Military Review

Sergey Gorshkov and his Grand Fleet

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Admiral S.G. Gorshkov and SSBN pr. 941. Photo source: RT


February 26, 2021 marks 111 years since the birth of Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, Admiral fleet The Soviet Union, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy from early 1956 to late 1985, the creator of our first ocean-going fleet and everything that so far at least formally classifies our Navy as a politically significant factor in world politics.

In Russia, in relation to S.G. Gorshkov today is dominated by indifference, occasionally interspersed with criticism. It is a different matter outside of it. So, in India, Gorshkov is considered one of the "fathers" of the modern Indian Navy, in the USA his legacy is also deeply studied. And to this day. Moreover, the Americans are surprised to note the almost complete indifference of Russians to the personality of Admiral Gorshkov and his activities.

They say that if God wants to punish a person, then he deprives him of his reason. The way in which S.G. Gorshkov and his activities are a clear indicator that something like this happened to us.

But no punishment can and does not last forever, except death. In a funny way neglect of the development of the Navy this very death can bring us in the future, and in the near... But until this happens, it makes sense to look into the very recent past. To the past that has caught in one form or another the majority of people living in Russia today. But which is mostly forgotten by them.

It's time to remember. We cannot live with an amputated mind forever. As usual, it makes no sense to focus on what was the biography of this admiral and the stages of his service. All of this is available today in a variety of sources. Much more interesting is what lessons for today we can learn from what was just recently.

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The entry of Sergei Gorshkov into the post of Commander-in-Chief took place on January 5, 1956. And, as today's authors write, it was accompanied by somewhat contradictory behavior in relation to the past commander-in-chief N.G. Kuznetsov.

Without further developing this topic, we can only say that Gorshkov clearly showed himself not only as a politician, capable (when necessary) of "contradictory" actions, but even as a politician who knew how to catch the wind directions in the Kremlin corridors well and follow them even then when a principled person would not.

Was it “ugly” from an ethical standpoint? Yes. But below we will see what the admiral could do and weigh his actions objectively.

The mid-fifties turned for the Navy into what the Americans call the perfect storm.

First, there was the N.S. factor. Khrushchev.

Previously, Khrushchev was credited with almost destroying the Navy. Today, a more balanced position is "in use" about the fact that under NS. Khrushchev, the fleet "threw away the unnecessary" and moved towards the creation of a modern nuclear missile fleet, such as we learned later.

In fact, both are right.

A significant part of the decisions that were implemented in relation to the Navy by N.S. Khrushchev, were indeed acquitted. So, obviously, the continuation of the construction of large artillery ships was no longer relevant. Recall that such a kind of forces as the Marine missile carrier aviation became a real force also in Khrushchev's times. The atomic submarine appeared at the same time.

But on the other hand, the pogrom still took place and became real.

Attitude towards new ships, which could well gradually become carriers of missile weapons (and practice has shown it) was simply wasteful.

Khrushchev's understanding of the nature of war at sea was nil.

So, we can recall the attempts to "scare" the Americans with submarines during the Cuban missile crisis. Unsuccessful and stupid, even from the point of view of banal logic. Until a certain moment, Khrushchev professed a truly manic approach, which was that even if the fleet is needed, it cannot be used. And again, the Cuban missile crisis was a prime example of this.

Khrushchev also got into tactical issues.

So, it is known that Khrushchev criticized Project 58 missile cruisers from the position that

"This ship cannot defend itself against aviation",

not realizing that the ships do not go into battle alone.

Khrushchev was convinced that submarines were a universal solution that would make it possible to neutralize the enemy's superiority in forces. Today we not only know that this is not so, but through our sad experience we have become convinced how much it is not so.

Khrushchev's voluntaristic decisions, of course, had a negative impact on the development of the Navy. So, today it is customary to exaggerate his dislike of aircraft carriers. (Although, in principle, he admitted that under some certain circumstances such ships could be built. But, again, by virtue of his understanding.) Still, it is impossible not to recognize his decisive role in the fact that we were so late with this class of ships.


But Khrushchev was not the only problem.

Few people remember today, but the second half of the fifties was the time when the navy, which was just "raising its head", faced a powerful offensive by the army generals, who were simply trying to prevent this type of armed forces from developing and getting out of control.

In the open press, this was briefly mentioned in an article by Captains 1st Rank A. Koryakovtsev and S. Tashlykov "Sharp turns in the development of the national maritime strategy":

“It should be noted that the new provisions of the naval strategy were focused on the prospects for the development of the fleet, which opened with the beginning of the qualitative rearmament of the Navy, its transformation into a nuclear missile fleet.

However, the new military-political leadership of the country considered the issues of the use of the Navy in a future war, based on the actual state of the forces of the fleet, which, after the adoption by the head of state, N.S. Khrushchev's voluntaristic decisions were significantly reduced.

Corresponding was the assessment of the role of the Navy, whose actions, in the opinion of the top military leadership, could not have a particular impact on the outcome of the war.

As a result of this approach, the competence of the naval leadership in the field of construction and preparation for war of the naval forces was artificially limited to the operational level.

In October 1955, in Sevastopol, under the leadership of N.S. Khrushchev, a meeting of members of the government and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy was held to work out ways of developing the fleet.

In the speeches of the head of state and Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov expressed views on the use of the Navy in a future war, in which preference was given to the actions of the forces of the fleet at the tactical and operational levels.

Two years later, the question of the illegality of the existence of naval strategy as a category of naval art was raised again.

The point in its development was set in 1957 after the publication of an article by the Chief of the General Staff of Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, which emphasized the inadmissibility of separating naval strategy from the general strategy of the Armed Forces.

In this regard, V.D. Sokolovsky noted that one should speak not about the independent strategy of the Air Force and the Navy, but about their strategic use.

Guided by these instructions, the scientists of the Naval Academy prepared a draft Manual on the Conduct of Naval Operations (NMO-57), in which the category of "naval strategy" was replaced by the category of "strategic use of the Navy", and from such a category of naval art as "war on the sea ”, completely refused.

In 1962, a theoretical work "Military Strategy" was published, edited by the Chief of the General Staff, which argued that the use of the Navy should be limited to actions "mainly on an operational scale."

It is worth noting that all this happened when the United States was actively deploying nuclear weapons in the Navy. When the question arose about arming submarines with nuclear missile weapons. When on the decks of American aircraft carriers "registered" heavy bombers - carriers of nuclear weapons. And when all the severity of the hypothetical confrontation in the future war with the US and NATO "shifted" into the air and into the sea.

This is a very important lesson - even in the face of the threat of the death of the country, the supporters of the thesis "Russia is a land power" will stand their ground, destroying the only means that will protect the country, simply because of their unwillingness to understand complex matters.

The traditionally strong army command in our country will also go to the end in these matters, disregarding reality in general and using its control over the General Staff as a battering ram.

So, today the fleet is practically eliminated as a single type of the Armed Forces, to tell the truth, our country simply does not have it. And there are naval forces of military districts. And now the army men are attacking the military aviation. And this is when we have almost no significant military opponents on the ground (with a common border with us), but there is the United States (with its aviation and the Navy).

That is, real military threats will not be an argument. Let's see what kind of consequences this army approach led almost immediately then, in the 60s.

“During this time, the situation in the Atlantic has become extremely complicated.

The unusually high traffic intensity of Soviet cargo ships in July-August finally attracted the attention of American intelligence. Regular overflights of Soviet ships by aircraft began, and on September 19 the Angarles dry-cargo ship was intercepted by an American cruiser, which accompanied it for more than a day, directing the trunks of the main caliber turrets to the ship.

The next day the vessel "Angarsk" was intercepted by an American destroyer.

This practice continued on all the following days. And all this time, surface ships and submarines of the Soviet Navy continued to stand in bases awaiting orders.

Only on September 25, 1962, at a meeting of the Defense Council, the question of the participation of the fleet in Operation Anadyr was considered.

The Council decided to abandon the use of a surface squadron, limiting itself to sending to Cuba only four diesel torpedo boats of Project 641 ("Foxtrot" according to NATO classification).

This decision, which radically changed the idea of ​​using the Soviet naval group, received various explanations in domestic and foreign historiography.

Russian authors explain this decision by the unwillingness of the Soviet leadership to risk the secrecy of the operation.

At the same time, however, the question remains unanswered why the requirement of secrecy was not taken into account in the initial planning of the fleet's actions.

Foreign researchers, on the contrary, attach much more importance to the refusal of the Soviet leadership to use the surface squadron.

The American researcher D. Winkler believed that the reason for this was "the inability of surface ships of the Soviet fleet to conduct operations in the ocean."

One of the participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis, US Navy officer P. Huchthausen, suggested that the Soviet leadership feared "further strengthening of the American fleet off the coast of Cuba."

To foreign researchers, this decision seems illogical and erroneous.

The well-known American historian of the Navy E. Beach believed that "an escort of Soviet surface ships accompanying bulk carriers that delivered missiles to Cuba in 1962 could have influenced the outcome of the crisis."

Moreover, the crews of American ships were expecting this and were pretty surprised not to find even the "slightest escort of merchant ships by the warships of the Soviet Navy."

And the final output:

Foreign historiography is unanimous in assessing the participation of the Soviet Navy in the Cuban missile crisis.

“The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was the sixth humiliating defeat for the Russian fleet in the last 100 years,

- wrote in 1986, P. Tsoras, an analyst at the Center for Threat Analysis of the US Army Intelligence. -

The Soviet Union found itself in a stalemate in Cuba, and only the Soviet navy could have rescued Soviet diplomacy ...

But the Soviet fleet showed complete helplessness in the face of US naval power, which may have done more damage to its prestige than defeat. "

Actually, it was so.

Source - "New historical bulletin ", article by A. Kilichenkov "The Soviet Navy in the Caribbean Crisis".

Of course, the fleet is also to blame. But could he develop in conditions when it was possible to stand up to the wall for the development of correct theories of combat use (in the 30s) or ruin his career (50s)?

It is worth noting that the superiority of the US Navy in forces could not be an argument in any way, since the Americans would not have started the war without a decision from Congress. And if they did, then completely different forces would be used than the Soviet military escort of merchant ships. For example, long-range aviation, which already had hundreds of bombers, would have gone. The Americans would have to take this into account.


During the Cuban missile crisis, this was the only way to protect Soviet ships.

It is also known, and in the article on the link, this fact is neatly bypassed, that the General Staff itself had a significant impact on the Kama operation plan. But the sailors were appointed the last for the emergence of diesel-electric submarines.

The destructive influence of army generals, however, was not the last factor that S.G. Gorshkov was forced to take into account in his politics (namely in politics).

The third factor was the influence of the military industry in the person of its long-term "curator" Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov. A lot has been said about this. And we are still reaping the fruits of those times. After all, both then and now, the industry could simply order the Armed Forces which weapons should be adopted. This is still the case. In fact, the decisions on what to use the state money for are made by those who use it. And this is precisely what caused those monstrous (you cannot put it otherwise) imbalances in the construction of the Navy that we have today.

And a politically possible order to the fleet to accept incapacitated ships, so as not to disturb the public (see the history of the air defense of our corvettes), and massive "sawing" projects (from the corvette of project 20386 and patrol ships of project 22160 to the nuclear torpedo "Poseidon", ekranoplanes and aircraft with short takeoff and vertical landing) - this is the legacy of the "monster" of the defense industry grown under the rule of Ustinov.

As well as today, then this factor existed "in full growth". And Gorshkov had to deal with him too.

The last factor was the intellectual level of the Soviet party elite - it was technically impossible to explain to yesterday's peasants, who reached Berlin in their youth, that in the war of the future, the land fronts would be deeply secondary (in relation to the exchange of nuclear missile strikes) and the struggle for supremacy at sea and in the air was technically impossible. ...

Similarly, today we have a large mass of citizens, simultaneously those who believe that Russia does not depend on sea communications and who know about the existence of the Northern Sea Route, Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the group of forces in Syria. This is a pathological problem that seriously complicates the adoption of correct decisions by the political leadership, if only because pathological thinking finds its supporters in the highest echelons of power.

In theory, in such conditions, the Navy, in general, could not survive then, in 1956-1960, leaving "under the army." A little later we will see that as a result of this, the country as a whole could not survive. A much less complex set of negative factors in 2009-2012 led precisely to the actual elimination of the fleet as a single type of aircraft. And Gorshkov, finding himself exactly in the epicenter of this collapse, not only survived, but also built an ocean-going fleet, which everyone had to reckon with.


Gorshkov's fleet can be criticized as much as you like, but everyone had to reckon with it.

Yes, it was not optimal and had a huge number of shortcomings. But who would have done better in that situation?

Yes, this fleet could not have won the war with the United States. But there is one caveat. And in this nuance, the greatness of Gorshkov stands up in full growth precisely as a military theorist, still very few people have fully understood.

The Navy was not supposed to win the war with America.

He had to make it impossible.

Theory and practice: a pistol at the temple of imperialism


It is believed that the theoretical views of S.G. Gorshkov were presented in his works, the most famous of which is the book "The Sea Power of the State".

Indeed, to a large extent the work of S.G. Gorshkov also reflect his military-theoretical views. However, none of his works reflects them entirely.

The views of S.G. Gorshkov and those senior officers who served under his leadership, reflects only the real activities of the Navy. And since the early sixties (right after the Cuban missile crisis) it has been described in one word - containment.

The essence of how the fleet operated under the leadership of S.G. Gorshkov, and what tasks he performed reflects precisely this word.

In "The Sea Power of the State" there is a red thread an indication of the vital role of submarines armed with ballistic missiles, and the combat services of these boats in the Atlantic (up to the areas adjacent to the territorial waters of the United States) and the Pacific Ocean, which have become a symbol of the Cold War, as well as on American attempts to disrupt these services, or vice versa, to covertly monitor our boats. Some dramatic episodes of those clashes can be found in the article “At the forefront of the underwater confrontation. Cold War submarine ".

But in the "Sea Power of the State" there is nothing about what has become the "calling card" of the general-purpose forces of the Soviet Navy - tracking the naval formations of the US and NATO (readily use weapons on them).

It was pure containment.

It started at a tactical level.

The American commander always knew that this Russian patrolman, clinging to him like a tick, with its 34 nodes of maximum speed, is now transmitting somewhere to the command post, which controls the missile weapon carriers, surface, air or submarine, its current coordinates, course and speed. And it is not known what orders Ivan has there - maybe he will strike in response to the rise of aircraft from the deck? Or maybe a volley will come in response to an attempt to detach from tracking? Maybe then we should continue to follow our own course, smoothly and without twitching, without undertaking anything?


Patrol ship (then - BOD) Project 1135 "Hot" is tracking the American aircraft carrier "Nimitz" and its escort, February 5, 1979.

These actions were carried out even by small rocket ships, which were able to independently destroy almost any surface target in the 70s, even without nuclear weapons.

These were frequent situations, and the US Navy did not have an answer to them for the time being. There is no war yet, but there are no guarantees that the Russians will not strike first at the slightest attempt at aggressive actions.

And what to do in this case?

There was no answer for a very, very long time.

But at the operational level it was the same.

More than once, Soviet nuclear submarines with cruise missiles took aim at American units of warships, using data on their position, course and speed, which they received from surface forces or from Tu-95RTs reconnaissance target designators. The commander of the American aircraft carrier group knew that he was at gunpoint. And he understood that he could not guarantee the non-use of weapons by the first from the Soviet forces. It only remained not to provoke.

In the seas adjacent to the territory of the USSR, everything was further complicated by the factor of the Naval Missile Aviation, which, perhaps, could win in a battle with the US Navy, but, perhaps, not. But the losses would have been enormous anyway. With some degree of probability, excluding the continuation of offensive military operations. And that "gunner" who will bring it to the target could be some ancient "57th project", catching on after the formidable powerful group of American ships. And this also had to be taken into account.

And it was the same at the strategic level.

Soviet SSBNs held at gunpoint American cities. And for all its technical superiority, the US Navy could not guarantee that their salvo would be completely disrupted. Even now they cannot fully guarantee this, and in the 60s and 70s it was simply impossible.

Thus, it became unrealistic to start a war under favorable circumstances.

The real start of hostilities led to the fact that those Soviet forces that did not die from the first strike of the Americans (and it would be impossible to ensure the simultaneous delivery of a covert first strike in almost the entire world), deliver a powerful missile strike against the US Navy forces that they hold at gunpoint, reducing the offensive potential of the US Navy at times and making it impossible for their further effective actions against the USSR from the sea.

The victory would go to the Americans "on points" - they would still have a lot of strength by the time our fleet almost completely ceased to exist.

But this is formal.

And in fact, the US Navy, after the losses suffered, would turn into a thing in itself, capable, at best, of escorting convoys and carrying out raiding operations. The US surface forces after such a pogrom, had it been carried out to the maximum extent possible, would have been unable to achieve any strategic results.

And if the Americans tried to use strategic nuclear weapons against the USSR, then missile submarines would be used, of which there were simply too many to be able to track them all at the same time. Moreover, before the appearance of the Mk.48 torpedo, the tactical and technical characteristics of American torpedoes did not guarantee that it would be possible to win a battle with a Soviet submarine, even suddenly firing first. It was only later that they "swung the pendulum" in their direction.

This means that a strike by Soviet ballistic missiles on American cities would inevitably take place. That guaranteed there would be no war. And she was not.

There is a famous expression by S.G. Gorshkov, which he personally used to characterize Project 1234 small missile ships -

"A pistol at the temple of imperialism."

It must be admitted that this expression perfectly characterizes everything that he did and the entire fleet that he built, in general.

It was a "mental revolution" in military affairs, including in the naval one. All military theorists of the past had the goal of their intellectual efforts to find ways to victory, while S.G. Gorshkov deliberately reduced the confrontation to what is called mutual zugzwang in chess - each move of the parties leads to a worsening of their position.

But in the case of confrontation at sea, the enemy was not forced to “go down” after all. And he didn't go. Thus, it was not about winning the war, but about not letting it start.

Nobody has done this before. Nobody even thought that before.

Gorshkov was the first. And he did it.

Theory embodied in metal


The whole point of what the Soviet Navy could and did was boiled down to a demonstration of the threat and putting pressure on the enemy by this demonstration. However, for the threat demonstration to work, the threat had to be real, real. And for this it had to be done as such. This required a completely specific technique, which was only in the Soviet Navy.

The Soviet Navy gave the world a lot of concepts that did not exist before. And it was not supposed in principle.

So, it was with the Soviet Navy that the build-up of superiority began not in the number of forces, but in their total missile salvo. Domestic discussion on tactical issues in the first half of the 60s as a whole led the command of the fleet to a theoretical consensus on issues of naval combat with missile weapons. And since then, the build-up of the volley has become a constant phenomenon.


Missile cruisers (originally destroyers, but "politics" intervened), etc. 58 became the first heavy carriers of anti-ship missiles in the surface forces. In the photo - RRC "Grozny".

But in order to strike at the enemy, superior in strength and having numerous carrier-based aircraft, a salvo had to be sent from afar. And also, to ensure its irresistibility by means of enemy air defense. For this, missiles were made really high-speed and with a long range, which, with those technologies, meant enormous dimensions.

Both large heavy and fast missiles have become the hallmark of the fleet, starting with Project 58 missile cruisers and Project 651 diesel submarines. And then through the Project 1134 BOD cruiser ("clean", without letters) and Project 675 nuclear submarines to Project 956 destroyers, Project 1164 missile cruisers, Project 1144 nuclear missile cruisers and Project 670 and 949 (A) SSGNs.

Sergey Gorshkov and his Grand Fleet
Diesel-electric submarine of project 651 with anti-ship cruise missiles.

In order to strike accurately from a long distance, it was necessary to provide target designation. And for this purpose, a naval reconnaissance and target designation system "Success" was created, in which the "eyes" of the shooting ships and submarines were the Tu-95RTs reconnaissance target designator aircraft and the Ka-25Ts shipborne AWACS helicopters, capable of detecting enemy surface ships from hundreds of kilometers.


Tu-95RTs and its purpose. In a real war, you wouldn't have to fly that close.

It is generally accepted that the Tu-95RTs were very vulnerable. In practice, even if the Tu-95 crew performed a “dumb” flight to the target at high altitude, without trying to evade detection and without doing anything to protect themselves, the enemy would need at least an aircraft carrier to “get it”. Moreover, it is the American aircraft carrier with the American air group.

And if the flight to the target (the position of which is approximately known from intelligence data, at least some last bearing to the target) were carried out precisely with the use of different techniques that allow avoiding detection, then the chances of successful target detection and transmission of data about it to the carrier of the missile weapon increased.

Moreover, the same applies to the Ka-25Ts, with all its disadvantages.

The West had no analogues of such a system in the 60s.

Only many years later, the systems of mutual information exchange within the Navy reached such a level that it became possible to use any F / A-18 as such a reconnaissance. And then it was unrealistic.

The very concept of submarines armed with anti-ship cruise missiles launched according to data from external sources of information is purely Soviet.

Synthesis of a naval understanding of the importance of a missile salvo and the ability to provide external data for the development of target designation, as well as Khrushchev's (and not only him) belief that only submarines can reliably evade the defeat of the omnipotent (in fact, not) carrier-based aircraft of the US Navy.

It was a specific technique, created for a specific military theory, which directly followed from, again, a specific goal - not to win the war, but not to allow it to start, keeping the enemy at gunpoint.


PLARK ave. 675

The "Legend" space system of marine reconnaissance and target designation, which appeared later, was also born within the framework of the pottery approach. Precisely to ensure the actions of those forces that were once originally created within the framework of his military-theoretical views. Today "Legend" is usually overestimated, although in reality its effectiveness was low. And the old system "Success" continued to retain its importance until the very end of its existence, and in the end remained irreplaceable.

Of course, it would be a big mistake to ascribe to S.G. Gorshkov has done everything.

It is not.

But in a completely obvious way, it was he who in many ways created the system of views and attitudes that gave birth to such a fleet. And directly for solving such problems by such methods.

Politics as the art of the possible


The way S.G. Gorshkov achieved what he achieved, was tortuous.

It is not for nothing that we can safely say about him that it was precisely a politician. As befits a politician, he adapted, maneuvered and sometimes made ethically ambiguous decisions.

But could it have been otherwise?

For example, the epic with vertical takeoff and landing aircraft was a clear concession to the subjective sympathies of D. Ustinov, like many other things - the industry then wanted people's money no less than it does now. And this had to be taken into account.

How much in the actions of S.G. Gorshkov was dominated by ideological prospects - to provide the country with a fleet capable of protecting it, and how much careerism?

The answer to this question is absolutely irrelevant. If only because the first task - to ensure the creation of the fleet, was completed by him. And there are no guarantees that it would also have been performed by someone else under the current conditions.

But the "flexibility" of S.G. Gorshkov possessed considerable.

When it was necessary, together with Khrushchev, to "roll" into the submarine, he did it. When it was necessary to rejoice in the "verticals" with Ustinov - he rejoiced. When, instead of re-equipping the brand new cruisers of the 68K and 68bis projects with missile weapons, they were simply taken to the reserve at best, and at worst they were cut or donated to Indonesia, he did not protest.

Light cruiser "Dzerzhinsky" with air defense systems. The air defense system was unsuccessful, but the cruiser as a platform for missile weapons was quite suitable. But the rocketization of the 68bis fleet did not take place - Khrushchev simply did not like surface ships and that's it. Gorshkov did not protest.

Then the industry received one desired "fat order" after another. True, this was already under Brezhnev.

So the fleet simultaneously received a lot of different missiles. In parallel, different types of ships of the same purpose (the most striking example of which were projects 1164 and 1144, which were built simultaneously). There was a terrible inconsistency in the projects, and in some places and unjustified specialization. For example, the BOD project 1155 was left without the ability to strike at surface targets. As earlier BOD (later reclassified in TFR) projects 61 and 1135.


The 61st project (despite its considerable size) did not have anti-ship missiles. And this despite the fact that they got up there - some of the ships were modernized for them. But only a part. Alas, there was a lot of this in the technical policy of the Navy. In the photo - "Sharp-witted", the source of the image is indicated in the photo.

But everyone was in business.

Gas turbines for some ships came from Ukraine, steam turbines for others from Leningrad, all were at work and with money. How it ended for the country is known today. But then this ending was not at all obvious. And the friendly disposition of the industry commanders, together with the all-powerful Dmitry Fedorovich, was very important.

Then, when they finally succeeded in pushing through the aircraft carriers, the first of which was Riga-Brezhnev-Tbilisi-Kuznetsov, they immediately began to build them, at the same time giving work for the Yakovlev Design Bureau with their Yak-41 "vertical" project, for which no not a single new carrier was planned.

In military theoretical works (in the same "Sea Power"), Gorshkov assented to the army generals who sought to "crush" this incomprehensible and such a complex fleet, repeating slogans about the unity of military strategy (which in Soviet newspeak meant somewhat differently from what it seems) of all types of the Armed Forces, without raising the issue of an independent naval strategy.

While Gorshkov has such an independent strategy was ... Moreover, he put it into practice, making the USSR Navy an independent strategic factor in the global balance of forces. And in the event of war, by a force capable of exerting a strategic influence on the course of hostilities. On your own.

But you have to understand - this was the specificity of the Soviet system.

You couldn’t just fulfill your duties honestly. This would mean, with a high degree of probability, simply an early resignation under some pretext. And that's all.

And Gorshkov could not ignore all this. For comparison, one can look at the situation now, when, in order to become Commander-in-Chief, one must be ready to cave in to industry without restrictions, to rapidly accept unfit submarines and turn a blind eye to their critical shortcomings, etc. And disagreement with such approaches automatically means a quick departure "from the cage" of promising commanders, or simply dismissal.

Today, even the question cannot be raised about the restoration of the powers of the High Command as a body of military command, or about the revival of the former role of the General Staff of the Navy.

Then it was all the same, but the results of the Korotkov leadership of the fleet, frankly speaking, are different than those of the current naval "commanders".

And this also characterizes him.

Victories and achievements


America's manic lust for unrestricted world domination is not a new phenomenon.

But during the Cold War, it was also burdened by an unbridled desire to stop the spread of leftist regimes with an ideology close to socialist. Religious America saw this as an existential threat. (And this became very aggravated later, closer to the 80s. That had serious consequences for the USSR).

In such conditions, a nuclear war was quite real. And it could well have begun. But it didn't start. And the Navy played a decisive role in this.

Modern man perceives modern history in a distorted, fragmentary manner. So, for example, most people who are confident that today the main deterrent are the strategic missile forces - the Strategic Missile Forces, latently carry in their heads the idea that somewhere after Korolev's "seven", this has become so in several years. And then it was always.

Everyone has heard that nuclear parity with the United States is in the 70s. And before that, it seemed like there was no parity? There were few missiles, but somehow it worked. How did it work? God knows ...

In fact, the situation with nuclear deterrence looked like this.

The first real ICBM in service with the missile forces is the R-16. Adoption for service - 1963. Deployment began at the same time. But in significant quantities, the silo modifications of these missiles were put on alert only by the end of the 60s. At the same time, due to this and other missiles, it was possible to deploy almost a thousand ICBMs. But the development of the command system, bringing the organizational and staff structures to the state necessary for waging a nuclear war and the achievement of the Strategic Missile Forces in full combat readiness as a whole - this is already the beginning of the 70s. It was then that we reached nuclear parity.

In addition, there was no way to carry out a retaliatory strike. The early warning system was just being created. And ground-based launchers are vulnerable to a sudden nuclear strike.
That ensured nuclear deterrence (until a sufficient number of missiles entered the Strategic Missile Forces). And what later made the guaranteed possibility of retaliation realistically feasible? These were Soviet missile submarines.

Since the mid-sixties, the "diesels" of projects 629 of various modifications begin to go "under America" ​​- under the most American shores with the task of carrying out combat duty with ballistic missiles of the D-2 complex (SLBM R-13). The missile range of several hundred kilometers required these boats to be literally under the coast of the United States.

And the fact that the boats were diesel-electric prevented a hidden transition to the combat service area. But the trouble is that the United States did not have such anti-submarine forces as later. The search for boats from the air, in general, was carried out by flying boats with magnetometers. And the United States could not guarantee the success.


Diesel-electric submarines of project 629 with ballistic missiles. These boats are forgotten today, but they and their crews saved the country more than once.


The reality is that in the first half of the sixties, US nuclear deterrence missions were carried out by suicide bombers from the crews of missile diesel-electric submarines. Yes, there were relatively few combat services, and boats were often tracked. But they were never tracked all at the same time. And besides, the United States never knew exactly how many boats actually sail along its coast in the Atlantic and later in the Pacific.

Soon nuclear-powered missile carriers joined the diesel submarines. First, project 658. These boats were imperfect and rarely went to service at first. But together with the Tupolev and Myasishchev bombers, this was already a serious deterrent. If only because a nuclear strike by several submarines, without even inflicting fatal losses on the United States, temporarily destroyed radio communications and made radar impossible. And, as a consequence, it created the possibility of a breakthrough by bombers. Even without knowing whether the USSR was planning something like this or not, the Americans simply could not ignore these factors in their actions.


Patrol areas for diesel submarines of Project 629 and the first atomic project 658. Source of the scheme: www.nukestrat.com

And this became the very insurance, thanks to which we first reached parity.

By the end of the sixties, the US PLO made a breakthrough in its development, the SOSUS system appeared, tracking our noisy submarines became easier, but the Navy already had a Project 667A with missiles with a range of 2400 km, capable of attacking the United States from the middle of the Atlantic. The Americans also tracked these boats. But then the quantity factor arose - old boats continued to go to services too.


Patrol areas of the project 667A. Scheme source: www.nukestrat.com

Now the principle “do not overheat everyone” began to work.

The Strategic Missile Forces now had enough missiles. But it was also necessary to provide a guaranteed retaliatory strike if the enemy could destroy most of the missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces on the ground. And this was done by the fleet - in full accordance with the ideas that were promulgated later by S.G. Gorshkov in his famous book.

Soon, the Cold War took on the form in which we remember it. The same tense underwater confrontation, sung by the same Tom Clancy, albeit in a grotesque "cranberry" manner and with a strong distortion of real facts, but with a very accurate transfer of the spirit of the era, the tension that accompanied everything then.

That is why the question can be posed - is it so bad that Gorshkov was, in fact, a politician in uniform?

Wouldn't happen that we would have done more tanks, would you find another person in his post, more direct and principled? Or would you set up a "coastal defense force"?

And what would have happened to the country if, in the hot years between the Cuban missile crisis and the first hundred ICBMs on alert (then, by the way, the United States had already fought "communism" in Indochina and had a huge grudge against us), the "peaceful sky" over the heads of Soviet workers would not insure naval submarines with ballistic missiles on board?

Our doctrine of nuclear deterrence has not changed since the days of S.G. Gorshkov.

SSBNs still have to provide a guarantee of a retaliatory strike in the worst scenario for the country. How this is done today is a separate issue. And the answer is very sad. But the fact is, we haven't come up with anything new since then.

But it’s not all about nuclear deterrence.

On December 15, 1971, in the midst of the Indo-Pakistani war, the US Navy Task Force 74 entered the Bay of Bengal, consisting of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise and ten other ships. Formally, the United States declared its goal of helping Pakistan to evacuate its troops from the territory of present-day Bangladesh. In practice, the compound was supposed to put pressure on India up to direct entry into hostilities.

The Indians suspected something. But then what could they do against such a force?

It is known today that the Indian Air Force had by that time selected a detachment of forty experienced pilots who were to launch an airstrike on the aircraft carrier "Enterprise" if the Americans entered the hostilities. The pilots were initially explained that they would not have a chance to return from this departure, but their families would be properly taken care of - for then India this was not the norm in all cases.

But nothing of the kind was needed - the USSR Navy by that time had several ships in the Indian Ocean and one diesel submarine. In addition, the formation of the missile cruiser pr.1134 "Vladivostok", BOD pr.61 "Strogiy" and two submarines (one with cruise missiles pr.675 "K-31", and the second torpedo pr.641 "B-112" ) left Vladivostok to help India.

It is still unclear what other forces the Navy had in the Indian Ocean at that time. Indian, and with them, American sources indicate that the aircraft carrier group of the US Navy was at the sight of the SSGN pr. 675, which had anti-ship cruise missiles with a nuclear warhead on board. And supposedly it thwarted all American plans. Our sources do not confirm this. But the personal statement of S.G. Gorshkov that it was all the same.

One way or another, the actions of the Navy then had a strategic effect that continues to affect relations between Russia and India to this day.

Here is what the Commodore wrote (the rank is higher than our captain of the 1st rank, but lower than the rear admiral, there is no analogue of this rank in the Russian Navy) Indian Navy, retired Ranjit Rai, about the importance that the Navy created by Gorshkov and he personally played in the formation of the Indian Navy (link, eng.):

"The old-timers of the Indian Navy still recognize him as the architect who laid the foundations for today's powerful Indian fleet."


In another Indian article, former intelligence officer Shishir Upadhiyaya directly refers to S.G. Gorshkov "The Father of the Indian Fleet." (link, eng.)

Few people remember today, but in that famous attack of missile boats on the port of Karachi, Indian commanders conducted radio communications in Russian so that Pakistanis, who could intercept their radio communications, would not understand what they were doing.

And the story about the cruise missile submarine that drove away the American aircraft carrier group from India will now forever remain in Indian history, regardless of how it really was there.

And this is also Gorshkov. And the relations with India that our country still has was largely ensured not only by Soviet diplomacy (although it would be deeply wrong to deny the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and diplomats), but also by Soviet naval capabilities, which were created largely in accordance with ideas of Admiral Gorshkov.

But the "high point" of the Navy was another crisis - in the Mediterranean Sea in 1973, caused by the outbreak of the next, fourth Arab-Israeli war.

Then, in order to prevent open US intervention in the conflict on the side of Israel and the Americans to disrupt the tasks of supplying the Arab armies, the need to transfer Soviet troops to Egypt was considered, which by the end of the war was more than real and for which the USSR was intensively preparing. It was assumed that Soviet naval strike groups and submarines with anti-ship cruise missiles would take American forces at gunpoint. In the same unique style. And by providing continuous tracking with weapons, they will make active military operations impossible for the enemy.

The format of the article does not allow retelling the course of those events even briefly. Moreover, they are described in the press in sufficient detail. All interested are invited to familiarize themselves with the essay "The Yom Kippur War 1973. The confrontation between the fleets of the USSR and the USA at sea" on A. Rozin's website and with a different description of the same events “The fifth squadron of the USSR Navy against the 6th US fleet. 1973 Mediterranean Crisis " from the magazine "Science and technology".
Minor contradictions in the texts are due to the lack of open documents, but the general course of events, the intensity of the situation that took place in those years, both essays convey very well.

Below is a diagram of the deployment of Soviet forces in the region in those days, reconstructed from open sources.


As you can see, the naval strike groups are kept at a certain distance from the US Navy, without entering the zones over which cruise missiles from submarines will go. The effect of that operation was simply devastating. For the first time, the United States realized that it might not win the war at sea. And it terrified them.

But the Soviet forces did not have a numerical superiority.

But they had the upper hand in the volley.

And they could have fired this volley first.

Read more about the value of this in the article. "The Reality of Missile Volleys: A Little About Military Superiority".

It would not be wrong to make the following statement: it was in the mid-seventies that the Soviet Navy reached its peak of development.

Exactly. Even before the nuclear cruisers and the SSGN of project 949A, before the submarines of the 971 project and before the massive arrival of the Tu-22M3 in naval aviation.

It was 1973-1980, when the Navy provided the maximum return on investment in itself. During this period, with his help, the USSR pursued a really active and effective foreign policy.

You can also recall the deployment of the fleet in the South China Sea during the war between China and Vietnam in 1979. And the operation to put pressure on Thailand (see article "Aircraft-carrying cruisers and Yak-38: retrospective analysis and lessons").

Why was it this way?

Because the Navy had a doctrine of combat use, which made it possible to influence the situation without slipping into open military operations. Including influencing a stronger opponent. In fact, while Gorshkov wrote that the Navy and other types of the Armed Forces have only a general strategy, in reality, he was implementing a completely separate naval strategy, which had little to do with what the ground forces or the air force were doing at that moment.

Your strategy.


And it provided the country with foreign policy advantages and security. And the fleet, developing within its framework, became an increasingly important factor in world politics.

You can go even further and say that the USSR was made a superpower not so much by economic power (Germany also has it) and not by tens of thousands of tanks and millions of soldiers (China also had them in the early 60s, but it was not a superpower in the full sense) of this definition). The USSR superpower jointly made the ideology in demand at that time, the nuclear missile arsenal, cosmonautics and the navy with a global reach. Moreover, the role of the fleet was no less than that of other factors.

And this is also the legacy of Gorshkov, which few people in our country think about today.

But everything in the world comes to an end.

The decline and fall of the Great Fleet


Created under conditions of a mass of political, ideological and industrial constraints, the navy had a lot of structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

So, in the conditions of the USSR, for a variety of reasons, it was impossible to achieve technological parity with the United States in those areas in which the United States seriously invested, and it was impossible at the cost of any investment.

Because in addition to money and resources, a comparable intellectual and organizational level was needed. Which country, which in 1917 had much less than half of the literate population, simply could not provide. There was nowhere in the USSR to take the school of management, intellectuals capable of pointing out the right or wrong paths of development, politicians, capable of subordinating their vision of the issue to expert assessments. On a systematic basis, not sometimes.

Poverty and the inability to allocate resources comparable to the United States for development fell on top of this problem. And also the initial technical lag from the West, which has not gone anywhere.

And for the implementation of the tasks of the same nuclear deterrence, it was necessary just a lot of missile submarines. The ships were also needed quickly.

As a result, imbalances began to emerge. We are building submarines, but we cannot catch up with the United States in secrecy, which means that we need to have many submarines so that they simply do not keep up with everyone. We are investing in shipbuilding, we build with strain for the economy, but there is no longer enough for repair capacity. As a result, boats and ships do not take care of their resource, but they still need a lot, which means they need to be built further. And they will still remain without repairs.

Added to this was the influence of the industry, which wanted budgets.

The voluntarism of politicians and ideological clichés such as "aircraft carriers are a weapon of aggression" and similar clichés did not allow building a truly balanced fleet.

The same voluntarism left Soviet ships without artillery. If, for example, a battleship in an American battle group had survived an exchange of missile strikes, and Soviet ships would have had to fight with it at best with 76-mm cannons (except for Stalin's projects - 68K, 68bis, and pre-war cruisers), there would not be enough speed to escape. This, incidentally, was the personal merit of Khrushchev.

The very organization of the Soviet system of orders for weapons added complexity.

In the USA, for example, the navy orders its own aviation on its own, starting from its specific naval requirements. The Marine Corps also independently determines its technical policy. The Air Force purchases the aircraft they need. IUDs are the ones they need. The Marines do not buy the Bradley BMP, like the army does, but buy specially designed amphibious transporters, etc.

This was impossible in the USSR. Since a new bomber was being created, at best, some of the requirements of the Navy could be taken into account in its development. The marines received the same armored vehicles as the ground forces, etc.

In the same Naval Missile Aviation, at first it turned out that after the Air Force, it began to receive aircraft of the Tu-22M family. Then, the MPA was left without refueling in the air, since the Tu-22M was refueled using the “hose-cone” system, and not with the help of wing refueling, which, with a reduced combat radius in comparison with the Tu-16, unexpectedly cut its shock capabilities. It was simply impossible to raise the question of a special naval strike aircraft in those years. The organizational specificity was such that this question could not even be born.

It was also impossible to leave in production the Tu-16 with the updated avionics and special naval weapons. The Air Force was responsible for ordering such aircraft. And they had their own requirements.


Refusal to continue the evolution of the Tu-16 for the Navy was, apparently, a mistake.

The missile-carrying aviation itself, on the one hand, turned out to be an unprecedentedly successful tool - it made it possible to increase the missile salvo at times when the USSR could not yet afford to build numerous missile ships. And build up quickly. She immediately provided the opportunity for a quick inter-theater maneuver, which other naval forces did not possess. But by the 80s it became clear that this is a very expensive instrument.

There were also mistakes, sometimes very expensive ones.

The same project 705 submarine, which M. Klimov wrote well in the article "Goldfish of Project 705: Mistake or Breakthrough into the XXI Century".

The stake on "a pistol at the temple of imperialism" required not only winning the fight for the first salvo, it needed this salvo to be powerful enough so that no air defense system could repulse it. This raised the question of the number of missiles in the strike, and, consequently, their number on the carriers. And since the missiles were huge, theoretically a situation could arise when they simply would not be enough.

There were a lot of such examples. And they all created vulnerabilities that there was nothing to compensate for.

But for the time being, Gorshkov's successful strategy covered it up.

In the late seventies, however, there was a turning point. And on both sides of the ocean.

The Americans, seriously frightened by 1973, made a firm decision to take revenge. And the nation has dedicated the lion's share of its efforts to this revenge. The Americans hit in two directions.

The first was the creation of the overwhelming technical (and then based on it, qualitative) superiority of its own Navy. It was within the framework of this work that Los Angeles-class submarines, Ticonderoga missile cruisers, AEGIS air defense / missile defense system, F-14 interceptors, Mk.41 vertical missile launchers, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Spruens destroyers appeared. From there grow the roots of American communications systems and automated command and control of forces and assets in the theater of operations. From the same place - and super effective anti-submarine defense.

AEGIS has become a separate issue. Now the Navy needed much more missiles to penetrate the defenses created by ships with this BIUS. And then it meant more speakers. It was not for nothing that a poster was hung on the first ship with this system - the missile cruiser "Ticonderoga"

"Get ready, Admiral Gorshkov:" Aegis at sea "

(Stand by adm. Gorshkov: Aegis at sea).

This was really the problem.

At the turn of the 70s and 80s, Americans seriously believed that in order to protect their Western capitalist way of life, they would have to fight the atheist communists. And fight seriously. They were preparing precisely for an offensive war, for the last war. And we prepared really seriously.

But gaining quality superiority was only one side of the coin.

Its second side was the increase in the number of forces.

How to prevent a Soviet strike group from hanging at the tail of each battle group?

It's simple - you need to make sure that the Russians do not have enough ships.

And they went for that too.

The first sign was the most massive post-war warship - the frigate of the "Oliver Hazard Perry" class, designed to give the mass necessary for "stumbling" the Russians. Later (already under Reagan) battleships returned to service. There was the question of returning the Oriskani aircraft carrier to service.

More about "Perry" - "The frigate" Perry "as a lesson for Russia: machine-designed, massive and cheap".

Most importantly, the Tomahawks appeared.

The USSR air defense got a chance to intercept such missiles only with the massive appearance of the MiG-31 interceptors and the S-300 air defense systems. Before that, there was simply nothing to intercept them. It was necessary to destroy the carriers, but now this required winning large-scale naval battles - the US Navy greatly increased both in quantity and quality.



Launch of the Tomahawk missile launcher from the Mk.143 launcher, aka ABL - armored box launcher and these launchers on the deck of a missile cruiser.


Battleship "Iowa". The symbol of American pressure from the 80s. 32 KR "Tomahawk", 16 anti-ship missiles "Harpoon", UAVs for artillery reconnaissance, modern control and communications systems of the Navy. And 406-mm guns, in case the anti-ship missiles are used up, but there is still someone to sink. These ships remained in combat until the very end, and their last war was the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

In addition, the question arose, what to do with the underwater media? To cope with which the USSR could not in any way.

All this was superimposed on the fact that the Americans have invested huge intellectual resources in tactics, in achieving superiority in the art of war. In the seventies, it was not entirely and not always clear what to do with the tracking of weapons by the USSR Navy.

In the eighties, a well-established standard scheme appeared for this:

“The Worthy, assigned by the direct tracking ship, hung at the aft heading angles of AVMA America - it took 5 days to complete the combat mission.

The task consisted in the continuous issuance of the control center to the command post of the Navy via AVMA, the continuity had a discreteness of 15 minutes, the issuance was in the form of a telegram "rocket" containing information about the place / course / speed of the AVMA and the nature of the order.

Fuel and water were slowly and surely spent - it was time to think about refueling, but in the process of tracking a possible massive takeoff of aviation from AVMA, Worthy went west pretty decently, leaving the Dniester at 52 points in the Salum Bay. "


“The telegram was being prepared, the gauges paced the map, marking the boundaries of the depletion of fuel supplies, and night fell on the Ionian Sea, scattering an incredible number of stars on the black southern sky.

The silhouettes of the ships of the AVMA order disappeared, navigation lights flashed in their place.


"The drowsy situation on the undercarriage was violated by the signalman's report:" The ships of the warrant turned off the running lights, "and after a while reports from the BIP began to arrive on the rebuilding of the ships of the warrant, the metrists fussed, putting on the LODs tablets - a picturesque group of chiefs in blue shorts crowded around the radar screens trying to understand what is the meaning of these close encounters. Out of 6 targets, there were five ... four ... three ... Instead of 6 neat marks, one hundred percent identified, three hefty plaques stuck out on the radar screens, which, among other things, also began to diverge in different directions, increasing the speed before our eyes!

The team in the SEE was late for launching the second sustainer, and then afterburners - the distance between us and the blamb, in which, according to our calculations, AVMA was, grew noticeably quickly - 60, 70, 100 cables, - the blamb rushed 28th, no, 30 ty! no 32 nodes! The plaque split into 150 cables, and both components continued to move in different directions. I must say that at such a distance it is impossible to identify the marks on the radar by size, and for which of them to continue moving, while sending telegrams with the coordinates of the symbol of American sea power - God knows ...

Nevertheless, four vehicles whistled, the ship's hull was filled with tremors, the speed on the log was approaching 32 knots: "Behind him!" - Zharinov pointed a finger at one of the specks spreading at the limit of radar observability. And we rushed off. Good luck. And they raced all night to make sure in the pre-dawn haze that this was not an AVMA America, but an integrated supply ship - almost as hefty. "

Source.

The outcome of history should not deceive - the Americans have worked out the gap.

In a combat situation, they really got off the hook, for example, when they hit Libya in 1986.

Schemes that allowed a slower ship to break away from tracking in the afternoon were also. The Americans have brought the art of their commanders to heights that they themselves cannot achieve today. And, alas, we were not ready for this.

Coupled with superior Western technology, aggressive willingness to fight, and numerical superiority, this made the US Navy an enemy of a completely different level than they were in the 70s.

The most important thing was knocking out of the Navy's arsenal of its most important trump card - the SSBN. It was in the 80s that the Americans reached such a level of development of their anti-submarine forces and submarine, which called the viability of our strategic missile carriers into question. And this seriously devalued the fleet as such, because by that time the protection of the areas where the SSBN was located was one of its main tasks.

In fact, the Americans brought their combat power and combat readiness to a level that apparently told Soviet leaders that it would be simply useless to resist, if anything. That is, the Americans, preparing to fight exactly, did it in such a way that they demonstrated to the USSR the hopelessness of a military confrontation at sea.

But (an important point) this was not the introduction of a conceptually new strategy.

The American response was extensive - more ships, better equipment and weapons, "pump" tactics to the limit, remove SSBNs to "bastions" in the North Atlantic and the Gulf of Alaska. This, however, was not an ideological revolution in naval affairs.

They decided to win Gorshkov's strategy "head-on" - stupidly investing more resources in everything, and making stricter measures to save them. The Americans could not defeat her "beautifully". They did this by overwhelming the Soviet fleet with mass and suppressing quality at the same time. Without the "mass" it wouldn't have worked.

Americans in the early 80s showed a spasmodic increase in aggressiveness, driven by their belief in the need to fight communism to the death to save America. And a thirst for revenge for Vietnam and the 70s.

They were ready exactly fight.

Second point. Since the early 80s, the Reagan administration's Maritime Strategy has also come under the control of intelligence. And detailed information about the moods of those who are in this administration. And the mood there was exactly the military. Today it is generally accepted that Reagan was bluffing, trying to ruin the USSR in the arms race. This is true.

But in addition to bluffing, sometime before 1986, when the Americans had a feeling that these communists would soon "fall down," they were really going to wage a nuclear war with its inherent huge losses. And lead her to victory.

Theoretically, at this moment, Gorshkov should have understood a simple thing - the increase in the number of enemy forces would not allow him to act as before. There just won't be enough ships. And the quality gap is too big. And, in addition, the enemy is no longer stopped by the threat to receive a missile salvo - he is determined to fight. He will take this volley. He will lose hundreds of ships and thousands of people. And then he will continue to fight. And his numerical superiority will provide him with the necessary amount of forces left after the first exchange of blows.

And this meant one simple thing - a strategy that was based on the fact that the enemy will not want bear these losses does not work when he is with these losses agree... Moreover, when he is to them готов.

In the late 70s and early 80s, the USSR needed a new naval strategy. But her appearance was impossible.

It is impossible because the first, successful one, was used unofficially - well, there was no possibility in the USSR even to pronounce the word "sea strategy".

It is impossible because the old de facto existing strategy was then successful and it continued to be adhered to by inertia until the very collapse.
Impossible because the industry demanded an extensive response to American actions - are they building more ships? We should too. And more submarines and more aircraft.

The military mentality of the WWII veterans, who then constituted a significant proportion of the representatives of the supreme power, also worked. Is the enemy pressing? We accept the fight, we will win as we did then.

As a result, the country entered into an arms race with a united West, without even close to having comparable resources. And there was simply no one to assess the long-term consequences of this approach.

In the late seventies - early eighties, the USSR began to give an extensive response to the Americans - new destroyers, new BODs, new submarines, new ballistic missiles. The answer to their every challenge.

Are you a Tomahawk for us? We give you a MiG-31.

Are you AEGIS? We are a series of missile cruisers (two projects at once) and a series of SSGNs, and Tu-22M, and new missiles.

And so at all levels.

A program to build aircraft carriers began, which was thirty years late.

And then there was the introduction of troops into Afghanistan, sanctions and a collapse in oil prices, which dramatically "released the air" from the oil-dependent Soviet economy. The efforts of Gorbachev's reformers finished off both the economy and the country over the next few years.

In the mid-eighties, the USSR found itself in a situation where investments in the Navy (huge) did not help it maintain any kind of parity with the Americans: neither qualitative nor quantitative. Gorshkov's old strategy (so successful in the 70s) turned out to be a bat.

And he did not come up with a new one.

And nobody came up with it.

But in the 70s, the United States also had a numerical superiority. It's just not like that. But there wasn't that overwhelming quality. Then the American superiority was beaten by a competent strategy. In the 80s, the weak USSR, instead of the same unexpected move, made an attempt to play by the rules of a rich and strong opponent.

Since 1986, the Navy has begun to collapse its presence in the world, to reduce the PMTO and bases.

This was due to the fact that the USSR really began to prepare to repel the Western invasion and pulled forces to its territory. And also by the fact that the Americans really pressed the sea and very hard. And it was clear that it would not be possible to cope with them using conventional methods.

The economy was staggering, there was not enough money. Combat readiness was falling, ships and submarines were waiting for repairs. And didn't get it or got fiction.

Gorshkov retired in 1985.

He died in 1988.

But he saw the end of his creation. End of the Great Fleet.

I wonder if he understood where he was wrong?

We won't know. But it is our duty to understand this now. Because soon we will also face challenges on the seas. And no one will wait when we collect our thoughts and figure out what to do.

Was it possible to create a new, more adequate strategy for the development of the Navy then, in the early 80s?

Probably yes.

And the military had a request for change - the scale of the rearmament being deployed by the Americans was obvious, as was the growth of their aggressiveness at sea. But nothing was done. Both the country and its fleet have sunk into oblivion forever.

There is still an opinion that the collapse of the fleet is the nineties. In an extreme case, the times of Gorbachev.

No, it is not.

Everything started to die much earlier.

Here are two stories about the combat service of the same submarine K-258, only one about 1973, and second about 1985... They are short. And they are truly worth reading.

This was the case at all levels.

The mistake was the very attempt to compete numerically with the United States, and not oppose them with a subtle game for which they would not be ready.

And this mistake became irreparable.

Heritage


We still live on the legacy of the old admiral.

We ensure the inevitability of a retaliatory strike against the United States (in words so far) by submarines carrying ballistic missiles. As under Gorshkov.

We keep them in areas we consider protected. Because then they did it.

Our fleet is preparing, if anything, to ensure the deployment of SSBNs by all means, as under Gorshkov. Because we believe in the ability of our missile submarines to stop the enemy with the threat of launching their missiles, as under Gorshkov.

We thoughtlessly copy the decisions of those old times, building submarines with a large number of Yasenei-M anti-ship missiles. Not because this is what is needed now. But because we did it under Gorshkov. And the tactical and technical assignment for the "Ash" was also signed by Gorshkov.

We know that basic strike aircraft are the only way to maneuver between theaters in a defensive naval war. Because then, in those years, we had such an aircraft. Now she's gone. But at least we know about what it should be. And about what she gives. Because she was with us and gave it to us under Gorshkov. And then some time.

We know how to give us an answer to the geographical closure of our exits to the sea - by deploying forces in the ocean in advance. We know this because we had operational squadrons - OPESK. And we remember how it was invented and worked under Gorshkov.


Areas of deployment of Soviet operational squadrons.

We know that distant foreign naval bases in our case are also needed for the defense of their territory. As was the case under Gorshkov, when OPESK provided the advance deployment of forces in peacetime, and the bases allowed these squadrons to rely on themselves in deployment. We are the opposite of others. And the base in Vietnam will help us defend the Kurils much better than the base on the Kuriles themselves. As under Gorshkov.


Nuclear submarine in Cam Ranh

Our fleet is a shred of his fleet.

Still not killed from the past cataclysms. What's left.

He is not just small, he is crippled.

His target designation was "torn off", but tactical schemes were not invented that would make it possible to do without the "Legend", "Success" and dozens of high-speed patrolmen, which can be assigned to the enemy's battle group in peacetime.

He still cannot make up for the losses in warships without losing size, tonnage and the capabilities they give.

We patch holes.

By building frigates instead of retiring cruisers, destroyers and BODs. Corvettes with 24-26 nodal speed instead of high-speed SKR capable of keeping up with the nuclear aircraft carrier. And drawing pictures instead of aircraft carrying cruisers.

Yes, our frigates are more powerful than the old cruisers in some respects. But these are still frigates. We are building them not because we need them just like that, but simply this is the maximum that we can build.

We don't have a strategy like Gorshkov did. And we build ships just like that. Without her. Some - very good results. Others, however, are so-so.

This fleet has no purpose.

And when there is no goal, then there are no criteria for what is right and what is wrong.

Is it right to build unarmed ships with the last money?

Not? And where did you get the idea that not?

True, since 1985 we have learned something new. Now we have cruise missiles and vertical launchers, like the Americans under Gorshkov. Thirty years after Gorshkov's resignation, we applied them. But this is still all from completely new things, there is nothing else. They promise hypersound, but it is without a control center. Oh yes, they also tried to fight with an aircraft carrier, it turned out - so-so. But this is not about the aircraft carrier ...

What was the success of the Navy under the leadership of S.G. Gorshkov in the 70s?

In the unity of the political goals facing the country, the tasks that the fleet had to solve in order to achieve them, with a strategy corresponding to these tasks and with a technical policy corresponding to this strategy.


Complete unity, which was born despite the position of a significant part of the military-political leadership. But in the end it led to a resounding success.

At the same time, the fleet acted offensively - the submarines broke through into the ocean and dispersed there. The missile ships chased the enemy to provide the naval forces with the opportunity to deliver, if necessary, a fatal blow.

Surprisingly, in many ways this became so because Gorshkov himself decided so. And not because of objective circumstances. It is a fact.

What caused the failure of the Navy in the 80s?

An attempt to outplay a stronger opponent extensively without creating a new strategy capable of reducing his superiority in forces to zero, as it did before.

The navy then began to slide towards the defense. Submarines with SLBMs became huge, expensive and few in number. It was no longer possible to arrange "melee" on them in the Atlantic. I had to go under my own bank, into and around protected areas of combat operations. And the enemy seized the initiative.

And we lost.

We lost because Gorshkov could no longer do what he once did. And we did not find a new figure of this level. This is also a fact.

Everything was decided by the strategy in both cases. In one case - adequate, and in the other - not.

And this is the most important lesson that we can learn from the heritage of S.G. Gorshkov.

We can, but we can't stand it.

Yes, OPESK and preliminary deployment, aviation (as the main striking force) remained with us. And, probably, they will return sometime.

If the Americans, who are going to a new assault on the heights of world domination, do not kill us earlier because of our stupidity.

But the main lesson is different - our strategy, for which the enemy is not ready, beats his superiority in strength... Moreover, it also beats our inner weaknesses and vulnerabilities, reducing their significance to zero. We have seen this. We did it and we won. But they didn’t understand anything.

This is what we must understand and realize at last. This is the main thing that S.G. Gorshkov by his service and life.

Yes, then in the end he lost.

But first, he showed us all that we can win.

And if we ever again create a strategy for which the enemy is not ready, then it will again give us a chance of winning - with all our weaknesses and with all the overwhelming (seemingly) superiority of the enemy. As under Gorshkov.


Will we ever realize all this?
Author:
319 comments
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  1. Thrifty
    Thrifty 26 February 2021 05: 03
    +11
    Alexander, then at least the fleet was more or less combat-ready, but now only a collection of ships, often without means of self-defense from the air. And, eternal long-term construction, with the postponement of the delivery date for years ahead.
    1. Oden280
      Oden280 26 February 2021 11: 10
      +2
      The article is interesting, only the author either out of ignorance of the material or deliberately distorts the facts. for example: "In the same Naval Missile Aviation, at first it turned out that, after the Air Force, it began to receive aircraft of the Tu-22M family. Then, the MPA was left without refueling in the air, since the Tu-22M was refueled using the hose-cone system, and not with the help of wing refueling, which, with a reduced combat radius in comparison with the Tu-16, unexpectedly cut its striking capabilities. It was simply impossible to raise the question of a special naval strike aircraft in those years. The organizational specificity was such that this issue could not even be be born. "
      Since 16, all combat tankers Tu - 1971 have been converted into Tu - 16 N or NN with a "cone-rod" filling system.
      Further: "For example, BODs of project 1155 were left without the ability to strike at surface targets. As earlier BODs (later reclassified in SKR) of projects 61 and 1135."
      Ships of projects 1155 and 1135 were armed with URK-5 "Rastrub-B" (PLUR 85RU), which allowed its use both on submarines and on NK. The M-1 Volna air defense system has a mode of operation for surface targets.
      And there are a lot of such bugs in the article, which may indicate deliberate misinformation of readers.
      1. timokhin-aa
        26 February 2021 11: 33
        +8
        Your comments are usually so empty and stupid that I ignore you, but since you tried to write something meaningful this time, I will answer. In order:

        Since 16, all combat tankers Tu - 1971 have been converted into Tu - 16 N or NN with a "cone-rod" filling system.


        Lie, only 20 aircraft from the Air Force were converted, there were no such machines in the naval aviation.

        Ships of projects 1155 and 1135 were armed with URK-5 "Rastrub-B" (PLUR 85RU), which allowed its use both on submarines and on NK.


        According to NK, strictly theoretically, the real possibility of using PLUR for NK in a combat situation was not even considered, the issuance of a central control unit for NTS to this complex was very complicated, the guidance system did not allow to lock the target at a long distance from the combat path of the PLUR, which excluded the possibility of firing at a maneuvering the ship was full, in addition, the range was so impermissibly small. The enemy worked on NK with aviation, the rapprochement with his ships at the launch range of the PLUR or SAM was unrealistic, the defeat of the target, subject to a successful rapprochement, even more so.

        So you are doing deliberate misinformation here.
        1. Oden280
          Oden280 26 February 2021 16: 14
          -3
          20 aircraft were converted into the Tu-16NN variant with the possibility of refueling both the cone-bar and wing-wing. And in the Navy they were converted only into the TU-16N version. Learn materiel.
          "Rastrub-B" was originally intended for a dual purpose. With the direct accompaniment of the AUG, the distance was quite normal for the complex. The preparation time is only 15 seconds. The issuance of target designation was carried out by the MGK-355 "Polynom" SJSC with a detection range of 50 km.
          1. timokhin-aa
            26 February 2021 18: 20
            +3
            20 aircraft were converted into the Tu-16NN version with the ability to refuel both the cone-bar and wing-wing. And in the Navy they were converted only into the TU-16N version.


            Again a lie. Is it seasonal or what?

            Regarding the hydroacoustics and the range of the Polynomial - you just don't understand what you are carrying. This range depended on hydrological conditions and ship speed.

            If the target was cooked at 25 knots, and it was necessary to follow it with the same speed so that at the time of the order to strike it was not lost, then what kind of Polynomial can we talk about?

            You are insane, citizen. Stop.
            1. Oden280
              Oden280 27 February 2021 00: 02
              +1
              Go teach the subject, and do not foul the brains of people with your delitanism.
              The polynomial worked just at speeds up to 25 knots. And this is the submarine range. On surface ships many times farther.
              And about the madness, I advise you to look in the mirror, there you will see the patient out of madness.
              1. timokhin-aa
                27 February 2021 00: 31
                0
                Go teach the subject, and do not foul the brains of people with your delitanism.


                Let's name the number of sides that have been altered? Can you? How many are in the Air Force, how many are in the MA, in which regiments? Here in the VO there are quite high-ranking officers from there, and from there, incl. those whom these planes refueled. It will be possible to check you.
                Want to?

                The polynomial worked just at speeds up to 25 knots.


                Yes? And at 26? 27? And if the target is stopped, then how? Did the range depend on the type of hydrology in the OBD area or not? From depth, bottom structure, water temperature?
                You do not understand anything in this matter, why are you letting go of such mediocre comments?

                And about the madness, I advise you to look in the mirror


                It seems to you that you are so directly convincing in your ridiculous and pathetic attempts to leave the last word for yourself.
                But actually no.
                1. Oden280
                  Oden280 27 February 2021 00: 50
                  +1
                  A total of 114 TU-16 tankers were built. During the development of the Tu-22 refueling system from the Tu-16N in the Long-Range Aviation units, a number of shortcomings were identified.Therefore, in 1970, the Air Force and MAP made a joint decision to refine the system, in particular, install FR-100 headlights to illuminate the refueling zone. At the beginning of 1971, the Tu-16N 1882202, with modifications, was tested at the Air Force Research Institute of the Air Force, after which all combat tankers were altered. Have you seen the word EVERYONE?
                  Of these 114 vehicles, 22 were converted into TU-16NN.
                  What does the depth, bottom structure, water temperature have to do with it? We are talking about SUPERWATER ships. And the faster they go, the more they make noise.
                  Go further on zen and swim.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
                  2. The comment was deleted.
                    1. Oden280
                      Oden280 28 February 2021 15: 50
                      +2
                      Especially for a stubborn person who cannot read. 20 cars are modification of НН, and the rest, about 100 cars are modification of НН.
                      Polynomial does not detect sound, but works with sound, both in active mode, sonar, and in passive mode, target sound. 50 km is the detection of submarines in active mode. surface ships, and even at high speeds, make a noise so that they can be heard by modern complexes for hundreds of kilometers.
                      1. timokhin-aa
                        28 February 2021 18: 59
                        -1
                        Especially for die-hard commentators.
                        Still, there is on the Internet, why lie?

                        u-16N along the fuselage from below was applied a red stripe. The entire system was worked out on the Tu-16 No.1882401, and since 1963, at the aircraft plant No.22, several vehicles were converted into a new tanker, designated Tu-16N or product "NN".

                        During the development of the Tu-22 refueling system from the Tu-16N in the Long-Range Aviation units, a number of shortcomings were identified.Therefore, in 1970, the Air Force and MAP made a joint decision to refine the system, in particular, install FR-100 headlights to illuminate the refueling zone. At the beginning of 1971, Tu-16N No.1882202, with modifications, was tested at the Air Force Research Institute of the Air Force, after which all combat tankers were altered.

                        Tu-16NN - this designation was given to Tu-16 (3), reequipped in 1969 according to the "cone-rod" system. At the same time, the equipment for cleaning and releasing the fuel hose of the wing filling system, a consumable fuel tank and lighting equipment for this system, as well as the PU-88 cannon installation were dismantled. A new consumable fuel tank with pumps, new lighting equipment, control and monitoring equipment for the refueling process, radio communication equipment were installed again. Externally, the Tu-16NN differed from the Tu-16N only in aerodynamic washers on the wingtips left over from the Tu-16 (3), and duralumin pads in the places of the removed lighting equipment of the previous system. Therefore, in the Air Force and in many documents, both aircraft were called the same - Tu-16N. In total, 16 vehicles were modified in the Tu-20NN.


                        The main question is how many of them were in the Naval Aviation. Why are you so diligently avoiding this question, citizen lover not tossing bags?

                        I will not even comment on your nonsense on hydroacoustics.
                        Answer how many Tu-16 tankers got into the naval aviation and in which regiments, balabol
                2. Oden280
                  Oden280 27 February 2021 01: 02
                  +1
                  By the way, almost all TU-16 tankers were quickly decommissioned in the early 80s, after the refueling rods were removed from the TU-22 in accordance with the 1 START-1979 agreement
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    28 February 2021 19: 01
                    0
                    By the way, balabolka, why do we ignore the question of how many tankers converted into "N / NN" ended up in Mro Aviation? Nothing to say.
              2. old gnome
                old gnome 28 February 2021 21: 22
                0
                dilettante ... dilettantism ..... in passing ?????
        2. Lozovik
          Lozovik 28 February 2021 21: 39
          0
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          Lie, only 20 aircraft from the Air Force were converted, there were no such machines in the naval aviation.

          Alas, you are lying. 16 Tu-831 bombers were modified into the Tu-24N version with the KAZ-16 complex refueling unit. 16 Tu-20Z tankers have been modified into the Tu-16NN version.

          Quote: timokhin-aa
          In the same Naval Missile Aviation, at first it turned out that, after the Air Force, it began to receive aircraft of the Tu-22M family. Then, that the MPA was left without refueling in the air, since the Tu-22Ms were refueled using the "hose-cone" system, and not using wing refueling

          It's funny at all. Are you going to refuel the entire division? This is, for a minute, 45 aircraft.

          Quote: timokhin-aa
          that with a reduced combat radius in comparison with the Tu-16, it unexpectedly cut its striking capabilities.

          Again, not true. Tu-22M2 with X-22M Dprakt. = 5100 km, Tu-16K-26 with KSR Dprakt. = 3900 km (where does the range come from if the takeoff weight of the "replenished" aircraft is still the same 79 tons?). And these very "strike capabilities" are not measured by a single radius, compare the navigation and missile systems.
          1. timokhin-aa
            1 March 2021 11: 19
            +2
            Alas, you are lying. 16 Tu-831 bombers were modified into the Tu-24N version with the KAZ-16 complex refueling unit. 16 Tu-20Z tankers have been modified into the Tu-16NN version.


            This is not a lie, this is a mistake, because I did not take into account that the bombers were also refitted, and not just the zaprachiki.
            How many got into naval aviation?

            It's funny at all. Are you going to refuel the entire division? This is, for a minute, 45 aircraft.


            Even one plane cannot be refueled without tankers. At least aerial reconnaissance, for example.

            Again, not true. Tu-22M2 with X-22M Dpract. = 5100 km, Tu-16K-26 with KSR Dpract. = 3900 km


            Only the Tu-16 can be refueled.
            1. Lozovik
              Lozovik 6 March 2021 22: 23
              0
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              This is not a lie, this is a mistake, because I did not take into account that the bombers were also refitted, and not just the zaprachiki.

              Why then bend your fingers? With your "knowledge"?

              Quote: timokhin-aa
              How many got into naval aviation?

              To get something "horrible", you first need to order something.

              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Even one plane cannot be refueled without tankers.

              How did the Tu-95RTs and Tu-142 refuel?

              Quote: timokhin-aa
              At least aerial reconnaissance, for example.

              The first sensible idea, you can refuel the RUG.

              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Only the Tu-16 can be refueled.

              Tu-22M2 too.
              1. timokhin-aa
                6 March 2021 23: 45
                0
                Why then bend your fingers? With your "knowledge"?


                The question was initially raised about the refurbishment of the refuellers that were available at that time.

                To get something "horrible", you first need to order something.


                What to order? Converted Air Force bombers?

                How did the Tu-95RTs and Tu-142 refuel?


                You yourself know. A counter question - would it be possible in the war, with the massive use of the Air Force bomber aircraft? I now suspect something that is not.

                The first sensible idea, you can refuel the RUG.


                It would be something.

                Tu-22M2 too.


                1. It would be what.
                2. The rods were also removed from the MRA aircraft later.

                Well, and returning to the beginning of the thread - refueling at the MPA by the mid-80s is a thing of the past, this is a fact.
                Whoever sang what and what.
                1. Lozovik
                  Lozovik 8 March 2021 22: 50
                  0
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  The question was initially raised about the refurbishment of the refuellers that were available at that time.

                  Tu-16Z at one time were also bombers, what is the fundamental difference?

                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  What to order?

                  Work on the Tu-16N was carried out by order of the Air Force, the fleet did not need such aircraft, as, incidentally, the Il-78.

                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Converted Air Force bombers?

                  The fleet had its own Tu-16 and Tu-16A.

                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  You yourself know. A counter question - would it be possible in the war, with the massive use of the Air Force bomber aircraft? I now suspect something that is not.

                  What kind of aviation is this? What tasks does it solve?

                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  1. It would be what.
                  2. The rods were also removed from the MRA aircraft later.

                  Have you finally remembered about Bulletin 2168? Only in the article there is only one reason.
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Then, that the MPA was left without refueling in the air, since the Tu-22Ms were refueled using the "hose-cone" system, and not using wing refueling
                  I don't see another in the article.

                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Well, and returning to the beginning of the thread - refueling at the MPA by the mid-80s is a thing of the past, this is a fact.
                  Whoever sang what and what.

                  This was inevitable, the Tu-80's life was coming to an end in the mid-16s. Tu-16N and Tu-16NN were removed from service altogether.
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    11 March 2021 18: 46
                    0
                    Work on the Tu-16N was carried out by order of the Air Force, the fleet did not need such aircraft, as, incidentally, the Il-78.


                    Well, what am I talking about?

                    What kind of aviation is this? What tasks does it solve?


                    Aren't you tired of clinging to every letter? Let me write "Dalnyaya". Will it go?

                    Only in the article there is only one reason.


                    The article is not the reason - the article is a fact. Tu-22M in MRA did not have refueling. It is a fact. The reasons there are completely different, in the human factor.

                    Not tired of clinging to letters?
                    1. Lozovik
                      Lozovik 21 March 2021 14: 37
                      0
                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      Well, what am I talking about?

                      The fact that the Tu-22M2 could not refuel only due to the lack of a wing-to-wing refueling system, that the Tu-16 with missiles had a larger tactical radius and that the MPA had reduced strike capabilities. Neither the first, nor the second, nor the third is true. About the "special naval aircraft" is also not true, it was created, but was not created.

                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      Aren't you tired of clinging to every letter? Let me write "Dalnyaya". Will it go?

                      Not tired. On the subject, do you know that refueling in the air is the most difficult type of preparation? That only a few of the commanding pilots were trained to refuel?
                      1. timokhin-aa
                        21 March 2021 16: 44
                        +1
                        And you are stubborn.
                        Okay, let's continue.
                        Here is a quote from my article, which we are discussing with you:

                        In the same Naval Missile Aviation, at first it turned out that, after the Air Force, it began to receive aircraft of the Tu-22M family. Then, that the MPA was left without refueling in the air, since the Tu-22M was refueled using the "hose-cone" system, and not with the help of wing refueling, which, with a reduced combat radius in comparison with the Tu-16, unexpectedly cut its shock capabilities.


                        Do you catch the logic? It makes no difference - the Air Force did for itself a "hose-cone" refueling for the Tu-16, this was not the case in the MRA.
                        Accordingly, the Tu-22M2 in the MPA were left without refueling.
                        This reduced their capabilities, because the Tu-16 could be refueled from tankers that the naval aviation had, but the Tu-22M did not. Then they dismantled the rods altogether.
                        What is not true in this?

                        On the subject, do you know that refueling in the air is the most difficult type of preparation?


                        Yes.

                        That only a few of the commanding pilots were trained to refuel?


                        Not. But there were a lot of crews capable of refueling in the air both in the Air Force and in the MA, even with this in mind.

                        About the "special naval aircraft" is also not true, it was created, but was not created.


                        And, that is, the question could still be raised? Well then, I will have to admit that I was wrong in posing the question, after you enlighten me about this plane.
                      2. Lozovik
                        Lozovik April 18 2021 23: 10
                        0
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Do you catch the logic? It makes no difference - the Air Force did for itself a "hose-cone" refueling for the Tu-16, this was not the case in the MRA.
                        Accordingly, the Tu-22M2 in the MPA were left without refueling.
                        This reduced their capabilities, because the Tu-16 could be refueled from tankers that the naval aviation had, but the Tu-22M did not. Then they dismantled the rods altogether.
                        What is not true in this?
                        Whose capabilities? The Tu-16 as a missile carrier has less RT than the Tu-22M2 (there are no miracles, the Tu-16 is designed for one 3000 kg bomb in the cargo bay, new equipment, radar fairings and missiles with the same take-off weight do not contribute to its preservation), the full strength of the strike teams is not able to refuel.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Not. But there were a lot of crews capable of refueling in the air both in the Air Force and in the MA, even with this in mind.
                        How much is this much? I will say this, by the time of the start of rearmament on the Tu-22M2, in two OTBAPs, there were 5 and 3 crews of Tu-16 refueled, respectively.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        And, that is, the question could still be raised? Well then, I will have to admit that I was wrong in posing the question, after you enlighten me about this plane.
                        T-4 was called.
                      3. timokhin-aa
                        April 19 2021 12: 32
                        0
                        Whose capabilities? The Tu-16 as a missile carrier has less RT than the Tu-22M2 (there are no miracles, the Tu-16 is designed for one 3000 kg bomb in the cargo bay, new equipment, radar fairings and missiles with the same take-off weight do not contribute to its preservation), the full strength of the strike teams is not able to refuel.


                        We have already discussed with you. There could be enough tankers for RUG.

                        How much is this much?


                        I will ask, unsubscribe if they answer.

                        T-4 was called.


                        Oh yes.
                        But that's a bit different from what I had in mind. It was made for strikes against surface targets, including, but for a mass of tasks it was redundant, moreover, it was an Air Force project, not a naval aviation project.
                      4. Lozovik
                        Lozovik 28 May 2021 09: 04
                        0
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        We have already discussed with you. There could be enough tankers for RUG.

                        Exploration and supplementary exploration are not necessarily carried out by the RUG.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Oh yes.
                        But that's a bit different from what I had in mind. It was made for strikes against surface targets, including

                        First of all, it was created as a strike and reconnaissance complex for naval aviation, it just turned out to be not needed by the fleet.

                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        besides, it was an Air Force project, not a naval aviation project.

                        The customer is the Ministry of Defense, the plane was supposed to be unified.
  2. tasha
    tasha 26 February 2021 05: 03
    0
    What a great article. There is something to think about after reading.
    I will share my first thought. What kind of victory in the 70s can we talk about if after 5-10 years the Americans have strained themselves and found their answer (!) To the strategies proposed by S.V. Gorshkov? And the efforts were in vain ...
    1. Bashkirkhan
      Bashkirkhan 26 February 2021 07: 03
      -7
      Another point, why for 70 years the communists have not built dry docks for large-tonnage ships in the Northern and Pacific fleets. Where did they think, why the fleet was left without a basing infrastructure. The Northern Fleet does not have a dry dock in which a heavy nuclear cruiser can be serviced, let alone aircraft carriers. This is despite the fact that after the tsar, a dry dock remained in Kronstadt, in which the heavy nuclear cruiser "Peter the Great" is located, the size of the battleship "Yamato". Attaching photo.
      1. timokhin-aa
        26 February 2021 10: 59
        +7
        Much was simply not understood then.
        There weren't enough resources for the other.
        The third was underestimated.

        Resources are always scarce and there are always mistakes in their allocation. Ours were like that.
        1. Bashkirkhan
          Bashkirkhan 26 February 2021 12: 59
          +2
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          Many things were simply not understood then, and there were not enough resources for others.

          Under the tsar, the dry dock indicated by me in Kronstadt was built 6 years before the First World War. The question is, what did the commies do for 70 years and where did the Soviet withers look and what did they think, why is there nowhere in the 20s of the 21st century in the Northern Fleet to dock a heavy nuclear cruiser? Or our Soviet naval leadership were narrow-minded people or traitors. But the commies spent billions of dollars to support socialism-oriented regimes.
          1. timokhin-aa
            26 February 2021 13: 27
            +1
            Well, they were floating docks.

            In general, a lot rests on the fact that the USSR was the world's first state of workers and peasants.
            The people are like that.

            That's all. There is absolutely no one to blame.
            1. Okolotochny
              Okolotochny 26 February 2021 13: 52
              +7
              It's a strange logic, for 70 years there is no one to blame, but over the past 30 a ton of shit has already been dumped.
              1. timokhin-aa
                26 February 2021 18: 22
                +1
                In fact, 1917-1945 was not up to the docks, to put it mildly, and not before the creation of a school of managers.
                And from the 86th the question of money stupidly arose.

                So the period was really short. In addition, all these things were planned after all, it was just a mistake in terms of time. Once they did not have time with the war, then it was necessary to drive the units into the combat strength, then the catastrophe, etc.
                1. Okolotochny
                  Okolotochny 2 March 2021 12: 35
                  +1
                  Conditionally accepted. But, 1986-1945 = 41 years. This time what did you do ??? Alexander, not a sailor not once, but even ... in general terms - I think that the Soviet leadership had an even less idea of ​​the Fleet than it does today. Take, for example, the fact that ships were built and commissioned without a suitable port infrastructure. What is it like?
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    2 March 2021 14: 21
                    0
                    According to the mind, it is necessary to count from Khrushchev. anyway
                    Management mistake - they underestimated how quickly the growth of repair brains would be required and overlooked the basing (they started designing and building berths, then abandoned them, etc.).
              2. Andre___86
                Andre___86 28 February 2021 10: 31
                +6
                How are we different from those 70 years? In addition to peasants and workers, thieves, oligarchs from the same guys appeared at the helm? In the USSR, at least they did not allow them to steal into their pockets as much as they do now)))
                1. timokhin-aa
                  28 February 2021 10: 43
                  -1
                  In theory, we must differ in historical experience.
            2. hydrox
              hydrox 28 February 2021 10: 03
              +5
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              The people are like that.
              That's all. There is absolutely no one to blame.


              You might think that we are all from the nobility, and our people are so and so.
              Have a conscience - when and in what state the people participated in the development of strategies, and even more so in the construction of the Armed Forces, Fleets and Air Armies.
              1. timokhin-aa
                28 February 2021 10: 43
                -1
                The question is that those who participate do not come from other planets.
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 26 February 2021 15: 33
            +4
            Quote: Bashkirkhan
            The question is, what were the commies doing for 70 years and where did the Soviet withers look and what did they think, why is there nowhere in the 20s of the 21st century in the Northern Fleet to dock a heavy nuclear cruiser?

            Because the completion of the construction of infrastructure for basing pr. 23 in four fleets was planned for 1943. If not for the war - in the same Severodvinsk there would be a dock under the LK on the island of Yagry.
            And after the war, floating docks went.
            1. Bashkirkhan
              Bashkirkhan 26 February 2021 16: 23
              +6
              Quote: Alexey RA
              And after the war, floating docks went

              The Swedes built the PD-50 for the USSR. It was used in the Northern Fleet.
              The duration of the repair of a dock type PD-50 by the self-docking method is over 400 days, which is very unprofitable for a ship repair enterprise, since for this entire period, work on the restoration and modernization of ships and ships is completely suspended. The execution of works on disconnecting the pontoons from the towers of the floating dock, docking and then connecting them (implementation of accurate alignment, docking and high-quality welding with ensuring the tightness of welded seams) requires the use of highly qualified specialists. All work on alignment and docking should be carried out only in low seas, and preferably in calm weather. Self-sucking on the PD-50 was not produced and the floating dock was used until it rotted and covered itself with a female reproductive organ and turned into an artificial reef. There is nowhere to dock.
              A dry dock for centuries.
              1. bayard
                bayard 27 February 2021 06: 33
                +5
                All this is true, only after all, the capitalists of the post-Soviet period were not too zealous in creating a normal infrastructure for the Navy and ship repair. So it’s not about the communists, they had at least an objective reason - the workers and peasants made a career and headed the state ... and building a fleet is a complicated matter.
                Yes, and Russia never had a normal fleet, except for the "Gorshkov period", there was no experience in building and maintaining such a huge colossus in combat readiness / serviceability ... plus the race for the leader, the Cold War ... There was simply not enough time and money for all at the same time (ships, naval base infrastructure, ship repair facilities), even with personnel (their training) there was a problem - they simply did not have time to train high-quality specialists (not lieutenants, but specialists) for the rapidly growing numerically fleet.
                And the ships of poor quality were taken under the Christmas tree, and then they toiled with them for years ... Race ... And lack of experience.
                And by the way, the floating docks at the time of the death of the Union were still in perfect order. They have already rotted under the bourgeoisie. And being on the balance sheet is not at all the fleet.
          3. hydrox
            hydrox 28 February 2021 10: 17
            0
            In fact, all the time until the middle of the 20th century, the Soviet Union was at war and it was not up to dry docks, since the battleships were recognized as unpromising floating craft, moreover, access to any Shipbuilding of the People's Democracies was opened for the USSR and floating docks appeared, which were enough to service Korotkovsky fleet.
            As for the leadership of the country, after Stalin's death, and now, either liberal traitors or managers of a liberoid color are at the helm.
            This is what Mishustin can do with his RTO team, will last another 100 years and it is not known whether he will succeed: the crew of an aircraft carrier with a full set of weapons and carriers is not there and is not seen on the horizon.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 1 March 2021 10: 46
              +3
              Quote: hydrox
              In fact, all the time until the middle of the 20th century, the Soviet Union was at war and it was not up to dry docks, since battleships were recognized as hopeless floating craft

              Until the middle of the XNUMXth century The USSR designed and even built the LC. And the infrastructure for them is the same Ruchyi base. Large artillery ships were recognized as hopeless only under Khrushchev (and here the maize was not mistaken).
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 26 February 2021 15: 30
        +9
        Quote: Bashkirkhan
        The Northern Fleet does not have a dry dock where a heavy nuclear cruiser can be serviced, not to mention aircraft carriers.

        Ahem ... and where, then, will Nakhimov be modernized? wink

        The problem is that only 1144 and the first four 1143 climbed into this dock and 1143.5 did not.
        1. Bashkirkhan
          Bashkirkhan 26 February 2021 15: 41
          +9
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Where, then, will Nakhimov be modernized?

          In the Sevmash loading basin, where "Admiral Nakhimov" could be brought only on pontoons, I attach a photo of pontoons. There is no docking, but the Kamasutra. The bulk pool is not a dry dock.
          1. Bashkirkhan
            Bashkirkhan 26 February 2021 16: 18
            +7
            There were pontoons close to the size of the batoport. And without them, the draft of the cruiser does not allow. And besides, the use of the Sevmash filling basin for ship repair interferes with the main activity of the enterprise - the construction of submarines.
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 26 February 2021 17: 41
            +6
            Quote: Bashkirkhan
            In the Sevmash loading basin, where "Admiral Nakhimov" could be brought only on pontoons, I attach a photo of the pontoons.

            Thanks for the information!
            Hmmm ... the XXI century is in the yard, and we dock the ships on the camel. smile
            1. Bashkirkhan
              Bashkirkhan 26 February 2021 18: 14
              +6
              After the pontoons were removed from the bulk pool, now the cruiser is at the wall.
        2. Alien From
          Alien From 28 February 2021 21: 48
          0
          What a giant ship good
      3. ccsr
        ccsr 26 February 2021 20: 13
        +4
        Quote: Bashkirkhan
        Another point why the communists have not built dry docks for large-tonnage ships in the Northern and Pacific fleets in 70 years.

        And the fact that at the Zaliv plant in the seventies there was already a dry dock at 360 meters, you probably do not know. And who prevented from sending any cruiser there for reconstruction, if there were personnel who had built both a nuclear-powered lighter carrier and supertankers under 300 meters?
        There were about a thousand enterprises involved in shipbuilding, i.e. the whole Union could send anything there, including designers and technologists.

        The dry dock (360 x 60 x 13,2 m) is served by two gantry cranes with a lifting capacity of 320 t each and five gantry cranes with a lifting capacity of 80 t each. Crane equipment makes it possible to form ship hulls from large sections and blocks weighing up to 600 tons.
        1. Bashkirkhan
          Bashkirkhan 27 February 2021 12: 03
          +5
          Quote: ccsr

          And the fact that at the Zaliv plant in the seventies there was already a dry dock at 360 meters, you probably do not know.

          I am aware that the Zaliv plant is located in the Crimea on the Black Sea. Your proposal to dock the ships of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet in the Crimea is stupid.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 27 February 2021 13: 35
            0
            Quote: Bashkirkhan
            I am aware that the Zaliv plant is located in the Crimea on the Black Sea. Your proposal to dock the ships of the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet in the Crimea is stupid.

            I didn’t speak about the Pacific Fleet - don’t distort.
            Well, if you believe that the dock modernization takes about 400 days, then why not send a cruiser there for modernization, if the transition from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean was worked out even during the exercises? Do you at least understand that the Crimean climate is much better for any shipbuilding and repair work than a similar enterprise in the North. In addition to the Zaliv plant, in the same Kerch there was a shipyard, a shipyard, a shipyard and several "plavmarus". Learn to count money before claiming that in the north we must maintain such a repair force. I did not mention the Pacific Fleet - they really need their own remodelers, although here it should be considered that it will be cheaper, because the civilian fleet is driving ships from the Black Sea to China for repairs. Moreover, as far as I remember, the Pacific Fleet sent its ships against the Somali pirates in the Red Sea, and it seemed that they weren’t soaring with the transition.
            1. Bashkirkhan
              Bashkirkhan 27 February 2021 16: 23
              +3
              Quote: ccsr
              Learn to count money before claiming that in the north we must maintain such a repair force.

               17.02.2021/35/35 Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Alexei Krivoruchko paid a working visit to the XNUMXth SRZ branch of Zvezdochka Shipyard JSC. During the meeting, they visited construction sites where the dry dock is being reconstructed. XNUMX SRZ Director Sergei Verakso reported Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation on the progress of the project.
              In this dry dock in Murmansk, after the end of construction, ships of the Northern Fleet will be repaired. Because it is economically viable.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 27 February 2021 18: 25
                -1
                Quote: Bashkirkhan
                Because it is economically viable.

                I would like to believe in this, but not all of the Soviet legacy was economically justified for the current situation. Do not forget that our fleet has long since dried up, and to maintain all the infrastructure for its maintenance, which we inherited, is dear to us, and we have already sipped grief:
                On October 30, as a result of an accident at a shipyard in Murmansk, our country lost the floating dock PD-50 and almost lost its only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov.
                1. hydrox
                  hydrox 28 February 2021 10: 30
                  0
                  Quote: ccsr
                  and we have already sipped grief:

                  And what do we want if liberal managers are at the helm of both the fleets and the country, who prefer to fight inflation against the country's fighting efficiency (even though they will not be kicked out of service for this, although nothing needs to be done, just harm unhindered) - last year's money-box was spent by about 12-15% - there was no one to give the command to calculate the justifications and the correct spending of funds, and to steal without the command "good!" are already afraid.
      4. Victor Leningradets
        Victor Leningradets 1 March 2021 11: 48
        +1
        Forgive me, but the dock of Tsarevich Alexei is a very average structure, which was recognized (horror-horror!) In 1914.
        It became clear that the dock with a width of 36 m at the doorstep and a length of the staging section of 229 m did not meet the prospects of military shipbuilding. As a palliative, it was supposed to lengthen it to 272 m. In Soviet times, it housed aircraft carrier pr. 1144 and 1144.2 (Kirov - Peter the Great) 251 m long. The first draft designs of the battleship A in 1936 also had corresponding restrictions. Yamato at the dock. them. Veleschinsky does not fit in any way.
        1. Bashkirkhan
          Bashkirkhan 3 March 2021 11: 23
          +1
          Quote: Victor Leningradets
          The dock of Tsarevich Alexei is a very average structure, which was recognized (horror-horror!) in 1914.
          It became clear that the dock with a width of 36 m at the doorstep and a length of the staging section of 229 m did not meet the prospects of military shipbuilding.

            hi You are right, but there is no such dry dock in the North yet. THAT is what they are going to build on 35 shipyards. In accordance with the 1st stage of construction, it is planned to build a two-row enclosing bulkhead (from a pipe sheet pile), organize the bank protection of a construction pit (from bore-tangential piles) with an anti-seepage circuit device, and provide for the filling of slopes inside the construction pit.
          In accordance with the 2nd stage of construction, it is provided (for information and accounting in work):
          - reconstruction and technical re-equipment of a 2-chamber dry dock into a single-chamber version with new dimensions of the dry dock chamber 332,5 x 70 (60) x 17,55 m;
          - the main hydraulic seal of the dry dock (hereinafter referred to as OGZ) - bathoport;
          - an additional repair provision for the OGZ, which ensures the repair of the main threshold of the OGZ;
          - an intermediate gate along the length of the dock for the possibility of docking sets of ships of shorter length with different docking periods;
          - construction of a new pumping station in the northern abutment of the reconstructed dry dock;
          - installation on the walls of the reconstructed dry dock of crane tracks with a track of 10,5 m for portal cranes with a lifting capacity of 50 and 100 tons;
          - arrangement of channels near the walls of the reconstructed dry dock for laying power grids;
          - installation on the walls of the reconstructed dry dock of points of connection to the power medium;
          - a sufficient number of mooring, towing and fenders for safe wiring and placing orders in the dry dock of the calculated annual production program.
      5. ZEMCH
        ZEMCH 16 March 2021 17: 18
        +1
        Quote: Bashkirkhan
        Where did they think, why the fleet was left without a basing infrastructure.

        I will even say more, for the entire existence of aircraft-carrying cruisers, their bases on the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet have not been created. Not from a good life Kuzya is standing in the 35th shipyard.
        1. Bashkirkhan
          Bashkirkhan 16 March 2021 17: 51
          0
          You're right. 1143.1 / 4 by 1991, the Soviet Navy was brought to a completely killed, incapacitated state due to the fact that not one of the ships did not even have a decent "wall" in the basing places and was constantly on the roads, killing the motor resource. In the USSR, there was not a single naval base where the ships in the parking lot would be supplied with everything required from the shore. The exception is Baltiysk-Pilau, well, so it was not built by the USSR.
    2. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 10: 58
      +9
      What kind of victory in the 70s can we talk about, if after 5-10 years the Americans pulled themselves up and found their answer (!)


      Well, this is the strategic art - to respond to the challenge of the enemy. In the 60s and 70s we gave it and created a challenge for the Americans. In the 80s they answered this challenge and created a new one for us.

      At this stage, we merged, although in the late 70s the outlines of future American pressure could already be seen and a counter-strategy could be worked out.

      About that article.
      1. ANB
        ANB 26 February 2021 11: 23
        +12
        ... Well, this is the strategic art - to respond to the challenge of the enemy. In the 60s and 70s we gave it and created a challenge for the Americans. In the 80s they answered this challenge and created a new one for us.

        At this stage, we merged, although in the late 70s the outlines of future American pressure could already be seen and a counter-strategy could be worked out.

        About that article.


        Many thanks to the author for the article.
        Gorshkov was no longer allowed to come up with a new strategy.
        The leadership changed, and then Gorshkov was removed.
        First, they were removed from the leadership of the fleet.
        And death is not all right.
        I am proud that I personally congratulated him on Victory Day in 1985.
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 11: 26
          +5
          Thank you for your comment.

          Gorshkov was no longer allowed to come up with a new strategy.


          I'm not sure that he could, at least because of his age. If you know something that did not get into the press, I would be grateful for the information, very interesting.

          I am proud that I personally congratulated him on Victory Day in 1985.


          Yes, there is something to remember for you.
          1. ANB
            ANB 26 February 2021 11: 58
            +3
            ... If you know something that did not get into the press, I would be grateful for the information, very interesting.

            Honestly, it's better to write it in a personal.
            1. timokhin-aa
              26 February 2021 12: 33
              +2
              I will be grateful.
            2. Artyom Karagodin
              Artyom Karagodin 26 February 2021 13: 28
              +1
              It is a pity that only in a personal. I would read it too. Maybe you can also copy the message that you send to Alexander? Confidentiality I promise. Although you do not know me.
              1. ANB
                ANB 26 February 2021 13: 31
                +2
                And there will be no details. Who would tell a 19-year-old everything.
                1. Artyom Karagodin
                  Artyom Karagodin 26 February 2021 13: 36
                  +5
                  Yes, your opinion is just interesting, that's all. This is dictated by the fact that you are impressed by the views of U. Alexander. This is not so common. Here I took the liberty of criticizing the ships of 22160, based, among other things, on the opinion that Alexander expressed about them, so they instructed me so many minuses that just hold on. I cannot say that I was upset, but once again I received confirmation of how widespread our jingoistic patriotism is in the style of "if tomorrow is war ... we are ready for victory today." With which the author of this article fights in his publications.

                  However, I will not insist.
                  1. ANB
                    ANB 26 February 2021 15: 22
                    +1
                    No, on this issue we agreed on the personality of S.G. Gorshkov.
                    And I won't discuss ship projects.
                  2. Nemchinov Vl
                    Nemchinov Vl 26 February 2021 16: 49
                    +3
                    Quote: Artyom Karagodin
                    With whom the author of this article and fights in his publications.
                    Alexander has really, often very interesting articles (!) yes ... but to understand what he is fighting for (advocates ?!), guided by ordinary logic, is not possible in principle !!. request
                    He often criticizes 22160 - "as an undership" (!), and on the one hand it would seem there is something for (!).. But in terms of using it "like a firefly in WOT" (give control center in real time !!), by the enemy's AUG / KPUG, by ship worth 9 billion., more logical than fr. 22350 worth 35 billion. ?! (this is for you as an option for thought) ... !!
                    Then, he often criticizes the Navy for acquiring the same 22160, but bypasses criticism of the Navy for acquiring 20380 (!)That are under 23 billion., but not suitable for the implementation of its main functions PLO / OVR (by the composition of weapons) ? !! And here thoughts about the unreasonableness of unnecessary costs (on non-functional) corvettes does not bother him (or he prefers to turn a blind eye to it) ?! Repeatedly, I try, it "push to article" conduct HONEST comparing 20380 and 11664 (according to their performance characteristics, and the cost of their construction) ? !! .

                    So that "the struggle in the publications of this author, sometimes, is quite selective" !!!
                    And his articles in general are often very interesting indeed, as are the topics raised in them ... hi
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      26 February 2021 18: 24
                      0
                      To use 22160 as you write, it is necessary that the targets can not break away from it.
                      Continue?
                      1. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 26 February 2021 21: 43
                        +1
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        To use 22160 as you write, it is necessary that the targets can not break away from it.
                        Continue?
                        continue Alexander. yes
                        SKR 1135 gave the same 30 knots as calculated 22160 ? !!, or not ? !!but most often used for "weapon tracking" (which, as follows from your own article, assumed, first of all, - spotter gunner role), and this is understandable, because not one TU-95RTs will be able to hang out indefinitely far from their bases ... yes
                        It seems that at 32 nodes only the 956 could afford (and then not right away ... KTU all the same ..), BOD 1155, well, and handsome pr. 61 (like "Sharp-witted") !! Some of them even gave 39 knots at the stage of state tests. !!. smile winked
                        And it looks logical (!), firefly (who acts "on the verge of the doomed") shouldn't be too expensive !!!
                    2. Ivanchester
                      Ivanchester 26 February 2021 19: 03
                      +2
                      Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                      20380 (!), Which are under 23 billion, but not suitable for the implementation of their main functions PLO / OVR

                      In articles uv. Alexander Timokhin is usually criticized by 20386, and he assesses the construction of 20380/385 positively. Why do you think that they are unsuitable for PLO / OVR?

                      Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                      HONEST comparison of 20380 and 11664 (according to their performance characteristics, and the cost of their construction

                      How can you objectively compare a real ship and a project? Especially in terms of cost?
                      1. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 26 February 2021 21: 30
                        +3
                        Quote: Ivanchester
                        In articles uv. Alexandra Timokhina is usually criticized 20386,
                        .. undeniably unreasonably expensive project (!), and here it would be difficult to argue with Timokhin. Only "a plus" in this project, - the concept of testing a power plant with a system of partial electric propulsion (!!).
                        As in my opinion, her (both this concept and this power plant), it would be more logical, practically test / try for 11356 R / M, and not fence for her tests "innovative monster", in the form of 20386 (? !!). recourse
                        This is my personal point of view. yes Here, perhaps OPK (industrial complex), pushed through (as in due time Ustinov, Gorshkova), baud larger scale financing ... request
                        Quote: Ivanchester
                        and he assesses the construction of 20380/385 positively. Why do you think that they are unsuitable for PLO / OVR?
                        already by the fact that 20380 is objectively not functional for the performance of its main tasks (no PLUR !!!), at too high a price for the PLO corvette .... winked But, 20385, - yes (!), it is certainly better (already the presence of UKSK), but significantly even more expensive !!!
                        Quote: Ivanchester
                        How can you objectively compare a real ship and a project? Especially in terms of cost?
                        let's ask together (provoke if you like winked ) Timokhin, as a person who is closer to the issues of shipbuilding of the Navy ? !! (well, how he positions himself what ), to conduct a comparative analysis of prices for the construction of corvettes of these two projects ?!, and if necessary, contact "to his friends from the Navy, and the defense industry complex" (of which, according to him, there are many) ... ? !!
                        So at the start there will be: проект 20380, - in which no one and nothing is going to change (!)But "sniffs it into the fleet without hesitation" (on the last forum "Army-2020", someone again despite its obvious jambs, I struck another plus 8 units ?!) crying
                        и проект 11664 (offered by Zelenodolsk PKB), where at the request of the customer (represented by the Navy, until this project is finally formed !!, and it MATTERS !!, because a set of requirements for performance characteristics, is formed by the CUSTOMER), there may be: two 8 cells of the UKSK (!), 24 cells of the Shtil-1 air defense missile system (instead of the Redut, which does not work without the Polyment, and the low VI of the corvette DOES NOT ALLOW it to be installed there !!), Radar type "Positive" "Monument" or "Monolith" (but not - ZASLON !!!, which will greatly reduce the price !!!), the same (the same) - SJSC "Zarya-2" (and the same BUGAS, it seems "Minotaur", if I am not mistaken). And the GEM is no less important from the "four new 12SD-500" (8000 hp each, similar to the old GEM from Kolomna diesels 6000 hp each) ? !!so that the PLO / OVR corvette does not appear again "toothless slug" (remind you that the speed is 20380 - 27 knots !!), which is not capable of squeezing out enemy submarines, but had a speed of 31 knots or more ... wink winked
                        Well, let's ask Alexander, with "his expert connections", conduct a detailed comparative analysis, only two such ships, and the cost of building each of them ? !! wink
                        help, convince ? !! what smile
                        shake your hand (!), and you will prove to me - that is he not selective? !! hi
                      2. Ivanchester
                        Ivanchester 26 February 2021 21: 58
                        -1
                        Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                        no PLUR !!!

                        The Albatross have no PLUR either, but this does not prevent them from being OVR ships.
                        Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                        comparative analysis, only two such ships, and the cost of building each of them

                        I agree that the project that you described looks more attractive than the real 20380. But this is just a project ... And objective data for comparing characteristics and costs may appear only after its implementation.
                      3. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 26 February 2021 22: 33
                        +1
                        Quote: Ivanchester
                        The Albatross have no PLUR either, but this does not prevent them from being OVR ships.
                        The comparison is not correct by definition (!).... First, between these projects (and the formation of requirements for performance characteristics) more than 30 years difference !!! yes
                        Secondly, EVEN in spite of THIS, at the "Albatross" there is a 533 mm TA, for the use of full-fledged torpedoes (!)... The Soviet range was approximately 22+ km. (!), and if, during the modernization, their data entry system succeeds "reflash", for modern UGST / Fizik torpedoes, this is about 40+ km. (!!)... winked you can compare it with 324 mm torpedoes of the "Packet-NK" complex, with a stroke length of 14-18 km. MAXIMUM !!! what
                        And yes (!)... Another (!). the cost of building "Albatross" at the time was not transcendentalotherwise they would not have become so widespread !!
                        Quote: Ivanchester
                        And objective data for comparing characteristics and costs can appear only after its implementation.
                        I guess, that "project men of the Ministry of Defense", already on the basis of the performance characteristics we are discussing, may well calculate the cost of each of these corvettes ... (for them that is not a secret cost for example, 24 cells "Calm-1" and "12 cells" Reduta "in comparison with them ? !! yes as well as the cost of the "ZASLONA tower", and the comparative link "Monolith-Positive-Monument" ... well, roughly speaking... I hope you understand the train of thought ?!).
                        But as if there is some "not visible and not tangible lobby", which is ready what is called "choke in the bud", even the shadow of such doubts, about the expediency of the Navy's costs (as a customer) on the OSK (as a manufacturer) ?! winked yes
                        I hope that I was able to fully and sincerely answer you the questions discussed. hi
                      4. bayard
                        bayard 27 February 2021 18: 19
                        +1
                        hi Greetings to Vladimir.
                        So after all, if a power plant on 20385 4SD12 is installed in hull 500, and instead of the aforementioned "Barrier" to put the very same bundle "Monolith-Positive-Monument", then the price of the corvette will immediately become "more democratic", and the characteristics will tighten. The speed will increase to 30 -31 knots, its seaworthiness is better for any one, and the GAK stands up better, and the helicopter is permanently based.
                        For service in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet, this would be optimal.
                        And to sculpt two UKSK on a boat VI 1800 - 2200 tons, this is already too much. For PLO, one head is enough for him. and if you want to add anti-ship capabilities, you can find a place for a pair of launchers for the "Uranus".

                        But the fact is that the military-industrial complex lobby plays a huge role in the formation of defense orders. And it's not a fact that if by some miracle they hear you and want to adopt a hypothetical 11664, they won't impose the same "Barrier" on it as an indispensable and non-negotiable condition. And the ship will turn out worse and not cheaper than 20385 - I think it is necessary to talk about it, because 20380 is a transitional model and was designed when the "Caliber" and its submarine modifications were not yet in service.
                        The trouble and tragedy 20385 of today's appearance, in the lack of power of the power plant (there is simply no other, and when it appears, the problem will disappear), and in the imposed damp, expensive and ineffective "Barrier" with excessive characteristics for such a small ship.

                        "Calm" will no longer go to the Fleet - UNIFICATION. Only "Redoubt" - in order to eventually reduce the price due to the massiveness. Well, in the interests of simplifying the supply.

                        And no one will rebuild the industry for the release of new products. What did Shoigu say in Komsomolsk?
                        "No more R&D. Mass production only."
                        And this is the verdict. request
                      5. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 27 February 2021 21: 00
                        -1
                        Quote: bayard
                        Greetings to Vladimir.
                        mutually, my dear friend !! hi
                        Do you mind if I will answer you point by point ? !!... I don't like conversations without argumentation (!). wink
                        Quote: bayard
                        So after all, if you install a power plant on 20385 4SD12 in building 500,
                        yes he really will get better (!), and so it should be done, on those (two 20385), which have already been contracted for "Army-2020", having given these orders to the Amur Shipyardso as not to lose it again (!!)... For a transitional period (1,5-2 years), with the sequential laying of these ships, in 10-12 months (!)... And this is ONLY for the sake of not "fell again ASCZ ", losing competence !!!... But the trouble is that big changes to it clearly will not be missed, and he already TOO expensive !!...

                        Figuratively speaking, - IF now, the Navy orders at the power plant planned for 20386 (partial electromotive) four frigates 11356 Р / М, with the addition of (at least 2 * 4 launchers for Uran-U, well, or one UKSK) (!), then they will cost the fleet cheaper than 4 corvettes 20385 (!), with more armament and seaworthiness of the project - 11356 RM !!! yes After all even for 2015 the cost of 20380 was equal to the cost of 11356 R / M ( with a difference in maximum speed and seaworthiness ?!) winked
                      6. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 27 February 2021 21: 00
                        -2
                        Quote: bayard
                        and instead of not for the night of the aforementioned "Barrier" to put that very bundle "Monolith-Positive-Monument", then the price of the corvette will immediately become "more democratic"
                        It was possible to do it already FOR A LONG TIME (!!), but the military-industrial complex will not go for it (!!), he is ON THE VERSA "pushes the Navy" that which is more expensive and, accordingly, PROFITABLE for MIC !!! ... what
                        Quote: bayard
                        ..The speed will increase to 30 -31 knots, his seaworthiness is any better
                        , belay than who? !!! ... Than Cheetah 11661 ?!, and therefore stupid Vietnamese, decided for PLO, which is better "Cheetah - 11661" (in VI 1700)Than 20380 (in VI 2200)? !!! You think they were "drunk in the trash" ?!, or vice versa - "are able to count money and expediency"? !!!

                        Quote: bayard
                        и GAK is better gets up, and the helicopter is permanently based.
                        Stop. STOP, stop !!!. Let's be honest and objective - at 11664 (enlarged for YOUR Navy project "Cheetah", it is assumed and SJSC "Zarya-2" i.e SAME as 20380/85 !!!and the same BUGAS !!But TWO UKSK, and TWO 12 cells each (total 24!) Cells "Shtil-1", instead of "Osa-m" - by 11661 !!!, because of what his VI - "grows up" from 1700 to about the same 2200 tons !!! smile so, - I ask you not to manipulate !! No. especially by helicopter, which both there and there are even projected!

                        Quote: bayard
                        For service in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet this is exactly what would be optimal .
                        Let the experts calculate ... exactly WHAT? !!... They can easily calculate all else being equal (as GAS and BUGAS, and even the same GEM (!)but 20385 with "Redoubt" and its "integrated radar mast", or as opposed to, - proposed for "Gepard 11664", a bundle of two UKSK (i.e., "plus" the cost of purchasing one 8-cell UKSK (!), and 24 cells. "Calm-1", - instead of 12 cells "Reduta" (that's really interesting, but which is more expensive? !!!,) and the "Monument-Positive-Monolith" radar., - instead of the "ZASLONA Integrated mast" .. ?!
                      7. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 27 February 2021 21: 00
                        0
                        Quote: bayard
                        And to sculpt two UKSK on a boat VI 1800 - 2200 tons, this is already too much.
                        why do you think so ? !!. And if in the same VI?!, But all other things being equal ?! Should I avoid this (there is an extra thrust-to-weight ratio)? !!! No. winked
                        Quote: bayard
                        But the point is that the military-industrial complex lobby plays a huge role in the formation of defense orders
                        I agree, in the sense "I understand you" (!), but from my point of view, - SO MAYBE IN THIS IS A PROBLEM? !!! recourse yes And if, what should be done to revive the Navy, - so it LIMIT influence of the role of "Rahman and Co" ..? !!!

                        Quote: bayard
                        ...AND not the fact that if by some miracle you are heard and want adopt hypothetical 11664 , he will not be forced the same "Barrier" as an indispensable and non-negotiable condition
                        !!! bravo Vitaly BRAVO !!! what but it seems already answered in the last paragraph, exhaustively on THIS account? !!! . hi
                        This is just in time for the QUESTION, - "so where are the eggs?!, exactly at the Navy as a customer ..?! .., or at USC as an executor of the order !!!" .. ... Who turns whom ? !! "A dog's tail, or a dog's tail", eventually ?! belay

                        Quote: bayard
                        The trouble and tragedy 20385 of today's appearance, in the lack of power of the power plant ( there is simply no other , and when it appears, then the problem will disappear),
                        Trouble never and nowhere will not disappear IF you do not look for ways of ITS SOLUTION (!!)....
                        If the Navy, money state programs armament / re-equipment fleet will start up again at eight - 20380 !!!, and not on solving within 1-2 years maximum (!), engine building problems (!!), then he will receive by Maximum 2 BNK when writing off 3-4 !!!! crying
                        А with funding for one and a half years of programs for the Kolomenskoye "family D-500" (12SD-500: 16SD-500 and 20SD-500) and second (except for "Saturn", let's say on the basis of the "Kronstadt plant" center for the production of gas turbine engines and gearboxes, with its own stand !!!) .. what well, China is the most vivid picture (as a model for solving shipbuilding programs (!!), through localization of the engine building FIRST, well, on the GAS and on the air defense system, etc. !!!), There are 24 units a year !!! We can do 5-6, if we raise the marine engine building !!!
                        Quote: bayard
                        ... And the ship will turn out worse and not cheaper 20385 -
                        to create more expensive and worse- "Well, here the gentleman has to contrive !!" (as the hero from "FORMULAS OF LOVE" ...) !!! recourse yes
                      8. bayard
                        bayard 27 February 2021 23: 15
                        0
                        The topic of PLO BMZ ships was very hotly discussed about a year ago at VO and all these topics had already been sorted out to the cog. The fact is that the hull and lines of the 20380 are really better and provide better seaworthiness than the lines of the Cheetah. In addition, 20380 is (as I said) a transitional model and was designed before entering service with the "Caliber" and PLUR from its family. Therefore, only versions 20385 are considered for the future.
                        According to the Amur plant, there is indeed an order for 8 corvettes, but only two of them (or four) will be 20380 (but with the "Zaslon", and another 6 (or four) pieces 20385. Plus two more 20385 will be built in Kaliningrad. The Pacific Fleet will receive 8 pcs 20380 for Primorye and 8 pcs 20385 for Kamchatka Continued laying 20380 is related to the existing stock at the plant and the time required to prepare the next project for laying.
                        "Barrier" is an extremely painful topic, but alas - unbreakable. The contractor has such a roof that neither the Investigative Committee nor the FSB can calm him down.
                        I really want to hope for the victory of common sense, but the reality is that it is still shoved into arms, breaking through the knee both the High Command and the command of the fleets.
                        It is this whim with the "Zaslon" that makes the corvette so expensive and indigestible.
                        It would be wiser and more useful to get by with a cheaper, more reliable, proven and serial solution. And they would save about $ 6 billion.

                        About engines.
                        The fact is that initially for 20385 more powerful German engines were supposed, but ... sanctions, and we had to put what we have - Kolomna 6000 hp. The above engines of 8000 and 10 l / s were just supposed to go to the new corvettes. but they do not exist to this day.
                        Maybe they will give birth to something by the end of this year.
                        That is why they held on to the 20385 series, for there was a very large shortfall in speed.
                        Perhaps now the calculation for new engines, since they started to bookmark again. Or it may be simply impossible to wait any longer.
                        In any case, there is no GEM for "Cheetah" either.

                        Now about the weapons.
                        For the PLO BMZ corvette, eight cells in the UKSK are enough with the head. After all, he has torpedoes and a helicopter with its own weapons. It's still not a frigate.
                        And this is just the case when you can spoil the porridge with butter - after all, there are not only the UKSK themselves, but also the missiles to them. That is, the ship becomes even more expensive, but due to the lack of demand for ammunition, it will be in vain to carry all this power, occupying useful volumes, impairing habitability and not allowing to place something useful.
                        After all, these ships do not go hunting on submarines alone, but as a rule in a group of 4 (at least this was the case before). Where are the four corvettes 64 PLUR?
                        And even if 32 PLUR and 32 RCC, it is still too much.
                        And it's expensive.
                        And PLO BMZ ships should be inexpensive and massive.
                        The Americans are planning to have only 16 CRs on their new frigates in two UKSK. With their VI of about 7000 tons.And you are going to pack such power on a corvette VI of 2200 tons ...

                        As for the air defense system, everything has already been determined here - "Redut" will be installed on all ships - for the sake of unification, facilitating supply and mass production. It's too late to campaign here. Although "Redoubt" is perhaps redundant for a corvette.
                        But they decided so.

                        Another thing is that it looks like there will be another BMZ corvette, but cheaper, lighter and not so sophisticated. On the basis of the extended "Karakurt" up to VI 1300 - 1500 tons, with "Pantsir-M" as an air defense system, GAK with BUGAS, UKSK for 8 - 12 cells, "Packet-NK".
                        As a power plant for them, it is possible to assume a power plant from 22380 on low-speed Kolomna diesel engines, with a speed of at least 30 knots.
                        A helicopter hangar is not provided there, but it is possible that there will be a helipad for receiving it.
                        If this project does see life and is implemented, it will accelerate and simplify the saturation of the fleets with BMZ anti-submarine specialization ships. For on some 20380/85 it will be too expensive and time-consuming.
                        Such ships can be delivered to the Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Sea Fleet, where the requirements for seaworthiness are lower.
                        Their price is expected to be two times lower than that of 20385.
                        And today ... there is simply no one to break the lobby of the military-industrial complex and the interested oligarchy.
                        Our "tsar" is of the wrong design ...

                        By the way, discussing the topic of corvettes a year ago, I was in correspondence with a number of our authors (Klimov, Timokhin) and a number of naval specialists ... In the "Cheetah" they dissuaded me.
                        But for the Vietnamese it is just right - inexpensive and cheerful. They do not require powerful air defense, no one imposes a fabulous radar on them, there is enough seaworthiness.
                        Hope to order a couple more soon.
                        hi
          2. ANB
            ANB 26 February 2021 13: 33
            0
            ... Yes, there is something to remember for you.

            I was 15 years old. :)
            And then I got to the podium of the mausoleum for the first and last time.
      2. hydrox
        hydrox 28 February 2021 10: 41
        -1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        In the 80s they answered this challenge and created a new one for us.

        At this stage, we merged, although in the late 70s the outlines of future American pressure could already be seen and a counter-strategy could be worked out.


        At the end of the 70s, the country was ruled by a mold out of mind, preparing the Gaidar-Chubais to replace themselves in leading positions, and the country had no time for the liberal-thieves' reforms there was no time for fleets and armies - (in the early 90s they did it brilliantly! ), - what THEY wanted, WE got it.
    3. CastroRuiz
      CastroRuiz 26 February 2021 14: 57
      0
      Vremenaya pobeda.
    4. hydrox
      hydrox 28 February 2021 09: 58
      0
      The answer is incorrect.
      Gorshkov built HIS strategies and HIS fleet (no matter how he did it) with the aim of PREVENTING a nuclear war - and he succeeded until the party degenerates of the 80s sold for cookies. Remember how many warships ON THE MOVE (sometimes with weapons and fire control systems!) Were sold out on pins and needles all over the world ...
      1. tasha
        tasha 28 February 2021 11: 13
        +1
        Gorshkov built OWN strategies and OWN fleet

        Strange, I thought the fleet was Soviet. It is now clear why these ships were so easily sold. Not your own, someone else's ... winked This is the first moment.
        The second moment - there is no Gorshkov, there is no fleet, and a nuclear war has not happened, pah-pah. So it wasn't in the navy that it was, and it wasn't in Gorshkov?

        In my understanding, the merit of S.G. Gorshkov is that in a short period of "the Cuban missile crisis and the first hundred ICBMs on alert ..." correctly noticed, nuclear war. For this (as I believe), a certain number of boats and surface ships are enough, which these boats will cover from the attack of enemy ASW forces.
        And building a bunch of warships without being able to fully maintain, maintain and train their crews will end up with these ships having to be sold. Anything better than they rot in parking lots?
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 28 February 2021 11: 48
          +2
          Quote: tasha
          The second moment - there is no Gorshkov, there is no fleet, and a nuclear war has not happened, pah-pah. So it wasn't in the navy that it was, and it wasn't in Gorshkov?

          Quite right - the whole point was in our heavy missiles of the Strategic Missile Forces, which, without any preparation, on a covert command signal, which the Americans could not intercept, made it possible to destroy with the first salvo not only the United States, but all NATO countries at the same time.
          Quote: tasha
          In my understanding, the merit of S.G. Gorshkov is that in a short period of "the Cuban missile crisis and the first hundred ICBMs on alert ..." correctly noticed, nuclear war.

          At that stage, the fleet played a major role, but then Gorshkov's art caused harm to our country, due to the fact that huge funds were invested in absolutely useless ships, the fate of which is sadly known. After all, it was a no-brainer that we would never be able to pull off an aircraft carrier fleet capable of at least somehow comparing with the American one, which means that we do not need to develop it if we have no plans to seize some territories. Now it is too late to shed tears, after we lost the USSR, but maybe in the future some of our "advanced naval commanders" will draw a conclusion for themselves - not a country exists for the fleet, but a fleet for the country. And if his role in the strategic confrontation has decreased, then there is no need to pull an owl on the globe, speculating on the historical past, telling what a great man Gorshkov was. Although, in my opinion, he was far from Kuznetsov as a builder of the fleet, and the naval officers themselves apparently understand this.
  3. Destiny
    Destiny 26 February 2021 05: 12
    +17
    We still live on the legacy of the old admiral.

    I would say that we still live on the legacy of the Soviet fleet.
    Thanks to the author for the article, I read it without stopping, I was hooked.
    1. Artyom Karagodin
      Artyom Karagodin 26 February 2021 13: 29
      +5
      In general, in addition to strong analytics and deep knowledge of the facts, Alexander is distinguished by an undoubted literary gift. I always read his materials with great pleasure.
    2. Alien From
      Alien From 1 March 2021 03: 49
      0
      I agree with you completely! The article is painful. hi
  4. Lech from Android.
    Lech from Android. 26 February 2021 05: 23
    +2
    Alexander described the fleet that the USSR was able to do, in our time everything again depends on the country's economy. Russia is now unable to build an aircraft carrier and an escort for its escort ... there is no money for this. Where to get the resources for the construction of a new modern Russian fleet?
    1. Destiny
      Destiny 26 February 2021 05: 38
      +20
      Yes, already several AU Gs have been taken out to the cordon in the form of stolen money, here are the resources, how many have already spoken on this topic here ... The fleet is financed on a leftover basis, it's not a secret for anyone - there is money, but not about the fleet honor. Those who decide who and how much money to give are constantly forgotten (or do not know at all) that the fleet is a little less than half of the country's nuclear shield, which ensures all of us a peaceful life.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 26 February 2021 20: 36
        +2
        Quote: Destiny
        The fleet is financed on a leftover basis, it's not a secret for anyone - there is money, but not about the fleet honor.

        This is a clear overkill, because the Navy traditionally spent at least 30% of the military budget in Soviet times, and this is a very huge amount. Another thing is that inside the fleet itself there was a constant war among those who decided what was more important, and there was a secret struggle for the division of funding between the surface and submarine fleets, between different types of aviation, inside coastal structures, and everyone wanted to pull the blanket over themselves. Moreover, the navy did not have the opportunity to train as many specialists in its higher educational institutions as was required to provide the officer corps of four fleets and one flotilla. And this led to the fact that the officers who came from the land and aviation schools were in every possible way overwritten, they did not shine for career growth, and this was a personnel problem, because it was not the best who moved, but those who had access to the sea. With a laugh I learned how the naval officers were hysterical, that the chief of intelligence of one of the fleets had become one of the best equipment in the country, who had vast experience in conducting reconnaissance, but did not have a ship's VUS.
        So it is high time for the naval forces to understand themselves, at least from the point of view of what the fleet will perform in the future, and what is more important for it - the seaworthiness of ships, or their total nuclear potential, including coastal systems. What part of the funds should be directed to the development of satellite communication systems and fleet reconnaissance, the maintenance of ground structures for this, the creation of new space technology. And this is only a small part of the problems of the modern fleet.
        Quote: Destiny
        that the fleet is a little less than half of the country's nuclear shield,

        This did not happen even in Soviet times, so we should not belittle the role of our Strategic Missile Forces, which have a much greater nuclear potential than the fleet.
    2. Sahalinets
      Sahalinets 26 February 2021 07: 15
      +13
      Check out the list of yachts of our oligarchs! There will be enough for a couple of aircraft carriers and an escort. It's just that the current elite has completely different goals ...
      1. Oden280
        Oden280 26 February 2021 10: 06
        .
        And what have the oligarchs and the fleet to do with it? We have capitalism and everyone has as much money as he could get. And spends them wherever he wants. They pay taxes on their income. And if you want to change the laws more like that and look for concealment of income.
        1. Sahalinets
          Sahalinets 26 February 2021 11: 25
          +10
          Tell us how hard and honest work they have become rich in loans-for-shares auctions!
          The goal of the ruling elite is to plunder the country and escape. Hence all the problems.
          1. Oden280
            Oden280 26 February 2021 16: 17
            -4
            If you do not like the current elite, then become the elite yourself and show how it should be. And then everyone can talk from the couch, but how to do so one whine from under the fence.
            1. bayard
              bayard 27 February 2021 08: 04
              +1
              Only our own people become elite, that's why it is the elite.
              1. Oden280
                Oden280 27 February 2021 17: 35
                -3
                The elite are those who really want it and have the knowledge and will to achieve their goal. And their own become just approximate.
                1. bayard
                  bayard 27 February 2021 17: 57
                  -1
                  Quote: Oden280
                  The elite are those who really want it and have the knowledge and will to achieve their goal.

                  Are you so naive, or are you just young?
                  In what regiments did you serve?
                  Or in the public service?
                  Who of the "elite" do you know? And who do you think is?
                  A person can be the "salt of his land" but not be a member of the "elite".
                  1. Oden280
                    Oden280 27 February 2021 18: 05
                    -1
                    I'm already retired. And the elite in any state are those who make decisions about the development of society and the state and are responsible for it.
                    1. bayard
                      bayard 27 February 2021 18: 33
                      +1
                      And in order to ascend to the heights of power, you need only ability, perseverance and determination?
                      Or is it still necessary to accept certain rules of the game? Become your own?
                      Or will the "white crow", living by its own principles, be lifted by the rest to the heights of power?
                      Without perseverance and determination, nothing happens at all.
                      Even a stool.
                      It just so happened that I saw how this new elite was born ... from within ... and exactly where and when it happened.
                      There were no random people there at all.
                      1. Oden280
                        Oden280 27 February 2021 21: 48
                        0
                        The elite differs from the close ones in that they themselves determine the rules of the game and form their own circle of close pushers.
                        I doubt that you are familiar with those who really decide, and do not puff up and yell at the public.
                      2. bayard
                        bayard 27 February 2021 23: 58
                        +2
                        Quote: Oden280
                        And the elite in any state are those who make decisions about the development of society and the state and are responsible for it.

                        Are you sure that the modern elite of the Russian Federation is responsible for at least something?
                        Quote: Oden280
                        The elite differs from the approximate ones in that they themselves determine the rules of the game.

                        Then we don't have one at all.
                        How else to explain the existence of the "Central Bank Law" and the Fiscal Rule?
                        Is it the "elite" that defined the rules?
                        Or was it imposed by another elite?
                        And can our "elite" change something in these rules.
                        For example, in monetary policy?
                        Can it, for example, print the ruble by ITSELF - to issue and lend to its business, the development of the economy, infrastructure, defense, science ... households for example ...?
                        Can our "elite" fire Nabiulina?
                        And why not?
                        Law.
                        And the law has a Guarantor.
                        That is, the Guarantor guarantees the immunity and immunity of Nabiulina as the head of the Central Bank.
                        So ?

                        When you wrote, what kind of elite did you mean?
                        And at one time I met with ministers, and with deputies (including those who were fired upon by tanks in the "White House"), and with vice-speakers of the State Duma ... at one time I communicated with Abramovich, and with Khodorkovsky, and with Nevzlin ...
                        Here is Khazin Mikhail, what position he held ... but the elite devoured him, for he honestly did his job ...

                        I would like a real elite to appear in Russia. With its own will - good for the State and Society. So that it ITSELF to establish laws and regulations - for the good of the State and Society.

                        But you probably don't think so ...?
                      3. Oden280
                        Oden280 28 February 2021 15: 53
                        -2
                        No, I do not think so.
                      4. bayard
                        bayard 28 February 2021 16: 39
                        +1
                        I knew it .
      2. Destiny
        Destiny 26 February 2021 12: 14
        +9
        Quote: Sahalinets
        There will be enough for a couple of aircraft carriers and an escort.

        It has long been known that the aggregate price of toys of domestic billionaires exceeds the cost of all warships built over the past 10 years for the Navy, only 20 yachts of our oligarchs are more expensive than the entire Russian Navy. This is about "where is the money, Zin" ..
        1. Captainvp
          Captainvp 3 March 2021 02: 00
          0
          1. "It is known for a long time" (as a variant of "Well-known") is one of the manipulation markers, which is ... well-known.
          2. In the Russian Federation at the moment there are billionaires, but there are no "oligarchs".
      3. Proxima
        Proxima 26 February 2021 14: 32
        +1
        Quote: Sahalinets
        Check out the list of yachts of our oligarchs! There will be enough for a couple of aircraft carriers and an escort. It's just that the current elite has completely different goals ...

        Or take civil shipbuilding. Russia is now one of the three in terms of tonnage of civilian ships. Tankers, gas carriers, and of course giant icebreakers that provide their traffic. In a word, if the money of the huckster oligarchs is involved, it turns out and we know how to build, moreover, quickly and high-tech! And these hucksters do not care about the navy! That's what's upsetting ..
        1. Ivanchester
          Ivanchester 26 February 2021 19: 54
          +5
          Quote: Proxima
          Russia is now one of the three in terms of tonnage of civilian ships.

          Russia entered the top three in the third quarter of 3 taken separately, and not in terms of output, but in terms of orders received.
          Unfortunately, in general, we are very far behind Korea, China and Japan.
        2. mvg
          mvg 27 February 2021 00: 39
          0
          Russia is now one of the three in terms of tonnage of civilian ships

          Don't be fancy ... Japan, RK and China. With a painful separation. And you can't compete for money.
    3. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
      Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 26 February 2021 10: 03
      +1
      Quote: Lech from Android.
      Where to get the resources for the construction of a new modern Russian fleet?

      Raise taxes, milk the people, curtail social programs, increase the activity of propagandists. Shall we treat with understanding?
      1. Okolotochny
        Okolotochny 26 February 2021 14: 00
        -3
        Raise taxes, milk the people, curtail social programs,

        I rarely agree with you, but here I will fully support you. Especially when the hype begins - there is no fleet, no naval aviation, no naval air defense and anti-aircraft defense, no aviks - and a chorus of applause from "commentators" - in the Soviet past, "Gorshkov's fleet" was created from the pockets of people. Will these "commentators" agree with this now?
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 18: 26
          +6
          And nothing that our grandmothers flow away like a river. Only at the exit there is nothing? What about this? With our expenses FOR THE SAME MONEY, it would be possible to have at least 1,5 times more powerful fleet.
          1. hydrox
            hydrox 28 February 2021 11: 46
            +1
            With this approach ("guns instead of butter" (fleet instead of social)) we will have a social explosion, and instead of the fleet and instead of the social sector - I don't think that Russia needs such a course of events ...
            1. timokhin-aa
              28 February 2021 12: 03
              +1
              Well, you need to spend money sparingly.
              1. hydrox
                hydrox 28 February 2021 14: 07
                +1
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Well, you need to spend money sparingly.


                So no one objects - of course, you need to save money, but have you yourself tried to curtail the appetites of VIP-liber-managers from Sudostroy? And do not try, this has not yet been achieved. For some reason, it seems to me that this cannot be achieved either from Putin in 15 years, and even more so from Mishustin in just a year ...
                So, as long as there are funds or assets, the "empowered little people" will try to plunder them - they have been doing this effectively and very successfully since 1993. yes
    4. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 02
      +13
      in our time, everything again depends on the country's economy. Russia is now unable to build an aircraft carrier and an escort for its escort ...


      Yes, we have it, and ships that become inexpensive escorts too. The problem is organizational - we cannot manage it all rationally and rationally.
      Well, if you count the cost of all projects like 22160, Poseidon, 20386, unnecessary for the fleet, then 25% of the aircraft carrier is buried only there.
      With Future Subs for Poseidon - half.
      Now they are trying to push the defective "Kazan", which is 1/3 of the aircraft carrier at a price, to the fleet.

      We don’t have money, we don’t have brains, alas.
      1. DrEng527
        DrEng527 26 February 2021 13: 20
        +2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        We don’t have money, we don’t have brains, alas.

        by the way, you partially covered this problem in the article!
      2. mvg
        mvg 27 February 2021 00: 53
        0
        defective "Kazan", which is 1/3 of the aircraft carrier for the price

        $ 1,5 billion is not the cost of 1/3 Henry Ford. And why did you decide that our piece production will come out cheaper. Plus an air wing and technology that does not exist. Kuznetsov cannot be repaired. With whom to compete at sea? Do we have overseas colonies? It is better to master the Arctic. We in the Navy will not surpass either the United States, or China, or Japan and Korea. And the investments are colossal.
        1. timokhin-aa
          28 February 2021 12: 05
          +3
          $ 1,5 billion is not the cost of 1/3 Henry Ford.


          But this is 1/3 of the cost of a dvuhkatapultnogo forty-ton, approximately

          Plus aircraft wing and technology


          MiG-29K production aircraft. produced incl. for export.

          In the Navy, we will not surpass either the United States, or China, or Japan and Korea.


          To continue further, it is necessary to formulate the concept of "surpass"
          1. mvg
            mvg 28 February 2021 13: 46
            -2
            But this is 1/3 of the cost of a dvuhkatapultnogo forty-ton, approximately

            What is this? Charles is French? We do not have small Rafal for him, and the MiG-29K is half-baked, not a finished product. And we will not build either Elizabeth or Gaulle, we will not master. Frigates, this is the maximum.
            Well, for surpassing, I meant the Pacific sea powers. Each of which is more powerful than all of our 4 fleets combined (not counting nuclear submarines)
            1. timokhin-aa
              28 February 2021 19: 09
              +3
              What is this? Is Charles French?


              This is roughly a catapult Vikrant. And it is quite possible to build it.

              The MiG-29K is half-baked, not a finished product.


              It's easier to finish than to create from scratch. Indians fly over there, although they have a choice. Though they grumble.

              Well, for surpassing, I meant the Pacific sea powers.


              Let's surpass this means what? Shall we customize more ships? What exactly do you mean?
    5. Nemchinov Vl
      Nemchinov Vl 26 February 2021 17: 04
      +3
      Quote: Lech from Android.
      Russia is not in a position to build now .... and an escort .... escorts ... no money for this. Where to get the resources for the construction of a new modern Russian fleet?
      can "take the hand of some prominent figures" (of the Russians closest to "TOPS FORBES" and from the ranks: Gref, Chubais, Miller, Rotenberg, Medvedev, Deripaska, Sechin ... etc.) invite to the column hall ... and in front of journalists, raise the issue - "About love for the Motherland, and the true patriotism of these Russians !!", and immediately ask each of them, finance EXACTLY from YOUR PERSONAL (and not the enterprises controlled by them !!!) funds, the construction of one warship for the Russian Navy, a class of at least fr. 22350, or better 22350M (or EM / BOD type 11560, with modern weapons systems: UKSK, SAM "Polyment-Redut", etc.) ... ?! winked Under wonderful toasts, - "about love for the Fatherland" ?!
      1. bayard
        bayard 27 February 2021 08: 36
        +1
        Who would dare to gather these crystal clear people? belay
        Who will encroach on these pillars of nobility, patriotism and selflessness? repeat
        Who will be that impudent, provocateur and anti-Semite? angry
        Who will encroach on the labor penny of these bezserebryanikov ?!
        These are holy people. yes
        You can only pray for them ...
        And repent. recourse
        And pay. sad
        And you Volodya - repent. smile
        That's not why they raised taxes. wink
        And not for the purpose of building ships. yes
        And in order for good people to live well. bully
    6. max702
      max702 26 February 2021 19: 58
      +1
      There is money and opportunities, it makes no sense ... Two AUG alone cannot solve anything, but with 5-6 you can not pull ... And how the US naval military-industrial complex will finally be delighted with some kind of goal to justify the grandmother ... That's why hypersound for everything possible ..
    7. hydrox
      hydrox 28 February 2021 11: 42
      +1
      Yes, it's not about the means.
      It is impossible to build ANY fleet without a scientific and political rationale (Concepts, Doctrines ...), from which it clearly follows who we are fighting with, the goals of this struggle, the resources necessary to counter the enemy (hereinafter the list of his resources and goals).
      Gorshkov had such an understanding, and therefore built such a fleet, guided by SUCH Doctrine, the use of which excluded the use of nuclear weapons.
      Today, on the contrary, our Doctrine allows us to be the first to use nuclear weapons with the massive use of conventional weapons against us - this position is a recognition of our weakness, that is, intimidation of the enemy.
      Gorshkov created a fleet based on the balance of weapons, not by the number of BGs, but by the permissibility of a certain number of losses. Today the situation is different: the can is READY to use nuclear weapons - this is evidenced by the increase in the number of provocations, orders of magnitude greater than it was under Trump.
      1. tasha
        tasha 28 February 2021 13: 57
        +1
        Our Doctrine allows us to be the first to use nuclear weapons in the event of the massive use of conventional weapons against us - this position is a recognition of our weakness, that is, intimidation of the enemy.
        Not sure if you are drawing the correct conclusion. And if so: in the event of "massive use of conventional weapons against us," we will fight to the end, and will stop at nothing, up to the use of nuclear weapons.
        Trying to maintain parity with a potential adversary in conventional types of weapons - no economy will survive. History to help us.
  5. Runway
    Runway 26 February 2021 05: 53
    +5
    Hard to read material. There are many assumptions and subjectivity. The moment about the "axes" and "31st" as well as the powerlessness of the air defense missile defense system in front of the "axes" is the distortion of the texture for oneself (it is ugly, however, but not the point).
    The current state of the Navy can be characterized by the expression "according to Senka cap." However, this also applies to the RF Armed Forces, other "power" departments, the defense industry complex and all branches of the "national economy".
    The newly formed "new" management system and society are not productive. The time of other "Empires" is coming.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 03
      +7
      oment about "axes" and "31st" as well as the impotence of air defense missile systems in front of "axes" - distorting the texture for themselves (ugly, however, but not the point).


      What do you mean?

      The current state of the Navy can be characterized by the expression "according to Senka cap."


      For the money that we spend at our prices, it would be possible to have at least 1,5 more powerful fleet. If not more.
  6. Free wind
    Free wind 26 February 2021 06: 05
    .
    Understood nothing. Now Khrushchev wanted to destroy the fleet, then he did not want to. The Cuban Missile Crisis which we ourselves unleashed by placing missiles on Cuba, but on that priest we moved out, for what? Aircraft carriers what do we need? To fight in Zasiria? Aircraft are quite capable of defending their territories even without aircraft carriers. Moreover, with the Chinese, the main border with us is by land. The military wants to get epaulets. and denyushka
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 04
      +11
      Understood nothing.


      Quite right, you have understood absolutely nothing.
    2. dauria
      dauria 26 February 2021 12: 48
      +5
      The Cuban Missile Crisis which we ourselves unleashed by placing missiles on Cuba, but on that priest we moved out, for what?


      The crisis is not "Caribbean", it is Turkish. And it began with the deployment of missiles in Turkey.
      Then, in response, ours in Cuba, then the confrontation on the brink - and removed the missiles from Turkey and Cuba. And the task was solved. Without a fleet, by the way. Some ground forces in Europe. Their simple presence and the ability to walk to Biscay, making the war meaningless for the United States. And not an exchange of nuclear bombs with aircraft and missiles. But this is for the author, not for you.
      By the way, Hitler also did not need the fleet to disperse everyone in the corners.
      And they broke his spine on land. If he hadn't climbed to the USSR, he would have ruled the seas and land from Scandinavia to Suez
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 26 February 2021 16: 17
        +3
        Quote: dauria
        And they broke his spine on land. If he hadn't climbed to the USSR, he would have ruled the seas and land from Scandinavia to Suez

        Everything would be fine, only Hitler got into the USSR due to the impossibility of direct coercion of Britain to peace by landing on the island. And the reason for this was precisely the fleet, which Limey had and Jerry did not.
        Therefore, the military-political leadership of the Reich, counting the losses during the landing, fell into indirect actions on land - anything, just not a landing. The same attack on the USSR was reasoned "depriving Britain of its last hope on the continent".

        And if Hitler does not climb the USSR, then he finds himself face to face with the coalition of Britain and the United States. Moreover, half of the Wehrmacht in this case is sitting in the East - to guard the neutral USSR. Because, on the one hand, Uncle Joe's real-life politician is well known - as soon as the Reich gets bogged down in the war and weaken the eastern borders, the USSR may well begin restore historical justice и free peoples from the fascist yoke... On the other hand, Adolf has an obsession that limes can really sign the Russian steam rink for themselves again. smile
        So the position of the Reich is unenviable in this case.
        1. dauria
          dauria 26 February 2021 16: 32
          +1
          So the position of the Reich is unenviable in this case.


          This position of England was unenviable - for the time being, Spain and Gibraltar, "neutral", followed by Suez and Arab oil. There, looking and Turkey as allies "for a small share" Well, they would sit behind a puddle on their hummock. It was as difficult for them to cross the English Channel as it was for the Germans to cross them. The United States was not eager to get involved in "congeners". And what's the point? War is decided on land, not at sea. Then Churchill jumped up to the skies with happiness, that "the war has moved away." He then counted on mixing France-Germany, and then a bummer, legs up and drape from Dunkirk.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 26 February 2021 19: 51
            +2
            Quote: dauria
            This position of England was unenviable - for the time being Spain and Gibraltar are "neutral"

            Spain? Did the Reich get excess food from somewhere?
            Franco agreed to enter the Axis only on one condition - the Reich replaces America in the supply of food for the country ravaged by the Civil War. In the Reich, in 1941, the situation is such that information about cutting rations reached as far as Halder's diaries, and the grain balance was reduced only on condition of the plunder of the USSR.
            And to force Spain into the Axis is to follow the path of Napoleon. smile
            Quote: dauria
            further Suez and Arab oil.

            Arab oil is post-war. At the beginning of the 40s, the main oil production was the USA (the absolute leader) and Southeast Asia.
            Quote: dauria
            Well, they would sit behind a puddle on their hummock. It was as difficult for them to cross the English Channel as it was for the Germans to cross them. The USA was not eager to get involved in the "congeners".

            Mwa-ha-ha ... the United States was so reluctant to get involved in limes that already in March 1941 (being neutral) sent a commission to reconnoitre the areas of the future basing of the American Armed Forces on the Islands and, in general, to assess what needs to be corrected in the British Metropolis for normal warfare. At the same time, American firms were engaged in the reconstruction of British ports.
            The defeat of Britain was not part of the plans of the United States - Runway number 1 they were not going to lose. And so they tried to provoke the Reich in any way - just pumping Britain with equipment and raw materials + the regular shift to the east of the border of the Neutral Patrol zone is worth what. smile
      2. mvg
        mvg 27 February 2021 01: 04
        0
        And they broke his spine on land.

        Very controversial. Without Lend-Lease, there wouldn't be much. If the USA had not broken Japan at sea, there would have been japans in the Far East. The British and Americans defeated Hitler in Africa. Minus oil, and this is gasoline and oils. Romania was not enough.
  7. smaug78
    smaug78 26 February 2021 08: 19
    0
    And in fact, the US Navy, after suffering losses, would turn into a thing in itself, capable, at best, of escorting convoys and carrying out raiding operations.
    Quite enough. How to safely deliver troops to the European theater of operations.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 06
      +3
      Well, according to the Maritime strategy, a "bright finale" was envisaged in the form of a landing in Kamchatka and the Kola Peninsula, the seizure of the Kuriles and further into Primorye.

      Did not know?

      In addition, there is a huge difference between total domination in all naval theaters and the escorting of convoys in combat, and it would be felt quite well in the land theaters.
      1. smaug78
        smaug78 26 February 2021 12: 08
        +3
        In addition, there is a huge difference between total domination in all naval theaters and the escorting of convoys in combat, and it would be felt quite well in the land theaters.

        и
        how our fleet would almost completely cease to exist.

        Well, according to the Maritime strategy, a "bright finale" was envisaged in the form of a landing in Kamchatka and the Kola Peninsula, the seizure of the Kuriles and further into Primorye.
        Believe it or not, you knew. Dear author, cleverness has not yet painted anyone
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 12: 43
          +6
          Yes, some other users have inflamed me here, do not take it personally.

          Let's just say, the situation "the United States can lead convoys to Europe and we sometimes bomb them and the unloading places too" is one thing, but when this is also there, but without "bombing", and also the marines In Magadan and Sakhalin, this is different and this the difference, in principle, could provide.
          Until a certain moment.
          1. smaug78
            smaug78 26 February 2021 15: 45
            +2
            I understand you, talking with a person for whom knowledge and logic is replaced by an ura-chuyka is incredibly difficult and nervous hi drinks
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 26 February 2021 20: 57
        -3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Well, according to the Maritime strategy, a "bright finale" was envisaged in the form of a landing in Kamchatka and the Kola Peninsula, the seizure of the Kuriles and further into Primorye.
        Did not know?

        Enough to carry the blizzard - only very naive people can believe in this nonsense, because as long as these "disembarkers" are loaded onto ships, nothing will remain of their country. By the way, who is the author of these Maritime strategy fantasies - give the name and position to begin with, in order to understand where the fireballs come from.
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 20: 59
          0
          Stop carrying a blizzard - only very naive people can believe in this nonsense, because as long as these "disembarkers" are loaded onto ships, nothing will remain of their country.


          You are a great expert in such matters, I remember.

          By the way, who is the author of these Maritime strategy fantasies - give a specific name to begin with


          And this man claims that he served in the GRU. Shame.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 26 February 2021 21: 50
            0
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            You are a great expert in such matters, I remember.

            So do not forget when you start to fantasize primitively. So there for the troops will be loaded on ships - do not evade, educate.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            And this man claims that he served in the GRU. Shame.

            I didn’t say anything to you - you’re a journalist, and for me there’s no authority at all to prove something to you.
            1. timokhin-aa
              26 February 2021 22: 59
              +4
              Yes, you have already proved everything.
  8. Pamir
    Pamir 26 February 2021 08: 26
    +4
    Most importantly, the history of the development and decline of the Navy, the leadership should teach something. It is criminal to mark the place for decades, you need to decide and get down to business. The article is good as always, respect to the author.
    1. Doctor
      Doctor 26 February 2021 13: 20
      +3
      laughing
      Most importantly, the history of the development and decline of the Navy, the leadership should teach something. It is criminal to mark the place for decades, you need to decide and get down to business. The article is good as always, respect to the author.

      The conclusion is simple.

      "If you want to destroy a small country, give it a cruiser, and if you want to destroy a large country, give it a large fleet!" laughing
  9. Silhouette
    Silhouette 26 February 2021 08: 34
    -6
    Russia is a continental self-sufficient country. Colonies are not needed. May God help you master your resources correctly. England and the United States are maritime countries that need a fleet to develop the resources of the colonies and fight for their retention with countries that are in the same position as them. Therefore, the Russian fleet does not need an "ocean" one as under Gorshkov, but a continental one. Stop puffing out your cheeks. Empty it. I was in the Indian and Mediterranean squadrons at Gorshkov. Solid show-off. Empty it.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 09
      +7
      Russia is a continental self-sufficient country.


      Not tired of repeating this nonsense?

      By the way, the article says about you:

      Similarly, today we have a large mass of citizens, simultaneously who believe that Russia does not depend on sea communications and who know about the existence of the Northern Sea Route, Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the group of forces in Syria. it pathological problem, which seriously burdens the political leadership making the right decisions, if only because pathological thinking finds its supporters in the highest echelons of power.


      Therefore, the Russian fleet does not need an "ocean" one as under Gorshkov, but a continental one.


      It remains only to explain what it is - a continental fleet.
      1. Silhouette
        Silhouette 26 February 2021 11: 33
        +2
        Similarly, today we have a large mass of citizens who at the same time believe that Russia does not depend on sea communications and know about the existence of the Northern Sea Route, Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the grouping of troops in Syria. This is a pathological problem that seriously complicates the adoption of correct decisions by the political leadership, if only because pathological thinking finds its supporters in the highest echelons of power.

        Sorry, but this is an empty set of words and clichés. I know that Russia does not depend on (not sea, but) ocean communications and the group of forces in Syria. And you do not catch the difference between sea and ocean communications.
        It is written about the "believers". And I consider myself to be "knowledgeable". Moreover, in my own skin, not only in combat service in those very 80s, which were the real finest hour of our Navy (and not the 70s, as you groundlessly claim). I explain about the continental fleet. This is a fleet that ensures the interests of the state in the economic zone of the sea. In the ocean, we have nothing to do except improve the BP during training voyages. The Russian economy does not depend on ocean shipping. And the northern sea route runs within the same economic zone. Now it is clear? Syria is a separate topic and has nothing to do with naval strategies. Now explain to me what a "pathological problem" is, how can a problem become pathological? Or is it you who are delusional and apply concepts whose meaning you do not know.
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 11: 36
          +3
          Sorry, but this is an empty set of words and clichés. I know that Russia does not depend on (not sea, but) ocean communications and the group of forces in Syria. And you do not catch the difference between sea and ocean communications.


          Well, then we will cut ALL communications and it is from the DMZ, is it unclear to you as a former officer?

          And I consider myself to be "knowledgeable"


          You should reconsider your self-esteem ...

          This is a fleet that ensures the interests of the state in the economic zone of the sea.


          What is "sea economic zone"?

          In the ocean we have nothing to do but


          Just one remark - the only force on the planet capable of destroying the population of the Russian Federation is physically American SSBNs and they are in the OCEAN.

          Is this point clear?

          There are a lot of such moments, in fact, I'm just too lazy to list them all.
          1. Silhouette
            Silhouette 26 February 2021 18: 48
            +4
            Just one remark - the only force on the planet capable of destroying the population of the Russian Federation is physically American SSBNs and they are in the OCEAN.

            Well, a very valuable remark. Straight eyes opened .... And in the OCEAN, we can destroy them? What and how?
            1. timokhin-aa
              26 February 2021 20: 04
              -1
              How and how are submarines destroyed?
              1. Silhouette
                Silhouette 26 February 2021 22: 14
                +2
                Are you from Odessa?
                1. timokhin-aa
                  26 February 2021 22: 58
                  -1
                  No, from somewhere else.
                  Just a natural question.
        2. ccsr
          ccsr 26 February 2021 21: 05
          +1
          Quote: Silhouette
          And I consider myself to be "knowledgeable". Moreover, in my own skin, not in one combat service in those very 80s, which were the real finest hour of our Navy (and not the 70s, as you groundlessly claim). I explain about the continental fleet.

          The trouble is that such specialists as you are not perceived by authors with a journalistic past, because they have nothing behind their souls, and they do not understand what you are talking about. Well, those who passed the times of Gorshkov and saw the collapse of the country as a mature person, have long understood that our generals and naval commanders also did not know the measures in their ambitions, and this had a very bad effect on the country and its citizens.
          Quote: Silhouette
          The Russian economy does not depend on ocean shipping. And the northern sea route runs within the same economic zone. Now it is clear?

          But nifiga they do not understand - give them the whole world and all the oceans, although it is clear that Russia is not even the USSR, and our economic opportunities for such spending are simply unprepared, which means we will again drive the economy with military spending.
          Quote: Silhouette
          Syria is a separate topic and has nothing to do with naval strategies.

          Absolutely true, especially since the VKS were the decisive force there.
          Quote: Silhouette
          Or are you delusional and using concepts whose meaning you do not know.

          This is what is inherent in them - I completely agree.
        3. Eroma
          Eroma 28 February 2021 20: 42
          +1
          Russia is the largest country on the planet fellow she, with all her desire, if she wants to be successful, has interests on a global scale! bully then that its size is the reason to reduce it !!! And even if our economy does not need ocean communications (and this is a mistake!), We must be able to threaten the communications of potential rivals! Otherwise, everyone will be solving only one problem: how to saw through Russia! And so we give them reasons to work out other questions laughing And our global military power can be converted into alliances, it certainly gives an economic effect! Our resource companies can develop deposits in other parts of the world, the arms market, investment opportunities in other countries, etc. etc.
      2. Proxima
        Proxima 26 February 2021 15: 34
        +2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Russia is a continental self-sufficient country.


        Not tired of repeating this nonsense?

        Unfortunately, the powerful of this world are sick with this delirium. Take Alexander the First for example. He said that Russia is a continental power and does not need a navy. The Emperor, you see, was offended by the naval forces that they did not help him in the fight against Napleon. As a result, funding was cut and already under Nicholas we received the shameful Crimean War. Indeed, why make disastrous campaigns on Moscow, if you can block the naval base and port cities - Sevastopol, Odessa, Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky ... And Russia, which ignored its fleet, almost turned into a semi-colony like China. It's good that we quickly picked up. History teaches us that no one teaches it. Sometimes this ignorance is very dear to us.
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 18: 11
          +2
          Unfortunately, the powerful of this world are sick with this delirium.


          Yes, I mentioned pathological thinking for a reason.
        2. The eye of the crying
          The eye of the crying 27 February 2021 16: 12
          +2
          Quote: Proxima
          Indeed, why make disastrous campaigns on Moscow, if you can block the naval base and port cities - Sevastopol, Odessa, Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky ...


          Do you really think that the Russian Empire lost the Crimean War because the enemy blocked the ports?
  10. north 2
    north 2 26 February 2021 08: 35
    +4
    that the authors pursued the article calling Sergei Gorshkov, and not Admiral Gorshkov, I did not understand. It's good that Admiral of the Soviet Union Fleet Gorshkov was not named in the title of the article yet simply Sergei Gorshkov. Such are the times ...
    As for how he writes in the article that Gorshkov showed himself as a politician who knew how not badly to catch the direction of the winds in the Kremlin corridors of power, it should be noted that the basis of Gorshkov's legacy of the development of attack surface ships was left by Admiral Kuznetsov in the program for the construction of as many as twenty-five lungs cruisers of project 68-bis. And while Kuznetsov could not contradict Khrushchev and Zhukov and built the Project 68 artillery cruisers, at that time in the United States, starting in 1953, they began to build Baltimore-class missile cruisers. And Admiral Gorshkov managed to stop the construction of the 68-bis project and began to build BOD, EM and TFR with missile weapons.
    So Admiral Gorshkov could defend his. What kind of politicking is there.
    And how would the authors of the article call the actions of Admiral Igor Kasatonov, who did not listen to how, according to Yeltsin's project, they began to break the Black Sea Fleet and even transfer Ukraine under the oath, and by his decisions and actions the Kasatonov stopped it and kept the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol for Russia. Also politicking?
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 18
      +3
      what the authors pursued


      There is ONE signature under the article. Can't you see?

      Well, the rest is some kind of phantom pain, of course it was Khrushchev who wanted to build 68bis, but of course.
      Well, a politician is not always a bad thing, which clearly follows from what has been written (not for everyone only)
  11. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 26 February 2021 08: 50
    -3
    a fleet is needed, 1. submarines are needed 2 Coastal aviation 3 PLO frigates and corvettes to control 2000-3000 km from Murmansk and Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky. Gorshkov's fundamental mistake was only NKs larger than 1135, 1155, mainly aircraft carriers with incomprehensible goals and simply unsuccessful without berths, even quickly out of order. And so the construction of hundreds of submarines, airplanes, dozens of patrol boats was very even true, although they had not yet betrayed the country and had not sent billions of dollars to America, so the budget was enough ... but is there any merit of Gorshkov personally?
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 24
      +2
      n, 1. submarines are needed 2 Coastal aviation 3 PLO frigates and corvettes to control 2000-3000 km from Murmansk and Petropavlovsk Kamchatsky.


      Don't you understand that it will not be possible to control the situation 2000 km from Kamchatka? There is already a deep American rear.

      Calm down Vladimir and buy a world map to get started.
  12. Silhouette
    Silhouette 26 February 2021 09: 06
    +6
    A typical photo, where "Hot" carries out a funny "weapon tracking" of the aircraft carrier "Nimitz". Tracking with weapons - sounds menacing! ..... What weapon? ... "Wasp" or what? So she is only able to shower with fragments. To him it is like a grain of an elephant. "Blizzard"? So the aircraft carrier is in the dead zone and it is impossible to use it. 76mm fart? This is yes. Powerful weapon. Only the torpedo tubes remain. As many as 3 starboard torpedoes. It is unlikely that it will be possible to turn to the left side. The principle of kamikaze. All tactics of the Soviet Navy are based on it. Gorshkov did not come up with anything new. We also followed the AV Vinson and the battleship New Jersey. We were ready to die, but not to disgrace the fleet. Mediterranean squadron - Tsushima # 2, Indian squadron - Tsushima # 3.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 19
      0
      A typical photo, where "Hot" carries out a funny "weapon tracking" for the aircraft carrier "Nimitz"


      Don't know the difference between tracking and tracking weapons? Where is it written that "Hot" is tracking WEAPONS?
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 26 February 2021 18: 15
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        know the difference between tracking and tracking weapons?

        there are reconnaissance ships for this, not patrol boats
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 20: 04
          -1
          Are you sure you served in the Navy?
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 26 February 2021 20: 13
            +1
            I know how it is, and they wrote about it above, (tracking by a patrolman, but without weapons), it is there, but it is stupid, But I know how it should be in my opinion, that is, obviously it is necessary to conduct tracking by a reconnaissance ship in order to obtain information about the actions of the ship of a potential enemy, and its means of control, weapons and radio communications ... I'm not one of those who are always sure that what is done in the fleet or in another structure is always true and it should be, I am one of those who are used to thinking with my own head and consider any situation according to the principle, "you can always improve something." Haven't you figured it out yet? ... you are a person who lives by the principle "everyone does it".
            1. timokhin-aa
              26 February 2021 20: 30
              -1
              Tracking and tracking weapons is a very specific action with a very specific purpose. Why are you tying RZK here? They were there, by the way, and did and are doing what you write, but this is DIFFERENT.

              Vladimir, ay! We are losing you.
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 26 February 2021 20: 46
                -3
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Why are you tying RZK here? They were there, by the way, and did and are doing what you write, but this is DIFFERENT.

                explain WHY to watch the enemy ship? goals, objectives, meaning? show him your flag?
                1. timokhin-aa
                  26 February 2021 20: 54
                  +2
                  Have you read the article you are commenting on? It was repeated there many times.

                  The fact that you did not serve in the navy after that is already obvious, well, or maybe in the medical service, for example.
                  1. Vladimir1155
                    Vladimir1155 26 February 2021 21: 13
                    +1
                    I'll reveal a secret .. I'm a mechanic
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      26 February 2021 22: 57
                      -1
                      Ага.
                      And tact. still tell me you have no preparation at all, even minimal? Vladimir, this is not serious.
                      Stop asking you.
                  2. Silhouette
                    Silhouette 27 February 2021 10: 39
                    0
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    The fact that you did not serve in the navy after that is already obvious

                    What do you have to do with the navy? Where and by whom did you serve?
  13. Operator
    Operator 26 February 2021 09: 09
    0
    Technodeb ... ism continues to bloom and smell: "The Soviet Union found itself in a hopeless situation in Cuba, and only the Soviet navy could help Soviet diplomacy", - yes, yes, yes: the exchange of Cuba in 1962 for West Berlin and Turkey with the help of Soviet tanks, aircraft and missiles with TNW, of course, was impossible bully

    The ultra-expensive strategy of the United States with a stake on the Navy ala early 20th century de facto led to the military collapse of the United States, since our country opposed it with a multiple cheaper strategy for the development of land-based nuclear missile weapons of the late 20th century, and 40-ton Poseidons with 100 Mtn charges are just cherries on the cake.

    The article is another lobbying artifice of the shipbuilding industry signed by a journalist from the outskirts of the region.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 40
      -1
      Andryusha, who gave you a plus? The two of you became stakes on the site? Or have you got yourself a virtual?
  14. Alecsandr
    Alecsandr 26 February 2021 09: 24
    -4
    It is necessary to put into service such weapons so that no one even has a desire to unleash a war. If the warhead is not less than 100 megatons. If weapons are developed on new physical principles. And there is nothing to be ashamed of, but to bring directly to any aggressor country that for the price is not And building thousands of ships and airplanes will not stand the economy.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 21
      +4
      And how can a 100 megaton warhead help us against a sudden disarming strike, or terrorism, or some kind of provocation?

      Can you estimate the size and weight of such a product?

      And the economy will not stand the construction of thousands of ships and planes.


      Straight thousands of ships ... surprisingly simple.
      1. CastroRuiz
        CastroRuiz 26 February 2021 15: 40
        0
        Tukhachevskiy vstal z groba. :)
        1. Pamir
          Pamir 26 February 2021 19: 28
          +1
          CastroRuiz, I did NOT minus you, but I'll correct it a little, it will be correct in Russian "turned over in the grave" if there is an interest in Slavic folklore.
          And what does Tukhachevsky have to do with it?
      2. Narak-zempo
        Narak-zempo 26 February 2021 15: 55
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        And how can a 100 megaton warhead help us against a sudden disarming strike, or terrorism, or some kind of provocation?

        Well, for example, to bomb Voronezh in response to hostile actions against Russia.
        Moreover, it can be placed in this very Voronezh - then the enemy's strike will be able to get ahead with an arbitrarily small flight time. And no media is needed.
        That would be a real pistol at the enemy's temple.
        1. Pamir
          Pamir 26 February 2021 20: 13
          +1
          Narak, I DO NOT minus you, the question to you is, what city do you live in? Why Voronezh for the slaughter? The city is strategically important for the Russian Federation, a millionaire, with enterprises of strategic importance, people live there, not a desert. Put a nuclear charge under your belly and fellow countrymen "Will you go as a sacrifice? Whoever offers, the first to be sacrificed. Will you go?"
          1. Narak-zempo
            Narak-zempo 26 February 2021 20: 16
            +2
            Quote: Pamir
            Narak, I DO NOT minus you, the question to you is, what city do you live in? Why Voronezh for the slaughter? The city is strategically important for the Russian Federation, a millionaire, with enterprises of strategic importance, people live there, not a desert. Put a nuclear charge under your belly and fellow countrymen "Will you go as a sacrifice? Whoever offers, the first to be sacrificed. Will you go?"

            Well, I didn’t come up with the meme about the bombing of Voronezh in response to the sanctions.
            1. Pamir
              Pamir 26 February 2021 20: 39
              -2
              In response to the sanctions of whom and against whom? Meme-meme, there are many thirsty likes, there is a lot that is not serious, but you wrote a joke about bombing. There are a lot of border cities, Rostov, Krasnodar, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, Belgorod, Kursk, Pskov, Novgorod, Sochi, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Astrakhan, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Murmansk, Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Sevastopol, it's not all clear on the periphery of the borders, there are much more cities, who should be the first to be under the bombs? "Who will agree? With your light hand? I honestly did not understand humor.
              1. Narak-zempo
                Narak-zempo 27 February 2021 08: 56
                +1
                https://sntch.com/otkuda-vzyalsya-mem-pro-bombit-voronezh/
          2. Nestor Vlakhovski
            Nestor Vlakhovski 26 February 2021 20: 43
            -2
            And what's the difference whose warheads will bomb a city in a nuclear war?
            So at least some benefit will be ...
            In fact, not the worst offer.
        2. Nestor Vlakhovski
          Nestor Vlakhovski 26 February 2021 20: 41
          0
          Bombing Voronezh is no longer fashionable.
          Military science has come to a proposal to collect together all available nuclear weapons and bury them in some superdeep mine.
          Then certainly not a single adversary will turn up after the threats to destroy the planet.
          1. Pamir
            Pamir 26 February 2021 21: 06
            0
            Nestor, I repeat, without minus one, will you put it under yourself? So that no one is sorry. You were, you are not, and fellow countrymen, too, business, what little thing. In whose deep mine, for yourself, will you get ready? "You are a mod, however. Well then, what specific fashion of the current date will you indicate? Well, fashionable to you, in this case, to nothing, you and your region, a flag in your hands, who offers, he experiences on himself. Beautiful is far away, to evil enemy , to get a sunburn with a nuclear tan, whoever burns immediately is lucky, from his own weapon, a wonderful prospect.
            1. Nestor Vlakhovski
              Nestor Vlakhovski 26 February 2021 21: 18
              -1
              will you put it under yourself?
              what should I put in? I don't have any bombs. There are specialists for this, they will put what is needed and where it is necessary, if they deem it necessary.
              I can only state that there are tons of proposals and are being discussed "where necessary."
              A nuclear exchange with the West is guaranteed to end with the destruction of Russia and the Russian people while inflicting non-critical damage to the enemy.
              But the threat to blow up the planet, with a nuclear charge on which we are sitting, can prevent any invasion attempts.
              1. Pamir
                Pamir 26 February 2021 21: 50
                0
                Nestor, thank God, and I have nothing under my belly either, but according to your "Bomb", another question, by the way? Under the influence of what (what kind of ammunition) would you prefer to be in the fashion trend? The question is, are you so easy to offer yourself and your family, your fellow countrymen in exchange? What are your fashionable views? Under the nuclear fashion impact naturally?
                In your;
                For this there are specialists, they will then put what is needed and where it is necessary, if they deem it necessary. "Indicate the responsible persons in the Russian Federation, when, who, where, prepares a nuclear pillow for its citizens?
                And further on yours; "I can only state that there are such proposals and are being discussed" where necessary "- the question, which of the responsible persons is ready to exchange, indicate. Since you are pointing to ....., I do not understand who? Point to those experts, if it does not make it difficult, as I understand it, you refer to the responsible persons of the Russian Federation. Voronezh is not fashionable, but what city is it fashionable to bomb in the Russian Federation?
              2. timokhin-aa
                26 February 2021 22: 56
                -1
                But the threat to blow up the planet, with a nuclear charge on which we are sitting, can prevent any invasion attempts.


                I knew that you were sick, I just felt it.
                Or is this just an attempt at trolling?
                1. Pamir
                  Pamir 27 February 2021 00: 08
                  +1
                  The author, Alexander, here apparently educated decided that they are invincible, it's time for them to be tested at Totsky, with a second test, for toy lovers on their smartphones. stupid people do not even imagine what it is, the impact of a nuclear detonation. They live, you understand, rather far from the coast, here the coast is far, up to the king, and they are beguiled, they live in toys, mama's sons. They even have nothing to write, dumb-ass , they do not even realize that what they write about, cities are blown up, and not their own cities, but state ones, playfully, it is so easy to put a vigorous matryon under the belly, far away from their relatives, themselves under a nuclear matryoshka they put them down, hide behind others, consider their own hut on the edge, they won't hook. Well, well, when it hooks, it won't seem a little, and it's too late to complain, medicine against oncology is still powerless. These smartphone heroes have not even read about "Chernobyl" read- "Essay by Lyudmila Ignatenko, wife of the deceased Chernobyl firefighter Vasily Ignatenko", mourning, from the impact of a dirty, minimal nuclear bomb. And now in service, clean nuclear weapons.
                2. Narak-zempo
                  Narak-zempo 27 February 2021 12: 25
                  +1
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  I knew that you were sick, I just felt it.
                  Or is this just an attempt at trolling?

                  Yes, not very similar to trolling (here I am basically a troll, and extremely thick).
                  Pavel just loosely expounds the concept of the "Doomsday Machine" (for those who do not know - that on Wikipedia).
            2. Narak-zempo
              Narak-zempo 27 February 2021 02: 28
              +2
              Quote: Pamir
              Nestor, I repeat, without minus one, will you put it under yourself? So that no one is sorry. You were, you are not, and fellow countrymen, too, business, what little thing. In whose deep mine, for yourself, will you get ready? "You are a mod, however. Well then, what specific fashion of the current date will you indicate? Well, fashionable to you, in this case, to nothing, you and your region, a flag in your hands, who offers, he experiences on himself. Beautiful is far away, to evil enemy , to get a sunburn with a nuclear tan, whoever burns immediately is lucky, from his own weapon, a wonderful prospect.

              The real Rus did not cease to be afraid of the Last Battle, for the revival of the world would follow the twilight of the gods.
  15. seregin-s1
    seregin-s1 26 February 2021 09: 40
    +6
    When was the fleet operational? Rather, the fleet was heroic. To detect a massive takeoff of aviation, the launch of ballistic missiles, report where to go and go to the bottom with honor. Each ship is in full view with the overwhelming advantage of the means of destroying NATO ships.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 22
      +2
      When was the fleet operational? Rather, the fleet was heroic. To detect a massive takeoff of aviation, the launch of ballistic missiles, report where to go and go to the bottom with honor.


      No not like this.
      Inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy, including combat ones, to which he will not agree, and THEN to the bottom.

      And that's not a fact, everyone would not be drowned.
  16. g1v2
    g1v2 26 February 2021 11: 25
    +6
    A rather controversial article. Although the opinion has the right to life. request
    Constant pressure from US ships? Well, what if the states just stupidly drowned the pressman and a big war began? Out of the blue? Blocks then kept their fingers on the descent and needed only a shot in Sarajevo. request
    Again Timokhin contradicts himself. On the one hand, the priority of land directions is in every possible way denigrated, and on the other hand, on the fate of the fleet, Gorshkov clearly shows that a coalition of naval powers can easily build a fleet larger and better than a land one. That is, as soon as the game went big, the mattresses were able to build a bigger and better fleet than we did. Moreover, since this is their main type of troops, since the states, Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand do not have on land, they could do this at the expense of the land component. We could not afford it, because there were European and Caucasian TVDs. And now it remains so.
    In order for Russia to build a fleet equal in value to a land army, maritime trade and transportation must multiply. The navy is a consequence of the developed civilian navy and sea trade. Otherwise, it will always be SECONDARY.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 11: 39
      +2
      Well, what if the states just stupidly drowned the pressman and a big war began? Out of the blue? Blocks then kept their fingers on the descent and only needed a shot in Sarajevo.


      Well, they didn't dare. Didn't dare?
      The question, however, is not this, but the main thing - the correct strategy beats the superiority of the enemy in forces. The article simply illustrates this with specific examples.

      That is, as soon as the game went big, the mattresses were able to build a bigger and better fleet than we did.


      No, in the 70s it was bigger and better. But the results are kind of hinting, right?

      In order for Russia to build a fleet equal in value to a land army, maritime trade and transportation must multiply.


      And we do not need an equivalent. We need an adequate and efficient one.
      1. The eye of the crying
        The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 13: 20
        +4
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        the correct strategy beats the superiority of the enemy in forces.


        The enemy, in addition to superiority in strength, can also have the right strategy.
        1. timokhin-aa
          26 February 2021 13: 22
          +2
          Well, there is already someone who will change his mind.
          1. The eye of the crying
            The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 13: 49
            +3
            It is impossible to "change your mind" the enemy for a long time if the enemy has the ability to adapt and stupidly more resources. You can win a short-term advantage (for example, it was in the early 1970s), but it must either be realized immediately (by starting a war) or lost. The only winning strategy is to avoid conflict.
            1. timokhin-aa
              26 February 2021 18: 09
              0
              You can win a short-term advantage (for example, it was in the early 1970s), but it must either be immediately realized (by starting a war) or lost


              Or win a new advantage.
              The essence of the Cold War at sea was that instead of actually destroying each other, we showed the enemy the ability to do this on conditions acceptable to him and unacceptable to him.
              This was the essence of the race.
              Therefore, it was not at all necessary to start a real war with 300+ million killed if you had a new trick in stock.
              We didn't have it.

              It must also be remembered that amers spent more than 6% of GDP on the military, and it is not a fact that they would have pulled out this race for another six or seven years.
              In the 70s we scared them CHEAPER than they did us later. One more repeat, and they could have fallen, not us.
              Well, or they would have fallen together, also an option.
              1. The eye of the crying
                The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 18: 31
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Or win a new advantage.


                Quote: timokhin-aa
                it was not necessary to start a real war with 300+ million killed if you had a new trick in stock.


                To play a deterrent role, this "new trick" must be known to the enemy. Here we again come to the logic of the arms race, and in this race the enemy is obviously stronger.

                Quote: timokhin-aa
                We didn't have it.


                And the war still did not happen.

                Quote: timokhin-aa
                It should also be remembered that amers spent more than 6% of GDP on military service.


                We must also remember that the United States has since become richer, and Russia is at best half of the Union. So they can exactly repeat.

                Quote: timokhin-aa
                and it is not a fact that they would have pulled this race for another six or seven years.


                This is as "not a fact" as the opposite. In general, it reminds the anecdote "I don't need to run faster than a lion, I need to run faster than you."
              2. Silhouette
                Silhouette 26 February 2021 19: 00
                0
                The essence of the Cold War at sea was that instead of actually destroying each other, we showed the enemy the ability to do this on conditions acceptable to him and unacceptable to him.

                Some kind of childish understanding of the Cold War at sea. There was no war at sea. Neither cold nor cool. There was a cold war in politics, and at sea, everyone was doing his job - both us and them. Regular combat training. In the air, by the way, the same thing. The Cold War is a propaganda cliche designed to proclaim victory in it.
                1. The eye of the crying
                  The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 19: 17
                  0
                  Quote: Silhouette
                  The Cold War is a propaganda cliche designed to proclaim victory in it.


                  Orwell, who invented this "stamp", put into it a very specific meaning - a conflict in which the place of hostilities between opponents is taken by a demonstration of combat power. In general, this "stamp" has been understood since then.
                  1. Silhouette
                    Silhouette 26 February 2021 22: 40
                    -1
                    Don't spread the myths of enemy propaganda. The clever Orwell did not invent the Cold War. He just simply on October 19, 1945, in his article “You and the Atomic Bomb,” wrote about the atomic bomb that it “will most likely put an end to large-scale wars for an indefinite period at the cost of establishing“ a peace that will not be peace. ”Here is a link to the complete text: https: //proza.ru/2014/03/29/1611 Bernard Baruch was the first to use this term in April 1947 as an advisor to the US President, and A. Timokhin invented and substantiated the "cold war at sea." an unconditional victory in it for the USA One stamp gives rise to another.
                    1. The eye of the crying
                      The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 22: 48
                      +1
                      Quote: Silhouette
                      Clever Orwell did not invent the "cold war"


                      He just described the future as he saw it smile

                      Quote: Silhouette
                      Here is a link to the full text: https: //proza.ru/2014/03/29/1611


                      "it will most likely put an end to large-scale wars indefinitely at the cost of establishing a 'peace that will not be peace'" What are you arguing with? smile
                    2. timokhin-aa
                      26 February 2021 22: 54
                      -1
                      And the "cold war at sea" was invented and substantiated by A. Timokhin.


                      Are you tired yet?
                    3. ccsr
                      ccsr 27 February 2021 10: 15
                      +1
                      Quote: Silhouette
                      And the "cold war at sea" was invented and substantiated by A. Timokhin. And also the unconditional victory of the United States in it.

                      When I first encountered his "creativity", at first I thought that the man was in the subject, and then when I began to delve into what he was writing, I immediately realized that his fantasies on naval affairs were just a set of cliches, and even with bad analysis. As the saying goes, if you put a thousand monkeys at typewriters and they will continuously beat the keys for a thousand years, then in the end one of them will print "War and Peace", but this will not make Leo Tolstoy. So it is with Timokhin - he fantasizes too much from a lack of basic knowledge and lack of naval experience as such, and this becomes noticeable to any military specialist, not even from the Navy. And why he pedals the topic of comparing our fleet with the American with a significant difference in the economic component of our countries, apparently the one who pays him for it knows.
                      Quote: Silhouette
                      One stamp gives rise to another.

                      This is the result of all his activities. It is a pity that ignorant people buy into it.
                      1. timokhin-aa
                        27 February 2021 14: 18
                        -2
                        When I first encountered his "creativity", at first I thought that the person was in the subject, and then when I began to delve into what he was writing, I immediately understood


                        Not bad for a drinking retired warrant officer. laughing
                        And how did you "penetrate" something? "Vnikalka" is needed for this.
                        laughing
            2. Eroma
              Eroma 1 March 2021 00: 09
              +1
              The USSR may have tried to give its own technological answer, to the American move in technology and numbers! this is a satellite targeting system, which turned out to be ineffective crying the USSR had a serious superiority in rocket technology, and if everything worked out with space, then all the attempts of the United States would go to dust lol Soviet nuclear submarines in hundreds of kilometers would follow the AUG and keep them under the gun of the Granit anti-ship missile, for example, the AUG would have nothing to oppose, looking for nuclear submarines at ranges of 400-500 km from the AUG, in my opinion, is not a real matter. In addition, the Soviet Navy, instead of the Tu16, could adopt the Tu 160 (with powerful electronic warfare systems, to disrupt the F14 attacks) + the satellite targeting system + long-range missile launchers, and then half of the world's oceans would be at gunpoint, and the time for an attack is literally 3-5 hours and Tu160 goes on the attack! and this would not have been answered in the USA either am .
              But it did not grow together ... then it did not grow together, but now new technologies, new opportunities, a satellite constellation with global coverage, I think, is cheaper than AUG and content is also cheaper! There are already hypersonic missiles with a range of more than 1000 km, Tu160 is being launched into series again, PAK DA with stealth technologies are being developed, UAVs with an intercontinental range for RTR are quite possible to create. If it works out with global target designation, then we already have all the other means of establishing dominance over the ocean!
              Strange as it may seem, but the dominance of the sea is ensured by AVIATION! we have aircraft with intercontinental range and there are missiles capable of penetrating any ship's air defense with a launch range outside the AUG air defense zone! soldier we are capable of delivering devastating AVIATION strikes against enemy fleets thousands of kilometers from our shores angry You just need to solve the task with target designation what
              1. The eye of the crying
                The eye of the crying 1 March 2021 09: 15
                0
                Quote: Eroma
                the USSR had a serious superiority in missile technology


                I won't even ask how it manifested itself smile

                Quote: Eroma
                we have aircraft with intercontinental range


                Quote: Eroma
                we are capable of delivering devastating AVIATION strikes against enemy fleets thousands of kilometers from our shores


                Yes? OK. Why do you need this?
                1. Eroma
                  Eroma 1 March 2021 14: 05
                  +1
                  As for the missiles: the advantage was expressed in the presence of missiles capable of supersonic hitting targets at a distance of 700 km! The United States did not have and does not have such weapons, perhaps due to a lack of interest in such weapons, but the fact remains! hi

                  The ability to strike thousands of kilometers from the native shores, why ?! what weird question! If you are a pacifist, what are you doing on this resource?

                  Just in case: our opponents have absolute superiority at sea (don't want to ask them the question: why do they need such naval power? laughing ), this allows them to use the seas and oceans in their own interests against Russia (to launch missile strikes wherever they want, to transfer troops and the necessary weapons), in principle, without any problems! And the ability of aviation to drown an adversary even near Greenland and drown their convoys in the center of the Pacific Ocean or in the middle of the Atlantic sharply cools hotheads who count on impunity in the event of aggression.
                  I clearly explained?
      2. g1v2
        g1v2 26 February 2021 15: 01
        +4
        As Slepakov sang "and what if not, just like that once and no?" You cannot count on the enemy's cowardice or caution in such matters. People are different. Could just be aggressive on the bridge. And then there would be a chain reaction that would be extremely difficult to stop. request
        I agree that the enemy's superiority can and should be leveled, but aggressiveness is not that. An increase in the power of missile-carrying aircraft is, for example, a good response to an increase in the enemy's fleet. As an example. And the boy's rasping - it does not always work. request
        So the result is something like we agreed - the decline of Gorshkov's fleet? As under Peter 1, we sharply built a powerful fleet, but without structure, repair facilities, mooring facilities, etc., it rotted and cut over time. There was no systematic gain. There was a splash and a cliff.
        Again, I do not agree with the attitude towards the military-industrial complex. It is clear that the military-industrial complex wants tasty orders. An example is the constant mock-ups and advertising articles from the UAC on the topic of an aircraft carrier in an attempt to promote the Navy for a tasty contract. And you have to fight them off. But at the same time, the military-industrial complex is the basis. This is more important than the ships themselves. The developed military-industrial complex will supply the fleet with any ships for years. And any fleet built on a dash will become obsolete in 15-20 years and will be cut over time. The military-industrial complex is the foundation. am And it is always necessary to start building the fleet with putting the military-industrial complex in order. What they are doing now in the first place.
        An example is ASCC. A few years ago, he was credited to the limit. That is why Perfect, since 2006, have been building that the money allocated for its construction was used to pay off debts. Do not extinguish? Then the enterprise will go bankrupt and nothing will be built on it for a long time. And when the debts were sorted out and put in order, the company handed over the third corvette. Moreover, it built Aldar in 5 years. Well, as the new order for 20380 and 20385 is fulfilled, the terms can be reduced to 4. To build quickly and cheaply, you need to build for a long time and according to a mastered project. Without exchanging for a wunderwafe. And walk the steps. request
        Now we need to at least solve the problem of re-equipping the auxiliary fleet, which is simply decrepit, complete the infrastructure of the bases and ensure the performance of the protective function of the fleet in the BMZ. All projects already exist, so you just need to build. A bunch of corvette 2038x-mrk, plus minesweepers 12700 and Grachata. Further increase the meat of the dmz fleet. Frigates 22350 and 22350m, DEPL and APL. You just need to build them in large batches, reducing the construction time and cost due to the mass scale. Not perfect? And there are no ideal ships and never will be. There will be vulnerabilities and weaknesses. Chasing a wunderwolf is stupid. Projects will be modernized and changed over time. That is, there will be differences from series to series. Let's compare 1135 Ladny and 11356 Grigorovich. Or Halibuts and Varshavyanka. The difference is huge. But, in essence, this and that is one project. That series of frigates 22350, which is being built now, will clearly differ from the one that will be built in 10 years. But due to the fact that enterprises will master the project, it will still be built faster and cheaper.
        Okay, then I’ve gone. Sincerely. hi
        1. Nemchinov Vl
          Nemchinov Vl 27 February 2021 04: 01
          0
          Quote: g1v2
          .... Bundle corvette2038x-mrk ...
          - ridiculous and pointless waste of money !!!, because if they pushed through 11664, then he for the money (cost !!) one 20380 (or even less) would replace "THIS so-called LINK", what is called - "in one person" !!! wink yes
          20380 (!), - slow, insanely expensive (ship for its class), with an incompetent air defense system (!), without PLUR (!) ... and this is for PLO / OVR ?! well
          Quote: g1v2
          and Grachata.
          ?! crying
          Quote: g1v2
          That series of frigates 22350, which is being built now, will clearly differ from the one that will be built in 10 years.
          still, and each not for ten years (!) winked
          Quote: g1v2
          The military-industrial complex is the foundation.
          so "the basis would be vparivat" for currency 20380 and "Buyan" and "Grachata", - the same Persians (!), and for myself I would build more functional and adequate ships (!).
          And the currency would be poured into the development of engine building, for the power plant ("five hundredth diesels of Kolomna", and enterprises for gas turbine engines and gearboxes) !!! what
    2. The eye of the crying
      The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 12: 55
      +2
      Quote: g1v2
      In order for Russia to build a fleet equal in value to a land army, maritime trade and transportation must multiply. The navy is a consequence of the developed civilian navy and sea trade.


      So you can agree to the point that military power is a derivative of economic and scientific smile
      1. timokhin-aa
        26 February 2021 13: 23
        +1
        Not always.
        You can, for example, look at the RKKA sample January 1946.
        With combat power, everything was fine there against any background.

        And what about the economy in the USSR?
        In general, don't oversimplify.
        1. The eye of the crying
          The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 13: 31
          +4
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          You can, for example, look at the RKKA sample January 1946.
          With combat power, everything was fine there against any background.


          This power was worth a monstrous effort (despite the fact that the States, which support quite comparable power, lived an almost peaceful life). And the attempt to maintain "good power" for decades ended badly.
          1. timokhin-aa
            26 February 2021 20: 36
            +1
            The fact is that I have pointed out to you an exception from your statement, very striking.
            And you can find more.
            1. The eye of the crying
              The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 20: 44
              +2
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              The fact is that I pointed out to you an exception to your statement.


              This is no exception. This is just an example of the fact that when a weak economy is all working for war with full tension, it can produce a result comparable to that of a stronger economy (which only partially works for war). But this does not scale for long historical periods.

              Quote: timokhin-aa
              And you can find more.


              And you can remember the Japan-USA match. However, if it is possible to "find more" - it would be interesting to hear.
              1. timokhin-aa
                26 February 2021 20: 52
                0
                ... But this does not scale for long historical periods.


                Initially, you did not raise the question about them.

                if it is possible to "find more" - it would be interesting to hear.


                Let's first define the criteria - what is power and what is weakness.
                1. The eye of the crying
                  The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 21: 17
                  0
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Initially, you did not raise the question about them.


                  The whole article is just about what is happening in a long historical period. And throughout the article runs (not explicitly stated) the belief that can come up with some "new trick" that will allow you to do or prevent ... something, again not explicitly stated in the article. As I understand it (I may be wrong), the "new trick" is to prevent the enslavement or destruction of Russia.

                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Let's first define the criteria - what is power and what is weakness.


                  If it’s about the criteria, I don’t understand what exactly you want. If about definitions - are they really needed? Then let it be like this: "military power" is a military force that makes it possible to solve assigned strategic tasks. "Military power", respectively - equipment and personnel of the army, aviation and navy.
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    26 February 2021 22: 53
                    -1
                    The whole article is just about what is happening in a long historical period. And through the entire article there is (not explicitly stated) the belief that it is possible to come up with some "new trick" that will make it possible to do or prevent ... something, again not explicitly stated in the article. As I understand it (I may be wrong), the "new trick" is to prevent the enslavement or destruction of Russia.


                    The article even has EXAMPLES of these tricks. Do you understand?

                    Then let it be like this: "military power" is a military force that makes it possible to solve the assigned strategic tasks. "Military force", respectively - equipment and personnel of the army, aviation and navy.


                    You see that your definition is not reducible to your other definition of a derivative from economics.
                    1. The eye of the crying
                      The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 23: 03
                      +1
                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      The article even has EXAMPLES of these tricks. Do you understand?


                      I do not understand. If there are examples of successful "new tricks" in the article, I've left them out.

                      Quote: timokhin-aa
                      You see that your definition is not reducible to your other definition of a derivative from economics.


                      It is derived. Because the ability to design and manufacture technology directly depends on the economy. And the personnel are demographic resources, which also depend on the economy, albeit indirectly. Those. without a strong economy, nothing will happen, although having a strong economy does not in itself guarantee the availability of military power.
                      1. Nemchinov Vl
                        Nemchinov Vl 27 February 2021 04: 11
                        +1
                        Quote: Eye of the Crying
                        And the personnel are demographic resources, which also depend on the economy, albeit indirectly.

                        Interestingly, but in China and India, how about this ?!... Well there primary and secondary .... An increase in the birth rate ... or an economic growth ?!. recourse request
                        Quote: Eye of the Crying
                        Those. there will be nothing without a strong economy,
                        so it seemed like tama bred ... ?! belay winked
                      2. The eye of the crying
                        The eye of the crying 27 February 2021 12: 31
                        -1
                        Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                        Interesting, but in China and India, how about this ?! ...


                        Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                        .Birth rate growth ... or economic growth? !!!.


                        It's about Russia and the United States. And not about fertility in general, but about demographic resources - for example, the ability to attract immigrants. Who simply will not go to Russia, but will go to the USA.

                        Quote: Vl Nemchinov
                        so it seemed like tama bred ...? !!! belay winked


                        You are fixated on fertility, and it was about production.
                      3. timokhin-aa
                        28 February 2021 10: 54
                        -3
                        I do not understand. If there are examples of successful "new tricks" in the article, I've left them out.


                        A whole section in the middle.
                      4. The eye of the crying
                        The eye of the crying 28 February 2021 15: 25
                        +2
                        If this is the section "Theory and Practice: A Pistol at the Temple of Imperialism" or "Theory Embodied in Metal", then there are described tricks that were new 50 years ago and which were parried with a margin in less than a decade. And the means by which these tricks were countered began to be developed earlier or simultaneously with the tricks themselves.
  17. iouris
    iouris 26 February 2021 11: 36
    +4
    Overall, an objective review. Although ... blaming everything on one is an oversimplification. Gorshkov is an element of the system, and by 1985 this system could not "rebuild" (not according to Gorbachev, of course), ideologically disarmed, lost faith and self-destructed. But the long-standing problems of defense capability were not resolved. The admirals also had and still have children ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 12: 37
      +3
      By 1985, it was the fleet that was too late to rebuild, the plans of the Americans in the late 70s were known, and the way they were solving issues was also known.
      I should have moved earlier.
      1. iouris
        iouris 26 February 2021 16: 52
        +2
        We must always move. Movement is life.
  18. Niko
    Niko 26 February 2021 11: 52
    +1
    The article is interesting, thanks. Although personally I am always struck by conclusions like: "Khrushchov was not bad, because with him they began to build .... (p. L. Missile-carrying aircraft, it is not so important that) or vice versa, WHEN HERE, they stopped building ships. .. And if it were not for Khrushchev? And whoever else? Atomic p.L. Wouldn't start building? Would babies still rivet? Individuals certainly influence such global processes, but not as much as it sometimes seems (well, lost or vice versa found an extra 5 years, nothing would have changed much) And even more so, these processes are seriously influenced only by truly STRONG PERSONALITIES. (to whom Comrade Gorshkov (a opportunist, who was simply mainly present during the process And apparently worried about his chair much more than for everything else, which the author at the beginning, in principle, mentioned) I would not
    1. iouris
      iouris 26 February 2021 12: 34
      0
      ... "under him they began (stopped) building ..."
      It is known that politics is the art of the possible. The aircraft carriers would be backward, and the Khrushchevs would not have been built.
  19. Avior
    Avior 26 February 2021 12: 02
    +5
    A good and interesting article, although in some places controversial.
    But, in my opinion, it touches on many topics for discussion at once, it would be better to break it down into two or three articles.
    And on the topic ...
    The doctrine of the first strike at sea from the position of tracking, as the author rightly noted, required powerful and fast missiles to defeat an enemy with a low defense capability from one surprise salvo, and the structure, armament, and naval composition of the USSR Navy was built specifically for this doctrine.
    But if the enemy is ready for hostilities, and it is difficult to deliver a strike from the position of tracking, which we are now observing, completely different approaches are required - different means of destruction, support, battle tactics, and so on.
    And one gets the impression that missiles are still being prepared for the strike doctrine from a tracking position, which is now unrealizable. At long ranges at sea, now it will be very difficult without aviation.: ((
    And the second thing. The fleet is built under certain political conditions. And the Soviet fleet is no exception. And although through the efforts of Gromyko, among others, the situation changed towards detente, the overall strategy remained unchanged, it was clear who the enemy was.
    And now the situation from partner to "partner" is changing in a few years. And if before 2014 there were partners with whom joint peacekeeping and anti-piracy operations were supposed, for which 22160 were built, more or less corresponding to offshore patrol ships, albeit with shortcomings, then since 2014, when they were laid down, the situation has changed dramatically, especially when by 2014 added 2015 and Syria. It is difficult to build an effective fleet without a clear understanding of its tasks and goals, especially when the state's foreign policy changes dramatically in a short time.
    There should be a strategy for planning the goals and objectives of the state for the future, and only then it will be possible to plan the goals and objectives of the fleet. And such a strategy has not yet been seen.
    1. timokhin-aa
      28 February 2021 11: 42
      +2
      Everything is written correctly. And yes, there is no strategy, alas.
      However, the partners seem to force us to strategize.
      If they do not clean up to zero by the beginning of the thirties, then, apparently, political goals for our military machine will appear.

      In the meantime, the PR-minister of defense is planning a super-grandiose Glavmorparad for 2021.
      By the way.
  20. Doctor
    Doctor 26 February 2021 12: 11
    -5
    My amateurish conclusion from the article.

    No matter how large the fleet is built, it is nothing without full-fledged aircraft carriers.

    6AV by 3 in the Pacific and in the Atlantic, 20 NK escorts for 10 displacement, 000-4 MAPLs and escort ships, would have provided the USSR naval representation much more sensibly than Gorshkov's vinaigrette.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 12: 39
      +4
      6AV for 3 in the Pacific and in the Atlantic, 20 NK escorts for 10 displacement each, 000-4 MAPLs and escort ships, would provide the USSR naval representation much more intelligently


      This would reduce the situation to an arms race with the United States, as in the mid-70s and 80s. We would have played it.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 26 February 2021 16: 26
      +3
      Quote: Arzt
      6AV by 3 in the Pacific and in the Atlantic, 20 NK escorts for 10 displacement, 000-4 MAPLs and escort ships, would have provided the USSR naval representation much more sensibly than Gorshkov's vinaigrette.

      In this case, it is better to remember the old sentence uv. Eхeter with VIF2NE: due to refusal asymmetric response (RRC, DBK, SSGN, MRA) build 8 AUG and keep them with a single fist on the Northern Fleet - defending the northern bastion and threatening the Atlantic communications. At the same time, AUG parity will be formed in the Atlantic - because the USA will have to use part of its AUG for maintenance.
      1. The eye of the crying
        The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 16: 57
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        build 8 AUG


        Great offer. Not one white elephant, but 8 at once.
      2. timokhin-aa
        26 February 2021 18: 05
        +1
        Wouldn't have pulled it out.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 26 February 2021 19: 58
          +3
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          Wouldn't have pulled it out.

          When sharpening the shipbuilding program under the AUG and stretching the building for 20-25 years, the cost of 8 AUG was roughly compared with the cost of what was built for the fleet during the same time in real life (while the SSBNs and SSNs were not touched, except that they reduced the variety, but SSGN were reset to zero). True, they used a cheating approach that was alien to our Navy and the shipbuilding industry, called serial construction of ships according to one project. smile
          1. timokhin-aa
            26 February 2021 20: 32
            0
            Well, let's look at the TAVKRs. They started in 68 (decree) -70th (Kiev was laid down), by 1991 (the collapse of the USSR) they had 4 Tavkr + Kuznetsov on tests and afloat the Varyag-Liaonin hull.
            Quite an illustration.
  21. The eye of the crying
    The eye of the crying 26 February 2021 12: 49
    +1
    The Americans, seriously frightened by 1973, made a firm decision to take revenge. And the nation devoted the lion's share of its efforts to this revenge.


    It was within the framework of this work that Los Angeles-type submarines, Ticonderoga missile cruisers, AEGIS air defense / missile defense system, F-14 interceptors, Mk.41 vertical missile launchers, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and Spruance destroyers appeared.


    Aegis, F-14 Spruence began development in the 1960s. The 1973 American "fright" looks like a big exaggeration.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 13: 24
      +3
      They pressed very hard after Mediterranean, read Zumwalt, read Lehman's interview.
  22. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 26 February 2021 13: 11
    -3
    And this meant one simple thing - a strategy that was based on the fact that the enemy did not want to bear these losses does not work when he agrees with these losses. Moreover, when he is ready for them.

    I do not know whether the author himself believes in what he wrote, but this is a primitive bluff and only a very narrow-minded person is able to believe it. The Americans have never been hit and will not be prepared to suffer huge losses in a nuclear war. Moreover, a nuclear war is much more dangerous for their society than for the Soviet one.
    The flood of New Orleans is a demonstration of what will happen only after one or more nuclear attacks on US cities.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 13: 26
      +2
      The flood of New Orleans is a demonstration of what will happen only after one or more nuclear attacks on US cities.


      And what was there? Plebs was thrown to die, the government remained unshakable, when unrest began because of the devastation in the city overtook the mercenaries and they gagged everyone.

      Everything was fine there in New Orleans, but the fact that hunger and devastation, so who cares? This is America.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 26 February 2021 16: 54
        +2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        And what was there? Plebs was thrown to die, the government remained unshakable, when unrest began because of the devastation in the city overtook the mercenaries and they gagged everyone.

        EMNIP, it was still more fun in New Orleans - the National Guard was brought into the city, including units that had just been withdrawn from Iraq. According to the recollections of the National Guards, the difference with Baghdad was small - water instead of sand, and everything else is painfully familiar. And the pumping before going out on patrol was ... peculiar - act like there if you want to return home on foot.
    2. Scaffold
      Scaffold 26 February 2021 18: 52
      0
      demonstration of what will happen only after one or more nuclear attacks on US cities

      It is enough to read this passage to assess your level of development.
  23. DrEng527
    DrEng527 26 February 2021 13: 18
    0
    Thanks to the author for the historical analysis that poses challenges for the future ... love
  24. Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 26 February 2021 13: 57
    +1
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    The flood of New Orleans is a demonstration of what will happen only after one or more nuclear attacks on US cities.


    And what was there? Plebs was thrown to die, the government remained unshakable, when unrest began because of the devastation in the city overtook the mercenaries and they gagged everyone.

    Everything was fine there in New Orleans, but the fact that hunger and devastation, so who cares? This is America.

    And there it was beating that no power in a particular city was beaten for several days.
  25. Victor Leningradets
    Victor Leningradets 26 February 2021 14: 03
    +1
    In the absence of a strategy, we are building the fleet of the past. Sad but not fatal.
    No cadres are being trained, and, if possible, the defense industry is being rearmed.
    The trouble is higher. There are no brahmins, and kshatriyas can only repeat what they have memorized, or play "tsap-tsarap" with enthusiasm (the latter, without prepared institutions, is generally meaningless). An idea can only be generated by creative people who do not worry about their careers, but who see the meaning of their existence in their readiness to accept a challenge and either win or lose. Of course, no one cancels the required educational qualification.
    Not sad, but deadly if the enemy seizes dominance in space and artificial intelligence. Waging war with an inanimate network-centric enemy in the conditions of his complete control of the overground space is limitedly possible only with the help of the Navy and its ocean power. And an attempt at extensive competition in new technologies with a much more powerful adversary is doomed to failure.
    Regarding continental thinking: all attempts to wage a land war for the Republic of Ingushetia, the USSR, and God forbid the Russian Federation will lead to a war on its territory with a lot of blood and a complete failure in achieving strategic results of the armed confrontation.
  26. xomaNN
    xomaNN 26 February 2021 16: 07
    +2
    During the "purges" and personnel leapfrog 30-40 years, the Navy was lucky with the Commanders-in-Chief - and Nikolai Kuznetsov and then Sergei Gorshkov in the 50-80s enjoyed a well-deserved authority throughout the human naval hierarchy. And then, after 1985, any Commander-in-Chief flickered and changed almost every year.

    What kind of strategy are we talking about ???
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 18: 04
      +4
      Well, yes, but on the other hand - that's why it was necessary to keep the same Chirkov? It's just a shame for the fleet. Vysotsky, who recently reposed, is talking headlong into the curtain, ceased to be friends.

      And so on. So they changed like gloves. Evmenov, too, will soon be thrown off, I think he will not stay in office for more than a year and a half.
      Something like that.
      It seems to me that here the supreme power should start to delve into the issues, and not just throw caps with the Minister of Defense together.
  27. Nestor Vlakhovski
    Nestor Vlakhovski 26 February 2021 20: 46
    +2
    Judging a person as an official should be based on results.
    And they were downright awful for the fleet, and this at the ruinous costs of the country for this fleet.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 20: 55
      +2
      This is when both Gorshkov and the whole country have suffered gigantomania since the late 70s.

      But at first it turned out well, until they began to toil.

      Which is reflected in the article.
  28. squid
    squid 26 February 2021 21: 00
    +1
    Again this Soviet whining ...
    "Today we have a large mass of citizens who at the same time believe that Russia does not depend on sea communications and know about the existence of the Northern Sea Route, Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the group of forces in Syria. This is a pathological problem."
    This is a pathological problem for the author of the article. And the "large mass of citizens" is absolutely right - Russia does not depend on Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the Northern Sea Route. Of what needs to be protected, they are in last place in importance. And the grouping of troops in Syria, be it the serious will of NATO and its member Turkey, will not be saved by any, even the most fantastic, fleet.
    As the author himself correctly pointed out, a potential enemy, both in Soviet times and even more so now, is much stronger economically, technologically, demographically, ideologically and organizationally. And, as it is rightly said, it is completely pointless to compete with him in symmetrical measures and in all aspects.
    However, having the largest territory in the world and a bunch of "potential partners" around it, it is vitally important, at any cost, not to allow a serious lag in certain, most critical, areas, without which the country's fate would be in jeopardy. What are these directions? The strategic nuclear forces are undoubtedly the number one priority. The ground forces - of course, having at the borders of NATO, China, the Caucasus, Central Asia and at the same time the longest border in the world - it is necessary to have at least defensive capabilities against all of the above, which for the current 146 millionth country (which is less than in Pakistan, for a minute) is already a huge challenge. Aviation - undoubtedly, conquer the enemy air supremacy and the rest will be useless, so you need to take off your last shirt for modern fighters. It turns out that almost all areas of our defense are critical. What remains? How can you save money? Fleet! Without this - please! And there is no need to prove its "strategic importance" here. Compared to all of the above, it is an absolutely secondary type of aircraft. If everything is fine on the above issues, if we have parity, if we are calm about our territory and border - of course, why not engage in expansion (although in relation to the USSR, exporting communism is so-so idea). But what's the point of showing off with a bare bottom? Despite the fact that neither the USSR, let alone the Russian Federation, even if they invested in full, would never be able to compete with the US naval power. Neither qualitatively nor quantitatively. And the current RF, in addition to this, also with China, Japan (in the Pacific theater of operations), the European Union and in general the entire perimeter of the sea borders. So don't try. And no asymmetric measures such as fragile boats on the tail of the AUG would help - all the author's theorizations work only with great luck and completely passive behavior of the enemy.
    To cover the same Kuriles, Kamchatka and the Arctic, there will be enough aviation. And not sea, but quite ordinary - MiG-31, Su-35, Su57, Tu-160 - which took on board anti-ship missiles and was trained to use them in advance. With the maneuver of forces, it can still be possible to count on something, if technologically they are not too far behind.
    So the Soviet and Russian generals are absolutely right - the naval forces of the districts will be enough. And SSBNs are not needed, since there is nothing to cover them with. There are enough Yars and Sarmats in the depths of the territory.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 22: 49
      +3
      This is a pathological problem for the author of the article. And the "large mass of citizens" is absolutely right - Russia does not depend on Kamchatka, the Kuriles and the Northern Sea Route. From what needs to be protected, they are in last place in importance.


      Pathology as it is. Well, at least indicate where that line is, after which nothing can be taken, for the sake of interest.

      But what's the point of showing off with a bare bottom?


      We may not be asked whether we want to fight or not. Did it occur to you?

      Despite the fact that neither the USSR, let alone the Russian Federation, even if they invested in full, would never be able to compete with the US naval power.


      In fact, in the 70s they could. Only not quantitatively and not qualitatively. But it was quite a rivalry and it was won at first.
      1. squid
        squid 27 February 2021 04: 25
        -3
        Why do you have to take something? An old Soviet habit? Building a useless "great" fleet that will still be defeated in the early days is the surest path to surrender.
        Precisely because the enemy will not ask whether you want it or not, and also (did it occur to you?) Will not expose aircraft carriers and other forces to the comical potter "great" watchdogs and under-aircraft carriers, and you need to invest in what is needed, not something that sea dreamers think might come in handy.
        In the 70s, if they were able to do something (although it is also doubtful), then by "asymmetric measures" in the form of submarine missile carriers and MRA (which has much more to do with aviation than with the navy). But at the same time, the Americans really got a fleet - a universal one, capable of projection of force, expansion and domination (including through "containment of communism" at any point in local conflicts), while we have a highly specialized something, conditionally suitable only for a one-time fight against aug in a global war. Asymmetry due to non-universality and overspecialization. And then, as they rightly said, the Americans greatly devalued all this with the advent of the Aegis system (and it was not at all difficult to predict the appearance of something like this in the 60s and 70s), and the Soviet SSGNs gained real strength only in 3 m generation, with the advent of the 949th project, which was built after Aegis. Before that, the missiles could of course be fired, only "roaring cows" with short arms in a real situation would have gone to the bottom first.
  29. squid
    squid 26 February 2021 21: 26
    -5
    As for the rest of the article, trying to exalt one of the Soviet would-be admirals, the conclusions are not at all those that the author is trying to draw. Namely. Your entire "Soviet system" is bullshit, the country was ruled by maniacs, tyrants and tyrants, unprofessional and who climbed wherever they ask. And, most importantly, the political system is designed in such a way that there was absolutely no one to pull them down. The USSR gave the latter to arms, but also managed to lag behind in them. And Gorshkov is a so-so "genius", since even with the resources and technologies of the USSR, he still riveted crafts such as the 1143 half-aircraft carriers at the price of real or 1155 half-destroyers without normal weapons.
    Separately, I was gladdened by the attempt, typical for the communists, to blame their infirmity on someone else - in this case, the “front men”. Not there, the country means they got in the 17th, yeah. Not so much that one cannot catch up in 70 years. But for some reason, China, having thrown communism to hell (in fact), in 40 years from a wretched backward country has become a superpower. And without any gulag concentration camp "feats" there. And the communists, having climbed onto the shoulders of the great Russian Empire they had killed, were able, as a result, basically to profuse the state.
    1. timokhin-aa
      26 February 2021 22: 50
      +2
      The crunch of a French roll is simply deafening.
      1. squid
        squid 27 February 2021 04: 37
        -3
        Well, what can you do if the communists whine all the time and blame someone else and external circumstances for their failures. Although it is quite obvious that the root of the problems lies not in the personalities of the leaders or even in the specific Soviet system, but in Marxism itself, which turned out to be an empty and useless ideology. It is simply impossible to build any competitive "new society" on the basis of this doctrine. Everything else - economic, organizational, ideological, intellectual lagging behind - is just a consequence. Marx's teaching is powerless because it is not true. That's all.
  30. Pavel57
    Pavel57 26 February 2021 21: 46
    0
    A serious article about serious problems.
  31. Usher
    Usher 26 February 2021 22: 09
    +2
    At the turn of the 70s and 80s, Americans seriously believed that in order to protect their Western capitalist way of life, they would have to fight the atheist communists. And fight seriously. They were preparing precisely for an offensive war, for the last war. And we prepared really seriously.
    they still think so, some paranoid, fanatics, obscurantists. I don’t understand how belief in a bearded grandfather behind the clouds and nuclear weapons can get along? How can the president of a country considered a technology leader swear by the bible?
  32. exo
    exo 26 February 2021 23: 20
    +3
    I liked the article. Gorshkov began to breathe easier when Grechko became the Minister of Defense. Well, and of course Brezhnev. It was at this time that they began to build the fleet the way Gorshkov saw it (of course, taking into account many other realities) Now, we could also have a normal fleet. It's not about the money at all, but the approach of the management.
  33. Klonser
    Klonser 28 February 2021 00: 31
    0
    I agree 100%. As you listen to what we expect from the Navy, I want to cry. He (navy) will only have to die with honor
  34. Bogatyrev
    Bogatyrev 28 February 2021 00: 33
    0
    Quote: Oden280
    refueling rods were removed from the TU-22 in accordance with the START-1 agreement

    By the way, did the crafty Americans insert this clause in the START treaty to neutralize our MRA, but our diplomats and leadership blinked brilliantly again?
    And for what only they received special rations)))
  35. clerk
    clerk 28 February 2021 10: 36
    +1
    Quite a good article (as well as a similar article in "Vzglyad"). Respect. But one can argue with the conclusion - in the 80s, the Americans certainly surpassed the Soviet fleet quantitatively and qualitatively and threatened with war. But who prevented from answering this asymmetrically - for example, by increasing the number of nuclear warheads on torpedoes and missiles - so that the tracking patrol can destroy the AV in one salvo? The PMSM did not merge the fleet - it merged the political leadership, which simply did not accept the American challenge (which naturally ended with Gorbachev's Perestroika). For the same Khrushchev, for all his foolishness, even with a ratio of 1:20 not in favor of the USSR in the Cuban missile crisis, the eggs turned out to be stronger.
    1. timokhin-aa
      28 February 2021 10: 52
      +1
      But who prevented from answering this asymmetrically - for example, by increasing the number of nuclear warheads on torpedoes and missiles - so that a tracking patrol can destroy the AV in one salvo?


      Firstly, there was basically no anti-ship missile on the patrol boats.
      Secondly, such an opportunity was already realized by means of a salvo according to data from a patrol boat, which would have been performed by a SSGN, missile cruiser, destroyer, or by means of an MRA strike.

      The problem was that the Americans had the answer - nuclear Tomahawks. And the Naval Strategy, in which it was clearly spelled out that in response to a nuclear strike on the Navy, the United States could launch a nuclear strike on the territory of the Eastern bloc or immediately the USSR.

      And we had no answer to that. In addition, technically, the United States could slowly raise the heat of the war at the "tact.NAO" level, until the complete destruction of our SSBNs and the partial destruction of the early warning missile systems, as a result of which they would have the opportunity to deliver a disarming strike against the USSR with the introduction of their SSBNs into combat.

      In short, it was not so simple with nuclear weapons back then. And it’s not for nothing that we, the Americans, had multilevel protection against unauthorized use. Rather, it insured against the fact that the enemy would use it first than it was really intended for the war.
      1. clerk
        clerk 28 February 2021 12: 40
        +2
        1) But there were torpedoes. And against NK, an underwater nuclear explosion is more effective than a surface one. 2) But in the presence of nuclear weapons on the tracker, it was much easier. 3) An attack by nuclear weapons on the territory of the USSR is a full-fledged nuclear war, regardless of whether the air defense could intercept the Tomahawks or not. 4) "Raise the intensity of nuclear war" by destroying our SSBNs, satellites and radar stations? It looks like this bluff worked. 5) In general, the chess player sat down to play poker. With a predictable result (((((
        1. timokhin-aa
          28 February 2021 12: 47
          +2
          1) What's the difference? Acoustics will immediately detect the underwater explosion.
          2) Simpler, but there was no anti-ship missile on them.
          3) Well, the Americans had a different opinion. I honestly don't know whose opinion would have outweighed. But, for example, in the exercises Zapad-77, the report of which is declassified and is on the Internet, tact is used. Nuclear weapons against the Soviet Army did not lead to the launch of ICBMs.
          This is, in general, a debatable question - what would happen if.
          4) I don't know if it was a bluff, but it worked, yes. They were going to shoot SSBNs at once, ICBMs and early warning missiles - only if a decision was made to use strategic nuclear weapons, so as not to bring it to this right away. So it was in the documents.
          5) The willingness to fight to the death was there. I can't say for the government, but lower - it was. And ours saw her clearly. As well as the achieved technical and tactical superiority.
          1. clerk
            clerk 28 February 2021 13: 49
            +1
            1) This is understandable. It is more difficult to hit civilian targets with a torpedo. 2) But the torpedoes were the same. I really don't know if our Navy had YABCh torpedoes, but technically in the 80s it would not have been a big problem. 3-4) The doctrine had to be answered with an appropriate doctrine (like the current Russian one), and not politicking about the refusal to use nuclear weapons first. 5) The military was probably ready. But the decisions are made by politicians. And the policy of the USSR in the 70s and 80s was stupidly contradictory - on the one hand, we were constantly increasing the threat to the United States (which scared them pretty much) - on the other hand, we were so scared of their response that we actually gave up. Despite the fact that in the 80s (in contrast to 1962) nuclear parity did take place.
            1. timokhin-aa
              1 March 2021 11: 57
              +2
              Torpedoes with special warheads were from the 60s, PLURs with special warheads were also on each submarine, but again - in response, the Americans could hit the shore.

              The rest is clear. But you still need to put yourself in the place of people then - the Americans fell into a real fighting madness, they would have gone to a nuclear war in reality.
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Silhouette
        Silhouette 28 February 2021 13: 02
        +2
        .
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Firstly, there was basically no anti-ship missile on the patrol boats.

        Not only on patrol boats pr1135. But also on the BOD pr61, pr 1134 A, 1134B, 1155, anti-ship missiles 1123. A whole fleet of "toothless beauties" was stamped by Gorshkov! The world has never seen such insanity. And I hope he won't see it again. Gorshkov did not solve the problem of basing the fleet either. In Strelka, on one pier, almost the entire 10 operational squadron, a floating workshop 2 EM 56 of the project, an artillery cruiser, two brigades of 1 rank ships were based, and 2 non-aircraft carriers soared in the roadstead until they exhausted themselves. To carry out the loading of missiles or torpedoes, the ships were driven out into the roadstead before each firing.
        1. timokhin-aa
          28 February 2021 19: 03
          +1
          This is all known, but the clerk's question was about the watchmen.
          In all fairness, 1134A and 1134B could still work with the Storm on the NC and it's not bad at all.
          But at a short distance.
          In terms of basing and repairing, it was a failure, yes.
  36. trahterist
    trahterist 28 February 2021 15: 29
    -1
    Quote: hydrox
    In fact, all the time until the middle of the 20th century, the Soviet Union was at war and it was not up to dry docks, since the battleships were recognized as unpromising floating craft, moreover, access to any Shipbuilding of the People's Democracies was opened for the USSR and floating docks appeared, which were enough to service Korotkovsky fleet.
    As for the leadership of the country, after Stalin's death, and now, either liberal traitors or managers of a liberoid color are at the helm.
    This is what Mishustin can do with his RTO team, will last another 100 years and it is not known whether he will succeed: the crew of an aircraft carrier with a full set of weapons and carriers is not there and is not seen on the horizon.

    DOES Russia NEED an aircraft carrier ??
    If the task is not set to pinch the bantustans on the globe, for which they are used by the "hegemon", then this is just an extra waste of funds for show.
    Or what, the States are going to seize?
    The current military doctrine of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation does not provide for any seizures in principle.
    Indeed, these floating airfields were given to you, yak fools with a written sack are rushing about ...
    Or "if only bulo" ??
    And for defense, they are generally the most helpless target, and no convoys will save you.
    Their "golden age" has long passed, like battleships in their time, but some still have hellish itching.
  37. serg2108
    serg2108 28 February 2021 16: 04
    0
    INTERESTING, INFORMATIVE ALTHOUGH AND WITH A SOME BENT TO PESSIMISM - THE AUTHOR OF THE PARTIES OF BLACK - RARE OBJECTIVELY WRITS ARTICLES, BUT SOMETIMES YOU GIVE OUT GREAT INFORMATIVE, WITH ANALYSIS AND HAPPY - (EVERYTHING IS NOTHING! ** IMHO
  38. Petrol cutter
    Petrol cutter 28 February 2021 18: 40
    0
    As zhist shows, t Gorshkov was smart and far-sighted
    music ..
    But there is one problem. The wishes of the fleet ... Didn't coincide with the opportunity.
    We are seeing the same situation now.
    Only at times more deplorable. To my deep regret.
    1. agond
      agond 28 February 2021 20: 21
      0
      Gorshkov was involved in project 941, perhaps even was the inspiration for the idea of ​​building these underwater airships with a displacement of 48000 tons of which 51% was water, without exaggeration, it can be argued that 941 projects cost two three times more than any other of our nuclear submarines and three four times more. American boats at that time ... and the combat value of ships with such dimensions is extremely doubtful, because as you know, the main weapon of a submarine is stealth, this is an axiom, those who think otherwise either do not think at all, or are cunning. because the authority of Gorshkov in this matter did the country a dubious service
      1. timokhin-aa
        1 March 2021 11: 54
        0
        There the problem was not in Gorshkovo, and the boats turned out to be good.
        https://topwar.ru/155667-javljaetsja-li-proekt-941-akula-gordostju-otechestvennogo-podvodnogo-korablestroenija-otvet-bezuslovno-da.html
      2. Vladimir Mitin_2
        Vladimir Mitin_2 1 March 2021 20: 47
        +1
        The pusher of the birth of 941 ave. Was Ustinov and the Rubin office. There was such a bike: reporting to Brezhnev about "Ohio", its TTD, Ustinov, in response to Brezhnev's surprise, noticed that we have a project that surpasses the American in size and power, but without making an emphasis on the cost and number of missiles. The old chief blessed the creation of this monster
  39. trahterist
    trahterist 28 February 2021 22: 38
    -1
    Quote: Silhouette
    Russia is a continental self-sufficient country. Colonies are not needed. May God help you master your resources correctly. England and the United States are maritime countries that need a fleet to develop the resources of the colonies and fight for their retention with countries that are in the same position as them. Therefore, the Russian fleet does not need an "ocean" one as under Gorshkov, but a continental one. Stop puffing out your cheeks. Empty it. I was in the Indian and Mediterranean squadrons at Gorshkov. Solid show-off. Empty it.

    Rarely adequate comments.
    And, judging by the author's answer, he also dreamed of aircraft carriers.
    Such a cannon shot should not be allowed to approach analysts, Russia will definitely not survive the second year of 1991.
    And he offers exactly that.
    1. timokhin-aa
      1 March 2021 11: 53
      +2
      Have you tried the "self-sufficiency" of Russia just to check at least?
      1. Silhouette
        Silhouette 1 March 2021 14: 01
        -1
        I recommend the author to study: N. Danilevsky "Russia and Europe", Parshin "Why Russia is not America". Well, and D. Mendeleev read "Intimate Thoughts". There is also about the self-sufficiency of Russia. A. Dugin can still "Geopolitics".
        1. timokhin-aa
          1 March 2021 18: 40
          +4
          I know much more about the "self-sufficiency of Russia" than your Dugin.
          Infinity times.
          Let's just ask a question - If you need a spiral pipe over 420 mm in diameter, will you find it in the Russian Federation?
          And a solid-rolled aluminum sheet with a width of 2 meters?
          And a hard drive for anything, even for a ship, for example (they are there now, in huge quantities)?
          Do you know where to burn 25nm crystals for "Elbrus"?
          Precision bearings?
          Natural rubber for tires?
          Opiates for the medical industry?
          Do you know that from this year, even in semi-garage factories for the production of tipper bodies, the transition to Swedish steel went? Domestic low-alloy simply ceased to be competitive even with us - "Swedes" are lighter, can you load more cargo in them without increasing the axle load?
          Do you know that the KAMAZ vehicle is located on the territory of the Russian Federation by 80%?
          That we do not have the full volume of catalysts required for oil refining?
          Have you ever seen a Russian mobile phone?
          Do you know anything about generics for medicines? Does Dugin know?

          Don't pour it on me here.
          In reality, there are no countries in the world that would be self-sufficient, any country that disconnects from world trade will turn into North Korea in a couple of years, and then begin to fall even further, to the bottom, below North Korea.

          The fact that without involvement in world trade there can be no development was well understood even under the first Rurikovichs, remember "from the Varangians to the Greeks", "from the Varangians to the Persians"? How long has Russia fought for access to the sea to remind? Wars with the Turks, the capture of Azov, the Northern War ... have you ever heard? Do you think it was someone's whim?

          I don’t need to fill in fairy tales. And you yourself should be ashamed to believe in them at your age.
          1. Silhouette
            Silhouette 2 March 2021 15: 46
            0
            Don't confuse soft with warm. These are different concepts. Your pipes and solid-rolled sheets have nothing to do with the topic. Mendeleev knew about rubber no worse than yours. The resources of the colonies are not needed in order to supply precision bearings from there or to establish their production there. All the same, read clever books, you see what you will understand.
            1. timokhin-aa
              2 March 2021 16: 20
              0
              This you confuse warm with soft, namely the provision of the Russian Federation with basic minerals and self-sufficiency.

              And I do not need to poke smart books, people who are familiar with the topic, at least as I am, in the whole country there are several hundred people.
              And Dugin is not among them.
              1. Silhouette
                Silhouette 2 March 2021 19: 09
                0
                Your article "The Admiral, Who Did It All Work Out" about Gorshkov on "Vzglyad" got as many as 3 comments in 6 days. And everyone is mocking you. This is a failure, Karl!
                1. timokhin-aa
                  2 March 2021 19: 37
                  +1
                  There is no failure, the "Opinions" column on Vzglyad is traditionally poorly read, and naval issues are traditionally unpopular, in addition, I deeply parallel the opinion of "personalities" who, for some reason, prevail in the comments on "Vzglyad".
                  Against their background, even you are a titan of thought.
                  1. Silhouette
                    Silhouette 2 March 2021 19: 53
                    0
                    Sensible "opinions" on the "Look" are well discussed. And your example of previous materials on the Russian Navy is a confirmation of this. And with Gorshkov - a bobble came out. And rightly so. Don't create myths. I just do not want to argue over all the discrepancies, contradictions and fantasies that are contained in your material. There are a lot of them. In terms of volume, it will be about the same as the article. You believe the reports and documents of that period, but I know how they were written, how they were compiled and what their real price is. I know much more about what was not included in them and why.
        2. timokhin-aa
          1 March 2021 19: 20
          +2
          With the diameter of the pipe, I wrote in the last comment 1420 it was necessary, I did not break the button.
        3. The eye of the crying
          The eye of the crying 3 March 2021 00: 17
          0
          Quote: Silhouette
          Parshin "Why Russia is not America".


          Damn, well, does anyone still believe in these fairy tales.
          1. Mordvin 3
            Mordvin 3 3 March 2021 00: 37
            0
            Quote: Eye of the Crying
            Damn, well, does anyone still believe in these fairy tales.

            What's wrong?
          2. timokhin-aa
            3 March 2021 13: 08
            0
            In some ways he is right, I had to fight for tenders in the far abroad, and the fact that our costs for the production of industrial products are much higher than elsewhere in the world is a fact. I felt it very well.

            Those areas in which cold is more important than heat are just developing, the same liquefaction of LNG or the construction of data centers, but they alone cannot even raise the economy.

            Although this problem is not a verdict (here Parshev is wrong in the end), his hands will always be tied, and there will always be a strong influence on the development of the country and its trade, one must understand this.
            1. The eye of the crying
              The eye of the crying 4 March 2021 00: 18
              +1
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              it is a fact that our production costs of industrial products are much higher than elsewhere in the world.


              Not the fact that the cold climate is to blame for this.
              1. Liam
                Liam 4 March 2021 00: 33
                0
                Just don't tell the author that almost year-round air conditioning in factories in hot climates consumes much more energy and money than heating in cold climates. He may not survive this ...
                1. timokhin-aa
                  9 March 2021 22: 29
                  0
                  Have you ever been to a small factory somewhere in India? There are NO WALLS sometimes, only two perimeters made of chain-link netting, between which the guards walk with sticks and chase monkeys who are trying to climb everywhere.
                  Compare this to the cost of a cap. construction here.
                  What air conditioners, what are you talking about?
                  Get back to reality.
              2. timokhin-aa
                4 March 2021 16: 22
                0
                Heating cost, logistics.
  40. RoTTor
    RoTTor 1 March 2021 02: 15
    +1
    Not only did the "greatest commander" Zhukov put a kakaruznik on our necks TWICE, he "thanked" him, but also the Navy shit.

    Those marshals and generals who stayed at mykytka held on to their posts like a louse to a casing and were ready to "bring a theoretical basis" to any nonsense.

    One example: what was left in the MA?
    God forbid war, but fighter aviation was removed from the MA, the attack aircraft was destroyed altogether, the schools of naval aviation were liquidated - flight, navigational, engineering, technical ....
    \
    1. timokhin-aa
      1 March 2021 11: 52
      +1
      liquidated schools of naval aviation - flight, navigational, engineering, technical ....


      This was the most powerful blow. Really. The regiments can be restored, even the training system can be restored, but at the time of the liquidation of the schools, traditions were killed.
      But this is not recoverable.
  41. orcinus
    orcinus 1 March 2021 13: 57
    +2
    For me, as a person far from the navy, it was interesting to read the article. Then I read about Gorshkov's biography. In my opinion, the reason for the sharp backwardness of our fleet since the beginning of the 80s is the age of Gorshkov himself. Well, a person over the age of 70 cannot adequately offer constructiveness. He himself, when he became the head of the department at the age of 40, could, then age took its toll. As, in principle, all the Politburo.
  42. Dmitry_6
    Dmitry_6 1 March 2021 16: 23
    +1
    Thank you for the article, and those who comment on it reasonably.
    I did not serve in the navy, but as I understand it, today the role of "a pistol at the temple .." is a strategically strike-reconnaissance UAV with a corresponding constellation of communications satellites.
    1. agond
      agond 1 March 2021 18: 24
      +1
      In everything it is known in comparison, for example, in the USA it was (hereinafter wikipelia)
      Hyman George Rickover January 27, 1900 - July 8, 1986 - Four-star Admiral of the United States Navy. He is known as the “father of the nuclear fleet,” which as of July 2007 consisted of 200 nuclear submarines, 23 nuclear aircraft carriers and cruisers, although many of these ships are now decommissioned and others are under construction.
      His unique personality, political connections, responsibility, and deep knowledge made Rickover famous as the longest serving senior officer in American history.
      He served for 63 years. Rickover's significant legacy in nuclear technology has led to the unbeaten record of accident-free operation of reactors on US Navy ships in terms of the uncontrolled release of radioactive products associated with core damage.
      By the way, he was the son of a Jewish tailor who was born on the territory of the Russian Empire.
    2. timokhin-aa
      1 March 2021 18: 41
      +1
      There are no such UAVs yet, and by themselves they will not solve any problems.
      1. Dmitry_6
        Dmitry_6 2 March 2021 09: 23
        0
        I'm not arguing for the sake of it. It's just logical, to use strategic UAVs like the Global Hawk to track and issue the control center. They can hang over the AUG endlessly replacing each other, and it is not so easy to get away from them. The cost of one corvette is 300 million dollars. RQ-4 is sort of like the US has 150. Naturally, this applies only to the task of tracking, and does not negate the need for a series of ships. IMHO.
        1. timokhin-aa
          2 March 2021 14: 27
          0
          It is logical, but this is a means of peacetime, in war they will be shot down
      2. Dmitry_6
        Dmitry_6 2 March 2021 09: 28
        0
        It is probably necessary to add that to the strike-reconnaissance UAVs it is necessary to revive the strike naval aviation and probably transfer it to the command of the Navy. Well, it is desirable that all this not to the detriment of the ships, which in this case can be moved away from the AUG to the border of the missile launch range at the control center from the UAV.
  43. Vladimir Mitin_2
    Vladimir Mitin_2 1 March 2021 20: 25
    0
    The article is useful, but the author has not said a lot - he feels it, wants it, but cannot. My thoughts coincide with the opinion that the industry now rules, and not vice versa, and it rules for its own income, inevitably there is an opinion about the merging of the command of the Navy with the command of manufacturers.
  44. RoTTor
    RoTTor 2 March 2021 02: 03
    0
    The fact that S. Gorshkov was at the head of the Navy for so many years and had the opportunity to make for the fleet more than all the commanders-in-chief not only of the Navy, but also of all types of the Armed Forces, is the merit of L.I.Brezhnev, with whom they were well familiar since the Great Patriotic War. ... Ilyich especially trusted those whom he knew personally from the war, and especially trusted Gorshkov and Grechko, the best post-war Defense Ministry.
    1. agond
      agond 2 March 2021 23: 22
      0
      I readily believe that Gorshkov was a patriot, but joy for the homeland is too little, as the people say, the admiral, in addition to the administrative talent, must also have the talent of an engineer, for example, Peter 1 himself participated in the construction of ships and in construction in general, that is, he did not took on faith everything that his entourage told him, and Makarov was an engineer and what kind of engineer he was Gorshkov is an open question, by the way, he was involved not only in the idea of ​​building nuclear submarines of inconceivable size, but also in aircraft carrying ships with the Yak-38, in the sense a normal t specialist should not have allowed the adoption of a VTOL aircraft with three engines !!! , I think someone else in his place might have refrained from such "utopian" projects
  45. Lirik R
    Lirik R 13 March 2021 13: 41
    0
    And also Gorshkov is a ZGRLS in the Navy
  46. Exval
    Exval 26 March 2021 08: 26
    0
    In my opinion, the figure of Gorshkov in this article is overblown, in accordance with the official myth about him. And, on the contrary: Khrushchev is completely unreasonably charged with the responsibility for disrupting Operation Anadyr. It would be possible to discuss this in more detail with the author, if there is a desire on his part.
  47. severok1979
    severok1979 26 March 2021 17: 21
    0
    I read the comments here and again they pulled out the pop myth about the bad Khrushch, who almost destroyed the Soviet dream fleet. For those singing from someone else's voice, let me remind you that I received the Navy at Khrushchev (including for a series of ships and submarines, begun by design and construction at Khrushchev, but completed in 1965-68):

    1. In the period 1956-1968. the Navy included 188 submarines, of which 56 are nuclear-powered. Nuclear submarines, which entered service in 1958-1963, made up the first generation of the nuclear submarine fleet, among them: submarines with ballistic missiles, project 658 (8 units), submarines with missile launchers, project 659 (5 units), project 675 ( 29 units), torpedo planes pr. 627 (1), 627A (12), 645 (1). However, diesel submarines remained the main part of the submarine fleet. During this time, 132 units were built, including 611 units with ballistic missiles pr. 629AV, 629, 29B, cruise missiles - 30 pl, and torpedo pr. 641 and 633-73 units.

    2. During 1956-1966. surface ships with missile weapons were built 26 units: 4 - project 56E, 8 - project 57 bis, armed with KSSH missiles; 4 - Project 58, armed with P-35 missiles and Volna missiles; 10 - pr. 61, with the "Volna" missile defense system. Construction of Project 1134 missile cruisers with P-35 cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear ammunition has begun

    3. In the mid-50s, due to the increase in the underwater speed of not only nuclear, but also diesel-electric submarines, the serially built patrol ships of project 50 and submarine hunters of project 122 bis became obsolete. During 1960-1968. built 64 ships of the project 204, 19 ships of the project 159 and 18 ships of the project 35, that is, a total of 101 new anti-submarine ships with new sonar stations, jet bomb throwers and anti-submarine torpedoes, as well as a new power plant.

    4. During 1956-1966. 220 missile boats of projects 183R, 205, 205U were built with P-15 missiles and 140 large torpedo boats pr. 183 and 81 pr. 206 (with a steel hull).

    In 1956-1966. 207 anti-mine ships were built, including 87 base, 69 raid, 41 boat minesweeper and 10 trawl barges.

    5. During 1956-1966. Russian factories handed over to the Navy 6 medium landing ships of project 188, 6 small ships of project 189 and about 100 landing boats. In 1963-1967. in Poland, 32 medium landing ships of the project 770D, 770T and 770MA were built.

    Plus, instead of obsolete torpedo bombers, in 1960, the Tu-16k-10 missile system was adopted, with a K-10 missile designed to destroy large surface ships with a displacement of 10 tons or more, with a launch distance of up to 000 km. In 300, the Tu-1962k missile system was put into service with the KSR-16 missile, designed to destroy destroyer and frigate-class ships, with a range of 2-100 km.

    In 1963, on the basis of the KSR-2 rocket, the KSR-11 rocket was created, equipped with homing equipment for an operating radar.

    In addition, under Khrushche, they continued without any obstacles in 1955-57. completion of 27 em. pr. 56, also 68 skr pr. 50 in 1954-1959, completed by 1958 215 medium-sized submarines pr. 613 and 26 large submarines pr. 611. In addition, at Khrushche, by 1959 completed a series of 29 extremely unsuccessful pl. Project 615A with a single engine for underwater and surface passage. - all according to the book "The Battle for the World Ocean in the Cold" and Future Wars "by Captain Ivan Matveyevich.

    So in the end, what did Khrushchev destroy in the fleet? He made the right decision to stop the ridiculous completion of 7 obsolete CRLs. pr. 68bis, as well as to stop the design and completion of obsolete types: battleship pr. 24, heavy cruiser pr. 82 and "medium" cruiser pr. 66. The main artillery caliber of these large ships was respectively planned 406-mm, 305-mm and 220-mm - in the realities of the mid-1950s, no more than expensive floating coffins for crews. For comparison, in 1960 the US surface forces included: battleships - 9, strike (multipurpose) aircraft carriers - 24, anti-submarine aircraft carriers - 19, cruisers - 58; destroyers, frigates, patrol ships - 1059, landing helicopter carriers - 6, tank landing ships - 134.

    Those. head-on competition according to the "catch up and overtake" scheme was beyond our strength, the chance to achieve parity was given to us by an asymmetric answer in the form of saturation of the fleet with carriers of nuclear missile weapons and the introduction of atomic propulsion systems. Khrushch was the first to understand this perfectly, and our admirals, even on maneuvers in the mid-1950s, tried to surprise him with dashing torpedo attacks from destroyers in the style of the middle of World War II!
  48. Exval
    Exval 26 March 2021 18: 14
    0
    Quote: severok1979
    Khrushch was the first to understand this perfectly, and our admirals, even on maneuvers in the mid-1950s, tried to surprise him with dashing torpedo attacks from destroyers in the style of the middle of World War II!

    Quite right. In addition, the admirals managed to mislead their Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the true capabilities of the fleet on the eve of Operation Anadyr, as a result of which the USSR suffered a serious defeat during the Cuban missile crisis.
    1. agond
      agond 30 March 2021 17: 55
      0
      Quote: Exval
      1. In the period 1956-1968. the Navy included 188 submarines, of which 56 are nuclear-powered. ... During this time, 132 units were built, including 611 units with ballistic missiles pr. 629AV, 629, 29B, cruise missiles - 30 pl, and torpedo pr. 641 and 633-73 units.

      However, interesting data, it turns out 60 years ago it was possible to build two dozen diesel boats a year, but it is interesting to build the same projects on modern equipment just as quickly and also inexpensively then in the sixties.?
  49. Dimon19661
    Dimon19661 31 March 2021 11: 32
    0
    Nonsense ... there is nothing more to say.
  50. VladVol
    VladVol April 8 2021 14: 20
    +1
    The fleet is a very expensive business (namely a business that gives great advantages to its country)
    And only a predictably self-sufficient country, in economic terms, can contain it.
    You can, having taken off your last pants, build a fleet, but if there is no money for its maintenance, everything will end with the sale of ships as scrap metal and shame, in half with memories of supposed power.