Betrayal 1941: the corridor from Vlasov or who destroyed the mechanized corps

In previous publications, we tried to investigate situations in the very first days of the war, which suggest, among other things, intentional sabotage. In any case, there were too many of them to be taken as coincidences or mere coincidences. In this article, we will briefly consider whether the mechanized corps were defending themselves?

Slaughter marches of mechanized corps

Before considering the fate of other army formations, you can also ask how they acted there. Tanks the most significant mechanized corps.

How were they involved in the early days of the war?

In fact, from the annals of the Great Patriotic War, we know about a very large tank battle (Western Ukraine), where armored combat vehicles were lost.

And, nevertheless, if we have already revealed the strange behavior of the army (12-oh, who surrendered) as a whole, as well as alarming details in the content of the orders of the headquarters of the South-Western Front, let's see, what if everything is not so decorous here.

It is common knowledge that the 5th Army acted with the utmost excellence. It included the 9th and 19th mechanized corps.

The 9th mechanized corps was commanded by K.K. Rokossovsky - in the future Marshal of the Soviet Union. His entire front line demonstrated loyalty and devotion to the Fatherland, as well as competent military art.

K.K. Rokossovsky is famous for another thing. He returned from defeated Berlin with a single small suitcase of personal belongings. And he was not convicted of robbery or looting.

That is why we will not look closely at what was happening in the mechanized corps of the 5th Army. Since the servicemen there approached the fulfillment of their military duty responsibly and with dignity, despite the difficulties and confusion of the first days and months of the Great Patriotic War.

While the corps assigned to the armies of the 6th and 26th is really worth a closer look.

Let's take a look at what ours had in the Lvov region (in the Lviv region)?

And there the 4th and 15th mechanized corps of the 6th army fought. In addition, there was also the 8th Mechanized Corps, assigned to the 26th Army.

On June 22, 1941:

“The 4th, 8th and 15th mechanized corps were the most full-blooded mechanized corps, but even in these mechanized corps, motorized divisions in tank regiments had only a combat training park. There was no combat fleet of vehicles in the motorized divisions. "

Link

First of all, the following incident with the operation of the above mechanized corps attracts attention. For some reason, on June 22, right in the middle of the day, the 26th mechanized corps was taken away from the 8th army, which was then fighting near Przemysl, and reassigned to the front headquarters. Moreover, he was sent completely away not only from the front line itself, but also from its supply arsenals and spare parts depots deployed in the cities of Drohobych and Stryi.

At first, this mechanized formation is moving at full speed in the vicinity of Lviv. And then it is again transported to the east of the Lviv region - to the city of Brody.

As a result, this corps, delayed for a day from the time indicated in the order of the front headquarters, concentrated on the Brody sector in order to advance towards the city of Berestechko.

In the end, on June 27, in the morning, 8 microns begins an offensive in a direction not to the west, but to Soviet territory.

Historians point out that at that hour (12:00) the 8th mechanized corps did not meet with the enemy (combat report of the SWF headquarters). 15th mechanized corps advanced in the same direction in contact with 8 microns. Both move through the territory of the USSR away from the border line. And there is no enemy ahead of them.

Przemysl. Molotov line. Dot. Source: topwar.ru

While earlier (June 25), front-line reconnaissance units revealed the accumulation of enemy mechanized units north of Przemysl. In other words, to the north of the fiercely fighting 99th Red Banner Division, which crushed the Nazis who had the advantage.

And on June 26, mechanized groups of fascists broke through the front of the 6th Army (left flank division). Then they were able to cut the line of the Stryi - Lvov railway, finding themselves on the outskirts of the city of Lvov (in particular, in the area of ​​the Sknilov station).

Why did we remember this?

And the strange thing is that from the base deployment of the 8th Mechanized Corps (Drohobych) to the German offensive (south-west of Lvov) was less than fifty kilometers.

If he stood in the same place, this corps, then the fascist offensive in this direction would have been someone who would have to repulse. And the flank, which opened at the 26th Army, would then have someone to cover.

In other words, some historians believe that then it was possible not to bring Lvov to surrender. If only this corps acted to defend the positions of its army.

And what happened?

When the Germans broke through the front, the commander of the 26th Army, Lieutenant General Fyodor Yakovlevich Kostenko, had infantry units to compete in speed with the mechanized formations of the Nazis, who bypassed it to the north.

It was he who would need extremely these same tanks from the 8th mechanized corps to cover his own flank.

Source: topwar.ru

Alas, by that time this corps had already been driven away a hundred or two kilometers east of Lviv and the region. Yes, at the same time, they also dispatched exactly to the east - in the direction of the Rivne region to attack.

Curiously, there was, in fact, no response from the SWF headquarters to its own intelligence that the mechanized units of the fascists were crowded there.

How Vlasov gave Sknilov to the Fritz

And so it happened that, as a result, Lviv passed. But historians note that this was a place of special importance. Huge warehouses were concentrated there, where various spare parts and property were stored.

Experts point out that two warehouse hubs were located in this area at once: in Lviv and in the city of Stryi.

As for Lviv, in itself it was an ancient city, so it was inappropriate to locate huge warehouse areas inside it.

But in the vicinity of the city, the Sknilov station was the main base storage at that time. It was in Sknilov that the Nazis were eager. And they got there already on June 26.

That is why historians believe that the Nazis needed Lvov not so much as Sknilov. After all, it was there that significant stocks of various property and spare parts for entire armies were stored. Just what the blood from the nose was necessary for the Germans for their advancing formations.

So is it not deliberately for this that they drove away from the approaches to Lvov and further to the east our brave 8 microns?

Let's leave the search for an answer to this question to historians.

And let's remember ourselves, where at that very time was our 4th Mechanized Corps, which was led at that time by General Vlasov, who later became famous for his grandiose betrayals?

Recall that Major General Andrei Andreevich Vlasov (in the future - the creator of the ROA) commanded 4 MK from January 17 to July 1941.

So, you will be unpleasantly surprised.

It turns out that it was the very same Vlasov who was entrusted (or is it not by chance?) To cover exactly the very direction necessary for the Nazis to the Lvov warehouse hub: to Sknilov (from Przemysl), through the forests southwest of Lvov.

Of course, the Nazis marched through the mechanized corps of General Vlasov, as if he was not there at all.

And by the evening of June 26, Vlasov received a front-line order from the headquarters: to retreat east towards the Ternopil region.

That is, just imagine the situation: the Germans broke through / passed (past Vlasov) to Sknilov. And 4 microns, instead of protecting Sknilov and crushing the enemy, are deployed to the east?

It should be recalled here that the 4th Mechanized Corps at that time was one of the two most powerful in our army. It was constantly replenished with military equipment, including the latest. By June 22, 1941, there were almost a thousand (979) combat vehicles in the corps, including 414 T-34 and KV-1 tanks. That is, he was much better supplied with equipment than others ...

And it is this mechanized corps that does not respond at all to the fact that the enemy made a breach and moved towards Sknilov?

Moreover, the headquarters of the South-Western Front orders Vlasov to go east. That is, they don't remember the need to crush the Germans on the outskirts of Sknilov either? So why, then, Vlasov stood in those forests that are from the south-west of Lviv? Surely not only to provide the Fritzes with free passage to that very strategic hub - Sknilov?

Military historians claim that this follows from the official documents of the headquarters of the SWF.

Instead of ordering - to smash and beat the enemy on the outskirts of Sknilov, where, among other things, the necessary spare parts for his combat vehicles are stored, Vlasov's mechanized corps is ordered to retreat further to the east. Although before that the Vlasov 4 micron had already traveled more than 300 kilometers in vain, only wearing out the cars on the march.

Is this right?

But it seems that the front headquarters, like Vlasov, did not have any doubts about the incorrectness of the maneuver and refusal to fight?

But, in truth, there was still only one commander who sounded the alarm then.

This is Major General Rodion Nikolaevich Morgunov. He was then the head of the armored department of the South-Western Front. So, he dared to write upward memoranda that such continuous marches of mechanized formations are simply unacceptable.

He reports on June 29, for example, that at that time almost one third (30%) of the equipment was lost. Tankers were forced to abandon it due to breakdowns, as well as due to a shortage of both time and spare parts for repairs.

Morgunov sends dispatches upstairs. Begs not to drive the corps. Stop them. Provide the opportunity to inspect and repair machines.

On July 17, 1941:

"The entire combat materiel during these days went under its own power on average up to 1200 km and, in terms of its technical condition, requires immediate restoration."

Link

However, mechanized corps are not allowed to stop.

As a result, by July 8, they are already written off to the reserve. Because the technique has lost its combat capability. Elementary broke down and out of order.

Maybe someone just needed it?

Remember, the mechanized corps from the army of Ponedelin (12th), upon reaching the lines of the old border, in general, turned into a foot corps. Without any battles whatsoever.

Generals Ponedelin and Kirillov in German captivity. Source: vif2ne.org

The 8th and 15th mechanized corps, in the end, nevertheless overtook the enemy: near Dubno there was a battle with the Nazis. There are no complaints about the leadership of these formations. The 8th MK fought heroically.

But there are questions about the significantly larger mechanized corps of Vlasov. Or was the problem in the commander Vlasov himself? Or in the command of this army (6th)? Or maybe in the command of this SW front?

Hack and predictor Aviator

Well, it should be noted in conclusion that the mechanized corps in the early days of the war generally did not fight.

They, in fact, were deprived of the ability to fight in those places where it would be possible to significantly change the balance of power.

They, as if on purpose, were driven by the march along the tracks and weights until they lost their motor resources.

Despite numerous protests and dispatches to the top of the head of the armored directorate of the South-Western Front.

From "Inquiry from the head of the Southwestern Front's Armored Directorate to the front commander on the state of the armored forces on July 17, 1941" (AMO USSR. F. 229, op. 3780ss, d. 1, pp. 98–104):

"As of July 17, 1941, all mechanized corps are, like mechanized corps, incapable of combat due to the lack of combat materiel."

Link

Продолжение следует ...

Comments

[parusnik]

Owl, owl, where is your globe?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: parusnik

Owl, owl, where is your globe?

[vladcub]

Lesha, the question must be asked to the author.
She, as they say: "mixed the righteous with the sinful"

[ramzay21]

For some reason, the author forgot that the Mech Corps of the Southwestern Front fought and retreated. The actions took place with complete domination of the enemy aviation in the sky, which struck at the mech corps, and then the catastrophe on the Western Front created a threat to encircle the entire South Western Front in the border areas, which was assumed by the Barbarossa plan. In addition, combat-ready units were removed from the Southwestern Front and sent to the Western Front, which received the main blow of the enemy.
And then counterintelligence did a very good job there, which was the best in the world, and it is already useless to look for betrayal there, everything is checked and rechecked there.

[Jolly Roger]

Quote: ramzay21

For some reason, the author forgot that the Mech Corps of the Southwestern Front fought and retreated.

This is not the only thing that the author "forgot".

[vlad106]

Quote: ramzay21

at that time, almost one third (30%) of the equipment was lost. Tankers were forced to abandon it due to breakdowns, as well as due to a shortage of both time and spare parts for repairs.

"" ... at that time almost one third (30%) of the equipment was lost. Tankers were forced to abandon it due to breakdowns, as well as due to the shortage of both time and spare parts for repairs .... ""

And who destroyed our country and industry with agriculture?
Machine-building and Mechanical Engineering, Shipbuilding (French saved us? Mistral) Electronics, with education?
Oh, yes, we have rocket science on the rise - roskosmos with trampolines outplayed and outstripped everyone

[lelik613]

"Never attribute to malice that which can be easily explained by stupidity" (c) Hanlon's Razor

[tasha]

If there is "Ira s VO", then is it any wonder where "Koli s Urengoy" comes from?

Of course, the Nazis marched through the mechanized corps of General Vlasov, as if he was not there at all.

They weren't there?

T-28 tanks of the 8th TD of the 4th MK, knocked out on the southern outskirts of Nemirov

Destroyed tank T-34 8th TD 4 MK, which crushed the German 50-mm anti-tank gun Pak 38

Lieutenant of the 63rd Tank Regiment of the 32nd TD 4 MK Gudz P.D.
"On the morning of June 22, 1941, on a combat alert, a command platoon (five KV-1 tanks, two T-34 tanks, and 2 BA-10 tanks), commanded by PD Gudz, headed the regiment's column towards the western border in the area Having met the advance detachment of the Germans, Gudz led the platoon to a rapprochement and was the first to destroy the enemy gun. By 12 o'clock in the afternoon, Gudz's platoon had already knocked out five German tanks, three armored personnel carriers and several vehicles. the past - a tank tester of the Kirov plant in Leningrad) struck a sliding blow into the steering wheel of an enemy tank Pz Kpfw III, knocked off a caterpillar and then knocked it into a ditch with a strong blow. According to some sources, this was the first tank ram in the Great Patriotic War. "

Serious research has been devoted to the actions of the mechanized corps of the Red Army at the beginning of the war. I can only recommend one thing about this "article":

- There is a saddle, the bitch's ass is tight.

[WHAT IS]

And what do you want if, in the previous articles of the author, entire armies in full force surrendered, as soon as they saw the Germans, and did not make their way to their own from the encirclement. Against this background, what kind of mechanized corps is there, what a trifle ...

[Magog_]

Why did they immediately give up? My father - a participant in this war as part of 37 td 15 mk, artillery - (a few days before his death in 2008) suddenly confessed to me, although conversations about the war we had with him were almost daily, "in the summer of 41 we retreating ... "
I looked after him, often looked into the bedroom where the "old soldier", as he often called himself, was lying ... when I noticed that with his weakening hand he signaled to me "to sit down next". So, his words: "... we retreated and literally dragged heavy weapons along the sides, swallowing thick road dust." Two questions are possible here: why "on yourself?" and "on the sidelines?" I asked him the second. He literally jumped up on the bed: "Yes, because on the road at high speed German mechanized columns were rushing past us, kicking up dust! ... They did not shoot - and we were ordered not to shoot! The only thing if the Germans noticed a tanker truck or a barrel with fuel, we tried to damage it. "

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: tasha

If there is "Ira s VO", then is it any wonder where "Koli s Urengoy" comes from?

Well, Kolya, at least, unlike this ... kind of mildly ... did not engage in idiotic low-grade conspiracy. So, Madame Frolova is much more disgusting. Would crawl to fuck on Yandex Zen knock down a trifle on feeble-minded mitrofanushki. The level of her writing is just right for that dump.

[Alien From]

You are right, but very categorical! All the same, the author is a woman!

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Alien From

You are right, but very categorical! All the same, the author is a woman!

It doesn't change anything at all. Let the suffragettes who think they are experts in "masculine" topics get used to the idea that gender does not give them any preferences. I see no reason to play courtesy after women’s phantasmagorias with "Hitler's palaces" - we are not on a culinary site.

[Daniil Konovalenko]

She is, first of all, the author of this writings, and only then a woman

[Krasnoyarsk]

Quote: Alien From

You are right, but very categorical! All the same, the author is a woman!

And I have claims not to the woman-author, I have claims to the "editorial board" that allowed the publication of this opus. If a woman has an itch, then no one will forbid her to write. Let him write ... on the table. And he will take care of this, so that the "editorial board" should have been "on the table". And do not force us to waste time reading this nonsense, constantly jumping up from the "discoveries" of the writing madam.

[vvvjak]

Quote: tasha

T-28 tanks of the 8th TD of the 4th MK, knocked out on the southern outskirts of Nemirov

The location of the knocked out tanks 4 MK in Nemyriv.
http://niemirow41.narod.ru/1941/24.06.41/24.06.41.html

[Andrey Yuryevich]

nichrome to myself ... almost eighteen + on VO ,, and there it is in the center, Irinka?

[ammunition]

Quote: tasha

Serious research is devoted to the actions of the mechanized corps of the Red Army at the beginning of the war

Dear Michael!
By 1943 .. and in 1042. there is clear and distinct information. -
Where did specific formations, regiments and battalions operate? What task did you have? What offensive or defensive battles were fought? What marches did you make .. and for what purpose? What were the losses .. and what were the losses? it.d it.d.
-------------------
Where to get similar clear and distinct information on the 41st year? Only without any there .. multi-letter (multivolume) "serious research".
and then some kind of garbage turns out .. We know in detail and meticulously - Where, How, When and Why went, acted and fought the legions and cohorts of Caesar .. or Hannibal. And on 41st year .. in formations, regiments and battalions of the Red Army .. "dark forest."

[tasha]

For instance. You can look for the book "Mechanized Corps of the Red Army in Battle: The History of the Red Army Armored Troops in 1940-1941". Author: E.F.Drig
There is a curious note about the 4MK:

The actions of the 4th Mechanized Corps to cover the withdrawal of the 6th Army's troops were included in the post-war tactics textbooks, as an example of the competent organization of defensive battles by tank units.
However, there were many shortcomings in the organization of hostilities. So, the 32nd Panzer Division operated for a long time with only two tank and regiments, its motorized rifle regiment was in the reserve of the commander of the 6th Army. The artillery regiment of the division was not equipped with tractors and left half of the guns in winter quarters, and the rest were lost due to technical malfunctions and breakdowns of tractors.
There was also the withdrawal by the higher command of the motorized rifle units of the 4th mechanized corps, which negatively affected the results of combat operations of the tank units, forced to operate without the support of infantry, and often artillery. So at different times, the motorized regiments of the 8th and 32nd tank divisions, the 202nd regiment of the 81st motorized division, operated outside their own divisions.
Long marches, up to 75 - 100 km per day, put out of action due to technical malfunctions of equipment more than from enemy fire. In addition, the evacuation and repair of equipment were hampered by the lack of evacuation equipment for heavy tanks [62], army repair equipment, and spare parts. At the army SPAM in Lvov, the equipment was repaired only by the means of the regiments themselves, after the abandonment of Lvov, the slow-moving equipment was towed from Staro-Konstantinov to the loading station in Proskurov.

[Darkness]

Any violent fantasy can be covered up with words - "military historians claim."

[Flooding]

Quote: Dunkelheit

Any violent fantasy can be covered up with words - "military historians claim."

but for this it is necessary that these same military historians begin to write articles for the VO

[kalibr]

Quote: Flood

but for this it is necessary that these same military historians begin to write articles for the VO

And there are many serious obstacles to this!

[Engineer]

The main obstacle is the low qualifications of military historians in the eyes of the local advanced audience.
Well, the historian will begin to broadcast about some kind of boiler Bryansk-Vyazma, and he immediately has a "detractor", "Stalin is to blame again", "liberoschizoid", "forger", "uses German archives, everything is clear with him", "I have a grandfather there was nothing like that fought. "

[kalibr]

Quote: Engineer

The main obstacle is the low qualifications of military historians in the eyes of the local advanced audience.
Well, the historian will begin to broadcast about some kind of boiler Bryansk-Vyazma, and he immediately has a "detractor", "Stalin is to blame again", "liberoschizoid", "forger", "uses German archives, everything is clear with him", "I have a grandfather there was nothing like that fought. "

Exactly, Denis! Here is a specific example: when I worked at my Department of Philosophy and Mass Communications, I repeatedly offered to publish here my fellow philosophers: "Philosophy and Problems of War and Peace", "Philosophy of War", many interesting topics you could think of. But no. Why? “I don’t want different ignoramuses to rinse me”. Or "I don't want to throw pearls before ...". As a result, due to the low culture of commenting, a lot of people do not receive interesting information. The same is with historians. This is for me here ... to the words of different people there ... And there are people who react very painfully to this. Well, on the one hand, it's worse for them, but it's better for me!

[Engineer]

As a result, due to the low culture of commenting, a lot of people do not receive interesting information.

This is the biggest problem. Everybody loses. And historians too. Without receiving a dose of constructive criticism, they slow down professional growth.
The VO level is appallingly low in many respects. Although it seems to be a specialized resource, but the same "tsushima" is inferior to the quality of knowledge of users at times, if not an order of magnitude. Communication culture is important, but in many respects secondary. A knowledgeable person knows the limits of his knowledge. Such a tautology. Therefore, he usually does not puff out his cheeks and looks for opportunities to increase knowledge. Hence, there will be constructive dialogues. There will be knowledge, there will be culture. But so far neither one nor the other.

[Pane Kohanku]

Hence, there will be constructive dialogues. There will be knowledge, there will be culture. But so far neither one nor the other.

Denis, golden words. I completely agree. But, as a rule .. the less knowledge - the more emotions and impudence!

[Kart]

Quote: Engineer

The VO level is appallingly low in many respects. Although it seems to be a specialized resource,

Was.
Now this is a collection of low-standard agitation "for a new expropriation", that is, against the country.
Incidentally, this is one of the methods of information warfare. A website is being created that is for the country, both smart and interesting. the audience is growing. And then once - and turns into a sect with a directly opposite goal.

[Essex62]

Not expropriation, but the return of privatized socialist property. And do not worry so, they will definitely be taken away and punished. As in 1917.

[Trilobite Master]

Quote: kalibr

I don’t want various ignoramuses to rinse me. ”Or“ I don’t want to throw beads before ...

Philosopher colleagues should remember that among their direct duties, as people of scientists, there is also the obligation to share knowledge with the "ignorant" and "...", otherwise their knowledge is useless, and therefore of no use themselves. To recognize themselves as exceptional intellectuals, spreading knowledge in a narrow circle of their own kind - what could be more stupid and disgusting?
I apologize for the harshness, but until these clever philosophers begin to broadcast their clever thoughts in an understandable way to a wide audience of unprepared listeners, this very audience will be brought up by Samsonov, Frolova and others ... for the correct naming of which the site relies on a ban.
Yes, you will have to endure, reading insults and other manifestations of stupidity, rudeness and, in principle, lack of culture, education and intelligence. Although, you don't need to read them, if it's so hard. But if they - these colleagues of yours, Vyacheslav Olegovich - want to live in a normal state, among smart and educated people, so, your mother, why bald are they locked in their offices and are clever in them exclusively for themselves and their own kind? Let them go to the people and prove to the turners, engineers and janitors that they do not receive their salaries in vain. Otherwise, in twenty years they will remain among the same audience without an influx of young and talented scientists, and when they are carried to the churchyard, when their generation naturally dies out, nothing will remain of them and no one will read the books written by them.
Or are they all so busy with fucking important scientific work that they can't get distracted for a few hours to express their thoughts in a ten thousand characters article?
And then, who is the "ignoramus" for them? Victor Nikolaevich? Denis? You? Maybe me? Not? So let them write for us - there are not so few of us here to neglect us as infinitely small quantities. And if they are not able to express their thoughts so that they are understandable, then it is worth considering whether they are needed at all, such scientists.
Once again, I apologize for the harshness (however, you are a smart enough person to understand that this harshness does not apply to you personally in any way ) but after today's materials on the VO it just boiled.
However, I'm not sure that the reason you voiced is the only one preventing the appearance of good, smart materials on the pages of this publication. I am afraid that most of these reasons lie in a completely different plane and only partly pertain to the potential authors themselves.

[Engineer]

Although not a reply to me, in this battle of history against myth, normal historians have no chance. The myth always triumphs in the mass consciousness.
Here, in the Video section, Timin was twice uploaded with an analysis of some aspects of the war in the air. You can disagree with his wording, but he is a professional in the topic, both in letter and in spirit. Personally, I was disgusted to see how he was honored by the local clowns who had not read a single book on the topic. So it's better to let the historians spare their nerves. Vaughn Vaschenko apparently decided that enough was enough for him, the popular opinion)

[Trilobite Master]

I watch Timina on his YouTube channel. I like. And here I have never even looked at Video.
The question is different. Where do they come from

Quote: Engineer

clowns who have not read a single book on the topic

Rather, it is not even necessary to pose the question here. Clowns who have not read a single book usually do not perform. Speakers are those who have read only one. Here are much more troubles from them. And to the question "where do they come from" there is only one answer: from reading this very one book, which turned out to be unsuccessful, stupid, etc. Why did this book catch their eye earlier than something worthwhile? Because there is not enough good literature. And it is not enough precisely because sensible authors do not want to write it. Or they can't. You see, unconstructive criticism hurts them ...
So there is nothing to be surprised at. It's like with children - whoever you bring up will grow up. But many scientists really forget about their duty as a public educator.
Okay, Denis, thanks for your support, I let off steam, only bile remained. And I still have to watch football today ...

[Herman 4223]

Perhaps they are afraid not to withstand criticism on this resource. After all, every philosopher is here.

[Prophetic]

“Philosopher colleagues should remember that among their direct duties as scientists….”
You know, I'm a physicist. When they tell me that a philosopher is a scientist, in me (and not only me) it can only cause a contemptuous smile. And it’s not just that. Science has a definition.
THE SCIENCE there is a sphere of human activity, the function of which is the development and theoretical systematization of knowledge about reality, and on the basis of this knowledge, models of behavior of the objects under study, the truth of which is determined by practice.
You see, if you just study and systematize some knowledge, this is not a science, but a type of activity. For example, a librarian studies and organizes books, a philatelist studies and organizes stamps, a jeweler studies stones and methods of their processing. But this is not science. This is a kind of activity.
The use of some scientific methods or devices also does not automatically turn your activity into a science. For example, if you are looking for a needle in a haystack, then you can use the iteration method or use a strong electromagnet or electromagnetic field induction method - it will still be just a search for a needle in a haystack, and nothing more. Pointless entertainment at public expense.
History began to use the achievements of REAL science - radiocarbon analysis, optical spectroscopy, dendrochronology, etc. Does this make history a science? Can history build models of human development and predict its future? Does history have its own Gary Saldon?
But history has at least some data on which it can rely - artifacts, ancient texts, the remains of buildings ... What does philosophy have? What does it rely on? What determines the truth or falsity of the stream of verbal constructions of philosophers? What models and on what basis do they build and how do they determine the truth of these models? And they themselves determine. In a close circle, reading their verbal constructions to each other, swelling with importance and self-importance. But what about - learned people!
Under the USSR, we were taught that history is a series of revolutions and the struggle of the oppressed for their rights. Philosophers have written up tons of waste paper about the inevitability of the triumph of communism. Then the USSR collapsed, and the same people changed their shoes in the air and began to vilify the system that they had glorified yesterday. And the Ukrainians? Who else but historians and philosophers in all seriousness write textbooks about the immeasurable antiquity and greatness of the ancient ukrov? This is done by people with scientific degrees, doctors of sciences, academicians. The Nazis are just repeating this nonsense. Are these people scientists? Or intellectual lackeys? Could it be a science that completely depends on what kind of power is in the yard today?
You know, in the Middle Ages there was such a "science" - scholasticism. Scientists - philosophers, in camisoles and powdered wigs, tried to cross a snake with a hedgehog, i.e. God with Aristotelian logic, to prove the existence of God logically. Thousands of volumes have been written for the library. How many devils fit on the end of the needle - also a very important topic - was discussed for a long time. And at the same time, everyone ate well. And they were also very proud of the realization of their scientific significance, to throw beads in front of what they believed was uneducated cattle.
Do you know how modern philosophers differ from medieval ones? Don't wear wigs ...
The real reason why these gentlemen do not want to speak to a wide audience is that they live in a narrow world of their high importance and they do not want to destroy this comfortable world where they are not badly fed. As soon as they come out into the light, then everyone will suddenly see that the king is naked. That they are just parasites serving the authorities, transferring paper in pseudo-scientific terms to waste paper, and nothing more. What if questions arise about the meaning of their financing? Go to work ?! By whom!? After all, they do not know how to do anything!

[Trilobite Master]

Quote: Prophetic

When they tell me that a philosopher is a scientist, in me (and not only me) it can only cause a contemptuous smile.

To no avail.
This is not the first time I have come across some chauvinism on the part of representatives of "technical" sciences in relation to "humanities" and each time I understand that this chauvinism grows out of a banal misunderstanding of the essence and significance of the humanities, including philosophy.
The humanities deal with man, human society, problems, it seems to me, are immeasurably more important than the nuances of the passage of electric current through some objects in various conditions, for example, because the solution of these problems affects how people will live in a year , ten, one hundred years.
To each his own - you are engaged in physics, philosophers - in philosophy. Perhaps if you come across a good popular science book on philosophy, you will change your mind about this science. If not, it's a pity, then you will most likely remain captive to your own delusions about her.
I have no desire here and now to initiate you into the foundations of the humanities in general and philosophy in particular.
Just keep in mind that among philosophers, too, there are probably cadres, just like you, who, having familiarized themselves with your scientific works in physics (if any), will say that this is all nonsense, cheating and profanation, designed for a narrow circle of individuals similar to you, and these works have no scientific significance.
So all your contemptuous grins are mirrored to your address, and with the same reasons as yours - one to one.
Try to figure out what a science like philosophy really does. Perhaps you will become interested and you will change your mind about her. But in any case, I strongly recommend giving up a contemptuous smile to you (and not only to you), because the only thing that it demonstrates to others is the complete ignorance of its bearer in certain issues.

[kalibr]

Quote: Prophetic

Do you know how modern philosophers differ from medieval ones? Don't wear wigs ...

By the way, it is also very true. In my opinion, there is a history of philosophy. The philosophy itself is gone.

[kalibr]

Quote: Trilobite Master

to the potential authors themselves.

Everything is very well said.

[Krasnoyarsk]

Quote: kalibr

all sorts of interesting topics one could think of. But no. Why? “I don’t want different ignoramuses to rinse me.” Or "I don't want to throw pearls before ...". As a result, due to the low culture of commenting, very

Your colleagues are just insecure people. Not confident in their ability to write text that is understandable to a wide, untrained audience. Following their example, doctors will stop treating patients for fear of criticism of the latter, etc. A person who is confident in his knowledge will not be afraid of any criticism. I think so. To bring knowledge to people, isn't this the main purpose of the intelligentsia? Or is the intelligentsia what Lenin pointed out?

[Flooding]

Quote: Engineer

The main obstacle is the low qualifications of military historians in the eyes of the local advanced audience.

no, the problem is that you cannot be considered a military historian the author of every amateur article on the topic.

[Richard]

K.K. Rokossovsky is famous for another thing. He returned from defeated Berlin with a single small suitcase of personal belongings. And he was not convicted of robbery or looting.

This is clearly not a copyright, but the original author's text. He especially smiled - "was not caught in robbery or looting" It is difficult to imagine Konstantin Konstantinovich doing this.
What did K.K. Rokossovsky from Germany - with one small suitcase, or with two more, the story is silent and the author does not need to engage in inventions
Konstantin Konstantinovich does not need this

Like most Soviet generals, Rokossovsky was credited with the export of untold riches from Germany, as well as the construction of an entire palace near Moscow.
For this reason, a special commission of the Central Committee was even created. However, no one has found any treasures, and the party commission that came to check the "Marshal's palace" found instead of him ... a wooden hut. Although the hut itself was indeed brought from Germany. It was one of the headquarters buildings of the 2nd Belorussian Front. After the end of the war, these houses were dismantled into logs and sent home, where they were handed over to Soviet generals for country dachas.
Konstantin Konstantinovich did not rebuild this dacha, considering it quite comfortable after the Spartan conditions at the front. So we can say that Marshal Rokossovsky did not part with the war, even on a summer vacation.

[Richard]

By the way, about the fact that Rokossovsky was leaving home with only one suitcase with one.
Yes, it was, but not in 1945 from the defeated Berlin, but in October 1956 from Poland.
The author got it all wrong as usual

After the death of President Boleslav Bierut and the Poznan speeches, the "anti-Stalinist" Vladislav Gomulka was elected the first secretary of the PUWP. The conflict between the “Stalinists” (“Natolin's group”) who supported Rokossovsky and the “anti-Stalinists” in the PUWP led to the removal of Rokossovsky from the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee and the Ministry of National Defense as a “symbol of Stalinism”. On October 22, 1956, in a letter to the Central Committee of the PUWP, signed by NS Khrushchev, the Soviet side expressed its approval and agreement with this decision. Rokossovsky was quickly retired, forcing to return to the Polish budget part of the salary received in senior positions. Rokossovsky left for the USSR and did not come again, and distributed all his property in Poland to the people who served him. Rokossovsky returned home with one suitcase.

[Sergej1972]

I studied a little the history of Poland during this period. The most interesting thing is that the notorious "Natolinians" (sort of Stalinists, but in reality everything is more complicated), both those who lost their posts and those who retained their posts (Ohab, for example), for the most part, were reorganized and in the 60s they themselves accused Gomulka and him supporters of authoritarianism, anti-Semitism and other sins. And they advocated the democratization of the party and the state. And Gomulka, objectively speaking, was trying to restore order in Poland. The intelligentsia did not like his fight against Zionism very much. There, the problem was that the Natolinians were largely Jews, while Gomulka and his supporting group of "partisans" led by Mochar relied on "indigenous" Poles and were inclined towards anti-Semitism. Many Polish dissidents are children of these "Natolinians". Such is the irony of fate. By the way, both Berut and the leader of Hungary, Rakosi, were Jews. The failed heir to Bierut, General Ohab, was also a Jew. Rakosi Gere's potential but failed successor was also Jewish. By the way, in the 60s and 70s, former Stalinists and Rakosi's associates (he really remained a staunch Stalinist to death) Gere and Hegedyush criticized Janos Kadar and his team not from a Stalinist standpoint.

[Serg koma]

Quote: Flood

so that these same military historians began to write articles

Everything has long been written, published ... The conclusions were drawn by eyewitnesses of the events, not historians.

and in the morning he introduced himself to the front commander, Colonel-General M.P. Kirponos. I was extremely surprised by his sharply conspicuous confusion. Apparently noticing my surprise, he tried to let himself be calm, but he failed. ...

So, several times over the phone he gave orders to the headquarters to transfer orders to someone about decisive counterattacks. But it all sounded uncertain, fussy, unnecessary. Ordering to throw one or two divisions into battle, the commander was not even interested in whether the named formations could counterattack, did not explain the specific purpose of their use. The impression was that he either did not know the situation, or did not want to know it.

In those minutes I finally came to the conclusion that such voluminous, complex and responsible duties are beyond the capacity of this man, and woe to the troops entrusted to him. With such a mood, I left the headquarters of the Southwestern Front heading for Moscow. I first learned that a very difficult situation had also developed on the Western Front: the Germans were approaching Smolensk. Knowing the commander of the Western Front, General D.G. Pavlova long before the start of the war (in 1930 he was the commander of a regiment in the division I commanded), he could have concluded in advance that he was a pair of Kirponos, if not even weaker than him.

Events would have proceeded completely differently if the command of the district was at the height of the situation and took timely appropriate measures within the limits of their powers, showing their own initiative for this, as well as the courage to take responsibility for carrying out measures dictated by the situation at the border. And this was not done. Everyone was waiting for instructions from above.

After all, their orders were clearly unrealistic. Knowing about this, they nevertheless gave them away, pursuing, I am sure, the goal of justifying themselves in the future, referring to the fact that the order for "decisive" actions to such and such troops (formations) was given by them. They were not worried that such an order was to send mechanized corps for extermination. Good tank personnel perished in an unequal battle, selflessly playing the role of infantry in battles.

Even when the directions of the main blows inflicted by the German troops, as well as their grouping and forces, were clearly established, the district command was unable to take responsibility and make a cardinal decision to save the situation, to save most of the troops from complete defeat, pulling them off to an old fortified area.

Rokossovsky K.K. Soldier's duty. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1988.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Dunkelheit

Any violent fantasy can be covered up with words - "military historians claim."

Are these the guys sitting through the wall with the "British scientists"? Y. Loza's neighbors?

[Aag]

Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.

Quote: Dunkelheit

Any violent fantasy can be covered up with words - "military historians claim."

Are these the guys sitting through the wall with the "British scientists"? Y. Loza's neighbors?

Explain, please, what's wrong with S.Yu. Lozoy.

[Darkness]

The article contains enough pearls characteristic of this author. Here she keeps the bar consistently high. Maybe they keep her on purpose - to raise the mood and develop the imagination of the members of the forum?

[bober1982]

Quote: Dunkelheit

Maybe they keep her on purpose

They keep for the sake of titles to articles that are provocative, the text itself does not interest anyone, and the titles of the articles themselves begin to flicker, thus trying to consolidate in the fragile minds of, as a rule, young people, this whole pseudo-history.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Dunkelheit

The article contains enough pearls characteristic of this author.

HUBS in Lviv and Strict - this, you see, is still fresh, t.s. jet

[Darkness]

I agree, and over time - "Dictionary of Fresh Terms". Here.

[Kart]

Quote: Dunkelheit

Maybe they keep her on purpose - to raise the mood and develop the imagination of the members of the forum?

What for?
These "forum users" do not need imagination. Only a manual with mantras about wonderful communism.
Well, the ability to bark in unison at dissent. Everything is like the sectarians have.

[Per se.]

"As of July 17, 1941, all mechanized corps are, like mechanized corps, incapable of combat due to the lack of combat materiel."

Severe losses in the first months of the war, not so much the "betrayal of 1941" as the initial strategic and political mistakes.

First, there was a time, and this is a historical fact, of our friendship with Germany. Was it a "cunning plan" of that era, a forced necessity or a political mistake, it is difficult to say unequivocally. But, there was a stage where the German workers' National Socialist Party was perceived by our leadership closer than the bourgeois governments of "hat Europe". Probably, the union of the two "socialisms" could give rise to some hope for opposition to the bourgeois West.

Here, only, this very bourgeois West, primarily the United States and Great Britain, brought Hitler to power, turned a blind eye to the violations of Versailles, in fact gave Austria and Czechoslovakia to the Third Reich, and then most of Europe, everything for Germany to obtain sufficient potential for the war with the USSR, the main task of the Anglophile Hitler. From defeated in the First World War, Germany was made anti-USSR, and from the Germans cannon fodder in the interests of the Anglo-Saxons. That is why Hitler allowed the British to get their feet out of Dunkirk, and the entire operation "Sea Lion" was a screen for the main task in the Barbarossa plan.

The mistake, if not stupidity, was the simultaneous formation of mechanized corps just before the war. There was no experience in managing such large formations, and, most importantly, new, poorly mastered equipment was mixed with the old one. It would be much more logical to start forming new mechanized corps, fully equipping them with new equipment, forming new corps as new weapons arrive for them. It turned out that the "old house" was demolished, but the "new house" was not completed in time.

Oddly enough, in a positive example under article 9, the mechanized corps of Rokossovsky had only old tanks, these are the T-26, BT and T-37/38, well mastered by the crews and more technically modified by the industry.

In addition, instead of a "sanitary buffer", new territories, often with a hostile population, have become a place of depots and concentration of our troops. The old border, like the "Stalin's line", would have been a more convenient place to meet an aggressor, and "surprise" would not have led to such a catastrophe in 1941.

It seems that it is not a matter of betrayal, but of mistakes, the imposition of political decisions, where technical and geopolitical ones were needed. Betrayal, if we talk about it, became a consequence, and the reason was strategic mistakes of the leadership, which led to the success of the Germans, who, by and large, had no chance to win from the very beginning.

[Fan-fan]

The proximity to the border of our warehouses, airfields and other bases is explained by only one thing - ours themselves planned to attack. But the plan failed.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Fan-Fan

The proximity to the border of our warehouses, airfields and other bases is explained by only one thing - ours themselves planned to attack. But the plan failed.

The proximity of the airfields to the border is explained by the fact that the combat radius of the main fighter of the Red Army Air Force is only 160-170 km. In addition, mixed air divisions were based at border airfields, intended to "work" in the interests of border armies.
And about warehouses ...

The artillery depots of the border districts were dispersed along the front and layered in depth. The first line of warehouses located 50-75 km from the state border was advanced warehouses, usually small ones (4th category). On the second line, 300-400 km away from the state border, warehouses of the 3rd and partially 2nd category were located, and on the third (rear) line were the most powerful warehouses (1st and 2nd categories). The total depth of the separation of the warehouses reached 500-600 km.

© Artillery supply in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45.
At the same ZOVO, a 1st category warehouse was located practically on the border with the RSFSR.

[Daniil Konovalenko]

ours themselves planned to attack

..Aha, but if it were not for the offensive, the warehouses of the troops located in the border districts should have been located beyond the Urals, or beyond the Volga.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

The mistake, if not stupidity, was the simultaneous formation of mechanized corps just before the war.

The problem is that we now know about this "before the war". At the time of the formation of the second wave of the MK, it was believed that the USSR had at least one more peaceful year.

Quote: Per se.

It would be much more logical to start forming new mechanized corps, fully equipping them with new equipment, forming new corps as new weapons arrive for them.

In this case, at the beginning of the war, we would have 4 MK. Moreover, the old OShS - overloaded with tanks to the detriment of infantry and artillery and underloaded communications and rear services. Plus, the personnel problem would not have gone anywhere - the BTV did not have experience in managing anything larger than the brigade. The first attempt to use the "old model" MK in 1939 ended in clogged roads and equipment that got up without fuel. Budyonny had to pull this plug away.

Quote: Per se.

It turned out that the "old house" was demolished, but the "new house" was not completed in time.

And there was no "old house". Until 1940, the USSR did not have tank formations suitable for independent action.
Soviet tank brigades of the interwar period were suitable for only one thing - the accompaniment of infantry. For not only was the infantry and artillery scanty in terms of staffing, so also most of the brigade did not receive them at all. Only tanks and minimal rears - that's all.
Soviet mechanized corps of the interwar period ... I already wrote above about their first use. The next time, in SFV, the mechanized corps was decided not to be used.
On the other hand, semi-fantastic reports on the independent actions of German tank formations in France, which decided the outcome of the campaign, go up.

Ideally, with the reform of the BTV in 1940, it was necessary to follow the path of 1941-1942, first forming ready-made Kampfgroups - separate tank and mechanized brigades - and combining them with a superstructure with means of reinforcement, support and rear in a mechanized corps. But this required the experience of the war.

Quote: Per se.

The old border, like the "Stalin's line", would have been a more convenient place to meet an aggressor, and "surprise" would not have led to such a catastrophe in 1941.

For two or three days, the problem of the army's lack of mobilization does not solve.
Fantastic scenarios about the allocation of advanced detachments for the maneuverable defense of the foreground break up against the harsh reality of the results of the actions of such detachments in 1942: inflicting little damage on the enemy and practically not delaying him, these detachments bleed the divisions that had allocated them, taking away the best units and vehicles.
And I still don't remember that the success of a mobile war is based on intelligence and communications. With what we in 1941 were not just bad, but disgusting - the throwing of the MK in the SWN zone was caused precisely by erroneous intelligence data, which suddenly found tanks where they were not, and did not find them where they were.

[Daniil Konovalenko]

I don’t remember, is there any real statistics of tanks in service, being repaired? How many tanks were worn out (repaired, overhauled). But somehow, the majority have an idea: here is a tank corps, here are so many tanks and all the workers, on the move. But in fact, conditionally, out of 80 tanks, 30 tanks are in working order , 30 under repair, 20 half ready. And on paper 80.

[Per se.]

Quote: Alexey RA

At the time of the formation of the second wave of the MK, it was believed that the USSR had at least one more peaceful year.

As it was said satirically in one Soviet film, "Suppose that the enemy is deaf, blind, and even ...", our failed plans, these are our mistakes, Alexei, that's why it all happened. What is the use of excuses?

In this case, at the beginning of the war, we would have 4 MK.

Yes, let there be 4 mechanized corps fully armed with T-34 and KV, plus diesel BT-7M.

At the beginning of the war, 19 mechanized corps were stationed in the western border districts (10 tanks of all types, according to other sources - 394).
Taking into account the tanks that were part of some rifle, cavalry and individual tank units, this figure, as of July 1, 1941, rises to 12 units.

The Germans put up against us by June 22, 1941, according to German data, 3582 combat vehicles, of which 965 T-IIIs and 439 T-IVs (classic work of Burkhard Müller-Hillebrandt "German Land Army 1933-1945"), the rest of the light tanks and assault guns. Agree, this is suggestive, given that there were 1475 new T-34 and KV tanks in the border districts.

For two or three days, the problem of the army's lack of mobilization does not solve.

And why was it not mobilized when the Germans were concentrating their forces on our border, "for rest"? I also disagree on the old border, albeit not completed "Stalin's line." These are all our problems, Alexey, our mistakes. When the Germans were still rolling plywood tanks during the exercises, we had them in reality. The British began to create their own cruising tanks, impressed by the exercises of the Red Army, where they swiftly attacked BT.

We had an army and had experience, it is not necessary to give out the ideal from the Wehrmacht, it is just that our leadership turned out to be this "deaf, blind and fool", and the Germans made good use of this, which does not detract from the courage and heroism of our soldiers, who were the first to fall in the defense of the Soviet Union.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

Yes, let there be 4 mechanized corps fully armed with T-34 and KV, plus diesel BT-7M.

So they practically were in real life - 1 MK, 4 MK, 6 MK, 8 MK.

Quote: Per se.

At the beginning of the war, 19 mechanized corps were stationed in the western border districts (10 tanks of all types, according to other sources - 394).
Taking into account the tanks that were part of some rifle, cavalry and individual tank units, this figure, as of July 1, 1941, rises to 12 units.

The Germans put up against us by June 22, 1941, according to German data, 3582 combat vehicles, of which 965 T-IIIs and 439 T-IVs (the classic work of Burkhard Müller-Hillebrandt "German Land Army 1933-1945"), the rest of the light tanks and assault guns.

Uh-huh ... we compare the total number of USSR tanks in the ZTVD with combat-ready tanks of only tank battalions of tank regiments plus shtugi.

Quote: Per se.

Agree, this is suggestive, given that there were 1475 new T-34 and KV tanks in the border districts.

Of these, no more than a hundred are combat training. That is, there were 34-350 real combat-ready crews of the T-400 and KV. The reason is known - the motor resource. Driving training alone took at least 50 hours - half of the resource. And there were 1 new engines for 10 tanks.

Quote: Per se.

And why was she not mobilized when the Germans were concentrating their forces on our border, "for rest"?

The main transfer along the Barbarossa is June. Even in the first ten days of June, the forces concentrated for "Barbarossa" roughly corresponded to the covering forces of the eastern border in the event that the Reich carried out the "Sea Lion".
Moreover, intelligence stubbornly reported that the Reich would not attack the USSR until the British problem was solved, Germany did not want a war on two fronts.

Quote: Per se.

We had an army and had experience, it is not necessary to give out the ideal from the Wehrmacht

Yep ...

... operational training of senior command personnel significantly increased and evaluated mediocre.

© Report on the results of the combat training of the ZOVO for the winter of 1940-1941.

[Per se.]

Quote: Alexey RA

Uh-huh ... we compare the total number of USSR tanks in the ZTVD with combat-ready tanks of only tank battalions of tank regiments plus shtugi.

Why should we be so poor that we were orphaned and wretched. If we admit the outrageous that 60% of our tanks were not combat-ready at all, there will still be more than 5000 units. Although, they always singled out equipment that needed medium and overhaul, and this is much less in percentage terms from those 11-12 thousand tanks, not counting armored vehicles with 45 mm guns.

It is also known that a 6-fold superiority was required for success in an offensive. Here is how the mute achieved it, even with their counterattacks at the end of the war, is another story.

Yep ...

About "yeah", there were Germans and cadets of our military schools, and the same Guderian borrowed a lot from the work of Georgy Isserson and his colleagues, Vladimir Triandafillov and Konstantin Kalinovsky - "The Evolution of Operational Art".
In 1940, Guderian even ordered the translation of Isserson's book New Forms of Struggle into German. It is our misfortune that the "theory of deep operations" created in our country was declared after the "theory of deep betrayal."

You go into details, in particular, and the dispute for the sake of the dispute, where again "for the fish money", is not interesting. The logic, where the reasons for the defeat of 1941 are actually declared to be the only possible, and even "correct", does not seem objective.
I expressed only my opinion, I see no point in repeating myself, thanks for the dialogue.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Per se.

Although, they always singled out equipment that needed medium and overhaul, and this is much less in percentage terms from those 11-12 thousand tanks, not counting armored vehicles with 45 mm guns.

It's just that the categories of property in the Red Army were designed for the normal supply of spare parts for routine repairs. Therefore, the notorious second category appeared, combining serviceable and faulty equipment:

2nd category - former (in) use, fully operational and suitable for its intended use. This also includes property requiring military repair (current repair).

In real life, the military repair of most of the faulty vehicles of the second category was impossible:

a) tank spare parts allocated for 219 million rubles. instead of 476 million rubles required by application;
b) automobile and tractor - funds allocated for 112,5 million rubles against 207 million rubles for an annual application.

The People’s Commissariat and Glavavtotraktorodetal completely refuse to manufacture complex scarce units and parts (wheels, half shafts, balancers, cranks, final drive cover, guitars, etc.)
The agreements concluded by Glavavtotktorodetal at 1.6.41 were fulfilled only by 0.3% ...

Delivery of spare parts for diesels is unsatisfactory ... Due to the poor supply of diesel engines, a large number of BT-7M tanks are not operational.

As a result, the 6th MK reports that

Due to the lack of highly scarce spare parts, it is not possible to timely restore machines with average and current repairs.

© Ulanov / Shein

[chenia]

Quote: Alexey RA

Ideally, with the reform of the BTV in 1940, it was necessary to follow the path of 1941-1942, first forming ready-made Kampfgroups - separate tank and mechanized brigades

The structure of the MC is quite correct. and we already had TD and TBR. And the Kampfgroups performed more the role of forming a breakthrough (here our mechanized brigade is more consistent), and not developing success (at the initial period, with an unstable defense, it worked, then it creaked).
The two TD and the MSD are the correct ratio in the MK. TD about two TPs and one MRP for that time is also excellent (well, if you understand that our infantry was not yet motorized rifle formations, but the idea is correct).
But TP-40 was built following the example of our TBR SK + a pile of German TP organization. Well, they have two-battalion (less often three) TPs, and ours already have four. Well, five tanks (medium) in platoons (for the formation of the development of success, an unnecessary amount (remember, among the Germans, TD also carried out a breakthrough in defense, it is even more or less justified there.
And if Three battalions, and three tank platoons, then TP -94-96 tanks (well, combat support units (reconnaissance company) another 10-15 tanks (mostly light).
So it turns out that the MK could have 475 main and 120-150 in the combat support division. THOSE. about 600 tanks.
In fact, by 1942, they came to this (only the formations began to be called differently. TBr with one TP, as a rule, a two-battalion composition of up to 70-75 tanks (and it could be 35-50). TK (3 Tbr with a set)) was essentially TD 40. Well, TA is also almost MK 40.

We reached it in battle, would have reached it after the exercises (and many pointed out the absurdity of TP). Did not make it. but they could check right after creation (well, let it be in the fall of 1940). They would have had a bunch of recommendations and comments in terms of management, OShS, and materiel. By 1941 it would be corrected.

Quote: Alexey RA

Plus, the personnel problem would not have gone anywhere - the BTV did not have experience in managing anything larger than the brigade.

The organizational mess in the BTV (and in almost the entire Red Army) tore off the BP and smeared the personnel on the virtually incapacitated formations.
We grabbed everything at once, and there was not enough time. Caste selfishness and lobbying, not betrayal, are the cause of the disaster. They wanted, while they give more to grab - more formations, more ranks and positions, significance and reinsurance (it never gets worse).

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

The structure of the MC is quite correct. and we already had TD and TBR.

In 1940, there were no commanders in the BTV with experience in managing consolidated formations: the regiment was from here. the battalion from there, the division was generally given from above. Therefore, it is best to dance from ready-made, well-coordinated tactical groups, which are only allocated means of reinforcement. That is, otbr.

Quote: chenia

We reached it in battle, would have reached it after the exercises (and many pointed out the absurdity of TP). Did not make it. but could check right after creation (well, let in the fall of 1940).

They could not - the first mechanized corps, fully equipped and coordinated to the level of the division, was planned to be received only in September 1941. In 1940, the exercises would only show that without the training of personnel and the equipment of the MK with equipment, the corps was incapable of combat.

[chenia]

Quote: Alexey RA

For 1940 there are no commanders in the BTV

We previously had an MK with two TBRs (- the so-called mechanized) where there were about 500 tanks and a rifle-machine gun brigade. And even at the exercises they drove. The Germans still dreamed of this (1934). Well, what is not the base.
To create a TD on the basis of TBR. The brigade will be split apart - there will be 2 TP (two battalions) and a joint venture (and they are available) and AP (light). Those. what that experience was. Yes, actually then they did so. but by creating two from one brigade (only they were called regiments with four battalions). And then we needed a run at the landfill.

Quote: Alexey RA

They could not - the first mechanized corps, fully equipped and coordinated to the level of the division, was planned to be received only in September 1941.

For this, both Meretsky and Zhukov had to be pressed (he managed to get the first one).
It was time. Since they were going to be replicated, the experimental MK should be ready in the fall of 1940 to throw all the forces on it. There, the entire MK in the expanded state is not needed. Only one TD and MD (the second TD could represent a company with one tank). And a bunch of intermediaries (from the commanders of all levels of future MC) who will evaluate and at the same time learn by themselves. Well, see how the MK fits on the card.
It seems that the generals decided to first grab more, and then think about how to fix it.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

We previously had an MK with two TBRs (- the so-called mechanized) where there were about 500 tanks and a rifle-machine gun brigade. And even at the exercises they drove. The Germans still dreamed of this (1934). Well, what is not the base.

It is precisely the interwar MK that is an excellent example of the lack of personnel in the BTV to manage such a formation and the absence of normal staff work at all. Outside of the teachings, they tried to apply it only once - in the Polish campaign. As a result, the MK turned out to be more dangerous for its own people than for the enemy: the equipment of the corps clogged the rear roads and stood up without fuel. A whole marshal had to clear this plug with the help of transport aircraft. What does this mean? That's right - either the headquarters could not plan the march even in its rear, or the standard means of supplying fuel were not enough - but this is again the fault of the headquarters, which was supposed to organize the march, taking into account the real availability of logistics equipment.
However, why be surprised ...

Until recently, they said that such and such a commander had failed, a hat, it was necessary to go to his headquarters. Or, for example, a person with a "vein" accidentally got into the headquarters, he can be in command, they say he has no place in the headquarters, he needs to be in the command post.
If you look at the headquarters in this way, then we will not have a headquarters. And what does the absence of a headquarters mean? This means the absence of a body that carries out the order and prepares the order.

© best friend of Soviet athletes

And it's better not to remember the pre-war teachings - even the help of intermediaries did not always save this ballet.

T-28s from the 1st BVO tank brigade "suddenly" (!) Found themselves in front of a strip of tank traps and gouges and were forced to turn sharply to the side - to a not yet explored area of ​​the terrain, where they got stuck.

© Simonov. Great maneuvers.

Quote: chenia

Since they were going to be replicated, the experimental MK should be ready in the fall of 1940 to throw all the forces on it.

It will not be ready in the fall of 1940 - there are no tanks. Almost the entire Kharkov edition of 1940 returned to the plant under warranty - they did it very quickly. Plus, coordination takes at least six months: there so many tasty things fell on the divisional commander and the headquarters that you should at least understand how to manage it all. Only one artillery regiment with 152-mm howitzers is worth something (moreover, with non-standard shots - from the M-10T , so the gunners will also have fun).

[chenia]

Quote: Alexey RA

It is precisely the interwar MK that is an excellent example of the lack of personnel in the BTV to manage such a formation and the absence of normal staff work at all.

Well, the frames are forged, and why for so much time we could not polish it is difficult to say.
Initially, it is clear that the understanding of the use of MC as the formation of the development of success has not yet come. He was supposed to provide shock functions (by the way, this is generally the norm for the Germans). This determined the large number of tanks in platoons and the number of tank units in the brigade.
The TBR, initially overcrowded with tanks, is generally a very poorly managed structure. For a breakthrough, when the units were attached to the SD, it was still suitable, but completely as part of the MK-stupor. And the brigade began to be controlled (1942) only when it "lost weight" to two battalions and up to 50-60 tanks (in tank platoons there were often two tanks) with the brigade structure of the combat and logistical support units .. And then the TK "started working" and the TA made up of them.
In MK 40, there was an understanding that the TD tank regiment (almost an analogue of the four battalion TBRs) was not controllable.

Quote: Alexey RA

And it's better not to remember the pre-war teachings - even the help of intermediaries did not always save this ballet.

Well, for this, many have seriously responded, and in all fairness.

Quote: Alexey RA

It will not be ready in the fall of 1940 - there are no tanks.

The structure can be initially run on the T-26 (management, organization of the march, cover, deployment, mat. And technical support) and then as technology arrives. And the MC exercises should not be a one-time event (the structure is new, unknown, there is no template).

Quote: Alexey RA

Plus, coordination takes at least six months:

For an experimental MC, you don't need to create an AP from scratch. We take two TBRs (and not from one we make two), then a set of already existing parts and units. We bring it in line with the state. And to the landfill. Alignment at the level of parts is already there (or at least should be).

Quote: Alexey RA

there so many tasty things fell on the divisional commander and the headquarters

And what does the division commander have to do with it. In my time, a window dressing for division commanders (methodological classes on conducting vocational training) conducted by the commander, all the district's BP management hung in the subdivisions (lieutenant colonels in platoons, companies, colonels in battalions, generals in a regiment). And they "shook" together with the line commanders in unison - Yazov loved to call out the chiefs in stripes.

So that the division commander and the corps commander would not be alone. From the General Staff, from the People's Commissariat, the High Commands, the academies, the relevant ministries for the production of equipment, the design bureaus of factories, and of course the guys from the NKVD, etc.
And everyone to help

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

Well, the frames are forged, and why for so much time we could not polish it is difficult to say.

Patamushta has no money and a weak industry. The army itself is an expensive pleasure, and the mechanical parts are even more expensive. To raise cadres, you need to conduct exercises. And this is the money spent and the knocked out motor resource. And there is no money even for the infantry - in 1935 there were 25 personnel divisions throughout the country. The rest is the territories. The industry also contributed: I wrote about the situation with spare parts, it was no better all the 30s. That is, the correction of even a minor breakdown was delayed to the point of indecency - and it turned out that the exercises reduced combat readiness. And the third problem is the states. In most brigades, the Komsomol squad could only learn to directly support the infantry (for in fact there was no regular motorized infantry). Moreover, for this it was also necessary to agree with the infantrymen on joint exercises.

Quote: chenia

Initially, it is clear that the understanding of the use of MC as a formation of development of success has not yet come. He was supposed to provide shock functions.

R - realism. It seems to me that the command of the BTV did not believe in the ability of the infantry in a timely manner (because time is critical - the enemy will transfer reserves) to provide "a clean breakthrough." And he suspected that armored formations would have to break through the defense on their own (as it regularly happened in real life).

Quote: chenia

The structure can be initially run on the T-26 (management, organization of the march, cover, deployment, mat. And technical support)

Uh-huh ... and then 10-ton diesel T-26s are crammed into this structure instead of 26-ton gasoline T-34s. And extremely raw. A rembat immediately falls apart, which needs new traction and technology, and in large quantities. Behind him begins a shake-up of the rear - a different fuel consumption, a different mass of ammo, a different nomenclature and a mass of spare parts, etc. And again we will have to expel the MK to the exercises to optimize the OShS.

[chenia]

Quote: Alexey RA

To raise cadres, you need to conduct exercises.

But there is no other way.

Quote: Alexey RA

Patamushta no money

And therefore it is necessary to replicate formations with 1000 tanks and an untested structure. As it does not fit.

Quote: Alexey RA

And he suspected that armored formations would have to break through the defense on their own (as it regularly happened in real life).

I agree with this, since we began to throw into the breakthrough when these formations became operational under the command of the front. And the functions of breakthrough and development were divided.

Quote: Alexey RA

Uh-huh ... and then into this structure instead of 10-ton gasoline T-26

Uh, not. It is enough for working off. The choice of routes of advancement, the construction of columns - the State Duma, the GPZ, the vanguard, the main forces, the rear. Deployment. Cover. Actions for air. chemical attacks, etc., etc. And if you own it, then 26 tons will not be too much and will load. We (my time) also did not drag the entire BC in the exercises, and did not raise all the rear services, and even in a reduced composition.

Quote: Alexey RA

Additionally, we will reform them in accordance with the states. And to the landfill.

Yes. And it will not work in another way.

Quote: Alexey RA

The infantry cannot interact with tanks.

And why the heck came to the landfill. We must study. Experimental activities are a cloud of bosses, theorists, and practitioners. A new structure is being created. What's surprising? All by trial and error.

Quote: Alexey RA

to the division commander and the corps commander, the entire department of the BP of the district

There should be representatives of the People's Commissariat, General Staff, GABU, representatives of the mot academy. and fur, and the BP of the district (in which these events are held) provides them with sleeping places at the landfill. In short, brainstorming, as they say now.

Quote: Alexey RA

if none of the district and Moscow tankers have ever seen their artillery

If we had “played in the war” at the firing range with the MC, we realized that the artillery in the TD, and from there the MC is not so important (well, if it were that the formation of the development of success rushes into a breakthrough and does not create it). We subsequently did not have an art division in the TD tank regiment (until the 80s). The TD and TP did not have an anti-tank battalion and batteries, respectively (and now they do not). There should not be a layered defense in a breakthrough (well, if stealth is failed, and it suddenly appears - but then spit in the mirror), resistance nodes can be (and should be bypassed). It's easier to organize shooting with PDO assigned gunners (well, a perversion, but provided). than to drag the artillery formation.

Quote: Alexey RA

All commanders and specialists of all departments know exactly as much about a tank division and mechanized corps as its commander knows. For they see her for the first time.

And the SD is even more difficult to control, there are more mouths (units), more weapons, fewer wheels. The columns are longer.

By the way, we were not that simple. There was an idea to create a Mech Division with two SP and one TP and a bunch of artillery - that's the formation of a breakthrough (a prototype of the future MSD) ..

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

And therefore it is necessary to replicate formations with 1000 tanks and an untested structure. As it does not fit.

Everything fits. There was no money until the end of the 30s. Exactly when it was necessary to train personnel.
And in the late 30s there was money. But the tankers had no personnel.

Quote: chenia

I agree with this, since we began to throw into the breakthrough when these formations became operational under the command of the front. And the functions of breakthrough and development were divided.

The functions are divided in theory. In practice, the front commander constantly had to choose between two evils:
- to wait for a clean breakthrough, while maintaining the power of the mechanized formations, but giving the enemy time to pull up reserves and organize defense in the revealed direction of the strike;
- to use the mechs of development of success to break through the defense, reducing their power, but gaining momentum and not giving the enemy time to react.
And usually they chose the latter.

Quote: chenia

It is enough for working off. The choice of routes of advancement, the construction of columns - the State Duma, the GPZ, the vanguard, the main forces, the rear. Deployment. Cover. Actions for air. chemical attacks, etc., etc.

Choosing routes for a 10-ton or 26-ton tank? And if under the 26-ton, then we will organize the march and count the rears according to the tabular performance characteristics? Or according to the real ones, along which the T-34 moves along a country road at a speed of up to 14 km / h, the mechanic drive at the same time turns the levers with forces of up to 30 kg, and the fuel in the internal tanks is enough for the tank for 165-185 km (and the oil - even less range).
It's like working out the tasks of the connection on the T-80, having the T-55 in stock.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

And why the heck came to the landfill. We must study. Experimental activities are a cloud of bosses, theorists, and practitioners. A new structure is being created.

The problem is that you will have to learn from scratch - from teaching the infantry to interact with tanks. So, at first, you will have to conduct exercises at the squad-platoon-company level. And to teach infantry commanders, who, as it turned out during the SPF, at best only know their charter, and have the most vague idea of ​​the capabilities and needs of tank units.

Quote: chenia

If we had “played in the war” at the firing range with the MC, we realized that the artillery in the TD, and from there, the MC is not so important (well, if it came to the conclusion that the formation of the development of success rushes into a breakthrough and does not create it).
(...)
There should not be a layered defense in a breakthrough (well, if stealth is failed, and it suddenly appears - but then spit in the mirror), resistance nodes can be (and must be bypassed).

Well, here's a classic case for you - Captain Kim's battalion, caught in the path of Eberbach's Kampfgruppe. It is impossible to bypass Kim - the Germans need Krichev with bridges behind him. If Eberbach had no artillery, he would have picked out Kim's infantry with regular anti-tank equipment from positions for half a day, while suffering losses in l / s and equipment. And in real life, Eberbach with artillery in a couple of hours brought Kim's position to the state of "defense is impossible, retreat."

Quote: chenia

It's easier to organize shooting with PDO assigned gunners (well, a perversion, but provided). than to drag the artillery formation.

The problem is that in the 1940 Red Army there are no artillery units capable of moving along with mechanical units (the bulk of the artillery moves at a speed of 3-5 km / h, some - 10-12 km / h). So there is no one to give - the artillery for adding the MK will also have to be formed from scratch.

Quote: chenia

And the SD is even more difficult to control, there are more mouths (units), more weapons, fewer wheels. The columns are longer.

The SD management at the very least worked out 20 pre-war years - such a staff unit in the Red Army was all the interwar period, only the states changed.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: chenia

For an experimental MC, you don't need to create an AP from scratch. We take two TBRs (and not from one we make two), then a set of already existing parts and units. We bring it in line with the state. And to the landfill.

Gorgeous. That is, we take two brigades of tankers, a regiment of an infantry division, a corps artillery division, an anti-aircraft division from the infantry, etc. Additionally, we will reform them in accordance with the states. And to the landfill. The infantry cannot interact with tanks. Artillerymen and anti-aircraft gunners never made a march at such speeds. Tank commanders have never seen their artillery in their lives.

Quote: chenia

So that the division commander and the corps commander would not be alone. From the General Staff, from the People's Commissariat, the High Commands, the academies, the relevant ministries for the production of equipment, the design bureaus of factories, and of course the guys from the NKVD, etc.

Do you understand the difference between "poorly trained divisional commander in the old organizational structure, through which the district authorities passed" And "poorly trained divisional commander in the zero OShS, which, moreover, includes forces and structures that the BTV did not have".
How to help the division commander and corps commander all department of the district BP, if none of the district and Moscow tankers have ever seen their artillery, and the infantrymen saw their tanks only in the parks (after the SPF it turned out that the tbn of rifle divisions were trained at tank ranges and practically did not conduct joint exercises with their infantry)? All commanders and specialists of all departments know exactly as much about a tank division and mechanized corps as its commander knows. For they see her for the first time.

[Kart]

Quote: Per se.

Severe losses in the first months of the war, not so much the "betrayal of 1941" as the initial strategic and political mistakes.

Well, that is, mistakes of the country's leadership.
The question naturally arises - if they made such mistakes in this field, then how are they in other areas? Really too?

[kalibr]

Stepan! Just read the newspaper Pravda after 1945. and 53rd. As the poet says: "Everything was darkness and whirlwind."

[Charlie]

Damn, the author, before you publish your text, give it to someone who knows how to use the Russian language for editing

[WHAT IS]

The author is the proofreader.
Corrector (from lat.corrector - director, corrector) is a specialist of a publishing house, typography or editorial office, proofreading texts, normalizing grammar (correcting spelling, punctuation, stylistic errors) and typography.

[smaug78]

Comparing I. Frolova with the traitor and falsifier of the history of the Second World War Rezun, I was wrong. Irina Florova, unlike Rezun, is just the bottom, with each article it gets worse and worse. The last article is a continuous lie and pathetic attempts to fit the tugged and out of context phrases to fit their "theory of betrayal", all this confusion is supported by an appeal to kitchen logic. Moreover, the lie is primitive and is not supported by documents. But Irina copes with the business of denigrating her own history with a bang ...

[Ilya-spb]

Is there a photograph of Irina Frolova? Maybe she is at least beautiful, with size 3-4?

[The leader of the Redskins]

Everyone imagines himself to be a strategist, seeing the howl from the side ...
Of course, it is easy to sort out numbers, numbers, units, knowing where who was when, what forces the enemy is advancing against.
Personally, I remember the book "General Lukin" very well. An experienced general very well described the confusion in the orders and on the spot during the defense of ONE city! When they demanded from Moscow to keep him, and half of the city was already occupied by superior forces of the Nazis!
And after the victory Lukin was not accused of treason, although he was captured ... And he communicated with traitors.
And here is a whole series of articles - labels: traitor ... Betrayal ... Betrayed ...

[Foul skeptic]

What a stubborn woman

[Undecim]

A question to the administration of the Voennoye Obozreniye website - for what purpose are you posting this libel, this malicious lie about the history of the Great Patriotic War on your resource?
Even the pursuit of clickbait should not go beyond a certain ethical framework and to use the memory of millions of dead people for this is blasphemy.

[Pane Kohanku]

A question to the administration of the Voennoye Obozreniye website - for what purpose are you posting this libel, this malicious lie about the history of the Great Patriotic War on your resource?

Paradox, Victor Nikolaevich. They just removed from the Kharaluzhny section (thank you very much for that), now Mrs. Frolova has appeared ... By the way, according to the level of low ratings from users, she has already done it. I don’t want to offend the lady ... But still, history is history, and there is no need to turn it into handicrafts of dubious quality. Moreover, tens of thousands of lives are behind each event ...

[Undecim]

I already wrote in a commentary to the very first "publication" that this is a rework of Pokrovsky's article from the site "Mysterious Country", which has been repeatedly analyzed and refuted. "Rewrite" autoressy, due to a complete lack of understanding of the issue and lack of knowledge in the topic, and so controversial material turned into a muddy stream, cynically and regularly poured out on readers, despite the indignation of the clear majority.

[Pane Kohanku]

despite the indignation of the clear majority

Maybe our Vyacheslav Olegovich or Valery Ryzhov will write something about history for us? And then today the choice in the section is very scanty ... Straight at least go to communicate under articles of three days ago!

[Undecim]

Ryzhov after the mafia, apparently, is restoring his strength, Shpakovsky, if he is, then in the evening, because there is nothing to read on the site.
I am now rereading a book about the history of the Krupp family. By the way, it is quite suitable for a series of articles, moreover, in the subject of the site. But for some reason the authors find only topics for throwing at the fan. Yes, there are practically no authors left, so - copywriters - spreaders.

[Pane Kohanku]

But for some reason the authors find only topics for throwing at the fan.

These are clicks of an emotional patriotic public!

[Undecim]

Clicks turning into hysteria. So soon the damage from the site will have to be removed.

[Pane Kohanku]

So soon the damage from the site will have to be removed.

I thought you were for science?

[kalibr]

Quote: Pane Kohanku

we already have Vyacheslav our Olegovich

Articles from the series about the Decembrists and Austerlitz are ready for moderation ...

[Pane Kohanku]

Articles from the series about the Decembrists and Austerlitz are ready for moderation ...

I have already stuck at least two minuses. Apparently, after mentioning your last name ...

[kalibr]

Quote: Pane Kohanku

Your last name ...

Do not wake up smartly while sleeping quietly! They are so ... "fighting". And they don't understand that ... the more clicks, the better. And so ... what's a minus, what's a plus - all the same. Remember the film "Marya the Artisan" - "What will, what bondage, all the same, all the same!"

[syndicalist]

Quote: Undecim

For what purpose are you posting this libel, this malicious lie about the history of the Great Patriotic War on your resource?

On the one hand, we secret all military archives, and on the other, we accuse everyone of "libels" and "malicious lies."

[Alex 1970]

And here's what's interesting to me, "After all, it was there that substantial stocks of various property and spare parts for entire armies were stored. Just what the Germans needed blood from the nose for their advancing formations." Why do the Germans need our spare parts for their advancing formations? Something I do not see the logic. Did the Germans fight on our vehicles? You didn't have your own?

[Fan-fan]

Of course, Ira thoughtlessly wrote about spare parts, but the Germans can also use food, fuel, weapons.

[Alex 1970]

The food is clear, just about the spare parts passage

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Alexey 1970

Something I do not see the logic.

don't look.

[Alex 1970]

yes, the hub, of course, is also a pearl, well, I didn't make any complaints about it, we still understood what it was about

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Alexey 1970

yes, the hub is of course a pearl too,

reminded me: somehow I had to contact a bright representative of office plankton at work (well, of those that rent a two-bed apartment for four in Kapotnya, but ride a fifteen-year-old credit X5), so this wonderful young man amused with phrases like "where is the location of your facilitation ? "

[Constanty]

Well. 1941 is easier to explain by treason than to understand the complexity and multiplicity of the reasons that led to the defeat of the Red Army after June 22, 1941.

Here Vlasov's example is very interesting. Since in the second half he was captured and collaborated with the Germans in the creation of the ROA - that is, he was a traitor as such.
And it is easy to blame him for previous disasters.

Already in the previous article, the author tried to push through the assumption that Vlasov de facto did not participate in the defense of Moscow, against even the judgments of Stalin and the leadership of the USSR

now she goes further, creating the hypothesis of the "Vlasov corridor".

From the point of view of the USSR and the oath he took, Vlasov turned out to be a traitor - yes, that was a fact, and he suffered from the consequences, but one should not forget that before the defeat of the 2nd Shock Army and his imprisonment, he was Stalin's favorite and one of the most brilliant and promising generals.
Indeed, on November 10, 1941, after being fired from Kiev, Vlasov had a long conversation with Stalin, after which he not only became the commander of the 20th Army, received the rank of lieutenant general, but was also awarded the Order of the Red Banner. , and later became a deputy of the Volkhov Front and was sent to break out of the trap of the 2nd Shock Army.

Would all this be possible if he was the author of these "corridors" or if he simulated the disease during the counteroffensive near Moscow?

Unfortunately, the author prefers "political correctness", "patriotism" and ideology over historical truth and logic.

Sorry to read such history manipulation.
Shame on Mrs. Frolov - shame!

[kalibr]

Exactly the same page and the same photos were in the PRAVDA newspaper ...

[atos_kin]

Quote: Constanty

Unfortunately, the author prefers "political correctness", "patriotism" and ideology over historical truth and logic.

Sorry to read such history manipulation.

Learn to write in Russian Galician.

[Constanty]

I am a Pole, not a Galician.
I can read Russian fluently, but, unfortunately, writing is difficult for me, so I use an automatic translator.
I am sorry for any mistakes. Some I pick up and fix, but sometimes I send in a hurry, as the machine suggested.

I hope, despite this, the meaning of the statement can be understood.

Sorry again

[Undecim]

Konstantin, do not pay attention to such remarks of illiterate hamsters.

[Undecim]

Before making such remarks, it would not be a sin to learn to write without mistakes yourself.

[Stirbjorn]

Quote: Constanty

From the point of view of the USSR and the oath he took, Vlasov turned out to be a traitor - yes, that was a fact, and he suffered from the consequences, but one should not forget that before the defeat of the 2nd Shock Army and his imprisonment, he was Stalin's favorite and one of the most brilliant and promising generals.

I do not dispatch Vlasov's betrayal, but for the command of the 4th mech corps, he was promoted to the commander of the 37th army. So I agree that the author is pulling an owl on a globe

[BAI]

There is a book
1941. Defeat of the Western Front
Dmitry Egorov
And there is chapter 13: "Find guilty ..."
Everything is well described there on the example of the Western Front.
And the book ends with very clever words:

There has been a kind of double standard in Russian military history for at least the last 70–80 years. In the defeats of the Russian army under the banners with the two-headed imperial eagle, there are always bright episodes, when some Andrei Bolkonsky at Austerlitz raises the fallen Banner and carries his grenadiers into the last attack; still someone shows military valor near Friedland, Schöngraben, Narva or on the Masurian lakes. Sixty-seven years have passed since the June 1941 disaster. At first there was a deathly silence, then there was a period of "melting", which threw out a certain part of the truth to the surface. Then again there was a wall of silence, replaced by spitting on the past under the slogan of "struggle for democracy." I really want to believe that this period has passed forever and the era of objective assessments has come, when the howl about "filling up with corpses" is replaced by such flawless projects from the point of view of civicism and patriotism as "Nemirovskie BT" I hope that there will be more of them and we will learn the names and exploits of the heroes who laid down their heads not only near Moscow, on the Kursk Bulge, during the crossing of the Dnieper or during the storming of Vienna and Berlin. There will be worthy materials about those who died in June 1941 in Lithuania, Western Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova.

[Pane Kohanku]

when some Andrei Bolkonsky at Austerlitz raises the fallen Banner and carries his grenadiers into the last attack

Sorry, I'm distracted off topic. Interestingly, the novel was based on the act of Kutuzov's son-in-law, Fyodor Tizengauzen. He had just died at Austerlitz, and the bookish Bolkonsky lived two and a half volumes more. with respect!

[ccsr]

Quote: BAI

There is a book
1941. Defeat of the Western Front
Dmitry Egorov
And there is chapter 13: "Find guilty ..."
Everything is well described there on the example of the Western Front.

I would like to note that D. Yegorov is no longer alive, and his book is really interesting for popularizing the history of the initial period of the war in the Western Military District. But he also has plenty of blunders - this was discussed in several historical forums during his lifetime.
As for the author of the article on VO, I think there is nothing serious in her works, and therefore you can immediately throw it into the trash without reading it.

[Gvardeetz77]

Without reading, I scrolled the article to the author, regretfully saw "to be continued ....", I went to read "Express Gazeta", they distort the story less ...

[nivander]

yes - the historian from the plow - he didn't even figure out the stop, but he had already made a lot of conclusions for execution under article 58, paragraph 1a

[Alexey RA]

For some reason, on June 22, right in the middle of the day, the 26th mechanized corps was taken away from the 8th army, which was then fighting near Przemysl and reassigned to the front headquarters. Moreover, he was sent completely away not only from the front line itself, but also from his supply arsenals and spare parts depots deployed in the cities of Drohobych and Stryi.

At first, this mechanized formation is moving at full speed in the vicinity of Lviv. And then it is again transported to the east of the Lviv region - to the city of Brody.

Hmmm ... Isaev's book about battles at the South-Western Zone is over 15 years old. But in 2021, there are authors who are spreading conspiracy theories around the reassignment and relocation of mechanized corps.
Well, really, why, having an order from the General Staff to inflict a flank attack on the German shock fist (the breakthrough 1st tank group), to collect the MK, taking them out of the subordination of the armies?

[Nitarius]

and that Vlasov type ONE WAS .... well, well, you will be surprised .. I advise!

[voyaka uh]

There was a technical and tactical defeat in battles for 41 years.
Before that, the Germans defeated Poland and defeated France.
Got tactical experience.
There is no need to braid a non-existent betrayal.

[atos_kin]

Quote: voyaka uh

There is no need to braid a non-existent betrayal.

There is always betrayal, especially when they shoot.

[Vovk]

Quote: voyaka uh

There is no need to braid a non-existent betrayal.

The author of the article follows the beaten path of glue labels "Enemy of the People", accusing everyone of betrayal except the country's leadership. But it was the cannibalistic policy of the USSR leadership that led to the fact that instead of fighting the Nazis, many Red Army soldiers began to settle bloody scores with the Communists or simply fled, and only the savage attitude of the Germans towards the citizens of the USSR sobered them, and only then did the real resistance of the peoples of the USSR begin.

[atos_kin]

Quote: Vovk

only the savage attitude of the Germans towards the citizens of the USSR sobered them, and only then did the real resistance of the peoples of the USSR begin.

There were some wrong soldiers in the Brest Fortress who began to resist the Nazis without "sobering up". Don't write nonsense, my friend.

[Vovk]

Quote: atos_kin

There were some wrong soldiers in the Brest Fortress who began to resist the Nazis without "sobering up"

Of course, they had to spend their last cartridge on themselves, so as not to surrender !!! Watch fewer films and believe less propaganda. Even in the Brest Fortress, everything was not so simple. There were those who fought to the last, there were also those who escaped or surrendered without a fight and then gave their commanders to the Germans.

[Undecim]

Quote: syndicalist

On the one hand, we secret all military archives, and on the other, we accuse everyone of "libels" and "malicious lies."

This is if you do not read and do not think before you write. And if you read and think a little, the question looks somewhat different: “On the one hand, the state secrets military archives, and on the other, it encourages all kinds of libelous and false historians.

[Eug]

In my opinion, Zhukov was directly involved in the use of mech. As for the "blow into the void" by the mechanized corps withdrawn to the east - both on the Western and Southwestern fronts, the Germans used the same technique - they "bent" the advancing wedges much further east than they had anticipated (and, accordingly, retracted the mechanized corps to cut them off) our "operational minds". On the Western Front near Minsk (and not near Baranovichi), on the South - West - beyond Ostrog (and not beyond Dubno). That is why all the "measures" led to the rout. Both Vlasov and Kommekhkor-8 Ryabyshev went on a promotion - they were appointed commanders of the armies, which was in fact an admission of the absence of their guilt ...

[voyaka uh]

To defeat the advancing mechanized corps, the Germans several times
applied the classic "Tatar-Mongol" technique - hit
into a "stampede". Ditching technique for believability. All sorts of trucks
wedges.
Red Army tanks rushed in pursuit of the retreating enemy.
And they were ambushed by anti-tank guns from the flanks.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Eug

In my opinion, Zhukov was directly involved in the use of mech.

EMNIP, Zhukov gave the order to strike and collect mechanized corps - and left the headquarters of the direction. After that, the command and headquarters of the YuZN began to freak out, actually canceling the order of the NGSH and starting to shuffle the mechanized corps in an attempt to repel the phantom threat that intelligence had told them about. Plus, Comrade Muzychenko made his contribution, laying his hands on the 8th MK, which turned out to be in the band of his army.
And as a result, having lost time, having washed away and "layered" the mechanized corps on marches, the command of the direction returned to Zhukov's plan. But it was already too late - there was no time to concentrate the 8th MK, the 4th MK did not give Muzychenko, and instead of the soft rear and rear guards of the tank group, the German infantry managed to approach the direction of the attack of the mechanized corps. Attacking a position with bare tanks was suicide.

[Pavel57]

Quote: Dunkelheit

Any violent fantasy can be covered up with words - "military historians claim."

Comrade Stalin was never able to figure out whether there was a betrayal or not.

[bubalik]

then the 4th Mechanized Corps at that time was one of the two most powerful in our army. It was constantly replenished with military equipment, including the latest. By June 22, 1941, there were almost a thousand (979) combat vehicles in the corps, including 414 T-34 and KV-1 tanks. That is, he was much better than others provided with technology.

...
,,, and what's the point Everything is fine on our papers.
REPORT
ON THE BATTLE ACTIONS OF THE 32nd TANK DIVISION FOR THE PERIOD
from 22.6 to 14.7.41
,,,,1. The fighter’s single training was completed and the crew (squad) was knocked out incompletely
The division received tanks from 25.4.41 to 25.5.41. Combat training was accelerated. There were no textbooks or exhibits. To accelerate the training of crews, special teams of workers and engineers from factories producing tanks were involved.
2. In terms of firepower training, the personnel of tank regiments shot the second exercise of the armored vehicle "KOP-38" 1. The entire division fired off the first exercise "KOP-38" with rifles. The 32nd Howitzer Artillery Regiment did not manage to fire a single gunfire. The personnel were not trained to fire in the field.
3. The technical training of the personnel, especially the driver's personnel, was insufficient. Due to lack of time, the personnel did not fully master the combat materiel and driving of both the KV and T-34 tanks.
4. By the time of hostilities, the division was equipped with:
commanding staff on - 50,3%;
junior commanding staff -42,9%;
by ordinary composition - 105%.
The rank and file consisted mainly of the April and May 1941 draft... The headquarters of the units, due to the shortage of commanding personnel and the short training period, were not put together. By the time of hostilities, the division was equipped with the following materiel:
KV tanks - 77%,
T-34 tanks - 78%,
T-26 tanks - 100%,
BT-7 tanks - 120%,
armored vehicles - 42%.
The overall percentage of manning with materiel was 83%, wheeled vehicles - 22%, repair facilities - 13%, and the division was provided with 2% of spare parts.
Communication: radio - 30%, telephone - 50%.
An acute shortcoming was in the radios “RSB” and “5 AK”.
Of the set By the beginning of hostilities, the division had 34 stations only 7, of which 2 were faulty and left in winter apartments.
The division was provided with engineering equipment by 28%. Especially there was a lack of entrenching tools (saws, shovels, axes), which are so necessary for all types of sapper work.

There are no commanders, no sergeants, no spare parts, no communications. The personnel are not trained.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: bubalik

Everything is fine on our papers.

Everything was fine in our reports from the stands. But on the papers the commanders of the MK in 1941 cut the truth.

B / part 8995 and 9325 - Not provided with classes due to lack of space. Teaching aids are not enough: there are no manuals on the KV and T-34 tanks, instructions on the new material part of the weapon, BUP part II, UTV part II, instructions on the field service of the headquarters. There is no new charter for the rear. There are no visual aids on new weapons ...
In / part 9325 - the existing firing range (Green) is not equipped with a sufficient number of dugouts and devices for firing at moving targets.
Military unit 8995 - the units do not have training grounds, shooting ranges and training fields, since all the land adjacent to the location of the units belongs to peasants and is occupied by crops ... Plots of land for shooting ranges and training fields have not yet been assigned to the units. Materials on the issue of securing areas are presented

Mysterious military units No. 8995 and 9325 are the 4th and 7th military units of the 6th MK of Major General Khatskilevich.

However, in 1940, the real state of affairs began to be heard from the stands.

How are we preparing the tank troops to the fire business? At present, even in 1941, it is planned to dispense 6 shells per year for one tank, and eight tasks must be completed. And besides, the inspections and commissions checking the troops check the firing training by shooting, which is spent on shells. Therefore, it turns out that there are no shells for crew training, and this is fraught with great danger.

© Fedorenko Ya.N., Lieutenant General of Tank Forces, Head of the GABTU KA

[bubalik]

Maybe I didn’t put it that way, but you corrected it correctly, in the reports from the stands everything is fine.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: bubalik

Maybe I didn’t put it that way, but you corrected it correctly, in the reports from the stands everything is fine.

It depends on what kind of reports. And then, as Melia wrote, you need to clearly separate propaganda and planning. Since 1940, this difference has become even more pronounced: bravura speeches "with little blood. Mighty blow" rushed "outside" from the army, and behind the doors of the conference rooms, the commanders cited facts of flagrant failures in supply and training (and proposed measures to eliminate).

[Seal]

Quote: Flood

but for this it is necessary that these same military historians begin to write articles for the VO

Oddly enough, but people who proudly declare that they are historians with much more eagerness to write whole stories on the topic of campaigns, for example, "A. Macedonian", "J. Caesar" or "Genghis Khan", where they explain in the most detailed way all the nuances the designs of these characters, the implementation of these designs, as well as the designs of their opponents. Moreover, our historians "know" all the details, up to the thickness of the spearhead or arrowhead of "A. Macedonian", "Y. Caesar" or "Genghis Khan".
The reason is the most commonplace. In the absence of documentary historical sources, you can scratch with whatever language you like, right or left, up or down. But as for the newest history, it is dangerous to scratch with language. Such a "historian" will begin to scratch with his tongue as usual, and then bam, and some document will emerge or a testimony of a participant in the event that does not confirm what the historian is scratching with his tongue. Why do historians need this? It is much calmer and, most importantly, safer for the reputation to describe the campaigns of all Ramses, Agamemnons, Pericles and the above-mentioned "A. Macedonian", "Y. Caesar" or "Genghis Khan"

[astra wild2]

Agree with you.

[Garist Pavel]

There is a very good study by Yu. I. Mukhina. Everything is laid out on the shelves. I am convinced that there was a betrayal. For example, the command of the Western Front did everything to make the Germans pass. For example, the troops were taken out into the field, but not armed. And the order to remove all weapons from the aircraft in a few days? My grandfather, a Belarusian, was there. So, according to his words, 22 they woke up, but not a single officer was present, everyone ran away. Then they themselves ornanized - and to the east, where part of the grandfather joined the combat-ready unit. And the actions of Kirponos, who, specifically, sprayed the troops and did everything not to interfere with the Germans. (apparently, he wanted to surrender, but how to surrender if there are honest commanders around you?) So he sent them to their death. But as a result, in this grove, either the Germans covered him by mistake, or the NKVD company figured out what was what and slapped him. Like this. Stigma in the gun about many "generalishek"

[astra wild2]

"how to surrender if there are honest commanders around you," but how did Ponedelin and Kirillov end up in captivity?
I read that Kirponos shot himself

[Richard]

Hello Vera

how did Ponedelin come into captivity?

A.A. Kamentsev, soldier of the 12th army. From a letter to the wife of P.G. Ponedelin, 1975:
"

In my letter, I must tell you that Pavel Grigorievich on August 6-7, 1941 in Podvysokoye literally fought to the last bullet. The place of the battle is the building and courtyard of the district party committee in Podvysoky. When the cartridges ran out, Pavel Grigorievich led the remnants of the commandant's company and other scattered units of the group's headquarters into a bayonet attack. On the lower street leading to the Yatran River, in hand-to-hand combat, he was stunned by the butt of a machine gun and taken prisoner. "

[astra wild2]

Good evening Dmitry "Rich". I deliberately didn’t want to comment on Frolova, they would say: "Baba's envy" and could not resist
All this: "Frolovshina" and "Samsonovschina" desire to be PR among colleagues with a child's intellect. For this, Hitler's toilet and once again make the Ukrainians villains.
I read Martirosyan and agree: there was treason, but where Frolova finds it.
In some TV program I heard: Kirponos shot himself. It is also assumed that Lizyukov shot himself

[Richard]

.AND. I. Lizyukov did not shoot himself - his tank was hit, and he himself was killed.
Materials of the official investigation of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front about the circumstances of the death of General Lizyukov. TsAMO. F. 202 (Bryansk front). Op. 50. D. 1. L. 304-305.:

According to the testimony of the only survivor of the KV crew - junior driver-mechanic senior sergeant Sergey Mozhaev:
"... Major General Alexander Ilyich Lizyukov died in battle with his crew on July 23, 1942, near the southern spur of the grove, which is 2 km south of the village of Lebyazhye (height 188,5) of the Semiluksky district of the Voronezh region from a direct hit from a shell. how to get out of the tank, I personally examined all the corpses. The body of the commander was practically headless. I could not find his commander's tablet, I could not find documents from the dead, since the entire crew and commander were in overalls. I managed to jump out of the tank and, having received two wounded, he was able, nevertheless, to crawl away from him for some distance, from which he saw that the German soldiers climbed onto the tank, pulled out the commander's tablet and looked at the documents that were there .. "

According to the testimony of the deputy commander of the 89th tank brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Davidenko:
On the afternoon of July 23, the tankers of the advancing 89th Tank Brigade found an unidentified corpse without uniform with insignia near the destroyed KV Lizyukov, in simple boots and working overalls, in which there was only a material book in the name of Major General A. I. Lizyukova. In the absence of information about the actions of the neighboring corps and the disappearance of the general, I decided to bury the unidentified corpse, and find out the origin of the booklet found on it. By my order, the unidentified murdered man, who, presumably, was General A. I. Lizyukov, was taken to the edge of the grove and buried there on the night of July 23 without any honors or monuments. "

Sdvizhkov I. Yu. "The last battle of General Lizyukov: tragedy, memory, searches." Military-Historical Archive No. 6 for 2009 provides an entry in the daily report from the 387th German Infantry Division to the corps headquarters for July 23:
“Our dive bombers disabled 8 enemy tanks. The artillery forces of the division knocked out 188,5 tank "KV" at the height of 1 "

In the report on irrecoverable losses dated October 2, 1942, the entry "killed on 23-25.7.42" is indicated

[astra wild2]

Colleague Richard, Dmitry. Good morning.
Perhaps they will again say that I am overly emotional, but I do not like, to put it mildly, Davydenko's act. Buried like a stray dog ​​at night

[evgen1221]

Communication and lack of initiative on the spot in making decisions from their intelligence, without looking back at Moscow and the General Staff. At least at the local level, they could trust their patrols. In general, of course, there are a lot of incomprehensible things, they cleaned a lot so that they do not look full of y, but only pieces of paper and archives are one thing, but real throwing is another, a piece of paper and (can be found) with an explanation of the consistency and throwing and supposedly planned boilers and rollbacks to Moscow, yes they will draw whatever they like.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: evgen1221

lack of initiative on the spot in making decisions from their intelligence, without looking back at Moscow and the General Staff

Well, Kirponos took the initiative and made a decision based on the report of his intelligence. The result is the failure of the counterstrike on the 1st TGr and the loss of the border battle.

Quote: evgen1221

At least at the local level, they could trust their patrols.

Oh yes ... remind you. that those who were not suitable for fighter and bomber aviation were written off to air reconnaissance.
The reconnaissance completely failed the assessment of the enemy forces in the SWN zone:

It is clearly seen that the forces of the Germans are underestimated. The forces advancing in the main direction, at the junction between the 5th and 6th armies, do not differ in intelligence from those operating in the auxiliary direction. The force of the blow from the Sokal salient is three times understated: instead of three infantry divisions, only one is indicated. The reconnaissance did not notice the appearance of the 11th Panzer Division. Only the appearance of the 14th Panzer Division at Ustylug was revealed.

© Isaev
On June 23, SWZ reconnaissance found nonexistent tanks at all:

On the highway from Brest * a ** to Kovel at 6 o'clock, the advance of tanks was noted, the number is not established

© Isaev

[astra wild2]

Quote: Alien From

You are right, but very categorical! All the same, the author is a woman!

Are you saying that if a woman is an idiot?
Frolovshina and "Samsonovschina" are a manifestation of the poverty of our site. Now only two authors decorate and save the Site - Valery and Vyacheslav Olegovich!

[smaug78]

Quote: syndicalist

On the one hand, we secret all military archives, and on the other, we accuse everyone of "libels" and "malicious lies."

This is your personal opinion and, moreover, it is erroneous ...

[Vovk]

Quote: smaug78

Quote: syndicalist

On the one hand, we secret all military archives, and on the other, we accuse everyone of "libels" and "malicious lies."

This is your personal opinion and, moreover, it is erroneous ...

What are you talking about? At least try to get access to the military archives on the defense of Moscow ... you will be surprised at the amount of still classified materials.
A simple fact is the flooding of the area without evacuation and warning of the local population during the defense of Moscow with mass casualties among the citizens of the USSR. This fact is still denied and the military archives for this are still classified.
Or when the first Siberian divisions near Moscow, practically unarmed (only 20% equipped with weapons), were criminally thrown under German tanks, and then the families of the victims were sent en masse statements that they disappeared, why help the families of the heroes. And of course there was no such fact ... in the open archives you will only find a mention of the 2nd wave of the Siberian divisions. And the classified military archives still contain lists of the heroes who died, but this means admitting that they sent people to certain death, and then abandoned their families to their own devices ...

[Konnick]

What archives were you interested in? Specifically?
Maybe Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 1269 of 1940, establishing pensions for families of those killed with one disabled person at 35% of their average monthly salary, with two disabled people - 45%, with three or more disabled people - 60%. And especially for you, a note: "families of those who disappeared during the period of hostilities have the right to support on an equal basis with the families of the victims."
And find the missing persons notice, it says that this notice is a document for applying for a pension.
My grandfather disappeared without a trace, but my grandmother received a pension, my grandfather was declared dead only in 1946, thanks to a letter from a friend in 42 from a friend about the death of his grandfather in battle. The author of the letter himself died in 45.

[Konnick]

The problem was more psychological, the widow is understandable, but the wife of the missing is different.
And here is the questionnaire for grandfather, post-war search

[Vovk]

Quote: Konnick

And especially for you, a note: "families of those who disappeared during the period of hostilities have the right to support on an equal basis with the families of the victims."

Yes, but you forgot one more informal note - it does not apply to families where there is a suspicion of surrender.
The price of 30% of that assigned pension was 300 grams of bread on the market.

[geologist]

In 1943-45. tank corps "drove" no less and nothing, coped. Chelyabinsk tankers ran from Berlin to Prague with battles through the Rudnye Mountains in a few days. The Germans, too, when they drove the freshest, not yet run-in tank troops to Austria, lost a lot of equipment along the way without fighting, which caused Homeric laughter from the British. To drive, you have to drive, but for a broken one they give you two.

[Iskazi]

The author has a lot of blunders ..., but the topic of betrayal is very relevant, and most likely it was, along with the incompetence of the command and the mess, and the fact that the Germans were going very quickly is an unpleasant fact ... my deceased uncle went through the whole war, in the summer On the 41st they walked along the road in the forest ..., and the Germans were advancing along the road, he really did not like to talk about the war, but sometimes it broke through.

[smaug78]

Quote: Vovk

Or when the first Siberian divisions near Moscow, practically unarmed (only 20% equipped with weapons) were criminally thrown under German tanks, and then the families of the victims were sent en masse statements - they disappeared, why help the families of the heroes

Do you use Svanidze at night?

[clerk]

Another foul-smelling trash. Interesting - what is this madama doing in life, except for sprinkling stupid articles? Does she understand what it means to make decisions in the face of conflicting orders and complete uncertainty? Again, betrayal is a deliberate act, in this case not proven by anyone. In general ..... f-ftopku (s)

[Vovk]

Quote: Konnick

What archives were you interested in? Specifically?

My great-grandfathers, grandfathers, fathers, all my life I have found out the fate of their relatives from Penza, who officially "disappeared" during the defense of Moscow. They just got into those first Siberian divisions, and for clarity, those divisions were not personnel. Personnel arrived only in the second wave.
Patriotic novels were not written about them, films were not made, since. the command of the Red Army stupidly practically unarmed people were thrown under the German tanks. And even now it is impossible to get the payroll of those divisions. They are not in the open archives.

[IL-18]

The clumsy article stinks. By the way, 15 MK fought pretty well for those conditions, although then it was commanded by the same Vlasov.
In the first month of the war, the SWF was a donor for the ZF, which contributed to the fact that the command was simply confused in choosing which hole to patch.
The place where the Germans could not use mobile units, the Pripyat swamps. There, the actions of the 5th Army were quite successful.

[Seal]

Quote: Vovk

And even now it is impossible to get the payroll of those divisions.

Do you have the numbers of these divisions and the names of the division commanders?

[Seal]

Quote: Vovk

A simple fact is the flooding of the area without evacuation and warning of the local population during the defense of Moscow with mass casualties among the citizens of the USSR. This fact is still denied and the military archives for this are still classified.

Come on. Here, read it.
http://moskva-volga.ru/moskovskij-potop-1941-goda-novye-dannye/

[maiman61]

The mechanized corps in 1941 was destroyed by commissars of all stripes! The commissars, naturally stupid, talkers and idlers, recruited from garbage dumps, forced commanders to throw subordinate troops into a meat grinder, without intelligence, without supplies, without communication, without ammunition and fuel, without the support of artillery and aviation! The generals were suppressed by the pre-war purges and submitted to the absolutely thoughtless demands of the commissars! The commissars bore absolutely no responsibility, they needed only one thing to be appreciated in the political department, their "courage"! Therefore, this harmful organ of the commissars was later abolished altogether, as harmful to the army!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: maiman61

The mechanized corps in 1941 was destroyed by commissars of all stripes! The commissars, naturally stupid, talkers and idlers, recruited from garbage dumps, forced commanders to throw subordinate troops into a meat grinder, without intelligence, without supplies, without communication, without ammunition and fuel, without the support of artillery and aviation!

Have you read Popelya? So he himself is a commissioner.
And, by the way, described by Popel "the appearance of commissar Vashugin to corps commander Ryabyshev", is absent in the documents signed by Popel. Moreover, at the time described in Popel's memoirs phenomena, 34th TD should have been advancing for a long time: according to the order of that same Ryabyshev, 34th TD was supposed to go on the offensive already at 9.00 on June 27.

[maiman61]

It is enough for clever people to read clever people, and not every hell knows who? Memoirs of Zhukov and other generals. You just need to read and try to understand what was happening then.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: maiman61

It is enough for clever people to read clever people, and not every hell knows who? Memories of Zhukov and other generals

Which are the memories of Comrade Zhukov? Otherwise they are from publication to publication fluctuated along with the party lineby changing its content.

[maiman61]

Well, of course! And your hell knows who with the party line did not hesitate!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: maiman61

Well, of course! And your hell knows who with the party line did not hesitate!

And mine are the same ones who wrote the memoirs. But during the war, and not after it, when everyone began to portray himself as a noble Gascon.
Documents from the times of the war should be looked at, not post-war literary exercises. And then, according to the memoirs, we have a grandiose victory in the oncoming tank battle, and according to the documents - a head-on strike on the German defense, two tank corps worn down to the point of loss of combat effectiveness and the battlefield left behind by the Germans.

[maiman61]

Those who fought, and not scratched their ass in the train, had NEVER had to write their memoirs!

[Radical]

While the corps assigned to the armies of the 6th and 26th is really worth a closer look.

Enough has been said in this phrase to determine the relation to this article. Formations, whether it be a mechanized corps or a division, can be organizationally part of a specific army, or attached / transferred from a neighboring army / front, or from a reserve, for example, the Supreme Command. In short, the connection is not a steamer that is assigned to any port ....

[georggy]

Heresy is some sort of article.

[Chack wessel]

Under the nickname "Irina Frolova" Martirosyan is hiding. :)

[Dzafdet]

I have long been tormented by doubts that not everything is going well with these mechanized corps. Strange movements .. Where was the reconnaissance? Zhukov, who destroyed 6500 tanks at the Southern Federal District ... But, unfortunately, under Khrushchev, the archives were heavily cleaned up ... How, with 22 tanks, did they lose in 1941? just don't write me tales about the dominant aviation ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Dzafdet

Strange movements.

Nothing strange - just the command of the SWF found it possible to cancel the order of the OGSh Zhukov for flank counterattacks on the 1st TGr and began to shuffle the corps based on the information available to the command. Which turned out to be false. As a result, having lost a day, the SWZ command returned to the original plan and began to move the MK again.
This arbitrariness was superimposed on the same arbitrariness of the command of the 6th Army, which not only did not give up "its" 4th MK for the counterattack, but also grabbed a division from the 8th MK, which was in the army zone.
Moreover, these are not isolated cases: at the SZN Zhukov tried for two weeks to pull the 1st Panzer Division out of Karelia: the command of the 14th A simply ignored the order. And when the division still managed to be transferred to Leningrad, it turned out that of the three regiments, only one remained in it - the 1st tank. The 2nd tank and 1st motorized rifle regiments remained in Karelia. Moreover, the 1st tank regiment did not arrive completely - without the 3rd tank battalion.
"Makhnov's freeman", lack of discipline and creative interpretation of orders were the scourge of the Red Army at the beginning of the war.

Quote: Dzafdet

Where was the intelligence?

She regularly reported on the tanks she found - in the wrong quantities and in the wrong place.

Quote: Dzafdet

Zhukov, who destroyed 6500 tanks at the SF.

The loss of the border battle in the SWN zone was not the result of Zhukov's order, but his failure to comply with the SWN command.

Quote: Dzafdet

How, having 22 thousand tanks, did you lose in 1941?

It's very simple: it's not tanks that are fighting, it's structures. And from us they took the German OShS from the times before the French campaign, inflated its warhead, did not provide rear services and communications, then these states were not staffed with personnel and equipment (especially artillery, rembats and rear services) and put in charge of all this people who are larger than the brigade, nothing in the battle was not fought. And they set the deadline for readiness in 1942. As a result, the Germans were met in the process of reforming and training.

[Seal]

Quote: Prophetic

History began to use the achievements of REAL science - radiocarbon analysis, optical spectroscopy, dendrochronology, etc. Does this make history a science?

Not. And it was the philosopher who convincingly proved this. The great German philosopher of the 19th century, Arthur Schopenhauer, in his classic work "The World as Will and Representation." So he wrote - "History does not meet the criteria that science should meet."

But history has at least some data on which it can rely - artifacts, ancient texts, the remains of buildings ...

The Lord is with you, where did the history of "ancient texts" come from? Name at least one ancient writer or politician, including "as is known, many personally wrote", for example, "Y. Caesar" in respect of whom it is "known for sure" that he could simultaneously write different texts with his left and right hand and at the same time carry on a conversation on the third topic. Is it really the handwriting of "Y. Caesar" established?
As Chipsa (Stepanenko) noted well:. All "Ancient History" is no more science than astrology. For it is all built on guesses, once expressed and accepted by the majority of "professional historians" as a "correct guess," the consequence of which is that this "correct guess" acquires the status of a "fact" in the next generation of "professional historians" ...
What do historians study?
Authentic documents?
Yeah, no matter how!
Take Egyptologists with their "Ancient Egypt".
The most important source for them is the "Works of the Priest Manetho".
And what, any of the historians have seen these "works" in the eye, even in a photocopy? Not! There are no originals of the "works of Manetho" in nature.
But this is not a problem for professional historians. They say that there is a list (copies or excerpts from the works of Manetho), made by a certain "ancient Greek" Eusebius.
Okay, but maybe one of them was holding or seeing a photocopy of the original of this Eusebius himself?
No, and Eusebius does not exist in the originals either.
But for professional historians this is not a problem either. They say there is a list (excerpts from the writings of Eusebius, which contains excerpts from the writings of Manetho), made by a certain ancient Latin, Jerome.
Of course you will laugh, but the originals of this Jerome are not left either !!!!
What is there? And there is a list (copy) of the medieval Byzantine Georgy Sinkeloss, who cites the "works of Jerome", in which there is a reference to the "works of Eusebius", which in turn contains a mention of a certain "ancient Egyptian Manetho and something of which he supposedly wrote or said what. "

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

After all, it was there that significant stocks of various property and spare parts for entire armies were stored. Just what was the nosebleeds the Germans needed for their advancing formations.

It is a very naive judgment that the attacking army in the offensive relies on captured warehouses (what equipment do they need? Ammunition? At best fuel), the offensive is carried out along the roads and the key points are the strongholds of the defense and the objectives of the offensive.
The author, having no military education, argues in a dilettante manner, like this entire dilettante series of articles.

[cniazev.borys]

The agents embedded in the ranks of the Red Army served well. At the right time, they did harm, so it is impossible to expose them. Perhaps it was the agents introduced by Trotsky who decided the fate of the battles in 1941.

[Dmitry Vaulin]

"People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal SK Timoshenko and the commander of the KOVO Army General G.K. Zhukov on the KOVO maneuvers. 1940"

[obratov]

... and there are also materials from Vlasov's interrogation, which for some reason are classified.
Yes, he is such a scoundrel and a scoundrel, but I would like to know ...
The style of the article is similar not to historical analysis, but to propaganda from the times of the war. What is it all about? Why should such nonsense be published on the pages of a resource that somehow respects itself?

[zrakvano]

This opus is similar to the method of hiding the true defendants with the help of one convict who took the blame. Such an agreement would be worth double-checking three times, this is how the facts are presented in order not to lose information management, apparently there is an order and therefore there are customers with money.

[Hippo]

"In previous publications, we tried to investigate situations in the very first days of the war, which suggest, among other things, intentional sabotage."
.................................................. .................................................. ....
The "True Story" of the Great Patriotic War is a fantastic composition from Zhukov's false memoirs, through and through Stadnyuk's fake novels and Ozerov's films. "
Anatoly Taras. Preface to the book I. Drogovoz. Large fleet of the Land of the Soviets. Minsk, 2003.S. 8

http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov11/31.html

[igor.borov775]

Hello everyone on the site. Yes, they hit hard without looking at the calendar. How many experts on war have grown up is incomprehensible. Everyone is trying to convince of the bad actions of our soldiers. And the actions of Korobkov's army There on the ledge north of Brest. They are heroes, our soldiers, bad military historians. They choose individual episodes, although there is a lot of that, then they contradict them and mold their own Throwing these facts out completely. The Germans knew all the combat units opposing them. They knew everything about us to Smolensk, inclusive. It's a pity that the last intelligence report for Verkhmat only once I read back in 1985 In the magazine Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. The Germans were calm about the large number of Armored formations of SA. At that distant time, probably the only time was published the DEFENSE PLAN of 1941 with the location of units of the first echelon of the troops covering the country's border and also the troops of the second echelon. It’s just inconvenient for me to read all this nonsense worthy of one editor KOROTICH (Ogonyok) it was not for nothing that he hastily moved to the United States. And now the 45th Infantry Division defended the border north of Brest, the defense sector 100 km south of Brest, the 75th Division. They received the full program. The soldiers fought. With the enemy to the last breath. Here, over the corpses of our soldiers, the famous tank groups Center and North moved into the depths of our country, a little later, they were joined by a group of the South. Read the reports of our districts on the first day of the war. Communication has been restored except for 45 and 75 infantry divisions. The sent liaison officers did not return. Attempts to find out that they had no success with them. It is necessary to read the reports of the Commanders of the Fleets of the German Air Forces. Bases, supply points, warehouses have been destroyed, where they are not fully controlled by aviation. Any empty car, loaded, is destroyed immediately. War has come to our house. And you need to write the truth, and not suck out profitable details. The border fought, no one retreated. The Germans suffered great losses. And the tanks of the Germans in the first day had already covered 60 km. They had no idea and they were rushing forward, crushing the rear. I read a list of five points which then interrogated all the living who were able to escape from that horror. Read them and the answers and all this dirtying will stop. It is necessary to take off the headdresses in front of these heroes, who were the first to take the battle with a cruel confident in their superiority, who has vast experience in fighting.

[Dmitry Golovkov]

Irina Frolova. How did you manage to sprinkle such an article and, at the same time, not a single link to sources of information? This is how you see from your bell tower the beginning of the war on the South-Western Front, or you still shoveled mountains of documents.
Reading your opus, one gets the impression that the armies and corps acted on their own and did not even interact with themselves, and at the same time you explain the reasons for such actions or inaction of the mechanized corps or by betrayal. In your opinion, almost immediately Vlasov became a traitor (well, yes, he was captured in the summer of 1942, accepted the proposal of the Nazis, which means he betrayed him at 41). Typical female logic.
And you were not interested when the SWF began to be put on full combat readiness? When did KOVO become SWF? Read the memoirs of Marshal Baghramyan, a 41-year-old colonel, chief of the operational department of the KOVO / SWF headquarters. It is clearly written there that this happened on 19.06.1941/18.06.1941/22.06 and the Commander departed for Tarnopol to the front command post. Those. Kirponos complied with the order of the General Staff of the Red Army dated XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX (which they write that no, and this "suicide" leads his district to the PBG). Baghramyan himself arrived at the command post only in the morning of June XNUMX, when the war had already begun.
In this regard, Rokossovsky's memoirs are very interesting in this regard, according to which, on the eve of the war, his corps carried out exercises, with access to the border river on 21.06. On the morning of June 22.06, he and the division commanders were going on a fishing trip, but then, supposedly, a defector brought disturbing news. And then the future Marshal of Victory decided to bring his corps to the PBG, without reporting either to the army or to the corps. The fact that the district / front was brought to this readiness from 19.06 by the famous marshal is modestly silent.
Silent or not knowing about bringing the SWF to PBG 19.06, you are also silent about the fact that the mechanized corps started moving on the same day. You also kept silent that one of the mechanized corps made a 500 km march before reaching the Dubno-Brody borders, losing more than half of the equipment.
You also did not mention the most important problem at that time: the lack of communication, as a result of which the front headquarters learned too late about the actions of the Germans in one direction or another and, accordingly, orders for retaliatory actions came with a delay. The lack of communication also interfered with the interaction of mechanized units and units on the battlefield.
You forgot to say the same about who flew to the headquarters of the SWF and actually supervised the actions of the SWF.
Having mentioned about Przemysl, you forgot or did not want to say that the western German part of Przemysl, on the left bank of the San River, was captured by the Red Army on 23.06.41/28.06/XNUMX and the bridgehead was held until XNUMX/XNUMX.