Betrayal 1941: captured armies

Captured Soviet generals P.G. Ponedelin and N.K. Kirillov talking with German officers in the area of ​​Uman (Ukraine). August 1941 Source: K. Simonov's book "One Hundred Days of War".

The 12th Army was surrounded. Tens of thousands of soldiers were captured along with the commander of the army Ponedelin. The Germans replicated his photo on leaflets. In the USSR, the general was declared a traitor, since he surrendered to the enemy. Historians are still wondering whether there was a betrayal or not.

About the first days and months of the Great Patriotic War in Russian textbooks stories pages about the heroism of our soldiers have been inscribed forever. We sacredly honor their memory. And with gratitude for a peaceful sky, from generation to generation, we will never tire of telling about how our fathers and grandfathers saved the Motherland from fascism. Low bow to all those who fell in those battles ...

Meanwhile, along with exploits, there was betrayal in that war. And these sad pages, we believe, should also not be forgotten. Not to stigmatize, blame or judge anyone. And in order not to repeat itself.

Recently, it is not customary to remind of the betrayals and betrayals in those years. Like, it was and passed, the past overgrown. But this is not so. Once in history this was inscribed in the chronicle of that war, then contemporaries, even after 80 years, also have the right to know the truth about such facts as well.

Of course, there are still more questions than answers. Despite the many declassified documents. But after all, questions about the truth are also important and need to be asked, isn't it?

Ponedelin's army retreat

In the last part, we stopped at the fact that at the end of June 1941, the 12th Army, by order of the front headquarters, began to retreat to the old state border, slowly turning to the east, starting from the 13th Rifle Corps.

Historians write that, practically without going into clashes with the enemy, this army has only small and insignificant incidents of forward detachments with groups of German motorcyclists.

The air connections of the 12th Army are still not lost. In any case, at least until July 17th. While caught in the scorching heat from the very first days of the Great Patriotic War, our other armies at that time had already managed to forget well what it was like to have air protection - aircraft with red stars.

That is, this army, exhausted not by the enemy, but by an urgent retreat, is moving in a hurry across Western Ukraine. On the way from the western edge of the USSR, it loses the materiel of its mechanized formation.

It turns out that, according to the comments of some experts, at the very beginning of the war, mechanized corps were practically deprived of the chances of being involved exactly there and when they could significantly affect the outcome of clashes. And as if they were deliberately driven from place to place until the resource was exhausted and full of technical wear and tear? And this despite numerous complaints from the chief of the armored directorate of the Southwestern Front, Major General tank troops of Morgunov, which were documented (F. 229, op. 3780ss, d. 1, ll. 98–104).

Finally, 12th Army arrives at the old border line and is stationed in these positions for about a week.

So, the already mentioned artillery witness of the 192nd division Inozemtsev in his diaries-letters from the front (NN Inozemtsev's book "Front Diary", 2005) writes that he finally approached the old state border and hopes that there will be a battle with the Fritzes.

He tells about the fortified area:

"We'll be here for weeks."

“I'm going to the bunker to the [commander] of the division. A hillock 2 meters high, standing on the outskirts of the village. Concrete 2,5 meters thick. Three heavy machine guns, a colossal supply of cartridges. An excellent periscope, an air filter, a large supply of water. Personnel rest room. There is no one - communication. "

«12 of July. Rumors persist that the Germans broke through the front line to our left, towards Zhmerinka. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon we receive the order to wind up the connection and start the withdrawal. For clarification, I go with Bobrov to the pillbox of the division commander. It turns out that no one has been there for a long time, everything is empty... We begin to withdraw by batteries. "

Some historians point out that only now (by mid-July) the Nazi infantry begins to actively press on the units of the 12th Army and break through the Ponedelin defense in the Letichevsky district.

Literally on the eve of the breakthrough, Ponedelin reports to the leadership about the meager armament of the fortified area. And he stood in this area, as experts say, before that without enemy attacks for at least seven days.

Alexey Valerievich Isaev in his book “Antisuvorov. Ten Myths of the Second World War ”also mentions Ponedelin's army.

In particular, he quotes from a letter from the commander of the 12th Army, which occupied the Letychiv UR on the old border. from July 2 to July 17, 1941.

In his letter to the commander of the Southern Front on July 16, 1941, with a request to allocate one rifle and one tank division, Ponedelin wrote:

“I got acquainted with the Letichevsky UR, the loss of which poses a direct threat to your entire front.

SD is incredibly weak. Of the 354 artillery combat installations, only 11 have, for a total length of 122 km of the front.

The rest are machine-gun pillboxes. To arm machine-gun pillboxes, 162 heavy machine guns are not enough.

UR is designed for 8 pulbats, there are 4 newly formed and untrained ones.

There is no preflight ...

There is an unprepared section of 12 km between the neighboring right UR ”. (TsAMO.F. 229.Op. 161.D. 131.L. ​​78.)

(There were 363 structures built in the Letichevsky district. The difference may well be an error in statistics or classification ").

Link

But the German infantry breaks through the Letichevsky fortification.

And artilleryman Inozemtsev says:

“Our entire reconnaissance has completely left at the disposal of the division commander to communicate with the regiments. These horse messengers were, in fact, the only means of communication. "

“Once I went to the division headquarters. About six kilometers away from us, about three artillery regiments stood in the field, lined up in squares and bristling with guns in all directions. In the forest - more divisions (and fresh, full strength) of infantry.

Why are they not thrown to help us, so drained of blood in previous battles?

This is what the complex work of the headquarters and the lack of interaction means.

The main reason came to light much later, in August, from Comrade Stalin's order of August 16: the commander of the 13th SK (Rifle Corps) and the commander of the army turned out to be traitors. In the meantime, all that remained was to see and be indignant. "

In response to the breakthrough of the Germans, Ponedelin gives a paper order to attack the Nazis, who broke through the defense of the Red Army.

And even in the morning he gives a second order about the blow. And the time of arrival is indicated as morning, 7 o'clock. Immediately after the end of enemy air bombing, specific formations are allocated for a retaliatory attack.

Historians ask themselves whether those orders were written purely for the report.

Since, studying the documents of the 12th Army, experts recorded obvious inconsistencies there. The fact is that, according to experts, one and the same unit assigned for an offensive operation (scheduled for seven in the morning) and by papers located near the old border, on the same day, also by papers, at five in the evening of the same day located in Vinnitsa next to the headquarters. Consequently, the question for historians was this: what if the connections did not move?

We read in the letters-diaries of the artilleryman Inozemtsev:

“In the morning, the order: clean weapon and saddles, wash, shave, etc. Building at 12 o'clock. The acting division commander speaks and announces: by order of the front, we all make up a consolidated artillery battalion, consisting of two companies (40 people in each) riflemen, a cavalry reconnaissance platoon (16 people led by Udovenko) and an auto platoon (3 vehicles with commanders of destruction tanks) ... The battalion is immediately given a combat mission: to take up defenses, fight the enemy's tank forces and hold them back until the divisions and armies' carts are safe.

All around - an open field, except for us - there are no traces of the army, where the enemy is and where he should come from - no one has any idea. Well, then, to fight - so to fight!

Everyone realizes the pointlessness of such an order and their doom - when we meet the Germans, we will hold out for several hours, and - the end, since everyone has long since departed, but the order is an order.

In the afternoon, a car appears, goes towards us at full speed, then, noticing one of us, turns around and gives full throttle. Who was in it is unknown.

Several more hours pass and, finally, we receive an order to proceed further. "

March into the bag

In the book of the military commander Konstantin Simonov "One hundred days of war" we read:

“If we resort to the testimony of our opponents, then in Directive No. 33 of the German High Command from July 19 1941 was recorded as follows:

"The most important task is to destroy the 12th and 6th enemy armies with a concentric offensive west of the Dnieper, preventing a retreat across the river."

Further, the 12th Army is fighting for the bridge on the Southern Bug River.

Due to the emerging danger of being surrounded by the Ponedelinskaya army, as well as the 6th army (Muzychenko) on this very bridge leave the fortified area, which, according to experts, could be held for at least 30 days (examples were: 5th Army).

If only because warehouses (clothing, food, ammunition, fuel, weapons, equipment and ammunition) were located in this sector of the old state border.

So over this bridge Ponedelin leads his army into an open, open field.

When Muzychenko was wounded, the 6th Army was transferred under the command of Ponedelin. It turns out that it is he, Pavel Grigorievich Ponedelin, who will lead both of these armies (12th and 6th) across the open plain straight into the bag of encirclement? And this bag in history will remain under the name "Uman Cauldron".

Russian military historian, specialist in the history of military technology and military art, candidate of philosophical sciences, reserve colonel Ilya Borisovich Moshchansky in a book "The catastrophe near Kiev" will write:

"In the morning July 25 the commander of the troops of the South-Western direction Marshal of the Soviet Union SM Budyonny proposed to reassign the 6th and 12th armies to the commander of the Southern Front. "

“The transfer of the 6th and 12th armies to the Southern Front had a detrimental effect on their fate. On the third day after their formal subordination to Tyulenev, the headquarters of the Southern Front reported to Headquarters:

"It is impossible to establish the exact position of units of the 6th and 12th armies due to the lack of communications ..."

Position in the area of ​​operations of the transferred armies we managed to find out only the 29th».

And here is the testimony of the artilleryman Inozemtsev:

«July 30... An order comes to pack up and at 16:00 the convoys and all personnel not included in the minimum combat crew move to Uman. The rest should start retreating at night, in the morning. "

And then he is:

“We are moving. We enter Uman. The airfield and the railway station are on fire. Lagging workers, Jews, party and Komsomol workers are leaving the city; local authorities and most of those to be evacuated left earlier. Prisoners are released from prisons, the local garrison is leaving. The shops have already been opened, everyone takes what he needs. "

“On bad sections of the road there is a huge crowd of people, cars, equipment, and you are literally surprised that there are no German planes. Probably, the German command considered us already doomed, was confident in the encirclement of this entire group and therefore, with the exception of individual aircraft, the flight forces did not delay us.

Most of the convoys, rear services and the headquarters of the 12th Army, together with other groups of troops, nevertheless fell into the hands of the Germans, and this happened mainly through the fault of the commander, who voluntarily surrendered. "

Armies in the bag

“We do not know what is ahead, but we are moving forward, since we know for sure that the Germans are close behind, that we are in a deep sack and you can't wait. "

(It was Inozemtsev again).

About Ponedelin's army a book military commander Konstantin Simonov "One hundred days of war" is an excerpt from the summary for July 31:

“During the night, the army regrouped ... with the aim of continuing from the morning of the 31st offensive in the eastern and northeastern directions.

The enemy is striving to complete the encirclement of the 6th and 12th armies with a simultaneous offensive from the north and south ...

The 13th Rifle Corps ... launched an offensive and, meeting strong fire resistance from the Kamenechye area, at 10:00 captured the southwestern outskirts ...

There are no neighbors on the right and left ... "

In the "Journal of Combat of the Southern Front Troops" for 5 of August it is said (quoted from K. Simonov's book):

“During the day, Ponedelin's group continued to conduct stubborn, unequal battles with the attacking superior forces of the enemy.

Prepared a night assault in a southerly direction in order to get out of the encirclement ...

No data on the results of the night attack has been received ... "

Apparently, this was the last entry in the "Journal of Combat Operations of the Southern Front Troops", which relied on any reliable data received from Ponedelin's group.

And the Russian military historian Ilya Borisovich Moshchansky in a book "The catastrophe near Kiev" writes:

General P.G. Ponedelin, who led the cut off troops, reported to the Front Military Council:

“The setting is amazing ...

The troops of the army are in extremely serious condition and on the verge of complete loss of combat capability "
(TsAMO RF, f. 228, op. 701, d. 58, l. 52)

And also the same author reports that

«2 of August the enemy ring has closed. "

This military historian points out:

“At the same time, in the southeast, at the junction with the 18th Army of the Southern Front, there was almost 100 km of space that had not yet been occupied by the enemy.

It could be used to withdraw the 6th and 12th armies.

But the command of the South-West direction, like the Headquarters, did not take advantage of this circumstance and still demanded to break through to the east. "

А 7 of August 1941 - this is already two captured armies.

Source: gazetavesti.ru

And General P.G. Ponedelin, and the commander of the 13th corps, General N.K. Kirillov are also prisoners.

Photo from Konstantin Simonov's book "One Hundred Days of War".

Historians pay special attention to the fact that not every soldier of the 12th Army was taken prisoner at that time. The same Nikolai Inozemtsev, whose book (diaries and letters) we quoted, did not surrender. In those days he was on the left bank of the Dnieper River. From the leadership of the 12th Army, they did not surrender and were not captured by the chief of staff and aviation commander.

But what surprises historians is that many tens of thousands of soldiers were literally “led” straight into the Uman pit, preventing them from engaging in battle with the Nazis. In fact, this was expressed in the fact that the servicemen were driven into a situation in the literal sense - incorrigible.

It turns out that the 12th Army practically did not fight? Although the privates and officers were eager to fight. And they were not allowed by the command of the army. Some historians point out that betrayal is a historically established fact.

But there is also another point of view.

For example, retired lieutenant general, participant of the Great Patriotic War Yevgeny Ivanovich Malashenko пишет on VO that

“The main reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941 were

untimely bringing to combat readiness of the troops of the border military districts,
insufficient training and
weak morale and combat qualities of personnel,
poor command and control of troops.

Such troops could not stop the advance of the German groupings and were forced to retreat. "

Enemy gaze

But the opinion of the Nazis themselves.

Historian of the German 49th Mountain Corps, whose divisions experienced the fierce attacks of the surrounded Red Army soldiers near Uman, wrote that the enemy,

"In spite of the hopeless situation, I did not think about captivity."

(Steets H. Gebirgsjaeger bei Uman, s. 91).

“The last attempt was made on the night of August 7 ...

Although even before August 13 in the forest east of Kopenkovatoe, by testimony Germans, a group of commanders and Red Army soldiers continued to fight. "

By a strange coincidence 6 of August 1941 years Hitler arrives in the Western Ukraine in town Berdichev (Hitler's Palace in Ukraine: "Werewolf").

Hitler in Berdichev. Ukraine... August 6, 1941.

And already on August 28, 1941 Hitler arrives again on Ukraine in town Uman (Hitler's Palace in Ukraine: Secret Trips). There, according to historians, he will visit the very place where Ponedelin's captured army is kept - the Uman pit.

Hitler exits the plane at the Uman airfield, Ukraine... 28 August 1941 Source: televignole.it

100 thousand captives at once?

“Unfortunately, it is very difficult to restore the true scale of losses of Soviet troops in the battle near Uman due to the lack of documents.

Known only that on July 20 the 6th and 12th armies numbered 129,5 thousand people [TsAMO RF, f. 228, op. 701, d.47, ll. 55, 56, 74, 75]. And according to the headquarters of the Southern Front, on August 11, 11 thousand people managed to avoid encirclement, mainly from the rear units [TsAMO RF, f. 228, op. 701, d.58, l. 139].

Judging by German sources, near Uman was captured 103 thousand Soviet Red Army and commanders [Das Deutshe Reich und der Zweit Weltkrieg, Bd. 4, s. 485; Haupt W. Kiew - die groesste kesselschacht der Geschichte. Bad Nauheim, 1964, s. 15], and the number of Russians killed, according to the daily reports of the Wehrmacht High Command, has reached 200 thousand people. "

From the book of the military historian I.B. Moschanskiy "Catastrophe near Kiev":

The fate of those captured near Uman is tragic. At first they were placed behind barbed wire in the open air.

And only with the onset of winter they were transferred to unheated barracks.

The Germans themselves then recorded on film how they placed our captured armies in the Uman pit (for more details in the article Hitler's Palace in Ukraine: Secret Trips).

They wanted to save, but Ponedelin surrendered

Marshal of the Soviet Union Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky in his a book "Life's Work" (1978) about the 12th Army we read:

“Kirponos and Khrushchev ... reported that the commander-in-chief of the South-Western direction gave them the task of providing assistance to the troops of the 6th and 12th armies and in the morning 6 of August strike from the Korsun area in the direction of Zvenigorodka and Uman.

They wanted to clarify whether the Headquarters would not mind this, as they are intensively preparing for this assignment.

Stalin replied that the Headquarters would not only not object, but, on the contrary, welcomes the offensive, which aims to unite with the Southern Front and bring our two armies out into the open. "

У Simonova there is also about the intentions of the leaders to save these our encircled armies.

In one of the documents sent “for immediate delivery. Moscow. Comrade Stalin, the commander-in-chief, ”it was said that the front headquarters had allocated two groups of specially trained persons for airlifting to the area of ​​encirclement.

“The groups are equipped with shortwave radio stations. People are dressed in civilian clothes. The task of the groups: to penetrate into the areas occupied by units of the 6th and 12th armies, and immediately report their position by radio according to the established code ... "

The truth about betrayal

Modern Media quote Ponedelin himself.

On the question

"What do you plead guilty to?"

Ponedelin answers clearly:

"I am only to blame for surrendering to the enemy."

In the book by Vladimir Dmitrievich Ignatov "Executioners and Executions in the History of Russia and the USSR" (2013) we read:

"During his stay in captivity, the Germans confiscated a diary from Ponedelin, in which he expounded his anti-Soviet views on the policy of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government."

On April 29, 1945, he was liberated by American troops and handed over to Soviet representatives. Arrested on December 30, 1945, and imprisoned in the Lefortovo prison. Was accused of being

“Being the commander of the 12th Army and being surrounded by enemy troops, did not show the necessary persistence and will to win, succumbed to panic and 7 of August 1941, having violated the military oath, betrayed the Motherland, surrendered without resistance captured by the Germans and during interrogations сообщил them information about the composition of the 12th and 6th armies».

At the beginning of 1950 P.G. Ponedelin wrote a letter to Stalin asking him to reconsider the case. On August 25, 1950, by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court, he was sentenced to be shot with immediate execution. He did not plead guilty in cooperation with the Germans.

Rehabilitated posthumously.

Certificate of rehabilitation P.G. Ponedelina. Source: volga37.ru

The ashes of General P.G. Ponedelina rests in a common grave No. 2 at the new Donskoy cemetery in Moscow.

To be continued ...

Comments

[Lech from Android.]

Uman pit is a terrible place, it is better to die in battle than to be there and die of hunger and cold.
Of course, Ponedelin did not match his position as commander of the army in terms of his personal qualities, he would have been a master of the warehouse, and not a combat general.
By their nature, officers are also divided into those who can be a fighter, a staff officer, or a logistic officer. The war put everything in its place and clearly showed who is who from the inside.

[Russian jacket]

You're right. And then, and now, until it came to a handle, such cadres led the armies, now they are in charge of corporations, regions and enterprises. As an unkind memory of the governor of the Irkutsk region - Mr. Kobzev. Throwing off his hat in front of the president .... But it looked like a slave bends down in front of the master. There is, of course, the hope that when it gets hot, they will begin to move to the leading positions of professionals ... But it is already a little hard to believe in this. Sooner or later she will kick someone who does not know history under the tailbone.

[Pessimist22]

Like Shoigu without military education, and orders with medals, as if he had gone through two wars.

[carstorm 11]

Most of his awards including the Emergencies Ministry Star. Don't need this dirt huh?

[aglet]

"Don't need this dirt, eh?"
And what did he personally do so heroic in the Ministry of Emergency Situations that he was drawn to a star?

[Andrey Yuryevich]

something like that shivering .. as if it is correct, and as if something is wrong ... here the case needs to be studied deeper, and even with witnesses, who are almost absent ... and diligently clean up.

[Igor Kobernik]

Orders and medals are awarded not only for military service ... All over the world ... And the position of the Minister of Defense does not provide for special military education, which confirms the experience of many not the very last countries of the world.

[Yuri Shalnov]

Who told you that? In the USSR and in Russia, up to Serdyukov, defense mines were commanded by professional military personnel! Russia is a huge and powerful country with a modern army, which simply must be commanded by a professional soldier, and not furniture makers and builders who robbed the army and surrounded themselves with hoes in general's uniforms! You should listen to what the officers in the units on the periphery have to say about this ...

[Andycomm]

For the fact that Kazugetich managed to get him out of the post-stool (and before that - post-perestroika) "army" by the 14th year it is not so much that anniversaries can be sprinkled with Heroic stars. And that will not be enough.

[vovan089]

Costumed reindeer breeder ...

[Free wind]

After 4 years of concentration camps at the Germans, he does not look haggard.

[kalibr]

Field Marshal Mack surrendered to Napoleon in the Ulm area. Napoleon, who knew him from Paris, spoke of him as a complete mediocrity. He was tried, stripped of awards and honor, imprisoned in the fortress, but then rehabilitated. And here is the question: how did such mediocrity get to high ranks and began to command the army. And who is he a traitor or ... And if the Austrians had such, how are we better? Nothing!

[BAI]

Vlasov also walked well up the hill until he was surrounded. And through no fault of their own. He (the army and the attached units) was driven there, and then thrown. And he was accused of everything.

[Elena Shevchenko]

Yes, Vlasov took over the 2nd Shock Army, when its fate was already in fact a foregone conclusion. But nevertheless, his subordinates, who were completely surrounded for months, ate grass and beetles from hunger in their swamps, for some reason did not surrender, but at the last moment we even went for a breakthrough! And almost all of them died there - in the Valley of Death, and in the meantime their commander, having abandoned his soldiers and dressed in someone else's clothes, with a handful of close associates and a mistress, tried to hide in some village, where the headman recognized him. And then this subject became the founding father of the infamous ROA.

[Mar.Tirah]

Quote: Lech from Android.

it is better to die in battle than to be and die of hunger and cold there.

The late father told me 40 years ago how he met one soldier from this army in Kolyma. He was condemned as a traitor and a traitor to the motherland. So he told me that before surrendering their company was withdrawn from the position supposedly to be reorganized, the foreman ordered to surrender their weapons and form to go to the gathering point in the village. That's how they were brought, right under the machine guns of the Nazis. And they were given a choice, either die under machine guns without weapons or raise your hands. He chose to remain alive and ended up in the Kolyma. after the defeat of Germany and liberation from the concentration camp. Betrayal of the top leadership of the army was corrected by the incredible heroism of ordinary soldiers

[mmaxx]

In the magazine "Rodina" for some ancient year there were several recollections of those prisoners. Who escaped how. But some, only after going to the service of the Germans in Khivi. We sat down later.
Read few things more terrible. Millions of German women should be very grateful.

[AlBir]

fairytale story

[WHAT IS]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Uman pit is a scary place

Memoirs of A. Kolesnikov, fighter of the 21st cavalry regiment of the NKVD:
“Here is Uman. We were driven into a deep pit from which a brick factory took clay. The pit was 7 meters deep, 300 meters wide and about one kilometer long. We were not fed, they were not given water. They poured all the puddles, began to eat clay. Then this clay in the stomach got into a lump, and the person died in heavy pain.
The Nazis threw dead prisoners to the edge of the pit every morning and practiced shooting from machine guns and pistols until they got tired of it.


What is Green Brama?
Among the hills of the Ukrainian land
There is a tract or oak grove
From the main paths in the distance.

This is the place of harsh events
Not recorded in the book of victories,
Unknown, or perhaps forgotten ...
How to find out their lost trail?

We dare not give in to oblivion
Those pages scorched by war:
How the troops fought surrounded,
Standing to death at the edge of the forest,

And at the cost of their lives they managed
On those flaming frontiers
For about two weeks
To delay the advance of the enemy.

... Let the war be peaceful descendants
Only known from legends, from books,
Let them learn from the songs how
A grenade and a bayonet entered the battle,

But must be forever alive
Our brothers from mass graves,
So that the surname, patronymic, first name
We could draw on the slabs.

Out of obscurity Green Brama
Finally, it should appear:
The mystery burns like an open wound
Clarity is a healed scar.

A long search is carried out with the calculation,
So that under the onslaught of facts and dates
To give so far unnamed heights
Names of unknown soldiers.

Evgeny Dolmatovsky
Green brama
June 1983 of the year.

[Cowbra]

What is most striking. Soviet troops still treated the Germans somehow humanly ... But the humane mattresses ...

Isn't it the Uman pit? There are no sorting rooms in the frame, let alone a place for washing, because more of them were killed in the camps than in battles with mattresses.

“We were only guarded,” recalled the former Wehrmacht soldier Michael Priebke, who was kept in the camp near Koblinz. - All the prisoners slept in the rain, in the wind, lying in the mud like pigs. True, they feed the pigs! Sometimes they brought food - they gave one potato a day. Later I met my uncle, and he told me: you know, in Berlin the Russians fed the Germans with porridge from their field kitchens! This surprised me a lot. "

[Krasnodar]

So the Germans also treated Soviet prisoners of war. The Americans began to behave this way with the Nazis only after they saw the concentration camps, before that the Fritzes were respected (good soldiers), they hated the Japanese.

[Cowbra]

The Soviet army did not go to waste. But the Americans are over there. "heroes" are shitty

[Krasnodar]

Quote: Cowbra

The Soviet army did not go to waste. But the Americans are over there. "heroes" are shitty

What does it mean oskatinil - not oskatinil? Everything depends on orders and instructions.
The Americans were most likely given instructions to treat the Nazis as they deserved. There is a known case when the Amers, on their own initiative, shot the guards of the concentration camp, as well as the case when the prisoners were allowed to deal with the SS guarding the concentration camp.

[Cowbra]

This is what it means. Indiscriminate shootings, genocide of prisoners of war, and at the highest level. What is photographed is a consequence of Eisenhower's order to consider the Germans not prisoners of war, but "disarmed forces of the enemy", that is, they do not need to be fed or treated - no conventions apply to them. And the Americans are no better than the Nazis in this matter, because this is genocide

[Krasnodar]

But how did the Germans treat the Russians? And to the peace man? What Stalin thought in advance, incl. about the GDR, that's one thing. The fact that the Germans really deserve this attitude towards themselves is another matter.
But then the Americans let them work in peace, and ours ruined everything with socialism. As a result, everyone who could fled to Germany

[Cowbra]

Everything is clear with the fascists, but WE had a moral - and a legal right - but not the Americans. Anything else about "screwing up" is generally nonsense, if only because the FRG is still occupied by the United States. And it does not apply to the issue of genocide. Genocide is not justified by mythical "given - not given"

[Krasnodar]

Moral right - I agree. Keeping fig captives is not genocide.
Was the GDR under occupation?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Cowbra

Everything is clear with the fascists, but WE had a moral - and a legal right - but not the Americans. Anything else about "screwing up" is generally nonsense, if only because the FRG is still occupied by the United States. And it does not apply to the issue of genocide. Genocide is not justified by mythical "given - not given"

Occupied by the United States, they do not have their own government, do not live by their own laws?

[Cowbra]

Those. for example, the FRG government is controlled, for example, wiretapped, by the US special services. And loyalty is guaranteed by the occupying army. The same "non-occupation" as the Germans were "not prisoners of war"

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Cowbra

Those. for example, the FRG government is controlled, for example, wiretapped, by the US special services. And loyalty is guaranteed by the occupying army. The same "non-occupation" as the Germans were "not prisoners of war"

Nonsense. The government and military lines of the USSR were also tapped for years and that the USSR was under occupation? As for the presence of troops, so they are in accordance with the agreement. Compare their numbers and the size of the Bundeswehr. Do you really think that the United States can influence Germany by force?

[Alekseev]

Quote: Lech from Android.

Of course Ponedelin didn't match

It could even be ...
And Muzychenko, the commander of the 6th Army, did he match? And Konev, Budyonny, Eremenko (encirclement near Vyazma and east of Bryansk at the beginning of the German offensive against Moscow), And Timoshenko, Kirponos, etc. are also candidates for traitors? And Kozlov and Mehlis in the Crimea? And who nominated and appointed them to these positions? German and Japanese spies, probably.
There was undoubtedly a betrayal during the Great Patriotic War. Both among individual generals and among the rank and file (up to a million of our former citizens served in the SS troops, police formations, etc.)
But betrayal was not at all the cause of the catastrophes of 1941, 42. This is a dilettante approach with statements taken out of context. The same K.M. Simonov, in the book mentioned, assessed the role of General Ponedelin and Kirillov in a completely different way, although not in 1941, but later, somewhat cooled down. The general state of the armed forces, from the quality of management to the training of a soldier, was this reason.
And people who are in the slightest degree versed in military history know very well that no one specially led the 6th and 12th armies to the Uman cauldron. They were driven there by the Germans, primarily the troops of the 1st Tank Group, who, having defeated the troops of the South-Western Front in a border battle, actually destroying its mobile units, were able to advance along the Dnieper to the flank and rear of our aforementioned armies. Did our command take action? Yes.
2 MK, numerically very solid, 400 tanks, received the task of inflicting a counterattack, not to allow the Germans to encircle our troops, but ... had no success.
I would like the authors describing, among other things, the sorrowful pages of our history, were distinguished by their competence and did not come up with simplifications that, they say, all the bad things were done by hidden enemies.

[The leader of the Redskins]

Here is another issue of "agitprop" on VO from I. Frolova. Today there is no mention of Hitler's palaces, but there is a light composition "about the books read", richly mutilated with chants and slogans.
Personally, I noticed some kind of unhealthy attention to the small Ukrainian town of Uman. The author's childhood passed there or what?

[carstorm 11]

You about Uman can ask those who drove the prisoners there? Obviously, this is not the author's decision. Sometimes people don't want to understand what they write at all ...

[bober1982]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Here is another issue of "agitprop" on VO from I. Frolova

Today is Forgiveness Sunday, we will forgive Irina Frolova for her writings, although it may be that the author of all these opuses is some man (s), quite possibly not Russian (s), foreigner (s)
And we will forgive him, the man too.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Leader of the Redskins

Today there is no mention of Hitler's palaces,

How is it not? There is a link to this manure in the text.

[tasha]

A very interesting book, by the way.

And this one too

I recommend:

And where is the article? Where is the article?

[Olgovich]

Quote: tasha

And where is the article? Where is the article?

And here is a purely author's "invention":

Air connections 12th Army is still not lost

.

No one else knew such ...

[tasha]

Sorry, brothers ...

I forgot another book.

[Lech from Android.]

I forgot another book.

Yeah forgot no need to lie.
Now you will start broadcasting about the billions of babies eaten by Stalin ...
Already the first known picture on the cover of two servicemen with revolvers at the shooting range raises a question to the author ... What have they to do with it?

[tasha]

You see, in the article, the commentary to which you wrote the very first of those who read carefully (hehe), there is a mention of this book. And there is no illustration. Disorder!

In the book by Vladimir Dmitrievich Ignatov "Executioners and Executions in the History of Russia and the USSR" (2013) we read:

[Lech from Android.]

really a mess ... Well, if only then I apologize.
Although, in my opinion, Ponedelin deserved to be shot for his mediocre leadership of the army and his surrender to the enemy. Against the background of thousands and thousands of deaths of our soldiers and officers in Nazi concentration camps where they ended up, including through his fault.

[Sergey Valov]

"For the mediocre leadership of the army and his surrender to the enemy he deserved to be shot" - it would be good to punish those who promoted him in the same way. And so on to the very top.

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Lech from Android.

really a mess ... Well, if only then I apologize.
Although, in my opinion, Ponedelin deserved to be shot for his mediocre leadership of the army and his surrender to the enemy. Against the background of thousands and thousands of deaths of our soldiers and officers in Nazi concentration camps where they ended up, including through his fault.

You put the blame on the lowest echelon in the command. Then let's be consistent and shoot the front leadership and the General Staff leadership.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: tasha

the comment to which you wrote the very first of those who carefully read (hehe)

This hobby is like putting all the slippers first. And as popophos as possible. I suspect he does not read what he is commenting on.

[Konnick]

The topic is interesting and you can't cover it with a few articles. You can read the memoirs of Poppel, the commander of group 8 of the mechanized corps, who participated in the battle of Dubno, there is a combat log on the Memory of the People website. For some reason, Zhukov did not particularly appreciate the merits of Poppel, for his skillful actions, but for some reason he praised Muzychenko and Kirponos. And historians have not yet figured out Kirponos, some believe that he was shot by a security officer while trying to surrender.

[Cartalon]

Well, maybe because Popel's merits were not as great as he described in his memoirs?

[Konnick]

Read
https://topwar.ru/25642-komissar-popel-i-podvig-sovetskih-voinov-pod-dubno.html

"Commissar Popel and the feat of Soviet soldiers near Dubno "

While some "highly professional" commanders were engaged in incomprehensible redeployments, this political officer practically stopped Kleist's tank group, and then, being surrounded, did not surrender like Potapov, Muzychenko, Ponedelin and others, but broke through, skillfully completing a 200 km raid with battles and left from the entourage

[Alexey RA]

Popel's memoirs have one small, but typical for memoirs problem - they practically do not fight with documents signed by Comrade Popel.

The first thing that catches your eye is the absence of even mention of any conflict with Commissar Vashugin. By the time the report was written, he was already dead (he shot himself on June 30, 1941) and anything could be blamed on him as if he were dead. However, Popel 'ascribes to Vashugin only the order to lead the group, capture the southern outskirts (see below) Dubno, and a somewhat strange demand not to cross the river. Unlike the memoirs, he could not drive Kirponos into the eyes that it was Vashugin who insisted on an immediate transition to the offensive, with the introduction into battle in parts. There is enough evidence that the orders for an immediate dash to Dubno had already been issued by the corps command by the time a member of the Front's Military Council arrived. Therefore, Comrade. Kirponos could not understand. It was in Popel's memoirs that a powerful image of the party's hand appeared.

The most interesting and controversial moment is the capture of Dubno by the Popel group, which was described first by Penezhko, and then repeated by Popel. Nikolai Kirillovich describes the process brightly and colorfully.
(...)
In the report, he only tactfully wrote: "By 23.00 the southern outskirts of Dubno were taken." Here he lied a little, within reason. Vashugin ordered to take the southern outskirts, he took it, yes. However, according to the report and the combat log of the 34th Panzer Division, the 67th Panzer Regiment, which had reached Dubno, "is being heavily bombarded by anti-tank guns and artillery from the southern outskirts of Dubno and Zabramye." Zabramye is the western suburb of Dubno. Accordingly, if they fired from the southern outskirts, then there were Germans. For the night, the 34th Division gathers in Podluzhie, a village southwest of the city. They did not take risks and attack Dubno at night in order to enter the "night streets". This decision had fatal consequences. At night, units of the 111th Infantry Division reached the city, at 7.00 they were already in Dubno and by the storming of the city, which Popel began at 9.00, he no longer had any chance of capturing it.

Further, Popel does not return to the issue of capturing at least some part of Dubno, having honestly written that the enemy had organized a defense on the northern and western outskirts of the town. Popel's group tried to ram this defense for two days, but to no avail. Let us leave memoir stories about the transition to defense on the conscience of Comrade Popel. In reality (and in the report), the lagging rear of the 34th Panzer Division in the Ptych area were defending themselves. The main forces hammered "taken" on the pages of Dubno's memoirs.

There are, of course, episodes that coincide with reality. The capture of German tanks by the Popel group and their use is confirmed not only by the Popel report, but also by the report of the 34th Panzer Division. Moreover, they were captured by the rear areas remaining in the Ptych region, who fought with 16 td.

© Isaev

[gorenina91]

- During WWI, there was such a "pseudo general" traitor NP Bobyr in the Russian army; who surrendered to the Germans a whole fortified area (quite well equipped and having large military resources in order to resist the Kaiser's army) ... - Moreover, the German troops who accepted this capture ... were one and a half times inferior in number to the military Russian garrison, which was in much more favorable conditions than the Germans, to whom this fortified area was surrendered ...

On August 21, 1915, perhaps the most inglorious, if not more dramatic, event in the history of the Russian army took place. Far from exhausting the possibilities of resistance and virtually without a fight, the largest Russian fortress, Novogeorgievsk, surrendered. More precisely, not even a fortress, but a whole fortified area with an area of ​​more than 200 square kilometers, which, in addition to the citadel, included 33 powerful reinforced concrete forts with numerous artillery.

23 generals, 1200 officers and more than 83 thousand soldiers surrendered - a case in Russia that has never been seen before. Moreover, all the fortifications, weapons and ammunition were transferred to the Germans safe and sound.

- Such are the things ... - Who knows ... - maybe this is very weighty and influenced the result of the entire sad ending of the Russian imperial army throughout WWI ...
- And then the Bolsheviks shot this Bobryr himself; and already in 1920 ...
- It is strange that among the huge number of those who surrendered in 1915 (and this is 23 generals, 1200 officers) there was not a single officer who would have shot this traitor Bobry ...

[nikvic46]

You cannot belittle others with one victory. Talking about the battle near Rzhev, the TV presenters came to an unexpected conclusion for me. Like, this battle bled the Germans, thereby there were victories at Stalingrad and Kursk. This position is somewhat surprising.

[Catfish]

So that's what they are TV presenters, what is the demand from them. Their work is the same at all times - with a smart face to talk about what they do not know and what they absolutely do not understand.

[Konnick]

Like, this battle bled the Germans, thereby there were victories at Stalingrad and Kursk. This position is somewhat surprising.

And why? The most efficient army group Center, was bound hand and foot near Moscow, got stuck in positional battles.
Stalin, using the unfortunate position of these German troops in the Rzhev salient, did not allow the use of German strategic reserves for an offensive into the Caucasus, for a passage to the Volga, for the capture of Leningrad, for hindering our counteroffensive at Stalingrad. If the Germans had sent 3 tank and 2 infantry divisions not at Rzhev, but at Stalingrad, then there would have been a defeat at Rzhev, and not at Stalingrad, and much more. The Germans understood this and in March 43rd, they hastily evacuated troops from Rzhev. And Model's 9th Army, battered near Rzhev, could not do anything when attacking from the northern face of the Kursk Bulge.

[Pessimist22]

Is Stalin a strategist or what? Not only did he not have a military education and did not have such an education, he spoke Russian with an accent, because he thought in his native language.

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Pessimist22

Is Stalin a strategist or what? Not only did he not have a military education and did not have such an education, he spoke Russian with an accent, because he thought in his native language.

It seems that the Berlin patient is the most, that neither is, both a strategist and a leader, if he speaks and thinks in Russian?

[ccsr]

Quote: Pessimist22

Is Stalin a strategist or what?

And he didn't have to be a strategist - they were directly subordinate to him. The task of a leader of this level is to choose the best of them, and entrust him with the strategic planning of all important operations, otherwise there will be a mess, and then there will be no one to ask when the country will be defeated in the war. By the way, the Crimean and Kharkov disasters were precisely the result of not so much strategic planning as personal mistakes of the officials responsible for it.
Well, do not underestimate the mental abilities of Stalin himself - this was even noted by his opponents. This means that during the first few months he was constantly listening to reports from different commanders and having mastered operational information, he quickly understood what strategy we need to choose at the initial stage of the war. So Stalin's strategy was all right, otherwise we would not have won that war.

[Sergey Valov]

If Stalin's strategy was all right, we would not retreat to Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey Valov

If Stalin's strategy was all right, we would not retreat to Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

If Hitler and his generals had everything in order with their strategy, they would not have attacked the USSR at all, and the Third Reich existed to this day and the 1939 Treaty would have been prolonged. I think they would have succeeded, I don’t know in what form, but the Europeans would be grateful to them, because no matter how Negroes or Muslims would then be in Europe.
So Stalin was the best strategist in the world - he made half of Europe socialist, that means something.

[Sergey Valov]

And where is this socialist Europe now? Just don't talk about traitors and bad students. In the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, there were anti-communist uprisings. He apparently brought a good life to these peoples.

[ccsr]

Quote: Sergey Valov

And where is this socialist Europe now?

What does Stalin have to do with this? Where is the Roman or British Empire now - a counter-question for you. Why did a rebellion take place in India and the noble kings were overthrown from Great Britain?

[Sergey Valov]

"What does Stalin have to do with this?" - it was Stalin who imposed on these peoples a regime under which these peoples did not want to live.

[clerk]

... And where is this socialist Europe now? Just don't talk about traitors and bad students. In the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, there were anti-communist uprisings. He apparently brought a good life to these peoples.

His goal was not the good life of Eastern Europe, but the military security of the USSR. And this he achieved until the appearance of the B-47.

[Sergey Valov]

At first, as part of your thesis, I agree, as for the criticality of the appearance of the B-47, I do not agree. By mid-1945, the USSR was many times weaker than the US-England coalition. Human reserves were almost completely depleted, the industry was running out of breath and critically dependent on the supply of certain types of raw materials and equipment by the allies, agriculture was barely breathing, the army was also critically dependent on the supply of certain types of equipment. The fleet was completely inoperable, there was no strategic aviation. And the presence of the atomic bomb in the United States made the superiority of the allies overwhelming. Our country needed peace to rebuild. The allies, by the way, did not need the war either, here the interests of all coincided.

[clerk]

... By mid-1945, the USSR was many times weaker than the US-England coalition.

British generals in 1945 categorically disagreed with you today. Re-read the plan "Unthinkable" - the text is on the net.

[Sergey Valov]

Firstly, these are the generals, and secondly, the British. I have no doubt that they thought that way, but I am sure that they did not have the slightest idea of ​​the state of the Soviet economy.

[clerk]

... Firstly, these are the generals, and secondly, the British. I have no doubt that they thought that way, but I am sure that they did not have the slightest idea of ​​the state of the Soviet economy.

Read all the same Plan "Unthinkable" - many of your fantasies will disappear by themselves.

[Sergey Valov]

I am not about the thoughts of the British generals, but about the real state of affairs. As for reading a book, I would love to, but I have not seen it on sale, and I do not read electronic texts.

[clerk]

... I am not about the thoughts of the British generals, but about the real state of affairs.

Why do you think that you know the real state of affairs better than British military analysts in 1945?

[Sergey Valov]

Because I now live in the Russian Federation, and not in 1945 in England. Plus, I had the opportunity to get information from primary sources, and not from the Internet.

[clerk]

... Because I now live in the Russian Federation, and not in 1945 in England. Plus, I had the opportunity to get information from primary sources, and not from the Internet.

That is, people who knew exactly what the USSR needed during the war understood the situation worse than you, who had read a couple of very subjective memoir books?

[Sergey Valov]

"Who has read a couple of very subjective memoir books" - do we know you personally? Do you know the level of my knowledge? Do you know the sources of my information? You don't have to answer, I stopped the discussion.

[clerk]

... I had the opportunity to receive information from the source

... who has read a couple of very subjective memoir books "- do we know you personally? Do you know the level of my knowledge? Do you know the sources of my information? You don't have to answer, I stopped the discussion.

... Sorry. And I so wanted to know - what is this mysterious primary source of information about the Soviet economy in 1945

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Sergey Valov

If Stalin's strategy was all right, we would not retreat to Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

Well, what are you - Comrade Stalin - the father of all victories, and the boilers and soldiers' graves are on the conscience of mediocrities-generals, whom the Leader did not fully atat-do in 37-38.

[clerk]

... Well, what are you, Comrade Stalin, the father of all victories, and the cauldrons and soldiers' graves are on the conscience of mediocrities-generals, whom the Leader did not fully attain in 37-38

Beautiful stupidity. In principle, it is impossible to win a war with the wrong strategy.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Sergey Valov

If Stalin's strategy was all right, we would not retreat to Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

Well, you, I suppose, are a very great strategist and can you tell us what should have been done based on the realities of that time?

[Sergey Valov]

There is no need to translate the arrows and get personal - we are talking about a specific person and the results of his activities.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Sergey Valov

There is no need to translate the arrows and get personal - we are talking about a specific person and the results of his activities.

Well, if you judge him, then you have the appropriate qualifications? Or ...?

[Sergey Valov]

Did I understand correctly that you need to get worn out?

[mat-vey]

Quote: Sergey Valov

Did I understand correctly that you need to get worn out?

Did I understand correctly that you are never a strategist?

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Sergey Valov

If Stalin's strategy was all right, we would not retreat to Moscow, Stalingrad and the Caucasus.

We would just lose armies in cauldrons

[Sergey Valov]

Or they stopped the Germans near the border. By the way, pay attention, the probability of this option for some reason is not even considered.

[AlBir]

Quote: Sergey Valov

Or they stopped the Germans near the border ...

... like the Poles in '39 and the French and British in '40.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: ccsr

And he didn't have to be a strategist - they were directly subordinate to him. The task of a manager of this level is to choose the best of them, and entrust him with the strategic planning of all important operations.

Well, yes, well, yes .... The fact that this genius of all times and peoples imagined himself to be a strategist is beyond doubt. And often for no reason. To the Rzhev mentioned here, who by the admirers of the Leader is presented by his brilliant multi-move, supposedly distracting the forces from Stalingrad and so on. - is it like the senseless offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts in March-April 1942 something "fettered" there and from somewhere "delayed"? "A leader of this level" Zhukov and Konev (whom he, in your opinion, should have "trusted") repeatedly asked to stop the suicide offensive ... 1-2 shots per gun per day (Zhukov) - if it is not

Quote: ccsr

mess

then what?

[ccsr]

Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.

That this genius of all times and peoples imagined himself to be a strategist

He never imagined himself - it was some of our sycophants who inspired him, and he knew it very well, since at the banquet on the occasion of the Victory he thanked the Russian people, who did not throw him off in 1941.

Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.

To the Rzhev mentioned here, who is exhibited by the Leader's fans as his brilliant multi-move,

Do not engage in bullshit, and remember that the entire Stalingrad battle was planned by two colonels from the GOU, who for a month did not leave the premises where no one except their boss entered, and where they received all the information required for this. And then so many of the creators of this battle discovered that the names of these people still do not know, although I am sure that their workbooks and calculation materials have been preserved in the archives of the General Staff.

Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.

Zhukov and Konev (who, in your opinion, he should have "trusted" a "leader of this level") repeatedly asked to stop the suicidal offensive.

Trust the memoirs less, many wanted to justify themselves before history, so they wrote what was beneficial to them.

Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.

during the onset, the rate of ammunition consumption is 1-2 shots per gun per day (Zhukov)

If in a secondary sector of the front, where a breakthrough was not planned, then maybe it was not the worst choice to redistribute ammunition in case of a shortage.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: ccsr

Trust Memoirs Less

Yes, I don’t trust them, but the patriots “Memories and Reflections” have a handbook (though I don’t know in which edition).

Quote: ccsr

many wanted to justify themselves before history, so they wrote what was beneficial to them.

Pepper is clear. This is the essence of memoirism. And Comrade Zhukov has a stigma in a strong cannon. How long did they do with Bulganin in the Wehrmacht in their report to the Headquarters on December 31, 1941? "Completely defeated" 14 infantry divisions, which strangely continued to fight after the Typhoon? 19th TD? Strange - she ended the war in the Moravian Cauldron in May 45. 2nd SS Brigade? In general, the joke is that the 2nd SS-infantry brigade was not close to Moscow. Maybe these reports inspired the Bet on the famous directive letter # 03 dated January 10? The war, no more, no less, were going to end up valiantly in 1942 with the defeat of the Germans.

Quote: ccsr

If on a secondary sector of the front

I would not call this site secondary.

[Konnick]

Completely defeated "14 infantry divisions, which in a strange way continued to fight after the Typhoon? 19th TD? Strange - she ended the war in the Moravian cauldron in May 45th.

The SS Regiment "Der Fuehrer" of which 35 people remained after the battles of Rzhev, also took part in the war further, and in the 44th "became famous" in the French village of Oradour, where he licked his wounds after the Eastern Front. This regiment destroyed all the inhabitants of this village and burned it. The French authorities did not restore this French Khatyn, but left everything as it was, now it is a memorial

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Konnick

SS Regiment "Der Fuhrer" of which 35 people remained after the battles in Rzhev

From the original 650 people. 150 killed, the rest are sanitary. Yes, ours mutilated him nicely) It's amazing that anyone stayed. It got to the point that the Model to close the gap in the 10th company of the regiment sent a combined company of convoymen - 120 people, who fled at the very first attack of ours. If not for the motorized infantry battalion "Das Reich" and the division of stugs, they would have buried everyone. And so ... When the Model arrived at sht.b.f. Kummu, the regiment commander, and asked about the losses, he said - all the people are built in the courtyard of the headquarters. The model looked at 35 people and grunted.
It seems that the regiment was first decided to disband, emnip, but Kumm personally wound up at the Fuehrer's headquarters and beat him with his brow. Well, in France it was re-formed, and in January 43 it was sent to the East.

[Konnick]

After the war, Otto Kumm became the manager of the Burda magazine, but that's not what I mean. You've quoted Leon Degrel or Paul Karel, but it doesn't matter, both are fiction. And in fact, there are now digitized documents about these battles, but everything is different there, there were no 30 light tanks, not these tanks destroyed the 10th company of der Fuhrer. Our team also tried, Konev reported on the defeat of the SS battalion.
The 10th company took up defensive positions at Kokosh Hill. Next, I'll insert an excerpt from my comment:

Lieutenant Smyk died on the same day with the legendary Gorobets, whose crew a monument was erected in Tver for a raid on the captured city. Two tanks from the 21st TBR, under the command of Smyk and Gorobets, together with the 46th separate motorcycle regiment, took the very important Kokosh hill near Rzhev, which was defended by the 10th company of the SS Der Führer regiment. Both Gorobets and Smyk died, Gorobets was posthumously assigned a Hero for this battle, the surviving crew was awarded the Orders of Lenin, and Smyk was awarded the Red Banner, attributing this phrase "is in the unit" in the award. Smyk died shortly before the assault, distracting by fire like Gorobets's tank, who then, in the morning, in the dark, drove up to this height from an unexpected direction for the Germans, along an ice slope, previously flooded by the SS, to the very center of the stronghold and already took over all the fire in order to divert attention from the 2 companies of the 46th MCP, who approached imperceptibly into a blizzard on the other side of the strongpoint, so that they could unexpectedly break into the trenches without firing and destroy the 10th SS company in hand-to-hand combat, which was successfully completed with minimal losses. The capture of this height was under Stalin's control, there is an order from the Headquarters, Konev and Lelyushenko were directly present there. Stepan Gorobets died on his birthday. he is 29 years old. And the commander of the 46th ICP, Lieutenant Colonel Polevoy, was awarded the medal For Courage, Lieutenant Colonel and For Courage, that is, for personal courage.

Wrong, Smyk Aleksey Gordeevich was also given the Order of Lenin. If someone is interested in the award, on the site of the Feat of the People there is an award from 29.09.42/03.02.42/08.02.42 with a postscript in other ink. According to Memory of the People, he died on XNUMX, and the height was taken on XNUMX.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Konnick

You quoted Leon Degrel or Paul Karel

Weidinger, rather.

Quote: Konnick

The 10th company took up defensive positions at Kokosh Hill.

What is the "Kokosh height"? If the village of Kokoshkino is meant, then it is in the deep rear of the regiment, on the other bank of the Volga. The 10th company took up defenses at Optyakhino, there is no height there.

[Konnick]

Optyakhino is three houses at the foot of the Kokoshe height

[Konnick]

Even now, at this height, there are continuous trenches and pits from dugouts.

It can be seen well even on satellite images

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Convinced, good.

[vladcub]

"in which edition" I have the first edition, and I saw the 1985 edition of my acquaintances. It seemed to me more reliable, but Molotov's words are known: "trust Zhukov less."

[clerk]

... And Comrade Zhukov has a stigma in a strong cannon. How long did they do with Bulganin in the Wehrmacht in their report to the Headquarters on December 31, 1941? "Completely defeated" 14 infantry divisions, which in a strange way continued to fight after the Typhoon?

To smash does not mean to destroy. The Wehrmacht lost 103 thousand dead and wounded in December. This is half of the l / s of 14 divisions. That, according to all the canons, is classified as a rout.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

He never imagined himself

What? An excellent strategist, anyway, at the end of 1941 we were already stronger than the Germans. The strategist Stalin is not to blame for the fact that our generals introduced organizational chaos and thwarted the BP (which determined the terrible losses of 1941). But having prepared the industry and reserves, and by 1942 we were stronger than the Germans. But the losses in 1941 determined the unsuccessful course of combat until October 1942.
Stalingrad would not have existed if it was possible to remove the Rzhevsky ledge (and this could have been done as a result of the December offensive) and drive the Germans away at least 300 km. And so the threat to Moscow. And our main direction was Moscow. And the main forces and means are concentrated there. And Tymoshenko was forced to attack (as a diversionary blow, to fetter the maneuver with the reserves of the German).
So it turned out that the Germans are advancing on the Caucasus and Stalingrad, and ours on Rzhev.
In general, the strategy is correct. but the performers (at the operational level) are worthless (Zhukov. Timoshenko).

Quote: ccsr

the entire Stalingrad battle was planned by two colonels from the GOU,

I don't know such subtleties. that two GOU operators did it, but in mid-October, already some of our commanders wanted to strike (felt weakness) on the flanks of the Germans. And they were instructed not to jerk on their own initiative, it means that there was already a plan, and preparations began.

Quote: ccsr

If on a secondary sector of the front, where a breakthrough was not planned,

The one to whom you are trying to explain is not aware that there is a breakthrough, but there is an offensive misleading the enemy or holding down the regrouping or maneuver of his reserves.

[Konnick]

was the senseless offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts in March-April 1942 something "fettered" there and from somewhere "delayed"? "A leader of this level" Zhukov and Konev (whom he, in your opinion, should have "trusted") repeatedly asked to stop the suicide offensive ... which, in general, cannot be called such - during the period of the offensive the rate of ammunition consumption is 1 -2 rounds per gun per day (Zhukov) -

From your point of view, this is meaningless ...
It was impossible to sit on the defensive, then the Germans would again seize the initiative, and Moscow was 200 km away. Yes, there was a shell hunger, just the artillery was not enough in these battles. And this offensive cannot be called suicidal. My grandfather, the squad leader of the 46th separate motorcycle regiment, died near Rzhev, near the village of Pogorelki, precisely at the beginning of March 42nd, and I do not consider his death senseless. This regiment usually attacked at night, as there was no artillery support, breaking into German trenches without firing and the attacks were successful. It was this regiment, named the best in the army by the commander of the 30th Army Lelyushenko,
took part in the destruction of the elite SS der Führer regiment, of which 35 people from 10 companies remained by March. And 46 MCL lost about 42 people out of 700 by June 1500, these are losses since the fall of 41. And the offensive was near Rzhev from January to March, and not to April. According to the results of the battles near Rzhev, 46 mtsp in April 42nd, became a 2-guards mtsp.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Konnick

And the offensive was near Rzhev from January to March, and not to April.

Yes? The directive of the SVGK No. 153589 is dated March 20th.
Item # 1:

Defeat the Rzhev-Vyazma-Gzhatsk grouping of the enemy and, no later than April 20, leave and gain a foothold on our former defensive line along the line of Bely, Bulashevo, Dorogobuzh, Yelnya, Snopot, Krasnoe.

The 43rd and 49th armies were ordered to unite with Efremov and no later than 1 April capture Gzhatsk and further, developing the offensive, Bryansk. These armies ceased offensive operations on April 14.

[Konnick]

I'm talking about the Kalinin Front, and the armies of the Western Front.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Konnick

I'm talking about the Kalinin Front, and the armies of the Western Front.

The Stavka directive concerned both fronts. Kalininsky was ordered to take Rzhev by the forces of 3 armies no later than 5 April.

[clerk]

... etc. - is it like the senseless offensive of the Kalinin and Western fronts in March-April 1942 something there "fettered" and from somewhere "delayed"? "A leader of this level" Zhukov and Konev (whom he, in your opinion, should have "trusted") repeatedly asked to stop the suicide offensive ... which, in general, cannot be called such - during the period of the offensive the rate of ammunition consumption is 1 -2 rounds per gun per day (Zhukov) - if it is not

For the year (!!!) of battles near Rzhev, the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army amounted to 360 thousand people. Do you want to compare with the Kiev or Vyazemsky boilers?

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: clerk

For the year (!!!) of battles near Rzhev, the irrecoverable losses of the Red Army amounted to 360 thousand people. Do you want to compare with the Kiev or Vyazemsky boilers?

What do you want to say? What does the boilers have to do with it, and with what fright should one compare with them?

[clerk]

... What do you want to say? What does the boilers have to do with it, and with what fright should one compare with them?

From such that in 1941-42 the Germans could easily enough break through the Soviet defenses and destroy entire fronts. almost twice as large as the total irrecoverable losses of the Red Army for the year of battles near Rzhev. It was this meat grinder that prevented the Germans from organizing a new offensive in that area. On the question of the alleged aimlessness of the Soviet offensives near Rzhev.

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

Quote: clerk

It was this meat grinder that prevented the Germans from organizing a new offensive in that area. On the question of the alleged aimlessness of the Soviet offensives near Rzhev.

An attack on a well-organized defense (such as the Rzhev salient was) is a senseless loss.
Mikhin P.A. (Gunners, Stalin gave the order) Participant in the battles for Rzhev:

In August, our army only slightly lacked forces and air support to take Rzhev. Heavy rains also prevented us. And when the rains ended [73], the water slept and the mud dried up, all means of breakthrough were removed from our combat positions and transferred to other fronts: corps artillery - thousands and thousands of guns, aviation and hundreds of tanks. And later we, who remained here, as if "local troops", completely exhausted, found themselves six kilometers from Rzhev in front of the heavily fortified defenses of the fascists, forced to attack the German fortifications without artillery preparation, stamping on the spot and bleeding. And a new painful, hopeless, pre-doomed offensive by means the remaining exhausted rifle divisions, while the Germans urgently overtook a lot of artillery, tanks, aircraft near Rzhev and all the time counterattacked us with fresh superior forces. On the one hand, Zhukov and Konev were afraid to justify to Stalin the impossibility of taking Rzhev with the remaining forces; on the other hand, they deliberately created an illusion for Stalin: the offensive continues and is proceeding successfully. In fact, this offensive has turned into a "meat grinder of Rzhev". Our command methodically, every day poured and poured thousands and thousands of soldiers into it. And the result was the same: CORPSE FIELDS, "GROVES OF DEATH", "VALLEY OF DEATH", along which we crawled unsuccessfully and fled from the swamps to the hills fortified by the Germans. The Germans also suffered losses, because we fought selflessly, but their losses were incomparable with ours.

[clerk]

.
It was this meat grinder that prevented the Germans from organizing a new offensive in that area. On the question of the alleged aimlessness of the Soviet offensives near Rzhev./////////////// ::: An attack on a well-organized defense (like the Rzhev salient was) is a senseless loss.
Mikhin P.A. (Gunners, Stalin gave the order) Participant in the battles for Rzhev:

So "Tsushima" was written not by a battalion, but by a writer ... - What ?! Have you read this ro'man? ... It was not written by a writer, but by a bataler! As he was, Novikov was a battalier, so he remained a battalion, and his novel is interesting only because it can be understood from it how a battalier looks at great events and human destinies ... How do-u-urak looks! "(C)

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

Quote: clerk

How doo-u-urak looks! "(C)

This is your opinion, I do not share at all.
As a witness to immediate events, he looks like a person who is offended for the state, as a person who does not want to die in vain - he is ready to stand up for his homeland, but not stupid useless cannon fodder

[clerk]

... This is your opinion, I do not share at all.
As a witness to immediate events, he looks like a person who is offended for the state, as a person who does not want to die in vain - he is ready to stand up for his homeland, but not stupid useless cannon fodder

This is a view from the trench. And what seems useless from the trench does not look like that at the headquarters, and even more so after so many years and the opening of the archives.

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

Quote: clerk

This is a view from the trench. And what seems useless from the trench does not look like that at the headquarters, and even more so after so many years and the opening of the archives.

Well then, try to answer the question why the losses of the Americans in Europe were less than those of the Red Army in the battles of Rzhev, and the losses of the Germans were incomparably greater. Ask, for example, how Operation Cobra, the Battle of Cherbourg, the Battle of Brest (of course French), the Falaise Bag (15 defeated Wehrmacht divisions) were carried out. Hacking West Val.
And not only the technical equipment and fire superiority of the Americans - but the organization of infantry support and more competent tactics allowed the Allies.
At the same time, the Americans themselves believed that:

In this first battle in northwestern Europe, the American army had well-founded regret that it had not prioritized infantry recruitment since the great mobilization of American manpower began in 1940.

So why is the result of the Americans with their worthless infantry so different in losses and results?

[clerk]

... Well then, try to answer the question why the losses of the Americans in Europe were less than those of the Red Army in the battles of Rzhev, and the losses of the Germans were incomparably greater.

For the same reason that the ratio of Soviet and German irrecoverable losses near Rzhev was 7: 1, and 2 years later in Belarus in 1: 1,6

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

Quote: clerk

For the same reason that the ratio of Soviet and German irrecoverable losses near Rzhev was 7: 1, and 2 years later in Belarus in 1: 1,6

The front arc of the Rzhevsky ledge was 530 kilometers. In depth, it went beyond Vyazma up to 160 kilometers. And from Moscow it was only 150 kilometers away. .... Stalin, who never went to the front, could not resist visiting Rzhev on August 4, 1943, six months after the fighting. It was there that he signed the order for the first salute in honor of the liberation of Orel and Belgorod.

The battles near Rzhev, from our side, were led by outstanding generals: Marshals Stalin, Zhukov, Konev, Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky. [102]

But Rzhev was never taken.

Our whole tragedy consisted in the fact that we were advancing, making detours through swampy forests, along the floodplains of numerous rivers and streams, along the shores of countless lakes, along the hills and ridges of the Valdai and Smolensk Uplands, under the endless bombing of enemy aircraft, often finding ourselves without food and ammunition in deserted swamps and without any hope of help from their own, while the Germans blocked our communications with the rear and held their defenses in dry places, towering over our positions, in well-equipped bunkers and dugouts. Our soldiers and officers fought selflessly and heroically near Rzhev and Vyazma, Sychevka and Pogorely Gorodishche, near Olenin and Bely. The most offensive for a soldier in a war is when, with all his courage, endurance, ingenuity, dedication, dedication, he cannot defeat a well-fed, arrogant, well-armed, occupying a more advantageous position of the enemy - for reasons beyond his control: due to lack of weapons, ammunition, food, aviation support, remoteness of rear services. Our soldiers and officers were not to blame for the fact that the commanders urged on by Stalin carried out military operations that were not provided materially, and primarily from the air, although by design they were daring and remarkable.

[clerk]

... Our soldiers and officers were not to blame for the fact that the commanders urged on by Stalin carried out military operations that were not provided materially, and primarily from the air, although by design they were daring and remarkable.

Who is the author of this nonsense?

[Dmitry Vladimirovich]

Quote: clerk

Who is the author of this nonsense?

A direct participant in the battles, an order bearer - but you know better from the sofa ...

[clerk]

... Quote: clerk
Who is the author of this nonsense?
/ / / / / / / / / /
A direct participant in the battles, an order bearer - but you know better from the sofa ...

Well, if the author during the battles near Rzhev was a lieutenant, having risen to the rank of lieutenant colonel of artillery and then taught mathematics to schoolchildren for half a century, then this is a view from the trench and is poorly competent in assessing the actions of the high command. By the way, the same Isaev in his video about the Battle of Rzhev directly says that initially powerful air support was envisaged, but the weather let down.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"How doo-u-urak looks!" (C) "
===
Aha
It is the battalion who mistook a clean victory for a clean defeat. But in fact it was the Russian fleet that defeated the Japanese at Tsushima.
And as soon as naval commanders later grew out of battalions - it is not clear! Peter I was only a scorer. And he had absolutely no naval education.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"A leader of this level" Zhukov and Konev (whom, in your opinion, he should have "trusted") were repeatedly asked to stop the suicide offensive. "
==
Is this crap documented?

[Witness 45]

You can have ten diplomas and remain a layman, Frunze, like Stalin, did not have a military education, however, in the Civil War, he beat educated and over-educated generals of the White Army on all fronts, where he appeared, if there is a mind, then knowledge and education will appear, and if it is not , then no amount of education will help. Natural talent, a gift from God, has not been canceled.

[Konnick]

Natural talent, a gift from God, has not been canceled.

It was Stalin who made the decision in January 42 on a wave of "dizziness from success" on the construction of the Volga Rockada, thanks to which they were able to transfer a lot of troops for a counteroffensive at Stalingrad. It is not known if we could have defeated 28 Wehrmacht divisions and their satellites there without this railway. ...

[Pilat2009]

Quote: Svidetel 45

You can have ten diplomas and remain a layman, Frunze, like Stalin, did not have a military education, however, in the Civil War, he beat educated and over-educated generals of the White Army on all fronts, where he appeared, if there is a mind, then knowledge and education will appear, and if it is not , then no amount of education will help. Natural talent, a gift from God, has not been canceled.

Well, Tukhachevsky also beat the whites along with Budyonny, and in the Polish one he got a schm. Talent, and the planning was not canceled. It was precisely because the Germans carefully planned their operations, they beat everyone in WWI and the beginning of WWII. And ruined them in both cases only war on 2 fronts

[clerk]

... Is Stalin a strategist or what? Not only did he not have a military education and did not have such an education, he spoke Russian with an accent, because he thought in his native language.

In fact, Stalin is the Strategist, two heads taller than Hitler and his generals. Stalin brilliantly prepared the country for a long war, which is why it was won. While the Germans were outplaying the Red Army at the operational level, they were winning. As soon as the Red Army learned to fight in a couple of years, the Germans stopped winning.

[nikvic46]

Nikolay. I agree with you. But we were also tied up. We could transfer forces to the same Stalingrad.

[Konnick]

We could transfer forces to the same Stalingrad.

Yes, they could. But the Germans, too, would have transferred these troops, and at Stalingrad, it would no longer be the Romanians and the Italians in the breakthrough areas on the flanks, but the most combat-ready units of the German army, and it is not known how it would have ended. It was beneficial for us to stretch the front line, and with the withdrawal of the Germans from the Rzhev salient, the front line would be greatly reduced. Even the fact that the Germans were allowed to go to the Caucasus played into the hands of the Red Army. Logistics in the bare steppes became very difficult for the Germans, even to Manstein's tanks it was necessary to deliver fuel on camels.

[chenia]

Quote: Konnick

... It was beneficial for us to stretch the front line, and with the withdrawal of the Germans from the Rzhev salient, the front line would be greatly reduced.

Oh no. ! 50 km from the capital. on the contrary strongly strained ours. At the end of 1941, in terms of manpower and equipment, we were more powerful than the Germans (the blitz was covered, and then it would take a curve.) The Germans could advance from the middle of autumn. only in one strategic direction. Yes, and Tymoshenko attacked with the aim of diverting the blow on Rzhev (and if he had not attacked? Well, there would have been no need). Throw the Germans back 300 km. it was possible to "play" with the reserves (and we had more of them). And they are mainly focused on the "Moscow" direction. The Germans, one way or another, would be advancing in the South. Tymoshenko on the defensive. would have inflicted a greater defeat on the Germans (two TCs would have been used for a contour). The Germans would have broken through his front anyway.
And received a blow from the flank from Zhukov. In short, what happened in late autumn in real life would have happened at its beginning, or even at the end of summer.

[Konnick]

This strained Zhukov, but not Stalin. Tymoshenko under Kharkov performed a completely different task, but the redeployed German air squadrons, which defeated the Crimean front, also defeated Tymoshenko's tank corps. The Germans skillfully used aviation, concentrating it in the right place and at the right time. Our strongest air group, covering Moscow, operated near Rzhev. Therefore, there was a big difference in the capabilities of the German troops in the south and near Moscow. And Stalin reasoned more strategically than Zhukov. Stalin valued aviation much more than Zhukov, and he was sure that without air superiority the Germans would not dare to attack. He was very angry with the defeat of the Crimean Front, this disrupted all his plans, so he reacted more calmly to the Kharkov catastrophe. Stalin constantly restrained Zhukov in his desire to defeat the Rzhev group, and when he sent Zhukov in the fall of 42 from Stalingrad to command the troops of the Western direction, he already knew that reserves were being transferred there from France and Zhukov would only be able to defeat Model if he was lucky. And the Germans, having learned that Zhukov was already near Rzhev, decided where Zhukov would be there and the main blow would be, thanks to this, Romanians and Italians remained on the flanks of Paulus.

[chenia]

Quote: Konnick

This strained Zhukov, but not Stalin.

Not nemchura was too close to the capital. In terms of the allocated forces and resources, this is the main direction (Stalingrad will become a priority later). The problem had to be solved - both Stalin and Zhukov understood this.

Quote: Konnick

Tymoshenko under Kharkov performed a completely different task,

Naturally, front-line operations are not carried out only as distracting. But the Headquarters is coordinating the sequence of actions of the fronts. And Tymoshenko's offensive should have made it difficult to maneuver the reserves.

Quote: Konnick

He was very angry with the defeat of the Crimean Front, it disrupted all his plans,

Eh. it would be better to put Manstein on the "stretch" Sevastopol-Kerch. To build a defense on the Kerch Peninsula (a third of the forces would be enough for this) and 11 PA would be blocked in Crimea. Crimea is not as valuable as Peter (that's where 2 UAs would add forces and resources.).

Quote: Konnick

in the fall of 42

And this is a different period, then our eyes lit up. At Stalingrad, everything was already asking to create a "mousetrap" and slam it shut.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: nikvic46

We could transfer forces to the same Stalingrad.

No, they couldn't. More precisely, they could have thrown them over, but supplied them - no longer. EMNIP, Isaev wrote that the forces gathered for Uranus were the maximum they could pull out the rear on that sector of the front.

[qQQQ]

Quote: nikvic46

Like, this battle bled the Germans, thereby there were victories at Stalingrad and Kursk. This position is somewhat surprising.

You wonder in vain, a very correct statement. There was not a single one isolated from other operations in the Second World War. Each of them allowed or did not allow something or someone to be used. It's just that Rzhev at that time was still too tough for the spacecraft (difficult terrain, the level of command, supplies, etc.), but the fact that he distracted a significant part of the German armies from other sectors is a medical fact.

[Doctor]

You cannot belittle others with one victory. Talking about the battle near Rzhev, the TV presenters came to an unexpected conclusion for me. Like, this battle bled the Germans, thereby there were victories at Stalingrad and Kursk. This position is somewhat surprising.

Old version. After all, Zhukov was in command there.

[Konnick]

By a strange coincidence, on August 6, 1941, Hitler arrives in Western Ukraine in the city of Berdychev (Hitler's Palace in Ukraine: "Werewolf").

And since when did Berdichev become Berdychev?

[qQQQ]

Quote: Konnick

And since when did Berdichev become Berdychev?

Since then, when they ceased to be interested in geography and simply tried to translate from Ukrainian.

[Konnick]

Quote: Pessimist22

Is Stalin a strategist or what? Not only did he not have a military education and did not have such an education, he spoke Russian with an accent, because he thought in his native language.

Well, this is one of those Khrushchev myths. And Stalin simply loved to check the spelling of his subordinates, but there was an accent, but he knew Russian for sure better than you, judging by your literacy in the comments. And I won't discuss Stalin's strategy with you, you still won't understand.

[Pessimist22]

What strategy can a person have with an unfinished theological seminary, where he handed over everyone, and then became a bandit and his methods of management were purely bandit, wild.

[Aviator_]

Pessimist, change your profile picture. The Banner of Victory is not suitable for such a troll to have on it.

[Pessimist22]

That is, you think that if my opinion differs from yours, I am a troll? It is good that people like you are not in power, but how will non-brothers be imprisoned and banned for their own opinion.

[Aviator_]

What strategy can a person have with an unfinished theological seminary, where he handed over everyone, and then became a bandit and his methods of management were purely bandit, wild.

What kind of avatar can an organism have that speaks so much about the leader of the USSR, under whose leadership the Great Country was created and who led the USSR to Victory?

[Pessimist22]

Organism, where is your great country?

[Konnick]

I will answer. Our Great country has remained in history, and yours is now in one place below the back, I'm afraid it will remain there ...

[Pessimist22]

Like in a joke about a goldfish : I want to have everything! You had everything ...

[Witness 45]

Here is another example of knowledge of the history of the country, the events of that time and people at the level of a cook with 3 unfinished classes of a special school for the mentally underdeveloped, but climbs with his opinion to judge.

[Mechanic]

My dear, why didn't Dzhugashvili go through not one criminal article, but only political? So, with the thug you flew

[mmaxx]

Seminary at all times gave a sickly education. And how many Stalin read, now very few people can do it. Not literature on demand.
And the illiterate Genghis Khan has done something. And Misha Gorbachev did a lot of things with 2 higher ones. Let's compare?
The Denikins, Wrangels, Yudenichs and others lost the war to absolutely civilian Bolsheviks - Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin, Frunze, etc. There is a lot to say about the education of Nicholas II. But his list of teachers will amaze anyone.
ANYTHING education does not say about a person, except what he received.

[Doctor]

And the illiterate Genghis Khan has done something. And Misha Gorbachev did a lot of things with 2 higher ones. Let's compare?
The Denikins, Wrangels, Yudenichs and others lost the war to absolutely civilian Bolsheviks - Trotsky, Lenin, Stalin, Frunze, etc.

At the time of Chingiz, everyone was illiterate, Gorbach did not fight with anyone, and Lenin is in the trench of a snake in itself an anecdote.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Lenin in the trench of a snake is itself an anecdote"
===
Commanders-in-chief do not sit in the trenches.

[Doctor]

Commanders-in-chief do not sit in the trenches.

Lenin was not even the Commander-in-Chief.

The commanders-in-chief of the armed forces of the republic were consistently:
Joachim Vatsetis and
Sergey Kamenev.

Both are former colonels of RIA.

So the tsarist officers Denikin and Wrangel lost to the tsarist officers Vatsetis and Kamenev.

Not some civilian Bolsheviks.

[BAI]

What kind of education did Hitler have? Those. one dilettante conquered all of Europe, the second then broke him? Some strange amateurs. They staged such a war that it didn't seem enough to anyone afterwards.

[clerk]

... What strategy might a person with an incomplete theological seminary have

The same as the current bachelor's. Or do you not distinguish seminary from parish school?

... then he became a bandit and his methods of management were purely bandit, wild.

Can you list these methods?

[evgen1221]

It's just that the connection, although it was invented a long time ago, but according to Russian habits, not everyone and not everywhere could use it. Plus, even if the frontline reconnaissance is observing the movements of the enemy, then while it goes to the top in Moscow, until it returns by order, the enemy has already captured and bypassed. We didn’t learn to use and respond to all-encompassing communications along the fronts, so they drove the armies into sacks, not knowing the situation along the frontiers. There are few signalmen and radio stations by subdivisions. From here and throwing in an open field.

[Shiden]

Here you are right, otherwise there are many strategists who have never been in the army but are judging like Napoleons.

[Pessimist22]

It looks like you were neither in the army nor at school, if you think so

[Shiden]

The difference from some who may have served for 25 years but who write such that military thought does not fit into any gates. It may be a discovery for you, but in a war all the tactical and strategic knowledge that was developed in peacetime breaks into reality.

[Konnick]

I wonder who taught Napoleon or Suvorov? Or did they use the Macedonian self-instruction manual

[Shiden]

According to history, they did not immediately become generalisimos. I am writing a story that I heard from an old warrant officer. It was in the 80s that there were large exercises in the south of Ukraine, they made a march, fell behind the column, saw a column with staff vehicles, and the warrant officer decided to ask the colonel if they had gone Autobat. Do you know what answer he received from the colonel "What kind of autobat I cannot find the division for the second day" and this will be noticed in peacetime. And here all are looking for traitors.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Shiden

Do you know what answer he received from the colonel "What kind of autobat I cannot find the division for the second day" and this will be noticed in peacetime.

Everything is like an old joke:

Mom, got the military card! Now he will ask the way!

©

[Fitter65]

... our armies at that time had already quite forgotten what it was like to have air protection - aircraft with red stars.

And that our troops could cover the planes with other identification marks?

The air connections of the 12th Army are still not lost.

The 12th Army was operatively subordinate to two fighter and one bomber regiments, subordinated, but not included in the structure. this means that, at the direction of the same Air Force headquarters, these regiments could be reoriented to other sectors and work in the interests of other military units and formations ... Moreover, they are not even indicated (at least I did not find, but honestly I didn’t look much) Which air regiments from which air formations were the 12 armies operatively subordinated, at which airfields were these units located?

[tasha]

Until July 15, 1941, 12 IADs were part of the Air Force of the 64th Army. On July 15.07, the division became part of the South-Western Air Force, on 17.7, on the 6A Air Force, but still interacted with the 12A units.

[Fitter65]

The 64th Aviation Division was formed in March 1941 at the airfield of the city of Stanislav (Ivano-Frankovsk) as part of the Air Force of the Kiev Special Military District. From 22.06.1941 as part of the Air Force of the South-Western Front, from 30.07. 1941 as part of the Air Force JF, from 07.09. 1941 as part of the South-Western Front Air Force ... We do not confuse operational subordination and be a part of ...

[tasha]

The issue is controversial, but agree not so important and fundamental. We analyzed it with the respected undecim in the comments to the previous "article" ...

The journal of the database of the Air Force Southwestern Federal District. "" 22.06.1941/12/12. Cooperated with units of the Air Force XNUMXA, being part of the Air Force XNUMXA "

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Fitter65

The 64th Aviation Division was formed in March 1941 at the airfield of the city of Stanislav (Ivano-Frankovsk) as part of the Air Force of the Kiev Special Military District.

Judging by rkka.ru, in the 64th IAD there were three formally combat-ready IAPs (12, 149 and 166) and two emerging ones (246 and 247).
At the same time, 149 IAP suffered from a typical problem in 1941 - a double set of aircraft and zero trained crews for new equipment (MiG-3). So, in reality, the division had 215 serviceable I-16 and I-153 - and 167 crews for them (while only 114 crews could take off at the same time).

[antivirus]

and in what thread the Swiss bank lie in the archive: our counterparts met: X from the USSR and U from Deutschland, spoke about the line of demarcation as in the Brest Peace of 1918. how to return the troops in Belarus to the west and in the Ukraine to withdraw to the east.
not a state archive and published (?). did the capitals support their plans? who was shot for separate negotiations?

[Fitter65]

... And the time of arrival is indicated as morning, 7 o'clock. Immediately after the end of enemy air bombing, specific formations are allocated for a retaliatory attack.

CLASS! To be honest, I did not understand so all the same the offensive was scheduled for 7 o'clock in the morning, or immediately after the enemy air raid? And what to do if the air raid is after 7:00 a.m. let's say at 7.30. or even worse at 8.00?

[Charlie]

Quote: Konnick

The topic is interesting and you can't cover it with a few articles. You can read the memoirs of Poppel, the commander of group 8 of the mechanized corps, who participated in the battle of Dubno, there is a combat log on the Memory of the People website. For some reason, Zhukov did not particularly appreciate the merits of Poppel, for his skillful actions, but for some reason he praised Muzychenko and Kirponos. And historians have not yet figured out Kirponos, some believe that he was shot by a security officer while trying to surrender.

The Soviet generals did not have personal protection

[Konnick]

Personal may not have been, but there were border regiments to protect the rear of the army. With a company of the NKVD guarding the front headquarters early. of the operative department Baghramyan left the encirclement in the Senchi area, in contrast to Kirponos, who ordered his group to go to Lokhvitsy.

[ccsr]

Quote: Charlie

The Soviet generals did not have personal protection

The guarantor was assigned to the commanders of the formations and above, at least, and he could indirectly perform the duties of personal protection. As for the "close guard" officer, this was not provided for by the states. As far as I know, there were platoons, companies and battalions of protection for the headquarters of formations and above, and from their composition groups were assigned to guard the command personnel moving in the zone of the active army. Although, in a difficult operational situation, the right to choose the guard remained with the official who had the right to dispose of this, and sometimes it came out sideways when we underestimated the actions of the enemy's sabotage groups. The story of the attack on Vatutin is a vivid example of this.

[carstorm 11]

And who is talking about personal? Local security was provided. Because of this, they don't stop being security officers, right?)

[chenia]

Quote: Charlie

The Soviet generals did not have personal protection

Adjutant (guarantor), or officer of the commandant's unit.

[tasha]

Flog! No pity, as already mentioned in the comments.

- There is a saddle, the bitch's ass is tight.

The authors! We, the readers, can afford the irony of your "creativity", but you covered yourself with pretentious words:

We sacredly honor their memory. And with gratitude for the peaceful sky from generation to generation we will not get tired talk about how our fathers and grandfathers saved the Motherland from fascism.

Do you get tired of telling with such words?
"On the way from the west edge USSR she "
"practically without engaging in clashes with the enemy, this army has only small and insignificant incidents forward detachments with groups of German motorcyclists. "
"slowly turning to the east, starting from the 13th Rifle Corps. "

Enough already? What are you doing? We are talking about the tragic death of two armies. In the village of Podvysokoe, several hospitals and medical battalions of the 6th and 12th armies were captured, along with all the wounded. 96th Medical Battalion - 2000 wounded. Do you want to think about their fate?

[mmaxx]

Duc, this is clearly a translation from English. Or already the brains are spoiled by English.

[bubalik]

When Muzychenko was wounded, the 6th Army was transferred under the command of Ponedelin.

,,, Muzychenko was wounded after (August 6) and Ponedelin did not hurt that and wanted the command of the 6th army, although he ensured the withdrawal from the encirclement.

It turns out that it is he, Pavel Grigorievich Ponedelin, who will lead both these armies (12th and 6th) across the open plain straight into the bag of encirclement?

Carried out the order of the headquarters of the Southern Front.

DIRECTIVE No. 0024 / OP SOUTH FRONT HEADQUARTERS PERVOMAYSK
25.7.41 18h 45m
Cards 500 and 000
First. By decision of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the 6th and 12th armies were transferred to the Southern Front. I ORDER:
Second. 12 army to withdraw from the battle and concentrate in the area of ​​Rassokhovatka, Potash, Pavlovka, where to take the line of st. Zvenigorodka, Sokolovochka, (suit) Art. Potash, Zelenkov, Pavlovka and a cut-off, prepared in advance position on the eastern bank of the river. Cyanosis.
Shtarm 12 - Нв. Arkhangelsk.
Border on the left - (claim.) Monastyryshche, Potash, (claim.) Нв. Arkhangelsk, NV. Mirgorod.
Third. 6 army to withdraw to the Uman, Khristinovka area, where to take the line for defense (suit.) Potash, Dobra, Khristinovka, Uman, replacing parts of Novoselsky.
Shtarm 6 - Uman.
Border on the left - (suit.) Kitay-Gorod, Ivangorod, Krasnopolye, Novo-Ukrainka.
Fourth. 2 microns, after being replaced by parts of the 6th army, concentrate in the NV area. Arkhangelsk, Podvysokoe, Tishkovka, where to enter the front reserve.
Fifth. Please inform me about the receipt of this directive and the progress of its implementation.

Commander Yuzh. front
General of the Army Tyulenev

Member of the Military Council
army commissar 1st rank
Zaporozhets

Our front
Romanov

[Operator]

The commander of the 12th Army was let down not only by his low professional level, but also by the blind execution of orders from his superiors (which is also related to the professional level).

The style of Ponedelin's reports is oozing with political turns of speech, and the recollections of ordinary soldiers of his army (given in the article) vividly testify to his military training - at the level of a comrade, which is unable to tactically line up troops on the front line even in the absence of enemy actions reliance on long-term field structures.

It is another matter that Stalin bears full responsibility for the pre-war personnel work with the command staff of the Red Army at the army level and above, with him and the demand for the appointment of political instructors to the position of commanders.

PS The question is - on what basis was Ponedelin rehabilitated, who violated the military regulations and collaborated with the enemy after being captured?

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Stalin bears full responsibility for the pre-war cadre work with the command staff of the Red Army at the army level and above, and from him the demand for the appointment of political instructors to the position of commanders"
===
Stalin is responsible for what he directly supervised. Until 1937, the army was actually led by two or three groups of high-ranking generals such as Tukhachevsky, Uborevich and the like. They were the ones who "educated" the commanding staff that Stalin had at the time of assuming ALL POWERS, from the military to the state. No wonder Stalin said that "we have no Hindenburgs in reserve." There are always few of them. And there were military theorists like Tukhachevsky, a lieutenant who commanded the Academy of the General Staff of the Red Army. The main theoretical achievement of which was the statement that "the armies of our potential adversaries have a class heterogeneous composition, and therefore are weak in comparison with the Red Army!"
In a more detailed form: "The" class strategy "is based on the assertion that the wars waged by the Red Army are wars of a completely new type. Just like the Red Army itself is an army of a new type, since it is class homogeneous. And the armed forces of a potential enemy have a mixed class composition, and therefore not strong ... In their ranks there are many proletarians, even more of them in the rear, and they naturally gravitate not to their bourgeois governments, but to the class close to Soviet Russia. a strong blow to the capitalist country, and the working class will immediately rise in it, overthrow the rule of the oppressors, and the bourgeois system will fall under a double onslaught ... behind enemy lines. "(Prudnikova, Kolpakidi)
"from his" classic "work" New Questions of War ", which was published in 1932:
“In the war of the imperialists against the USSR, the workers of the capitalist countries, who are fighting to turn the imperialist war into a civil war, will create their own Red Armies, just as the Polish workers did in 1920 (what glitches did he dream of ?! - A. B .) and will join the ranks of our Red Army in order to support and ensure its Victory both over their own bourgeoisie and over the bourgeoisie of the whole world. "
Well, how he looked into the water! By the way, it is thanks to such delusional writings that some optimists in our XNUMX in all seriousness expected that the “German proletariat” was about to turn its bayonets against Hitler. And some, judging by the surviving reports of political instructors and the NKVD, even refused to shoot at the "German proletarian in a fascist uniform." The poison turned out to be active for a long time ... "
This is how the Red Army prepared for war until the end of 1937.

[Operator]

Tukhachevsky and others are responsible only for the development of the tactics of the Red Army, and Stalin - for the selection of personnel, starting with the corps commander and higher. If a person was initially not adapted to military activity, but only to propaganda, Stalin was obliged to admit him to the leadership of military units.

Without personnel work, Stalin, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Secretariat and the organizational department would be just ballast in the political system of the USSR.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"and Stalin - for the selection of personnel, starting with the corps commander and above."
===
And from whom to choose? There were no Hindenburgs.
E. Prudnikova and A. Kolpakidi wrote well about the morals and state of the army: "Double conspiracy. Secrets of Stalin's repressions."
Until 1937, the army was a thing in itself, almost autonomous, not allowing the native government to realistically resolve military issues. In 1927, the army allowed itself to threaten the government with a military coup if the government decided to establish state order in this army. Yes, it came to that.
It was then, before 1937, that the highest army cadres had to be trained in sufficient numbers.
But three army groupings (former officers, cavalrymen and primakovs / uboreviches) were mainly engaged in sorting out relations with each other, drunkenness, hooking up and other army entertainments.
So Stalin got the shots he got.
And it is good that in 1937 he managed to neutralize the most active supporters of Trotsky and the Germanophiles. Trotsky generally proclaimed that when the Germans attacked, his supporters should immediately arrange a coup d'etat and seize power. And then, together with Germany, establish their own order in Europe.
In addition, these army men made the largest strategic mistake in military planning back in 1931: the size of the army by 1940 was planned to be 1,8 million people. In reality, in 1941 there were 5,4 million. Hence the terrible shortage of personnel. Well, the purge of the army in 1937-38. affected. True, it is not clear in which direction. Today's historians are inclined to the position that the purge was urgently needed, otherwise the number of traitors in the highest army command would have been ten times greater.

[mmaxx]

Any war shows that 30 percent of commanders are not good for anything. Only the beds are equal. It's just rubbish. Another 30 - more or less, but without any talents.
This is how it is everywhere. If the army is not at war, then the class of the commander cannot be recognized in any way. Send him to 10 academies.
And Stalin's cadre policy is confirmed by his commanders. Those who made the victory. Who of them and who was in 41st? Not everyone was a big boss.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"And the liberality of Stalin's personnel policy is confirmed by his commanders."
==
I hope it was written "CORRECT"!

[mmaxx]

Yes of course. I write 99% from the phone. Check-check, but typos are inevitable. Something Honor's keyboard makes mistakes much more often than Samsung's.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Operator

Tukhachevsky and others are responsible only for the development of the tactics of the Red Army, and Stalin - for the selection of personnel, starting with the corps commander and higher.

... in 1929, 81,6 percent (and in infantry schools - 90,8 percent) of the army enrollment in military schools had only primary education, or had none at all! In January 1932, 79,1 percent of cadets of military schools had primary education, in January 1936, 68,5 percent (but 85 percent in armored ones)

... on February 15, 1936, in the 24th division of secondary education, 68,6 percent of middle commanders, that is, lieutenants and senior lieutenants (they mainly commanded platoons and companies), did not have 96 percent, and in the 71th - 64,6 percent. Among senior commanders (including captains, who made up the bulk of battalion commanders), these were 59 and XNUMX percent, respectively.

© Simonov. Great maneuvers.
What do you think - is it worth waiting for the mass appearance of the Hindenburgs on such a base?

[Operator]

We are not talking about the Hindenburgs, but only about professionally oriented military careers and possessing natural skills for this Soviet citizens born in 1910-20 (brought up already in Soviet ideology), and not about political instructors loyal to Stalin in life without any talent and independent positions in the military profession, assigned to the post of corps commanders and higher on the principle of how it would not work out.

By 1941, the required number of such people reached hundreds, God forbid, who could easily be found among the graduates of Soviet universities of the 1930s - among Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians, of course. Plus about 1 thousand divisional commanders and about 10 thousand regiment commanders.

Now tell us that this was an outrageous task for a country with $ 100 million. the young and militarized from school population of the indicated nationalities

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Operator

We are not talking about the Hindenburgs, but about just professionally oriented military careers and possessing natural skills for this Soviet citizens born in 1910-20 (brought up already in Soviet ideology)

Statistics on professionally oriented to military service citizens born in 1910-1915 is given by Simonov - 80-90% of illiterate and semi-literate. These are precisely those oriented towards military service, because the position of the cadets of the Red Army in the late 20s and early 30s was worse than that of low-skilled workers - approximately as in the "holy 90s".
And citizens born in 1916-1920 by 1941 will reach the maximum of majors.

The main problem of the commanders of the Red Army of the 30s is the extremely low level of basic knowledge. The roots of lack of initiative or ill-considered decisions lie precisely in him: this is not "the loyalty of political instructors", but simple ignorance - and what can be done in general in this situation. And the future marshals of the Victory in 1941 mowed down on a par with others.

Quote: Operator

Now tell us that this was an outrageous task for a country with $ 100 million. young population of these nationalities

In 1939 year among the cadets of schools, those who graduated from workers' faculties and technical schools accounted for 14,5% of the total, 10 classes - 17%, 9 classes - 9,9%, 8 classes - 12,6%, 7 classes - 43,9%, and university students were 1,5%.

© F.B. Komal. Military personnel on the eve of the war.
And this was considered a significant increase in the level of education.

[Operator]

I'm not talking about the educational level of cadets of Soviet military schools, but about the number of graduates of Soviet universities, each of which had a military department, and all graduates, without exception, had a military specialty.

From 1921 to 1941, the number of such graduates with higher education should have been at least 1 million people - an order of magnitude more than the number of army commanders, corps commanders, divisional commanders, regiment commander and battalion commanders in the Red Army as of June 22, 1941.

[Yuri Kabaev]

Such graduates have long since lost all military knowledge. If graduates of military schools, getting into cadre and especially territorial divisions, lost their knowledge and command skills, then what can we say about civilians, who were called up for training every three years for three months. And then until a certain age. In our country and in the SA, they also tried to train and retrain officers at the military departments of universities. And what's the use?

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Statistics on professionally oriented to military service citizens born in 1910-1915 is given by Simonov - 80-90% of illiterate and semi-literate."
===
Well, involving Simonov as experts is not respecting yourself at all.
He lied too much.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"What do you think - is it worth waiting for the mass appearance of the Hindenburgs on such a base?"
==
Well, so they appeared. It was when Stalin took EVERYTHING into his own hands!
For example, Zhukov had TWO classes of general education. And most of the Soviet generals were not very different from him. But they broke the Germans.
And in tsarist Russia, it seems that all or almost all had a higher military education. And it all ended in failure and military defeat.
And read Chernavin, "On the question of the officer composition of the Old Russian Army towards the end of its existence.", Sofia, 1924.
And it was not for nothing that in the middle of the war the slogan "Make way for young talents!" Was already proclaimed.
"Extremely weak military-theoretical training of the generals, which manifested itself throughout the war, which subsequently (in 1917) led to a massive replacement of them with grown-up officers: up to 500 generals were dismissed under the slogan" Road to talents. "
Accordingly - the mediocre conduct of military operations, which had a seemingly high military-theoretical training, by the generals headed by Nikolai Nikolaevich. "
In the USSR, even in the most difficult times of 1941-42. up to 1000 people were withdrawn from the front at the same time, STUDY IN ACADEMIES AND ACADEMIC COURSES, front-line officer improvement courses. Therefore, the failed generals and senior officers of the Red Army were replaced by "academicians", young, literate, active and assertive, who had already seen the war and had a sad military experience of the initial period, who hated the invaders. Almost everyone won their war at their own level, which led to the OVERALL VICTORY! We won by military qualifications, good weapons, knowledge of weapons, the ability to fight with these weapons, and not by "filling up corpses", although there was such a period in the first half of the war, in the defensive-counter-offensive period. But then, first of all, German soldiers were “piled high with corpses”.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Yuri Kabaev

Well, so they appeared. It was when Stalin took EVERYTHING into his own hands!
For example, Zhukov had TWO classes of general education. And most of the Soviet generals were not very different from him. But they broke the Germans.

Yes, natural selection learning is extremely effective. Just remember the price of this military training?
In addition, there were few changes at the grassroots level until 1944 - wild-growing commanders, after being promoted, began to mow in the same way. In 1943, EMNIP, on the Lenfront, it was necessary to issue a front-level order on the need for careful planning of operations at the battalion level, with examples such as "in such and such a battalion, the battalion commander forgot about the presence of mortars, and they did not take part in supporting the attack","in some battalion they forgot about the transfer of fire - and the mortars covered the former German positions already occupied by the battalion".

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Just remember the price of this military training?"
===
Of course! VICTORY!
I remember! And how the same Brusilov fought is also in the know.
May-June 1916 - a brilliantly organized breakthrough. And when the Germans pulled themselves up, then for six months they stubbornly drove the soldiers to the German positions, perfectly equipped with artillery and machine guns. It was there, at Stokhod, that they finally finished off their regular officers and guards. The total losses amounted to more than a million wounded and about 200 thousand killed. But I somehow do not believe that for more than a million wounded there were only 200 thousand killed. According to military statistics, when for 1 killed there are 2,7 wounded, so there are no less than 350 thousand killed.
It was by the example of Brusilov that Zhukov acted. And Konev too. And the results are about the same.
Nelipovich: "... by the end of the year, according to the data of the front headquarters, sent daily to the Headquarters, the losses as a result of the offensive of A. A. Brusilov were: killed - 2930 officers and 199 836 soldiers, wounded - 14932 officers and 1075959 soldiers who disappeared without lead - 928 officers and 151749 soldiers, a total of 18 006 officers and 1436134 soldiers {50} ... Thus, the ratio of the losses of the Russian troops to the losses of the enemy was 2: 1. True, the Russian troops captured a large number of prisoners and trophies - 417 thousand. prisoners, 1 machine guns, 745 mortars and bombs, 448 guns and other military equipment {581} But the human losses were much heavier - 52 times higher than those of the enemy. . only 5 thousand people returned to service {1916}, then it should be noted that the Russian army was completely drained of blood. In the fall, 204-53-year-old teenagers, who made up the main core of the reserve regiments in 16, began to be called up for service. "
But General Brusilov was recognized as an EXCELLENT, OUTSTANDING commander. To the point.
And after the civil one, it was Brusilov and his associates who trained the future red commanders, the same generals of the Red Army.
Who commanded in the initial period of the war.
There was SOMEONE to teach the future Soviet generals.
We learned it ourselves during the war.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"The Voroshilov General Staff Academy, which became the Voroshilov Military Academy at the beginning of 1942, was based in Moscow and Ufa during the war. During the war, it graduated 1178 officers from its main course and 176 from the Advanced Training Courses for the highest command personnel {353}. In addition to the crucial role it played in the training of senior command personnel, this academy also served as a "think tank" responsible for a thorough analysis of hostilities and the development of new operational and tactical techniques. numerous in-depth studies of all types of warfare - especially at the strategic and operational level.For example, she prepared more than 1700 detailed military-scientific and historical studies during the war, including extensive analytical analyzes of the Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussian and Berlin operations {354}.
The Frunze Military Academy, which is more correctly called the MV Frunze Military Academy and which was located during the war in Moscow and Tashkent, sent more than 1943 graduates to the front by December 6000 and 11 more - until the end of the war {000}. Like the Voroshilov Military Academy, she also worked on generalizing combat experience and incorporating the lessons learned from this experience into her curriculum {355}.
(D. Glantz) "
It was for such a military-theoretical work that the tsarist army turned out to be incapable. Therefore, they lost their part of the First World War. Although they fought mainly against the Austrians with a limited presence of the Germans.

[bubalik]

which occupied the Letichevsky district on the old border with July 2 to July 17 1941 year.

,,, Commander of the 12th Army
PRIVATE BATTLE ORDER No. 0050. SOUTH-WEST HEADQUARTERS
FRONTA SVYATOSHINO 7.7.41


1. The enemy continues to actively advance with a mechanized group in the Shepetivka and Proskurov areas.

The armies of the Southwestern Front have the immediate task of retreating to the line of the old fortified areas and firmly gaining a foothold in them.

2. 12th Army by the morning of 9.7.41. retreat to the northern wing of the Letichevsky fortified region and occupy it for a solid defense. With access to the fortified line, withdraw one rifle division - Litin - to the front reserve.

To ensure retreat and gain time, it is widely used when retreating barriers.

To occupy intermediate lines: Proskurov, Podlesny, Tynna - by the end of 7.7.41 and Medzhibozh, Mikhalpol, Pokutintsy - by the end of 8.7.41.

The headquarters of the 12th Army - until 12.00 on 7.7.41 - Solobkovtsy, before the end of 8.7.41 - Derazhnya and subsequently - Litin.

Borders: on the right - (claims) Kazatin, (claims) Yuzefovka, (claims) Trembovlya; on the left - Vinnytsia, Smotrich, Berhomet.
Commander of the Forces of the Southwestern Front
Colonel General Kirponos
Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front
Lieutenant General Purkayev

[bubalik]

Due to the emerging danger of being encircled, the Ponedelinskaya army, as well as the 6th army (Muzychenko), leave the fortified area along this very bridge, which, according to experts, could be held for at least 30 days (examples were: 5th army).

If only because warehouses (clothing, food, ammunition, fuel, weapons, equipment and ammunition) were located in this sector of the old state border.

,,, and how are they defending themselves?

A technically imperfect SD was not ready for defense, it did not have a complete and trained garrison. There were clearly not enough troops to hold it. The formations of the 12th Army, which occupied the UR, were overstretched on a huge front. In addition, their combat readiness due to losses, fatigue and the actual lack of supplies was rather low.
On the day of the German assault, our artillery was almost always silent. In particular, by the time of the German assault on 15.07.41. the state of artillery of the 192nd Guards Rifle Division was as follows:

579 GAP lost 14 guns, and for the remaining 10, there were only one projectile!!! on the trunk;

division 298 LAP had no more than 6 mountain guns with an insignificant amount of shells for them, and its battery of heavy mortars of mines had only 3 shot on the trunk;

the regimental battery 618 of the GSP lost 3 of 4 guns, and the remaining one also had only a few rounds;
there were no more than a dozen light mortars left with an insignificant amount of ammunition for them.

[bubalik]

I got acquainted with the Letichevsky UR, the loss of which poses a direct threat to your entire front. SD is incredibly weak. Of the 354 artillery combat installations, only 11 have, for a total length of 122 km of the front. The rest are machine-gun pillboxes. For armament of machine-gun pillboxes, 162 heavy machine guns are not enough. UR is designed for 8 pulbats, there are 4 newly formed and untrained ones. There is no preflight. There are also no explosives, mines and wires. The minimum garrison of field troops is required in the number of 4 full-blooded rifle divisions and one tank division, I have 3 mountain divisions of a weak composition, moreover, upset. Between the adjacent right SD there is an unprepared section 12 km long.
In the interests of the common cause, and especially of your front, I ask you to allocate one rifle and 39th tank divisions at the expense of the troops of your front. These forces are part of the 18 army, which, remaining in it for a long time, will be idle. South-West. the front cannot select anything.
I ask you to notify about your decision. For my part, I am taking all measures to encircle the UR with anti-tank ditches in the next two days and develop defense in depth up to Vinnitsa, inclusive.
I report that I have just received a notification that up to 100 enemy tanks broke through to Proskurov and scattered the weak parts of the 26th Army. The further advance of these tanks, presumably, will follow in the direction of Zhmerynka and Vinnitsa.

[Yuri Kabaev]

and it turned out that, according to Ponedelin, it was better to bring the army out into the open field, without any signs of previously created lines of defense. And there it is mediocre and practically without a fight to surrender an entire army. And then they disrupted the Podolsk cadets from their studies and plugged holes in the defense with them.

[Richard]

I welcome you, Sergey
Thank you for the documents provided, which at least somehow allow you to shed light on the situation.
Unfortunately, the author has nothing like this except for book covers.
Here is another document from that dramatic period.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"579 GAP lost 14 guns, and for the remaining 10, there was only one round !!! per barrel;"
===
Where did you lose something? Have thrown heavy artillery? And where did the shells go? There were almost no hostilities. Fled from the place where everything was, threw almost everything and scrambled?

[bubalik]

Where did you lose something? Have thrown heavy artillery? And where did the shells go? There were almost no hostilities. Fled from the place where everything was, threw almost everything and scrambled?

,,, it was.

[Yuri Kabaev]

So much for your betrayal.

[senima56]

"Meanwhile, along with the exploits, there was betrayal in that war." Unfortunately, there were many times more "betrayal" than "feats", so the Germans even reached Moscow!

[Yuri Kabaev]

In general, the investigation by Yuri Mukhin outlined by him in the book "If it weren't for the generals" is confirmed!
Our generals did a lot of other things during the first and even the second year of the war.
Alas, if they did not really study the latest military theories, the combat regulations of the enemy troops, the course of the previous victorious military campaigns of Germany, then they fought exactly the way they KNOWLED to fight: i.e. - mediocre and treacherous.
The very course of hostilities of the 12th Army shows this.
By 1941, Stalin did not succeed in breaking the consciousness and backwardness of almost half of the senior officers and generals. As they were brought up by Trotsky and Tukhachevsky, they fought.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Enough to parachute the generals already! There was no other. Favorite hobby, damn it - Stalin is our everything, and the generals are scoundrels, ignoramuses, cowards and traitors. And what the fuck has Trotsky got to do with it ?? Did he impose the 1939 model on the Red Army. some doctrine of your own? Have you sent your own version of the Charter from Mexico?

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Enough of the intoxicated parachuting of the generals! There was no other."
===
And I mean the same: there was no other. But it was the generals who screwed up the initial period of the war. It is about this that we must remember.
This manifested itself in a particularly terrible way near Vyazma and Bryansk in early October 1941. Three months of preparation, they created a powerful line of defense, prepared reserves, created a numerical advantage in all types of weapons - and resisted for FIVE DAYS! And then they began to skedaddle, throwing their weapons. The MILLION GROUP, relying on the most powerful fortified area, with huge reserves of weapons and equipment, fled.
You can also recall the defense of Stalingrad, when in July the Germans broke through more than 200 km in three days and reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. Along the way, having crushed / scattered a division on the march, which went without head and side marching outposts, without reconnaissance, in general, not like in a war. Then General Gordov was in command.
And then they accused Stalin of condemning the population of the half-million city to destruction. About Gordov and his role in this battle - not a word.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Well, look for flaws in the system, not in persons.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Well, look for flaws in the system, not in persons."
===
This means that the Soviet system was able to retrain the senior officers and generals in the most difficult conditions, train the middle command personnel. Read Glantz.
And the royal system COULD NOT!
And this despite the fact that the USSR was attacked! Yes, in principle - suddenly. Outstripped in deployment. Lack of initiative is a huge disadvantage. They fought for the initiative for almost a year, even more. But the USSR has never been recognized as an aggressor anywhere and never for 60 years.
And the Russian Empire itself attacked GERMANY! Those. had a WAR INITIATIVE! DID NOT HELP! Is this a vice of the imperial system or what?
Namely, the Soviet system was able in the shortest possible time to prepare the command staff so that they defeated the best army in the world.
And further!
France in 1940.
DID NOT HAVE:
repressions against the army (“the“ best ”were knocked out, aha!);
civil war and mass emigration (Again "the best");
dismantling of fortified areas (we had almost none);
no surprise attack: 8 months of state of war.
WERE:
fully preserved regular officers and non-commissioned officers of WW1
full mobilization readiness: 8 months of state of war;
well-developed industry;
numerical superiority of troops;
excellent air force, in terms of quantity and quality, not worse than the German;
significant quantitative and overwhelming qualitative superiority in tanks over Germany;
excellent fleet;
well-organized defensive system of fortified areas with a full complement of weapons and ammunition;
the presence of military allies;
shitty radio communication, not at all better than in the Red Army;
a clearly visible reluctance to fight at all, starting on September 3, 1939.
RESULT: 46 days - and a military defeat. With surrender.

[Paragraph Epitafievich Y.]

Quote: Yuri Kabaev

created the most powerful line of defense,

Where was it created? What is the 'most powerful' one? Where does this belief in a fortification miracle come from? Did she help the French a lot? According to the NKVD and NKO, 42000 workers were required daily for the construction of airfields, URs and PZs. Even a third did not scrape together, despite the labor and animal service, the prisoners and construction battalions. Even the regular parts were attractive. What, nafig, 'the most powerful fortifications'?

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Where was it created? What is the 'most powerful'? Where does this belief in a fortification miracle come from?"
===
It took three months to build. Created. Near Vyazma.
In our country it is fashionable to yell that "if only Stalin would have allowed the troops to be put on alert!" So here's combat readiness and no surprise, more than three months of war, huge reserves of ammunition and food. AND FIVE DAYS of resistance! TOTAL!
The Germans almost at the same lines, using to a large extent precisely those defensive lines, defended on them for almost a year. The same Rzhev-Sychev operation. This means that the fortification was quite up to the mark. Only the Germans had a General Model.
And our generals?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Yuri Kabaev

You can also recall the defense of Stalingrad, when in July the Germans broke through more than 200 km in three days and reached the outskirts of Stalingrad. Along the way, having crushed / scattered a division on the march, which went without head and side marching outposts, without reconnaissance, in general, not like in a war.

The division marched in the rear. Here the question is, rather, not to the organization of the march, but to the untimely notification of the breakthrough of the front.

[Yuri Kabaev]

The march is marching, and the head march outposts are required to be nominated by the charter. Anyway. To get used to doing it right.

[BAI]

1.

What relation to the described events have the maneuvers of the Kiev military district in 1935? Photos from the maneuvers.
2.

They wanted to save, but Ponedelin surrendered

Wanting to save and save are two different things. Nobody was going to save the encircled armies. There is NOT a SINGLE case of unblocking and withdrawal from the encirclement of large military units (a large number of people). As always, the order - "Stand to death", and the fact that the Germans used for the blockade fewer people than were surrounded, our historians and memoirists are silent.

[vladcub]

Comrades, whatever you want, but it seems to me that there is too much turbidity with Ponedelin.
12 the army actually lingered nowhere, rolling towards Uman
The Germans were masters of provocation, this is true, but judging by the photograph: he speaks at ease with the Germans.
Ponedelin or Kirillov, there were not only generals who were in captivity. For example, General Lukin, but there are no such pictures with him.
PS
Simonov is certainly a talent, but I cannot trust his impartiality .. And here's why
Ponedelin in 1956 was rehabilitated, and Stalin turned out to be a byaka. Guess at once how Simonov will write. I hope: "The Living and the Dead" have read and remember Stalin's assessment?

[Bobrovsky]

The Germans wrote that Lukin was wounded in the leg by our Red Army soldier, so he could not stand. And then they cut off his leg altogether. Otherwise, I would have stood and photographed.

[vladcub]

However, Stalin had no doubts about Lukin.

[Eula]

And it was necessary to rehabilitate him? Blame, regardless of whether treason or inaction, wartime, respectively, and punishment.

[Kushka]

Quote: Konnick

By a strange coincidence, on August 6, 1941, Hitler arrives in Western Ukraine in the city of Berdychev (Hitler's Palace in Ukraine: "Werewolf").

And since when did Berdichev become Berdychev?

- Sema, and where did you get such a gorgeous suit?
- In Paris!
- Is it far from Berdichev?
- Two thousand miles!
- Wow, such a wilderness, but they sew gorgeous!

[orcinus]

Recently, I have been paying a lot of attention to the topic of the so-called. "the reasons for the defeats in 1941" My personal opinion is that there could not have been elements of betrayal in the actions of individual military leaders. A trivial example: in the story "Vanka-Rotny" it is described how the division commander caught the reconnaissance company when that night, disguised, walked from the side of the enemy's front line, saying that he "went to reconnaissance." After the surrender of the city of Bely, and the subsequent encirclement near Rzhev, the division commander and the doctor from the medical battalion disappeared in an unknown direction. However, in the city itself there is a monument to this man. Here is an example of the discrepancy between the official version and the testimony of living witnesses. Why, with equal staffing and staffing, some units confidently held the front, others hopelessly stuck in boilers? It is very simple to explain everything by incompetence. But take into account that only 20 years have passed since the revolution, there are enough people left who did not see themselves in the format of the state structure of the USSR. Here, after the collapse of this very USSR, 30 years have passed, and even on the pages of our resource there are many people who regret "that" time and who want to, in Ich. "active", change. I constantly write in the comments that in my value judgment General Pavlov was also not just an "incompetent commander". In Belarus, where even today the roads passable for armored vehicles can be counted on one hand, it was very suspicious not to assess the main directions of the strikes.

[Bobrovsky]

Absolutely correct. 12 days before the start of the war, Stalin personally warned Pavlov about the concentration of German troops in the area, and he replied that there was no concentration, and his intelligence was working well. And on the night of June 17-18, a directive was received on the forthcoming, within the next five days, Germany's attack on the USSR and bringing the troops of the districts on alert. Pavlov did not even move.

[xomaNN]

Ponedelin was a traitor or an inept commander, he killed tens of thousands of soldiers by his behavior. And the fact that retreating, the Red Army did not catch on to the old line of fortified areas, but went not completely unprepared fields? But the shock of June 22, after a month and a half, should have passed. The days of war have come

[Igor Kobernik]

Ponedelin deliberately "ruined" two armies, and it is not clear why he was "rehabilitated" in the "glorious" years of the thaw. Indeed, and many military historians write about this, both armies practically did not fight serious battles and retreated from the border in a more or less decent condition. Indeed, if the headquarters and intelligence of both armies were working, it would be more promising to break through to the southeast (there were no serious German groups, and even closer), even the maps given in German sources speak of this. And not to "break" to the "east, northeast", where the enemy's tank groupings operated. And another fact, many formations of the Red Army, allegedly defeated by the Germans in border battles, not only "came to life" in the battles near Moscow, but also fought successfully until the end of the war ...

[Charlie]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Charlie

The Soviet generals did not have personal protection

The guarantor was assigned to the commanders of the formations and above, at least, and he could indirectly perform the duties of personal protection. As for the "close guard" officer, this was not provided for by the states. As far as I know, there were platoons, companies and battalions of protection for the headquarters of formations and above, and from their composition groups were assigned to guard the command personnel moving in the zone of the active army. Although, in a difficult operational situation, the right to choose the guard remained with the official who had the right to dispose of this, and sometimes it came out sideways when we underestimated the actions of the enemy's sabotage groups. The story of the attack on Vatutin is a vivid example of this.

The guarantors were introduced into the states, if I am not mistaken, in the fall of 41. And not from the "commanders of large units and above," but from the commanders of companies and above. The guarantors performed mainly the role of messengers. From company commander to platoon commander, from battalion commander to company commander, and so on. In battle, it is, of course, and the bailiff will be your bodyguard, and you will be his. There is no way without mutual assistance. Well, you still call the general's driver a guard

[Your stranger]

Let's not forget that for many of the officers of World War II, the USSR was the one who betrayed the Tsar and the fatherland in 2!

[Fitter65]

Quote: Stranger

Let's not forget that for many of the officers of World War II, the USSR was the one who betrayed the Tsar and the fatherland in 2!

Let's not forget that the Tsar-Emperor betrayed the faith and the Fatherland, who abdicated the throne, that is, threw the state entrusted to him in wartime. He threw those soldiers and officers, the people of the Great Country during the war, into which he dragged the country ... So neither the officers betrayed, but betrayed them. moreover, the supreme commander-in-chief, their tsar-father, a servant of the people, who was the chief voivode betrayed ... And the officers and other service people fulfilled their duty to the Motherland, they did not let the interventionists fall apart, and much of what Kolya Romanov lost was returned in 1945

[Yuri Kabaev]

Quote: Alexey RA

And the future marshals of the Victory in 1941 mowed down on a par with others.

They mowed down. Just as the tsarist generals with higher educations and academies of the General Staff did it. 30-40 years old training. It was only at the beginning of the 20th century that mandatory retraining of officers was introduced, I don't remember how many years later. Only this did not apply to the generals, who were educated back in the 19th century. And they were in command.

[Oleg Kievlyanin]

Terrible time and place Uman pit, but the surrender of commanders. ,, I don’t know I can’t judge, but I can’t justify

[Novichek]

For some reason, no one remembered a very interesting book by Valentin Runov, "1941. Hitler's Victory Parade. The Truth about the Uman Massacre" https://libking.ru/books/nonf-/nonfiction/302371-valentin-runov-1941-pobednyy-parad- gitlera-pravda-ob-umanskom-poboishche.html

July 31, 1941 On this day, the commander of the Southern Front, in his report to the General Staff, wrote:
“During the day of July 31, Ponedelin's group continued to fulfill directive No. 0027,
held back the enemy from the north, north-west, west, and with short counterattacks in the east, provided access to the line of the Sinyukha River.
The last communications aircraft of the Southern Front U-2 landed at the Uman airfield. On it, the liaison officer brought the next order of the front commander - "To clear the enemy from Novoarkhangelsk and Talnoe to Ponedelin's group by a blow in the direction of Zvenigorodok." The 6th and 18th armies were ordered, "while firmly holding the occupied lines, with a concentric attack in the direction of Ternovka, to destroy enemy units in the area of ​​Ternovka, Ladyzhin, Teplik."
As can be seen from these tasks, the headquarters of the Southern Front still did not know the true state of affairs near Uman.

2 of August
G. Shteets in his book “Mountain huntsmen near Uman” notes: “On August 2, the rain poured in continuous streams. It was with difficulty that orders to advance were carried out, but, despite this, the ring around the enemy was still closed. The intention of the command of the 1st Mountain Rifle Division was to establish contact with tank units located on the left bank of the Sinyukha. Only 15 kilometers separated the group
Langa from Dobryanka, where the units of the 9th Panzer Division were supposed to be located ....

...

....... By the evening of August 2, the corps command made an analysis of the enemy's position and decided
that the surrounded Soviet troops would make their way through Ternovka. In the area of ​​Novoarkhangelsk - Oksanino - Dubovaya - Ternovka aerial reconnaissance found a cluster of about 1400 carts. "
Soviet sources testify that on this day the Nazis reached Pervomaisk and joined up with the troops of the 17th Field Army. As a result, around P.G. Ponedelina formed
double encirclement ring.
On this day, a radiogram from the headquarters of the Southern Front arrives at General Ponedelin's headquarters with an order to occupy and firmly hold the line: Zvenigorodka, Novoarkhangelsk, Ternovka and eliminate the enemy that has infiltrated east of the specified line. There is no permission to go for a breakthrough ourselves, but there is no strength for a breakthrough either ... The troops of the P.G. Ponedelina continued to steadily retreat to the Novoarkhangelsk area, already being in the encirclement ring ....

So it turns out that the command did not give permission for a breakthrough, they did not provide assistance either, i.e. - first they threw it, and then they also piled all the blame on you ...

[Yuri Kabaev]

Then why was it even necessary to withdraw from equipped positions, to break away from the supply bases? After all, some other armies fought, surrounded, on the base, albeit unfinished, but still URs.

[Novichek]

And what is interesting, Runov claims that not even two armies were killed near Uman, but three !!!

All sources reflecting the tragic events near Uman in the summer of 1941 refer to the troops of the 6th and 12th armies. But what happened to the troops of the 26th Army of the Southwestern Front, which at the beginning of the war were located between these armies? It is known that in July the command of the 26th Army was transferred to the area south of Kiev, where a new association began to form. Where did the 26th Rifle, 99nd and 72rd Mountain Rifle Divisions, corps and army units, which were part of the 173th Army of the First Formation, disappeared?
The answer is nowhere! These troops also retreated together with the troops of the 6th and 12th armies and found their death near Uman.

more about the personality of Ponedelin himself - for me, he was clearly not a coward:

From the memoirs of Kolisnichenko. “I am familiar with Arushanyan's article, in it he writes that most of the soldiers of the 12th and 6th armies left the encirclement, this is not entirely true. And who filled the Uman pit? He simply tries to smooth things over in his article in order to somehow justify his activities as army chief of staff. In the same article, he writes that in one of the groups he participated in breaking through the front line, this is also subject to doubt. When we were in the warehouse with sunflower grain, preparing to break through the front line, one of the commanders asked Grulenko or Averin what the headquarters were planning. The answer came that the fate of the staff documents had been decided last night. At night, two planes flew into which they loaded the staff documents, and in view of the fact that Ponedelin refused to fly, saying that the commander must share his fate with the fate of his army, Arushanyan was put on the plane to accompany the documents. And this seems to be true.
In 1945, returning from Sukhumi on the ship "Ukraine", I met with the former chief of the topographic department of the headquarters of the 12th Army, Captain Blinnikov, who told me how he had removed a large group of staff and rank-and-file personnel from the encirclement, and also confirmed the version about Arushanyan's departure by plane.

[Novichek]

forgot the link: https://libking.ru/books/nonf-/nonfiction/302371-valentin-runov-1941-pobednyy-parad-gitlera-pravda-ob-umanskom-poboishche.html#book Valentin Runov - 1941. Victory Parade Hitler. The truth about the Uman massacre

[Alexfly]

The age-old problem is the lack of communication and interaction, as well as personal responsibility .. For each decision we look at the "main thing".

[Yuri Kabaev]

Volkssturm: the agony of the Third Reich
Author: Mikhail Sosnovsky.
...
As part of the expansion of the "people's war" in the second half of 1944, the conscription to the Wehrmacht was extended to young men born in 1927, in February 1945 - born in 1928, and in March - to young people born in 1929. Also, in the second half of 1944, the conscription of women into the auxiliary services of the armed forces began - by the end of the existence of the Reich, 470 thousand women served in the Wehrmacht. From February 1945, women over 18 years of age were subject to military service in the Volkssturm.
In the last months of the war, adolescents from Jungfolk, a division of the Hitler Youth for children 10-14 years old, were put under arms. There were no official orders to mobilize the "pimpf" (the colloquial nickname for the Jungfolk members), but local party and SS leaders used the practice of forcibly taking children away from their families quite widely. Altner Hellmuth, author of the book "The Berlin Dance of Death", who was in 1945 a 17-year-old Wehrmacht soldier, quotes the following story of a 13-year-old SS man from the 32nd SS Division "January 30": ... We were forced to march in the SS barracks and in the castle square. Then we were divided according to our Hitler Youth units and attached to the SS and Volkssturm detachments. Our troops were sent into battle in the northern and eastern parts of the city. Most of us were killed by enemy infantry as we fled across open fields. When we wanted to pack up our things and go home, we were stopped and forced to hold the defense of the canal that leads to Eden. The commander of my platoon refused, and then two SS men and one SA soldier hanged him on a tree, however, he was already fifteen. "

[Bobrovsky]

Someone Ponedelin undertook to make a wheel for a cart, spoiled the material and never did anything. They laughed at him and did not trust him with such matters anymore. General Ponedelin undertook to do the job and did it in such a way that a huge mass of his troops were captured and died there in a terrible death by starvation. And they did not care at all whether he was a traitor or the most ordinary inept. They shot him absolutely correctly, there was nothing to go into generals. I had a friend who said - they offer me, I agree, they offer me, I agree. And when they realized that I, and I am already a lieutenant colonel. There are many such people who agree to jump higher, and Ponedelin is one of them.

[Bobrovsky]

And when they realized that I, and I am already a lieutenant colonel.

[snku]

For the criminal mistakes of the Soviet command both in 1941 and in subsequent years, which led to the death or capture of millions of soldiers and officers, not to mention civilians, no one has yet answered. For the catastrophe of the Western Front in Belarus, only General Pavlov was shot. The rest were written off by the Victory, paid for by the lives of almost 30 million Soviet people. Hitlerite Germany lost 10 million in that war.

[Yuri Kabaev]

"Hitlerite Germany lost 10 million in that war."
==
And what, ours also had to begin the destruction of German women, old people, children, disabled people?

[Yuri Shalnov]

Ponedelin voluntarily surrendered to the enemy and surrendered his army! Why then was he rehabilitated in 1956?

[Alexander Koshkin]

Stalin had no other generals! Without exception, ALL commanders of fronts, armies, corps and fleets suffered the most devastating defeats up to the beginning of 43!

[In a d and m]

The head of the personnel department to the court!
...
After all, someone promoted this warrior to the chief. The bastard knew what he was doing.

[Alexey Gorshkov]

Undoubtedly, before the war, our army was not beheaded, but CLEANED! Skorzeny, although a bastard, but he is right, citing as an example our pre-war purge of the army - Germany, where the military staged a riot in the HEAT OF THE WAR - in 1944! Having got rid of Tukhachevsky and his pack, we won! Relapses of "Tukhachevism" cost us dearly in 1941.
In my opinion - after all, there was some kind of "conspiracy of the military" at the beginning of the war! As a student, I was a member of the military-historical organization "Snow Troopers". Among other things, we interviewed war veterans and eyewitnesses of those events. MOST of them believed that at the beginning of the war there was some kind of "conspiracy of the military" - isn't it the root of the strange pre-war carelessness and incomprehensible actions at the beginning of the war of the local military leadership? And this was not the case everywhere - somewhere we suffered unjustifiably huge losses, and where there were apparently no participants in this conspiracy in the military leadership, we did not suffer any special losses, and even STARTED! Almost nowhere is the fact of our occupation of bridgeheads on the territory of Romania mentioned in ... June 1941! As far as I understand, where did the participants in the conspiracy find themselves in power, something completely incomprehensible was happening. For example: before the start of the war, we had superiority over the enemy in the number of tanks. And so - the war began and the tanks began to drive ... behind, along the front line, developing their service life WITHOUT CONTACT WITH THE ENTIRE !!! As a result, we lost almost all the tanks, and later rolled back to Moscow! The most famous example is the leadership of the Western Front! General Pavlov and his accomplices, in my opinion, were not shot in vain - after all, it was their Western Front that was completely defeated at the beginning of the war, unlike the others. Even the Germans think the same! One German general (I think - the chief of the German General Staff Halder) wrote (I am writing from memory, maybe not literally): "Only in the central direction the enemy was defeated, in the south and north we just drove him in front of us." True - it was necessary to condemn not for unintentional actions, such as cowardice and slovenliness, but for INTENTIONAL betrayal! How many innocent people - both military and civilian - were killed because of them! What I noticed: how the leadership of this front changed - the defeats ended - there were unsuccessful operations, but there were NO loud defeats of our troops before the Vyazemsky encirclement !!! An indirect confirmation of the "conspiracy of the military" is the greater, in comparison with the "Westerners", the combat capability of the rear (today it is more customary, after the Germans, to call them "Siberian") troops! The professionalism of the military was on the same level with others - they studied with, say, Muscovites in the same schools! But the military leadership - the top commanding staff of these troops, due to their remoteness, was not, or almost was not, involved in the "military conspiracy", unlike their western and central colleagues! And with a completely, MUCH more disadvantageous balance of forces with the enemy, they won near Moscow, while a HUGE GROUP of our troops just ... lost the border battles!
In my opinion, the rehabilitation of the Khrushchev and Gorbachev years should be reconsidered! It seems to me that they were carried out "chokh", did not really understand, but were rehabilitated only on the basis of condemnation in Stalin's times! This does not mean at all that all the generals are still guilty of something, but it is necessary to reconsider these rehabilitations! At one time, they forgave different coves, for example, the Banderaites - look what they and their spiritual heirs are doing now in the neighboring state! I also remember our "saints of the 90s", how General Vlasov "appeared in a dream" to the mayor of Moscow G. Popov, someone put a monument to Hitler's general von Pannwitz on the Don, and so on. In addition, some myths of the Khrushchev times should be revised - such as the "general's bayonet attack", during which General Kirponos died. There is a version that Kirponos, when trying to transfer him to the Germans, was shot by his own special officer ...

[Semyon Mikhailov]

Yes ... The mistakes and miscalculations of the country's leadership before the war and at its initial stage were costly ... They became one of the reasons that the enemy reached the Volga and Moscow, that the country lost 27 million people ...