On March 26, it became known that, as part of the Umka-2021 Arctic expedition, the Navy finally conducted the first under-ice torpedo firing in the Arctic. With a delay of tens of years, but spent. It would seem that there is something to be happy about, but what happened raises such a mass of questions that one cannot simply be happy.
First of all, the approach itself, in which only one torpedo was used, raises questions. One shot is practically nothing, the Americans fire dozens of shots during each exercise, and under different conditions. It also raises a lot of questions about the form in which everything that happened was reported to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Was objective information brought to him? And from these questions follows the main one: was this the beginning of real work on bringing the torpedo case in the Navy to the desired state, or was it just an attempt to calm the public?
Umka-2021 and a report to the President
At first - message from the website of the President of the Russian Federation.
The President heard a report by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Nikolai Evmenov on the progress of the integrated Arctic expedition on March 26.03.2021, 17, 15:XNUMX.
V. Putin: Nikolai Anatolyevich, good afternoon!
N. Evmenov: I wish you good health, Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation!
V. Putin: The Arctic expedition, about which you will report, has no analogues in stories, both of the Soviet period and in the modern history of the Russian Federation. Please report your results.
N. Evmenov: Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, from March 20, 2021, under the leadership of the Chief Command of the Naval Fleet an integrated Arctic expedition "Umka-2021" is underway.
In total, the plan provides for 43 activities ... To date, in accordance with the plan, 35 activities have been completed, eight are being implemented according to the plan.
For the first time in the history of the Navy the following has been done:
- ascent from under the ice of three nuclear missile carriers with a break of one and a half meter ice according to a single plan and plan at the appointed time in an area with a radius of 300 meters;
- flight in the circumpolar region with refueling in the air with a pair of MiG-31 with the passage of the geographic point of the North Pole in the forward and backward directions;
- practical torpedo firing of a nuclear submarine from under the ice, followed by icing a practical torpedo, detecting it by technical means and lifting it to the surface.
V. Putin: Nikolai Anatolyevich, good afternoon!
N. Evmenov: I wish you good health, Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation!
V. Putin: The Arctic expedition, about which you will report, has no analogues in stories, both of the Soviet period and in the modern history of the Russian Federation. Please report your results.
N. Evmenov: Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, from March 20, 2021, under the leadership of the Chief Command of the Naval Fleet an integrated Arctic expedition "Umka-2021" is underway.
In total, the plan provides for 43 activities ... To date, in accordance with the plan, 35 activities have been completed, eight are being implemented according to the plan.
For the first time in the history of the Navy the following has been done:
- ascent from under the ice of three nuclear missile carriers with a break of one and a half meter ice according to a single plan and plan at the appointed time in an area with a radius of 300 meters;
- flight in the circumpolar region with refueling in the air with a pair of MiG-31 with the passage of the geographic point of the North Pole in the forward and backward directions;
- practical torpedo firing of a nuclear submarine from under the ice, followed by icing a practical torpedo, detecting it by technical means and lifting it to the surface.
The last phrase should be specially emphasized.
Next:
As a result of the measures taken, the samples of weapons, military and special equipment confirmed all their specified technical characteristics in conditions of high latitudes and low temperatures.
It should be noted that some provisions of this report of N. Evmenov to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, to put it mildly, do not correspond to reality.
For example, in addition to "three nuclear missile carriers" (two projects 667BDRM and K-549 "Prince Vladimir" of project 955A), there was also a special nuclear submarine BS-64 (project 09787).
The photo clearly shows four ice breakage, snowmobile tracks and markings left during the advance preparation of the ascent site by forces on the ice surface. Source: Maxar technologies
Very bad questions are raised by the "vigorous report" about the alleged "confirmation by all samples of military equipment and military equipment of their specified performance characteristics." A simple example is how messages about an event look on the website of the Ministry of Defense and on the website of the Presidential Administration.
Obviously, the difference in the meaning of the two phrases below is significant:
As a result of the measures taken, the samples of weapons, military and special equipment confirmed all their specified technical characteristics in conditions of high latitudes and low temperatures.
и
Based on the results of the measures taken, samples of weapons, military and special equipment participating in military-technical experiments, generally confirmed their tactical and technical characteristics in conditions of high latitudes and low temperatures.
And the word "as a whole" allows for a very loose interpretation and the possibility of "stretching" the results. At the same time, it is clear that the "DIMK formulation" was not invented by him and was evidently present in the original text of N. Evmenov's report. However, a completely different meaning and essence was reported to the President of the Russian Federation ...
And this is not the first time this has happened.
You can recall the exhibition of naval weapons in Sevastopol in December 2019, where on the model of the "promising ship of the oceanic zone" of project 20386, the Supreme Commander was given Reduta launchers for the "Caliber" launchers. Or a show with the destruction of German mines during the Great Patriotic War by the minesweeper "Alexander Obukhov" in the area of the sinking of the Shch-308 submarine (on the eve of the immersion of the President of the Russian Federation), that is, work that could be done with practically the same efficiency by a minesweeper of the USSR Navy in the early 70s biennium project 1265 (with GAS MG-89 and underwater vehicle "Luch-1"). But the fact that "Obukhov" (and the entire "newest" project 12700) has very serious problems with modern bottom mines, they "safely forgot" to report to the president ...
We can recall the "brave reports" of the Department of Information and Mass Communications of Konashenkov (DIMK MO) about the alleged "successes" of firing new corvettes of the Navy with the MF-RLK "Zaslon" (in fact, "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" did not fire anti-aircraft missiles at all, but shooting "Thundering" was carried out in conditions not only in the slightest not corresponding to the real battle, but, moreover, for them it was generally possible not to include the "passing state tests" MF-RLK), for more details see the materials "Thundering" and others. Will our fleet get effective ships in the near-field? " и The Leaky Umbrella of the Fleet.
Let me emphasize that if the conclusion about the failure of the firing of "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" was made on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of various sources (including the Internet inside information of the MF-RLK developers themselves), then according to "Thundering" these are precisely the facts documented by the DIMK of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation - see. video of shooting, with a lot of technical details (the very fact of the open publication of which causes frank bewilderment).
That is, misleading the president has actually become the norm when it comes to naval issues. And the ice-firing torpedoes are a vivid example of this. He understood in detail in the article “To deceive Putin. How the domestic and Western press are used for misinformation ".
That is, in accordance with the "answer" at the request of the presidential administration, and GOU GSh (!), We allegedly have:
- ice shooting is carried out;
- our submarines have effective anti-torpedo protection and are armed with modern torpedoes;
- our submarines and NSNF are provided with effective anti-submarine and anti-mine defense. Etc.
All this is a lie (which is confirmed, among other things, by photographs of the Boreyev torpedo decks and materials of arbitration courts), and this lie was reported to the Presidential Administration by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff!
- ice shooting is carried out;
- our submarines have effective anti-torpedo protection and are armed with modern torpedoes;
- our submarines and NSNF are provided with effective anti-submarine and anti-mine defense. Etc.
All this is a lie (which is confirmed, among other things, by photographs of the Boreyev torpedo decks and materials of arbitration courts), and this lie was reported to the Presidential Administration by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff!
What has the OU GSh to do with it?
And here's what - this is how the "answer" looked at the time at the request of the Presidential Administration of the Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff:
No. 312/4/4421 dated 15.05.2019/XNUMX/XNUMX
The handling of information on the state of the submarine forces of the Navy and the Northern Fleet, received by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been considered. This situation is not true.
I. Dylevsky, Deputy Head of the General Staff School.
The handling of information on the state of the submarine forces of the Navy and the Northern Fleet, received by the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, by the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has been considered. This situation is not true.
I. Dylevsky, Deputy Head of the General Staff School.
What was the request about?
As for the ice shooting, of course.
Now the dots above the "i" for ice shooting are placed. Officially, including on the website of the President of the Russian Federation: performed for the first time (in the Navy of the Russian Federation and the USSR), during the events "Umka-2021". The fact of deliberately misleading the country's leadership has received public evidence.
I must say that the responsible persons lied not only to the president. It is also appropriate to recall how earlier representatives of DIMK, to put it mildly, “misled the public” by making deliberately false statements (deputy head of DIMK, Volosatov, “VPK”):
Even more surprising are statements that the naval forces are not practicing combat training exercises in the Arctic [with practical torpedo firing - M.K.]. Probably Klimov doesn't bother with routine monitoring news information on this subject.
Now everyone can see everything well?
It is worth noting that in the days of the USSR, for false reports to the highest military-political leadership, they were mercilessly removed from their posts. And that was absolutely correct. We, on the other hand, often only have new questions from the reports to the management. This shooting is just such a case.
"Inconvenient" facts and questions of "Umka-2021"
Of course, the fact that we have finally begun to do what for the US Navy has been a "routine of combat training" for a quarter of a century is a positive event.
The reaction to this news in the media was very stormy. Including again emerging "ducks" (the level of simply inadequacy) about the alleged "freezing (and getting stuck in the ice)" of American submarines and their alleged "inability to operate in the Arctic."
However, there are objectively no special grounds for jubilation and “massive throwing of caps into the air”.
The snapshot indicates that a combat torpedo (most likely 53-65K) was used to break through the ice during the exercise. Source: Maxar technologies
First. The US Navy not only began the development of the Arctic before us, they immediately put at the forefront the question of not just "sailing there" (like we), but effectively fighting. For example, the first group ascent of three submarines (and at the North Pole) during the ICEX exercise was carried out back in 1986!
Second. The number and level of special exercises with us and with them is simply disproportionate. "The so-called partners" conduct such exercises at least once every two years, with multipurpose PLA hunters. The non-participation (?) Of multipurpose nuclear submarines of the Navy in Umka-2021 (and, accordingly, their failure to conduct torpedo firing in ice conditions) begs very bad questions for the Russian Navy.
Third. Torpedo firing. When one side conducts them regularly and in dozens, and the second - "once and all right", the question arises - what was it? Is this definitely combat training (and not an element of a ceremonial PR report)?
Fourth. Why did not our main "ice walker" shoot the nuclear submarine of Project 677BDRM? Technically it was quite possible, even by "Physicists" with telecontrol from a portable device for backup data input. And even more so they could shoot old torpedoes SET-65 SSN "Keramika" or "Sapphire". Only here shooting at such exercises with torpedo junk SET-65 would be just a shame. Why didn't our multipurpose nuclear submarines fire?
Fifth. The Umka-2021 exercise, of course, was closely monitored by anti-submarine forces and the means of "so-called partners." The presence in one place of two or three strategic "bomb carriers" and a special purpose boat is a tasty catch, which simply could not pass by the attention of the US Navy. At the same time, even the old Sturgeons could cope well with covert tracking of the 667BDRM project (which was fully demonstrated by the collision of the 1969 Greyling with the last BDRM hull in 1994).
Moreover, the presence of two BDRMs nearby (including a special-purpose boat converted into a boat) was an unmasking factor for our newest strategic agro-industrial complex Prince Vladimir of project 955A. With a probability of "four nines", he was tracked during "Umka-2021", and his noises were recorded. Having organized a show of three "strategists" in a group ascent, the Main Command of the Navy did everything so that the enemy could easily do this.
As for the report on “43 events”, RM comes to mind. Melnikov, the book "Rurik" was the first ", the chapter" Cruisers are preparing for battle ":
The famous table of 286 exercises was given from above, in the mass of which, sometimes far-fetched and archaic (with mine rafts, kites, rockets for railway communication from the coast, etc.), those main ones were lost, on which the combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the ship directly depended ... The above-set ammunition consumption remained depressingly low as before ...
It ended with Tsushima and revolution ...
Against this background, 1 (one) Umki-21 torpedo raises a very bad question: was this a real attempt by the Navy to end it or was there a need for a vigorous report from the Supreme Command?
I think both.
For there were those who demanded and carried out (this is, first of all, the Northern Fleet), and there were those who “promoted” and used it, including in “career interests” (and the latter were really “uninteresting” in full-fledged tests and firing).
Against the background of the statistics of a huge number of ICEX special exercises, attracted by submarines and massive torpedo firing on them by the US and British navies, 1 (one) torpedo shot during Umka-21 is not even funny, but very sad. Especially considering the very significant costs (financial, extremely expensive resource of the nuclear submarine) for this event.
An unpleasant phrase from the publications of 2019, which has been "cut" by many: "Arctic fitness of the Russian Navy instead of tin combat training in the Arctic for US and British submarines" is also true for Umka-2021 ...
On the question of the results of torpedo firing.
From the article "Arctic torpedo scandal".
I am sure that the first shooting under the ice will turn out to be largely a failure. And this is an objective fact. Do not worry: a tough and decisive elimination of the identified deficiencies, and again shooting. More disadvantages? Again, their removal and shooting. And the task will be solved, because, I repeat, there are no technical problems, everything is within our reach and can be solved. The question is exclusively in the tough formulation of the question (just as it was done earlier with the “Polyment-Redut” AAMS).
Our submarines are required to have a reliable and effective torpedo weapon and be able to use it in all conditions of the situation (including under the ice)!
Our submarines are required to have a reliable and effective torpedo weapon and be able to use it in all conditions of the situation (including under the ice)!
Some may argue - how is it that the author wrote about the "failed shooting", but now Mr. Evmenov is reporting to the president that:
have confirmed all their specified specifications in high latitude conditions.
And it is very simple - by means of telecontrol it is possible to "drag" a torpedo even with an almost "deafened" CLS to the target according to the hydroacoustics of the firing submarine (and then monitor its ascent point or, in general, lead to a large ice hole).
Note. Shooting with autonomous torpedoes (without telecontrol) is also possible, for example, near the edge of the ice with the formation of a firing task for the output at a given time of the torpedo to clear water to lift it.
There is also the option of placing special navigation aids on the ice, but I don’t want to think about this, since taking into account the short range of such means (to ensure the required accuracy), such shooting will be simple in “aquarium” conditions.
In addition, the Arctic is different. And for a torpedo shot, an area with a relatively flat bottom surface of the ice (that is, without a large number of "plots") could be chosen.
It will not be superfluous to recall the main SSN torpedoes of the Navy (so far):
The powerful low-frequency SSN “Waterfall”, which is the main one for USET-80 since its “birth”, has extremely low noise immunity, and is practically inoperable in ice conditions.
In 1989, due to the extremely low noise immunity of "Waterfall" at shallow depths, USET-80 received a medium-frequency low-power SSN "Ceramics" (literally from the developer's book: "reproduced on a domestic base" with SSN of the American torpedo Mk46mod.1, 1961), which, in fact, is a shameful page in the domestic torpedo building.
Until now, the Ceramica SSN, despite its extremely low performance characteristics, is the most common SSN of the Navy's torpedoes.
The use of USET-80 with "Ceramics" in ice conditions is possible with very significant restrictions, and at minimum ("pistol") distances, despite the fact that the firing positions of enemy torpedoes are almost an order of magnitude higher than ours (the performance characteristics of torpedoes are simply incomparable). Figuratively speaking, the enemy has a "sniper rifle" against our "pistol", and this is in conditions of a significant lead in detection!
In such a situation, a clash between a Russian nuclear submarine and an American or British submarine will be described by the word “shooting”.
In 1989, due to the extremely low noise immunity of "Waterfall" at shallow depths, USET-80 received a medium-frequency low-power SSN "Ceramics" (literally from the developer's book: "reproduced on a domestic base" with SSN of the American torpedo Mk46mod.1, 1961), which, in fact, is a shameful page in the domestic torpedo building.
Until now, the Ceramica SSN, despite its extremely low performance characteristics, is the most common SSN of the Navy's torpedoes.
The use of USET-80 with "Ceramics" in ice conditions is possible with very significant restrictions, and at minimum ("pistol") distances, despite the fact that the firing positions of enemy torpedoes are almost an order of magnitude higher than ours (the performance characteristics of torpedoes are simply incomparable). Figuratively speaking, the enemy has a "sniper rifle" against our "pistol", and this is in conditions of a significant lead in detection!
In such a situation, a clash between a Russian nuclear submarine and an American or British submarine will be described by the word “shooting”.
To the history of these SSNs (and how we came to such a shameful situation with the combat capability of the Navy submarines, we will return below).
A brief history of the under-ice confrontation between the Navy of the USSR (RF) and the Navy of the United States and Great Britain.
Rear Admiral V.G. Lebedko:
The first attempt to reach the North Pole was the voyage of the American submarine "Nautilus" under the command of W. Andersen in September 1957. Then the American submariners reached 87 ° north latitude.
In March 1958, a group of submarines S-347 V.N. Chernavin, B-76 V.N. Berkovchenko and B-70 L.A. Matushkina. Their main task was to study the possibility of receiving radio transmissions under the ice. Having traveled north about 90 miles under continuous ice cover, the boats turned back and, at the limit of their energy capacities, surfaced in broken ice, before reaching clear water. This is all that our new diesel-electric submarines could do in "response to Andersen" (such an unofficial name was used by this ice navigation among the submariners of the Northern Fleet).
In March 1958, a group of submarines S-347 V.N. Chernavin, B-76 V.N. Berkovchenko and B-70 L.A. Matushkina. Their main task was to study the possibility of receiving radio transmissions under the ice. Having traveled north about 90 miles under continuous ice cover, the boats turned back and, at the limit of their energy capacities, surfaced in broken ice, before reaching clear water. This is all that our new diesel-electric submarines could do in "response to Andersen" (such an unofficial name was used by this ice navigation among the submariners of the Northern Fleet).
On August 3, 1958, the USS Nautilus submarine reached the North Pole for the first time in the world.
In 1959, the nuclear submarine of the USSR Navy K-3 Captain 1st Rank L.G. Osipenko made a short voyage under the ice of the Arctic (260 miles).
In 1961, four cruises of the naval submarine took place in the Arctic, with the K-3 L.M. Zhiltsova reached 82 ° north latitude.
In 1962, a 50-day trip to the Arctic was made by K-21 (commander - Captain 2nd Rank V.N.Chernavin). Under the ice, they covered 1700 miles, developed a method for finding polynyas and surfacing in them, determining a place in high latitudes.
July 17, 1962 K-3 captain 2nd rank L.M. Zhiltsova finally reached the North Pole.
Let me emphasize that we were in relation to the US Navy, already actively sailing in the Arctic (up to the group actions of the submarine - the first group ascent on August 22, 1962: SSN-578 Skate and SSN-584 Seadragon), in the position of catching up. It is worth noting that the then anti-submarine torpedoes of our nuclear submarines - SET-53 - had a passive SSN, which was quite functional under ice conditions. More details - "Torpedo SET-53: Soviet" totalitarian ", but real".
In 1971, for the first time, a campaign was made in the Arctic (and to the North Pole, although he could not use his missile weapons there) RPK SN project 667A K-411 (commander 1st rank captain S.E. Sobolevsky, senior campaign rear admiral G.L. Nevolin) and the newest multipurpose nuclear submarine K-147 of project 671 (passed under the ice of the Arctic about 10 miles).
Only this was again a response to the active development of the Arctic (since 1969) by the latest USS Sturgeon-class submarines.
After the US Navy's submarines received Mk-70 remote-controlled torpedoes in the early 48s, they acquired a decisive military-technical superiority over our nuclear submarines.
At the same time, after we received intelligence information about the very high efficiency of the American stationary SOSUS submarine detection system, the Navy was forced to shift the patrol routes of the RPK SN (with intercontinental missiles - projects 667B, BD, BDR) closer and closer to its coast. This decision was extremely positively received in the US Navy - since now the activity and initiative of the USSR Navy in the far and oceanic zone was shackled by "weights on its feet" with the demands of providing its PKK SN in the coastal "bastions".
The solution for the Soviet Navy to "unload" its general-purpose forces was the Arctic, whose difficult conditions significantly hampered countercurrent operations. From the beginning of the 80s, mass campaigns and pratrolling of our RPK SN "under the ice" began. For example, in 1982 the RPK SN K-211 (commander 2nd rank captain A.A. Berzin) made a cruise along the perimeter of the Arctic Ocean.
Rear Admiral V.G. Lebedko:
By 1984, American submarines had 26 Arctic cruises, while the Soviet had over 70.
Of course, the result is very serious. However, we have lost the main thing - the ability to actually fight and win under water in ice conditions.
The fact that the question of ice firing was not raised in our country at that time is possibly a consequence of a grandiose "torpedo scandal" (and a criminal case) over the newest torpedo USET-80 (basic for the 3rd generation), which turned out to be practically incapable of combat.
The main anti-submarine torpedo of the USSR Navy submarine at that time was the SET-65III with the Sapfir SSN, which had several times worse performance characteristics in comparison with the Mk48 and could be effectively used under ice only from "pistol distances" and with a number of serious restrictions (which no one had ever checked practical shooting).
Briefly on the methodology of the US Navy exercises in the Arctic
The US Navy's ICEX exercise is administered by The Arctic Submarine Laboratory is the US Navy's Center of Excellence for the deployment of submarines to the Arctic.
The Arctic Submarine Laboratory is a center of excellence for diving in the Arctic, which is responsible for developing and accumulating practical knowledge, technologies and procedures to work more efficiently and safely in the unique environment of the Arctic Ocean.
Its main tasks:
- research and development of specific experience in the Arctic;
- training and advanced training of submariners for the deployment of naval forces in the Arctic;
- planning and organization of seasonal ice bases and ICEX operations;
- testing and evaluation of weapons and military equipment for operations in the Arctic.
Just one example of the scale of such work in the US Navy. During ICEX-2003, the SSN-22 submarine fired 2003 Mk18 torpedoes within two weeks (and the personnel of the ICEX-48 station removed from under the ice).
The technique of lifting torpedoes from under the ice of the US Navy is interesting, and the key here is the high accuracy of the Mk48 torpedo control system and the presence of telecontrol. Due to this, at any moment in time on the firing submarine they know the exact location of the torpedo, have telemetry from its side (including the work of the SSN) and can control it (including for withdrawal to the area that is optimal for lifting from under the ice).
Further, the coordinates of the surfaced (frozen) torpedoes are transmitted via the underwater communication to the ice control point, from where helicopters take off to the designated point. A team of three to four people drills a series of holes ("holes") for divers, as well as one hole for a torpedo, which is then lifted by a helicopter.
Lt. Courtney Callaghan of the ICEX Exercise Support Team writes:
As soon as we know the location of the torpedo and the holes, the divers descend into the water to place ballast weights on a cable attached to the tail of the torpedo to change the buoyancy of the torpedo from positive to neutral in order to move it to the hole for subsequent ascent.
Simple, reliable and efficient.
If you have in the ammunition load modern and mastered torpedoes (and not "green torpedo firewood", as is often the case with us). More information about these exercises of the US Navy can be found in the article "ICEX - the Arctic threat to Russia" ("NVO" 2019).
The key problem of the Russian Navy in the Arctic is that we have never conducted torpedo firing under the ice with homing systems turned on. Thus, we get that the "probable enemy" has tough combat training, as close as possible to real conditions, while we have "Arctic fitness". The only thing that was done in the USSR was bathyspheric (stop) tests of torpedo homing systems from ice, and the last of them were carried out already in 1971! ..
The question of conducting their own special exercises, similar to ICEX, was repeatedly raised by the initiative officers of the Russian Navy, but "things are still there." Reasons for refusals to organize such exercises range from “no money” to outright fear of “revealing” acute problematic issues. As a result, we got a situation where today the submarine forces of the Russian Navy in under-ice conditions are practically non-combatant. Obviously, this situation is intolerable, and decisive measures are needed to correct it as soon as possible.
The question of conducting their own special exercises, similar to ICEX, was repeatedly raised by the initiative officers of the Russian Navy, but "things are still there." Reasons for refusals to organize such exercises range from “no money” to outright fear of “revealing” acute problematic issues. As a result, we got a situation where today the submarine forces of the Russian Navy in under-ice conditions are practically non-combatant. Obviously, this situation is intolerable, and decisive measures are needed to correct it as soon as possible.
There is also something related to torpedoes under the ice, and besides shooting.
Bathyspheric tests of our torpedo homing systems in the Arctic
Taking into account the huge "failure" in the development of modern domestic SSN torpedoes in ice conditions, the bathyspheric (stop work) of the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor", carried out until the beginning of the 70s, is of great interest. in the Arctic.
From the article "Bathyspheric Chronicles" (N.Kh. Boychenkov, Yu.N. Bukhalov, Ph.D. V.N.Shekhin Central Research Institute "Gidropribor") with the author's comments:
By decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in the period from the second quarter of 1970 to the second quarter of 1971, the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor", together with the AARI, organized a second Arctic expedition at a specially created drifting station SP-20 ...
A leveled pack ice floe measuring 750x4,2 km, at least 3,9 years old, was chosen 3 km from Wrangel Island. The thickness of the ice floe in some areas varied from 2,8 to 12 m.
A leveled pack ice floe measuring 750x4,2 km, at least 3,9 years old, was chosen 3 km from Wrangel Island. The thickness of the ice floe in some areas varied from 2,8 to 12 m.
The level of the problem statement - the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR - draws attention to itself.
Conducting full-scale stop tests of samples of non-contact systems on SP-20 included studies of the performance of the CLS of serial and experimental torpedoes MGT-3, SET-40, AT-2, UST, UMGT-1, as well as measuring input effects by equipment with CLN parameters. torpedoes MGT-1 with the use of bathyspheres, lowered on a cable into the water through holes punched with explosives in the ice-hole ... The first sea tests of the UMGT-1 torpedo SSN were started in under-ice conditions at the SP-20 station.
Thus, on the SP-20, stop (bathyspheric) tests of all the latest SSN torpedoes of the Navy were carried out:
- SSN UST Naumov (later "strangled" by intrigues in "Gidropribor" - more about this will be in the article on USET-80);
- SSN UMGT-1 "Waterfall" (eventually installed (in a more powerful form) instead of SSN Naumov in the UST-A torpedo (USET-80));
- SSN MGT-1 "Kolibri" (our copy of the American Mk46 mod1, which later became the SSN "Ceramics");
- SSN MGT-3 and AT-2 (which became UAS "Sapphire").
A very interesting episode of work on the SP-20 was the use of divers:
In order to get an idea of the structure, scale and configuration of ice irregularities reflecting and scattering sound, in the summer of 1970, a group of scuba divers from the Hydrographic Service of the Navy brought to the station carried out an underwater survey of the ice floe near the floes and photographing the most characteristic relief forms of the lower edge of the ice cover.
And already the torpedo-familiar "all is well beautiful marquise":
… The drift passed without emergency and faults. The ice floe turned out to be extremely reliable and durable. It was a pity to part with the habitable station and well-established technical facilities. In total, in the period from July 1970 to April 1971, several dozen hydroacoustic observation stations were carried out - sessions of work and tests of the CLS of all types. During the summer and winter seasons, the features of the under-ice propagation of sound and the functioning of the equipment in various modes in a wide range of operating frequencies, immersion depths and trims were investigated.
The results obtained confirmed the assumptions and predictions about severe hydroacoustic conditions for the operation of the CLS equipment under the ice cover of the Arctic and made it possible to develop a number of recommendations for improving the quality and reliability of the samples, both serial and experimental equipment.
The real test results (first of all, the "hopes of Gidropribor" - SSN "Waterfall") were such that everything was done so that more such tests would not be carried out. The scandal with the SSN "Waterfall" and USET-80 broke out already in 1983, although all the problems were clear from the beginning. They were “just” hidden and covered ...
Subsequently, already in the 80s, NPO Uran discussed plans to organize another research expedition to the Arctic to conduct stop full-scale tests of promising SSN samples, but the gaining momentum and economic reasons made their implementation impossible.
Translated into normal technical language, this means that the second time with SSN "Sapphire", "Waterfall", "Keramika" to go out to dishonor in the Arctic "Gidropribor" did not want and waited for the appearance of a new generation of SSNs ("Electronics" and "Pilon"). However, perestroika and the collapse of the USSR came much faster ...
Well, and once again about the bathyspheric tests:
2006 marked the 10th anniversary of the imperceptible exit from the structure of the institute's divisions of the bathyspheric sea trials sector. And for almost 15 years the boxes have not been packed, and the tough guys from the bathysphere team do not go on business trips to the training grounds. Maybe this is partly hidden the reason for the difficulties experienced by the 165th department (SSN) in the process of creating and testing new technology (SSN). Models - models, but the experiment has not been canceled. And it should be borne in mind that obtaining experimental information, for example, about the characteristics of the hydroacoustic channel, the levels of reverberation, the expected range of the CCH, the reflecting ability of various objects when using bathyspheres, it requires an order of magnitude lower costs compared to torpedo firing.
Here, it will be appropriate to recall that the great success with the development of the first domestic anti-submarine torpedo SET-53 was largely due to the large volume of bathyspheric work carried out by the Navy (namely the Navy - the mine and torpedo institute!), Which ensured its creation.
Today, this experience in the Navy and the military-industrial complex is not just “forgotten”, but “buried”, because if you start working seriously, very big problems in all torpedo ROCs (which are now hidden and covered) will be revealed.
Taking into account the unconditional need to fulfill the huge statistics of tests of torpedo launchers in the Arctic and the extremely high cost of a torpedo shot in the Russian Navy, it is bathyspheric tests that are very important, since they allow, at a minimum cost, to actually reveal most of the problems for their elimination. In the case of a single torpedo shot, instead, the organizers are faced with the need to work in obviously simplified conditions, without checking problematic issues (for example, firing at an icy submarine target).
PR and Silence Against Free Press and Public Opinion
First, a little history. From the book "Panama of the Russian fleet" Russian officer Boris Tageev:
All the telegrams about the combat readiness of the fleet flew, and the whole of Russia, through the rattling of weapons "Novoye Vremya" and similar publications, read about the mighty stronghold in the Far East in the person of the Pacific squadron.
Thanks to the lackey newspaper "Novy Kray", Lieutenant Colonel of the Maritime Department P.A. Artemyev, the combat training of our fleet was inflated to the last degree. Flattering, laudatory articles were reprinted by Russian newspapers, and the bribed French organ in Shanghai, "Echo de Chine", echoed its Amur comrade, fogging the already giddy heads of the sailors.
Thanks to the lackey newspaper "Novy Kray", Lieutenant Colonel of the Maritime Department P.A. Artemyev, the combat training of our fleet was inflated to the last degree. Flattering, laudatory articles were reprinted by Russian newspapers, and the bribed French organ in Shanghai, "Echo de Chine", echoed its Amur comrade, fogging the already giddy heads of the sailors.
A "wonderful question" arises - what prevented Mr. Evmenov from conducting under-ice torpedo firing when he was Kom SF (from April 2016 to May 2019) or two years after that in the chair of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?
At the same time, they publicly declared:
The Northern Fleet has tremendous experience in ice navigation and operation of submarines and surface ships in Arctic conditions ...
The main assessment criterion is the readiness to perform tasks according to its main purpose at sea. I have no doubt that today the Severomor submariners are ready to complete all assigned tasks 100% ...
We also closely monitor the activities of our subarctic neighbors in this region. We draw conclusions and on the basis of them we improve our training.
The main assessment criterion is the readiness to perform tasks according to its main purpose at sea. I have no doubt that today the Severomor submariners are ready to complete all assigned tasks 100% ...
We also closely monitor the activities of our subarctic neighbors in this region. We draw conclusions and on the basis of them we improve our training.
As a result, it was the public reaction (including at the "top") to the "Arctic torpedo scandal" that made it happen.
This is a very important point - the recent shooting has become possible. only thanks to the harsh statement in the media of very uncomfortable questions to the Navy in terms of under-ice torpedo firing.
Just a few examples.
1. "Forgotten underwater rake" ("MIC" 2019).
Ice fitness. We have never conducted torpedo firing in the Arctic, under the ice with homing systems turned on ... While we are actually engaged in "patrolling with fitness elements" in the Arctic, the enemy is practicing tough combat training there, being ready to immediately destroy our submarines upon receipt of an order.
2. The above article "ICEX - Arctic Threat for Russia" ("NVO", 2019).
3. Voennoye Obozreniye, 2019, Arctic Torpedo Scandal.
Articles published in "VPK", "NVO", "Voennoye Obozreniye" (and their "resonant coverage" in the Internet edition "Lenta") about the problems of combat readiness of the Northern Fleet's submarine forces (who have never carried out torpedo firing under the ice with working homing systems) caused a violent reaction: in the media, society, the Ministry of Defense and government bodies (up to official requests: "to understand and report").
4. "Voennoye Obozreniye", "The Fleet Going to Tsushima. Results of the Navy for 2020 ".
The real threats to Russia in Artik today come either from under ice and water (US and British submarines), or from the air (US Air Force).
And at least one torpedo firing under the ice with the included homing systems was carried out? No! The Navy has not been able to do this until now (despite the "ice torpedo scandal" a couple of years ago).
And at least one torpedo firing under the ice with the included homing systems was carried out? No! The Navy has not been able to do this until now (despite the "ice torpedo scandal" a couple of years ago).
“A drop is hammering a stone”, all this was read (including at the “top” and among specialists - we will write about the reaction to articles of “VO” in the specialized press in the next materials). And the lack of ice firing of the Navy raised more and more questions ...
And finally, such a shooting was carried out.
But a beggarly one torpedo shot (with very significant forces involved and huge costs) raises a tough question - what was it all the same: a show for the Supreme and society or the beginning of a real solution to critical problems of the combat capability and combat readiness of the Russian Navy?
After all, once again - one torpedo is not enough to obtain all the necessary information about the work of its CLS under the ice. And there was exactly one torpedo!
There will be no conclusions this time. Let everyone do them himself. According to my experience, education and honesty.
And the real criterion of the meaningfulness of what happened and the answer to this most important tough question will be the facts of new firing and testing of torpedo weapons in the Arctic.