"Anti-torpedo disaster" of the Russian fleet
In April 2018, the USS Virginia-class submarine USS John Warner was ready to sink Russian warships if they responded to a US air strike on Syria, Fox News reported.
And this could have the most disastrous consequences.
In fact, both our ships and our submarines would melt there "like kittens." Simply due to the complete absence of modern anti-torpedo protection (PTZ) and extremely serious problems with our underwater weapons.
Enemy
SSN-765 John Warner submarine belongs to one of the last sub-series of Virginia-class submarines, having, however, as anti-ship and anti-submarine weapons only torpedoes Mk48 mod.7., Used with 4 torpedo tubes (TA), with the ability, if necessary, to have in a salvo, all 4 torpedoes with telecontrol and simultaneous active maneuvering of submarines at speeds up to 20 knots.
PLA SSN-765 John Warner
On April 14, 2018, the United States, France and the United Kingdom launched a series of rocket attacks against government targets in Syria. According to American data, 105 different types of cruise missiles (CR) were used against three targets in Syria. 6 cruise missiles were launched from SSN-765 John Warner (USA) submarine from the Mediterranean Sea.
With a high probability, all these missile launchers were used from vertical launch units (VLU), and the TA, which were loaded with torpedoes, were ready for battle with our ships and submarines.
The composition of our forces in the Mediterranean
The grouping of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean Sea at that moment included warships: two frigates of project 11356 (P) "Admiral Grigorovich" and "Admiral Essen" and two diesel-electric submarines of project 06363 "Nizhny Novgorod" and "Kolpino", which on the eve of the strike of the coalition went to sea from the Tartus home base under the pretext of performing rocket firing:
On the website of the Federal Office of Civil aviation USA On April 4, 2018, a NOTAM message appeared (operational information on changes in the rules for conducting and ensuring flights, as well as aeronautical information) that from 7:00 on April 11, the Russian Navy will conduct exercises in the Nicosia region in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular, rocket launches.
The restrictions will last until 15:00 on April 26.
The restrictions will last until 15:00 on April 26.
The frigate "Admiral Grigorovich" at sea
Diesel-electric submarine "Nizhny Novgorod" goes to sea.
It should also be noted the exercises of the anti-submarine aviation of the Navy:
March 29, 2018. Anti-submarine Tu-142 conducted exercises in the Mediterranean Sea.
Russian anti-submarine aviation conducted exercises to search for submarines of a mock enemy in the Mediterranean, the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Russian Defense Ministry said.
Russian anti-submarine aviation conducted exercises to search for submarines of a mock enemy in the Mediterranean, the Department of Information and Mass Communications of the Russian Defense Ministry said.
Alas, it was pointless to set the task of searching for actual boats for the Tu-142, due to the absolute obsolescence of their search and sighting systems (PPS) and radio hydroacoustic buoys (RGAB). A similar assessment can be given to the Ka-27PL anti-submarine helicopters, which should be routinely based on Project 11356 (R) frigates.
At the same time, the question remains - were they there at all?
For too often our ships (including anti-submarine ones) go into combat with unarmed Ka-27PS search and rescue helicopters.
What could be the battle between the US Navy submarine and our ships?
The frigates "Admiral Grigorovich", "Admiral Essen" and "Admiral Makarov": hydroacoustic complex (GAK) MG-335M "Platina-M" with a sub-keel antenna (without towed), torpedoes SET-65, RBU-6000 with the possibility of using not only RSB-60 but also gravitational underwater shells 90R (with a homing system and an increased likelihood of damage) and SGPD type MG-94M. There is a Ka-27 helicopter.
Alas, the main means of detection - the MGK-335M GAK has a very weak energy and detection range even under normal conditions (much less than the distance of a torpedo salvo). In addition, the complex hydrology of the Mediterranean Sea raises the question of the need for towed antennas (which did not exist at all).
The only thing that could detect a submarine under the "jump" - lowered sonars (OGAS) of helicopters "Ros", however, this high-frequency OGAS has a short detection range and is the development of the late 70s of the Kiev Research Institute of Hydraulic Instruments (like the entire PPS "Octopus" Ka-27). The place of this hydroacoustics in the museum. And for a very long time.
Frigate of project 1356 (R) and GAK MGK-335ME.
The diesel-electric submarines Velikaya Novgorod and Kolpino had the MGK-400M SJC (domestic version with the letter B) and the Physik-1 torpedoes and the Vist-2 type SGPD.
Loading torpedoes "Physic-1" and missiles of the "Caliber" complex on diesel-electric submarines of project 03633.
The issue of hydroacoustics diesel-electric submarines of project 636 was discussed in detail in the article "Rubicon" of underwater confrontation. Successes and problems of the MGK-400 hydroacoustic complex ".
I would very much like to hope that our frigates and diesel-electric submarines deployed at sea acted together, covering each other, because when used separately, they were simply targets for enemy submarines. Alas, knowing the realities of the Russian Navy, there is good reason to doubt that the correct tactical option was adopted.
With separate actions of frigates and diesel-electric submarines, the critical problem of the "bare rear" both for Project 11356 (P) and for Project 06363 immediately arises. That is, a large "blind sector" in the stern (due to the limitations of the field of view of the main nasal antennas of these SACs).
Accordingly, the enemy submarine, having a significant lead in detection and good energy in torpedoes, can covertly shoot our ships, launching torpedoes by means of telecontrol into the "blind" aft sector.
This fact is obvious to any objective officer, specialist. But in the "valiant navy" they simply "hammered a bolt" on him. (War is not expected, is it? - Perhaps it is not expected. And everything is beautiful at parades).
The solution to this problem has been known for a long time - towed antennas, on which, however, we are very fond of saving money (despite the fact that there are such antennas, with very decent characteristics, and they have been repeatedly offered by the Navy industry).
Diesel-electric submarines of project 6363 with a towed antenna
(360-degree view with reliable early detection of torpedoes).
However, the enemy could attack with torpedoes and "head-on". Simply because neither frigates nor diesel-electric submarines could practically oppose anything to this. In view of the deliberately low effectiveness of anti-torpedo protection (PTZ) or their complete absence.
Readers may have a question, what is the author's confidence based on that in the event of the discovery of real hostilities, the John Warner submarine could reliably detect (and from a great distance) diesel-electric submarines of project 06363?
The answer is simple. In the zone of the deployed anti-submarine warfare system, diesel-electric submarines simply have no chance to remain stealthy and survive. They may have the most minimal noise, but they still need to charge the batteries, and then set up tracking for them (even after a dive) - a typical and long-established task of NATO anti-submarine forces. It will be necessary to “illuminate” the water area with low-frequency emitters, after which even the “blackest holes” become “flies on glass”.
We do not have such a system there, the “so-called partners” (quote from the words of V.V. Putin) have created it there a long time ago and are constantly being improved.
Our chances were only with the joint actions of diesel-electric submarines and frigates, where the SAC diesel-electric submarine would play the role of a large submersible (for the optimal search depth) antenna (in the interests of the entire connection) in combination with a "long arm" and telecontrol of torpedoes "Physicist-1".
Note. The issues of hydroacoustics and anti-submarine weapons of our ships have already been raised on Voennoye Obozreniye in the articles:
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Weapons and tactics " и
Anti-submarine defense: ships against submarines. Hydroacoustics".
The opponent was ready to fight, not bluffing
In the situation of April 2018, it is worth paying attention to the chronology and development of events.
New York, USA, 13 March 2018, 07:42 - Regnum. The United States of America is ready for another missile attack on Syria if it fails to achieve a ceasefire in Eastern Ghouta in the suburbs of Damascus, said US Permanent Representative to the UN Nikki Haley during a meeting of the Security Council.
Moscow's reaction was unusually tough. And not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Ministry of Defense. And personally to the Chief of the General Staff:
Moscow. March 13. Interfax-AVN. The Russian military will retaliate if a blow is struck against Damascus, said the chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
"In the event of a threat to the life of our servicemen, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will take retaliatory measures against both missiles and delivery vehicles that will use them,"
He said in a conference call on Tuesday.
"In the event of a threat to the life of our servicemen, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will take retaliatory measures against both missiles and delivery vehicles that will use them,"
He said in a conference call on Tuesday.
The conclusion suggests itself that the US Navy (and the John Warner submarine) actually had an order to use weapons on Russian Navy targets in the event of a strike on them (for example,
"Unknown anti-ship missiles from the coast of Syria").
This is clearly indicated by the fact that the US Navy withdrew all surface ships from the eastern Mediterranean (they were striking from the waters of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf). The enemy is really very afraid of our anti-ship missiles.
The task "if anything" to attack our ships was set by the submarine John Warner. And she was ready to fulfill it. Anti-ship missiles "Harpoon" have long been removed from the US Navy PLA (and only recently began its return to the PLA ammunition). And the only weapons of the "sea battle" were the Mk48 torpedoes. Torpedoes are sophisticated, effective, and a favorite of the US Navy. And very well mastered.
The author is not ready to vouch for the figure he met on one of the American specialized forums. The combat torpedo hit the submarine's ammunition only after about 5 shots with it in a practical version. However, this is very similar to the truth.
The statistics of torpedo firing of the US Navy is simply enormous (annually, torpedoes are fired about ten times more than missiles). And the frankly "wounded" and "shabby" look of American torpedoes says that they were fired at many times (in a practical version).
Loading torpedo Mk48. A very "Bushny" type of torpedo is clearly visible.
Torpedoes in the US Navy are a reliable and mastered weapon in which both crews and command are confident (and which, despite this, is constantly being improved in key elements: homing and telecontrol systems).
We summarize.
The enemy was actually preparing to attack our ships and submarines. And attack with torpedoes.
And what can we counter the American torpedoes? Will those be released on our ships and submarines?
The state of the anti-torpedo protection of the Navy today
It makes no sense to consider old PTZ devices - drifting means of hydroacoustic counteraction (SGPD) MG-34 and GIP-1 (1967). Due to their absolute antiquity and inefficiency.
Project 11356 frigates have RBU-6000, with which it is theoretically possible to use PTZ MG-94M drifting instruments.
PTZ MG-94M device, start-up from RBU-6000.
Theoretically, not only because the PTZ ideas underlying the MG-94M device were outdated even before the start of its development, but also because information on the supply of the MG-94M to the Navy was never given on the government procurement website (in contrast to the supply of other devices, - "Whist-2" and "Blow-1"). Of course, it is possible that purchases for MG-94M were not made publicly available. However, it seems more likely that they simply did not exist.
The issue of using standard rocket depth charges RSB-60 with RBU-6000 for PTZ tasks in the Navy was developed a long time ago (included in the governing documents, is being worked out), but with models for the use of torpedoes that are completely different from real ones.
That is, those extremely low probabilities of destroying a torpedo, which are given for RBU-6000, are in fact much lower. Just because real torpedoes go
"Not there and not so",
as the developers of the RTZ RBU algorithms would like (in fact, they were developed against straight-going torpedoes during the Second World War).
At the same time, the author considers it necessary to note that in April 2013, the Navy submitted proposals for a promising complex of PTZ of surface ships with a combat effectiveness more than an order of magnitude higher than everything previously created on this topic (with the complex use of promising anti-torpedo only a separate ship, but also a formation or convoy).
The Navy's proposals were received with great interest (they were preserved at the Naval Academy). However, they were "buried" by intrigues in the defense industry system. Alas, it is no longer possible to fully implement them. Due to the departure in recent years from the life of a number of large domestic specialists (and bearers of a unique scientific and technical groundwork). For example, Myandina A.F.
Diesel-electric submarines of project 636 are armed with SGPD: drifting device PTZ "Vist-2" (developed and manufactured by JSC "Aquamarine") and self-propelled multipurpose device MG-74M (instead of the long-obsolete GIP-1, MG-34 and MG-74).
Drifting device "Whist" and self-propelled MG-74M.
The MG-74M device is an export product. And it is obvious that something else is intended for the Russian Navy. However, its main problem is that it was carried out in a caliber of 53 cm.That is, it requires a reduction in ammunition (despite the fact that the possibility of creating effective small-sized devices was confirmed by the results of our developments in the 80s) and the number of torpedo tubes with weapons.
Accordingly, "weapons are usually chosen."
Details on the Vist-2 drifting device were given in the documents of a number of state purchases (on the official portal), but the key is the following:
- "Vist" is a PTZ tool and does not have any effect on the operation of target designation means for weapons (in other words, via the telecontrol channel, the torpedo will confidently aim at our submarine according to the low-frequency SAC data).
- Against modern SSNs, the effectiveness of single drifting SGPDs is extremely low, and the group use of "Whists" is impossible due to the outdated logic of their work. (In fact, there will be a "dog wedding" - those staged by the "Vista" group will work on the first emitting device, and will "crush" themselves).
- The short operating time of "Vista" does not allow diesel-electric submarines to move to a safe distance.
According to one of the major domestic specialists in torpedo launchers, the "efficiency" (in quotation marks) of "Vista" is such that when discussing the organization of torpedo tests, he spoke about them literally:
“Let them do it!
It will be easier for us to aim at the target! "
It will be easier for us to aim at the target! "
And this man knew very well what modern CLOs were and what “Whist” was.
Let me emphasize that these are not some "technical secrets", this is "banal physics": the ideas underlying Whist correspond to torpedoes of the 90s of the last century. And since then, actually two generations of torpedo weapons have changed (MG-94M, in fact increased in size (for a larger caliber) and Vist energy, with the possibility of firing it from RBU-6000).
Even tougher assessments will be given below for the "faith, hope and perhaps" of the Russian Navy - the PTZ "Module-D" complex of the newest nuclear-powered ships of the 4th generation.
The question arises, how did "all this" go through the acceptance of draft, technical projects, testing, finally?
But so that we still have not carried out a single real test of new torpedoes against new AGPD (with imitation of actual combat conditions of use).
The only, but rather weak, exception is "Package".
Despite a number of its shortcomings, its torpedo (and its SSN) is really good and promising. And their results against "Vista" were such that the specialists of "Aquamarine", who liked to "trump" the results of using their products against the old torpedoes "Gidropribor". "For some reason" they do not like to recall the "Packet" test results.
Here a logical question arises, if the developer of the "Package" GNPP "Region" had the most perfect CLNs, then why did the specialists of the "Region" themselves not develop the SRS?
The terms of their development are relatively short, and large expenditures are not required. The topic is simply "golden" in terms of financial (including exports). And they offered to the leadership. Repeatedly. Without any consequences other than the phrase:
"Let anyone develop them, the" Region "SGPD will not develop them!"
Taking into account the fact that JSC "Aquamarine" considered the subject of the AGPD "its fiefdom", and the chief designer of the enterprise and the "regional" complex "Package", Drobot, was a member of its board of directors, the blocking of all proposals for the PSA in the "Region" is not surprising. In the smoking-room, the phrase sounded more than once or twice (and from different specialists):
"It sucks when your boss is on the board of a rival firm."
So easily the greed for profit destroys the country's defense ...
Note. It is necessary to emphasize both the really high technical level of Aquamarine's own developments and the fact that the company actively invested in the development of production. However, the willingness to "master funds" on openly dubious topics and requirements led to the fact that JSC "Aquamarine", which was once extremely active in the market and was engaged in PR, was eventually forced to completely curtail public activity (which now remained only in arbitration) ... Those who wish can "enjoy" (link)... Despite all the "dryness" of legal documents, the "seething rage" on the part of the Rubin Central Design Bureau towards Aquamarine is very well felt.
At the same time, experts spoke about these problems and warned them back in the early 2010s.
Undoubtedly, the positive aspect of this “legal stories"Is the tough position of the customer. The option "the third grade is not a marriage" did not work in this case. And the industry has learned a tough but necessary lesson for the future.
Briefly on underwater weapons (to a general understanding of the situation).
The best we have now is the Package. However, the extremely acute anti-torpedo problems for the Lasta submarines (and absolutely solvable ones) raise the question - is Packet all right?
In addition, despite the excellent anti-torpedo, there are still "holes" in the solution of the PTZ problem. The author considers it inappropriate to paint them publicly. However, they are quite obvious. And not only for specialists, but also for simply technically competent people.
Experts are advised to carefully study what the "Package" was supposed to be and how it turned out in the end. Carefully study, and start not even with the preliminary design of the ROC, but with the research work (R&D) that preceded it.
However, in the situation of 2018, the refusal of the naval command to transfer (and emergency transfer) corvettes of the project 20380 (with anti-torpedoes and low-frequency towed antennas) from the Baltic to the "hot eastern Mediterranean" is absolutely perplexing.
What, in general, are these corvettes doing in the Baltic? Are they waiting for shells from Polish land howitzers in Baltiysk?
Returning to the frigates of Project 11356 (P). And their anti-submarine torpedoes SET-65 have a primitive homing system (HSS) "Ceramics" ("reproduced on a domestic base" from the SSN American torpedo Mk46 mod.1 1961).
If someone from the pilots today offers to go into battle with missiles with homing heads during the Vietnam War, he will be sent to a psychiatrist. In the "valiant navy" this is the reality and the norm, even on the newest ships (for example, the Boreyas, on the torpedo decks of which there are ancient USETs with "Ceramics", "ripped off" from the American SSNs of development back in the late 50s).
Torpedo SET-65 and its control devices with mechanical spindle data input (Kiev Automation Plant)
In view of the extremely low noise immunity of the old types of SSNs of our torpedoes, there is no need to speak of any "effectiveness" in the situation when the enemy uses the SGPD.
The sad and harsh irony is that In the situation of 2018, the only really combat-ready model of underwater weapons, which actually posed a threat to the John Warner submarines, on the surface ships of our Mediterranean squadron was precisely the APR-2 "Hawk" (1978) of the helicopter ammunition. The rest of the torpedo ammunition was just "wood".
Aviation anti-submarine missile APR-2.
Well, all right, surface watermen. They were financed in the Navy for a very long time on the basis of the "leftover principle." But how is the "faith, hope and perhaps" the Navy - a nuclear submarine?
What will happen if for the anti-submarine defense of our Mediterranean squadron to attract the newest APRK "Severodvinsk" project 885 "Ash"?
And it will be even worse than with 06363.
For with all the shortcomings of the "Vista", they can do something (especially if they are "used outside the box"), and the SSN's visibility for the SSN torpedo is much less than that of the huge nuclear submarine "Severodvinsk".
All this is true for the serial PTZ for the same "Varshavyanka".
And what about advanced systems?
That's how.
"There is a cow ... Here on these" crap "the torpedo will come out on it." Or "anti-torpedo pit" "Module-D"
"Marine collection" No. 7, 2010, from an article by Rear Admiral A.N. Lutsky:
Submarines under construction of the Yasen and Borey projects are proposed to be equipped with PTZ systems, technical specifications for the development of which were drawn up back in the 80s of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these means against modern torpedoes indicate an extremely low probability of not hitting an evading submarine.
Rear Admiral A.N. Lutsky, an article in the "Marine Collection" and products of the "Module-D" complex
In the article in the "Marine Collection" the name of this complex was not named, however, in subsequent years, enough open and public materials appeared that allowed not only to name it ("Module-D"), but also to reveal all the rotten organization of work on this topic in the defense industry complex. Navy and Ministry of Defense.
It all started with the US Navy.
The Mk48 torpedo had not only excellent characteristics, but also (in the first modifications) a number of serious problematic issues. One of them was a significant time of the exhibition of a precision navigation control system (necessary for effective firing at long distances), similar to those for missiles with an inertial control system developed in the late 60s - early 70s.
Taking into account the real detection distances of our submarines, the situation was such that at the time of the capture of the American SSN submarine of the salvo of our torpedoes quickly fired from the torpedo launchers on duty, the magnificent American Mk48 still “twisted gyroscopes” in the tubes of the TA, and it was it is impossible.
The US Navy did not want to abandon effective long-range shooting (that is, strict requirements for the accuracy of gyroscopes). The solution for them was the SGPD. First - onboard jamming devices. However, their effectiveness in this situation was reminiscent of "Russian roulette" (which the rational Anglo-Saxons did not accept with all their gut).
Further - there were powerful fired jamming devices from outboard launchers (to ensure a quick response). Moreover, it was necessary to suppress not only the CLS of torpedoes, but also the GAS (GAK) targeting them (which was implemented in separate low-frequency and high-frequency devices).
It is necessary to note the extremely high efficiency of their combined use against most GAS and naval torpedoes in the 80s. However, the key technical condition for their effectiveness was the imperfection of the then massive GAS and SSN torpedoes of the Navy (taking into account the significant level of "side lobes" of the directional patterns and the small dynamic range of our analog hydroacoustics of that time).
At the same time, already in the 80s, samples of digital GAS appeared, against which the idea of using a pair of low-frequency and high-frequency drifting devices already obviously did not work. However, the specialists of the Navy and SPBM "Malakhit", who seized on the "American idea", decided to "improve" it by "adding energy."
They sharply increased the caliber of devices (from American ones), and most importantly, they introduced explosive sound sources (VIZ) as emitters for a low-frequency device ("Oplot"), as the most advantageous in terms of energy. The most "sad-funny" thing is that in the corresponding works of American specialists it was directly written why it should not be done this way.
Separately, it is necessary to dwell on the device for suppressing communication channels "Burak-M" (about which our "cheap mass media" wrote with admiration not so long ago). The RSAB communication channel is simple (more precisely, it was simple before, but now the situation is changing). And really effectively and simply "chokes" on the means of electronic warfare.
The "probable enemy" has shown us (our naval aviation) this more than once or twice since the 70s. Such devices for our submarine could dramatically increase its combat stability - a relatively simple fired electronic warfare station provided a real multiple increase in the likelihood of evasion of the USSR Navy submarines from the US and NATO anti-submarine aircraft.
From the technical point of view, everything was clear, simple and understandable. It was necessary to “just do”. And so that these massive and cheap electronic warfare devices could be equipped with all submarines of the USSR Navy - from 941 to 613 projects.
Instead, a bunch of research projects were written, a bunch of dissertations were defended, and a similar "scientific fuss" was conducted. The fact that our submariners, who were virtually defenseless against anti-submarine aircraft, still need to be given something effective, "naval thought" (gradually turning into a "cramp") came only at the end of the 80s.
But in a completely "creative design" - as an integral part of the "Modul-D" design and development project, with extremely expensive electronic warfare devices (that is, without the possibility of their real development and testing during combat training) and only for new generation 4 nuclear submarines (with unique launchers ).
And the rest of the SPs?
They were "out of luck."
From the anniversary edition “KMPO Gidropribor - 75 years in service the fleet and fatherland ":
In 1993–2016. within the framework of the ROC, a set of drifting instruments was created for arming submarines. The following products have been developed:
• "Oplot" - a drifting device for counteracting submarine hydroacoustic detection systems.
• "Udar-1" - a submarine drifting anti-torpedo protection device.
• "Burak-M" - a drifting electronic suppression device for enemy aircraft surveillance.
The aim of the work was to solve a complex of problems of countering submarines to means of detecting and destroying anti-submarine forces.
The developed products should be in service with submarines of modern projects.
The devices developed within the framework of the Modul-D ROC had a number of previously unused technical solutions: for the first time in our country, VIZ (Oplot) were used as sources of acoustic interference, means of countering radio communication channels (Burak-M) were developed ,a drifting device capable of occupying a given working depth ("Shock-1") was created.
• "Oplot" - a drifting device for counteracting submarine hydroacoustic detection systems.
• "Udar-1" - a submarine drifting anti-torpedo protection device.
• "Burak-M" - a drifting electronic suppression device for enemy aircraft surveillance.
The aim of the work was to solve a complex of problems of countering submarines to means of detecting and destroying anti-submarine forces.
The developed products should be in service with submarines of modern projects.
The devices developed within the framework of the Modul-D ROC had a number of previously unused technical solutions: for the first time in our country, VIZ (Oplot) were used as sources of acoustic interference, means of countering radio communication channels (Burak-M) were developed ,a drifting device capable of occupying a given working depth ("Shock-1") was created.
The presence of the Modul-D launchers on the Borey (A) missile launcher was also directly indicated in the public materials of the Ministry of Defense. For example, at the Army-2015 forum.
Arbitration court of the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region
February 6, 2018. Case No. A56-75962 / 2017 Joint Stock Company St. Petersburg Marine Engineering Bureau Malakhit (hereinafter - the plaintiff) filed a claim with the Arbitration Court of the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region to recover from the Joint Stock Company Concern Marine Underwater Weapons - Gidropribor "(hereinafter referred to as the defendant) forfeits ... the parties concluded an agreement dated June 25.06.1993, 10313 No. 93/193 / 93-1 to carry out development work on the" Impact-XNUMX "theme.
February 6, 2018. Case No. A56-75962 / 2017 Joint Stock Company St. Petersburg Marine Engineering Bureau Malakhit (hereinafter - the plaintiff) filed a claim with the Arbitration Court of the city of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region to recover from the Joint Stock Company Concern Marine Underwater Weapons - Gidropribor "(hereinafter referred to as the defendant) forfeits ... the parties concluded an agreement dated June 25.06.1993, 10313 No. 93/193 / 93-1 to carry out development work on the" Impact-XNUMX "theme.
That is, the head of the "Module-D" is SPBMT "Malakhit" (as the head organization for complexes of underwater weapons and self-defense in the Russian Federation).
It is interesting to compare the specialists of "Malachite" with their "creation" with the C303 / S complex (Italy, Whitehead, link).
The known launcher of a submarine anti-torpedo protection system C303 / S ... is a multi-barreled sealed module, located outside the strong hull of the submarine.
The standard configuration assumes the presence of up to 12 barrels in the module, at the same time, the number of barrels in the module and the number of modules can be changed to meet the requirements of the submarine design ...
The disadvantages are:
- limited functionality and operational characteristics due to the impossibility of servicing and repairing electronic warfare devices loaded into the launcher barrels;
- low protection of electronic warfare devices from external influences, in particular from the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion;
- a long cycle of preparation for firing due to the time spent on moving the launcher out of the light body space.
In addition, the extension of the launcher from the space of the light hull degrades the vibroacoustic characteristics of the submarine.
The standard configuration assumes the presence of up to 12 barrels in the module, at the same time, the number of barrels in the module and the number of modules can be changed to meet the requirements of the submarine design ...
The disadvantages are:
- limited functionality and operational characteristics due to the impossibility of servicing and repairing electronic warfare devices loaded into the launcher barrels;
- low protection of electronic warfare devices from external influences, in particular from the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion;
- a long cycle of preparation for firing due to the time spent on moving the launcher out of the light body space.
In addition, the extension of the launcher from the space of the light hull degrades the vibroacoustic characteristics of the submarine.
At the same time, unlike its western counterpart (C-303S), the Malachite launcher is not capable of salvo use and excludes the use of “long” products (self-propelled with high performance). That is, it has a deliberately unsatisfactory efficiency. And therefore it cannot provide effective counteraction to modern torpedoes.
Single drifting devices, even extremely powerful ones, are not able today to provide effective counteraction to modern torpedoes.
The phrase said by a specialist about the anti-torpedo "efficiency" (in quotes) of the "Module-D":
"There is a" cow "... Here on these" cakes "the torpedo will come out on her!"
They know about this situation all specialists and bosses. It is for this reason that everything was done to exclude the possibility of testing it against modern torpedoes, despite the disrupted development timeframe for Modul-D (one of the pretexts for this is the very high cost of Modul products and, accordingly, tests).
The author personally raised this question (within the framework of the State tests of the Severodvinsk agro-industrial complex) before the head of the EW service of the Navy in August 2013. For some reason, this did not arouse interest. All tests of "Modul-D" were carried out mainly in "light mode" with the exception of the use of new modern torpedoes.
However, things are much worse with Modul-D.
For "Modul-D" really in battle could not effectively counteract the old types of torpedoes.
On human conscience and anti-torpedo protection
The description of "epic feats" (in quotes, the word "mistakes" is clearly not for this case) by its developers is a vivid example of how rotten the system of development and testing of naval submarine weapons of the Navy is.
So, with the aim of repeatedly exceeding the energy of the interference in the "Oplot", VIZ was applied. Advertising pictures were spectacular (Mr. Mavrodi with MMM would have envied too).
However, only people (bosses) can be deceived, but not technology and physics. And physics gave this "knockdown" to the developers of "Module-D". In 2004 and (as can be seen from the public link to a scientific publication) at the Ladoga training ground "Gidropribor".
That is, the spectrum of the explosion of the VIZ low-frequency device "Oplot" with the VIZ confidently and reliably enters the operating band of the high-frequency counter-torpedo device "Udar-1".
Whom will “Blow” crush?
That's right - your own "Oplot"!
What did you think about before and “where did you look”?
And they looked, for example, in "learned books", where everything was "fine":
Simply, either the receiving hydrophone was taken with a "cut strip", or it was placed at a distance (aside). And the high-frequency signal faded before it.
What happened next, it would be correct to call
"A fire in a brothel behind closed doors."
After the tests of 2004, the complete inoperability of the Modul-D complex for its main purpose was absolutely clear to the developers. However, the topic was funded by the customer (and funded well)!
And in this situation, the developers of moral qualities for an objective report on the problems, to put it mildly, were not found. They tried to “cure” the problem (presenting and “treating” “sepsis” as a “runny nose”). This also had public echoes in the open special press (“a dissertation is sacred,” therefore, the statistics of VAK publications are also needed).
Of course, there are no "terrible words" "torpedo", "SGPD" in it ("secrecy is above all"!). However, everything is clear from the meaning of the article.
In addition, the cipher of the universal decimal classification (UDC) is 623.628. At the same time, the "neighbors" of the specified UDC are: 623.623 - weapon systems (complexes) for jamming radio and radar systems, 623.624: countering radio-electronic means, 623.626 - protection of systems for combating enemy radio-electronic means, methods and means of protection.
But, perhaps, these employees of SPBMT "Malachite" are simply in
"Weekend come up with something on abstract topics"?
Just "for myself", "patent office", dissertations, etc.?
However, let us turn again to the materials of the arbitration courts ( link):
Case No. 2-45 / 13 dated January 24, 2013.
Having considered in open court a civil case on the claim Borodavkina A.N., Andreeva S.Yu., Kurnosova A.A. to OJSC SPBMT Malakhit on compulsion to conclude an agreement, established:
JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" is a patent holder of service inventions,
...patents for which he received as part of the work on the state defense order.
The authors of the invention "Submarine Launcher", patent of the Russian Federation No. dated (date) are the employees of JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" (patent holder) - Borodavkin A.N., Kurnosov A.A., Nikolaev V.F., Andreev S.Yu.
Plaintiff Borodavkin A.N. filed a lawsuit against the defendant OJSC SPMBM "Malakhit" for coercion to conclude agreements on the payment of remuneration for the use of patents on the proposed terms. In support of the claim, pointing out that after receiving the patents, the defendant suggested that he conclude an agreement on the procedure for paying the author <data taken> rubles against remuneration for the use of his invention.
The plaintiff, disagreeing with the proposed amount of payment, sent the defendant his version of the revision of the controversial clauses of the agreement on the amount and procedure for payment of remuneration, setting them out in memos dated (date) and (date), the answer to which had not been received until the filing of the claim ...
Plaintiff Borodavkin A.N. believes that the amount of remuneration indicated by the defendant in the amount of <data taken> rubles does not correspond to the real remuneration, and therefore asks the court to compel JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" to conclude agreements with him on payment of royalties for the use of patents on the terms proposed by him, namely - payment to the author for each fact of using his invention, including cases of assignment of a patent to third parties, remuneration in the amount of 4% of the share of the cost of productionattributable to this invention, and in the event that the patent holder concludes a license agreement by paying the plaintiff royalties in the amount of 20% of the proceeds from the sale of the license without limiting the maximum remuneration, indicating that the defendant must inform the plaintiff about each fact of using the invention.
In the course of pre-trial preparation in the case, the court attracted all the co-authors of the controversial service inventions to participate in the consideration of the dispute as third parties, of which the authors Andreev S.Yu. and A.A. Kurnosov. independent claims were announced to compel JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" to conclude controversial contracts on conditions similar to those of the plaintiff.
During the consideration of the case, the parties presented a draft agreement on the payment and amount of remuneration.
Having considered in open court a civil case on the claim Borodavkina A.N., Andreeva S.Yu., Kurnosova A.A. to OJSC SPBMT Malakhit on compulsion to conclude an agreement, established:
JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" is a patent holder of service inventions,
...patents for which he received as part of the work on the state defense order.
The authors of the invention "Submarine Launcher", patent of the Russian Federation No. dated (date) are the employees of JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" (patent holder) - Borodavkin A.N., Kurnosov A.A., Nikolaev V.F., Andreev S.Yu.
Plaintiff Borodavkin A.N. filed a lawsuit against the defendant OJSC SPMBM "Malakhit" for coercion to conclude agreements on the payment of remuneration for the use of patents on the proposed terms. In support of the claim, pointing out that after receiving the patents, the defendant suggested that he conclude an agreement on the procedure for paying the author <data taken> rubles against remuneration for the use of his invention.
The plaintiff, disagreeing with the proposed amount of payment, sent the defendant his version of the revision of the controversial clauses of the agreement on the amount and procedure for payment of remuneration, setting them out in memos dated (date) and (date), the answer to which had not been received until the filing of the claim ...
Plaintiff Borodavkin A.N. believes that the amount of remuneration indicated by the defendant in the amount of <data taken> rubles does not correspond to the real remuneration, and therefore asks the court to compel JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" to conclude agreements with him on payment of royalties for the use of patents on the terms proposed by him, namely - payment to the author for each fact of using his invention, including cases of assignment of a patent to third parties, remuneration in the amount of 4% of the share of the cost of productionattributable to this invention, and in the event that the patent holder concludes a license agreement by paying the plaintiff royalties in the amount of 20% of the proceeds from the sale of the license without limiting the maximum remuneration, indicating that the defendant must inform the plaintiff about each fact of using the invention.
In the course of pre-trial preparation in the case, the court attracted all the co-authors of the controversial service inventions to participate in the consideration of the dispute as third parties, of which the authors Andreev S.Yu. and A.A. Kurnosov. independent claims were announced to compel JSC SPMBM "Malakhit" to conclude controversial contracts on conditions similar to those of the plaintiff.
During the consideration of the case, the parties presented a draft agreement on the payment and amount of remuneration.
Actually, we have a clear confirmation that the above launcher of countermeasures was developed within the SDO and is being implemented in series. Where and in what complex is obvious.
At the same time, despite the fact that this complex was deliberately incapable of solving the main task for its intended purpose, its developers had enough "conscience" (in quotes) not only to continue the "development" of considerable budget billions, they "had enough" to demand it for this I also "drank" rewards for myself.
But
"The sawmill continued to whistle."
Realizing that with the Udar-Oplot combination it turned out “somehow really bad”, the “creative group of persons” from “Malachite” (and another creative organization) decided to “change the scenery”.
"I'll just leave it here".
(Screen from forum forums.airbase.ru).
So our "anti-torpedo MMM-shchiki" finally realized that the single devices were "somehow outdated" (it came down - with a delay of a quarter of a century).
As a result, we are already witnessing a group application of devices very similar to Vista (with a “hood” to provide acoustic isolation between the receiving and emitting parts). "Efficiency" (in quotes), like "Leni Golubkov's" (modeling "really showed"). Bingo! You can open a new OCD for billions more (and you must not forget yourself in it):
"Payment to the author for each fact of use ... remuneration in the amount of 4% of the share of the cost of production attributable to this invention."
Just a very simple technical question.
Taking into account the broadbandness of the new torpedo SSNs in the receiving part of the PTZ devices, it is necessary to lower the "threshold" (signal / noise ratio), with the subsequent triggering of one device on interference and the "dog wedding" of all the others already fired at it.
And the attacking torpedo and its SSN?
And on her (taking into account the real distance of interaction), this "dog wedding" of the GSPD will have practically no effect. The new CCHs have a high resistance to interference, the bandwidth is wide using various complex signals, and it will normally be guided to our submarine.
I repeat once again that what is written above is not some kind of "revelation." This is the elementary physics of the process. And this was discussed by experts. And including with the persons indicated in the patent 10-15 years ago.
A devastating result for the Russian Navy
In fact, the PTZ of the Navy is simply absent.
И moreover, with the existing organization of work there are no prospects for solving this problem.
And this is not only a failure at the tactical, but also at the strategic level, at the level of strategic nuclear forces. For the key requirement for NSNF is combat stability. And with the indicated problems of PTZ, no "Bulava" and "Sineva" have any sense (unless they have just been "handed over to the diocese" of the Strategic Missile Forces). "Borey-Bulava: the volley is gone, but hard questions remain".
The mastering of anti-torpedoes “Lasta” by our submarine has been disrupted. Rear-Admiral Lutsky wrote above about the extremely low efficiency of the "Module-D" complex (declared on the "Boreys", according to the official information of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on "Army-2015").
Moreover, under a far-fetched pretext, self-propelled anti-torpedo protection devices were removed from the ammunition of the naval submarines (including the NSNF) (already available and showing efficiency).
Moreover, under a far-fetched pretext, self-propelled anti-torpedo protection devices were removed from the ammunition of the naval submarines (including the NSNF) (already available and showing efficiency).
And here I would like to cite, for comparison, the approach to solving such problems, which was practiced in the Ground Forces.
“It all started with the fact that in Chechnya, while carrying out a combat mission, a soldier protected by a bulletproof vest was killed by a bandit's pistol bullet.
A bandyuk was shooting from a Makarov, but according to all calculations, a bulletproof vest cannot be pierced with this weapon.
Counterintelligence drew attention to this and reported to the General Staff.
General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky, who was at that time the chief of the General Staff, instructed his deputy, General Alexander Skvortsov, to check what was going on.
Skvortsov took a choice of several armored vehicles from a large batch, which was supplied by the Artess company, and went to the training ground, where he himself shot the vests.
Bullets pierced armor like tissue paper.
After that, the general went to the firm to check the quality of the goods on the spot.
He was given a control body armor from a huge batch - 500 pieces.
Oddly enough, this product turned out to be of high quality - its plates consisted of all the required 30 layers of the so-called ballistic fabric (or Kevlar). And the bullets did not pierce him.
When the general himself chose several bulletproof vests for testing, everything became clear: some did not even have 15 layers of Kevlar ...
After that, the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office (UPC) of the Russian Federation joined the case. "
A bandyuk was shooting from a Makarov, but according to all calculations, a bulletproof vest cannot be pierced with this weapon.
Counterintelligence drew attention to this and reported to the General Staff.
General of the Army Yuri Baluyevsky, who was at that time the chief of the General Staff, instructed his deputy, General Alexander Skvortsov, to check what was going on.
Skvortsov took a choice of several armored vehicles from a large batch, which was supplied by the Artess company, and went to the training ground, where he himself shot the vests.
Bullets pierced armor like tissue paper.
After that, the general went to the firm to check the quality of the goods on the spot.
He was given a control body armor from a huge batch - 500 pieces.
Oddly enough, this product turned out to be of high quality - its plates consisted of all the required 30 layers of the so-called ballistic fabric (or Kevlar). And the bullets did not pierce him.
When the general himself chose several bulletproof vests for testing, everything became clear: some did not even have 15 layers of Kevlar ...
After that, the Investigative Committee under the Prosecutor's Office (UPC) of the Russian Federation joined the case. "
What to do?
First of all, to begin to carry out objective tests, comprehensive testing of new CLOs and SRS. The technical groundwork, there are specialists for this.
Moreover, I repeat, we have worked out really breakthrough proposals on this topic.
The question is in the tough formulation of the task - the fleet, the NSNF must have effective anti-torpedo protection! And it will be done, and in a very short time.
In the meantime, here's what we have ( link):
“Throughout the entire campaign of our carrier group in 2016, there was not a single ship with modern anti-submarine weapons in the guard of Kuznetsov. And the maneuvering of our ships ... at the sight of foreign submarines operating in the same place.
Moreover, even in the conditions of a sharp aggravation of relations with Turkey at the end of 2015, the Navy did nothing to provide real anti-submarine support for its forces off the coast of Syria - and this is taking into account direct statements by Ankara that our ships, including the cruiser Moskva, are at gunpoint Turkish submarines.
The phrase of a high-ranking naval officer who did a lot to increase the real combat capability of the fleet:
"Until Moscow becomes Cheonan, nothing will change here."
Cheonan is a South Korean naval corvette torpedoed by a DPRK midget submarine in 2010.
And "Moscow" is a cruiser. Our.
Moreover, even in the conditions of a sharp aggravation of relations with Turkey at the end of 2015, the Navy did nothing to provide real anti-submarine support for its forces off the coast of Syria - and this is taking into account direct statements by Ankara that our ships, including the cruiser Moskva, are at gunpoint Turkish submarines.
The phrase of a high-ranking naval officer who did a lot to increase the real combat capability of the fleet:
"Until Moscow becomes Cheonan, nothing will change here."
Cheonan is a South Korean naval corvette torpedoed by a DPRK midget submarine in 2010.
And "Moscow" is a cruiser. Our.
Information