Torpedo disaster of Russia
Article "Anti-torpedo catastrophe of the Russian fleet" caused a violent reaction, including in the professional environment. A question from a prominent Russian specialist (on "related topics") to the author:
"Is this all true?"
Of course.
Moreover, the article contains only those facts that have not just public links, but in the most "sensitive issues" links to sources permitted for publication by the relevant authorities.
That is, the simply "lethal" facts set out in the article are just the "tip of the iceberg".
This is an anomaly on the scale of the entire Armed Forces, where the Navy is the most disastrous in terms of rearmament. And in the Navy itself - the whole topic of marine underwater weapons, where the military-technical lag from the current level reaches half a century (!).
Taking into account the acuteness of the issues and the specifics of the problem, it is necessary to write about it relying on open and public documents, but with the implementation of their comprehensive deep analysis.
Of the “fresh” publications worthy of a “deep dissection”, it is especially worth noting the article by Yu.V. Novikov (head of the military-technical cooperation department of the Concern "Gidropribor") "Military-technical cooperation of the State Scientific Center of JSC" Concern "MPO-Gidropribor" with foreign countries ".
It was written (the style was slightly changed) in 2014 as part of a sharp "torpedo discussion" on publications in the "Military-Industrial Courier":
I think it is worth identifying the main problems of modern domestic torpedoism, with "some explanation of the situation" ...
1. Lack of modern scientific and technical groundwork. Here "Lomonos" played a negative role, which began to be "officially" shoved since about 2010 - "the development of super torpedoes of the 21st century with fantastic performance characteristics in a fantastically short time."
Moreover, this was "promised" by an organization that has failed all the topics over the past couple of decades and has serially produced equipment that has been "altered" from the American early 60s of the last century. The actual goal of "Lomonos" is to "devour" all "Torpedo money" for the coming years.
2. For this, the "crushing" began "Physics" (with the cowardly compromise of the "Region") - that is, the model considered by the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate of the Navy in the 2000s as the base torpedo of the Navy, which had the highest performance characteristics of all domestic, a huge modernization stock, and confirmed its performance characteristics (yes, it's hard, with "Blood") on state tests back in 2007 (!).
Prices for the products themselves soared, and most importantly for operation (with the existing ones - the modernization of "Physics" and its normal development for navy impossible due to the wild cost of shooting).
3. Due to the termination of the modernization of "Physics" many years ago, the antique "Kant" was launched. "Questions" on it are given above. (If we take the real, then this "balalaika" actually did not pass the tests. Those that were - this is their imitation and falsification). Further, the modernization of "Physics" was "resumed". But in a form in which not only it will not be, but also further serial production will become impossible. Calling a spade a spade is a deliberate sabotage.
4. Under these conditions, UPV was forced to order outdated USETs to Dagdizel, especially since Dagdizel began a serious initiative R&D on a new product, which went very well.
As a result, we have:
- a scam with "Lomonos" (despite the fact that it is clear to all sane specialists that the deadlines will be disrupted, and most importantly, there will be indecency at the end);
- the serial production nevertheless, despite all the intrigues of the "Physics" launched in the series, after a while will become impossible;
- serial production of antique USET-80 is no longer possible;
- completion of tests (for which it is necessary to manufacture materiel - that is, money) of a new product of "Dagdizel" is blocked, accordingly - without the completion of tests there will be no series.
All.
And this is done by the "hydra" so that the fleet, which has already been placed on all fours with torpedoes, "squeezes its nose" and "closes its eyes." And crawled to them on all fours "give at least something." After that, the "hydra" will solemnly foist on him the "Kant" who did not pass the tests, and the lies about "Lomonos". Moreover, the fleet will be made guilty for all this. And he will be forced to be silent!
1. Lack of modern scientific and technical groundwork. Here "Lomonos" played a negative role, which began to be "officially" shoved since about 2010 - "the development of super torpedoes of the 21st century with fantastic performance characteristics in a fantastically short time."
Moreover, this was "promised" by an organization that has failed all the topics over the past couple of decades and has serially produced equipment that has been "altered" from the American early 60s of the last century. The actual goal of "Lomonos" is to "devour" all "Torpedo money" for the coming years.
2. For this, the "crushing" began "Physics" (with the cowardly compromise of the "Region") - that is, the model considered by the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate of the Navy in the 2000s as the base torpedo of the Navy, which had the highest performance characteristics of all domestic, a huge modernization stock, and confirmed its performance characteristics (yes, it's hard, with "Blood") on state tests back in 2007 (!).
Prices for the products themselves soared, and most importantly for operation (with the existing ones - the modernization of "Physics" and its normal development for navy impossible due to the wild cost of shooting).
3. Due to the termination of the modernization of "Physics" many years ago, the antique "Kant" was launched. "Questions" on it are given above. (If we take the real, then this "balalaika" actually did not pass the tests. Those that were - this is their imitation and falsification). Further, the modernization of "Physics" was "resumed". But in a form in which not only it will not be, but also further serial production will become impossible. Calling a spade a spade is a deliberate sabotage.
4. Under these conditions, UPV was forced to order outdated USETs to Dagdizel, especially since Dagdizel began a serious initiative R&D on a new product, which went very well.
As a result, we have:
- a scam with "Lomonos" (despite the fact that it is clear to all sane specialists that the deadlines will be disrupted, and most importantly, there will be indecency at the end);
- the serial production nevertheless, despite all the intrigues of the "Physics" launched in the series, after a while will become impossible;
- serial production of antique USET-80 is no longer possible;
- completion of tests (for which it is necessary to manufacture materiel - that is, money) of a new product of "Dagdizel" is blocked, accordingly - without the completion of tests there will be no series.
All.
And this is done by the "hydra" so that the fleet, which has already been placed on all fours with torpedoes, "squeezes its nose" and "closes its eyes." And crawled to them on all fours "give at least something." After that, the "hydra" will solemnly foist on him the "Kant" who did not pass the tests, and the lies about "Lomonos". Moreover, the fleet will be made guilty for all this. And he will be forced to be silent!
Something has changed since then.
"Physicist-1" was launched into a large series and put into service. The sabotage with the modernization of "Physics" was stopped, and its more or less decent deep modernization ("Case") began. Stopped "Lomonos". He successfully completed the tests and entered the Ichthyosaurus series.
Success?
Is that small.
At what cost it was given to all participants - a separate conversation. And in a number of cases with details worthy of the pen of Agatha Christie.
However, when considering the issues of high-tech weapons, comparison with the enemy is very important. Yes, the worst weapon in some cases can be successfully fought and won. However, here it is necessary that there be at least a “minimum threshold level of its effectiveness”. In order to use it successfully by other means (tactics, military cunning). If this “minimum level of effectiveness” is not there, then the weapon is nothing more than “firewood”.
And with our torpedo weapons, in relation to the ammunition of the fleet, the situation is largely exactly the same - "torpedo firewood".
Speaking about the topic of naval underwater weapons, it will be very useful to recall the only public discussion that took place at the Army-2015 forum, with the participation of key industry and navy specialists. More details about this - “Russia's naval underwater weapons today and tomorrow. Will the breakthrough come from the "torpedo crisis?"
The author was directly related to the events related to the IGO and the development of the IGO Concept, since since 2007 he worked closely on this topic with Admiral G.A. Suchkov, Admiral of the Russian Defense Minister.
Taking into account the critical situation with the IGO of the Navy, Admiral Suchkov, in 2007 a memo was submitted to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Without touching upon the issue of Serdyukov's numerous mistakes (including in the part of the clumsy "reforming" of the command and control bodies of the RF Armed Forces), in that situation he behaved like a normal defense minister - give the Concept ("business plan") - "there will be funding for it."
However, the development and approval of the IGO Concept was then thwarted. This was due, first of all, to the intrigues of certain individuals and organizations, given that the decisions planned by the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate (UPV) of the Navy (in particular, on the Fizik torpedo) were fundamentally at odds with their financial interests.
Taking into account the critical situation with the IGO of the Navy, Admiral Suchkov, in 2007 a memo was submitted to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation. Without touching upon the issue of Serdyukov's numerous mistakes (including in the part of the clumsy "reforming" of the command and control bodies of the RF Armed Forces), in that situation he behaved like a normal defense minister - give the Concept ("business plan") - "there will be funding for it."
However, the development and approval of the IGO Concept was then thwarted. This was due, first of all, to the intrigues of certain individuals and organizations, given that the decisions planned by the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate (UPV) of the Navy (in particular, on the Fizik torpedo) were fundamentally at odds with their financial interests.
It was written in 2015 ...
Five and a half years have passed. The term for which it was possible to carry out development work (R&D) on a promising topic. In other words, to solve the main part of the problems and really provide the fleet with effective and reliable torpedoes.
What actually happened?
Torpedo "firewood" of the Navy
The topic of ancient and obsolete (even at the time of their adoption in service in 1980) USET-80 torpedoes in the Boreyev ammunition has been raised several times. However, this is a question that needs to be raised harshly and publicly until it is resolved. The Navy itself, completely following the lead of the industry, apparently is not in a position to independently solve this problem.
APKR project "Borey": loading torpedo "firewood" USET-80, they are also on the torpedo deck.
And the key problem here is not even the low transport characteristics of the USET-80 torpedo, but the extremely low noise immunity of both variants of its homing system (CCH): both "Waterfall" and "Keramika".
At first, USET-80 had a SSN "Waterfall" (the so-called "five"), later replaced (after a criminal case and a big scandal with "Keramika" - the so-called "ten").
Something about these circumstances:
The head of the torpedo weapon exploitation department of the 28th Central Research Institute of the Navy L. Bozin recalled:
“The commander of the 3rd generation submarine formation, Admiral Tomko, sent the boats into combat with a heavy feeling ...
Knowing that torpedoes are not aimed at the target, when performing a combat exercise, he positioned the shooting boat and the target in such a way that it was impossible to miss.
But the torpedo still did not see the target ... "
“The commander of the 3rd generation submarine formation, Admiral Tomko, sent the boats into combat with a heavy feeling ...
Knowing that torpedoes are not aimed at the target, when performing a combat exercise, he positioned the shooting boat and the target in such a way that it was impossible to miss.
But the torpedo still did not see the target ... "
Very interesting here is the "look at the emerging problem" of the industry ("Gidropribor"), which, in fact, "got it done in full", but is very "concerned" with the "honor of the fleet":
A similar situation is described in the memoirs of an employee of the Gidropribor Research Institute, who participated in the development:
“It was 1986. The Northern Fleet has been firing USET-80 practical torpedoes for five years.
However, in the submarine mode, the results of these firing began to alarming: maybe the sailors are poorly mastering this torpedo or the torpedo is unstably guided in the conditions of shallow northern ranges.
After repeated batisfere tests on real targets, it was established that the SSN torpedoes USET-80 in the conditions of the North landfills did not provide the required response distance according to the technical specification.
The honor of the fleet remained at the height, and the Central Research Institute Gidropribor took another two years to put on the torpedo USET-80 SSN, adapted, among other things, to the conditions of the North. ”
USET-80K caliber 534 mm, 1989 ... new SSN "Keramika" ... pleased with their successes ... homing devices completing their cycle of full-scale tests of torpedo "Kolibri" (product 294, caliber 324 mm, 1973) with SSN reproduced on domestic elemental base ...
This SSN - "Ceramics" - has broken all records of longevity. There is practically no torpedo left where this SSN was not installed as an anti-submarine SSN during modernization. "
“It was 1986. The Northern Fleet has been firing USET-80 practical torpedoes for five years.
However, in the submarine mode, the results of these firing began to alarming: maybe the sailors are poorly mastering this torpedo or the torpedo is unstably guided in the conditions of shallow northern ranges.
After repeated batisfere tests on real targets, it was established that the SSN torpedoes USET-80 in the conditions of the North landfills did not provide the required response distance according to the technical specification.
The honor of the fleet remained at the height, and the Central Research Institute Gidropribor took another two years to put on the torpedo USET-80 SSN, adapted, among other things, to the conditions of the North. ”
USET-80K caliber 534 mm, 1989 ... new SSN "Keramika" ... pleased with their successes ... homing devices completing their cycle of full-scale tests of torpedo "Kolibri" (product 294, caliber 324 mm, 1973) with SSN reproduced on domestic elemental base ...
This SSN - "Ceramics" - has broken all records of longevity. There is practically no torpedo left where this SSN was not installed as an anti-submarine SSN during modernization. "
Taking into account the fact that this SSN "Gidropribor" "tore" (and still "fights" in the series!) From an American torpedo, the development of the late 50s (Mk46 mod.1, 1961), as they say, comments superfluous!
Sharp posing of questions by the author of the article in 2010 (from the article "Marine underwater weapons: problems and opportunities" Part 1., Part 2.) caused a "definite reaction" of "Gidropribor" - article "An example of unfounded criticism":
Discussing the SSV "Waterfall" (amplitude equal-signal), M. Klimov drew attention to the insufficient range of action on submarines, which took place in the shallow areas of our northern ranges.
But he either forgot or did not know that a similar property in shallow water is inherent in all western CLOs. Unfortunately, the same picture was observed in our country as a result of an increase in the levels of the boundary reverberation interference under these conditions and, accordingly, an increase in the triggering threshold of the CCH due to the receiving acoustic beams deployed in the vertical plane.
In the temperate and deep-water areas of the North, Black, Japanese and other seas, the range of the "Waterfall" SSN fully corresponded to the requirements of the TZ.
But he either forgot or did not know that a similar property in shallow water is inherent in all western CLOs. Unfortunately, the same picture was observed in our country as a result of an increase in the levels of the boundary reverberation interference under these conditions and, accordingly, an increase in the triggering threshold of the CCH due to the receiving acoustic beams deployed in the vertical plane.
In the temperate and deep-water areas of the North, Black, Japanese and other seas, the range of the "Waterfall" SSN fully corresponded to the requirements of the TZ.
Over time, the "Waterfall" SSN was replaced by a later development - the "Ceramics" phase SSN, which has high noise immunity. Yes, one of the first SSN models of the American MK46 torpedo served as a prototype for the "Keramika".
Ну и что?
SSN MK46 was not only deciphered by us and transferred to the domestic element base, but also supplemented with a number of electronic units of our design. And, in particular, technical solutions to protect against GPA funds, which were not available in the prototype at all.
Ну и что?
SSN MK46 was not only deciphered by us and transferred to the domestic element base, but also supplemented with a number of electronic units of our design. And, in particular, technical solutions to protect against GPA funds, which were not available in the prototype at all.
The answer to such "creative" views followed. And devastating - article "Marine Underwater Weapons-2: Arguments and Facts".
My opponents declare that the "Waterfall" CLS meets the technical specifications in temperate and deep-water areas. "
However, it is not.
It all depends on the conditions of the shooting. Even in deep-water areas, under a number of conditions, there was no need to talk about the compliance of the Waterfall CLS with the technical specifications ...
The reason for the difference between the results of samples and real work in the fleet is well known - greenhouse test conditions.
The reference of my opponents to the fact that a number of western torpedoes also had problems with aiming at targets in shallow water is untenable.
Of course, they had problems, but their level and complexity could not be compared with the failure that we got with the SSN "Waterfall".
The reason for this is that Western CLOs had a number of effective methods of protection against reverberation interference (reflections from the surface, volumetric irregularities, and especially the bottom), which were absent in the “Waterfall” CLO, and their signals were more adapted to work in jamming conditions.
However, it is not.
It all depends on the conditions of the shooting. Even in deep-water areas, under a number of conditions, there was no need to talk about the compliance of the Waterfall CLS with the technical specifications ...
The reason for the difference between the results of samples and real work in the fleet is well known - greenhouse test conditions.
The reference of my opponents to the fact that a number of western torpedoes also had problems with aiming at targets in shallow water is untenable.
Of course, they had problems, but their level and complexity could not be compared with the failure that we got with the SSN "Waterfall".
The reason for this is that Western CLOs had a number of effective methods of protection against reverberation interference (reflections from the surface, volumetric irregularities, and especially the bottom), which were absent in the “Waterfall” CLO, and their signals were more adapted to work in jamming conditions.
It should be noted that the author's acquaintance with USET-80 and "Waterfall" was not at all theoretical. And in personal communication with the authors of the article "An Example of Unjustified Criticism", these authors simply had nothing to cover. As for Keramika:
A number of limitations of the design of the "original sample" did not allow for a significant increase in the performance characteristics of "Keramika" and bring them in line with the modern requirements at that time.
So, the author's point of view is that the result of work on the development of the CLS should be a serial torpedo mastered in the fleet, confirming its performance characteristics when firing in real conditions of use.
Figuratively speaking, this is "a look at the situation from the torpedo compartment and the central post of the submarine."
My opponents, apparently, consider a large amount of R&D and performance of firing, carried out in obviously ideal conditions, to be the “result” ...
So, the author's point of view is that the result of work on the development of the CLS should be a serial torpedo mastered in the fleet, confirming its performance characteristics when firing in real conditions of use.
Figuratively speaking, this is "a look at the situation from the torpedo compartment and the central post of the submarine."
My opponents, apparently, consider a large amount of R&D and performance of firing, carried out in obviously ideal conditions, to be the “result” ...
In addition, one cannot fail to note another excellent statement by the representatives of Gidropribor:
As for the current level of our developments in comparison with the West, then, according to the General Director of OJSC Concern MPO - Gidropribor V.A. Osipova,
“... we lagged behind for one simple reason: those ROCs that were started in the 80s should have been completed in the 90s, which would have allowed us to at least reach parity.
But due to the collapse of the USSR, which led to the disruption of the existing cooperation, and weak funding, we are reaching this level only now, more than 10 years late. "
“... we lagged behind for one simple reason: those ROCs that were started in the 80s should have been completed in the 90s, which would have allowed us to at least reach parity.
But due to the collapse of the USSR, which led to the disruption of the existing cooperation, and weak funding, we are reaching this level only now, more than 10 years late. "
So, what began in the 80s, "Gidropribor" is trying to finish "just now." And solemnly "hand over" to the fleet. However, for the aforementioned SSN it still looks "decent" (from the point of view of Gidropribor specialists). Still, "some thirty years"! But the chief designer of the engine of this "very strongly" proposed to the fleet of the torpedo died in 1969. Never mind, it was recently put into series production at Gidropribor again (de facto having signed for the inability to create a modern engine).
It should be noted that the title of this topic has an “English version of reading”, which comprehensively characterizes the entire “bottom” of this OCD.
In details - "Ichthyosaurus" and others. Electric torpedoes - new and old. "
From the author's statement to the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (No. OGR-12224 of 20.07.2017):
... for ROC "Kant" (modernization of product 2503):
1. No tests have ever been carried out to check the real noise immunity ... - with the simultaneous presence of the target and hydroacoustic countermeasures in the observation zone of the CLS, modern, ... operating in the normal mode.
2. The single-use battery ... has never passed real tests for charging (start-up) ... in accordance with the technical specifications.
3. The new practical battery of the product did not pass the safety requirements (tests) in the Navy, it has the letter 01 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and there are still numerous failures in the control and protection system. The unsatisfactory operation of the control and protection system is a prerequisite for an explosion and fire of a powerful power battery on the torpedo deck.
4. The Kant II product has never been tested in conjunction with a combat battery, while separate batteries for the power and instrument circuit were used for testing (which cannot be provided for a combat battery).
1. No tests have ever been carried out to check the real noise immunity ... - with the simultaneous presence of the target and hydroacoustic countermeasures in the observation zone of the CLS, modern, ... operating in the normal mode.
2. The single-use battery ... has never passed real tests for charging (start-up) ... in accordance with the technical specifications.
3. The new practical battery of the product did not pass the safety requirements (tests) in the Navy, it has the letter 01 of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and there are still numerous failures in the control and protection system. The unsatisfactory operation of the control and protection system is a prerequisite for an explosion and fire of a powerful power battery on the torpedo deck.
4. The Kant II product has never been tested in conjunction with a combat battery, while separate batteries for the power and instrument circuit were used for testing (which cannot be provided for a combat battery).
This raises a "wonderful question":
"But what about the Physicist?"
And with him, despite his formally high performance characteristics (confirmed on state tests), so far not a single prize of the Commander-in-Chief "for some reason has happened."
Moreover, at the time of the author's statement in the fall of 2015 to the Main Military Prosecutor's Office for Physics and Case, the Physicist torpedoes were last aimed at real submarine targets only on Gosy in 2007 (this was “somewhat corrected”, but only later 2015)!
That is, the fleet was supplied with obviously unusable ammunition. And this is not "someone gave out a military secret", and purely technical reasons for the deliberate destruction of this torpedo - up to deliberate sabotage.
Examples?
Please.
According to the formal requirement of the military acceptance of the State Scientific and Production Enterprise "Region" (and absolutely inadequate), the filling of the antenna was replaced. In other words, the "state" torpedo successfully passed with one fill, and went into production with a completely different one. And experts immediately warned about the consequences of this ...
Or, for example, the deliberate disruption of the extended tests (RI) "Physics" personally by the chief of military acceptance of the "Region", who deleted from the list published on the website of state purchases, the work of "Region", without which it was simply impossible to carry out these RIs. As a result, they still had to be carried out, but in the ways in which questions arise: where did those who were supposed to “watch” look?
However, the main problem of "Physics" was named back in the article of 2014 in the "Military-Industrial Courier" "Pitfalls of Severodvinsk":
Attention is also drawn to the extremely high cost of firing torpedoes "Fizik-1" (especially for work in the north from "Severodvinsk" - more than eight million rubles). Actually such a cost "kills" the "Physicist-1" torpedo, excluding its effective modernization and normal development in the fleet, due to the prohibitive cost of testing and combat training. These fantastic prices appeared after 2009, when the Gidropribor concern was appointed the sole supplier of Physics.
After that "suddenly" the cost of the product itself soared, and most importantly - the shot. Prices need to be reviewed. After firing torpedoes should be re-prepared in the navy with the participation of industry representatives, but under the supervision of naval specialists. In addition, it is necessary to restore the practice of one hundred percent zeroing (shooting) of all fired thermal torpedoes. This will give statistics, reliability, and confident mastering of new weapons.
After working out all coursework tasks, it is necessary to conduct ice tests similar to those of the American ICEX with firing of new torpedoes and countermeasures.
After that "suddenly" the cost of the product itself soared, and most importantly - the shot. Prices need to be reviewed. After firing torpedoes should be re-prepared in the navy with the participation of industry representatives, but under the supervision of naval specialists. In addition, it is necessary to restore the practice of one hundred percent zeroing (shooting) of all fired thermal torpedoes. This will give statistics, reliability, and confident mastering of new weapons.
After working out all coursework tasks, it is necessary to conduct ice tests similar to those of the American ICEX with firing of new torpedoes and countermeasures.
That is, the "Physicist-1" torpedo "exists" in the Navy, is supplied by the industry, and is in ammunition. However, in a "half-choked state."
At the same time, the "so-called partners", having adopted the Mk2006 mod.48 torpedo in 7 (at about the same time as the state tests "Physicist-1"), the US Navy in 2011-2012 managed to fire more than 300 rounds of Mk48 torpedoes mod.7 Spiral 4 (4th software modification of the 7th torpedo model). This is not counting the shots of the previous "mods" Mk48 from the modifications of the latest model (mod.7 Spiral 1-3).
Mass torpedo firing is an axiom of modern torpedoism. Unfortunately, Western.
The reason for this requirement is the complex and variable environment in which torpedoes are used. The unitary breakthrough of the US Navy (that is, the adoption in service in the late 60s - early 70s of the Mk46 and Mk48 torpedoes with dramatically improved performance characteristics) was associated precisely with the need to shoot a lot to practice and master new complex homing, control and remote control systems.
In terms of its characteristics, the OTTO-2 unitary fuel was frankly mediocre and was inferior in energy to the peroxide-kerosene pair already successfully developed in the US Navy by more than 30 percent. But this fuel made it possible to significantly simplify the torpedo device, and most importantly, to sharply (by an order of magnitude) reduce the cost of a shot. This ensured massive firing, successful fine-tuning and development of new torpedoes with high performance characteristics in the US Navy.
Solutions to the problems of Physics (including the inflated cost of a shot) were reported to the management (in particular, the Acting Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Fedotenkov in the fall of 2015), caused a lot of enthusiasm and ... fierce opposition from "persons with interest" who blocked the issue.
In addition, the export of our only 53-centimeter torpedo with more or less decent performance characteristics - UGST - was de facto blocked. As a result, not a single torpedo was exported, and this is against the background of the super-successful contracts of the 90s for its predecessor. But more on that below.
Torpedo UGST (photo by Vitaly Kuzmin)The question arises:
“And what about the Case?
Firstly, the "popular" statements of some of our media (including TASS) about the alleged "completion of tests" and "acceptance of this torpedo" have nothing to do with reality.
Real work on the "Case" (more precisely, on the main thing - her "head", "brains") began only from the end of 2015. After the author's application to the SHG. Despite the fact that there were good reasons for the "case" based on what was happening with this OCD in the period 2013–2015, everything was done to hush it up.
However, a big plus (and here a very positive role was played by the Technical Inspection of the Ministry of Defense) was already in the fact that they finally began to do what had to be done immediately (in fact, the ROC was started anew). Alas, not all.
The technical details are, of course, not for the media. However, it should be noted that the author was one of those who raised (2012–2013) the question of implementing the highest possible requirements in the Case. But on non-technical, organizational problems, he himself suggested (after a series of meetings with experts) to take a "step back" from this "maximum level of requirements." Just because there are questions and parameters, to "swing" at which without serious research and research, means - with a high probability of "flunk" OCD.
Accordingly, about any superiority of the "Case" over the Mk48 mod. 7 is not necessary to say. In terms of transport characteristics, due to our requirements for ampoule storage of fuel (similar in energy capacity), we obviously lose. On the "head" - also. Due to the failure to carry out (in fact, deliberate blocking, including on the part of the customer), the R&D works necessary for a breakthrough.
At the same time, in no way can it be considered that the "Physicist" torpedo is bad. Even despite some (small) lag in performance characteristics from the Mk48, you can successfully fight with it (including due to its very high noise immunity). And the people who make her "brains" are not just the best domestic specialists, but also sincere patriots of the country. Let me remind you that the success of the same persons on "Last" back in 1998 in the USA and Germany has not been able to repeat until now.
Here is the answer to the question:
"Case" or "Ichthyosaurus"?
"Ichthyosaurus" is already in the series. And the Navy needs it, unambiguously, in a certain (small) amount. However, both in terms of transport characteristics and in terms of "brains", "Case" is significantly superior to "Ichthyosaur". And it would be right to focus further production of Dagdizel on Case. We need an alternative, the problems of the "Gidropribrovsky" "Physics" extremely sharply raise the question of another manufacturer of the new torpedo.
From a 2017 article “Shooting at sea and bases. The newest submarines of the Russian Navy are being armed with outdated weapons and self-defense means. "
Separately, I would like to note the breakthrough groundwork for the acoustic CLS of torpedoes of the former head of the small acoustics department of AKIN D.P. Frolov, capable of increasing the effectiveness of our submarine forces by an order of magnitude. Its implementation in naval torpedoes allows even on old second-generation submarines, project 667BDR, to have equal chances in battle with the newest fourth-generation submarines "Virginia" (because the main thing in battle is weapons).
And this is quite objective. These solutions were actually tested at sea for real purposes. And the question of their introduction into the "Physicist" and "Case" torpedoes has been raised by specialists many times. However, all work on this topic was discontinued in the mid-2000s, with the transfer of ordering and control functions for R&D from the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate, first to the Directorate of Orders and Supply of Ships and Weapons, then to DOGOZ.
And this is quite objective. These solutions were actually tested at sea for real purposes. And the question of their introduction into the "Physicist" and "Case" torpedoes has been raised by specialists many times. However, all work on this topic was discontinued in the mid-2000s, with the transfer of ordering and control functions for R&D from the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate, first to the Directorate of Orders and Supply of Ships and Weapons, then to DOGOZ.
Dmitry Pavlovich is no longer with us today.
However, his scientific and technical groundwork remains, which someone really wants to destroy: from physical liquidation (documentation and materiel) to the elimination of any mention of these works.
For example, his speech at a conference at the KGSC in the fall of 2015, where he recalled some of the results of his work, simply disappeared from the conference reports. And it’s a very good question whether it’s an "accident" or "something more."
Export: and "torpedo firewood in load"!
Let's return to the article "Military-technical cooperation of SSC JSC" Concern "MPO-Gidropribor" with foreign countries ".
Section "Proposals for military-technical cooperation with foreign customers regarding the supply of mine and torpedo weapons"
2) torpedoes UETT, TE2 of various modifications ... belong to modern models.
In reality, the TE2 torpedo has:
- SSN, "reproduced on a domestic base" from an American torpedo developed at the end of the 50s;
- a battery according to an American patent of the 40s of the last century;
- the engine, the chief designer of which died in 1969;
- a telecontrol system, the level of the early 60s (which today it would be correct to call "reins").
Wow "modern sample"!
At the beginning of the XNUMXth century, on the world market of ship bottom mines, a certain interest was aroused by the proposals of JSC KMPO Gidropribor for the supply of an instrumentation module (APM) for the modernization of bottom mines of the UDM-E and DM type.
The question of this "rudiment" of the 60s of the last century has already been dealt with in the article “What's wrong with the 12700 project's newest PMK?”
However, it is worth adding to this the "reaction of foreign customers":
Regarding the interest of the Indian side in sea bottom mines, it should be noted that in 2010-2012. an international competition was announced for organizing joint production in India. The Concern's proposals were rejected.
... In terms of sea bottom mines, the PRC did not show interest in the proposals of KMPO Gidropribor.
... In terms of sea bottom mines, the PRC did not show interest in the proposals of KMPO Gidropribor.
It should be noted that the first customer of APM, having received this development, did not swear. And just in a couple of years I made myself modern sea mines. Himself. Against the background of which, what Gidropribor is demonstrating today is just antique junk.
Participation in the military-technical cooperation assumes the constant maintenance of export samples of equipment at a modern scientific and technical level.
For this purpose, JSC "Concern" MPO - Gidropribor "carries out constant measures to improve scientific, technical and industrial cooperation. In the Russian Federation, these include:
- Development of an electronic control device B-107 for torpedo weapons and its serial production since 2016 to replace the electromechanical control device B-27, supplied by JSC NPO Kiev Automation Plant.
- Organization of serial production of DP-31UN type birotative electric motors.
- Development and production of lithium-ion batteries for practical torpedoes TE2.
- Constant updating of technical documentation in order to use modern domestic element base.
For this purpose, JSC "Concern" MPO - Gidropribor "carries out constant measures to improve scientific, technical and industrial cooperation. In the Russian Federation, these include:
- Development of an electronic control device B-107 for torpedo weapons and its serial production since 2016 to replace the electromechanical control device B-27, supplied by JSC NPO Kiev Automation Plant.
- Organization of serial production of DP-31UN type birotative electric motors.
- Development and production of lithium-ion batteries for practical torpedoes TE2.
- Constant updating of technical documentation in order to use modern domestic element base.
Well, you can't publicly “take off your pants” like that. That is, the "modern" (in quotation marks) level of "Gidropribor" is the launch of junk into a series and the "correction of technical documentation" for the "use of a modern element base", "ripped off" from the American development of the late 50s.
On mass failures of lithium-ion batteries - described in the article already mentioned in the text “Ichthyosaurus "and others. Electric torpedoes - new and old».
Torpedo TE2Note. The author first heard about the massive failures of the control and protection system of this battery in the office of Admiral Suchkov back in 2012. It's 2021. (And in 2019 there was "Losharik").
UETT torpedoes have been in operation for about 15 years, which predetermines the following options for negotiating topics with the customer
- torpedo repair,
- modernization of torpedoes,
- purchase of modern TE-2 torpedoes.
Let's take a closer look at these options:
- The scope of the repair is determined by the customer's requirements and agreed with the contractor. According to its capabilities, the Concern is able to carry out repairs of any complexity, except for the repair of the “B-26” control device, which must be addressed to the manufacturer.
- AO Concern MPO Gidropribor can fulfill any modernization requirements, but It should be borne in mind that when replacing the B-26 control device with a B-107 device and when using lithium-ion batteries, in practical torpedoes, the total cost of upgrading the UETT torpedo may exceed the cost of the new TE2 torpedo.
- torpedo repair,
- modernization of torpedoes,
- purchase of modern TE-2 torpedoes.
Let's take a closer look at these options:
- The scope of the repair is determined by the customer's requirements and agreed with the contractor. According to its capabilities, the Concern is able to carry out repairs of any complexity, except for the repair of the “B-26” control device, which must be addressed to the manufacturer.
- AO Concern MPO Gidropribor can fulfill any modernization requirements, but It should be borne in mind that when replacing the B-26 control device with a B-107 device and when using lithium-ion batteries, in practical torpedoes, the total cost of upgrading the UETT torpedo may exceed the cost of the new TE2 torpedo.
I repeat once again, the cost of installing a new block of B-104 gyroscopes and an "innovative" lithium-ion battery (from which components - we will not ...) is more than the cost of a new TE2 torpedo! Publicly, this figure did not appear, but it is, let's say - "very, very immodest."
Some time ago, a violent reaction was caused by the price of the Ichthyosaurus torpedo. It is a pity that there was no price tag for TE2 nearby. The amazement (here it would be more correct to say another word - from the "boatswain's lexicon") society would be guaranteed.
Taking into account the antiquity and the very high cost of KMPO Gidropribor products (in fact, these "torpedo firewood" are supplied to the customer for "load" on Russian-built ships), there are problems with export, to put it mildly. Therefore, all these "firewood" are "simply obliged" to "accept and pay" for our Navy and the Ministry of Defense: both the B-107 and the lithium ion batteries that have not passed the required tests (including safety tests) (which have been stubbornly trying to push them into fleet).
There is not a single mention of UGST in the article (all export contracts are listed and supplies for them are detailed), which has long turned into an "interior for salons".
Moreover, the article itself was written at an extremely low professional level. There are a lot of mistakes that raise very bad questions about the degree of "competence" of the author in the subject of IGO and arms export. Only one example, diesel-electric submarines of project 877EKM (deliveries of the 80s, with torpedoes with mechanical spindle input of firing data) turned out to be, among other things, with "electrical input of shooting data" (sic).
It should be added to this that, despite the fact that since the summer of 2013, there is no doubt about the ability of the M15 anti-torpedo to reliably kill attacking torpedoes (based on the results of a series of tests on real targets with outstanding results), the export of this unique piece has failed. Moreover, they disrupted their equipping of submarines of the Navy (including the newest "Ash" and "Boreev", where they were supposed to be according to the project and state contract). After that, it is no longer surprising that there are no export deliveries of "Package".
Stupidity or sabotage?
And this is all in a situation where, despite a number of problems, there are all the technical possibilities to have a decent and effective naval underwater weapon. Moreover, some of our achievements (for example, anti-torpedoes), our Western "so-called partners" cannot repeat for two decades!
A logical question arises:
"What's going on?"
For example, one of the high-ranking leaders of the defense industry complex behind the scenes directly raised the issue of direct sabotage on the subject of underwater weapons and countermeasures. That is, in fact, deliberate preparation of the military defeat of the country.
Where is the fleet looking?
Ex-commander-in-chief Chirkov and Korolev are now in "fat" positions in the USC. And the list goes on.
From the article “Russia's naval underwater weapons today and tomorrow. Will the breakthrough come from the "torpedo crisis" 2015 of the year:
The question of personal responsibility.
Let me emphasize that no one in the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, or in the defense industry has bore real responsibility for what is happening.
At the same time, IGO is not “something not very important”. IGO is the most critical and disastrous area of the RF AME, including extremely important for ensuring defense capability and strategic deterrence.
The basis of the latter is not "the flight range and the number of SLBM warheads", but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, the basis of which is the combat stability of the NSNF (the most important part of which is the IGO).
Today, the country and the navy need an honest and well-grounded comprehensive target program "Marine Underwater Weapons" to overcome the acute crisis of IGOs.
Otherwise, the construction of the Russian Navy in its current form does not make sense.
Let me emphasize that no one in the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, or in the defense industry has bore real responsibility for what is happening.
At the same time, IGO is not “something not very important”. IGO is the most critical and disastrous area of the RF AME, including extremely important for ensuring defense capability and strategic deterrence.
The basis of the latter is not "the flight range and the number of SLBM warheads", but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, the basis of which is the combat stability of the NSNF (the most important part of which is the IGO).
Today, the country and the navy need an honest and well-grounded comprehensive target program "Marine Underwater Weapons" to overcome the acute crisis of IGOs.
Otherwise, the construction of the Russian Navy in its current form does not make sense.
Well, then there was "Arctic torpedo scandal".
Today in 2021, our boats are still virtually unarmed.
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