Goals and Objectives of the Russian Navy: Strategic Deterrence

What tasks should the Russian Navy solve? And what should be its composition for solving these problems? Let's try to consider these issues in stages, based on the importance of the tasks to be solved.

Challenges and opportunities

Exactly so - tasks, taking into account the possibility of their solution. It makes no sense to pose a problem if its solution is obviously unattainable. For example, a symmetrical opposition to the American naval forces (Navy) with conventional weapons, and even at a distance from the borders of the Russian Federation - this task is obviously impossible due to the incomparable financial and technical capabilities, as well as the peculiarities of the geographical location of the United States and Russia.

There is no special sense in the task so beloved by many as "demonstration of the flag", if, of course, it means beautiful but useless trips of 3,5 ships to the other end of the world, and not a real force capable of influencing the situation in the area of ​​its presence.

The use of NK for trips to "distant countries" in conditions when in fact they have practically no opportunity to carry out a real combat mission there, nothing more than "show off"

Then what tasks should the Russian Navy solve?

According to the author, the first and main (but not the only) task of the Russian Navy is strategic deterrence.

Challenge # 1 - Strategic Deterrence

Strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs) are currently one of the most important elements of the nuclear triad, second only in combat power to the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces). There is even an opinion that at present there is a serious bias towards the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces (SNF).

Given the actual dominance of the US Navy and NATO in the waters of the oceans, such an opinion may be well founded. Nevertheless, there are factors that justify the presence of a developed naval component of the strategic nuclear forces - "putting all the eggs in one basket" can lead to the enemy concentrating on the possibility of destroying the remaining component of the strategic nuclear forces (which the Strategic Missile Forces actually are) and find a way to destroy them by sudden disarming blow with a result acceptable to him.

In addition, there is an objective reality in which the newest SSBNs of project 955 (A) "Borey" are present. It hardly makes sense to consider sending the latest weapons, on which billions of rubles were spent, on needles? This means that the Russian Navy must, as a matter of priority, ensure their combat stability.

SSBN project 955 (A) "Borey" is an integral reality of our Navy, critically important for ensuring the strategic security of the Russian Federation

How can this be done and what is needed for this?

Taking into account the above thesis about the overwhelming dominance of the US Navy and NATO at the moment, these can only be the so-called "bastions" - the guarded patrol areas of Russian SSBNs. At the exit from the bases and in the "bastions" SSBNs will be threatened by the enemy's multipurpose nuclear submarines (PLA), in the "bastions" themselves - his anti-submarine aviation, and surface ships.

Again, taking into account the aforementioned thesis, the "bastions" of Russian SSBNs should be located in relative proximity to the Russian coast, therefore, aircraft carriers and even ships of the first rank are not required to protect them. More precisely, they can be used to solve this problem, and very effectively, but the price of such a solution for the Russian budget will be prohibitively high.

What resources do we need to solve the problem of ensuring the combat stability of SSBNs?

To combat enemy submarines, own submarines (submarines), anti-submarine surface ships (NK) and anti-submarine defense aviation (ASW) can be used.

At the same time, the use of submarines and NKs, not to mention PLO aviation, to combat surface ships, within the framework of solving the problem of defending the enemy's SSBN bastions, is inappropriate. Surface ships will not help either from enemy ASW aircraft. The destruction of enemy aircraft and surface ships, in the framework of solving the problem of protecting the "bastions" of SSBNs, in the author's opinion, it is advisable to assign to coastal aviation.

It should be borne in mind that the task of protecting the "bastions" can be divided into two parts - preventing a sudden disarming strike aimed at neutralizing the Russian strategic nuclear forces, and defending the "bastions" in the event of a full-scale attack that will be a continuation of the conventional conflict. Moreover, it is obvious that the second task will be limited in time, since a direct attack on elements of strategic nuclear forces will force the defending side to use SSBNs as intended until they are destroyed.

Submarines

Given the relative geographic proximity of the "bastions", the question arises of the expediency of escorting SSBNs only with multipurpose nuclear submarines.

Perhaps diesel-electric submarines (diesel-electric submarines) or non-nuclear submarines (non-nuclear submarines) can cope with this task?

The advantage of diesel-electric submarines is its lower cost, however, its emergence can unmask the SSBN patrol area. On the other hand, the appearance of diesel-electric submarines in itself does not mean that it covers SSBNs; it may well solve other problems. Or, for example, it was specially used to distract the enemy from the real area where the SSBN is located. The non-submarine submarine is less vulnerable in this respect, since the period of its patrolling in a submerged position is much longer.

Diesel-electric submarines of project 677 "Lada" can supplement or even replace multipurpose submarines while protecting SSBNs in "bastions"

There is no doubt that multipurpose submarines will be more effective for covering SSBNs, but the problem is that we have very few of them. Project 971 submarines will become obsolete and gradually withdraw from the Navy, and many Yasen-class SSNs will not be built, and their capabilities are excessive to cover SSBNs. Also, both options - PLA and SSK / NAPL can be used together.

Perhaps the best and most optimal option would be the creation of inexpensive multifunctional submarines based on existing diesel-electric submarines and a block nuclear reactor. A similar option was considered by the author in the article Nuclear Reactor for NAPL. Will Poseidon lay Dollezhal's eggand also by Maxim Klimov in the article Does our fleet need a small multipurpose nuclear submarine.

At the same time, from diesel-electric submarines and submarines to the Russian the fleet not get rid of. At the very least, they are needed in the Black Sea and the Baltic, as well as technologies for building nuclear submarines (including for export). Consequently, building diesel-electric submarines / submarines in a relatively large series, it is possible to provide them with the Northern and Pacific fleets to solve the problems of covering SSBNs.

Of course, promising diesel-electric submarines and submarines should be provided with modern torpedo and anti-torpedo weapons, but this applies equally to submarines.

Surface ships

Corvettes optimized to counter submarines are the optimal solution here. An article was recently published on the Military Review What are we building - corvettes or flag demonstrators on the feasibility of creating a new corvette based on the complex and expensive project 20386 and abandoning the outdated project 20380 due to its weak air defense and the lack of technologies to reduce the visibility in it. According to the author, this is a wrong opinion.

Here we can rather agree with Alexander Timokhin and Maxim Klimov that the main task of the corvette should be anti-submarine warfare. And the corvette 20380 is quite suitable for solving this problem, including for covering the deployment of SSBNs, especially in combination with an anti-submarine helicopter. But the corvette of project 20386, especially after the modernization, will become more expensive than the frigate of project 22350, to which it will still be inferior in most parameters. You shouldn't make a cruiser out of a corvette.

The corvettes of project 20380 have been worked out in construction and may well solve the tasks of PLO while protecting the "bastions" of SSBNs, corvettes of project 20386 are redundant for solving this problem, their construction has not been worked out, which promises delays in construction and an increase in financial costs

Considering that the corvette should operate near its shores, its air defense should be provided by coastal aviation or other NKs. This also includes the technology for reducing the visibility. It is good when it is there, and if someday a new inexpensive and efficient corvette is created, then it is great if stealth technologies are implemented on it. But their absence is also uncritical in the light of the task being solved - to ensure the deployment of SSBNs. The very fact of an attack on the covering forces is already quite a reason for a nuclear strike, which the enemy is not at all interested in - he needs to suddenly and quickly destroy SSBNs before their SLBMs (submarine ballistic missiles) are launched.

PLO aviation

The next component of the defense of "bastions" and the protection of SSBNs from submarines is ASW aviation, which includes anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters. PLO helicopters are deployed on Project 20380 corvettes, and one of the priority tasks is their modernization in order to increase the ability to combat modern submarines, which has been repeatedly mentioned on the pages of VO.

The second component of PLO aviation are anti-submarine aircraft, presented in the Russian Navy by Il-38 aircraft. As in the case with PLO helicopters, it is required to provide the Navy with a sufficient number of PLO aircraft equipped with modern means of detecting and destroying submarines. Whether these will be modernized Il-38 aircraft or the development of a fundamentally new model is required, the question is open. The important thing is that the demand for such machines is as high as possible.

IL-38N modernized anti-submarine aircraft of the Russian Navy

Potential risk should be noted - the possibility of equipping the latest modification of the American submarine "Virginia" with laser weapons with a capacity of about 300-500 kW is being consideredcapable of ensuring the destruction of PLO aircraft and helicopters when the PLA is at periscope depth. This could potentially create significant problems for ASW aviation. However, in the context of solving the problem of covering SSBNs, as in the case of the attack on corvettes, the destruction of ASW aircraft protecting the "bastions" can serve as a signal for the start of a nuclear war, as well as distract the PLA from its main goal - the destruction of SSBNs and make it a target for PLA / Diesel-electric submarine / submarine cover.

Coastal aviation

Why should coastal aviation be involved in solving the tasks of destroying NK and enemy aircraft, and not use, for example, surface ships?

First of all, because of its much greater versatility, in relation to the latter, and the possibility of an operational transfer and concentration of force.

Even in peacetime, fighter aircraft may well displace enemy ASW aircraft from the "bastions" zone, disrupt their work, and in a threatened period, more stringent measures can be applied.

If a surface ship is not equipped with a long-range anti-aircraft missile system (SAM), then it will not be able to create any serious threat to enemy ASW aircraft, since they will simply leave the affected area using the speed advantage. In addition, PLO aircraft can leave the affected area by dropping below the level of the radio horizon - when an PLO aircraft is flying at an altitude of 50 meters and an altitude of the ship's radar station up to 30 meters, the line-of-sight range will be about 50 kilometers. In peacetime, the NK will not interfere with the PLO aircraft in any way (unless it tries to interfere with the sonar buoys).

At the same time, fighter aircraft can easily destroy any PLO aircraft, no matter how it maneuvers.

If we are talking about a full-scale attack by an aircraft carrier strike group (AUG), then this task already goes beyond the protection of "bastions".

All of the above does not mean that the Russian Navy does not need ships larger than a corvette, by no means. Surface ships with modern air defense systems are necessary, and the Russian Navy has such ships - these are frigates of Project 20350. However, their role in terms of ensuring the stability of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces will be minimal, and we will return to the tasks of ships of Project 20350 in the next article ...

What coastal aircraft are needed for the Navy from the point of view of ensuring the combat stability of SSBNs?

First of all, as in the case of the air force (air force) of coastal aviation, the navy needs "eyes". Based on the trends in aircraft construction, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are the most effective means for solving this problem.

To search for aircraft and NKs, two types of UAVs are needed - a specialized reconnaissance UAV and an early-range radar detection UAV (AWACS). Moreover, the UAV AWACS is also capable of detecting NK.

Previously, UAVs of AWACS, among other things, were considered in the article Ensuring the work of the air defense system on low-flying targets without involving Air Force aviation... Their creation is quite within the capabilities of the Russian aviation industry.

Prototype UAV DRLO JY-300 Chinese company CETC

Image of the turbojet engine AI-222-25 and the concept of the UAV AWACS "Zond-2" on this engine, developed by KB "Sukhoi"[/ Center]
It should be noted that an AWACS UAV will not replace a specialized AWACS manned aircraft. The key difference between an AWACS UAV is that it is designed for the primary detection of enemy aircraft and the issuance of target designation to missiles with an active radar homing head at targets located beyond the radio horizon, while a manned AWACS aircraft, in addition, provides combat control as an air command post. Therefore, both of these types of AWACS are urgently needed. The creation of aircraft and UAVs for AWACS is one of the most pressing tasks of the Russian Air Force and Navy.

The Air Force and the Russian Navy are in dire need of a relatively inexpensive modern AWACS aircraft, such as the American E-2 Hawkeye, the Swedish Saab 340 AEW & C, the Brazilian Embraer R-99 or the Yak-44 carrier-based AWACS aircraft developed in the USSR

However, within the framework of solving the problem of protecting the "bastions" from PLO aircraft, the capabilities of an AWACS UAV are more than enough - to detect and recognize an approaching PLO aircraft, to transmit information to the command post for sending fighters. When equipping an AWACS UAV with electronic warfare (EW) means, it can itself interfere with the operation of the PLO aircraft, drowning its communication with sonar buoys.

Despite the fact that the UAV AWACS is able to detect not only aircraft, but also NK, for this purpose it is more expedient to use specialized reconnaissance aircraft. This issue was discussed in detail in the article Find an aircraft carrier: to replace the Tu-95RTs... Sooner or later, the problems with the engines will be resolved, and medium and heavy UAVs will appear in service with the Air Force and the Navy of the Russian Federation, capable of carrying out reconnaissance of the NK at a considerable distance from the territory of the Russian Federation or providing long-term patrolling of a given area.

Su-35 fighters (or their possible future modification, for example, with a radar with an active phased antenna array - AFAR) or fifth-generation Su-57 fighters can be used as a strike force to protect "bastions" from enemy aircraft or PLO ships. Moreover, the Su-35 is seen as the preferred option in the context of the defense of "bastions", since it is cheaper, you can buy more of them, and they will quite cope with the task of destroying PLO aircraft and / or PLO ships.

The Su-35 is the optimal vehicle for coastal aviation if we are talking about ensuring the defense of "bastions" or naval bases. To solve shock missions, vehicles with a significantly greater range and payload are required.

Take cover in the crowd

There are several more methods that the Russian Navy can use to increase the survival rate of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces.

One of them is the creation of autonomous unmanned underwater vehicles (AUVs) designed to simulate submarines. The capabilities of the AUV were considered by the author in the article ANPA vs AUG... Among other things, the project of the AUV "Surrogate" was mentioned, being developed by the Central Design Bureau of Marine Engineering "Rubin".

The length of the hull of the AUV "Surrogate" is 17 meters, the estimated displacement is 40 tons. Diving depth up to 600 meters, maximum speed 24 knots, cruising range over 600 nautical miles. The main task of the AUV "Surrogate" is to simulate the magnetoacoustic characteristics of various submarines.

Image of AUV "Surrogate"

AUVs of the "Surrogate" type can be used to solve tasks to divert the enemy's attention from real targets, primarily anti-submarine aircraft.

As a hypothesis, we can consider another option, when the AUV of the "Surrogate" type, connected to a fiber-optic cable with an SSBN, when leaving the base follows the carrier at a certain distance and maneuvers along the course and depth, creating a risk of collision for a potential pursuer - PLA- the enemy hunter, forcing her to intensively maneuver, revealing herself. If the enemy's submarine concentrates on the SSBN and uses it as an "SSBN identifier", then she may be disappointed when the SSBN after a certain time breaks contact with the SSBN and returns to its home base in autonomous mode. But this is, rather, a matter of tactics.

The second option is the continuation of the construction of the 955 project in the 955K modification - nuclear submarines with cruise missiles (SSGN). This issue was discussed in detail in the article Nuclear submarines - cruise missile carriers: reality and prospects, and such an opportunity considered by the Russian Navy.

Considering that the signatures of Project 955A SSBNs and Project 955K SSGNs will be practically indistinguishable, it is possible to organize a pair of SSBNs and SSGNs on patrol. In this case, the enemy will need twice as many PLA hunters in order to track all SSBNs. Relatively speaking, if tracking one SSBN requires 2-3 submarines (taking into account their rotation to ensure continuous watch at the Russian Navy bases), then tracking 10 SSBNs will require 20-30 submarines, respectively, if 6-8 more submarines are added to them. SSGN, you will need 32-54 PLA.

The possibility of using SSGN 955K to cover the deployment of SSBNs was previously considered in the article The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

The existing Project 949A SSGNs are becoming obsolete, some of them are being modernized, and they will serve for some more time, others will be recycled. In any case, they will need a replacement, and the "Ash" will not fully become one - for this they have too limited ammunition, and at the same time they are significantly more expensive, although, of course, they are more versatile. And the series of SSGN 955K will logically continue the series of SSBNs of project 955A, which will lead to a decrease in the average cost of one submarine of this type, and will ensure the utilization of the production capacities of the Sevmash shipyards.

Reducing the likelihood of SSBN escorting of enemy submarines is not the main goal of creating the 955K SSGN, but only an additional opportunity that can and should be used. We will talk in more detail about the main goals and objectives of the SSGN 955K in the next article.

It is worth noting that in the event of a serious aggravation of the situation and the withdrawal of the United States and the Russian Federation from the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START), cruise missiles (CR) with a nuclear warhead (YBCH) can be installed on the 955K SSGN. Considering that one Borei-K will be able to carry about 100-120 CD, 6-8 Project 955K SSGNs will be able to increase the strategic arsenal of the Russian Federation by 600-960 nuclear charges, which no air defense can intercept with a coordinated launch.

The Navy and Nuclear Deterrence "after Project 955A"

If now Project 955A SSBNs are among the most modern in their class, then over time they will inevitably become obsolete and replaced by new generation submarines. If we talk about the longer term and the role of the Navy in the context of nuclear deterrence, then this issue was also considered in the aforementioned article. The evolution of the nuclear triad: prospects for the development of the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation.

In particular, it is proposed to create a unified universal submarine, which can perform the functions of SSNS, SSGNs and SSBNs, depending on the installed weapons compartment.

This solution has several goals:

- to unify the manufactured submarines to reduce their cost;
- make it difficult for the enemy to detect and track carriers of strategic nuclear weapons;
- to ensure the possibility of a wide change in the ammunition load of submarines depending on the changing international situation and the tasks being solved;
- to guarantee sufficient survivability of universal submarines with SLBMs to get out of the "bastions", next to which the enemy can place missile defense ships intended to destroy SLBMs in the initial section of the trajectory;
- to increase the likelihood of a submarine reaching the enemy's shores at a distance of an SLBM strike along a flat trajectory with a short flight time to create a threat to the enemy of a sudden decapitation strike, which will require him to reorient significant resources to the defense of close lines

This task is quite real, it is discussed in more detail in the above article. In short, the possibility of creating unified submarines is supported by the fact that previously strategic missile carriers in the dimensions of multipurpose submarines, for example, the Benjamin Franklin submarine with an underwater displacement of 8 tons, have already been created. The Trident-250 SLBM used in the Benjamin Franklin SSBM had dimensions comparable to the Bulava SLBM. And currently, on the newest Virginia Block 1 multipurpose submarines, an additional VPM weapons bay is being installed, which, among other things, should house CPS hypersonic missiles, including a C-HGB hypersonic glider with a conventional warhead on a two-stage launch vehicle comparable in dimensions with SLBMs.

Comparative dimensions of the Benjamin Franklin SSBN with a submerged displacement of 8 tons and the Ohio SSBN with an underwater displacement of 250 tons. Comparative dimensions of the Trident-18 SLBM and the Bulava SLBM, the Virginia Block 750 submarine with the VPM module and the LRHW ground-based hypersonic complex, on the basis of which the CPS rocket is being created

When 4–6 SLBMs are deployed in the weapons compartment of a universal submarine, with 3–6 warheads on each, and the construction of universal submarines by a series of 60 units, 20 of which will be armed with SLBMs, the total number of operational-deployed nuclear warheads on the Russian Navy will be 240– 720 warheads, which is quite enough within the existing restrictions.

At the same time, there will be a technical possibility of placing SLBMs in the compartments of other universal submarines, which theoretically makes it possible to maximally deploy about 1440-2160 nuclear warheads.

In the next article, we will talk about the tasks of the Russian Navy that are not related to nuclear deterrence.

Comments

[Grandfather]

to the author: if long-distance trips of NK are "show off", then any study is "show off", just sell "rights" in kiosks ... and take away "navigation business". further, after such "profundity", I did not read, apparently there, in the written, there is also a lot of "smart".

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Dead Day

apparently there, in the written, also a lot of "smart".

You just looked into the water! Clever - more than enough ...
The author "with an extraordinary ease" (a kind of Chichikov on the problems of the Navy!) With broad strokes of absurdity paints a picture of NSNF, not a bit not caring about the approach (at least to the fifth degree) to the truth ... well, or modern views on this very problem. But, in order:
1. The author absolutely does not follow the terminology. There are no definitions, so double-convex definitions freely walk through the text!

actual dominance of the US Navy and NATO in the waters oceans

- said COOL! backhand! from the heart, so to speak, so that it becomes clear to everyone: the author does not intend to joke ...
And yet: Theorists of naval power [Mahan AT, Colomb PH] define dominance at sea as the freedom to use the sea and the prohibition of its use by the enemy. In other words --Domination of the sea - the decisive superiority of one of the parties in the naval theater of operations (theater of operations).
Now the question. Will the US Navy and NATO be able to seal our SF and Pacific Fleet, well, at least their submarine forces? And the Black Sea Fleet and Kasp. flotilla?
Further. And what will they do with the PLA fleet? and where is NATO? if their area of ​​responsibility is the Atlantic.
Therefore, it would be necessary to "trim down the sturgeon" to "superiority in forces in the Atlantic" (for example).
2. The author heard that there are such "sea bastions" (protected areas of combat operations for the RPKSN), but he did not understand their essence. Therefore, he completely lacks such an important element of the area's engineering equipment as the BGAS and the underwater / surface surveillance system. Therefore, his Yankees roam wherever they want and when they please. But the Leksin brothers also showed how, at the Pacific Fleet, their Delta took an absolutely noiseless Yankee PLA at ranges of up to 150 km. And she classified it !!! And that was back at the end of the 20th century.

3. It is not clear what kind of "direct attack" on the elements of the "bastion" the author is talking about. But the fact that he has purely "infantry ideas" about this sea area is beyond doubt. Therefore, even without finding our APRK SN in it, he speaks of its destruction ... But you still have to get into the "Virgin" ZRBD. Here is just a question: - but will she be able to maintain her innocence at the same time? One can speak seriously about the chances of enemy BPA and NK under our coast only after the destruction of the air defense and BRAV fleet.
4. The author for some reason refuses the RK to destroy the enemy's NK, although this is their main BR. More than strange is his assertion that if the NK does not have a BD air defense system, then he cannot influence the ASW aviation in any way. Apparently it did not occur to him that such a ship could be placed in the path of Poseidon's flight, which would have to change its route. And if there is an "air defense fence" of 3 frigates? Then you will either have to abandon the search for submarines in the area, or draw a serious hook in the route ...
5. For some reason, the author reduces the entire search for the submarine's BPA to RGAB-s. And he does not mention other, more productive, methods of searching for submarines by aviation. Apparently because of the "innate modesty"!
6. The fact that the Su-57 can be carried out by the BZ to cover (isolate) the RBD is no question. But they are designed to gain (and maintain) air superiority over a theater of operations. And they have absolutely nothing to do over the deserted waters of the Barents (Okhotsk) Sea. Yankees don't fly there. There is no one to shoot down.
7. NPA "Surrogate" is woven by the author "on the occasion" in order to show erudition and awareness ... The submarine simulator is used to practice the tasks of the submarine power supply unit and submarine submarine submarine ... Is it possible to use it in wartime? Quite. To create false routes for the deployment of submarines. But what does APRK SN have to do with it? - silent killers of loners !? Ninja with rattles do not go !!! it's time to learn this already for "free artists" from other types of the RF Armed Forces ...
8. I just want to say: - "IN LARGE STUDIES, the author paints a picture of the future NSNF" ... - it's like in the Hermitage, at the canvases of luminaries of painting. Well. Let's join the excursion into the future ...
- a single modular submarine for all tasks and cases ... BRED !!!
It was about the maximum unification of "minced meat" (PC stuffings - general ship systems, components and mechanisms, power plant, ASBU, but the software will be different; hull structural elements, etc.) and not about "replaceable modules" SLBM / KRBD or - PKR / TO ...
In short. For some reason, an allegory comes to mind: "By wide ravings with a large cell, the author tried in the murky waters of the problems of the Navy to catch the truth and the prospect of its further development" ...
But not everything we have conceived is being realized. And thank you for trying to look beyond the event horizon.
PS / I beg your pardon for mischief .... Spring, however!

[ccsr]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

7. NPA "Surrogate" is woven by the author "on the occasion" in order to show erudition and awareness ... The submarine simulator is used to practice the tasks of the submarine power supply unit and submarine submarine control system ... Is it possible to use it in wartime? Quite. To create false routes for the deployment of submarines.

As far as I understand, communication systems are one of the most vulnerable links in submarine control, and there is still no system of instant (second duration) transmission of a command signal in a submerged position without surfacing. What is available now is not entirely acceptable, as I believe:

Receiving signals from "Zeus" is carried out by submarines on the move at a depth of 200 meters to a towed antenna about one kilometer long. Due to the extremely low data transfer rate (one byte in a few minutes), the system "ZEUS" is obviously used to transmit the simplest coded messages, for example: "Ascend to the surface (release a beacon) and listen to a message via satellite communication."

Naturally, a technical solution suggests itself so that the "Surrogate" product in a threatened period could not only create a false target, but also become a repeater of a combat signal if it is located near the surface. For this, it is possible to use acoustic underwater communication at a certain distance, of course, if such a system is to be developed. I believe we will come to this anyway - a simulator + a repeater in one bottle to increase the safety of SSBNs and the reliability of communication with submarines.

[Boa kaa]

Quote: ccsr

simulator + repeater in one bottle to increase the safety of SSBNs and the reliability of communication with submarines.

Greetings
You may be right. But I would never hang a rattle over my head (buoy designator).
Now a more promising topic: green laser and spacecraft. The beam penetrates 10 m under the water, the speed you yourself understand what.
So, "will we wait for your mother? - We will wait!" (from)

[ccsr]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

You may be right. But I would never hang a rattle over my head (buoy designator).

And forty-fifty kilometers from the submarine? After all, as I understand it, the "Surrogate" should go somewhere to the side right after launch.

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

Now a more promising topic: green laser and spacecraft.

Sounds beautiful, but for now I can hardly imagine how it will work if the state of the atmosphere can affect such a connection. But I am glad that this issue is given top priority - this is even more important than the number of warheads on board.

[Bez 310]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

BPA submarine reduces to RGAB-s. And he does not mention other, more productive, methods of searching for submarines by aviation.

Sorry to bother you, but what are you talking about?
Which BPA are we talking about, and which ones, "more productive"
methods the author does not mention? Something I am completely confused ...

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Bez 310

Which BPA are we talking about, and which ones, "more productive"
methods the author does not mention?

BPA - basic patrol aircraft. For example, R-8A Poseidon, method - "window" - search for standing waves using a radar. Our Tu-142s did it as a pair: one shines, the other looks ... You don't have to remember about magnetometry. There is already a search for the thermal and radioactive trail. For about 10 km boats go out to the head. They were silent about this before, but now, I see, they are writing. And the people in black don't bother anyone ...
But.

[Bez 310]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

Our Tu-142 did it as a pair: one shines, the other looks ...

About "Poseidon" I will not say anything, I do not know, but about the Tu-142 - nonsense.
Attempts were made on different types, but no result.

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Bez 310

but about the Tu-142 - nonsense.

Perhaps so, I'm not a flyer. But it was written by a person who personally participated in this. And he is from the old cohort of VO-shniks who (unlike neophytes) are used to answering for their words. By coincidence of facts and circumstances that I had the honor to verify, I - BELIEVE. The fact that the method did not work is neither mine nor his fault.
The ships also used it. At the exit (in German pr. 133.1), I personally saw this effect on the radar screen ...
So, we have what we have ...

[Bez 310]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

The fact that the method did not work is neither mine nor his fault.

Our PLA does not work with this method.
Why? This is a question for our admirals.
There is even an unofficial opinion that this method has been forgotten by admirals, because if aviation works according to this method, then admirals will not be needed.

[timokhin-aa]

There is even an unofficial opinion that this method has been forgotten by admirals, because if aviation works according to this method, then admirals will not be needed.

This method can be neutralized, Only the boats have to be different.

[Bez 310]

Quote: timokhin-aa

boats should be different.

Yes, we already have almost no boats ...

[timokhin-aa]

They do not exist, because we are raining on monsters for 100 billion per case, which are perfectly detected by both acoustic and non-acoustic methods due to their design and size.
Whereas you need something completely different.

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Bez 310

if aviation works according to this method, then admirals will be unnecessary.

And at the same time, the general directors of corporations, general designers and other heads of associations ... And yes, we will also cancel the principle of one-man management ... Well, so as not to go over the ears of gullible members of the forum twice!
AHA.

[Bez 310]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

Well, so as not to go over the ears of gullible members of the forum twice!

Well, you take everything seriously ..
But seriously, the "Window" did not give irrefutable results, quite possibly due to imperfection
our equipment.

[timokhin-aa]

because a computer complex was needed for the radar, statistics were needed, additional tests in order to identify ALL effects from a submerged submarine that could be detected by the radar (not all were used in the "Window" topic), and thermal imagers to track the thermal trace of an atomic submarine, data which the computer complex was supposed to "spliced" with the radar data.
And we found that natural anomalies give similar effects and stopped there.

And the Americans didn't stop.

[timokhin-aa]

Tu-95 shone, Tu-142 was modified with buoys.

[jonht]

The author gives out his thoughts better and more definitely, definitely much better than in previous articles. We can agree with something, support something, but something "free Fantasies", but this material is more or less ... We read.

[Hunter 2]

Quote: jonht

The author gives out his thoughts better and more definitely, definitely much better than in previous articles. We can agree with something, support something, but something "free Fantasies", but this material is more or less ... We read.

I completely agree, there are controversial points, there are topics for discussion, but - The article is not all-prophetic and not urapatriotic, the author shared his thoughts in a calm manner. Article plus!

[Alien From]

In the articles on the Navy, such mastodons of the VO converge that I quietly and silently read ..... I put a "plus" on this topic to all authors, because the truth is born in a dispute

[Nemchinov Vl]

Quote: Alien From

after all, in a dispute, truth is born

and sometimes (if not more often), on the contrary, 0 dies !!!

[Serg4545]

Well I do not know.
It seems to me that the concept of "bastions" is initially wrong.
The whole point of SSBNs is stealth. The creation of "bastions" makes SSBN meaningless, and the author does not understand that there are many pitfalls).
For example. What prevents a potential adversary, knowing where our SSBNs are (and we ourselves designate their location!), To fit ships and planes with long-range anti-aircraft missiles to the borders of the "bastions"? And at the right time it is easy to shoot down our ballistic missiles taking off from SSBNs?
Of course, a certain number of ships and aircraft can be allocated to neutralize this new threat. But the enemy, in response, can increase the number of ships and aircraft. And in this race we will definitely lose. The enemy has too much advantage in ships and planes!
In general, "bastions" are useless. And even harmful.
And it is clear where this idea of ​​"bastions" came from.
On this site, for some unknown reason, the following idea was settled:
Our SSBNs are doomed and useless, because immediately after leaving the base, enemy nuclear submarines sit on their tail and continuously keep them at gunpoint. And in which case they will immediately destroy, not allowing ballistic missiles to be launched.
This wrong belief is based on SINGLE facts of long-term tracking of our SSBNs. And it was a long time ago. And even then, the enemy could keep only a small percentage of our SSBNs on the fly.
So the above belief is completely wrong.
But even if this were the case, this threat is easier to neutralize easily. And I am sure that something similar is actually used in our country.
And so our SSBN leaves the base and goes along our coast. At the scheduled time, our boat passes through the acoustic control zone. These can be underwater hydrophones connected by a cable to the shore. Or PLO ships lined up. Or helicopters, which control the situation with the help of equipment lowered into the water by cable. In any case, these means first detect our SSBNs, and then the enemy nuclear submarine hanging on the tail (if it really exists). After that, measures are being taken so that the enemy nuclear submarine abandons tracking our boat. There are many different ways. Well, for example: an enemy nuclear submarine is processed by directional acoustic waves in all ranges (from ships or helicopters). As a result, for some time the enemy nuclear submarine loses the ability to hear the surrounding space and our submarine breaks away from tracking. After that, our SSBN once again passes the acoustic control zone (already in a different place). If everything is clear, the boat goes to the patrol zone. Under the ice of the Arctic Ocean. And here our SSBN is practically invulnerable! There are simply no enemy ASW ships there (there is nothing to do there without an icebreaker). PLO aircraft are also useless (neither acoustic buoys nor torpedoes can be used because of the ice). Enemy nuclear submarines can hardly do anything either. Due to the acoustic cacophony created by the ice floes rubbing against each other, it is incredibly difficult to find another boat. And it's easy to lose.
In general, why fence "bastions" when there is a free Arctic Ocean, which is better in all respects?
The only SSBN patrolling in the Arctic Ocean cannot be fired immediately. We need to find the wormwood. Or do it with torpedoes or hull. Or go beyond the boundary of the ice.
However, for a retaliatory strike, such a delay does not matter.

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Serg4545

In general, "bastions" are useless. And even harmful.
And it is clear where this idea of ​​"bastions" came from.

Sergey, I agree with you, but ...
1. ZRBD - was a forced measure to preserve the combat stability of our 2-3 generation RPKSN. Tk they did not fully meet the requirements of acoustic invisibility. And the discretes also had rattles at a speed of more than 10 knots like a cart. This measure is becoming a thing of the past, along with the boats that gave birth to it.
2. The essence of SSBNs and our SNS is not only that it is an element of a strike NSNF. And their task is to minimize the time it takes to deliver the hotel to Uncle Sam through the window of the White House. Except for the RPKSN, no one can approach the borders of the "partners", stay there for a long time and strike unexpectedly. I very much doubt even the ability to complete this task with our Tu-160M, although it is much easier to launch a CRBD through the SLO ... Therefore, even our 885M with CRBD in areas (ROP) in a 1000 mile zone from the States is a direct clear threat to their national security ! And these are not always areas controlled by PLO forces ... Therefore, our modern submarines are not very to the taste of Uncle Sam.

Quote: Serg4545

enemy nuclear submarine hanging on the tail ...

Actually, this is a figure of speech, jargon. Tracking, as a rule, is carried out from the zone of g / a of the shadow at KU = 120-150 * pr / l of the side of the target boat. As a rule, they reach the g / a contact along the wake. In this case, the search is carried out by non-acoustic means. Now the problem of stealth / detection has moved to the area of ​​low frequencies ... Therefore ... there are problems. So let's say.

[Avior]

... The very fact of an attack on the covering forces is already a reason for a nuclear strike.

Interestingly, the author of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation has read and does he know the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons?
This statement looks especially strange against the background of the fact that the author is not supposed to advertise that, in fact, these are the forces of cover.
Commercials to "the whole world in dust" not far just by mistake ...

[ProkletyiPirat]

In my humble opinion, "military doctrine" is such a verbal diarrhea with spherical horses in a vacuum that at least laugh at crying, in my opinion it should generally be renamed from "military" to "political-holivar". So, if it makes sense to refer to it, then immediately indicate a specific item with a specific quote. According to my observations, this of course will not help and will launch another holivaro-srachik, but as the saying goes, "what if you're lucky and there will be a meaningful discussion."

[squid]

Well, finally, a competent article about the fleet on topvar! Well, in comparison with the Timokhinsky and other works of the sect of the aircraft carrier's witnesses)
The thesis about the uselessness and ineffectiveness of the AV for protecting the areas of SSBN patrols is worthy of praise.
A couple of controversial points:
1) a single plarb / plark / boards - utopia. The tasks and sizes of the enclosures are too different. In principle, it can be done, but it is equally bad for all applications.
2) Space surface monitoring systems are not taken into account. And in this matter, since the time of the "legend" mcrc, the progress has been colossal. Already now it is possible (and the "probable partners" are already carrying out) the creation of numerous (tens and hundreds) constellations of light satellites RL, RTR and optical reconnaissance, with the highest resolution. In this case, the detection intervals will be tens of minutes. Those. sufficient for reconnaissance and target designation.
Although, of course, this does not negate the need for drlo aircraft - for air defense and defense missions (in terms of protection against crushing).
3) in the light of the above, there is not enough mention of the coastal areas. With a range of modern complexes of 2-5 thousand km, they are capable not only of protecting patrolling areas from NC, but also generally taking on a significant part of the task of protecting the coast, even without the participation of aviation

[Bez 310]

Quote: squid

coastal areas. With a range of modern complexes of 2-5 thousand km, they are able not only to protect patrolling areas from NC, but in general to take on a significant part of the task of protecting the coast, even without the participation of aviation

What complexes are we talking about?

[bayard]

Quote: Bez 310

What complexes are we talking about?

These are fantasies that the usual "Caliber", "Caliber-M" (which does not exist yet) and X-101 \ 102 can play anti-ship missiles.
Of course they won't.
If "Zircon" confirms its characteristics in terms of range (over 1000 km) and the ability to hit mobile sea targets, as well as if such missiles are adopted for arming DBKs, then a range of 1000 km may become a reality ... But along the entire coast they will not poke around.
It is necessary to revive the MPA on new aircraft.
An enhanced modification of the Su-34 would be quite suitable for this ... but that's about something else.

[Castro Ruiz]

Moderzinzirovaniy i dorabotaniy SU-34FN.

[bayard]

Quote: CastroRuiz

Moderzinzirovaniy i dorabotaniy SU-34FN.

Well, this one can.

[Newone]

Actually, the original Caliber is exactly what the anti-ship missile. True, the range there is far from 1000 km

[bayard]

Quote: Newone

Actually, the original Caliber is exactly what the anti-ship missile.

Who told you THIS?
"Caliber" is a conventional version of the still Soviet CD "Granat". And it was used ONLY for stationary ground objects and had nuclear warheads.
In the KR "Caliber" family there is an anti-ship missile with a supersonic second stage and a range of 300 km ... but it has not been put into service.
For surface ships it is not needed - there is "Onyx" and it is much better.
For submarines to shoot a torpedo tube ... they think, but there is no solution.
The anti-ship missile is a very specialized missile. And this is not "Caliber".

[squid]

Quote: bayard

The anti-ship missile is a very specialized missile. And this is not "Caliber".

Very funny. Now read about the 3M54.
The range of the non-export version seems to be classified, but it is at least 600 km, according to English-language sources.

[bayard]

Have you heard about the adoption of it for service and supply of the Navy?
And are you sure this CD was the original version of the Caliber?

Quote: bayard

"Caliber" is a conventional version of the still Soviet CD "Granat".

And the 3M54 is a safety option during the development of Yakhont / Onyx, as a cheaper alternative with a supersonic warhead for breaking through the air defense in the final section.
This missile was not accepted for service.
And this modification of "Caliber" is not "original".
Moreover, the Navy has never considered the subsonic "Granat" and its modifications as anti-ship missiles.
The 3M54 is considered (but only considered) as a possible variant of anti-ship missiles for arming submarines and MAPLs of the Russian Navy for firing from TA.

[squid]

Quote: bayard

Have you heard about the adoption of it for service and supply of the Navy?

This information is not publicly available. It doesn’t matter, since it’s about perspectives development of the fleet.

Quote: bayard

And are you sure this CD was the original version of the Caliber?

I didn’t say that, and again, it’s not important.

Quote: bayard

The Navy has never considered the subsonic "Granat" and its modifications as anti-ship missiles

of course. in the 80s there was no target designation at such distances, stealth technologies, such a range was meaningless at subsonic speed. so the best is closer but faster and more powerful. however, times are changing.

[bayard]

Quote: squid

of course. in the 80s there was no target designation at such distances, stealth technologies, such a range was meaningless at subsonic speed. so the best is closer but faster and more powerful. however, times are changing.

The Soviet Union had enough reconnaissance and target designation equipment for sea targets.
And the range of Soviet supersonic anti-ship missiles reached those same 1000 km.
But the USSR relied on supersonic anti-ship missiles, believing that they would better penetrate enemy air defenses.
A "Granat" and its daughter "Caliber" were exclusively for the destruction of stationary ground targets in their basic versions.

[Newone]

Who told you THIS?

https://missilery.info/missile/3m54e1 например.

[squid]

Quote: bayard

These are fantasies that the usual "Caliber", "Caliber-M" (which is not yet) and X-101 \ 102

and also - memories of the almost finished 3M25, if you know about this, with a range of 5500 back in the 89th year

Quote: bayard

can play RCC

They can, after some alteration, at the level of a harpoon or a pkr-tomahawk, i.e. with subsonic speed. By the way, the latest versions of the PKR-tomahawk, reworked by replacing some parts from the "usual" ones (apparently for "playing the PKR"), have a range of "over 1000" nautical miles, i.e. under 2000 km.

Quote: bayard

range of 1000 km can become a reality

such a range became a reality (in a series) for Soviet missile defense systems back in the 80s.

Quote: bayard

It is necessary to revive the MPA on new aircraft.
Enhanced modification of the Su-34

Another wrecking idea of ​​the local aircraft carrier sect headed by Timokhin. Such an aircraft as a carrier of an anti-aircraft missile system will be inferior to heavy fighters of the su-35 / su-57 type in almost everything, but it will be highly specialized and much less useful even in the defense of the coast.

[bayard]

Quote: squid

and also - memories of the almost finished 3M25, if you know about this, with a range of 5500 back in the 89th year

"Meteorite"?
It was intended to destroy strategic targets. He never played in the PCR.

Quote: squid

By the way, the latest versions of the PKR-tomahawk, reworked by replacing some parts from the "usual" ones (apparently for "playing the PKR"), have a range of "over 1000" nautical miles, i.e. under 2000 km.

The first versions of the "Tomahawk" in the anti-ship missile version had a range of 780 km. and were in service. With the seeker from the "Harpoon". And now it's about the same. The seeker has probably become somewhat more compact, the warhead has probably improved somewhat, but the range of 1000 miles ... no. Such a range is that the usual "Tomahawk" with a nuclear warhead (which is lighter than usual) reached.
But the range is 1000 - 1100 km. for the version of the RCC, I, in principle, admit it.

Quote: squid

Quote: bayard
range of 1000 km can become a reality

such a range became a reality (in a series) for Soviet missile defense systems back in the 80s.

I had ONLY the promising Zircon rocket. Old missiles have either been decommissioned long ago or will be decommissioned this decade. And this range was only along the high-altitude route with nuclear warheads (which is much lighter than usual).

Quote: squid

Quote: bayard
It is necessary to revive the MPA on new aircraft.
Enhanced modification of the Su-34

Another wrecking idea of ​​a local aircraft carrier sect led by Timokhin

I don't know what sect Timokhin is headed ... and what have the aircraft carriers to do with it?
You just don't scratch them, and they will stop bothering you.
But I understand that you are not only against aircraft carriers, but also against the revival of the MPA?
And who among us is a pest?

Quote: squid

Such an aircraft as a carrier of an anti-aircraft missile system will be inferior to heavy fighters of the su-35 / su-57 type in almost everything,

RCC are capitalized.
And so, what do you think the modernized version of the Su-34 bomber as a carrier of anti-ship missiles will be inferior to ... fighters
In speed?
Maneuverability?
Bomber?
Missile carrier?
Maybe in range?
And this is unlikely. Even with PTB.
At altitude?
So why does he need height records?
The quality of avionics?
A fighter will never have as much as a similar bomber.
Especially for work on the ground and water surface.
And the Belka radar for the new Su-34 is just asking. And there is where to put it.
Or will the fighter be able to take more heavy anti-ship missiles?
And how can a fighter ... ONE-SEATER ... solve the problem of finding enemy ship groups in the far zone? Without a navigator and weapons operator?
No one can perform the task of a bomber better than a bomber.
The same is true for fighters.
But the Su-34, if necessary, can at least fight back. And maneuver. And come off on the afterburner.
And there are no station wagon pilots.
Well, they do not work out - too different and specific skills and instincts are developed for each type of task. That is why in the United States, having common platforms for fighters and attack aircraft, pilots are trained separately.
Yes, and there have already been attempts by fighter pilots to make them work on ground targets ... Thank God - during exercises. The result is known. And in our mixed regiments, as a rule, specialization remains, even if the squadrons are armed with one type of aircraft (say, the Su-30SM) - one shock, the second for air battles.
And there is no other way - a (real) pilot has been trained for 10 years. At the same time, it was by no means a versatile person, but quite a specialist for herself.

Quote: squid

will be highly specialized and much less useful even in coastal defense.

The tasks of the MRA are to search and destroy the enemy's KUG and AUG at a great distance from the bases. And near the coast, DBKs and conventional Su-30s can handle the Kh-35 and Kh-31 anti-ship missiles (with a range of their anti-ship missiles up to 200 km.).
And no one except the MPA will be able to respond so quickly and convincingly to sudden threats from the sea, and so quickly move to the theater of operations where they are especially needed. Neither the surface nor the submarine forces of the Navy are capable of such efficiency and flexibility. And tactical and basic aviation will not have enough combat and strike capabilities.
Nobody can do their job better than a specialist.
And with a station wagon, there is a VERY high probability that he will do all types of work equally badly.

[squid]

Quote: bayard

He never played PCR

A matter of desire. ARGSN was present at it even in the "strategic" version.

Quote: bayard

I had ONLY the promising Zircon rocket

But not me. American pkr are generally subsonic and they are enough. Higher speed means less range.

Quote: bayard

but 1000 miles range ... no

Teach materiel
"Tomahawk Block V, when fully realized in its Block Va and Block Vb varieties, will be expected to hit surface ships at Tomahawk ranges - in excess of 1,000 miles"
https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/12/14/the-us-navy-has-an-upgraded-tomahawk-heres-5-things-you-should-know

Quote: bayard

You just don't scratch them, and they will stop bothering you.

MRA based on su-34 - from their menu. Thought you were from their camp.

Quote: bayard

Are you not only against aircraft carriers, but also against the revival of the MPA?
And who among us is a pest?

In my opinion, aircraft carriers are not useless, but they can be useful as much as possible for local conflicts off distant shores. Libya, Yemen, Africa or South America - that's all. Maybe, if necessary, threaten the sea powers like Pakistan (and then hardly). In a collision with any country of the "golden billion" they are extremely vulnerable and useless. Perhaps the USSR would have come in handy 50 years ago, but now are different times.
I have nothing against the airborne missile defense system, only for. But only not highly specialized aircraft, suitable only for operations over the sea.

Quote: bayard

RCC are capitalized.

I randomly write a variety of words from capital letters. because the internet and I'm too lazy. sometimes

Quote: bayard

what do you think the modernized version of the Su-34 bomber as a carrier of anti-ship missiles will be inferior to ... fighters

Well, compare the performance characteristics of the su-34 and su-57 in the final version. It will surpass in range, combat load, cruising speed, the ability to further enter the zone of action of air defense and carrier-based aircraft, and most importantly - in versatility. A multipurpose fighter will always come in handy, and not only at sea. A specialized aircraft mra will wait all its life for a conditional naval war, which most likely will never come. And after waiting, he will be able to attack the NK, but he will not be able to do anything with the enemy aircraft. Bomb sights and armor elements will not help in any way - dead weight.

Quote: bayard

Or will the fighter be able to take more heavy anti-ship missiles?

In the case of the Su-57, it is quite possible. The maximum BN mass is much higher. The question of finalizing the suspension units.

Quote: bayard

And how can a fighter ... ONE-SEATER ... solve the problem of finding enemy ship groups in the far zone? Without a navigator and weapons operator?

Firstly, almost any fighter jet always has a two-seat version. Su-57 will not be an exception.
Secondly, the search for NK, and even in the far field, is not his task.

The most important thing is the search, and in the future, the control center, should be carried out from external sources. The main one is a developed satellite constellation. Read at least here the articles about the latest achievements in this area - this was never dreamed of in the days of various "legends". In addition to satellites - drlo aircraft, reconnaissance, etc. and all this is not at all necessary in the manned version. In the fight against large NCs, there is no need for any "capture of the target on the carrier" and other things. The task of our missile carrier is to deliver the missile defense system to the launch site. No carrier will detect an NK for 1000 km, no matter what kind of brao you put on it.
And normal countries, except for the USSR / RF, have not made any specialized aircraft of the world for a long time, as well as specialized bombers (except for heavy ones), making do with multipurpose fighters.

Quote: bayard

there are no station wagon pilots.
Well, they don't work out - too different and specific skills and instincts

the fact that the bombers cannot be forced to conduct an air battle - I willingly believe
What prevents an IA pilot in the 21st century from pressing the launch of the missile defense system, according to automatically entered data from an external control unit?

Quote: bayard

That is why in the United States, having common platforms for fighters and attack aircraft, pilots are trained separately.
Yes, and there have already been attempts by fighter pilots to make them work on ground targets ... Thank God - during exercises. The result is known. And in our mixed regiments, as a rule, specialization remains, even if the squadrons are armed with one type of aircraft (say, the Su-30SM) - one shock, the second for air battles.
And there is no other way - a (real) pilot has been trained for 10 years. At the same time, it was by no means a versatile person, but quite a specialist for herself.

somewhere I already heard it ... perhaps from you
can you refer to this here "pilots are trained separately"?
even in Afghanistan, pilots of single-seat Mig-23s could well conduct an air battle (with the Pakistanis who were breaking through) and even bomb unmanaged bombs point objects.
all this is some kind of your personal superstition.

Quote: bayard

The tasks of the MPA are the search and destruction of the enemy's KUG and AUG at a great distance from the bases

no. there are other tools for this now. see above. at the launch range of promising missile systems, no world will independently detect anyone. only external tsu.

Quote: bayard

no one except the MPA will be able to react so quickly and convincingly to sudden threats from the sea, and so quickly transfer to the theater of operations where they are especially needed. Neither the surface nor the submarine forces of the Navy are capable of such efficiency and flexibility. And tactical and basic aviation will not have enough combat and strike capabilities.

Can. Conventional modern multipurpose aviation. Perhaps slightly modified for the suspension of the rocket launcher and with additional trained pilots.

Quote: bayard

And with a station wagon, there is a VERY high probability that he will do all types of work equally badly.

Was 40 years ago. It's easy to do well now.
But from a specialized world, there is not a probability, but a certainty that it will draw off very limited (in the current RF) resources for itself, but it will not really come in handy for it.

[bayard]

Quote: squid

A matter of desire. ARGSN was present at it even in the "strategic" version.

Anti-ship missiles of this range have never been developed, and using them at a distance of up to 1000 km is irrational. The rocket is too expensive and the infrastructure for it. She did not go as a strategic one, although three versions of her basing were envisaged. It's just that a naval target at such a large distance will leave the affected area much earlier than the missile arrives there. Obsolescence of target designation information.

Quote: squid

But not me. American pkr are generally subsonic and they are enough.

For the Americans, the main PC means are aviation. And aviation and a subsonic low-altitude missile are enough. They generally have a different ideology of war - based on geography and available technical capabilities.

Quote: squid

Teach materiel
"Tomahawk Block V,

Young man, I studied my materiel back in the distant 80s, when these missiles were just entering service with the US Navy. And not from brochures and the Internet, but from quite reliable chipboard intelligence bulletins. It's just my profession.
And I never believed in US advertising brochures - they regularly overestimated the characteristics of their weapons in them. They overestimated it very much. An example of the F-111 with a declared speed of 2650 km / h is enough ... And this is about an airplane that barely reached 2000 km / h. With his engines ...

Quote: squid

Quote: bayard
You just don't scratch them, and they will stop bothering you.

MRA based on su-34 - from their menu. Thought you were from their camp.

For me, these are quite competent and respected authors, I communicated with them in correspondence.
And about the Su-34 and its ability to become an MRA aircraft, not only Klimov spoke, but also the chief designer of this aircraft in the context of the ability to carry up to 3 air versions of Zircon or Onyx on suspensions.

Quote: squid

In my opinion, aircraft carriers are not useless, but they can be useful as much as possible for local conflicts off distant shores. Libya, Yemen,

There they are unnecessarily. There are normal airfields there capable of receiving our aviation. My opinion is that air defense / PLO aircraft carriers are needed - carriers of fighters, AWACS aircraft and PLO helicopters of medium displacement.
But not foolishly and not out of the principle that "one should" or "one wants to" - such ships are a guarantee of the combat stability of our ship groups in DI and OZ. But not now, when the industry is completely unprepared for this, and the Fleet is just beginning to build (jambs with ship power plants that have stalled all shipbuilding programs), but in 4-5 years, when the necessary competencies are acquired and mastered, and shipbuilders will gain experience in building two UDC in Kerch.
And for the stability of our ships in the so-called. "bastions" from the raids of enemy aircraft and to prevent the enemy's anti-aircraft missile planes there. Shipborne air defense systems cannot do this.

Quote: squid

Well, compare the performance characteristics of the su-34 and su-57 in the final version.

And who told you that the modification of the Su-34 for the MPA will correspond to its present appearance (it was designed in the late 80s - early 90s)?
A very serious modernization of this aircraft is proposed for the MPA. By analogy with the FB-111 compared to the F-111, when the glider was enlarged (lengthened), the wing area was increased, which gave a sharp increase in flight range and combat load. Or an example of the enlargement of the glider of the MiG-35 in comparison with the MiG-29.
The increase in the airframe should correspond to the increase in engine power, for engines from the second stage Su-57 (Product-30), and engine nacelles / air intakes from it, are provided. The result is an aircraft with a combat radius (with a load) of approximately 2500 km. , speed up to 2M, capable of carrying up to 3 anti-ship missiles of a heavy class (air version of "Zircon") and enough explosive missiles for self-defense.
Partially avionics can also be borrowed from the Su-57 - communications, electronic warfare, encryption, Belka radar are all-round, which will be a very useful option for an MRA attack aircraft when repelling an attack from fighters and for illuminating the air situation with a specially selected aircraft outside the main strike groups.
The Su-34 is a very successful platform for the revival of the MRA, in the modernized version it is quite capable of becoming a full-fledged replacement for the Tu-22M3.

Quote: squid

Quote: bayard
Or will the fighter be able to take more heavy anti-ship missiles?

In the case of the Su-57, it is quite possible. The maximum BN mass is much higher. The question of finalizing the suspension units.

The bomb load of today's Su-34 and the Su-57 is about the same - up to 12 tons. But the Su-57 for this will have to take the load on the external suspension, and this levels out all of its characteristics. It will take 4 - 5 tons into the inner compartments at most. Why spoil a good fighter when you have a good bomber?

Quote: squid

Firstly, almost any fighter jet always has a two-seat version. Su-57 will not be an exception.

The question is WHEN?
When can this significant event take place, if we still have 1 (ONE) of this kind in our troops, certainly a very good plane.

Quote: squid

The most important thing is the search, and in the future, the control center, should be carried out from external sources.

Quote: squid

In addition to satellites - drlo aircraft, reconnaissance, etc.

Do we have it?
Just don't need your own fantasies for a radar specialist.

Quote: squid

Read at least here articles about the latest achievements in this area.

You can read it. We are always happy, since we are trained to read and write. But to see these wonderful (in the descriptions) means ... it is difficult.
For we have neither reconnaissance aircraft, nor AWACS aircraft, nor normal PLO aircraft, nor even patrol aircraft ... But articles and descriptions and PLANS / promises are in abundance.

Quote: squid

And normal countries, except for the USSR / RF, have not made any specialized aircraft of the world for a long time, as well as specialized bombers (except for heavy ones), making do with multipurpose fighters.

the "normal countries" you mean have an abundance of carrier-based aircraft or a fairly powerful fleet ... besides, they are part of a fairly serious military bloc.
And MRA is needed by a country that OPPOSES this powerful military bloc with a large number of AUG, an extremely large fleet, deck, base, anti-submarine and other special aviation, AWACS aircraft ...
And so the counterbalance to all this wealth should be (and was at one time) MPA, leveling all these advantages of the enemy in the zone of its reach.
And only she is capable of leveling the chances of our fleet.
There is nothing else.
This is especially achieved due to its mobility and the ability to maneuver forces to any threatened theater of operations.
Tactical aviation and multipurpose fighters are not capable of this.
A heavy rocket cannot be suspended on the same Su-30SM - it is necessary to strengthen the glider and make a special pylon. Look at the ordeal of the Hindus, who made the airborne version of "Brahmos" lighter up to 2500 kg. , but at the same time it was necessary to SPECIALLY re-equip all the Su-30s intended for this.
And these are no longer fighters.
These are already MRA strike aircraft.

Quote: squid

the fact that the bombers cannot be forced to conduct an air battle - I willingly believe
What prevents an IA pilot in the 21st century from pressing the launch of the missile defense system, according to automatically entered data from an external control unit?

This is only in your dreams. But in real life, the pilot will have to be seriously retrained, the aircraft should be modernized and ... we lose the fighter pilot and gain the strike aircraft pilot.
We tried.
We already tried to force the pilots on the Su-27 to bomb ground targets ... it turned out to be both laughter and sin. My friend took part in those exercises. They tried and spat - the pilot cannot be retrained if he is already a fighter. Perhaps it is easier to train a drummer in aerial combat.
But this is not a fact either.

[squid]

Quote: bayard

But you can't poke them along the entire coast.

Along everything (if you mean the Arctic), and do not.
But a couple of places in the Okhotsk, Barents and Japanese seas are enough.

[bayard]

They are already there.

[Vladimir1155]

Quote: squid

The space tracking systems for the surface situation are not taken into account. And in this matter, since the time of the "legend" mcrc, progress has been colossal. It is already possible (and, in the case of "probable partners", it is already under way) to create numerous (tens and hundreds) groups of light satellites for radar, RTR and optical reconnaissance with the highest resolution. In this case, the detection intervals will be tens of minutes. Those. sufficient for reconnaissance and target designation.
Although, of course, this does not negate the need for drlo aircraft - for air defense and defense missions (in terms of protection against crushing).
3) in the light of the above, there is not enough mention of the coastal areas. With a range of modern complexes of 2-5 thousand km, they are capable not only of protecting patrolling areas from NC, but also generally taking on a significant part of the task of protecting the coast, even without the participation of aviation

yes it is true, space systems are submarine systems, progress does not stand still, .. only the sect of witnesses of the aircraft carrier is still in 1903 and thinks of artillery battles albeit with missiles

[Runway]

"One hundred grams in the morning!" (c). What realities break and what is (subjectively) missed:
1. Not a single military airplane in peacetime can displace an ASW / AWACS airplane from the air of an SSBM (in a special period when the "red flags" are voiced, when the probable local conflict is already "over the knee" - maybe, but the Central Command is needed).
2. The UAV will not be able to operate in bad weather conditions, unlike the PLO airplane with a swearing crew.
3. Diesel-electric submarines, in the form of a "curtain" - this is not news (the Magadan nomadic brigade of "diesels" is a confirmation of this). But the latest bravura news about new "diesels" for the Pacific Fleet breaks down on the flashing phrase "renewal / replacement" in relation to diesel-electric submarines, which are now getting wet in the rain in M. Ulysses - that is, The Pacific Fleet, as it had 6 diesels, will continue to “have 6” (which is regrettable, but not fatal, because where is the “diesel” and where is the RBD RPKSN).
4. Not disclosed (in relation to the Pacific Fleet) the topic of the Kuril straits and illumination of the surface / underwater and air staging above those in the 7/24 mode. And the La Perouse Strait is in the same "basket" as the northeastern part of the Kuril Basin and the enclave of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: WFP

The UAV will not be able to operate in bad weather conditions, unlike the PLO airplane with a swearing crew

And the author's thesis:

UAVs of medium and heavy class will appear, capable of carrying out reconnaissance of NK at a considerable distance from the territory of the Russian Federation or providing long-term patrolling of a given area.

controversial in terms of the possibility of normal operation of the UAV in conditions of significant superiority of a potential enemy at sea. Those. will not allow to work normally, this is still not a Tu-95 (or a promising analogue, if we have one) UAVs "accidentally" and completely unobservable drop partners may not be ashamed.

increase the likelihood of a submarine reaching the enemy's shores at the distance of an SLBM strike along a flat trajectory with a short flight time to create a threat to the enemy of a sudden decapitation strike,

Here the author is quite optimistic, at the peak of the power of the Navy the USSR had problems with this, the Atrina had to be turned off, and now it is the Russian Federation.

[bayard]

That is why it is worth thinking about the phased abandonment of the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces (SSBN) in favor of land (mine and mobile) ICBM basing, and all the submarine forces of the fleet (including those upgraded to the "K" level of the "Borei" shore to forward deployment areas. For the presence there of a few and not optimal in terms of noise "Ash" will be extremely insufficient to designate and create (!) A real threat to the enemy's territory from hypersonic and winged carriers of our nuclear weapons.
And the "bastions" games have already proved their low efficiency due to the low probability of SSBN survival there before the first strike. They draw off huge forces of the Fleet to their defense, but the Fleet cannot guarantee the effectiveness of this defense.
And it cannot because of things of an irresistible nature.
This is a passive defeatist strategy.
A strategy doomed to fail.
Only the transition to active actions of the forces of the Navy is able to effectively dispose of the forces and means available to it (and expected in the near future) for the actual "strategic deterrence" of the aggressor from his rash actions.
The fleet, which is hiding from everyone "in the house", no one is afraid. In this case, the initiative is given to the enemy WHOLE, which the enemy will take full advantage of and at any moment convenient for him.
A transition to active - proactive actions of the Fleet is necessary.
The use of AWACS unmanned aerial vehicles is justified only in a limited number of cases or in the case of patrolling and monitoring the surface situation. They will not be able to lead fighters and missiles effectively in a collision with a more or less serious enemy - it is quite simple to shoot them down or suppress communication channels.
If the bet on the bastions is still continued, then they (the bastions) will simply draw on their defense all or almost all of the forces of the Fleet with a very dubious effectiveness at the exit.
The strategy needs to be changed.
But for this it is necessary to change the thinking, the very approaches to solving the tasks facing the Fleet and the Country.
The position "I am in the house" is obviously losing, and the loss of such a position is obvious to the enemy.
Asymmetric actions are required.

[Newone]

"Bastions" are necessary to prevent the enemy from striking strategically important targets on our territory from the waters they occupy.

[bayard]

This is a very important and laudable task for the fleet, but we still call something else "bastions". Namely, the areas of combat deployment of SSBNs, where they will be protected by the available forces of the fleet.
But all our "bastions" are full of holes, like a sieve. And the fleet is tied up with stupid tasks to "protect" them. It's like sticky tape for flies - everything is stuck on it and no longer interferes with anyone (the enemy).
I wonder who at one time suggested such a "brilliant" strategy?
A cast iron medal of Judas Iscariot around his neck ... two pounds.

[Newone]

Bastions are generally a slang expression that came to us from the Americans through the media. And the waters controlled by us were called so. The "leakiness" of the bastions is greatly exaggerated, including by local alarmists. It is not in vain that the Americans rivet Virginia by 2 for each of our SSBN cruisers. They do not cope, even taking into account the KOH.

[bayard]

In the USA I rivet "Virginia" for the planned renewal of the MAPL fleet. The US is not increasing the total number of MAPLs, new ones are replacing the old Elks.
As for the reliability of our "bastions" - I would very much like to believe ... But there are not enough reasons - there are not enough MPLs on the fingers, diesel-electric submarines are also few and of outdated types, bottom sensory fields (?) ... Americans have already plowed them several times with bottom trawls, PLO ships are extremely small, they are being built slowly, they are not improving the weapons of the submarine, but the RLK, absurd in terms of price and quality ... PLO aviation? and what is its quality?
So how is the stability and reliability of the "bastions" ensured?
What are these miracle cures?
Or is it still a "paper shield"?
And how is Vega doing there?
Already provided the modernization of the Il-38? To the level required for today?
Have you created a new PLO aircraft?
Did you create the A-100?
Other RT and HRD systems?
And why ?
Why are all the results of the labors of this wonderful organization so ... virtual?
I don’t want to repeat the tale about arming the army with crystal swords before the invasion of the enemy ...

[Newone]

The Los Angeles park was designed to resist the Soviet Navy, which was 4 times larger than the Russian Navy. Maintaining so many hunter killers unnecessarily is stupidity that I personally don't believe in.
Taking into account KOH, each of our nuclear submarines has 2 Virginia. When the United States has a reserve of 32 moose for any Chinese.
And the Americans are striving to maintain the 1/2 ratio in their favor, which is justified only in the event of an extremely difficult anti-submarine situation for them in peacetime.

[Pavel57]

The article contains a certain logic, from which one can build on, and with which one can agree and argue.

[antivirus]

on the tasks of the Russian Navy not related to nuclear deterrence.

there is only one problem - the land-based thinking of the whole country and the hands-va in PM.
semi-marine solutions for the fleet were laid down in the childhood of all of us - we sledged down the hill and swam several times in the short summer. on boats and yachts did not go. fins and a mask? resorts - banana rides and what?

the oligarchs having yachts and having formed their "sea soul" (advanced. who not only wash the loot) did not speak for the ocean fleet.
Without forcing - this is an evolution for 2 generations - up to 50 years for the awareness and understanding of the sea-ocean.

[ProkletyiPirat]

Quote: antivirus

there is only one problem - the land-based thinking of the whole country and the hands-va in PM.

The problem is that the Navy worked and works through F, sometimes through a large and bloody J. But the most important thing in more or less modern history is that when the Ministry of Defense allocated money for the development of the Navy, the Navy staff wasted this money at a frantic pace. And it's not only and not so much the lack of technology / shipyards / knowledge, etc. how much in the ability to analyze and plan long-term / super-long-term actions at the level of the General Staff of the Navy. That is, at the level of the ship we have good specialists, at the level of the naval base sometimes good specialists appear, but at the level of the General Staff of the Navy they are in trouble, and this trouble, apparently, is historical, educational and analytical, which consists in the fact that all the analytics of the General Staff of the Navy is contained in the phrase " to do as they have, but cheaper, more, stronger, faster, more versatile, faster, help_necessary_ ".

For example, you can give the following (copying from my notes)

since 1933 in the USSR \ RF the simplified maximum and maximum mass dimensions of the vessel are approximately equal: dimensions 135m * 14,3m * 4m * 15m (l * w * o * h), weight 7,5 + kt, these numbers are comparable with full-fledged warships for the near, middle and far sea zones, that is, frigates and destroyers of the leading naval powers, but we build ships stubs like corvettes / MRKs or oversized vessels in relation to this mass-size.

Try to estimate how much money could be saved by building one type of ships instead of many dozens.

Also, for example, we can cite jambs associated with piers, locks, canals, bridges. So, do you think it's normal when a civil engineer building a new bridge creates a height limit for ships when they are transferred between our closed seas? I think this is not normal. And when coastal cities are designed in such a way that it becomes unprofitable / impossible to build civil ports and shipyards? But then all the propellers will whine about the lack of capacities \ piers \ etc.

In general, from the largest in the last century, one can recall the epic of Gorshkov and the company in the days of the USSR (insane senseless spending, and the result was scrapped, but you'd better look for the details yourself, at least in Wikipedia).

psAt the same time, note all the negatives (problems / shortcomings / shoals) of the current fleet are directly related to planning and development (i.e. analytics), and not command and design.

[antivirus]

the fleet is asked a problem - "how to repel a tank armada, as in 43g?" like against Germany, in the Baltic - but there will be no sense.
or "How to support the Hokkaido landing?" or "cover our ships on the shore, in La Manche"
immediately limiting - Americans are out of competition in the ocean, we are not rushing yet.
while stretching from Tsushima, 1905. it is Cuba and other allies - in the nuclear era it is easier to approach paradise. than to build such a large fleet and naval base

[ProkletyiPirat]

These "tasks" are not analytics, they are, at best, "delusional-thinking" (well, I call it that), but as a rule it is a banal holivaro-srachik.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: ProkletyiPirat

For example, the following can be given (copying from my notes)
since 1933 in the USSR \ RF the simplified maximum and maximum mass dimensions of the vessel are approximately equal: dimensions 135m * 14,3m * 4m * 15m (l * w * o * h), weight 7,5 + kt, these numbers are comparable with full-fledged warships for the near, middle and far sea zones, that is, frigates and destroyers of the leading naval powers, but we build ships stubs like corvettes / MRKs or oversized vessels in relation to this mass-size.

Oh, you have entered with trump cards, you are quoting the classics.

[ProkletyiPirat]

So the phrase "I quote" is not in the sense of "I refer to the truth in the first instance," but in the sense of "this did not appear from a bunch of flounders, but was discussed and pondered by me many times." And in general, I can not stand this "authority of opinion" when it is important who says, and not what, too often these "authorities" roll into nonsense, populism and demagoguery.

[Cowbra]

Sorry. I am a woodpecker, here is a wooden one. There is no higher education, I can fight, unfortunately. I'm a dumb wooden overland

The destruction of enemy aircraft and surface ships, in the framework of solving the problem of protecting the "bastions" of SSBNs, in the author's opinion, it is advisable to assign to coastal aviation.

The coast, the coast will give protection. And we will guard the coast.

It should be borne in mind that the task of protecting the "bastions" can be divided into two parts - preventing a sudden disarming strike aimed at neutralizing the Russian strategic nuclear forces, and defense of "bastions" in the event of a full-scale attack

In general, you stuck with your bastion then? How many launchers can you make in just one submarine? and come on, look for them, but just to defend ... I don't know for your "bastion"

And let's see ... the current must first run
Forgive me, the author ... I repeat, well, and biased - you showed me again. That Russia is a land power. And the fleet eats the fuck up, and without exhaust.

[Cowbra]

Well, okay, then the submarine fleet makes at least some sense - retribution. Well, when we are rolled out. And why the heck above water, so that we give you a pacifier?

[Vladimir1155]

Quote: Cowbra

Why the heck above water

only for PLO PMO around the bases of nuclear submarines, that is, the surface fleet is a few corvettes and frigates of PLO and minesweepers, and only at two points, that is, around the two existing bases of nuclear submarines, but it is not possible to explain this to saws, sailors who are afraid of pitching, members of the aircraft carrier's witness sect. ... they have blind faith and complete paralysis of logic ...

[bayard]

Quote: Cowbra

In general, you stuck with your bastion then? How many launchers can you make in just one submarine? and come on, look for them,

Quote: Cowbra

Sorry, author ... - you showed me again. That Russia is a land power.

This whim with the "bastions" from the misunderstanding that out of the 10 available SSBNs in the sea there will be two at a time ... maximum three submarines.
And the rest are IN BASES.
Not on duty with weapons, but in bases!
Under a 99% guarantee of destruction by the first blow.
IN BASES.
Without any benefit!
Not having time to make a single volley.
And those in the "bastions" - accompanied by the enemy's MAPLs, will also be sunk at the first "green whistle" not for a pound of tobacco.
It's just that they have orders of magnitude (alas) better and more (more numerous) PLO aviation.
And the number of submarines and diesel-electric submarines / submarines of the United States and its allies is many times greater than that of our submarine covering forces, including diesel-electric submarines, in general!
And why do we need to keep these forces under our own shore with SUCH efficiency of their use in "Hour-X"?
Guard 2 - 3 SSBNs in the "bastions"? !!!
Who are themselves at gunpoint, along with all their "escort" and cover?
The only justifiable benefit of the Navy is to be "a pistol to the aggressor's temple."
And that means - under HIS shore!
And to the surface forces of DM and OZ - too.
Thus, they will not only have "at least some" benefit, a very great benefit from pressure on the enemy by naval forces of forward deployment.
Moreover, it is better to do this relying on the naval base in Venezuela and Cuba.
Including fighter and submarine base aircraft, strike MRA, land-based cruise and hypersonic missiles, air defense, RTR PRK.
Such an advanced deployment of the Navy (and the Aerospace Forces) forces will allow us to increase our strike potential across the United States with nuclear forces at least twice as compared to today, without violating any treaties.
It is necessary to exclude the very concept of "bastion" from the vocabulary of the Navy and concentrate all forces on strike capabilities in areas of forward deployment.
Will the enemy track down our SSGNs?
Does he have great superiority in PLO aircraft and naval surface forces?
Yes .
But he will do this UNDER HIS SHORE.
This will draw off a lot of his strength.
And our surface fleet DM and OZ will also be there - to strengthen the combat stability of the submarine fleet.
Covering it from enemy aircraft submarines, illuminating the air and surface situation, pushing back enemy surface ships and PLAYING ON THE NERVES OF THE AGGRESSOR.
Such a task for the Navy is quite justified and respectable.
And in his bases and in bastions, he will remain "Rybnadzor", as one old friend of mine calls him.

[ccsr]

Quote: bayard

This whim with the "bastions" from the misunderstanding that out of the 10 available SSBNs in the sea there will be two at a time ... maximum three submarines.
And the rest are IN BASES.

Let's all the same not only live for today, but at least focus on the end of the twenties of this century, when the next stage of the weapons program ends. And if you carefully analyze our plans, then we will have at least 20-24 SSBNs - if this is not so, then correct me, but for some reason I heard this figure. This means that at least 6-8 nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles will actually be in the sea. Of course, this is less than in the days of the USSR in terms of the total power of nuclear warheads, but even if we lose 50% of the weapons on duty from the enemy's ASW assets, the remaining SSBNs will be able to inflict unacceptable damage to the United States. So not everything here is so sad, you just need to really look at the situation, and understand that submarines cannot be built quickly, these are too complex products, and much more complicated than any surface ship.

Quote: bayard

Such an advanced deployment of the Navy (and the Aerospace Forces) forces will allow us to increase our strike potential across the United States with nuclear forces at least twice as compared to today, without violating any treaties.

Afraid that you got excited about Cuba and Venezuela, although I am a supporter of our base for servicing ships in Cuba. We will not be able to pull this off, and the local authorities are unlikely to allow our nuclear submarines to enter them with a full BC.

[bayard]

Quote: ccsr

... And if you carefully analyze our plans, then we will have at least 20-24 SSBNs - if this is not so, then correct me, but for some reason I heard this figure.

I do not know from whom you heard this figure, but at the end of the decade we should write off the last SSBN 667BDRM. Today there are 5 of them in service. and one more - "Bryansk" is being renovated in "Zvezdochka". But their service life was extended from 25 to 35 years. Not more .
And they were built in the period from 1981 to 1992. So count it.
Only the Boreas remain - there will be no others at the end of this decade.
And we have them in the ranks, construction and in the order - 10 pieces.
And we have not heard anything about plans to lay at least a couple more.
So at the end of this decade we will have just 10 - 12 SSBNs.
More pieces 8 - 10 "Ash" and 4 949A pr.
And about five old ones (we not only do not build others, but do not even design) MAPL pr. 971.
All !
So the number 20 - 24 is most likely the expected number of nuclear submarines as such, which will be in service. For it is not known how the repairs and modernization of the 949A and 971 projects will go. After all, they may well stop funding ... under a very "plausible" pretext ... or even without it ...
But no matter how many SSBNs we have in service, at sea there will be at most 1/3 of their payroll.
And most likely - 1 \ 4.
Those that will be in the base will come under the first blow of the enemy - for example, "Trident-2" with the British SSBN on a flat trajectory.
And you can't hide anywhere ... until the "Burrow" is completed ...
And those that will be in the sea, with a probability of 80% will be destroyed from the position of "weapon tracking".
And that’s it.
These are the "bastions".
And now, in all honesty, tell me - DO WE NEED IT?
ARE THESE BASTIONS?
In which, with a probability of 80% to 100%, everything ... EVERYTHING !!! ... our naval forces of strategic nuclear forces will be destroyed in a surprise preemptive strike within a few minutes.
Personally, I think this strategy is a crime.
It is better, indeed, to build land ICBMs ... at least no enemy MAPLs "from around the corner" will creep up to them.
The "bastions" were invented by the late Soviet military-political leadership, who had lost his mind and conscience ... out of hopelessness ... To a greater extent - far-fetched.
and akin to this "strategy", "strategy" of Serdyukov - to collect all the country's military aviation on 2 - 3 "superbases" ... so that the "respected partner" would have less trouble destroying them.
What about? 2 - 3 warheads, and there is no aviation in Russia.
Combat.
So it is in the "bastions".
It is a trap .
Expensive, troublesome, costly, and ABSOLUTELY useless in a real combat situation.

Quote: ccsr

So not everything here is so sad, you just need to really look at the situation, and understand that submarines cannot be built quickly, these are too complex products, and much more complicated than any surface ship.

Well, why, just SSBN (SSBN) we have not forgotten how to build. And they cost much cheaper than surface ships.
Non-nuclear.
The cost of "Borey" is equal to the cost of the frigate (!) Pr. 22350 - about 550 million dollars.
And in terms of construction time, everything is more or less decent - about seven years.
But all this wealth and power to lose in the first minutes of the war ... I would not want to.
But we will certainly lose if we leave all this stuff in the "bastions" and bases.
Therefore, for me, prospect "Borei-K" is much more preferable, because serving him under the enemy's shore, holding a pistol at the aggressor's temple and even if he dies, then with a sense of accomplishment, because everything that has time - will shoot right at him (the enemy ) the lair.

Quote: ccsr

I'm afraid that you got excited about Cuba and Venezuela, although I am a supporter of our base for servicing ships in Cuba. We will not pull it, and the local authorities are unlikely to allow our nuclear submarines to enter them with a full BC.

Why won't they?
If not in a thieves' way, not timidly / cowardly, like Khrushchev, but systematically and thoroughly.
On a long term basis.
We have business in Venezuela.
Serious business.
And there, in 2027, our naval base and an air force base should appear.
And Cuba is Venezuela's closest ally, a country to which we have written off a monstrous debt (about $ 24 billion), a country that has been living for more than half a century under American sanctions and the threat of intervention ... The country of Great Fidel ...
Will accept.
They themselves will be so calmer.
And more reliable.
And safer.
And our SSGN will be able to shoot from the Cuban territorial waters when needed.
And on Cuban airfields our fighter, submarine and strike aircraft can be deployed.
And air defense systems.
And RER funds.
And ZGRLS on the southeastern tip of Liberty Island.
And an early warning system - to control the launches of ICBMs and in general all missile launches from the east coast of the United States.
And besides the submarine forces, the operational squadron of surface forces will be based there (in Venezuela and Cuba). By that time, the entire 22350 series will be built and erected as needed. "Admiral Nakhimov" and "Peter the Great" will already be in the ranks ... and they will not squirm under their native shore ... I admit that the first 22350M will also be in the ranks.
And BDK.
And do not forget that most of the US forces will already be tied up with the growing Chinese fleet.
but for successful work in the oceanic zone under the enemy's coast it is necessary to remove from the Navy an unbearable and useless burden - service in the "bastions". And repurpose all SSBNs in SSGNs in "Zirconami" and "Caliber-M". Then everything will work out and will be in the best possible way.

[ccsr]

Quote: bayard

I do not know from whom you heard this figure, but at the end of the decade we should write off the last SSBN 667BDRM. Today there are 5 of them in service. and one more - "Bryansk" is being renovated in "Zvezdochka". But their service life was extended from 25 to 35 years.

You yourself are reporting that the resource can be extended, so it is not yet clear what will be planned in the next five years - the construction of new ones, or the extension of the life of the old ones.

Quote: bayard

So the number 20 - 24, this is most likely the expected number of nuclear submarines as such,

I think it is the naval ones who will justify this figure when they are asked at whose expense they will go for some reduction of other naval structures.

Quote: bayard

More far-fetched.
and akin to this "strategy", "strategy" of Serdyukov - to collect all the country's military aviation on 2 - 3 "superbases" ... so that the "respected partner" would have less trouble destroying them.
What about? 2 - 3 warheads, and there is no aviation in Russia.

In fact, they are provided with other basing airfields during the threatened period, and moreover, they will begin patrolling before something falls on their airfield - this was conceived back in Soviet times. I don't think the concept has changed now.

Quote: bayard

And they cost much cheaper than surface ships.

This is a very controversial issue, and with all the calculations it may turn out to be completely different. At least our Typhoon cost almost as much as our aircraft carrier.

Quote: bayard

because to serve him under the enemy's shore, keep a pistol at the temple of the aggressor and even if he perishes, then with a sense of accomplishment

This is what a submarine fleet is for, and a surface one is not suitable for this.

Quote: bayard

Why won't they?

I am a realist, and I perfectly imagine that not everything is so simple even with this.

Quote: bayard

And there, in 2027, our naval base and an air force base should appear.

We cannot complete the construction of SP-2 on time because of the sanctions, and what will happen if we decide to build bases there, we cannot even imagine.

Quote: bayard

And our SSGN will be able to shoot from the Cuban territorial waters when needed.
And on Cuban airfields our fighter, submarine and strike aircraft can be deployed.

Trim the sturgeon - military professionals will not appreciate your fuse.

Quote: bayard

And do not forget that most of the US forces will already be tied up with the growing Chinese fleet.

This is from the realm of speculation - the Americans are well aware that China has too weak a nuclear potential to threaten America, as we can.

Quote: bayard

And repurpose all SSBNs in SSGNs in "Zirconami" and "Caliber-M". Then everything will work out and will be in the best possible way.

I totally disagree with this.

[bayard]

Quote: ccsr

You yourself are reporting that the resource can be extended, so it is not yet clear what will be planned in the next five years - the construction of new ones, or the extension of the life of the old ones.

It will be extended, but not indefinitely. At the moment, it has been extended to 35 years. Perhaps another 5 -10 years will be thrown ... about another 10, I may have gotten excited, but the new Liner missiles are now being installed on them. And that is why I suggested, after the completion of the service of the Dolphins themselves, to put them as floating missile batteries - after all, the Liner missiles on which they are rearmed are completely new.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: bayard
So the number 20 - 24, this is most likely the expected number of nuclear submarines as such,

I think it is the naval ones who will justify this figure when they are asked at whose expense they will go for some reduction of other naval structures.

They will justify anything.
I probably could do it too.
But they can neither increase the number of ships possible for construction, nor unlimited extension of the service life of old ones.
"Dolphins" only 5 pcs. in service, and perhaps there will be one more.
"Boreev" and "Boreev-A" will be no more than 10 units. ... well, maybe +2 more. if you are very lucky, they will be laid and built before the end of the decade.
So no 20 - 24 pieces. will not, and they are not needed.
There will simply be no one to protect them.
Because we do not have a single new MAPL.
There is not even such a project.
This is worse than a crime.
This is an impermissible ERROR.
It's the same as if in the old days someone would have started to build a fleet of only battleships, neglecting destroyers, submarine minesweepers, light cruisers and naval aviation ... The enemy would have sunk all these battleships with aviation and submarines without entering artillery duel.
What is the use of warships, when in case of war you can use only no more than a third (in fact, no more than 25%)? And even then this is if you are VERY lucky.
This is a direct waste of already scarce resources on an extremely unreliable means of strategic nuclear forces.
And this at a time when we almost completely lack AWACS aircraft, PLO aircraft, specialized reconnaissance aircraft, MAPLs, SSBNs do not have reliable anti-torpedo protection, ASW corvettes, and naval missile-carrying aircraft.
But SSBNs with SLBMs are being built with throw-weight characteristics more than two times worse than those of Trident-2 ...
What for ?
If our "Sineva" on the old already "Dolphins" has the same characteristics as the "Trident-2".
With a lower starting weight.
"Bulava" IS INSUFFICIENTLY effective means of delivering strategic ammunition to the intercontinental range.
It is especially ineffective due to the type of deployment and the strategy chosen for this.

Quote: ccsr

In fact, they are provided with other basing airfields during the threatened period, and moreover, they will begin patrolling before something falls on their airfield - this was conceived back in Soviet times. I don't think the concept has changed now.

Serdyukov changed everything!
A huge number of military airfields were abandoned and plundered.
He AT ALL did not think about security and simply about the functioning of the Russian military machine.
He destroyed it.
Now he is doing this in relation to the aircraft industry.
And with the same unchanged result.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: bayard
And they cost much cheaper than surface ships.

This is a very controversial issue, and with all the calculations it may turn out to be completely different. At least our Typhoon cost almost as much as our aircraft carrier.

Our Soviet aircraft carriers were cheaper to build than the 1144 Orlan cruiser, and the Orlan has a smaller displacement than the Typhoon.
In addition, the Typhoon and Orlan are outstanding and exclusive ships, I would even say.
But the numbers are numbers - both "Borey" and frigate 22350 cost both about 550 million dollars.
And in the USA "Virginia" is comparable in price to "Arleigh-Burke".
But the "Ash" we have turned out to be truly gold - the price of two "Boreas", over a billion dollars.
You often mention "military specialists" .... Are you sure these specialists are specialists?
If all their initiatives go to waste with a waste of huge funds for the country?
I am used to evaluating any specialist by the results of his work. And I have enough life experience to give such an assessment.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: bayard
because to serve him under the enemy's shore, keep a pistol at the temple of the aggressor and even if he perishes, then with a sense of accomplishment

This is what a submarine fleet is for, and a surface one is not suitable for this.

With the abundance and quality of anti-aircraft weapons at the enemy, to release the submarine fleet into the sea without cover from the surface fleet ... this is a direct suicide for the submariners and an article of the Criminal Code for those who gave such an order. The approach to the issue should be comprehensive.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: bayard
Why won't they?

I am a realist, and I perfectly imagine that not everything is so simple even with this.

Big politics and military affairs are not simple things by definition.

Quote: ccsr

We cannot complete the construction of SP-2 on time because of the sanctions, and what will happen if we decide to build bases there, we cannot even imagine.

What will happen?
War?
We have already received the sanctions.
By resting the trunk on the genitals of the "partner", it is much easier to do business, even if your "partner" is a common scumbag.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: bayard
And our SSGN will be able to shoot from the Cuban territorial waters when needed.
And on Cuban airfields our fighter, submarine and strike aircraft can be deployed.

Trim the sturgeon - military professionals will not appreciate your fuse.

Some "military professionals" from Shoigu's entourage were talking about something similar, though with regard to our bases in Venezuela.
And Cuba was also mentioned there.
So this is their sturgeon.
They should cut it.

Quote: ccsr

Quote: bayard
And do not forget that most of the US forces will already be tied up with the growing Chinese fleet.

This is from the realm of speculation - the Americans are well aware that China has too weak a nuclear potential to threaten America, as we can.

Have you heard that the CCP has decided to increase the number of nuclear weapons on strategic delivery vehicles up to 1000 units?
And how much time do you think it will take them.
The world is changing .
The enemy is changing.
We are changing.
It's time to get out of the enemy paradigm.

[ccsr]

Quote: bayard

And that is why I suggested, after the completion of the service of the Dolphins themselves, to put them as floating missile batteries - after all, the Liner missiles on which they are rearmed are completely new.

Maybe this is a good idea, but everything will run into money - the naval forces will still be forced to make a choice, either expensive new weapons, or modernizing old ones with vague prospects. Everything will depend on how firmly the naval ones will substantiate the naval strategy at least in the General Staff, and only then will they come out with a joint proposal to the Supreme - I only see it this way.

Quote: bayard

They will justify anything.
I probably could do it too.

Not everything is so simple - they do not select fools from the naval forces to the General Staff, and they know their business, so it will not be such a simple matter.

Quote: bayard

So no 20 - 24 pieces. will not, and they are not needed.

I did not take this calculation from the ceiling, and I also read some analytical reviews of former naval commanders. For some reason, some of them consider this figure to be the basic one for Russia, and I think they are not mistaken - two boats on duty in three oceans are quite reasonable dispersion and a relatively decent reliability of the system for any situation.

Quote: bayard

With the abundance and quality of anti-aircraft weapons at the enemy, to release the submarine fleet into the sea without cover from the surface fleet ... this is a direct suicide for the submariners and an article of the Criminal Code for those who gave such an order.

Not all navies will agree with you, because there have been successful detachments all the time, even on old nuclear submarines. And now, when we can focus on this, I think there will be more perfect ways to avoid tracking - for some reason I am sure that this is the direction of the future. And it will be much safer and cheaper than pumping funds into the ocean surface fleet.

Quote: bayard

Some "military professionals" from Shoigu's entourage were talking about something similar, though with regard to our bases in Venezuela.
And Cuba was also mentioned there.
So this is their sturgeon.

I'm afraid that you did not distinguish propaganda from real actions in this case. We, too, have learned to intimidate the townsfolk all over the world - what Basharov and Petrov did alone, although none of the knowledgeable people believes in this nonsense. But what is the reaction - now the whole world knows what "Newbie" is, and now it also knows about "Sputnik V".

Quote: bayard

Have you heard that the CCP has decided to increase the number of nuclear weapons on strategic delivery vehicles up to 1000 units?

The Chinese love to show off, but no one denies that they can do it. Although it is unlikely that their carriers are at such a level now to compete with the United States. So let's see first how their economic war with the West will end - it has recently begun too actively, and it is not yet clear who will emerge victorious.

Quote: bayard

It's time to get out of the enemy paradigm.

Who to go out - make it clear.

[Boa kaa]

Quote: bayard

with a probability of 80% to 100% all ... ALL !!! ... our naval forces of strategic nuclear forces will be destroyed in a surprise preemptive strike within a few minutes

Quote: bayard

The "bastions" were invented by the late Soviet military-political leadership, who had lost his mind and conscience ... out of hopelessness ... To a greater extent - far-fetched.

Quote: bayard

convert all SSBNs into SSGNs into "Zirconami" and "Caliber-M". Then everything will work out and will be in the best possible way.

A few words about.
1. Why is there such confidence in the inevitable death of "from 80% to 100%" of our naval forces of strategic nuclear forces !? Can you give the calculations or refer to the author of a thread?
2. About a sudden preemptive strike by the British SSBNs on inclined ballistic trajectories by the American "Tridents" -II.
Horror!
a) back in the years of WWII, the fleet had a system of alarms that allowed it (the only one of all the families and types of the Red Army!) to get out of the blow of German aviation without losses. today such a system also exists. There are degrees of BG, according to which the forces leave the OPB in the MBP. Even with a cold reactor on a battery, a few are able to escape from the impact and start the reactor, carry out the PP of the complex. So ... Doesn't roll.
b) Trident has no inclined trajectory. Yes, he has a min. D launch 2300 km - and only ... But then they will become the prey of the Prometheus: the S-500 should take on targets for which the D launch is less than 5000 km.
3. About the bastions. I already wrote, so there is no point in repeating myself. I would only like to remind you: our ancestors were no worse than the current strategists. Therefore, the creation of air defense missile systems for the RPKSN at that time was the only way out to ensure their combat stability ...
4. About the re-profiling of the branches of the (submarine) fleet.
The thing is that the APRK SN can upset the Yankees right from the pier, which, due to the radius of reach of the RC, the plark is deprived. She needs to pass half of the way under water, force the lines of the PLO, hide from the BPA constantly, again, meetings with a counterpart can happen. What the APRK SN lacks ... Therefore, let's leave everything as it is and wish our guys the strength of a solid hull and the number of ascents equal to the number of dives. (and as few urgent dives as possible!)
AHA.

[bayard]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

... About a sudden preemptive strike by the British SSBNs on inclined ballistic trajectories by the American "Tridents" -II.

Well, the SSBN may not be English, it's just that the infrastructure of the Northern Fleet is just more convenient.
And as for the flat trajectory for Trident-2 ... so many similar launches have already been there. And precisely along a gentle trajectory. The term is really the wrong one, I apologize.
The figures for the possibility of defeat are taken from the case that there will be no threatened period, but there will be just a sudden blow without diplomatic notes and political swing. In this case, it may not be possible to shoot from the pier, and if one succeeds, then she will not be allowed to finish the volley - the flight time will be minimized.
And only the lazy did not talk about how closely our SSBNs graze American and British MAPLs, how freely their anti-submarine aviation feels in our "bastions". And if these were the idle conversations of the couch warriors ...
After all, I propose to transfer all Bulavas to land carriers, their range is quite intercontinental. Yes, this will require additional costs and R&D, but they are not critical to implementation. But we then free up to a dozen (or more, if you still lay) "Boreyev" to serve as a SSGN, carrying up to 112 cruise missiles on board.
There will not be enough "Ash" alone for service under the enemy's coast - at best it will be possible to keep two or three pieces there, and given their ASW capabilities, this cannot be considered sufficient to create a real threat. But if 8-10 Boreyev-Ks are added to the 10-12 "Ash", then it will be a completely different alignment, then it will be possible to simultaneously have 2-3 SSGNs under each of the two shores of the United States. Plus one more MAPL (we simply do not have more and is not expected).
Such a grouping in the areas of forward deployment would be a very compelling argument - the possibility at any moment to bring down several hundred (not dozens) hypersonic Zircons and Caliber-Ms with a range of up to 4000 - 4500 km on the United States. Within a few minutes, you can cut down the entire infrastructure of the missile defense system, naval base, command centers, airfields, arsenals, etc. Even before the ICBM arrives. Here is exactly the case when quantity inevitably turns into quality. The quality and effectiveness of the first, in every sense of the disarming strike.
And such a threat will have to be reckoned with.
And the "dismounted" Bulava will serve as a light class ICBM in constant (!) Readiness for a counter-strike. In much greater readiness than being on duty in a crowded base, where all of them can be covered with one single warhead ... Two, if we talk about the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. However, I think about them and will not regret much more.
The S-500 is not yet in service, and such missile defense systems would be very desirable for covering bases in Severomorsk and Kamchatka.
And rock shelters with a wet dock in the mountain are very useful things. May God grant that they were completed and commissioned
But the Navy must behave actively, must create a threat, and not hide from the threat in "bastions".
And the surface fleet should not guard the "bastions", but ensure the stability of the submarine forces in the DM and OZ. Illuminating the surface and air situation with them and covering enemy aircraft from submarines during the threatened period and in the event of the start of the airborne attack.
The fleet must become a pistol, rested in the genitals of the aggressor. It was such a Fleet that Gorshkov created (and created) at one time. And the rejection of the "Gorshkov Doctrine" is a sign of decline and defeat.
Hiding in the "bastions" the Fleet knowingly admits its defeat.
And this is wrong.

[SVD68]

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

1. Where does such confidence in the inevitable death of "from 80% to 100%" of our sea forces SNF come from !?

Because 80% of our NSNF is located at the base. And in the sea, only 1-2 RPKSN can be tracked, albeit not always, but the choice of the start time is not ours.

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

3. About the bastions. I already wrote, so there is no point in repeating myself. I would only like to remind you: our ancestors were no worse than the current strategists. Therefore, the creation of air defense missile systems for the RPKSN at that time was the only way out to ensure their combat stability ...

At the time, yes. But then a dozen of our submarines with ballistic missiles were on alert at sea at any given time. In this case, the ZRBD made sense. Now this is impossible, now there are 1-2 missiles in the sea.

Quote: Boa constrictor KAA

4. About the re-profiling of the branches of the (submarine) fleet.
The thing is that the APRK CH can upset the Yankees right from the pier,

Do you believe that in the event of the outbreak of war, RPKSN will be able to shoot from the pier?

[Boa kaa]

Quote: Cowbra

Russia is a land power. And the fleet eats the fuck up, and without exhaust.

One immediately feels that you often look at a geographic map ...
Now take the GLOBE and look at it. Find a country - the United States - and see how it will get to us by land ... The Berenga Strait does not count!
And then, though you are not Russian, but communication with our great people struck you with one bad ailment: the habit of giving the invaders at the gates of the defended fortress. The last time it was near Moscow and at the walls of STALINGRAD (!).
Maybe that's enough ... And it's time to put pressure on the candidates for "world leadership" with their LGBT battalions right in the cradle of "democracy"? Otherwise they are 16 (!) Times more in terms of the ratio of forces of the sides than us together with the Republic of Belarus ... The hand will fall off to hand out slaps in the face to everyone.
And so - he drowned a couple of "OCEANIKOV", and the half of the group was gone ... It is not necessary to pick out every John - Sam from the trench ... Again - saving fuel ...
However, this does not convince you. You are accustomed to wearing a "2 layout" for a boot and cleaning the RPK in the morning and at bedtime ... And a tank, after all, it is like a tractor, closer and closer than a kayak or a punt with a neighbor! And besides, you can drown at sea. And on land - got drunk and fell asleep (under every bush and a house and a table!)
It was in vain that Tsar Peter chopped off your beards ... you had to .... (cough!) ... caftans to run faster and climb up the shrouds !!!
Well, but seriously, the fleet means communications, logistics, goods! And without him today is impossible. The ships need to be protected. And for this, the fleet is needed. And so, for little things - a 200-mile economic zone, gas pipelines, the NSR, deposits of secretions and other crap mined from the bottom - you also need to protect and defend.
Therefore, do not ask, boyar, but the country will have a fleet. And as it is written in the Naval Doctrine - the second most powerful. In terms of displacement, only I.V. Stalin wrote. The current drivers are more modest than the father of nations ... The specifics are afraid that later they will not be asked for what they have not done.
IMHO.

[SVD68]

What is described in the article looks correct and beautiful. But three essential points are missing.
1. All of these measures, even in aggregate, do not provide 100% protection for SSBNs, since in peacetime, potential enemies cannot be destroyed, they can conduct their activities with much larger forces.
2. We can only have 2 rocket launchers on alert at any given time. We cannot significantly (several times) increase this number.
3. We are not planning the first disarming strike. And the enemy is planning. This means that the initiative will be behind the enemy.
Hence the conclusion. The described system for imparting combat stability to SSBNs is unreliable, tk. the enemy will be able to choose the moment to destroy all our SSBNs on alert. We cannot improve the reliability of this strategy.
It is necessary to look for another strategy for the combat stability of the NSNF.

[Rlptrt]

Did the author write this seriously?
Does he not know that each element of the nuclear triad has its own advantages and disadvantages, and only the nuclear triad as a whole can work as a military force, as an instrument of deterrence? In particular, the nuclear submarine fleet has the ability to covertly deliver missiles to the enemy's coast, which, when launched, will not leave him time for a reaction. To do this, SSBNs must go out into the ocean, overcoming the attack of the enemy fleet and the protracted line. In this they can be helped by the surface fleet (both OVR and large ocean-going ships, as well as multipurpose submarines), and aviation. The idea of ​​"bastions" has been wandering for a long time from the despair of the Russian fleet and is initially flawed. The uncertainty of the launch point is lost and the boats in the * bastions are “destroyed with the same ease as at the pier. This nonsense has been criticized for a long time and there is no point in repeating it.
And the idea of ​​a "universal" boat, which will perform all tasks equally badly, but will be incredibly difficult and expensive due to the contradictory requirements, is generally enchanting! Worse than it might be a proposal to build many large nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. We will go bankrupt, while today it is still possible to start building an adequate fleet to defend the country.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rlptrt

The idea of ​​"bastions" has been wandering for a long time from the despair of the Russian fleet and is initially flawed.

Is not. After all, the bastion does not have to be used to accommodate SSBNs, it can just as well be used to withdraw SSBNs to other areas. Roughly speaking, if within a radius of 500 km from the SSBN base there is a bastion in which enemy submarines are detected with a high probability, so there is no point in sending them there, then in order to detect an SSBN entering the combat duty area, you need to control 1550 km of the border of the bastion, from where the SSBN can appear.

[Rlptrt]

Is an.
1. For the withdrawal of SSBNs, even from the base, even from the "bastion", an operation of the fleet and aviation is needed to clear and distract the navy. Which are not. There is no anti-submarine fleet or anti-submarine aviation. And, judging by the actions of the authorities, it won't.
2. Build, do not build bastions at the exit from our only two bases - Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk, several Virginias are on constant combat duty. They won't kick SSBNs.
3. At the exit to the deployment area there are anti-submarine lines - Faroe-Icelandic and Aleuto-Japanese, saturated to the limit with means of detecting and destroying submarines. They can only be broken through with casualties and destroying them with the forces of the fleet and aviation, which, again, do not exist.
4. I am constantly developing and improving the global underwater lighting system. It makes no difference to look at a dozen, five hundred or five thousand kilometers. And we don’t even have the urge to create something similar, even close to our borders. Create, do not create bastions, there is nothing to detect enemy submarines in them.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Rlptrt

To withdraw SSBNs from the base or from the "bastion", an operation of the fleet and aviation is needed to clear and distract the navy. Which are not.

Sorry, but if they are not there, then there is no bastion. What is there to talk about then?
We discuss the bastion as an idea, suggesting that the means to do so can be created.

Quote: Rlptrt

Build, do not build bastions at the exit from our only two bases - Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk, several Virginias are on constant combat duty.

Which can be identified and put under control, which will allow SSBNs to leave the bases unnoticed

Quote: Rlptrt

At the exit to the deployment area there are anti-submarine lines - Faroe-Icelandic and Aleuto-Japanese,

SSBNs absolutely do not need to break through either the Farrero-Icelandic, and the Aleuto-Japanese is too large to ensure a reliable interception there.

Quote: Rlptrt

I am constantly creating and improving the global underwater lighting system. It makes no difference to look at a dozen, five hundred or five thousand kilometers.

There is. At our borders, it’s just that their global system does not work, only its mobile components can work there. So that they can't work, we need a bastion

[Rlptrt]

We discuss the bastion as an idea, assuming that the means to do so can be created.

Okay. Let's say they have created means of protecting the bastion. They still will not provide a way out of it. We need others.

That can be identified and controlled

So the fact of the matter is that there is nothing to reveal. There is no FOSS and is not expected, and the on-board GAS of the corvette are too bad and, most importantly, not low-frequency.

SSBNs absolutely do not need to break through either the Farrero-Icelandic, and the Aleuto-Japanese is too large to ensure a reliable interception there.

And how will they go out into the ocean to the skies' shores to launch ballistic missiles along a flat trajectory? Will they fly through the air?

There is. At our borders, it’s just that their global system does not work, only its mobile components can work there.

No. There were two R&D projects that drank some money and died out. On the border of the tervod, their mobile components are quite enough. GUS Virginia discovers our boats enough. And then SSBNs will meet all the strength of their fleet.

[Serg4545]

Quote: Rlptrt

And how will they go out into the ocean to the skies' shores to launch ballistic missiles along a flat trajectory? Will they fly through the air?

Well, why! That's why launch rockets on a flat trajectory !!? What will it give us?
A very small effect can be observed only if we planned, prepared and carried out the first blow (aggression).
Only then does it make sense in a flat trajectory and a breakthrough through different lines, so that the missiles can be launched along a flat trajectory.
A flat trajectory is not needed for a retaliatory strike. And there is no need to break through. Calmly shot from the Barents Sea. And that's all.

[ProkletyiPirat]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Rlptrt

To withdraw SSBNs from the base or from the "bastion", an operation of the fleet and aviation is needed to clear and distract the navy. Which are not.

Sorry, but if they are not there, then there is no bastion. What is there to talk about then?
We discuss the bastion as an idea, suggesting that the means to do so can be created.

Rlptrt apparently did not understand what bastions are in question, he apparently thinks that the "bastion" is a building on the shore / island.
But in general, in my opinion, "Bastion" is more accurate "The concept of" Bastion "based on a specialized large surface fleet (ie AUG \ KUG)" is unreasonable, in BMZ \ SMZ it is easily replaced by coastal, aviation and underwater stationary systems. And in the DMZ, the development of submarines and systems based on them (alteration of SSBNs into an MPN (multifunctional underwater carrier)). For example, the installation of tethered surface-underwater drones for PMO on the MPN. For example, the installation of retractable radar and anti-aircraft torpedo missiles and / or underwater launching surface / aviation drones of the patrol type. Well, or you can form external bases on the basis of small islands and / or offshore platforms, and already from them cover the areas where SSBNs are located, even if they are not there (the goal is to stretch the enemy's fleet by making it economically and industrially unprofitable). Even if this does not help, then it is possible to abandon the specialized fleet in favor of the multifunctional civil-military shipbuilding (MVGK), the main thing is not to rework civilian ships, but to develop it from scratch specifically for the tasks of the MVGK.

[Rlptrt]

Do not think that you are smarter than everyone else, and others are fools.
1. Coastal missile systems are the same bullshit for the electorate, like, say, Poseidon. Yes, they are needed and they solve some problems of coastal defense. Use it wisely. But to create a sufficiently vast protected area in which SSBNs can safely maneuver, it is necessary that the BRK missiles flew several thousand kilometers. In principle, it is possible to create such anti-ship missiles. There is nothing to give them target designation. We do not have cover aviation and network-centric structures for AWACS and reconnaissance aviation supported by aviation.
2. There is no naval strike aviation. And its creation will cost no less than building a fleet.
3. Your wet fantasies about drones and missile torpedoes are no less harmful than the waste of effort and money to create a Poseidon-type wunderwolf. We do not have and do not foresee fundamentally less complex anti-submarine deep topreds, no counter-torpedoes, and not much.

Well, putting weapons on civilian ships is the height of misunderstanding of the tasks and problems of the navy. In addition to weapons, you need to have many other systems on the ship. Many of which are quite seriously secret. On a civilian pelvis, this will instantly become the property of the enemy.

[ProkletyiPirat]

Quote: Rlptrt

1. Coastal missile systems are the same bullshit for the electorate, like, say, Poseidon. Yes, they are needed and they solve some problems of coastal defense. Use it wisely. But to create a sufficiently vast protected area in which SSBNs can safely maneuver, it is necessary that the BRK missiles flew several thousand kilometers. In principle, it is possible to create such anti-ship missiles. There is nothing to give them target designation. We do not have cover aviation and network-centric structures for AWACS and reconnaissance aviation supported by aviation.

You're the captain of the obvious, so I'll say the obvious, NO? SO CREATE! only for the creation and effective use in the conditions of the Russian Federation it is not necessary to create analogs of the AUG \ KUG of the leading maritime powers.

Quote: Rlptrt

Well, putting weapons on civilian ships is the height of misunderstanding of the tasks and problems of the navy.

And here you misinterpret what I wrote, I wrote "military-civilian" and not "civilian" and certainly not "ersatz-military". In your opinion, that DVKD with the function of militarization / demilitarization will poorly perform the task of the carrier of anti-aircraft missile defense aircraft? Or will it not be able to carry out the transportation of goods in peacetime, recouping its cost and providing a human / material reserve? In general, your point of view is clear: "I have not read it, I have not delved into it, but I condemn it."

[Rlptrt]

SO CREATE! only for the creation and effective use in the conditions of the Russian Federation it is not necessary to create analogs of the AUG \ KUG of the leading maritime powers.

I completely agree that there is no need to create analogs of AUG. And what about "create", I would create, if I was in place you know who. But I am not him.

There are no military civilians. You can adapt a civilian ship to carry out military tasks (landing, supply, escort, Club-K to be delivered at last), or you can use a warship for civilian purposes. But the first is from despair, and the second is from the evil one, because the military is built on purpose and is much more expensive both in construction and in operation. And most importantly, as I said earlier, problems with the regime.

[ProkletyiPirat]

yes, I already understood that you only "did not read, did not delve into, but I condemn", as for the regime, then this is the question you have two ships
1) DVKD standard size well, let it be a mistral - it has an integrated command complex
2) DVKD of the same standard size but in the MVGK format - a land or container command complex is installed on it (it is not in civilian life)
What will be worse for the second ship in terms of security / secrecy? I will repeat in advance the second option is not "civilian", not "military", not "ersatz-military made of civilian", but initially "military-civilian" and stabilization systems for pitching and much more that does not interfere with "militarization-demilitarization without the use of SRZ and MK \ PC "is already there.

[Rlptrt]

I have never seen and can not imagine what your MVGK is. "Originally a military-civilian". I have seen and know examples of how the military made ersatz out of civil courts. I've seen the military rebuild into yachts. But at close range I do not understand how to use a ship for military purposes in civilian life. Either combat helicopters are based there with their own control system, data processing and transmission and ship defense systems, or none of this is there. Why do civilians need a large helicopter wing? Pollinate the fields?
And yes. I do not really know the specifics of the combat use of helicopters. Although I have been to Moscow (helicopter carrier), but in my specialty.

[ProkletyiPirat]

Well, actually, your mistake became clear, in the sense of a mistake in building information in your head, it lies in a misunderstanding of the function "militarization-demilitarization", in words everything is simple

Everything that interferes with the work of the demilitarized MVGK must be done in a removable form.

But in reality there are nuances, both organizational and structural, and analytical. In general, the result will be a less military-efficient ship, but orders of magnitude more military-profitable. (The ultimate goal is to save money on the Navy without cutting the fleet)

1) For example: why would a demilitarized MVGK used as a ferry between St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad or Vladivostok and the Kuril Islands have a helicopter wing? Correctly, there is no need, so we withdraw the air wing into a separate organizational structure or even transfer it, combine it with the VKS, and, if necessary, militarize the MVGK by returning forces, funds and equipment by the crew without using the SRZ, MK \ PK. In this case, at first, we will get negatives (problems, difficulties) with the organization of interaction, but over time, the internal charters / rules / relationships will be worked out and the negatives will be resolved. Once again, I explain, take everything that the air wing needs, if this does not interfere with the MVGK ferry, then we leave it, if it interferes, then we display it in a separate structure, for example, "a temporary field airfield complex for the Navy \ VKS \ SV". The helicopters themselves are accordingly grouped in such a way that one group would fit into an MVGK of an average size.
2) If you take the aft dock, air deck, elevators, infrastructure, then they do not interfere with the demilitarized MVGK, and may even be useful. For example, when a demilitarized MVGK operates as a Ro-Ro-container ship when exported from the Russian Federation to other countries.

Quote: Rlptrt

I have never seen and can not imagine what your MVGK is. "Originally a military-civilian".

If you represent purely appearance, then you can imagine ferries / rollers (photo below) but with a number of differences, from the main one:
1) maximum size air deck
2) several longitudinal hold-hangar-docks with the function of transverse sealing. That is, instead of one hangar 21m wide, we get, for example, 3 hangars of 7m each.
3) internal and external elevators, elevators, external in folding form
4) internal crane system for cargo handling
5) systems for stabilization of pitching \ geolocation
6) the ability to install and use modules and / or land equipment. This is, first of all, the infrastructure and the given strength of the ship.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

SSBNs absolutely do not need to break through either the Farrero-Icelandic, and the Aleuto-Japanese is too large to ensure a reliable interception there.

Well, the author thinks more broadly:

increase the likelihood of a submarine reaching the enemy's shores at the distance of an SLBM strike along a flat trajectory with a short flight time

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

There is. At our borders, it’s just that their global system does not work, only its mobile components can work there. So that they can't work, we need a bastion

Yes, at least the fleet should provide it. But about the uselessness of long trips, the author got excited

For example, a symmetrical opposition to the American naval forces (Navy) with conventional weapons, and even at a distance from the borders of the Russian Federation

Here he discussed with one about the need for 152 mm guns on each corvette and with the indispensable special ammunition in the cellar.
So with them, each corvette and above will be able to asymmetrically withstand US NAVY, taking into account the autonomy and seaworthiness of course.

[Alexander Vorontsov]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Which can be identified and put under control, which will allow SSBNs to leave the bases unnoticed

How will "revealing" Virginia prevent Virginia from revealing our strategist? When identifying it, it is assumed that? Stun? Dazzle? Grab your hands by the legs? Or maybe ... right away ... well, this ... that ... with a knife in the throat? Regulation under control is what?

[bk0010]

Quote: Rlptrt

Build, do not build bastions at the exit from our only two bases - Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk, several Virginias are on constant combat duty.

What prevents us from throwing controlled mines (such as captors) near our bases, these are our territories. water?

[Rlptrt]

The area of ​​SSBN maneuvering is much larger than the tervod. And on which board the mine will work on someone else's or his own ... With the complete lack of hands of the victims of the exam from the military industry, it is better not to think.

[bk0010]

Quote: Rlptrt

The area of ​​SSBN maneuvering is much larger than the tervod.

I'm not talking about the whole area, I'm talking about the area near the base, so that they don't graze right at the exit.

[Serg4545]

Quote: Rlptrt

Build, do not build bastions at the exit from our only two bases - Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk, several Virginias are on constant combat duty. They won't kick SSBNs.

What nonsense!
How can someone not release our SSBNs !? Will your breasts get in the way? Will they go to the ram?
There are two options:
1. There is a war. Our SSBNs are not going anywhere at all. They shoot off the ammunition where they are at the moment.
2. There is no war. Our SSBNs go wherever they want. Virginias (if they really are constantly on duty near our bases) follow our boats until the beginning of the ice in the Arctic Ocean, where they lose our boats.
Because under the ice of the ocean, the interference acoustic environment is so complex that no tracking is simply impossible!

[Rlptrt]

"There is no war" - they are really coming. Only accompanied. Lost the main trump card and the main success of the captain of the submarine - secrecy.
For the special ones, I repeat: Virginia's GUS will find our lumbering boat much earlier. And Virginia has something to impress her with.
"There is a war" - well, how long can you repeat about the absolute ignorance of "a salvo from the pier" ?! Zadolbali, right.

[Serg4545]

Quote: Rlptrt

"There is no war" - they are really coming. Only accompanied. Lost the main trump card and the main success of the captain of the submarine - secrecy.

Stealth will indeed be lost. A day for two. Then the boats will reach the ice of the Arctic Ocean. And Virginia will lose our boat. Because of the infernal acoustic interference environment, which is created by continuously rubbing and breaking ice floes. And over the next few months our SSBN is not threatened and no one will find it.

Quote: Rlptrt

"There is a war" - well, how long can you repeat about the absolute ignorance of "a salvo from the pier" ?! Zadolbali, right.

Did she come up with it herself, was she offended?
Where did I even mention pier shooting !?
Incidentally, I was responding to your incredibly stupid comment. Where do you say that our SSBNs, for some kind of rogue, well, it is absolutely necessary to break through the anti-submarine lines into the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean.
Can you explain why a missile salvo of our SSBNs from, say, the Laptev Sea, can be less destructive than the same salvo from the Caribbean Sea? North America.
And if there is no difference in destructive power, then why waste time, take risks, incur losses, for the sake of a trip to the Caribbean?
I’m just wondering how you yourself explain this meaningless action.

[Rlptrt]

"There is a war going on .... fire off the ammunition where they are"

Most of them are located at the pier.
Indeed, the Arctic is still helping us a lot. So far, they are doing poorly in the Arctic and so far the Arctic direction is poorly protected by them. But this will not always be the case.
First, the Laptev Sea still needs to go out. And this is also not a ceremonial wake. Secondly, the salvo will be expected from the Lapteah Sea rather than from the Caribbean Sea.
Think why not waste a lot of effort and money to keep our boats out of the Atlantic, building an anti-submarine echelon line? This means that they are more dangerous there than in the Barents Sea.
As I understand the hydroacoustics, today the noises of ice, whales and herring farting do not interfere with the complex system of low-frequency active location. Yes, in the Northern Arctic Sp3t5 people are powerless. Under the ice. But you have to get out of it at least someday. It seems that you can shoot without leaving, I don't remember exactly. But for the people this is the most dangerous direction, and they look there more and more closely.
And yes. The sea is on Laptev, and Laptev ... This is "incredible stupidity".))

[timokhin-aa]

Because under the ice of the ocean, the interference acoustic environment is so complex that no tracking is simply impossible!

Who told you this?

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: timokhin-aa

Because under the ice of the ocean, the interference acoustic environment is so complex that no tracking is simply impossible!

Who told you this?

Alexander, how do low-frequency GUS show themselves under the ice?

[Runway]

With your figure, we must also keep the line of 1550 km and an area of ​​one third of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk (roughly).
Then the RBD and "draw" taking into account the geography of the coast.
You can narrow down the task for the support forces:
- the capabilities of the detection means on our steamers;
- the possibility of means of destruction of the enemy on our ships (submarine torpedoes, mines, rocket torpedoes, etc.)
- the length of the “corridor” from the PB to the “bastion” with the Khkol-vom RBD;
- external borders of the "bastion" taking into account the geography of the coast.

[Vladimir1155]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

e is. After all, the bastion does not have to be used to accommodate SSBNs, it can just as well be used to withdraw SSBNs to other areas. Roughly speaking, if within a radius of 500 km from the SSBN base there is a bastion in which enemy submarines are detected with a high probability, so there is no point in sending them there, then in order to detect an SSBN entering the combat duty area, you need to control 1550 km of the border of the bastion, from where the SSBN can appear.

smart thought from Andrey! I respect, but it is better to move the border to 1000 km, it is quite possible then the perimeter will become so long that it will be possible for the RPKS to enter the ocean secretly, but ... this can only be done if you do not spend money on crazy AV UDC and battleship destroyers

[Winnie76]

Quote: Rlptrt

and only the nuclear triad as a whole can work as a military force, as an instrument of deterrence?

Why's that? Here Kim Jong-in from the nuclear triad has only one seven-mole. Ground. Somehow it is holding back.
According to the reviews of our competent comrades, our SSBNs are being conducted almost from the exit from the base. It turns out that the only reason to justify billions of dollars in investments in SSBNs is the bastions.

Quote: Rlptrt

In particular, the nuclear submarine fleet has the ability to covertly deliver missiles to the enemy's coast, which, when launched, will not leave him time for a reaction. To do this, SSBNs must go out into the ocean, overcoming the attack of the enemy fleet and the protracted line.

Why should we unleash a nuclear war? It is enough to have a guaranteed answer.

Quote: Rlptrt

The idea of ​​"bastions" has been wandering for a long time from the despair of the Russian fleet and is initially flawed. The uncertainty of the launch point is lost and the boats in the * bastions are "destroyed with the same ease as at the pier.

How is it? A bastion is understood as a quite extensive water area.

[Rlptrt]

Well, shall we chew the snot of the first graders again?
1. Only a triad. Because it supports each other and scatters the forces of the enemy. And Kim, like that Chingachgook from the anecdote, is of no use to anyone. But Russia is needed.
2. There is no need to unleash nuclear mobsters. You need to restrain. But the guaranteed answer is the possibility of launching missiles. For SSBNs, this means being undetected at the point of the salvo. And not to die heroically from the first blow at the pier.
3. The possibility of creating a protected area with even larger aviation and naval forces than ours creates a "marquise puddle" that is ridiculously small for an SSBN. Since its missiles are the very weapons of the triad, and this entire small area will be covered by the first strike to ensure the destruction of possible SSBNs in it.

[bk0010]

Forget about UAV-RC and UAV-DRLO: to control them at long distances, you will need a relay satellite for each operating such UAV (since this is not a telephone, a wide data transmission channel is required). It is unrealistically expensive, and during the war these satellites will be neutralized (yes, this is not easy - 36000 km, but possible). Well, or you need a ship to control the UAV, at a distance of 200 kilometers from which these UAVs will operate.
The second question: how will the US convoys heading to Europe be drowned after the exchange of nuclear strikes? Corvettes? The nuclear submarines can, but we have few of them.
I believe that in addition to the coastal protection fleet, something like OPESK is needed, which could bring justice to any corner of the world's oceans. We still have the pair 1144 as its basis.

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: bk0010

Forget about UAV-RC and UAV-DRLO: to control them at long distances, you will need a relay satellite for each operating such UAV (since this is not a telephone, a wide data transmission channel is required). It is unrealistically expensive, and during the war these satellites will be neutralized (yes, this is not easy - 36000 km, but possible). Well, or you need a ship to control the UAV, at a distance of 200 kilometers from which these UAVs will operate.
The second question: how will the US convoys heading to Europe be drowned after the exchange of nuclear strikes? Corvettes? The nuclear submarines can, but we have few of them.
I believe that in addition to the coastal protection fleet, something like OPESK is needed, which could bring justice to any corner of the world's oceans. We still have the pair 1144 as its basis.

You are right that space is needed, but you are wrong that it is unrealistically expensive and easily destroyed. This will be discussed in detail in the next article, it has already been submitted.

On "US convoys" also further. This is a different task, here we looked only at the fleet as an element of the strategic nuclear forces.

[Vladimir_2U]

For example, a symmetrical opposition to the American naval forces (Navy) with conventional weapons, and even at a distance from the borders of the Russian Federation

Here he discussed with one about the need for 152 mm guns on each corvette and with the indispensable special ammunition in the cellar.
So with them, each corvette and above will be able to asymmetrically withstand US NAVY, taking into account the autonomy and seaworthiness of course. Keeping track of weapons, so to speak, how do you like this idea?

[bk0010]

Quote: Vladimir_2U

Keep track of weapons, so to speak

First of all, for this, they will have to supply a power plant twice as powerful in order to get at least 33 knots of travel. And much more fuel is needed so that at least a couple of days he can go with the AUG at full speed.

[Vladimir_2U]

Quote: bk0010

And much more fuel is needed so that at least a couple of days he can go with the AUG at full speed.

Well, not a corvette, even a frigate, and in the AUG from NK there is only one aircraft carrier with a nuclear power plant, I'm talking about 152 mm with special ammunition as an asymmetric confrontation.

[Niko]

In my opinion, one of the mistakes is a serious overestimation of the capabilities of coastal aviation and an underestimation of the capabilities of air defense-combat even of small groups of surface ships. There was an article on VO a couple of three years ago with an approximate calculation of the number of coastal aviation necessary to solve the problems of covering its ship group at sea ( is quite comparable to the cost of an aircraft carrier) Plus the problem of coordination of actions, REAL attempts to cover the coast from the coast in a huge number of cases failed (why suddenly now, with a decrease in response time, the result will be better?)

[xorek]

Write more The author is interesting to read! I see many here have become mangled and it means a good article! A plus !

[iouris]

What is, tovarischi, "goal", and what is, tovarischi, "task"?

[BAI]

What tasks should the Russian Navy solve? And what should be its composition for solving these problems? Let's try to consider these issues in stages, based on the importance of the tasks to be solved.

How long can you do non-science fiction? The other day in St. Petersburg a submarine was launched (even the propellers were shown, although they were always hidden). And the announcer proudly announced that by 2030 (the plan for 9 (NINE) years) the fleet will receive 6 (SIX) such submarines - diesel and about HUNDREDS OF AUXILIARY Ships. Everything. There won't be anything else. The military budget directly says: 4,2 billion for the infrastructure of the Black Sea Fleet. At the same time, Shevtsova says that the main funds will be directed to the infrastructure facilities of the fleet in the Arctic and the Far East. It seems that the Ministry of Defense does not themselves know where the money will go, but what is not for the construction of new ships - for sure. It is from here that the tasks that the fleet must solve are determined. Powered by 6 diesel submarines and hundreds of support ships. And the infrastructure of the fleets.

[squid]

I would also note the controversy of the statement about the preference of the su35 over the su57 as the main attack aircraft. Judging by the published information, based on the price of a contract for a batch of 76 su57, it turns out to be comparable in value to 35m.
At the same time, for su57 with a 2nd stage engine:
- higher range
- noticeably higher max combat load
- higher cruising speed
- less rl visibility
The choice for the future is obvious

Regarding the alteration of the deple into small apl - nonsense, IMHO. Too fundamentally different designs, it's like remaking a hedgehog, it's easier to make a new small apl. But taking into account the widespread (in the world) success in the development of vneu, it is better not to do it. To begin with, I would suggest at least simply transferring the DEPL to options for high-reliability lithium batteries (for example, LiFePo is very reliable and safe, while being produced in the Russian Federation for the civil sector)

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: squid

I would also note the controversy of the statement about the preference of the su35 over the su57 as the main attack aircraft. Judging by the published information, based on the price of a contract for a batch of 76 su57, it turns out to be comparable in value to 35m.
At the same time, for su57 with a 2nd stage engine:
- higher range
- noticeably higher max combat load
- higher cruising speed
- less rl visibility
The choice for the future is obvious

If the price is comparable, then certainly. But I doubt it very much. A lot of things happen in military contracts. One at a time - naked cars, and on the other - full stuffing - weapons, MOT for 10 years, etc.

Quote: squid

Regarding the alteration of the deple into small apl - nonsense, IMHO. Too fundamentally different designs, it's like remaking a hedgehog, it's easier to make a new small apl. But taking into account the widespread (in the world) success in the development of vneu, it is better not to do it. To begin with, I would suggest at least simply transferring the DEPL to options for high-reliability lithium batteries (for example, LiFePo is very reliable and safe, while being produced in the Russian Federation for the civil sector)

Such projects were processed back in the USSR. I considered this topic in detail, the article contains a link https://topwar.ru/157454-jadernyj-reaktor-dlja-napl-otlozhit-li-posejdon-jajco-dollezhalja.html. Since then, technology has leaped forward.

We are talking about a block reactor of limited power, which will recharge batteries, moreover, it is LiFePo4. Those. the reactor may not even provide power for the maximum stroke, but provide a conditionally unlimited small stroke + recharge the batteries that are used "for throwing". The reactor can be maintenance-free for 20-30 years.

[squid]

Quote: AVM

If the price is comparable

I think that in new purchases it is definitely necessary to completely switch to the 57th after the appearance of the 2nd stage engine (the prospect of the coming years).

Quote: AVM

Such projects were processed back in the USSR

And even in the USSR they did not do this. And nowhere, in general.
Putting some kind of reactor, in theory, is probably possible. What to do with diesel? fuel tanks? compartment with so many batteries? change the instrumentation .. And the operation and maintenance of nuclear-powered ships - completely different money and conditions.
IMHO, the idea is even worse than the universal SSRB / MCAPL. There, the boat is equally bad for everything, here is a dubious nuclear-powered ship with the complexities of the present. The idea looks like a caricature, honestly ...

[V1er]

Building boreas with calibers / zircons is the same as building Ash trees. Expensive and long. Better to develop a Warsaw woman and put a nuclear reactor on them and rivet, rivet, 2 pieces a year. And already to start thinking about a new project, based on Warsaw women, that could be delivered in the same timeframe, economically and efficiently. I agree with the rest. I would also add that it is necessary to revive long-range anti-ship aircraft. To resume production of the Tu-22m3m, but not a copy of the Soviet one, but with deep processing and modernization. Either on the basis of the Tu-160, or on the basis of the PAK DA, but the latter will be very long and expensive.

[Peaceful SEO]

Quote: Avior

... The very fact of an attack on the covering forces is already a reason for a nuclear strike.

Interestingly, the author of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation has read and does he know the conditions for the use of nuclear weapons?
This statement looks especially strange against the background of the fact that the author is not supposed to advertise that, in fact, these are the forces of cover.
Commercials to "the whole world in dust" not far just by mistake ...

All doctrines work in peacetime and mainly in the information field. When you smell fried, everyone will wipe themselves off with doctrines and treaties.

[ccsr]

Quote: Peaceful SEO

All doctrines work in peacetime and mainly in the information field. When you smell fried, everyone will wipe themselves off with doctrines and treaties.

Absolutely right. Moreover, the job descriptions of some on duty are generally written for completely different actions.

[Avior]

and what is wrong with the doctrine? it records a healthy and very vital situation, there is no doubt that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be made by serious people who are not prone to hysterical reactions. I have no doubt that the use of at least strategic nuclear weapons will fully correspond to what is written in the doctrine.

[ProkletyiPirat]

Quote: Avior

there is no doubt that the decision to use nuclear weapons will be made by serious people who are not prone to hysterical reactions.

Yes, everyone understands this, and without any doctrines.

Quote: Avior

and what is wrong with the doctrine?

Well, personally in my opinion doctrine is a document the purpose of which
1) be public
2) be simple and understandable without geopolitical demagogy
3)be suitable for use by others in the interests of the doctrine-writer (that is, for the benefit of him)
For example, there is Finland, we have a long and multifaceted history of relations with it, there are now supporters and opponents of the country's entry into NATO (I'm talking about full entry, not observer status) Here are opponents of entry into NATO, in their dispute with supporters, should have the opportunity to take our doctrine, indicate there a specific point / points, and show how they will harm Finland if it joins NATO, and immediately show other points that will benefit Finland in the event of its partial independence, and immediately show even greater benefits in case of full independence, and even greater benefit in the event of an alliance with the Russian Federation, and not NATO ...

[Avior]

There is also another side.
Opponents also need to understand, at least in general terms, what their actions can lead to a nuclear war and where the Red Line runs, and misleading in such matters is fraught with misleading.

[ProkletyiPirat]

I wrote about this above, point two to be more precise, and if my memory serves me, then even the topic of nuclear weapons in our doctrine was littered with info-garbage in the style of political correctness.

[Avior]

it looked different for you

"military doctrine" is such a verbal diarrhea with spherical horses in a vacuum that at least cry at least laugh

in fact, it is quite a serious document, at least in the field of the use of nuclear weapons.

[xomaNN]

Not only in our midst, colleagues, but also in the General Staff of the Navy, specialists and, I hope, naval commanders with admiral's stars know - ACTIVE DEFENSE OF DEPLOYMENT BASES and their shores, this is the maximum possible goal of the Russian Navy. Especially the surface segment

[Barberry25]

In general, I agree with the author, but I can't believe about the carriers of cruise missiles from Boreyev, it's not even that by the time the shipyards begin to be able to make additional boats to cover the exit of missile carriers, we will already have 8 Ash trees and a dozen diesel-electric submarines for cover .. the fact is that a hunter is a hunter, in order to be quiet and dangerous, the missile carrier looks weak in this regard, although in the future it costs to make several K-versions for cruise missiles, they are cheaper as a factor of uncertainty remains .. Rather, we need to work on the number of diesel-electric submarines in order to cover the near sea and be able to work on the AUG ... but here the issue of ensuring autonomy is worth it ..

[SHOPPING MALL]

Quote: Barberry25

In general, I agree with the author, but I can't believe about the carriers of cruise missiles from Boreyev, it's not even that by the time the shipyards begin to be able to make additional boats to cover the exit of missile carriers, we will already have 8 Ash trees and a dozen diesel-electric submarines for cover .. the fact is that a hunter is a hunter, in order to be quiet and dangerous, the missile carrier looks weak in this regard, although in the future it costs to make several K-versions for cruise missiles, they are cheaper as a factor of uncertainty remains .. Rather, we need to work on the number of diesel-electric submarines in order to cover the near sea and be able to work on the AUG ... but here the issue of ensuring autonomy is worth it ..

The SSGN has other tasks, which are discussed in the following materials.

8 Ash trees and a dozen diesel-electric submarines are very few. Ash also have their own tasks - it is redundant to cover the SSBN. SSGN 955K should not cover SSBNs, just go out to sea with them at the same time - the enemy will have to double the detachment of forces in order to track all 955 (he will not distinguish 955A from 955K under water, if there are no gross miscalculations in their low noise, allowing to make an "individual portrait"). Or they will accept the risk of unwarranted tracking of SSBNs, which is from 48 to 160 warheads (from 3 to 10 for SLBMs) ​​- 1 SSBN has left, and the expediency of a sudden disarming strike is questionable.

[Ryusei]

And you are a fine author, and the rest are fools, and you are a fine fellow, it's a pity not the admiral, but the staff members, the Britons, the Chinese, the Indians are all fools, and you are a fine fellow, although ... maybe the other way around ...?

[Vladimir1155]

I fully support the respected Andrei Mitrofanov for sound thoughts and ideas, an adequate description of the situation, a detailed analysis without emotions. real goals, specific tasks

[Photon]

There are a lot of letters. I read up to this point: "The destruction of enemy aircraft and surface ships, in the framework of solving the problem of protecting the" bastions "of SSBNs, in the author's opinion, it is advisable to assign to coastal aviation" I would like to know what this opinion is based on. There were other opinions. And the holders of these opinions referred to research and mathematical calculations.

[st2st]

but I remember the times, 1993. when the French corvette Danville (or Danville) came to refuel with fuel oil in Anna Bay in Primorye, I remember amers' call at the Vostochny dock in Nakhodka, with an allegedly friendly visit in 1994. P. S.

[K298rtm]

[Because under the ice of the ocean, the interference acoustic environment is so complex that no tracking is simply impossible!]
1. Have you been there?
2. Tracking is possible there, unless, of course, polar bears are placed (by the way, weren't polar bears told you about the impossibility of tracking?)
3. To detect the tracking of the strategist, a multi-purpose aircraft is needed (other anti-submarine forces do not roll into the AB). Before entering under the ice (and tracking may begin long before the ice edge), this task (checking the absence of tracking) may well be provided by dpl.
4. Volumes have been written about the OO system as the basis for ensuring domination in the adjacent seas (Barents and Okhotsk) and there is no point in repeating.

[GEOID]

Hmm ...
https://otvaga2004.mybb.ru/viewtopic.php?id=2245&p=39#p1412453

[Evgeny Seleznev]

Logically, an AUG or a KUG on the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet is needed to cover and calculate the path for SSBNs to the area of ​​operation (not to launch rackets from the pier). As well as PLO ships for this purpose and protection of the basing area and PLO naval aviation. We have an emphasis on the BO gunboats, this is redundant weapons without target designation and the absence of intelligible air defense and anti-aircraft defense. The choice is not dependent on us. But the vinaigrette of models in the same row could not serve the USSR. And the USSR is a force, not a fact of the Russian Federation.