Inconvenient questions for supporters of the aircraft carrier lobby
Perhaps, starting this material, it would be worth saying that the topic of aircraft-carrying ships has long been controversial for our country. This issue was raised more than once at the Military Review - and, I think, my publication will not be the last in this difficult dispute.
Previous article on the issue of the revival of the marine aviation, stirred up a discussion that affected carrier-based aviation - one way or another, many people still believe that aircraft carriers can become a guarantee of ensuring the defense of the Federation's maritime borders. I do not plan to put forward theses opposing coastal and deck-based air forces - first of all I would like to consider issues that are sometimes avoided by both supporters and opponents of the "aircraft carrier lobby".
The development and production of carrier-based aircraft can cost Russia even more than the construction of the aircraft carrier itself. Source: US Navy
Aircraft carriers are very often viewed as a kind of superweapon. In some respects, this statement is true. However, in order to fully unleash the potential of carrier-based aircraft, many conditions are necessary, which, in fact, exist in an extremely limited number of countries in the world. And ours - unfortunately, does not apply to them. Given the current foreign policy strategy of the Russian state, injecting funds into weapons of this type is beginning to seem completely insane - however, we will leave the issues of conceptual application for later. First of all, we need to decide on problems of a completely different nature ...
Where to build?
In general, here it would be just right to ask: "Who should build?" However, we will have to combine such large-scale issues together.
Military shipbuilding is one of the most difficult areas of activity. Cooperation of suppliers, the number of which reaches thousands and thousands, timely design and delivery of many unique components ...
When supporters of Russian carrier-based aviation start talking about carrier ships, the impression begins to appear as if the country is replete with engineers and specialists in this field, and we are doing new ships, as Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev said, like sausage. The problem is that at the moment we cannot even determine the intended appearance of a ship of this class, let alone its design. All attempts at leadership fleet to issue terms of reference for the development of promising projects looked at least unintelligible, and the Navy cannot get rid of the obsession with creating a new aircraft-carrying cruiser - moreover, a springboard. This point should be kept in mind by all lobbyists on this topic. For if the "aircraft carrier business" gets off the ground, the country will receive not an analogue of "Gerald R. Ford", but a new "Admiral Kuznetsov" ... And this is at best.
By the way, the Navy categorically rejected the preliminary design of a nuclear aircraft carrier with a displacement of 60 thousand tons, which is a modernized version of "Ulyanovsk" - project 11437 - the first and never saw the life of the Soviet classic aircraft carrier ship.
In general, this issue looks extremely bad even at the stage of conceptual development - and consideration of the problems of practical implementation looks even worse ...
Even such a technologically advanced country as France could not develop a catapult aircraft carrier without the help of the United States. Source: US Navy
If we talk about the closest modern experience of Russian shipyards working with carriers of carrier-based aircraft, then this, of course, will be the restructuring of the Vikramaditya, the former aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Gorshkov. Here I would like to draw your attention to the fact that at the time of those works, a significant part of Soviet specialists were still “in the ranks” - it was banal for them not so many years, and the United Shipbuilding Corporation had experienced and efficient personnel at its disposal.
Now another decade has passed - and it is reasonable to ask, how many of those who participated in the work on the Vikramaditya are still “in the saddle”?
However, even this factor did not save the ship - everyone knows about the accident during sea trials, when the power plant of the aircraft carrier failed. The very same project of re-equipment of "Admiral Gorshkov" turned out to be unprofitable for Sevmash. But, even worse, it influenced the implementation of the state armaments program - because of the problems that arose, the delivery of the Yuri Dolgoruky, Alexander Nevsky and Severodvinsk nuclear submarines was postponed. And this, for a minute, was not the construction of an aircraft carrier from scratch and with quite lively Soviet personnel!
There is another point that is rarely mentioned in discussions: before there is even a grain of steel on the stocks, it will be necessary to carry out hundreds of R&D, which will cost billions of rubles. An aircraft carrier is one of the most complex technical structures created by man, and a country that does not have experience in the construction and operation of such an object will be doomed to a lot of research and development work that will drag on for many years. At the moment, Russia does not even have competencies in coastal-based naval aviation - in such conditions, the development of carrier-based aircraft will become a real "black hole" of the defense budget. It is necessary to develop a nuclear power plant, catapults, elevators, electronic equipment, deck tractors and many other elements, without which the functioning of a ship of this class is impossible.
If we talk about the direct construction of a full-fledged AB (such as, for example, the type "Nimitz"), then we are faced with the problem of a shortage of shipbuilding capacities. Proposals for a large-block modular assembly are untenable - we need large slipways, which we simply do not have, and welding work on open slipways at sub-zero temperatures (if we talk about the same Sevmash) is undesirable. What does this mean? Firstly, you will have to invest billions of dollars (by no means rubles) in modernizing and expanding the capabilities of the ship industry - and, secondly, at least five years to wait for results.
As a conclusion, I would like to add that we also do not have an infrastructure for basing such ships - and it needs to be built from scratch. For example, China (with its monstrous economic power and engineering and construction potential) has been doing this for four whole years - that is how much it took to build a special naval base in Qingdao.
I think the conclusions from the last paragraph will do everything themselves.
How to fight?
This question is much broader than it seems: we are talking not only about deck aircraft, but also about escort ships, without which, in fact, the very meaning of building an aircraft carrier is lost.
At the current moment in time, the only serially produced combat aircraft suitable for basing on AB is the MiG-29K. To this day, this vehicle can already be called at least morally obsolete - if we talk about the future (and we have no choice, given the preparation time for the construction and the construction of the carrier of carrier-based aircraft), then it will be as suitable for combat operations as and Po-2.
This leads us to the logical conclusion that full-scale work on the design and construction of new types of machines suitable for basing on a domestic aircraft carrier is required to complete the aircraft wing.
Successful use of aircraft carriers in combat requires experience and decades of practice. We don't even have one in the operation of deck helicopters ...
Source: US Navy
The most obvious choice seems to be the use of the Su-57. However, this aircraft is still not in serial production, does not have second stage engines, and is probably too heavy even for an ejection AB. And, accordingly, it needs significant alteration for service in carrier-based aviation. All of the above entails extensive R&D and de facto development of a completely new machine.
However, the situation with the AWACS aircraft is much worse - and without this class of aircraft, any dreams of a Russian aircraft carrier can be considered unrealizable and untenable. Many people often like to appeal to the Soviet Yak-44, forgetting, however, that it was never built even as a prototype for a rather prosaic reason - the work stalled at the stage of on-board equipment development, and this happened with the mighty and living defense industry of the USSR! Considering that at present our Oboronprom has rested even on a large-scale modernization of the A-50, any talk about a carrier-based AWACS aircraft can be considered fantastic history about the jelly shores. Moreover, the Russian Federation has not yet launched mass production of aircraft of this class, even ground-based ones - and they have much less structural complexity (there are no restrictions on the length of the runway, fewer requirements for compactness of equipment, etc.).
To this we can add the absence of multipurpose shipborne helicopters with a modular architecture of functional loading - in Russia there is no serial production of deck-mounted vehicles similar to the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk, and serial army helicopters are unsuitable for ship-based.
Summing up, we can say that the cost of creating an aircraft fleet can exceed the cost of the aircraft carrier itself - and, much worse, there is no guarantee that by the time serial production begins, our promising carrier-based aircraft will not be outdated.
The issue of recruiting an escort group stands apart. We, as usual, touch on it in passing. And often the main argument in it is the statement that, they say, frigates, they say, will close all the necessary niches. This can be called either an impudent lie, or a blissful delusion: ships of the "frigate" class can perform auxiliary tasks as part of the AUG, but they are definitely not its backbone. Moreover, in the event that our ship group is in the ocean (and the supporters of aircraft carriers always emphasize the fight against the enemy "on the distant lines"), ships of such a modest displacement may be unable to use weapon due to the restrictions imposed by the pitching. Sometimes even vessels as large as destroyers find it difficult to cope with the turbulence in the oceans. And what can we say about ships with a displacement of 5000 tons?
For the price of an aircraft carrier group, you can purchase 20 intercontinental stealth bombers - and their bomb load will be at least ten times greater.
Source: US Air Force
The main problem, however, is the frigates' inability to form an air defense battalion. In the US Navy (and a more exemplary AUG operator in the world simply does not exist), the task of air defense of the formation falls on the ships of the first rank, such as the destroyers Arlie Burke and the cruiser Ticonderoga with the appropriate anti-aircraft missile and anti-missile weapons. Moreover, they are equipped with a multifunctional BIUS "Aegis", which has no analogues in our country. Separately, it is worth mentioning the integrated supply ships (by the way, they themselves are slightly smaller than AB and their construction requires appropriate funds and capacities) - we do not have ships of this class, and without them the autonomy of the aircraft carrier strike group is called into question. All this leads us to the fact that for the formation of the AUG, it is necessary to develop and design new naval weapons, automated control systems and, in fact, the combat and auxiliary ships themselves.
I think everyone understands very well how much it will cost the country.
Where to apply?
Alas, this is by no means an idle question - many people like to talk about "the longest maritime border in the world", forgetting, however, that most of it lies in freezing waters, and all other water areas are blocked by natural barriers that are successfully used by our enemy: the Danish Straits , Bosphorus and Dardanelles, Faroe Islands and Iceland, Aleuts and Japan. Our fleets are locked in closed seas, which automatically defines our aircraft carriers in the category of defense weapons, narrowing the range of their practical use. Limited by "glasses" of small water areas, our AUG will be under constant observation of the enemy, which, however, still holds the Black, Baltic and Okhotsk seas at gunpoint.
If we talk about the prospects for the development of missile weapons and long-range reconnaissance UAVs, the situation is taking on a completely unpleasant turn for us.
The deployment of single squadrons in the oceans controlled by the United States and its allies also looks like a sophisticated form of suicide, especially given our lack of a network of foreign naval bases. Of course, this will force the enemy to divert significant forces and means, but it will end in the inevitable destruction of our AUG - and, given the complete lack of experience in the combat use of formations of this type, as well as the total air superiority that the enemy can provide almost anywhere in the world, by no means it is not a fact that in the course of performing this task, he is at least guaranteed to suffer large losses.
As a conclusion of this material, I would like to quote from the book “Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace ”by military analyst Edward Nicolae Luttwak, a man who worked in the Ronald Reagan administration and who saw the peak of the development of the US Navy with his own eyes. This excerpt focuses on the debate that emerged in Congress following an analysis of the fighting in the Falkland Islands War.
Dipole reflectors, confusing enemy radars, naval missile impulses in the infrared range, and deliberate electronic interference will all deflect anti-ship missiles targeting aircraft carriers off course, while anti-aircraft missiles and escort ship cannons will shoot down other missiles, and planes that risk flying too close to be released. And this, as indicated by the commanders of the Navy, was only the middle layer of defense.
24 long-range fighter-interceptors on each aircraft carrier, with four aircraft equipped with long-range warning radars, and four electronic warfare aircraft to produce interference will have to provide the outer layer of defense, while four tanker aircraft will provide them with long-range refueling.
Finally, there was also an inner layer of defense: radars, countermeasures, anti-aircraft missiles and guns on each ship, including special automatic anti-aircraft guns designed solely for this purpose.
This response to the 1982 anti-ship missile enthusiasts was so overwhelming that the other side of the coin received almost no attention.
If you calculate everything that is required to successfully respond to anti-ship missiles, it becomes clear that in addition to the extremely high cost of escort ships, a significant part of the combat power of the aircraft carrier itself is absorbed in the task of protecting against attack by anti-ship missiles.
Do we really need an aircraft carrier to pour the bulk of our defense budget into its construction program for decades?
Is the country really ready to sacrifice the development of vital defense programs in order to create, in essence, a parade ship, unsuitable for the hostilities that we will be forced to conduct?
Aircraft carrier fantasies are far from harmless.
This is a malicious message that rejects a much-needed pragmatic approach for the country, a call to waste money allocated to the development of the armed forces.
The rationale behind their construction has no practical justification, except for the notorious desire to enter the circle of aircraft carrier powers.
- A. Voskresensky
- US Air Force US Navy
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