Description of the posts of PMCs:
The PMC adopted a military system ranzhira and the same qualification features called SKU. The company’s council has established special ranks of officers according to the military pattern, generally accepted in the analogy of the countries of the North American continent, mostly the US analogy (territoriality of company registration), since the “Compliance” form is convenient for civilian missions. In the US Army, a similar form of control was adopted - the title (internal rank) - position. Those. each position we have a special title. But the same title or SKU (special control code) reflects the analog level of employee training, the number of years in continuous professional activity, military or civilian work experience before joining PMCs.
For example, to take the Team-Lieder post (captain), you must serve at least five years in assault units with the rank of a similar officer or other special forces, taking part in hostilities, or eight years with the police, in the analogy of 10 years in special security structures. Also, the job seeker must undergo special retraining at the SEC (The Special Educational Center) or have a similar history training in the world centers of this profile, where they give special practical knowledge for a security specialist for combat zones.
SKU employees PMC:
1. Sergeant Major - position and SKU employee when signing the contract.
2. Command Sergeant Major - position and I & C of the group commander up to 3-5 people.
3. Specialist 126.96.36.199 - rank for specialists with an indication of the class, by analogy with the US Army, is assigned to the first SCU. It is understood that this is not a command position, but a level of class.
Senior employees (officers):
1. Lieutenant Colonel- Deputy Project Manager.
2. Colonel - Project Manager of the expedition.
1. Brigadier General 1 - The expedition leader is subordinate to more than three offices and he completely manages the project. Deputy CEO of the company.
2. Lieutenant General 3 - Director of the incoming company. Deputy Director General.
3. General 4 (General) - General Director of the company.
The book from which the excerpts are provided was written by one of the first wild geese - a native of the USSR
From I.Koval's book “An Unorthodox Soldier” Russian view
Tactics, methods and weapons of the rebels in Iraq
In order to understand the essence of PMCs that employees of these structures encounter in carrying out their official duties, it is necessary to get into their “shop”, or in other words, into the work area. The situation in Iraq in the middle of the first decade of the XX1 century can serve as a very good example for all. This guide will help with this. It provides information on the strategy, tactics, methods of conducting the armed struggle of the rebels in Iraq against the forces of the Coalition, and accordingly against the Western PMCs, as system components of this process.
In addition, here’s some information about certain systems. weapons. In some cases, certain weapons covered in this manual were often not used by the rebels; however, such weapons are still in Iraq, and therefore, the accidental use of these systems remains possible.
To highlight the topic to a wider segment of the population, this guide is published at the UNSECRET level. Also, the level of detail (described here) remains relatively professional and broad, even though more specific information may be available.
O. Valetsky, I. Bogoslavets took part in the analysis.
The main trump card of the tactical tasks of the United States and the MTR on the eve of the outbreak of war in 2002-03 and subsequent strategic decisions was that the main "hostile" part of the country, which can form partisan-sabotage movement and enemy units, is a desert, and using technical superiority and air supremacy, it will be easy to break all opposition attempts to translate the war into a successful long-term guerrilla action.
But all the predictions were not justified, to put it mildly. Terrorists (as they are calling everyone who disagrees with the official version of Washington regarding events in the world) or insurgent groups (as anyone, for whom what sense is closer) in Iraq are still guerilla warring against the forces of the Coalition and the official government of Iraq. Which, in their opinion, does not reflect the national, local clan, religious interests of the historically national structural associations. How did it happen that the terrain, on which the US MTR command was hoping for, did not give the occupying forces any advantage? Raids, ambushes, bombings, sheltering, sabotage, and general secretive tactics were very effective primary military means of fighting the Coalition's forces. And it turns out that success does not need mountains and passes, where movement of troops and support forces is difficult. In Iraq, the rebels have denied all the doctrines of US special forces, which undoubtedly were based on the general experience of modern warfare on foreign territory, including the USSR. Open terrain is obviously a light object in the territorial aspect, to control the formation of aggressive actions against the forces of occupation. But it turned out that this is an erroneous fact and technical superiority with a nominee in some kind of global space environment is not a law of success.
The rebels in Iraq were forced to apply the latest tactics using the maximum conditions for complicating the presence of Coalition forces and support structures on the ground. Which is used to this day. They use murder, kidnapping, informational operations to intimidate and control the population in the subordinate territories and in the “dual zones” of control.
“In a word,” this whole complex combination of tactical guerrilla solutions can be called an asymmetric war. An asymmetric war or a guerrilla war in Iraq is a departure from contact with the enemy by a given CS and, at the same time, attacking places that are weak in the very structure of the formation and basing of the Coalition Forces (hereinafter COP).
(Literally, “Asymmetrical” has a meaning that is inappropriate. That is, the word itself contains the meaning of the actions of the responding side. They seem to correspond to the actions and tactics offered by the enemy for various reasons on the battlefield. Asymmetry is reflected in everything, up to choosing this “battlefield.” As a rule, the asymmetric side reserves this right. The usual meaningful meaning of action is to avoid situations where the enemy may be given the opportunity to use his power in military contact, but at the same time time by all means to strengthen the moments and exploit its weaknesses. By this definition, most modern wars are asymmetric.)
The asymmetrical tactics that the rebels used at the time in Iraq, to date, can be roughly divided into the following categories:
the use of attacks that can be called "Dead End" IEDs "(These are ambush actions using Improvised Explosive Devices when, after a blast, superior forces are held down by indirect fire)
АсDistinct tactical attacks target aggression (RTNTSA) - they include raids, ambushes, "creating a small war" on the territory of the target objectives and, accordingly, the withdrawal of entire tactical groups operating on a single pre-planned plan. Or, the last stage “withdrawal” is completely excluded from the very beginning, which gives this form of armed struggle a special status and strength of influence on the enemy. This is the seizure of an object, its shackling for a possible time, with causing appreciable damage to the police, troops, civil administrations, with active combat operations conducted from the walls of this object (part of the city), using heavy weapons previously brought into the territory of aggression, followed by mining and undermining the whole object along with itself .;
Skit and rapid disappearance from the attack zone - concealment of attack groups, and the use of camouflage. Under the camouflage refers to the opportunity to get lost among the civilian population;
Ignoring the Law of Armed Conflict, as established by the European Conventions, which the Western armies adhere to - ie non compliance with the European structuring of database maintenance. For example, the use of human shields, suicide bombers, children's and other civilian institutions for rocket attacks and so on ...
Informational operations. This operation is not with the media system, it may seem. This is an informational form of struggle with the use of disinformation technologies. The goal is to confuse the enemy about their real strength, location, intentions and so on.
As already noted, insurgents in Iraq generally seek to avoid the concept of conducting an armed struggle “force on force”, in the usual military sense of conventional obligations. And they prefer instead to use the tactic of “disappearing” from the place of contact, imposed by situations on the forces of the CS. For this good raids and ambushes, the operation of "suicide bombers", and other similar tactics. The main thing in such actions is the introduction of confusion in the system of warfare. When Coalition forces get together to set up cordons and sweep, or even worse, start the main “Retaliation” campaigns, most of the rebels leave or “camouflage” in the territories under the local population. The weak level of the intelligence network for the special forces of the CC and special intelligence services of the CIA is explained by the impossibility of the secret existence of an agent for a long time on the territory and the subsequent cruel retribution by the Mujahideen. They destroy the relatives of agents to the seventh generation and this is perhaps the main factor motivating the refusal to cooperate with the occupiers. Money does not solve anything. Money is usually taken, but the result is weak.
In general, rebel actions are targeted mainly at seizing and subsequent control over regional areas, when the Coalition, exhausted by hostilities, draws a tie in the so-called treaty zones or “liberates” those areas by transferring control to government forces. This is the most vulnerable point of the database management system in a foreign territory, where non-combatants are turning into an enemy with lightning speed, and, moreover, well-coordinated and informed. The main exception to this rule was the Fallujah operation in April and November of 2004, when the faction headquarters developed an operation to take under full control of the province of Anbar. And for some time it was possible. But it is comparatively short and with the help of the mobilization of very many forces, which in itself is a very laborious and monetary exercise. But as soon as the rebels debugged the weapons supply system, the ammunition to the province, a batch of trained suicide bombers arrived from Syria — everything returned to normal. The new round was even worse and more cruel. The Islamic Party of Iraq was the key link between all Sunni groups and all Iraqi-loyal Ba'aths. And rather, it is still nationalistic rather than religious. It is interesting that the combat units of this party did not use martyrs to the village, and their actions were directed only against the US military and non-Iraqi military contractors. Means of struggle, such as kidnappings and the use of martyrs, were used by the Omar brigade and several radical groups of Bin-Malik and Al-Ansar, who later joined the Iraqi first-class Mujahideen unit in 2006. The tactics of suicide bombers is their main tactic. And then, before the events described, they acted, independently, fighting mostly with the Shiites. Omar fought with the Badr troops, Shiite militants who were loyal to the government of Iraq. The Ansar al-Sunna Army (Partisans of the Law) acted territorially in Kurdistan and was the most radical in Islam - its doctrine is very close to Al Qaeda, but putting itself in opposition to this organization.
The key period of new tactics against the “Crusaders”, as the forces of the KS rebels called, was the period of 08.2004-06. It was a period of understanding the previous experience of the struggle and an awareness of the upcoming change. At that time, the rebels prepared a massive blow, not only in Anbar, both physically and psychologically, demonstrating the coherence and consistency between the faction leaders. Which was especially shocking to the CIA, and it was forced to beat out new spending on a special war from the US Government. It was then that PMCs began to be actively used to wage war already consciously and planned, and not like in 2003-04, when private guards simply found themselves in combat zones unplanned.
In Anbar, the rebels ambushed a convoy of American private guards, destroying everyone, and causing a wild nervousness in the Pentagon itself. At the same time, actions were carried out in several localities of different provinces to explode suicide bombers, which took the lives of a huge number of civilians. Well-organized raids were made on several police posts and stations in Anbar and Dial. The destabilization of the situation in the sector on the second day reached its apogee. In some places, members of the administration and local government were killed. The Pentagon was forced to authorize the headquarters of the COP to take measures to develop a military operation in the province of Anbar for the complete destruction of the underground.
A similar name was born from the specifics of the actions of the rebel detachments. A dead end is when an action, a more equipped and powerful enemy, is shackled by certain factors, including terrain, city blocks, cemeteries, and other buildings. And these factors are used against them. That is, military actions become dead-end.
Since for the most part, Mujahideen rebels are trying to avoid direct fire obligations with American heavy-armored vehicles, Bradley infantry vehicles, Marine Corps (IFVs) and tanks Abrams, who provide the main superiority in direct battle, they prefer to carry out operations “dead end” using weapons, the so-called “indirect fire.” As already mentioned, “Dead End” means attack from a preferred distance and use the time for tactical maneuver in their favor, thereby to allow avoiding direct contact battle and to fight the enemy for a long time according to their tactical laws imposed on the opponent as opposed to the enemy. Those. attack, when it is completely unexpected for the military and security structures of the Coalition, in places completely unsuitable for counterattack, on forces that are not able to quickly form a response operation. At the same time, it is necessary to inflict maximum damage on the enemy’s manpower and maximize the use of the propaganda machine to process the population against invaders and destabilize the general civilian situation. This will allow the SK to make mistakes, and the Mujahideen forces conduct long-term military operations and control the area. As a rule, during this time those city officials who collaborate with the new government are destroyed. And this is the main goal of such actions. The ultimate. Later, Coalition forces and government troops, when taking control of the territory again, are faced with the fact that there is no one to put the governor. And the bet again remains with the rebels. Only their people agree without hesitation, showing a temporary agreement, and the enemy has no choice. What happens next is understandable. It was here that the Pentagon found a way out in attracting bases in such cities of PMCs after the troops carry out liberation operations and governors again rose up. The entire administration of the Arab cities began to transfer the contractor to the Pentagon, the western (American and English) PMCs.
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
IEDs are the main weapon of the rebels. It ranges from simple to complex: from a single equipped bomb, blown up by a wire crew, to multiple ammunition on long stretches of routes blown up by radio control (REMOTE CONTROL). The most complex IEDs are equipped with intruder sensors (EFPs), armed with REMOTE CONTROL and equipped with passive infrared motion sensors.
Attacks using suicide bombs are used quite often. These are vehicles filled with VBIEDs and suicide vests that are worn by shahids. The IEDs ("shahid") is the most effective weapon in the rebel arsenal in terms of the number of victims in incidents. Multiple VBIED attacks are also used against fixed targets, such as advanced checkpoints and checkpoints, as well as against mobile targets, such as support convoys, which by the 2005 were transferred to the PMC for all 100%.
A special peak of the terrorist suicide war came in 2005 year. When for several months a massive number of explosions were carried out in Dial, Anbar, Baghdad, Karbala and Al-Najaf. Both military targets, strategic routes, as well as civilian and religious targets were simultaneously hit. The number of victims was catastrophic. One such terrorist attack claimed the lives of 50-250 people. And sometimes the number of victims reached the 1000 people, with poisoning with hrorinil.
Mortars. Mortars can be used in the so-called “hunt-and-rapid-waste” method.
Similar tactics were used in Afghanistan and are used by Hezbollah and Hamas militants in Palestine. Iraqi gunmen RO or salvo mortars in a truck or pickup truck, sometimes making a hole in the roof of a simple sedan to release weapons and not be visible to patrols.
They make several simultaneous volleys and move to a new position before they are spotted by enemy art correctors. The rebels can also simply leave these systems after use to facilitate rescue - if they were firing for a long time, say by convoy, escort, or deployed base. Sometimes they leave a trap with high-explosive bombs on the equipment left or leave a “place” under the blow of another indirect fire system to call and then destroy unsuspecting Coalition units that capture equipment after receiving a signal about the location of the object.
Such information is easily transmitted through its people to the local police. This practice brought a good effect. Thus, the mobile unit of the special operations unit of the US MP in Anbar province in 2005 was destroyed, which were given the task to liquidate the rebel gang in the Shiite area, with whom there was coordination on protection. Thus, the maximum destabilization of the situation was also achieved. PMC leaders who had coalition contracts for demining and disposing of ammunition and mines, frightened by activity, cunning (several groups of PMCs were called to the place of detection of suspected ammunition and were undermined by radio signal) and the audacity of the militants began to refuse to fulfill their previous commitments.
The tactic of wearing down was a very effective rebel struggle against PMCs. Often used models in this tactic played a major role. Improvised rockets were used in a set-and-forget tactic (that is, an installation aimed at an object connected to a timer device and power supply, and armed to “shoot”).
Missiles require more planning and even more delivery and installation time than sly tactics. The forgotten and “merged” false installation became a trap for the special forces team and for the PMC groups that are fighting against “indirect fire” units in the contractual security zones. Sometimes such installations blocked the roads for several days, as there were no special teams of engineering special forces on site, and the Iraqi security forces were only able to block the dangerous area. Russian convoy groups had to fall into similar situations.
Iraqi rebels and terrorists have been using classic partisan tactics that have been around for centuries. They lead a war without fronts; they scatter and move in small groups to remain undetected; they avoid direct confrontation with superior concentrations of enemy forces; they attack the lines of communications and supply of supplies of isolated sections - accompanying all this with massive raids and ambushes in different places of the region. Sometimes, knocking out units of the COP for months from the territories. Since the formation of collateral security in the provinces follows a certain pattern (such are the conditions) using the attracted resources of various departments, including civilians, the Mujahideen fully collect information on such structural units and strike them in the form of raids on bases, in the form of ambushes on the roads, abductions, etc.
A scattered attack (also known as distributed operations or nonlinear scattered operations described in the methodic "Guerrilla War or Counteraction against the forces of CO") is a non-linear approach to the protection of a territory. Small groups in a semi-autonomous mode with a place of deployment, called by the Americans battlespace (a term from the method of warfare), remain the most important elusive and hidden from the Air Force Coalition and artillery. What makes the forces of both the rebels and the Coalition almost equal makes the war, in simple terms, lead. And the COP has the only advantage in it in the form of tanks and armored personnel carriers. But against them the Mujahideen also invented their tactics of opposition. The intelligence activities of the US and British MTR forces are practically reduced to zero, since the control, command and control of the actions of these combat units of the Mujahideen are decentralized. And the zone protection system is assigned to the networks of these cells. When the Coalition units, completing tasks, enter these battlespace, scattered before the troops converge and the attack occurs from many sides, as far as possible. In 2003, the doctrine of the partisan war fell into the hands of the Saddam officers in the form of a “Rebel Document”. And in May, 2004, the streets of Baghdad and the COP patrols, recognized it at its best. Marine and Army Special Forces units encountered this type of protection in Fallujah during April 2004 and in November 2004, and then in Dial.
Deception and conspiracy (D&D)
The most common insurgent methods D&D (English abbreviation) are to hide all factors of the armed struggle. D&D tactics are a well-established method of action in which groups are dispersed into small subgroups and cells; hiding in buildings; using forked passages, trenches, and tunnels; maneuvering within civilian crowds on the streets; wearing civilian clothes, they remain well-coordinated combat units, with a good control system, completely incomprehensible to modern tactical techniques using electronic equipment.
Dispersion, stealth in the crowd, mixing with civilians in the complex landscape of the city, can nullify the work of the CA air force and ground VOC systems.
Fights in the Sadre City area of Baghdad 2004, 2006; shelling of the "Green Zone"; the alarming night war in Heif in 2004-2005 (Baghdad district), when night snipers calmly hit their targets, nullifying the work of entire tactical groups on armored vehicles with the latest equipment - all this was tactics (D&D).
Ignoring the Law of Armed Collision
While the Coalition forces must follow the rules or the so-called "Laws of Armed Conflict", the rebels do not. They are free to choose a plan of action and opposition. The guerrillas hope to exploit the fact of the Coalition’s adherence to the Armed Clashes Law in order to gain a tactical advantage. The Mujahideen use human shields, their position during raids in so-called “protected” urban structures, such as mosques and schools, and often use “evil jokes” such as pretending to surrender and conclude an armistice on guests' terms. They hide explosives (IEDs) in human corpses and animals, carefully camouflage the padding to wire systems; fake surrender in contact fights, waving white flags and then firing when units of the Coalition Forces approach. The use of stolen vehicles, weapons, uniforms (ISF-uniforms of the police) for ambushes on the tracks, favorite events of the alibab and detachments of field commanders, for example at the time of Zarkauvi. It is the PMC groups that often become the main victims of such attacks.
The rebels deliberately use non-combatants as “human shields”. Almost all the daring raids and attacks of Zarqawi detachments in Baghdad, Bakkuba, El Fallujah, used firing points for the enemy, in residential densely populated neighborhoods, in schools, madrasas, teahouse. Sometimes it was in the nature of the use of the civilian population by the Mujahideen, as hostages and in the open, not allowing civilians to leave these so-called “battlespace”. In Fallujah throughout April 2004, they prevented civilians from leaving the zone of the forthcoming hostilities, prohibited to be evacuated on pain of death and retaliation to the seventh generation. The calculation is simple - a living shield bores the actions of the COP, because they will have difficulty resolving the main issue - the suppression of key points of the Mujahideen. The presence of a huge number of civilians guarantees the operation of the rebels two things: either the protected points cause maximum damage to the Coalition forces, or they make huge sacrifices from the infidel fire. Both cases are at the hands of the Al-Qaida Center, the main customer for such destabilizing operations.
During 2004 in Baghdad, supporters of Mukhtata al Sadr closed schools and organized work strikes to create the effect of a crowd of civilians in the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City. The rebels also used peaceful demonstrations as a cover and a means of salvation after the attack was carried out.
Urban infrastructure, such as buildings, shrines, museums and ruins of buildings, can be used as tactical fortifications. And at the same time they can decide political, religious, cultural, or historical nuances, in one direction or another. The rebels deliberately occupy these structures and conduct a DB from them, forcing the Coalition forces to either refrain from attacks, or at least limit the return fire in order to minimize civilian casualties. For example, during the uprisings of the Mahdi Army in 2004, the US military did not directly attack any of the three most holy mosques in Shiite Islam - Ali Shrines, Najaf, and Hussein and Abba Shrines in Karbala - for fear of an uncontrolled uprising of the local population.
During April, 2004 Mahdi Sadr's Army launched a fierce struggle around the All Kufah mosque in Najaf, while Al-Sadr barricaded himself at Ali Shrine. The Mahdi Army used mosques and shrines as military fortifications at Karbala and Kufa. 11 in May 2004, the forces of the American 1 Armored Regiment and the 2 Battalion of the 15 MT Corps attacked the Mukhaiyam Mosque in Karbala to knock out the Mahdi fighters, who then moved to the civilian sector of the city. Subsequently, Mahdi fighters, regrouped around the Shrine of Abba and the Shrine of Hussein, only in 600 feet east of the Mukhaiyam Mosque, conducted a powerful counterattack on American forces using mortars and RPGs.
In Najaf, May 2004, Mahdi Army fighters deployed in neighborhoods and suburbs of settlements, including local ruins, and fought over the high walls of the fortress and the crypts of the Wadi al-Salam cemetery (Valley of Peace), the largest Shiite cemetery in the world.
There is only one result - over time, the occupying forces become clear that they cannot use the scorched-earth tactics (Vietnam and Afghanistan are a good example), otherwise it threatens to completely destabilize the situation. At the same time, there is only one solution - a cease-fire and the transfer of control to the treaty forces. As a rule, over time, the territory again passes under the control of rebel leaders and a vicious circle turns out, exhausting the Aliens.
Over time, the treaty zones become even worse “non-contractual,” new insurrections flare up on religious and inter-ethnic grounds, regional leaders often are powerless in solving problems, and it is not rare that they themselves are killed during these outbreaks of violence. And even if they managed to avoid a violent death, by using foreign guards - who professionally, blocking the rebels for a while, saved the "body", anyway, the political career in the region ended there. This man is like being dead. As a result, active hostilities are again unfolding, - which bear new victims and destruction, giving rise to a new layer of offended and humiliated citizens.
Since 2008, the rebel units have become even more sophisticated in the tactics of “scattered hostilities”. When the objectives of the targets remained unchanged, the tactical attacks of the target aggression were scattered, the approach to their fulfillment changed. Rather, to exit the combat part of the operation. As the combat actions of the Mujahideen of the previous period showed, the main vulnerable point of the RTNCA was precisely the departure of attack groups from the place of the task of temporary destabilization. As it is known, the mojaheds, planning attacks on large cities and enemy bases, set themselves a temporary retention of territory. The main goal of such an attack is the subsequent temporary destabilization of the situation. Then exit from the battlefield, and the preservation of the group, was sometimes an impossible task, and this destroyed all the plans of the rebels. Sometimes, in spite of the first colossal results of horror targeting, the apogee of such attacks was quite low in terms of the advantage effect over the newcomers in the eyes of the local population. The American infantry very quickly learned to block such areas and “divide” them into sectors, systematically and then destroying them. Often, such disparate groups simply surrendered to captivity, erasing out all the “positive” previously earned. Moreover, the US military taught and trained the Iraqi Guard and special forces for such countermeasures in urban environments, reducing the time of control of the rebels. But the longer this time lasts, the more effectively the group worked. At that time, the most unpredictable and insidious method of achieving such a goal was the actions of a suicide bomber. The destructive force depends on the mass of explosives, the number of victims on the choice of the object. Advantages - it is difficult to detect the subject of an attack before this attack itself, and the absence of the need to evacuate it, after completing the task. But the strength of tactics was laid and its weakness. Such attacks acted only in time for the subsequent explosion. Real-time terrifying with this approach was impossible. In addition, no territory, even for a time, was left to the forces opposing the invaders regime. Strategists from the Mujahideen decided to combine the two approaches of conducting terror into one. Groups of professional fighters began to be created who underwent psychological training for the suicide bomber, but did not stupidly go to the slaughter, choosing just the place of the future explosion, and were full-fledged combat units of the tactical operational orders of the Mujahideen. With the help of such groups, bold and aggressive attacks on objects that were not previously considered by the leadership of the Mujahideen for seizures, were developed because of the complexity of their execution. The level of protection due to the degree of significance of the objects was so great that the thought of a raid on them, and on one and the other hand, was delusional, was doing. As you know, you can capture any object, having prepared the soil in advance. I dare to suggest that a well-prepared and motivated group is capable of capturing even the Kremlin in Moscow. All you need is time, funds and support teams. Let us say almost in confidence that in large cities a system of control is built only for large movements of troops, the system does not function against small, well-trained, tactically balanced divisions of professionals. An example of this is the Nord-Ost tragedy. The main problem in such operations is to hold such an object for a long time, and then evacuate the group. And if the second task is still, as it is stretched in time, then the latter is not feasible in principle. A solution was found.
The first and middle parts of the operation are easy to stretch, reinforcing the groups with multilevel training and adding external support units to them. According to a pre-planned plan for the “transfer” of auxiliary groups, a well-armed combat group, carrying on themselves serious weapons and explosives, leading an aggressive battle, captures the desired object. For efficiency and speed of capture there are many ways known from the textbooks of the rules of sabotage war. One of them is a red herring when one of the subgroups of saboteurs unleashes a battle in a completely different place, improvising a raid on an imaginary object. Such tactics in saboteurs is called "glasses".
The audacity of the raid is always a very effective thing, with the suddenness of the action. Immediately resist such an aggressive form of attack is almost impossible. Each fighter (and with this approach to the operation, the combat ratio of forces in the personal composition of the shooters looks like this: 1 to 5 guards) knows the object very well and its place in it. As well as goals and objectives. With relative small numbers (the group can usually consist of 3-10 people, depending on the size of the object and the tasks), the sabotage squad is very effective. As soon as it enters the building, it is immediately distributed into two or three subgroups. Some equip shooting positions, others sweep buildings and establish links with support teams, a third subgroup mines an entire facility or even a microdistrict, leaving mines and explosives on themselves. Then they prepare for battle and lead him from all trunks, which they dragged and which they seized from the guard of the object. Thus, shacking around him huge forces of anti-terror units and the army. As a rule, hostages are in the hands of terrorists, with the help of which it is possible to increase the effectiveness of the damage to the attackers. In such an arrangement, battles can go for days, or even weeks. Such an example was in Tikrit in winter 2011 of the year. In principle, the usual operation of the sabotage group. What is unusual is that the plans of this group do not have a final destination - evacuation. This means that it is not necessary to plan the ammunition, carry out the wounded and the dead, put support groups at risk, put the fight cell at risk. When the last bullet ends, at the command of the terrorists undermine themselves along with the entire object. As a rule, the effect of destabilization in the region is enormous. The human toll, which amounts to hundreds, material damage to millions. In the end, all this causes a blow similar to the domino effect to the consciousness of people. Fear begins to constrain various spheres of city management, spreading, step by step. And this is the main task of gliders such attacks.
In addition, during the war, whole “divisions” and “armies” are formed that build a business in a war: the sale of weapons, drugs, human trafficking, etc., and it is almost impossible to stop this orgy by military means, because it involves typically, representatives of both sides of the confrontation.