Despite the absence of any compelling confirmation from the defense department and the command of the Azerbaijani Air Force (whether it is a chronologically verified chain of "detection - linking the route - capture for precise auto-tracking and destruction", recorded by the system for documenting information about the combat mode of operation of the multifunctional targeting / guidance radar EL / M-2248, or a demonstration of the elements of the 9M723-1E OTBR corps with corresponding damage from the high-explosive fragmentation "equipment" of the Barak-8ER missile defense system), as well as a complete refutation by the head of the republic Ilham Aliyev, information about the allegedly successful interception of the operational-tactical ballistic missile 9M723-1E "Iskander-E" of the Armenian Armed Forces through the Israeli Air Defense Forces of Azerbaijan, the Israeli long-range air defense system "Barak-8ER", continues to be actively discussed by both Azerbaijani and Western, as well as some domestic media.
The repost of technically incompetent "stuffing" by Western media about the low effectiveness of Russian high-precision aerospace attack weapons never ceases to amaze the knowledgeable audience of domestic military analytical portals
To our great regret, the very authoritative military-technical portal avia.pro was no exception, the team of which hastened to question the strike potential of the Iskander-E tactical missile system, based on only one unsubstantiated statement of an anonymous Azerbaijani high-ranking official, the text of which was published by the British news the Internet portal "Middle East Eye" a few days earlier.
Meanwhile, making a "blind" repost of this news resource "Middle East Eye", the authors of avia.pro did not even bother to compare the principles of operation of control systems, and, consequently, the flight performance parameters of the operational-tactical BR 9M723-1E "Iskander-E "And SAM-interceptor" Barak-8ER ".
So, the second (combat) interceptor stages of anti-aircraft missiles "Barak-8ER" have both the planes of the aerodynamic rudders and the gas-jet units of the thrust vector deflection system, located in the nozzle channels of the main solid propellant rocket motors and represented by cross-shaped heat-resistant planes, controlled by high-speed servos.
Undoubtedly, the presence of OVT gas-jet systems provides the Barak-8ER missiles with the ability to maneuver with the implementation of overloads in the range of 50-60G, and therefore, intercept highly maneuverable objects carrying out anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads of 20-25 units.
Nevertheless, the time period required for a sufficient effect of the force of the deflected thrust vector (passing through the center of mass of the Barak-8ER missile) on the spatial position of the missile defense system (with the required change in its course direction and bringing the available overloads to 50-60G), as a rule , is 0,1–0,2 s.
This indicator is several times longer than the period of implementation of transverse "throws" on the trajectory (with the implementation of a similar range of overloads during the first 0,04–0,07 from the moment of the first transverse thrust impulses of the DPU) by modern anti-aircraft guided missiles with gas-dynamic "belts" of transverse control engines 9M96E / DM (complex S-350 "Vityaz" and KZRK "Redut"), MIM-104A PAC-3MSE ("Patriot PAC-3MSE"), as well as "Aster-30" complexes PAAMS / SAMP-T.
The following conclusion suggests itself: the capabilities of the gas-jet systems of thrust vector deviation do not provide the Barak-8ER missiles with those flight and technical qualities that would guarantee a 100% probability of destruction of the 9M723-1E Iskander-E operational-tactical ballistic missiles.
After all, it is well known that the presence of developed tail aerodynamic rudders of a large area, as well as tail gas-dynamic blocks for flight trajectory correction / pitch control (represented by 4 two-nozzle modules powered by 4 in-vessel gas generators) allow ballistic modifications of Iskander-E to carry out rather energetic anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads from 20 to 30G both on the cruise and on the terminal sections of the quasi-ballistic flight paths.
Therefore, any unconfirmed "stuffing" by the British press, referring to unverified Azerbaijani sources, about the inability of the Iskander-E OTBR to overcome the layered anti-missile "umbrellas" erected by modern Israeli or Western air defense and missile defense systems, can be interpreted only as regular futile attempts of the US, Western European and Israeli defense industry complex to partially squeeze the unique brainchild of the Kolomna Mashinostroeniya Design Bureau in the firmly occupied niche of high-precision weapons in the global arms market to promote operational-tactical missile systems of the ATAMS, Deep Strike families (developed as part of the ambitious LRPF program), as well as LORA from the Israeli aerospace concern Israel Aerospace Industries.