the Kola Peninsula. This led to a reduction in reconnaissance flights.

But even in these years, the power of the air defense was far from sufficient. The Americans, on the other hand, were armed with hundreds of B-52s and thousands of medium-sized B-47s; it was technically unrealistic to repulse this blow in those years.

The ability of the Americans to hit targets on the territory of the USSR was declining very slowly. But they took action in advance. Bombers of the third modification, variant "C" (English) were armed with AGM-28 "Hound Dog" missiles with a thermonuclear warhead and a range of more than 1000 kilometers.


B-52 with Hound Dog missiles

Such missiles were the solution to the problem of object air defense - now there was no need to go under the fire of anti-aircraft missile systems, it was possible to hit targets from afar.

But these missiles greatly reduced the combat radius of the bomber. From that moment on, the United States began a theoretical study of the idea of ​​a combined strike - first, some planes strike with missiles, then planes with bombs break through the "hole" in the air defense formed as a result of a massive nuclear strike.

The Hound Dog was in service until 1977. However, in 1969, a more interesting replacement was found for them - the AGM-69 compact aeroballistic missiles began to enter service, which, due to their small size and weight, could be put on bombers in large quantities.


Bomber with AGM-69 aeroballistic missiles. The warheads of the missiles could have a power of 17 or 210 kilotons, depending on the setting before departure.

These missiles gave the B-52 the ability to strike at Soviet air defense airfields and then break through to the target with bombs until the enemy recovered from a massive nuclear strike.

In 1981, the first modern cruise missile, the AGM-86, which also exists in the "nuclear version", began to enter service. These missiles had a range of more than 2700 km in the version with a thermonuclear warhead, which made it possible to attack targets without putting bombers at risk. These missiles are still the "main caliber" of the B-52 in a nuclear war. But rather, they are unique, since the tasks with nuclear bombs from these aircraft have been removed since 2018, and the B-2 aircraft are the only strategic bomb carriers.


B-52 with ALCM on underwing hardpoints. Pay attention to the "anti-nuclear" paint on the lower part of the fuselage.


Launch AGM-86 from bomb bay B-52

But there was also a minus. Now the scheme with the receipt of the task did not work even in flight - the data for the missiles had to be prepared on the ground. And this deprived aviation of its inherent flexibility - what is the point in a bomber that cannot attack any targets other than those assigned in advance? But some of the aircraft were redesigned for cruise missile carriers.

Now the strike by the B-52 looked like a cruise missile launch from a long distance, and only then “ordinary” bombers, which also had aeroballistic missiles, and bombs to complete their “work”, would fly up to the enemy who survived a massive nuclear strike. The breakthrough of a single B-52 to the target would look like a nuclear "clearing" the way in front of the plane.

Thus, cruise missiles would be used not only to defeat targets of particular importance, but also to "soften" the Soviet air defense, and before the appearance of the S-300 and MiG-31, we simply had nothing to shoot down such missiles.

Then the air defense would have sought by strikes of thermonuclear aeroballistic missiles. And already through this scorched zone, bombers with the remaining aeroballistic missiles and bombs would go to the target.

At the same time, the Americans made tremendous efforts to ensure that this breakthrough was successful. All B-52s have been upgraded to allow them to fly at low altitudes. It affected both the fuselage and avionics. As usual, it was about heights of hundreds of meters (no more than 500). But in reality, the pilots of the SAC calmly worked at 100 meters, and above the flat sea surface - at an altitude of 20-30 meters.



Spans less than 30 meters above the sea.

The B-52s were equipped with the most powerful electronic countermeasures system in the history of aviation, which made it possible to divert both anti-aircraft missiles and radar homing missiles from the aircraft. In Vietnam, this technique showed itself from the best side - having made many thousands of aircraft sorties, the United States lost several dozen bombers. In Operation Linebreaker in 1972, when the United States undertook massive bombing of North Vietnam, the consumption of anti-aircraft missiles on the B-52 was enormous, and the losses of these aircraft were disproportionately small compared to the number of missiles spent on them.

Finally, the B-52 was simply a sturdy and tenacious machine. That would also play a role.


The bomber continues to fly after the tail fin has been lifted off.

A characteristic feature of the B-52 in the 80s was the white coloring of the lower part of the fuselage, to reflect the light radiation of a nuclear explosion. The top was camouflaged in order to merge with the ground during low-altitude flight.

It should be admitted that a breakthrough in the USSR's air defense with such tactical schemes was quite real, although in the 80s the Americans would have had to pay a huge price for it. But it is somehow frivolous to talk about the price in a global thermonuclear war, but they would cause considerable damage.

All of the above applies to a situation where most of the American ICBMs were destroyed on the ground and did not have time to launch. In a situation where a retaliatory strike by ICBM forces was nevertheless inflicted, the task of the bombers going in the second wave would be facilitated tenfold. There would be basically no one to resist their raid.

Conclusion


The example of the US Air Force Strategic Air Command shows that it is quite realistic to create a system based on bomber aviation that can provide a nuclear retaliatory strike. Its potential will be limited, but it guarantees those capabilities that other means of waging a nuclear war do not provide.

These are the possibilities:

- assigning a goal after the start.
- recalling aircraft from a combat mission when the situation changes.
- adding strike time, allowing politicians to take measures to stop hostilities, restore control of the Armed Forces, or simply sort out the situation.
- changing a combat mission during a combat mission.
- reuse.

In order to realize all these possibilities, a huge organizational work is required, aircraft corresponding in their characteristics to the performance of such tasks, selection and the highest level of training of personnel.


Pilot B-52 in special equipment for the use of nuclear bombs. The Americans did not know the word "little things" in their preparation for war.

We need a psychological selection that will allow us to recruit responsible people who are psychologically capable of maintaining a high level of discipline for years in conditions when the war still does not start.

And besides this, an understanding of the very nature of the aviation component of the strategic nuclear forces is required - for example, organizing a retaliatory strike only with cruise missiles is extremely ineffective, the situation may require a strike on targets other than those for which there are ready-made flight missions. It is impossible to correct this deficiency in the course of a nuclear war that has already begun. The organization of a second strike in conditions when the air bases on which the aircraft were based before the war have been destroyed, along with the personnel and equipment necessary to prepare cruise missiles for use, will be almost impossible.

And if the plane cannot technically carry bombs or other weapons that the crew can use independently, without prior preparation of the flight mission and from any place, for any purpose, then it can turn into a thing in itself immediately with the beginning of the conflict. Unfortunately, we do not understand this. And the Americans understand. And the resistance that AGM-86 cruise missiles met in the SAC was due precisely to these considerations.

An American bomber returning from a mission can receive fuel, a bomb, equipment that will rearrange spare cartridges (if it is a B-52), a combat order written by hand by a superior commander at an airfield that has survived an exchange of missile strikes, and fly out again to strike.


The technician installs the cartridge into the B-52 nacelle. Source: media.defense.gov

A "clean" carrier of cruise missiles will simply be put on hold if there are no missiles, or they require loading a flight mission, and the control center for these missiles cannot be provided by the crew itself using the aircraft equipment.

In the USSR, old missiles, the control center of which was formed on board the aircraft and loaded there - from KSR-5 to X-22, made it possible to use aviation flexibly, simply by setting tasks for the crews. It was a mistake to reject such weapons, albeit made at a new level, and turn our Tu-95 and Tu-160 into "clean" cruise missile carriers, the flight mission for which is being prepared in advance on the ground. American developments demonstrate this very clearly.

All this in no way means that it is necessary to increase the share of ANSNF in the nuclear triad. In no case. And this does not mean that air-launched cruise missiles should be abandoned. But the example of the Americans should make us assess the potential of the bombers correctly. And learn how to use it.

For example, take into account such opportunities in the form of PAK DA.

So that later you do not face unpleasant surprises that could have been foreseen, but which no one had foreseen.
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212 comments
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  1. +15
    April 14 2021 05: 51
    Yes, you can't throw such hats
    1. 0
      April 15 2021 12: 44
      The enemy should not be underestimated or overestimated.
      Vietnam has put everything in its place, these are not defenseless cities to compare.
  2. +2
    April 14 2021 05: 52
    There is no doubt that if it were not for the nuclear missile shield created by the USSR and the leadership of the USSR did not demonstrate its readiness to use it, the US-sheep would not hesitate to dump all their power on Soviet Russia.
  3. +5
    April 14 2021 06: 10
    For comparison: in the USSR Air Force, even in an emergency situation, heavy aircraft rose into the air at minute intervals, that is, 4-5 times slower than the Americans.

    no need to fool people. The problem is not "could-could not", but that with an interval of 15-20 seconds. taking off could get into the wake of the aircraft in front. Therefore, they flew at one minute intervals. That is, technically, you can fly at least on the tail of the leader, but with the risk of slamming against the runway. To think that the Americans could somehow get rid of such a risk is pure nonsense.
    1. +6
      April 14 2021 06: 36
      in order to assert that they could, it was necessary to check, and then regularly practice it in exercises. This applies not only to aircraft and pilots, but also to all airfield services. If no one was doing this, the regiment was destroyed by an enemy strike.
      1. 0
        April 14 2021 07: 37
        to claim that they could, it was necessary to check

        What to check? I wrote it clearly - technically nothing is in the way. Take off at least in parallel, if you suddenly find such a runway. It's about the added risk.
        and then practice it regularly in exercises.

        work out what? At a takeoff of 380 km / h and a vertical speed of 50ms, what will you do there if you suddenly completely lose control? You won't even have time to get scared at such a height.
        1. +6
          April 14 2021 08: 59
          Sophistry versus facts is not an argument
          1. -3
            April 14 2021 09: 12
            Sophistry versus facts is not an argument

            exactly. There is no need to paint pink elephants on glass with saliva. The reality is very different.
            1. +2
              April 15 2021 00: 20
              Reality was shown to you in the video. What else did you see there?
              1. -3
                April 15 2021 11: 41
                Reality was shown to you in the video. What else did you see there?

                you wouldn't get into an argument at all. Row, discuss Putin and that everything is bad in Russia again. You don't have enough brains for more, you fucking flying expert. For what reason did you draw the pilot's shoulder straps? Was he a warrant officer at GSEM at best?
              2. -3
                April 15 2021 12: 41
                What is the reality?
                Departure prepared in a month? Agitprom?
                Show-off to reality that has nothing to do with it.
                1. +2
                  April 15 2021 15: 41
                  This was the daily routine for nearly forty years.
                  1. +1
                    April 16 2021 04: 27
                    This was the daily routine for nearly forty years.

                    your "order" was tested for exercises under ideal conditions. A simple change in wind direction would put a big cross on your championship climb times. You, except to see all sorts of kin, at least once visited a military airfield, but talked with the pilots. And only then they organized a sect of "flat earth believers" laughing
                    1. +2
                      April 19 2021 12: 39
                      You are arguing with reality now. Of course, a strong side wind would have prevented it from taking off.
                      But it would have to be a gale wind.



                      This is also a fabulous movie, right?

                      And this?



                      And only then they organized a sect of "flat earth believers"


                      They just showed you the real level of the enemy, you compared it, it hurts you now, and you just turned on the armor and refuse to believe in what you see. It's a shame for an adult to do that.
                      1. +2
                        April 19 2021 12: 45
                        You are arguing with reality now. Of course, a strong side wind would have prevented it from taking off.

                        and who spoke about the side? Suppose the wind has changed by 180g. How will you take off? And who cut in the armor here? I'm just wondering what are you guided by in addition to "kin"? Let's go into the details. The plane is at the preliminary stage and then the wind has changed and you need to take off in the other direction. Go to the other end of the runway, turn around and .... take off? Or do you take off in the wind, not giving a damn about the possibility, in principle, to break away from the runway to its end? come on hit me with another feature film instead of an answer
                      2. +1
                        April 19 2021 13: 20
                        The plane is at the preliminary stage and then the wind has changed and you need to take off in the other direction.


                        Yeah, as the crew jumped into the cockpits, so over the next five minutes the wind and direction changed, and gained such speed that it would not take off from the runway whose length is 1,5 times the takeoff run.

                        Well then they won't take off from this base laughing
                      3. 0
                        April 20 2021 04: 21
                        And I gained such speed that it would not take off from the runway whose length is 1,5 times the takeoff run of the aircraft.

                        strange dispute .... by the way, have you ever piloted an airplane yourself? Not on a simulator, not in a simulator, but real piloting with a real machine? At least educational? In my opinion, no. Such nonsense can only be borne by a person who has nothing to do with aviation, but is pushing to argue.
                        You first wrote nonsense, ruining a pretty good article on the whole, and now you've been trying to defend this nonsense for a week for some reason ...
                      4. 0
                        April 21 2021 09: 05
                        You don't have to be a pilot to see your motivation in this case.
                      5. 0
                        April 21 2021 09: 26
                        motivation? Is it like your enemies paid me to criticize your material? laughing laughing laughing taking into account the cost of my working time, it would not have cost them cheap)))
                        in fact, I read your articles with interest. They are, in my subjective opinion, a solid four. Which is no longer bad.
                      6. 0
                        April 21 2021 10: 28
                        No, of course, no one paid you, it is simply unpleasant for you to see what level of combat training and equipment were among those against whom you had been preparing to fight all your life.
                        I even understand this, I just think that it is necessary to step over emotions and study the experience of the enemy impartially.

                        That’s how I don’t like the USA either.
    2. +12
      April 14 2021 08: 08
      It's not entirely clear who is fooling around. The author states a fact. The fact that reducing the intervals increases the risks is obvious and is not disputed by the author. It's just that the Americans managed to minimize these risks.
      1. 0
        April 14 2021 08: 47
        It's just that the Americans managed to minimize these risks.

        how did you manage? Write specifically. For example, when taking off in this mode, there are two planes on the runway at the same time. In the event of engine failure of the first aircraft, the SPV (aborted take-off speed) did not ensure a safe stop of the second. So how do you minimize this risk? Well, exactly how?
        They did not minimize them, but simply took them into account. As not a priority, statistical losses. That's all.
        1. +7
          April 14 2021 10: 47
          Eight engines))

          There, not the second speed did not provide a stop, but at least three, maybe four.

          But this has never happened - in general.
          1. -1
            April 15 2021 12: 45
            If we don’t know something, it doesn’t mean that it didn’t happen.
            1. +2
              April 15 2021 13: 24
              All aircraft built in the USA had serial numbers, everyone can be tracked.
    3. +15
      April 14 2021 08: 39
      Quote: Ka-52

      no need to fool people. The problem is not "could-could not", but that with an interval of 15-20 seconds. taking off could get into the wake of the aircraft in front. Therefore, they flew at one minute intervals. That is, technically, you can fly at least on the tail of the leader, but with the risk of slamming against the runway. To think that the Americans could somehow get rid of such a risk is pure nonsense.


      And here "fooling people head"?
      Yes, even what was said with peremptory character, which supposedly does not require explanation.
      There are about a dozen videos, and some Timokhin provided, where it is clearly shown. how such planes take off.
      And we have never seen or read about the disasters that happened to our enemy during such training, massive take-offs.
      Maybe all the same, they know something "in fact", more than we "in theory"?
      And fooling around without anyone?
      They just do it, and do not talk about why "this is impossible"!
      1. 0
        April 14 2021 08: 53
        In general, the laws of physics and aerodynamics have not been canceled and there is nothing secret that no one would know.
      2. -14
        April 14 2021 09: 00
        And here "fooling people head"?
        Yes, even what was said with peremptory character, which supposedly does not require explanation.

        no, you personally can believe anything. Even the fact that physical laws are not applicable to an individual state. But the point is not that I doubted your beloved USA, but that, according to Timokhin, we (the USSR Air Force) could not take off in this mode. That’s what I’m writing about. And you immediately pounded in a panic - well, of course, someone dared to run into the great Americans
        1. +8
          April 14 2021 10: 05
          But the point is not that I doubted your beloved USA, but that, according to Timokhin, we (the USSR Air Force) could not take off in this mode.

          Our Air Force did not do this and did not practice it during the exercises, but they did it and worked it out. Therefore, they could take planes into the air in a short time and provide a retaliatory strike, but we cannot, and the whole value of our bombers without this useful quality comes down to show in parades. Moreover, their combat value in a nuclear war is now equal to zero.
          1. -11
            April 14 2021 10: 17
            Are you a pilot? Where do the firewood come from? Have you participated in the exercises? What did you fly on?
          2. The comment was deleted.
            1. +8
              April 14 2021 11: 32
              Do you have information that refutes what the author wrote, or did you just want to declare yourself?
              1. -9
                April 14 2021 11: 37
                I'm asking you. Don't slip on the author. It was not he who drove with your hand when you stuffed on the keyboard
                Our Air Force did not do this and did not work out in the exercises,

                So where did the firewoods come from?
                1. +8
                  April 14 2021 12: 15
                  The safety standards in the USSR Armed Forces are known; for heavy vehicles, the intervals between aircraft taking off were at least a minute.
                  1. 0
                    April 16 2021 05: 43
                    There are no such norms.
                    1. 0
                      April 19 2021 12: 33
                      Well, no, the flight crew above says that there is.
                2. +2
                  April 14 2021 18: 48
                  I'm asking you. Don't slip on the author. It was not he who drove with your hand when you stuffed on the keyboard

                  So there is nothing to say to you.
                  So where did the firewoods come from?

                  I don't know about firewood, but I heard that they come from the forest
          3. -1
            April 14 2021 12: 39
            Quote: ramzay21
            Our Air Force did not do this and did not work out in the exercises,

            Are you sure about that? What have not been worked out? Before the collapse of the USSR, the simultaneous take-off of regiments of fighter aviation, the IBA and the FBA was often practiced ... On the other hand, well, they took off in the "breathing in the buttocks of the one in front" mode, and what next? Again, who needs an empty plane in the air. The fact that they were like they were standing in the parking lot with nuclear weapons on board nude ... Looks beautiful, even spectacular, but what is the practical value of this maneuver? And especially considering how in the 50s and 60s, and even later, we were very closely following the actions of a potential enemy, many things were adopted, but did you miss such a moment? Maybe because of its uselessness in a real combat situation?
        2. The comment was deleted.
      3. -1
        April 15 2021 12: 47
        One thing, but according to your answer, you will not know about disasters. Since it is unlikely that this video will be posted.
    4. 0
      April 14 2021 09: 58
      However, they did it and we didn’t, we have to learn and do it.
      1. +1
        April 14 2021 12: 39
        Quote: ramzay21
        However, they did it and we didn’t, we have to learn and do it.

        What for? and for what?
    5. +5
      April 14 2021 10: 37
      Do not speculate for others, please, I have not written anywhere that they got rid of this risk, do you see in the video how they are shaken after taking off from the runway?

      As for ours, since they did not practice such takeoffs with a conveyor belt during exercises, it means they could not, that's all.
      1. -5
        April 14 2021 10: 51
        As for ours, since they did not practice such takeoffs with a conveyor belt during exercises, it means they could not, that's all.

        firstly, the takeoff in the air regiment was practiced more than once. It was just that the interval was taken more, 1 minute. Why - I explained. If you do not know about it - do not broadcast your ignorance to the readers. Not all pilots can believe it.
        secondly, "it means they could not" your guess. What is it based on, besides poking your finger at the ceiling? I wrote in the comments what is the risk. The Americans spat on him and flew. Our fathers-commanders at the top decided otherwise. A question of strategy, not your far-fetched and naive conclusions
        1. +11
          April 14 2021 10: 53
          For those who are in the tank, troops / forces in a combat situation can only do what was previously worked out in the course of combat training.

          What more do you want from me?
          1. -7
            April 14 2021 10: 55
            What more do you want from me?

            I want nothing. I pointed to the drawn speculation. And you really want to contradict him out of stubbornness - your business.
            1. +8
              April 14 2021 10: 56
              This is not speculation, we have never taken off at 12-15 second intervals either on the Tu-95, or on the 3M, or on the Tu-22 and 22M.
              There was no such thing.
              This is a fact.
              1. -10
                April 14 2021 11: 02
                This is not speculation, we have never taken off at 12-15 second intervals either on the Tu-95, or on the 3M, or on the Tu-22 and 22M.

                I guess - because "could not"? belay
                1. +10
                  April 14 2021 11: 05
                  The article says - because of security requirements.
                  But in the end, they could not.
                  Because they didn't train.
                  Now, if we trained, then we could.
                  1. -5
                    April 14 2021 11: 19
                    Now, if we trained, then we could.

                    I already wrote to one expert about training. I repeat: how do you work out the loss of control training at an altitude of 300 m and a speed of only 450 km / h? Or an engine failure during takeoff, when an aborted takeoff won't save you or the car behind? Let me remind you once again about the risk of 15-20 seconds that I wrote about above:
                    The Americans spat on him and flew. Our fathers-commanders at the top decided otherwise. A question of strategy, not your far-fetched and naive conclusions
                    1. +12
                      April 14 2021 11: 32
                      The Americans spat and flew and got + to the nuclear deterrent system.
                      We are not.
                      That's all.
                      They did not have accidents-disasters such as you describe
                      1. -3
                        April 14 2021 11: 52
                        The Americans spat and flew and got + to the nuclear deterrent system.
                        We are not.

                        I summarize:
                        Mr. Timokhin believes that it is technically impossible to take off on the Tu-22 with an interval between the master and the slave of 20 seconds. The reason is because it was not done that way. The argument that it is technically possible, he does not accept (probably better acquainted with piloting TB)
                        Mr. Timokhin believes that in the USSR Air Force there was no simultaneous (as he calls conveyor) flight of TB, although I already wrote that such flights were part of our TBP more than once.
                        Okay, Alexander, write. Here, judging by the downsides, gathered only experts and pilots. Who know better than me how and why. request
                      2. +12
                        April 14 2021 12: 14
                        Ospodin Timokhin believes that it is technically impossible to take off on the Tu-22 with an interval between the master and the slave of 20 seconds.


                        Why is it impossible? I didn’t write what is technically impossible.
                        Impossible legally.
                        Impossible due to insufficient l / s preparation for such take-offs.

                        Do not speculate for me, I already asked.

                        , although I have already written that in the composition of our tbap there were such flights more than once.


                        And at what intervals between cars or pairs of cars?

                        You run in circles. Calm down, practice shows that fighting Timokhin is harmful to mental health.
                        Re-read what you are commenting again.
                      3. +9
                        April 14 2021 12: 18
                        The dispute turned out to be about round and green)
                        As I understand it, no one is pleading for the skill and feats of arms of the USSR Air Force in the Cold War, and I am sure if the party had set the task, they would have found a way to take off with an interval of 15 seconds. The fact that they could and we could not - as I understand it, comes from the unwillingness of the command of the USSR Air Force to take risks of non-combat losses in an accident on takeoff. I hope they had reasons for that (for example, statistics of engine failures in takeoff modes). But A. Timokhin is also right that the US Air Force gained a certain advantage in this component, but could we (could) do so or not and for what reasons these are our problems (or not if calculations show that the risks exceed the benefits, but if these calculations were carried out and there is an opportunity to publish them, it would be interesting).
                      4. +2
                        April 14 2021 12: 33
                        you are probably right, Dmitry.
                      5. +1
                        25 May 2021 11: 55
                        And why not, judging by your "bazaar" you have a very distant relationship to the flight personnel.
                      6. 0
                        25 May 2021 12: 37
                        you are sitting in the bazaar
                      7. -1
                        April 14 2021 12: 42
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Americans spat, flew and got + to the nuclear deterrent system

                        And what + did they get, if not a secret of course?
                      8. +8
                        April 14 2021 12: 58
                        The whole article is about it
                      9. -2
                        April 14 2021 12: 59
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        The whole article is about it

                        In short, we can take off beautifully, but what's the point in this?
                      10. +6
                        April 14 2021 13: 24
                        I will not copy parts of the article here. The meaning in it is fully disclosed.
                      11. -2
                        April 14 2021 13: 30
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        I will not copy parts of the article here. The meaning in it is fully disclosed.

                        Yes and no, I read your story (story), I did not see anything new for myself, neither in your article nor in those articles that they wrote about it before you. About the meaning and benefits of this maneuver ...
                      12. +1
                        April 14 2021 19: 38
                        Something is not similar to what you read.
                      13. 0
                        April 15 2021 11: 22
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Something is not similar to what you read.

                        You will be surprised, but we studied this circus in the late 80s ...
                      14. 0
                        April 15 2021 15: 42
                        I'm surprised how eagerly you can comment on an unread text.
                      15. 0
                        April 15 2021 00: 32
                        Guys, damn it, what kind of people are you if you can't understand the elementary? I explain for the slow-witted: our warhead flies to the American airfield for about 25 minutes, during which time they need to have time to lift the planes into the air so that they do not die in vain. Can't your brains understand this?
                      16. -1
                        April 14 2021 13: 00
                        And what + did they get, if not a secret of course?

                        the flight of an ICBM from the territory of the United States to the territory of the USSR and back was about 30 minutes. From the nuclear submarine conditionally 10-15 minutes. Timokhin believes that during this time the Americans will have time to run away from the air town, sit in the seats, enter the course, start the engines, taxi to the preliminary one, get the go-ahead from the control room, take off and fly off to a distance of several tens of kilometers from the airbase so as not to get hit by a nuclear explosion ...
                      17. +1
                        April 14 2021 13: 13
                        Quote: Ka-52
                        Timokhin believes that during this time the Americans will have time to run away from the air town, sit in the seats, enter the course, start the engines, taxi to the preliminary one, get the go-ahead from the control room, take off and fly off to a distance of several tens of kilometers from the airbase so as not to get hit by a nuclear explosion ...

                        Yes, that's what I'm hinting at, it's one thing when you prepare half a day for such a flight and start the exercise, and it will look quite differently in the "out of the blanket" mode ... But a person does not understand, and does not know many little things , for example, after a cartridge launch, routine maintenance is required, and who will carry them out, even if not injured, but empty and not prepared for this airfield. Yes, I repeat it looks spectacular, but what is the combat value of the maneuver? 0 !!!
                      18. +6
                        April 14 2021 13: 25
                        Do you also comment on the article without reading it? 20 minutes = 6-8 aircraft from any airbase based on the experience of their exercises.

                        No need to deny reality, this is not to the face of an adult
                      19. -3
                        April 14 2021 13: 36
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        20 minutes = 6-8 aircraft from any airbase based on the experience of their exercises.
                        No need to deny reality, this is not to the face of an adult
                        AND? What's next then? Well, they took off, well, they circled further, then what?
                      20. +1
                        April 14 2021 19: 35
                        The article says that.
                      21. -1
                        April 15 2021 00: 35
                        what's next?
                        Then they flew to bomb us.
    6. -1
      April 14 2021 15: 01
      Quote: Ka-52
      no need to fool people. The problem is not "could-could not", but that with an interval of 15-20 seconds. taking off could get into the wake of the aircraft in front. Therefore, they flew at one minute intervals. That is, technically, you can fly at least on the tail of the leader, but with the risk of slamming against the runway. To think that the Americans could somehow get rid of such a risk is pure nonsense.

      In Russia, there are military airfields with 1 runway and there are 2 or more. At aerodromes with two-lane runways, planes can be lifted simultaneously in 2 lanes and there will be no such problem.
      1. -1
        April 15 2021 00: 36
        Apparently there will be problems, since we did not even try to do this.
  4. +5
    April 14 2021 07: 41
    the transformation of our Tu-95 and Tu-160 into "clean" cruise missile carriers, the flight mission for which is prepared in advance on the ground, was a mistake.
    I do not understand what the mistake is, nuclear weapons imply many degrees of protection and a minimum of human factor influence on the solution of tasks for use at the lower level. They gave an alarm task, uploaded them into the aircraft's on-board computer, into the missile heads. The commander brought the aircraft to the specified point and dropped it. missiles and where will they go to New York or Detroit, why does he need this information. And he simply has neither the right nor the ability to retarget missiles privately.
    1. +3
      April 14 2021 08: 21
      The author has everything on punched cards and everything manually ..
      1. +1
        April 14 2021 10: 45
        Manually or not, it takes more than a month to reprogram all our RCs. And then you have to strain.
        1. +4
          April 14 2021 12: 44
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          Manually or not, it takes more than a month to reprogram all our RCs. And then you have to strain.

          That is, you are aware of such a moment? How long does it take to reprogram the American ones, or not at all? Especially on a plane taking off? And what is the state of the vigorous ammunition on board this aircraft? ready to use, or do you still need to carry out some operations with it? Again, the question is, how long can a special munition be on board an aircraft, without maintenance? Do you know there are some features, by the way, on VO already about these features of storage and maintenance of special ammunition was told. That is, how not to turn and the special ammunition must be periodically removed for maintenance, which does not take place in one hour. Specificity. And even if they took off beautifully with an interval of 15 seconds, and the sense of the yadrenbaton on the regulations ... Once again I will repeat beautifully but without sensible.
          1. +3
            April 14 2021 13: 05
            I have a feeling that without reading the material, you rushed to comment on it.

            How long does it take to reprogram the American ones, or not at all? Especially on a plane taking off?


            I don't know, I think it's a comparable time. But the fact is that they have more than just CD. And this is clearly written in the article.

            And what is the state of the vigorous ammunition on board this aircraft? ready to use, or do you still need to carry out some operations with it?


            And to read what you comment on is not destiny?

            Do you know there are some features, by the way, on VO already about these features of storage and maintenance of special ammunition was told. That is, how not to turn and the special ammunition must be periodically removed for maintenance, which does not take place in one hour.


            Well, you need a plane, so what? There are duty forces ready for immediate take-off and the use of weapons, when they are replaced by rotation, then the regulations will be made.

            What is the problem?

            Specificity. And let them take off beautifully with an interval of 15 seconds, but the sense is yadrenbaton


            Do you really think that this cannot be planned?

            Once again I will repeat beautifully but without sensible.


            One B-52 in the 80s, 12 210 kt aeroballistic missiles and a couple of bombs, I don’t remember how many. There are 14 charges in total.

            With the withdrawal of 6-8 vehicles from 5-6 air bases, we get 420-672 warheads on 30-48 carriers.

            Of course it's stupid!
            1. +1
              April 14 2021 13: 22
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              With the withdrawal of 6-8 vehicles from 5-6 air bases, we get 420-672 warheads on 30-48 carriers.

              You don't get anything, for a simple reason
              As of early 2021, the US Department of Defense maintained an estimated 3800 nuclear warheads for delivery on 800 ballistic missiles and aircraft. [6] Most of the stock warheads are not deployed, but are stored for potential loading on missiles and aircraft when needed. Many will have to "retire." According to our estimates, about 1800 warheads are currently deployed, of which about 1400 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles, and more 300 - at the bases of strategic bombers in the United States.

              A total of 300 charges. TRIST in total. This is with those who are on the database, on regulations, and in storage.
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              There are duty forces ready for immediate take-off and the use of weapons, when they are replaced by rotation, then the regulations will be made.

              As I understand it, you do not understand anything in this matter. Neither what are the forces on duty, nor the specifics of combat duty, and even more so about the rules for storing special ammunition ...
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Do you really think that this cannot be planned?

              The beginning of a worldwide apocalypse? Why can't you schedule it when the US Air Force has a shift change?
              1. +4
                April 14 2021 13: 26
                On principle, I refuse to retell the text that you are trying to comment on.
                Everything is written in the article.
                And the years when all this happened are also mentioned.
                1. -1
                  April 14 2021 13: 55
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  And the years when all this happened are also mentioned.

                  That's just the point that happened! HAPPENED. And even the Americans realized that there was no point in this. Dispersal of aviation in advance makes more use and sense
                  A characteristic feature of the B-52 in the 80s was the white coloring of the lower part of the fuselage, to reflect the light radiation of a nuclear explosion. The top was camouflaged in order to merge with the ground during low-altitude flight.
                  It should be admitted that the breakthrough of the USSR air defense with such tactical schemes was quite real
                  Well, yes, a serious tactical scheme. Moreover, in Vietnam, they were used from high altitudes, but as an aircraft for a low-altitude breakthrough of the B-52 air defense, well, not like in this regard, the fact that sometimes they dropped in flights to the height of the ship's superstructures is not an indicator. All cases of combat use of the B-52 consisted of use from high altitudes.
                  1. +2
                    April 14 2021 19: 34
                    All cases of combat use of the B-52 consisted of the use from high altitudes.


                    Well, there was no nuclear war if, what to do.
            2. 0
              April 26 2021 04: 05
              Why are you arguing?))))))) They are right. In my own way))))))
          2. +1
            April 14 2021 14: 21
            I also do not believe that the Yankees with loaded nuclear warheads stood on taxiways for months, bullshit, there is its own storage technology, there is constant radiation from the warhead and protection is needed, there are also a million protections and protections ...
            1. 0
              April 14 2021 19: 33
              And who told you about the months? It took a week under normal conditions. Then the rotation of crews and aircraft. Bombs for regulations, etc.
            2. -1
              April 15 2021 00: 49
              there is constant radiation from the warhead
              And how do our Poplars carry it, after all, the warhead is right above the cab of the driver and his colleagues? Well, how did the radiation from the warhead not kill the drivers?
              1. +2
                April 15 2021 05: 15
                This is a military secret, as they carry laughing
    2. +2
      April 14 2021 09: 05
      Quote: anjey
      And he simply has neither the right nor the ability to retarget missiles privately.

      It's not about a private order, but about the ability to change the task of the bomber after the departure: for example, new information came from intelligence, which changed priorities. Or, for example, some new circumstances do not allow the bomb carrier to reach the main target, but it can still work out for some alternative.
      1. +1
        April 14 2021 10: 57
        Do you understand what strategic tasks are in a nuclear conflict? There will be no time, funds and opportunities for some kind of improvisation.
        1. +1
          April 14 2021 11: 34
          It's not about improvisation.
          In the course of hostilities, the situation happens and changes.
          1. +3
            April 14 2021 14: 26
            You are confusing the tactical component with the strategic one under the conditions of a nuclear strike, especially since the main fleet of strategic aviation simply will not have time to take off with nuclear warheads on board.
            1. 0
              April 15 2021 00: 59
              But many will take off, for example, NATO is full of F-16CG / DGs, there is also a Tornado, and these aircraft can carry B61 nuclear bombs. And when the air defense is knocked out to us, they will easily break through and finish off the surviving objects. It is not necessary to enter target designation into the bomb.
    3. +3
      April 14 2021 10: 38
      You greatly simplify the process of preparing and loading a flight mission.

      It makes no difference to the pilot where the missiles go, but to the headquarters planning operations, there is even a difference.
      1. +2
        April 14 2021 11: 01
        The headquarters are responsible for the development of tactical tasks for the exits of the boards into the launch zones, and here the strategic goals and objectives and information at the level of the general staff and the supreme, this is nuclear weapons. The headquarters of the regiments do not know these goals, they can change at the highest level ... declaring that today I am flying with a regiment to destroy Washington, New Orleans and Chicago.
        1. +1
          April 14 2021 11: 04
          The fact is that it makes a difference which targets are hit.
          1. +2
            April 14 2021 14: 28
            What are you talking about, I served in the strategic aviation.
            1. -1
              April 14 2021 19: 32
              In what aviation? !!!

              In essence, the enemy has such mobile forces as the fleet, aviation, they constantly change their deployment locations, military objects that were not considered priority targets before the war, etc., can manifest themselves.

              There are tasks for additional reconnaissance of the target and strike. There is a need to retarget a plane - Target A is not hit, because the bomber that was supposed to hit it for technical reasons crashed, another plane must be sent to it, but how? KR is not reprogrammed.

              You watch a movie, there ALL of these moments with the use of bombers are shown, despite the cranberries.
              1. 0
                April 14 2021 19: 36
                Cinema dear is one thing and life is another laughing
                1. 0
                  April 14 2021 19: 40
                  In this case, the movie showed how it can be real there.
              2. -1
                April 14 2021 19: 38
                You do not know what strategic aviation is, I am surprised at you? What are you and to whom you are writing here, they no longer see you laughing
                1. +2
                  April 14 2021 19: 40
                  There is no such kind of aviation forces in Russia - "strategic aviation".
                  1. 0
                    April 14 2021 20: 17
                    And in your opinion there is no nuclear Triad, are you from Warsaw? Or Ashdod again? Rabinovich?
                    1. +2
                      April 14 2021 20: 40
                      There is long-range aviation in the Russian Federation, but no strategic one.
                      1. -1
                        April 14 2021 21: 12
                        And what do you think Dalnaya with nuclear weapons on board are not strategists? You are not as stupid as Friedman from Zhmerinka? laughing
                      2. 0
                        April 14 2021 23: 20
                        In my opinion, you do not know what your troops were called. What kind of hints.
    4. The comment was deleted.
  5. -2
    April 14 2021 07: 51
    Quote: Alexander Timokhin
    ... let's look, for example, at the Tu-22M ... And ask ourselves a question, How many minutes lost during an emergency takeoff - to clean the gangway?

    To pull the ladder aside - no more than five seconds.
    1. +7
      April 14 2021 08: 17
      Quote: Boris55
      To pull the ladder aside - no more than five seconds.

      NO!
      1. -3
        April 14 2021 08: 20
        Quote: Bez 310
        NO!

        He's on wheels laughing
      2. +2
        April 14 2021 10: 10
        NO!

        Please voice the opinion of a professional, as much as possible, of course!
        1. +14
          April 14 2021 10: 32
          Quote: ramzay21
          Please voice the opinion of a professional

          This is not a ladder, but a STEPLADDER.
          It is stalled, that is, it is impossible to budge,
          without unscrewing the screw stops. The stepladder is heavy
          and it takes several people to move it.
          And in general, boarding the crew on the Tu-22m3 is a very
          difficult and not the fastest.
          1. +2
            April 14 2021 11: 28
            Clear! Thank!
    2. +3
      April 14 2021 09: 12
      Quote: Boris55
      To pull the ladder aside - no more than five seconds.

      And what is the wing length of the Tu-22M on takeoff? 13-15 meters? You have to run fast. And then this ladder must be dragged away somewhere further so that it does not interfere with the rest of the planes.
      1. -1
        April 14 2021 09: 22
        They are not on the taxi stand and not the runway. So who will be disturbed?)
    3. +7
      April 14 2021 09: 48
      Quote: Boris55
      Quote: Alexander Timokhin
      ... let's look, for example, at the Tu-22M ... And ask ourselves a question, How many minutes lost during an emergency takeoff - to clean the gangway?

      To pull the ladder aside - no more than five seconds.

      And to drag? Well, everything connected with it? The author's thought is ABSOLUTELY clear and correct
  6. +2
    April 14 2021 08: 06
    Thank you so much for the interesting and informative article.
  7. +8
    April 14 2021 08: 11
    I had to participate in training for getting out of the blow, so I understand well what the article is about. But how did the preparation of the navigation complex proceed?
    1. +5
      April 14 2021 10: 43
      I deliberately did not delve into this issue. As I understand it, there ANN + astrocorrection, probably exhibited by the luminaries, then went along the ANN.
      Western INS are exposed in motion quickly and accurately.
      Plus, before the nuclear strike, they could receive signals from radio navigation systems, and they could also be used for INS.

      Didn't find out on purpose.
  8. +3
    April 14 2021 09: 16
    Detailed, sensible, interesting. Thanks to the author.
  9. +3
    April 14 2021 09: 56
    Thanks to Alexander for a great article! Everything is correctly stated. You have to learn from the Americans.
  10. +5
    April 14 2021 09: 56
    A very good article. The material is weighted, calmly stated. And with meaning, and not just "to write" It is especially pleasant that the author managed to avoid opposing strategic aviation to other forces (the Navy, for example, as was the custom recently among fans of strategic aviation). The niche is shown very well why and why strategic aviation makes sense. The dictates of operational readiness (or the lack of such in our case, that is, problems) are also well covered
  11. +3
    April 14 2021 10: 09
    To be honest, I would very much like to see something similar (calm, meaningful, with knowledge of the subject) from the authors who claim that they know and love aviation, but for some reason decided that their task for today is to fight the fleet, and not the enemy's, but their own. If any of them would undertake to write something about the real possibilities of response, etc. in Russian aviation, it would be really interesting material (just no reprints from Wiki about what cool planes are there)
  12. +7
    April 14 2021 12: 20
    Here they began to argue - can our planes take off so quickly, or not? But the fact is that a quick takeoff is the "end product" of the system for preparing an aircraft for take-off by "taking out from under impact." I don’t know in what condition (readiness) those B-52s, which launch and take off so quickly, are. So we should not talk about the take-off time of the aircraft that taxied, but about the time the aircraft is ready to taxi after receiving the signal. If all the aircraft systems are ready, and powered by an APU or an airfield source, this is one thing, but if the aircraft is sheathed, then this is quite another. In general, the video of quick start and taxiing makes me think that the planes have already been prepared, it remains only to start the engines, and switch to power from the generators. All this is very similar to "window dressing".
    1. +5
      April 14 2021 12: 26
      This is not window dressing, it's just that these are the planes that are on alert. Yes, they were always fully prepared for take-off, refueled, stood with suspended weapons.
      All they had to do was start the engines from the pyrostarters, and that was all.

      This was the meaning of the watch.
      1. +7
        April 14 2021 13: 21
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        these are the planes that are on alert.

        So that makes a difference!
        This is not "taking out from under the blow", this is taking off from the database.
        1. +1
          April 14 2021 13: 27
          They would have received the take-off command at the moment the early warning system was triggered, and our missiles were sent to their airbases.
          So what is so true and so true.
          1. +5
            April 14 2021 15: 06
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            So what is so true and so true.

            No, not true.
            Departure from the database - departure on signal, planes and crews are ready,
            the planes are checked, all systems are working, the crews are nearby
            or on planes.
            Conclusion from under attack - planes and crews in constant readiness,
            aircraft with operational refueling, sheathed, crews are
            at home.
            1. +3
              April 14 2021 19: 29
              Well this is our terminology, not theirs.
              Then it turns out that Departure from the database, but with a caveat - it was necessary to take off faster than the ICBM will reach the airfield.
              1. 0
                April 14 2021 19: 55
                During the flight time of the American ballistic missile - 45 minutes, we hung only one CD missile under the plane, so draw conclusions and the constant combat readiness of the Americans is also a myth. By the way, the Americans are still hoaxers, remember the Moon and their historical, constant bluff in poker laughing ...
                1. +3
                  April 14 2021 20: 38
                  Well, it's useless to talk about these things with the captains.
                2. +1
                  April 15 2021 00: 37
                  By the way, the Americans are still hoaxers, remember the moon

                  In fact, the flight to the moon is a historical fact, confirmed, among other things, by the USSR. If there was a hoax, ours would have immediately discovered and published this fact.
                  1. -1
                    April 15 2021 12: 01
                    But this is not a fact. Exchange of lunar disinformation for something valuable for those who have hammered into a real confrontation, in order to move them farther and shouting to the whole World-World-world, Politburo elders do not consider?
                    1. 0
                      April 15 2021 19: 37
                      This flight was tracked by our space observation systems, as well as by systems in many countries of the world. And you are the leadership of one of the world's two superpowers, do not compare with the current leadership.
              2. 0
                April 14 2021 20: 08
                Do you naively believe that nuclear warheads will be constantly on duty on the plane?
                1. +2
                  April 14 2021 20: 39
                  This was the case in their case from 1955 to 1991.

                  Have you ever tried to read what you comment on? Disasters with radioactive contamination in Spain and Greenland what was it?
                  1. -2
                    April 15 2021 00: 44
                    This is certainly an interesting experience, but do you think hypersonic cruise missiles will put an end to the use of this method of getting out of the impact, because the flight time of hypersonic missiles will be much less than 20 minutes?
                    1. +1
                      April 15 2021 00: 50
                      It is necessary to drive the carrier of hypersonic missiles close to the coast.
                      In general, hypersound really changes a lot, but for example, the dispersal of aviation partially solves the problem - they won't cover everyone, they won't just reveal it on time.

                      In addition, you can also invest in an air defense system.

                      The same S-400 hypersonic missile of the "Zircon" type will be knocked down "once".
                  2. +2
                    April 15 2021 05: 00
                    I didn’t deny flying on a DB with nuclear warheads, but no one would keep them under the plane all the time.
                    1. +2
                      April 15 2021 06: 48
                      Duty under normal conditions was 7 days, in the limit up to 14, then the plane, and the crew, and the bomb changed.
                      1. +1
                        April 15 2021 11: 53
                        There were times on the brink of war, for example, the same "Caribbean Crisis" when nuclear weapons were on duty on carriers, then crises changed with political warming and there was no such urgent need to keep nuclear weapons constantly ready under the aircraft, long-range missiles appeared, on KR aircraft with special warheads, but due to the secrecy, the specifics of storage, reporting and a multi-stage access and security system, SBCs or nuclear warheads began to actually equip less often, even on a DB, so I think the Americans had and still have such difficulties, you indicate in the article and even emphasize the 100% readiness of the Americans, as if you yourself were constantly equipping and taking out their nuclear warheads for planes, I saw two types of warheads on alarm and when equipping, and I'm not sure that they were real and not simple telemetry, "deaf and dumb" with RTB no such secrets were shared with us. laughing
                      2. +1
                        April 15 2021 13: 23
                        and there was no such urgent need to keep nuclear weapons constantly at the ready under the aircraft


                        Whether or not it was one question, the fact that they kept him there was another.
            2. -3
              April 15 2021 01: 11
              Why cover the plane?
      2. 0
        April 14 2021 19: 48
        They were Yankee show-offs, I don't believe it, I know what a DB is, it's 50% Big Bluff on both sides ...
    2. +6
      April 14 2021 13: 05
      I testify that they kept up to 200 vehicles in full readiness. During the 1975 exercise, 220 units were lifted into the sky, and in the summer of 1976 even more (I don't remember exactly). The enemy was extremely serious and motivated by the fact that, in their opinion, they "were not allowed to win in Vietnam."
      1. +4
        April 14 2021 13: 26
        Quote: Victor Leningradets
        I testify that they kept up to 200 vehicles in full readiness.

        You are not entirely accurate in terminology, hence the "misunderstandings" arise. "Ready" for what? For flights? So this is not an achievement, but a common thing ... In the Soviet MRA, more than 20 aircraft from the regiment were taken out for regular flights, and this did not surprise anyone.
        1. +6
          April 14 2021 13: 49
          On duty for the Giant Lance program. We tracked them by numbers. Crews, weapons, airfield services - everything is on the database. If anything - "Quick Start White" and forward the training. And if "Quick Start Red" ...
          By the way, they shot and bombed at targets very accurately.
          1. 0
            April 14 2021 20: 03
            And that missiles and bombs with nuclear warheads were tracked by the American ....? The article is about the use of nuclear weapons by aviation, as I understand it.
      2. 0
        April 14 2021 20: 01
        Are you from the GRU? laughing
  13. +7
    April 14 2021 13: 13
    Thank you so much, Alexander!
    This is how experts write, popularly, understandably without unnecessary details - the very essence.
    I read it - I just returned to my youth. By the way, the B-1A was practiced in 1975 as an AGM-69 (SRAM) carrier to break through air defense, and the B-52G and B-52H - to destroy objects on enemy territory.
  14. +1
    April 14 2021 13: 59
    America would have gotten its big war with tens of millions of corpses
    Like the USSR and China ...
  15. +1
    April 14 2021 15: 16
    “It is important to recognize ... that the forces armed with ballistic missiles,
    both in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, represent
    potential for conducting strategic nuclear war
    at the most indiscriminate level, at the highest level, at the level,
    least controllable.

    The use of this weapon in a lower-level conflict,
    will likely lead to an uncontrolled escalation of the situation to an intensity,
    which can be largely
    disproportionate to the scale of the initial collision. "
    Isn't it easier to STOP provocations and escalating tensions, withdraw US troops from military bases outside the US itself and stop driving their AUGs across the oceans?
    1. +1
      April 14 2021 16: 40
      This is a philosophical question, this will probably never happen. The gene of aggression in humans cannot be eradicated.
      1. +1
        April 14 2021 16: 44
        That is so, but the US Chiefs of Staff have already simulated local wars five times - first against the USSR, now against Russia, with conventional weapons. And each time they turned into a nuclear war.
        1. 0
          April 14 2021 17: 15
          As long as there is even a potential threat from the Russian Federation, they will prepare for war. It is also true in the opposite direction. We are sure that we are not going to attack them, but from the point of view of military planning, if there is a potential threat, we must have plans to repel it, or better to eliminate or level it, which is what they actually do. Independence is very expensive in every sense.
          1. +2
            April 15 2021 16: 54
            "While there is even a potential threat from the Russian Federation,"
            Where do you see this potential threat? Where are the Russian military bases near Italy, Portugal, Great Britain, USA, Greece, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Japan ...? There is really only one Russian military base abroad: Khmeimim. The Kaliningrad region and Crimea are not called the territory of Russia. On the other hand, there are hundreds of NATO bases around Russia - in Poland, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic States, Norway, Japan, Germany - and in Ukraine, the United States is going to build two military bases - in Ochakov and Nikolaev, although Ukraine is not a member NATO, NATO warships are constantly climbing in the Black Sea to the shores of Russia.
  16. 0
    April 14 2021 16: 32
    And we still have hope and personal heroism.
  17. +1
    April 14 2021 19: 12
    Thank you so much for the article, very informative. Order beats the class. And if the class is ordered, then this is a terrible force.
    1. -1
      April 14 2021 19: 25
      And if the class is ordered, then this is a terrible force.


      Yes, class and order were on the side of the enemy.
  18. 0
    April 14 2021 19: 43
    Thanks to the author for a good and competent article! Although it was sad to read - our adversary is attentive to details, highly cultured in production and meticulous in innovation with an incomparably larger economy. In fact, this is the worst that could have been, but since the 1980s it has also caught up with us in terms of demographics.

    I have a suspicion that at some point in the Cold War, the leadership of the USSR concluded that an all-out nuclear war is extremely unlikely precisely for reasons of statistical and quantitative modeling. And since then, in fact, our preparation for this was carried out on the principle of a formidable but formal saber rattling, but the enemy just considered everything much more seriously.
    1. +2
      April 14 2021 21: 06
      And since then, in fact, our preparation for this was carried out on the principle of a formidable but formal saber rattling, but the enemy just considered everything much more seriously.


      Quite right. So it has been around since 1984.
  19. +2
    April 14 2021 22: 00
    The article is good, but its place is in the "history" section)) Even there it eats "stretch marks" in the number of those who managed to get away from the FIRST (by the author) enemy strike. No 20 minutes. will not (then) From the Caribbean owls. SLBMs covered all SAC bases in 5-8 minutes.
    And what was previously impossible to implement now. Previously, activation codes were in 2 (envelopes?) From the commander and ... Free-falling ones could attack and what they themselves decide. Now such risks are no longer acceptable, and people are no longer the same (psychologically), such trust cannot be given to them. Remember (German?) Ebus crashed in the slopes of the Alps. It turned out that the co-pilot turned off the automatics and deliberately ... had wanted to die for a long time, had been treated by a psychologist (a doctor. Mystery!) Finally decided and so it would not be boring ...
    So what is a strategist. bombers are good as a means of RETURN - the invention of a respected author. And even as the first, not very bases are observed, it is impossible to lift a lot at the same time, and the approach time is long.
    1. +2
      April 14 2021 23: 19
      From the Caribbean Sea owls. SLBMs covered all SAC bases in 5-8 minutes.


      Most of the boats were tracked and at the beginning of preparation for launch (there are a number of noisy processes such as trimming) they would have been destroyed. So they didn't cover it. Well, if one or two.

      And what was previously impossible to implement now. Previously, activation codes were in 2 (envelopes?) From the commander and ... Free-falling ones could attack and what they themselves decide. Now such risks are no longer acceptable


      But the B-2s still carry bombs, and it was precisely in order to be able to attack that he himself decided. And with the B-52, the bomb strikes were removed only in 2018.
      Do not "beat" your statements with reality.
      1. 0
        April 15 2021 00: 27
        Do not "beat" your statements with reality.

        Which of them? The fact that your statement (strategic bombers are good as a means of retaliation) is wrong?
        Most of the boats were tracked at the beginning of preparation for launch (there are a number of noisy processes such as trimming) they would be destroyed.

        Straight in the harbors of Cuba? It's about first shock (if they wanted it in the USSR)
        Here are only B-2s carry bombs to this day, and precisely in order to be able to attack that he himself decided

        Where are they? On duty for KICKback ?? And probably the activation is still "network-centric")) And then "private nuclear weapons" ...
        1. +2
          April 15 2021 00: 35
          Which of them?


          Which I have quoted.

          Straight in the harbors of Cuba?


          But from this place in more detail, please.
    2. -1
      April 15 2021 12: 51
      I would like to add that the defeat of an airfield with carriers is calculated taking into account all the capabilities of a potential enemy.
      Those. or a reduction in the strike time or an increase in the affected area is chosen.
  20. 0
    April 14 2021 23: 16
    Wow! This is possibly the best article I've read in a while! It was extremely interesting, thanks.
  21. -1
    April 14 2021 23: 24
    Damn, these things need to be thought out in advance. I am simply amazed at the "stupidity" of the military if such banal things as the organization of alert duty cannot agree. And such logical chains as issuing control points and all that. Is it difficult?
    1. 0
      April 14 2021 23: 31
      The combination of risk modeling + economy multiplied by time and other tasks (including of a defense nature) ruined more than one beautiful and effective structure. When the Third World War is expected for decades, everyone gradually gets used to it .. well, or almost everyone.
  22. -3
    April 14 2021 23: 57
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    All cases of combat use of the B-52 consisted of the use from high altitudes.


    Well, there was no nuclear war if, what to do.

    And you smoke that the use of special ammunition, the more freely falling would be made from low altitudes?
    1. +4
      April 15 2021 00: 34
      Breakthrough to the goal would be carried out incl. at low altitudes. Reset of course not.

      PS No silly questions to ask, please.
      1. -2
        April 15 2021 11: 32
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Breakthrough to the goal would be carried out incl. at low altitudes. Reset of course not.
        PS No silly questions to ask, please.
        So you would not write nonsense. It's just that the B-52 is not suited for low-altitude air defense breakthroughs. Although they write that it is a type of breakthrough at a low altitude, the machine is a priori not suitable for this. At low altitude, it is a slow-moving, low-maneuverable, huge target.
        1. +1
          April 15 2021 11: 53
          They were specially modified for a low-altitude breakthrough of air defense, and the avionics were also finalized - up to the display of the terrain relief on the screens of the pilots right along the course.
          He behaves normally at low altitude.





          The speed is low, but this is on the contrary a plus - for the old conscientious interceptors with their radars, such a speed would make it difficult to detect the target.
          1. 0
            April 15 2021 12: 56
            In Vietnam, bombers at low altitude tried to escape missiles and were hit by machine guns.
            About the minimum damage from anti-aircraft missiles in Vietnam smiled, but then where are the hundreds of coffins with pilots?
            There was a swing of a shield and a sword no more.
            1. +2
              April 15 2021 13: 22
              Look at the percentage of successful launches on B-52 - there is something to be surprised
              1. -1
                April 15 2021 16: 31
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Look at the percentage of successful launches on B-52 - there is something to be surprised

                So let's take into account, firstly, that this is not the air defense of the USSR, and secondly, the planes were flying at high altitudes. Why didn't you go small? In the same place as you write
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                this is on the contrary a plus - for the old conscientious interceptors with their radar, such a speed would make it difficult to detect targets.

                Or, unlike you, there people thought with their heads and compared the facts. Indeed, in just a month of testing in a combat situation, 3 out of 6 (THREE out of Six = 50%) specialized aircraft for breaking through air defense at low altitudes equipped with a terrain avoidance system - F-111 were shot down. And all of these super-sophisticated devices were shot down 11, not counting those that were written off as not subject to recovery. He arrived, but he won't take off. This is once again to draw your attention to an aircraft that specialized in low-altitude flight, breakthrough and approach to the target. And this is for a country with limited air defense capabilities (this is not the USSR) with obsolete interceptors, because in 1972 the air defense of the SRV was not armed with either the MiG-25P, or the Su-15TM, ​​or the Yak-28PM in the end. And given the number of airfields at that time, you can't shoot a missile with nuclear warheads for each, as well as considering that there are certain routes for all bombers from the USA to the USSR and back, well, they will fly through Antarctica, ground-based air defense units are deployed in these threatened directions (the level of training and possession of higher-quality equipment is still higher than that of the Vietnamese), again, you can't bang a missile for every radar station ... So this American circus remained only as another beautiful cut of the dough. And even such a moment during the years of service in the SGV, our regiment periodically practiced the task "all of a sudden", when at the same time the whole regiment took off, the planes taxied out of shelters, arches, and take off, one squadron along the taxiway, another along the runway, the third along the highway. 15-20 minutes the regiment is in the air, and given that these events were carried out as part of the division, the regiments are sitting at different airfields, we at the ZKP called it "porridge in the air." So once again I repeat the benefits of this American circus -0.

                Simultaneous takeoff of a pair of Su-27 and departure of a squadron of Su-7BKL. And even now we periodically practice such a task of getting the planes out of the attack.
                1. 0
                  April 21 2021 18: 42
                  And this is for a country with limited air defense capabilities (this is not the USSR) with obsolete interceptors, because in 1972 the air defense of the SRV was not armed with either the MiG-25P, or the Su-15TM, ​​or the Yak-28PM in the end


                  And we all of the USSR was stuck with MZA? Nothing that the conditions were different to put it mildly? In Vietnam, tactical aircraft with PRR could cover them, at least the proportions between MZA and SAM were completely different, nuclear weapons were not used.

                  Enough to deny the obvious already, you are now carrying the dregs of the level of some "New Chronology" by Fomenko, that is, you are denying well-known and many times verified historical facts head-on.

                  Simultaneous takeoff of a pair of Su-27 and departure of a squadron of Su-7BKL. And even now we periodically practice such a task of getting the planes out of the attack.


                  Long-range aviation did not do that. I myself can tell about the IBA, right up to the takeoff of the regiment in front of the Minister of Defense Grechko, but this is different.
  23. AML
    -3
    April 15 2021 22: 01
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    I deliberately did not delve into this issue. As I understand it, there ANN + astrocorrection, probably exhibited by the luminaries, then went along the ANN.
    Western INS are exposed in motion quickly and accurately.
    Plus, before the nuclear strike, they could receive signals from radio navigation systems, and they could also be used for INS.

    Didn't find out on purpose.


    Well, find out. To spin the gyroscope, even now, it is half an hour of time. And only motionless on the ground. In the air, you don't. Although, of course, these are Americans, they can.
    1. +2
      April 16 2021 00: 04
      It doesn't take half an hour anymore, ANN based on FOCL and GPS plus solve this problem quickly.
      1. AML
        -3
        April 16 2021 02: 12
        Quote: merkava-2bet
        It doesn't take half an hour anymore, ANN based on FOCL and GPS plus solve this problem quickly.

        If Americans get their knowledge from the same sources as you do, we have nothing to fear.

        1. +1
          April 16 2021 12: 09
          I'm used to hitting my face with facts to make it feel good.


          And this is so offhand, so that your brain does not flow.
    2. 0
      April 19 2021 12: 44
      I once participated in a tender for the supply of INS modules for armored vehicles of one country, so that each unit would have navigation independent of "space", so there the client set the INS commissioning time on the go, and we provided its exhibition on the go, during just did not meet, we do not know how as Westerners.
  24. +2
    April 15 2021 23: 51
    Great article, thanks, but there are a few nuances.
    1) AGM-86 cruise missiles could be reprogrammed in bomber flight after 1985, after the modernization of the INS and the introduction of the NAVSTAR SNS, and the AGM-129 cruise missiles immediately received the NAVSTAR SNS receivers, that is, there was no problem changing the flight task for the cruise missile.
    2) The survivability of bombers on the continental United States increased due to a gigantic number of airfields, more than 13000 runways, and even if, say, 500 of them could receive B-52 type aircraft, it is a very big problem to destroy them.
    3) I advise all those who argue here about the B-52 to read K. Kuznetsov


    And also S. Moroz "Enemy number one" in the magazine "Aviation and Cosmonautics", or download from the forum where I posted them.
    http://militaryrussia.ru/forum/viewtopic.php?f=734&t=2180&sid=708bdb6041b5f7beb27783f4eaf71883&start=100
    1. 0
      April 19 2021 12: 45
      1) AGM-86 cruise missiles could be reprogrammed in bomber flight after 1985, after the modernization of the INS and the introduction of the NAVSTAR SNS, and the AGM-129 cruise missiles immediately received the NAVSTAR SNS receivers, that is, there was no problem changing the flight task for the cruise missile.


      And who and how would it do this on a combat mission?
      1. 0
        April 20 2021 21: 25
        As far as I understood from some English-language sources, they had "battle corridors" and replaceable cartridges of flight missions, of course, at the beginning it was difficult and the main thing was the accuracy, but after the modernization of 1985 everything became much simpler, especially with the AGM-129 CR. smarter than the CD AGM-86B.
        1. +1
          April 21 2021 09: 04
          Something I have doubts, considering how they struggled with flight missions during the Gulf War.
          1. 0
            April 21 2021 13: 01
            I've heard this half-bike many times.
            But it breaks down on the facts, since 1986, the AGM-86C KR with a conventional warhead and a NAVSTAR SNS receiver has been adopted, and the TERCOM system with the R-1000 INS as additional channels. I'm sure that the problem was in the weak jamming immunity of the satellite navigation channel, and they were and therefore decided to play it safe, firing through the northern mountainous regions of Iraq, where the TERCOM system worked tolerably. There were no further problems with missiles with GPS SNS when flying in desert areas, especially in the AGM-86C block 1 modification, which have protected and multichannel GPS receivers.
            1. 0
              April 21 2021 18: 32
              I meant how they prescribed them then.
  25. AML
    -3
    April 16 2021 02: 24
    Quote: merkava-2bet

    3) I advise all those who argue here about the B-52 to read K. Kuznetsov


    And here no one argues about the B-52. Here the argument about jumping in and out quickly has no practical application.

    Well, for those who do not know, even in the USSR there were air defense missiles with nuclear warheads. It can be argued that this compensated for the low probability of hitting, but it can also be argued that the quantity does not always decide and for each bolt with a cunning thread there is its own nut.
    1. +2
      April 16 2021 12: 18
      Well, for those who do not know, even in the USSR there were air defense missiles with nuclear warheads. It can be argued that this compensated for the low probability of hitting, but it can also be argued that the quantity does not always decide and for each bolt with a cunning thread there is its own nut.

      You read the article badly again, and that the Americans didn’t fly in a handful like in WWII, and that the Americans didn’t fly in a group like in WWII, besides, their weapons simply shot down the air defense, AGM-69 SRAM, AGM-86B, and the ADM-20 Quail REP ADM-XNUMX Quail bait rocket.
    2. +2
      April 16 2021 14: 46
      And here no one argues about the B-52. Here the argument about jumping in and out quickly has no practical application.

      Yeah, they have been honing their skills for almost 40 years and have achieved excellent results in terms of the survivability of their cars and crews, well, they are not "stupid", but what do you have, cars stand in the rain and snow, flights once a week, etc. the annual flight time of the B-52 crews over 500 hours, somehow they wanted to reduce it to 400 hours, so they raised a riot, and the average B-52 training flight was 6,7 hours, what pedants.
    3. +1
      April 19 2021 12: 48
      And here no one argues about the B-52. Here the argument about jumping in and out quickly has no practical application.


      Brainless Americans have been working out this for 40 years in large quantities, in vain they burned kerosene.

      This is how the savages are exterminated if anything. An enemy warrior cannot kill our warrior from a hundred meters, a spear does not fly so far.

      And then we wonder how in 1941, how they did it ...
  26. +1
    April 16 2021 08: 30
    Quote: ramzay21
    This flight was tracked by our space observation systems, as well as by systems in many countries of the world. And you are the leadership of one of the world's two superpowers, do not compare with the current leadership.

    The strongest superpower of the USSR was made by Stalin with the marshals, reaching Berlin and half of the bourgeois world and Beria, Kurchatov and Korolev, who created the shield of socialism. And these all profiled, driving the loot into the offensive power of thousands of tanks that were not going to be used for the second half. And they disintegrated the socialist society, screwing up the USSR. It was they who put the backsliders on our necks, forgetting about the principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
  27. AML
    -3
    April 16 2021 13: 04
    Quote: merkava-2bet
    I'm used to hitting my face with facts to make it feel good.


    Here's a quote from the wiki. In normal docks, plus or minus as well. You will reach the end of 100 meters with such precision, for certain. Therefore, you need a correction for zhps and other garbage. And the fact that the railway station will not work during hostilities, there is no doubt about it. Therefore, shove your facts where you got them from.

    One minute of the angle at sea level (at the equator or meridian) is approximately 1,86 kilometers or one nautical mile ("approximately" because the Earth is not a perfect ball, but is slightly flattened). The second of the angle is equal to one sixtieth of this value: about 30 meters or 100 feet.
  28. AML
    -4
    April 16 2021 13: 09
    Quote: merkava-2bet
    Well, for those who do not know, even in the USSR there were air defense missiles with nuclear warheads. It can be argued that this compensated for the low probability of hitting, but it can also be argued that the quantity does not always decide and for each bolt with a cunning thread there is its own nut.

    You read the article badly again, and that the Americans didn’t fly in a handful like in WWII, and that the Americans didn’t fly in a group like in WWII, besides, their weapons simply shot down the air defense, AGM-69 SRAM, AGM-86B, and the ADM-20 Quail REP ADM-XNUMX Quail bait rocket.


    I don't need to read about spearheads and their applications. And leave all the crap about cool American missiles to the masquerade drivers. How many Tomahawks flew there last time? Do not remind?
    1. +2
      April 16 2021 13: 26
      And leave all the crap about the cool American missiles to the masquerade drivers. How many Tomahawks flew there last time? Do not remind?

      You jump from side to extremes, the question was about the time when the ANN went into operation and that's it. Yes, how many missiles reached the target, or showing the fragments of two missiles allegedly KR Tomahawk on the first channel convinced you, but where are the rest of the debris? So show me all the wreckage of the missiles!
      So what what and the Americans are always ahead of the means of attack, this is their credo.
  29. AML
    -3
    April 16 2021 13: 56
    Quote: merkava-2bet
    And leave all the crap about the cool American missiles to the masquerade drivers. How many Tomahawks flew there last time? Do not remind?

    You jump from side to extremes, the question was about the time when the ANN went into operation and that's it. Yes, how many missiles reached the target, or showing the fragments of two missiles allegedly KR Tomahawk on the first channel convinced you, but where are the rest of the debris? So show me all the wreckage of the missiles!
    So what what and the Americans are always ahead of the means of attack, this is their credo.


    By CD - You need to be able to play.

    Do not pour from a sore head to a healthy one. In the video I cited, they say in black and white that on modern ships, up to 2020, the time for the gyroscope to return to normal operation is 3 hours. I was talking about 30 minutes. Do you think that other laws of physics apply to American missiles and planes? And therefore, if we return to the main question, then the takeoff of b52 in 15 minutes with an interval of 15 seconds has no practical application. Targeting on wearable ammunition will be akin to 'somewhere there'.

    The Americans had some technological edge, like gunpowder and electronics. Today they have lost it. That is why, even SK, they said utyu-tu-tu-tu and quickly pissed off.
    1. +2
      April 16 2021 14: 17
      By CD - You need to be able to play.

      Where are the proofs of missed and generally very ineffective Tomahawk-type missiles, which have had a combat history of use since 1991?
      The Americans had some technological edge, like gunpowder and electronics. Today they have lost it.

      Yeah, the MC-21 aircraft is at least 50% of the electronics not Russian, guess whose, which country. In Russia there is still no plant that can massively produce chips with a topology of 90 nm, oh poor Yankees, how they lagged behind. They are so backward, that AFAR has been massively introduced and sold since the beginning of the 2000s, remind me on which VKS machines are massive AFAR and there is experience in their combat use, now it is already 2021 and the lag is at least 20-30 years. ...
  30. AML
    -4
    April 16 2021 14: 42
    Quote: merkava-2bet

    oh poor Yankees, how they lagged behind. They are so backward that they have massively implemented and sell AFAR since the beginning of the 2000s, remind me which aerospace forces are equipped with massive AFARs and have experience in their combat use, now it is already 2021 and the lag is at least 20 30 years old Tell me more fairy tales, I like to read before bedtime.

    Isn't Russian native to you? I talked about the fact that the Americans have lost their superiority, and you are broadcasting about what I called from the laggards.

    Another. Do you at least understand the difference between AFAR and PFAR? If not, then it makes sense for me to breed dialogues with you on this topic?
    1. +3
      April 16 2021 15: 17
      Isn't Russian native to you? I talked about the fact that the Americans have lost their superiority, and you are broadcasting about what I called from the laggards.

      Maybe you have problems with the Great and Mighty Russian language, do not wag your benchmark in azimuth, read your writings.
      Do you at least understand the difference between AFAR and PFAR?

      Judging by the question, you are definitely a layman and an amateur, good luck to you, adyu to you with a brush.
  31. 0
    April 18 2021 23: 11
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    But let's take a look, for example, at the Tu-22M. And let's ask ourselves the question, how many minutes are wasted during an emergency takeoff - cleaning the gangway?
    What is this "emergency take-off"? I am embarrassed to ask, have you seen such a plane in readiness number 1?

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Next came the stage of starting the engines. The B-52 has two launch modes.
    As I understand it, since all this is written here, it means that it is reproached for us. What do you think are the disadvantages of the method of launching the Tu-22M3 or Tu-160 (we do not take into account the Tu-95MS)?

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    At the same time, the Americans made tremendous efforts to ensure that this breakthrough was successful. All B-52s have been upgraded to allow them to fly at low altitudes. It affected both the fuselage and avionics. As usual, it was about heights of hundreds of meters (no more than 500). But in reality, the pilots of the SAC calmly worked at 100 meters, and above the flat sea surface - at an altitude of 20-30 meters.
    Alas, these fantasies crash against reality. The B-52, at low altitudes, is subject to short-period oscillations, resulting in damage to the point of destruction.

    No wonder they invested so much in the FB-111A and B-1A.

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    The B-52s were equipped with the most powerful electronic countermeasures system in the history of aviation, which made it possible to divert both anti-aircraft missiles and radar homing missiles from the aircraft.
    It is debatable what types of interference he knew how to put?

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    In the USSR, old missiles, the control center of which was formed on board the aircraft and loaded there - from KSR-5 to X-22
    In NK-45, routes are programmed in advance. The head of the rocket is the most primitive - DISS + DSP, for launching, you need a range to the target and a heading angle.

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    allowed the use of aviation flexibly, simply by setting tasks for the crews.
    This, of course, is not done, the goals (main and secondary) are predefined. The crew learns the specific target by opening the package. Without preliminary preparation, the blow is doomed to failure.
    1. 0
      April 21 2021 12: 06
      Alas, these fantasies crash against reality. The B-52, at low altitudes, is subject to short-period oscillations, resulting in damage to the point of destruction.


      This information is outdated decades ago. The problem was with the bombers, which did not go through modifications (see the photo with the tail keel torn off), but not with the modernized aircraft.







      It is debatable what types of interference he knew how to put?


      To be honest, I'm too lazy to go so deep into the structure. Below is a quote that lists the electronic warfare equipment on board the aircraft, see for yourself if you're really interested:

      The ITT AN / ALQ-172 (V) 2 electronic countermeasures system features multi-band threat recognition and multiple threat jamming. The AN / ALR-20A radar warning system detects and prioritises multiple threats.

      The Northrop Grumman (Litton) AN / ALR-46 digital warning receiver detects radar emissions in the 2GHz to 18GHz band and can simultaneously identify up to 16 radar signals. Northrop Grumman's AN / ALQ-155 jammer power management system gives 360 ° coverage in D, E, F, G and H radar bands.

      It is also equipped with Motorola AN / ALQ-122 multiple false target generator, AN / ALT-32 noise jammer and Northrop Grumman AN / ALQ-153 tail warning set, which is a pulse Doppler threat warner.

      12 AN / ALE-20 infrared flare dispensers and eight launchers for the AN / ALE-24 chaff dispenser are fitted.


      In NK-45, routes are programmed in advance. The head of the rocket is the most primitive - DISS + DSP, for launching, you need a range to the target and a heading angle.


      What prevents it from being launched on a radio-contrast target? How about the ship? There are radio contrast targets everywhere and always - bridges, fuel tanks, television towers, etc. And they can be identified in advance, even before the war.

      This, of course, is not done, the targets (primary and secondary) are determined in advance. The crew learns the specific goal by opening the package.


      Well, the Americans had them appointed in advance, too. They could simply be retargeted if the situation demanded. And I wrote about the "package", if that.
      1. 0
        28 May 2021 09: 05
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        This information is outdated decades ago. The problem was with the bombers, which did not go through modifications (see the photo with the tail keel torn off), but not with the modernized aircraft.

        The problem is in the design of the aircraft itself, the indicated speed is only 640 km / h, the permissible overload with low flight masses is 2,0, with high 1,8, how can you fly with such parameters at extremely low altitudes? Photos of the passages are not to be offered, what really happens to the plane is presented on the gif.

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        To be honest, I'm too lazy to go so deep into the structure.

        Why then statements like "the most powerful in history"?

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        What prevents it from being launched on a radio-contrast target?

        The launch range is reduced. Besides, the stealth of the attack is important.

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        How about the ship?

        Such missiles are not fired at ships (count as point targets).

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        There are radio contrast targets everywhere and always - bridges, fuel tanks, television towers, etc. And they can be identified in advance, even before the war.

        Let me remind you that you write about military operations with the use of nuclear weapons. These are not targets for long-range aviation, you can just as well attack sheds in villages.

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Well, the Americans had them appointed in advance, too. They could simply be retargeted if the situation demanded. And I wrote about the "package", if that.

        SURO-70 stores data on several targets, the entry of the flight task into the X-55 is carried out from the carrier So what's the problem?

        It is interesting to hear the answer about the launch of our aircraft.
  32. AML
    -1
    April 19 2021 14: 27
    Quote: timokhin-aa

    Brainless Americans have been working out this for 40 years in large quantities, in vain they burned kerosene.

    This is how the savages are exterminated if anything. An enemy warrior cannot kill our warrior from a hundred meters, a spear does not fly so far.

    And then we wonder how in 1941, how they did it ...

    I understand you correctly that there are 2 alternatives. Either the Americans are stupid and we are smart, or, on the contrary, we are stupid and the Americans are smart. Is that correct?
    1. +1
      April 21 2021 09: 07
      Stop acting like a fool. We must surpass them in the ability to fight, otherwise they will kill us. This simple thought, as I see it, does not reach you.
  33. AML
    -1
    April 19 2021 15: 32
    Quote: merkava-2bet
    Well, for those who do not know, even in the USSR there were air defense missiles with nuclear warheads. It can be argued that this compensated for the low probability of hitting, but it can also be argued that the quantity does not always decide and for each bolt with a cunning thread there is its own nut.

    You read the article badly again, and that the Americans didn’t fly in a handful like in WWII, and that the Americans didn’t fly in a group like in WWII, besides, their weapons simply shot down the air defense, AGM-69 SRAM, AGM-86B, and the ADM-20 Quail REP ADM-XNUMX Quail bait rocket.

    Did they fly in Vietnam and Korea one at a time? Or was it before WWII?

    I'm glad for their missiles. It is not clear only why they were often carried forward with their feet, with such missiles then?
    1. +2
      April 21 2021 09: 06
      Did they fly in Vietnam and Korea one at a time? Or was it before WWII?


      It was in completely different conditions, and the understanding of a low-altitude breakthrough came AFTER Vietnam, if anything
  34. 0
    April 20 2021 18: 43
    Quote: Bez 310
    Quote: Boris55
    To pull the ladder aside - no more than five seconds.

    NO!

    They will drag her away while he starts the engines. All the same, it will run for another half hour
  35. AML
    -1
    April 21 2021 11: 53
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Stop acting like a fool. We must surpass them in the ability to fight, otherwise they will kill us. This simple thought, as I see it, does not reach you.


    And let's eat blacksmiths, the Chinese have been eating them for centuries. What if there’s no food and we’ll all die of hunger. Crazy?

    It's good that you have a simple thought. It is bad when only she fits in the head.
    1. +1
      April 21 2021 18: 35
      Stop writing nonsense
  36. 0
    April 26 2021 03: 51
    The system is complex, but it is not difficult to break it - a dozen good saboteurs with two or three small nuclear missiles will partly destroy and partly disable the planes before the start. Well, at least, the runway will be turned around.
  37. -1
    4 May 2021 11: 26
    Quote: merkava-2bet
    In addition, their weapons simply shot air defenses, AGM-69 SRAM, AGM-86B, and the ADM-20 Quail REP ADM-XNUMX Quail bait rocket.

    Well, yes, yes, they won in Vietnam))))
  38. -1
    4 May 2021 11: 30
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    All aircraft built in the USA had serial numbers, everyone can be tracked.

    And here are the aircraft numbers and incident records?
    Or are they freely available or do you have access?
  39. -1
    4 May 2021 11: 33
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    This was the daily routine for nearly forty years.

    Agitprom, I said so.
    Or do you think that drunkenness, drug addiction and orgies have just appeared in the Anglo-Saxon army?
  40. 0
    8 June 2021 02: 17
    1. An interesting article is written well, the topic is also interesting, - thanks
    2. The author demonstrates groveling in front of the West - this is bad.
    3. I don’t understand the subject of the dispute in the comments - the faster the strategic carrier can take off, the better if the Americans really achieved 20 minutes readiness for takeoff from the strategists, they are good fellows and clever.
    4. The author's assertion that in the event of the first strike by the USSR, and even after 75g, the US strategic aviation will break through somewhere there are ridiculous and absurd. Tk, 30-40 bombers have no chance at all to overcome even only the line of long-range interceptors, which, due to the fact that the USSR is attacking, have been in the air for a long time and wait for shortcomings, if they are at all
    5. If the rockets fly from the cubes (launched from a submarine), then you will not have any 20 minutes, not even 10.
    6. All this whistling with 20 minutes of readiness certainly commands respect, however, in the conditions of the USSR it was stupid and meaningless right after the 70s, since the conditional Pershing flew to the conditional Engels much faster than 20 minutes, and even in 5-7;
    7. In current realities, when a conditionally nuclear hypersonic Dagger can launch a conditionally nuclear hypersonic Dagger from a B-52 at a conditional airfield, a conditional MIG-31 suddenly appeared, which by no means can be detected by means of an early warning system
    or the conditional ash will release the conditional nuclear Zircon, the same being difficult to detect for the US PLO, this whole circus with horses does not make any sense for the USA either;
    8. Conclusion The only means of ensuring the survivability of strategic aviation at the present stage of the development of nuclear weapons of attack is to ensure constant air watch with nuclear weapons on board. What no one does at all, due to the poor readiness of the mate for such a task. (It is necessary to cut a specialized pepelats - so that he can confidently be on duty for a couple of days with normal habitability for two crews at once)
    9. Recommendation - To consider strategic aviation as an exclusively auxiliary element of the nuclear triad and / or to develop specialized bombers intended for long-term patrols in the air and equipped with offensive weapons that can, at least hypothetically, overcome US air defenses in the event of a first strike (i.e. they will have to be armed for sure NOT with subsonic CR)

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